Contingencies

Barbara H errnstein Sm ith
Contingencies of Value
Contingentes of Value
Alternative Perspectives
for Critical Theory
Barbara Herrnstein Smith
Harvard University Press

Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England
Copyright © 1988 by the President and Feliows
of Harvard College
Ail rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
First Harvard University Press paperback édition, 1991
Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Smith, Barbara Herrnstein.

Contingencies of value.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Literature—History and criticism.
2. Value. 3. Aesthetics. 1. Tille.
PN45.S4794 1988 809 88-887
ISBN 0-674-16785-6 (alk. paper) (cloth)
ISBN 0-674-16786-4 (pbk.)
For Alex
Acknowledgments
For their important contributions to the shaping and sharpening of the

ideas in this study, I am grateful to the students who participated in the
seminars on Value and Evaluation at the University of Pennsylvania,
1976-85. My thanks also to Thomas D. Cohen, Morse Peckham, and
Arkady Plotnitsky for especially productive exchanges relating to these
questions over the course of several years. The manuscript benefited
from attentive readings of individual chapters by John Fekete, Stephen
Jones, Robert A. Pollak, and Lindsay Waters, and from spécifie tips and
encouragements—and/or significant résistances—offered by William
Connolly, Clifford Geertz, Thomas A. Green, Joseph Gusfield, Albert O.
Hirschman, Joanna Kirkpatrick, Sanford Levinson, Andrew Pickering,
Joan Scott, Richard Shweder, Michael Walzer, David Wiggins, and
Brackette Williams. Mark Lytal's assistance in the final stages of its
préparation was expert and invaluable.
I thank the Guggenheim Foundation, the Luce Foundation, the Na
tional Endowment for the Humanities, the Rockefeller Foundation, and
the University of Pennsylvania for grants, awards, and leaves that sup-
ported the pursuit of this project. I had the good fortune of being able to
complété it under the génial conditions provided by the Center for Ad
vanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 1985-86, and the Institute for
Advanced Study, 1986-87.
An earlier version of Chapter 1 appeared in Poetics Today 1, nos. 1-2

(© New World Perspectives, 1979); the article originally published as
"Contingencies of Value," Critical Inquiry 10, no. 1 (© University of
Chicago Press, 1983), is incorporated here—with révisions, additions,
Acknowledgments
and updated référencés—as Chapters 2 and 3; a portion of Chapter 5

was previously printed in Life after Postmodemism: Essays on Value and
Culture, edited and introduced by John Fekete (New York: © St. Mar-
tin's Press, 1987). Permission to use these materials is gratefully ac-
knowledged.
Contents
1 Fixed Marks and Variable Constancies:

A Parable of Value 1
Evaluating Shakespeare's Sonnets 1
Critical Problematics 9
2 The Exile of Evaluation 17

Fact and Value in the Literary Academy 17
The Politics of Evaluative Criticism 24
An Alternative Project 28
3 Contingencies of Value 30
Contingency and Interdependence 30
Matters of Taste 36
Processes of Evaluation 42
The Dynamics of Endurance 47
4 Axiologic Logic 54
Hume's Natural Standard 55
Kant's Pure Judgments 64
Logical Tastes and The Other's Poison 72
Three Postaxiological Postscripts n
Contents
5 Truth/Value 85
Judgment Typology and Maclntyre's Fall 85
Value without Truth-Value 94
Changing Places: Truth, Error, and Deconstruction 116
6 The Critiques of Utility 125

Humanism, Anti-Utilitarianism, and the Double Discourse
of Value 125
Bataille's Expenditure 134
Endless (Ex)Change 144
7 Matters of Conséquence 150
Critiques and Charges: The Objectivist Génération of "Relativism" 150

Quietism and the Active Relativist 156
Community, Solidarity, and the Pragmatist's Dilemma 166
Politics and Justification 173
Conceptual Tastes and Practical Conséquences 180
Notes 187
Index 223
1
Fixed Marks and Variable Constancies:

A Parable of Value
Evaluating Shakespeare's Sonnets

My text is a passage from the first scene of King Lear. The kings of
Burgundy and France, for some time rivais in the courtship of Cordelia,
are confronted by her abrupt disinheritance. Burgundy, with embar-
rassed politeness, will décliné the offer of her now dowerless hand. The
king of France (a better man) will seize it nonetheless, observing:
Love's not love
When it is mingled with regards that stand
Aloof from the entire point. . .
My topic is évaluation: and what I shall suggest here is that it is not like
love—or at least not like love so conceived. For évaluation is, I think,
always mingled with regards that stand aloof from the entire point:
always compromised, impure, contingent; altering when it alteration
finds; bending with the remover to remove; always Time's fool.
Our title here is tricky: "Evaluating Shakespeare's Sonnets."1 No
agent: who’s doing the evaluating? No tense: evaluating when? But its
form is perhaps proper enough: the agents are innumerable and
unspecifiable; the activity is continuous and ongoing; the evaluating of
Shakespeare's sonnets has had a past and will hâve a future. Ail the
evaluatings hâve been contingent, and ail of them will be—which is, I
think, as it must and should be. I'il begin by looking at the past.
The sonnets hâve been the subject of évaluation for more than three
and a half centuries and, as such, hâve exhibited a very mixed, variable,
and compromised history. The first evaluatings of them were performed
1
Fixed Marks and Variable Consîancies
by the poet, in letting them stand: not merely in his not ripping them up,
but in the thousand individual acts of approval that the whole complex
act of poetic création must hâve entailed: each word and line that was
not rejected, that was preferred to another, and thus pronounced good—
or good enough.
It has been noted that the sonnets themselves exhibit considérable
self-evaluation and -dévaluation: the topos of modesty—"my pupil
p en /' “my slight Muse," “these poor rude Unes"—coexists with large
daims of poetic value: such virtue hath his pen, so powerful is his
rhyme, that eyes not yet created shall o'er read his lines and, through
them Death, to him subscribe. Here we might also note that the poet
himself assumes and asks for biased readers, readers who will value the
poems, he says, "for their love, not their style"; for the poems are sent,
he says, "to witness duty, not to show [his] wit"—not as literary
achievements, but for what they reflect of his personal feelings. But, we
may observe, the feelings that they do reflect are not always the sorts of
things the biased and implicated reader might wish to know or want to
hear: vows of irrational adoration, betrayals of naked resentment, bully-
ing pleas and blackmailing apologies. We do not know how the sonnets
were valued and evaluated by their immédiate readers—those thou's to
whom they were addressed and into whose hands they may hâve been
delivered—though it is an interesting exercise for the modem reader to
imagine what it might hâve felt like to receive such embassages as these:
Being your slave, what should I do but tend
Upon the hours and times of your desire? . . .
Farewell, thou art too dear for my possessing,
And like enough thou know'st thy estimate . . .
Yet fear her, O thou minion of her pleasure!
She may detain, but not still keep her treasure . . .
For I hâve swom thee fair, and thought thee bright,
Who art as black as Hell, as dark as night.
What could the value of the sonnets hâve been for those original
readers? Certainly impure, certainly mingled with regards that stood
aloof from the entire point, certainly variable: very different, we might
imagine, when the poems were received in the midst of a love affair
from when perused or disposed of years later—when ail the lovers were
old, and love had long been cold.
But such évaluations are presumably not part of literary history. As
2
Fixed Marks and Variable Constancies
"works of literature," the sonnets must be judged insofar as they appeal

to their real readers, whom they continue to greet over the shoulders of
those thou’s to whom they were once addressed. So we move from
surmising the vagaries of their private, personal value to the record of
their public value and evaluating. But, before we corne to their "réputa
tion"—or what Hyder Rollins, in the Variorium édition of the sonnets,
calls their "vogue"—we should acknowledge an intermediary history of
valuings, also variable, also contingent, and notoriously compromised:
for example, the simple fact that they were found to be, for whatever
motives, ah! publishable; worth the printing and presumably, for some
purchasers, worth the price; and even, as the thirteen surviving copies
of the Quarto attest, for some reasons worth the keeping. Each of these
acts—publishing, printing, purchasing, and preserving—is an implicit
act of évaluation, though we may think it necessary to distinguish them,
with their mixed motives, from real literary évaluation, the assessment
of intrinsic worth.
The question then becomes whether, and to what extern, the sonnets
were found worth the reading by their original public audience. We
cannot be sure, of course, but, as with any body of poetry, that too must
hâve been a variable matter: for example, the sonnets, individually and
as a group, would not hâve been valued quite the same way by fellow
poets as by such readers as might pick them up to pass the time of day.
As we know, there is reason to believe that the Quarto édition was
suppressed—possibly by the poet, possibly by others. If so, either way,
the suppression was another act of both valuing and devaluing the
sonnets: an implicit witness to their having been found, though perhaps
good for something, still not good for something else. Value is impure;
évaluation is contingent.
And so it goes. Thirty years later, they were found at least worth the
pirating and republishing. Thereafter, especially with Malone's édition
in 1780, we can begin to trace the fortunes of the sonnets in the hands of
the literary establishment—the editors and anthologists, the critics and
scholars, the professors and students of Eng. Lit., down to our own time
and this very moment—and, with less assurance, their fortunes in the
hands of those myriad inarticulate nonprofessionals for whom, during
more than 350 years, the sonnets hâve figured in some way: the "read
ing public," those who, for whatever reasons, hâve treasured or dis-
missed them, bought them as gifts for friends, read them aloud to lovers,
quoted them in letters, or tossed them out when cleaning up the attic.
I shall not chronicle in any detail those fortunes—which, as we
3
know, hâve been extraordinarily variable and, until fairly recently, fairiy
dismal. We might recall, however, that the sonnets hâve been character-
ized, by men of éducation and discrimination, as inept, obscure, af-
fected, filled with “labored perplexities and studied deformities," writ-
ten in a verse form "incompatible with the English language," a form
given to "drivelling incoherencies and puling, petrifying ravings." We
might recall especially Henry Hallam's remarking of the sonnets that "it
is impossible not to wish that Shakespeare had not written them" and
that his assessment or distress was shared, at some point in their lives,
with some variations, by Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Hazlitt.
Wish Shakespeare had not written them? Lord, man (we may wish to
shout back into that abysm of time), did you really read them? Well,
presumably Hallam did read them, as did Dr. Johnson, Coleridge,
Wordsworth, Hazlitt, and Byron (from each of whom I hâve been quot-
ing here): but whether any of them read the same poems we are reading
is another question. Value alters when it alteration finds. The texts were
the same, but it seems clear that, in some sense, the poems weren't. How
else can we account for the—to us, astonishing and perverse—
évaluations of them by our eighteenth- and nineteenth-century col-
leagues? or those of John Crowe Ransom and Yvor Winters, in an âge
not so remote from ours? The taste of the times? Congénital rigidities of
mind? Cultivated frigidities of spirit? To be sure; but in so accounting for
them, we cannot thereby discount them. Those évaluations were not
facile, ill-considered, or perfunctory; they were, we sense, straight from
the heart and head; we can still feel Coleridge's shudder and
Wordsworth's disdain and Hallam's embarrassed exaspération. Their
disgust was as true as anything—except, perhaps, true love.
Well, where are we now?—and who are we, anyway? We and our
absent counterparts—scholars, teachers, critics, and students of the son
nets: it is clear that we are not quite the reading public, those who now
encounter the sonnets in anthologies of "great poetry'' or who purchase
them in cheap éditions with omate typefaces (but no footnotes) or in
expensive éditions with goldleaf borders (but still no footnotes) and
among whom, we know, many of the sonnets are popular . . . but
probably the "wrong" ones—or the right ones, but probably "for the
wrong reasons."
Granted we are not them, it may still be asked where we fit in this long
fitfiil history of the sonnets' évaluations. Can it be that we fit at the end
of it?—that now, here, with our authoritative and annotated texts in our
hands and, in our heads, the sonnets not only of Petrarch and Sidney
4
but also of Keats, Millay, and Berryman, we, untrammeled by historical

ignorance, intellectual provincialism, or personal eccentricity, are the
ones who can finally provide a just assessment of the sonnets' true
value—as literature? Or would we not, rather, be Time's fools—or fools
of some sort—to think or claim so?
By way of answer, I should like to give an account of another history
of the sonnets' value and evaluating: that is, my own, a history that also
culminâtes here, at this time, and culminâtes with my solemn and sin
cère déclaration that I cannot evaluate Shakespeare's sonnets—which is
not to say that I believe the sonnets cannot or should not be evaluated.
On the contrary, I believe that they should be, must be, and, in fact, are
and will be evaluated, continuously, repeatedly, privately, and publicly,
by us and by them and by ail who follow. My own incapacity in this
regard happens to be a somewhat spécial case, but I think it is an
instructive one for the question at issue.
I cannot evaluate Shakespeare's sonnets partly because I know them
too well. It may be thought that one's ability to deliver a just assessment
of an artwork is enlarged by expérience: we look to the expert, the
connoisseur, the man or woman of knowledge—deep knowledge of the
thing itself, and broad knowledge of the kind of thing it is and of others
of its kind. But éxperience not only deepens and broadens us: it also
batters, scars, individualizes, and specializes us; expérience is a provin
cialism of its own, separating us from our fellow créatures. To evaluate a
work of art is, among other things, to estimate its potential value for
others; but while our ability to make that estimation correctly certainly
increases in time with ail our general and spécifie knowledge, it also
decreases in time as we become less and less like anyone else, and thus
less able to predict anyone else's responses on the basis of our own.
But that is not the only or even the basic reason why I cannot evalu
ate Shakespeare's sonnets. The basic reason is that I am too conscious of
how radically variable and contingent their value has been, and re
mains, for me. I shall not give you a narrative of the history of my own
engagement with the poems: a history that spans thirty-five years, dur-
ing fifteen of which I professed them almost without interruption,
sometimes every term, and during two years of which I prepared an
édition of them. There is no other work or body of literature that I know
so well—though there are no doubt other people who know it better;
but the sonnets are so strung through my life, and my life has been so
strung through them, that there hâve been times when I believed I had
written them myself. I shall not give you a narrative account of their
5
value for me because the point will be made sufficiently if I indicate its
range. And that range is “savage, extreme, rude, cruel," and "not to
trust”—which suggests, by the way, that if poetic value is not like true
love, it may be a little bit like true lust.
In any case, it would be only slight hyperbole to say that there is not
one of Shakespeare's sonnets that has not, at some time, been the occa
sion of the finest and most intense kind of literary expérience of which I
am capable; and there is also not one among them that has not, at some
time, struck me as being awkward, strained, silly, inert, or dead. Some
of the sonnets that are now (i.e., this week or the day before yesterday)
my favorites, I once (i.e., last week or ten years ago) thought of as
obscure, grotesque, or raw; and some that I once saw as transparent,
superfîcial, or perfunctory hâve subsequently become, for me, thick
with meaning, subtle, and profound. But I hâve, in the very process of
demonstrating to a class or friend the subtlety and profundity of a son
net, been struck in the midst of my own words by how limp and thin it
was, or hâve seen its power suddenly collapse upon the page into bathos
or barbarism. A sonnet that I had never assigned to a class and dis-
dained to comment upon will, during a half-casual rereading, suddenly
leap from the page and startle me into awe and récognition—often
because, since last reading it, I hâve lived the poem, lived something like
its occasion or something like its motive. Most appalling, there are
sonnets that I allude to in class or conversation, only to find that they
hâve disappeared, truly are not there, and others that I had not "forgot-
ten" but which, at some reading, I realize were never there before.
I hâve said nothing here of the form, style, logic, figurative language,
or structure of the poems. I can't see them anymore and couldn't, today,
"analyze" a Shakespeare sonnet if my life depended on it; ail such
matters hâve, for me, been absorbed or reabsorbed into the art of the
whole and my expérience of it. And, amusingly enough for a card-
carrying anti-intentionalist, I now find myself, both in class and in my
private musings on the poems, drawn more and more into thinking
about the man himself, wondering what he really felt, and speculating
about what really happened: What the devil were that unappreciative
young man and obsessing mistress really like? and what were they ail
really doing with and to each other?
Sonnet 116 will serve as well as any other to make this a bit more
concrète. For a long time, I didn’t much like it at ail. As a discriminating
young snob, I was predisposed to find the value of any poem inversely
proportional to the frequency of its appearance in anthologies. More-
6
over, I had heard this one read too often at the wedding ceremonies of
friends. It became an embarrassment just to glance at its opening lines,
an agony to recall the couplet. And, to cap it, a professor whose opinions
I valued very highly had once demonstrated in class, with great wit and
dash, that the sentiments of 116 were as inane as its logic was feeble and
its imagery vague.
So it stood until several years ago, when I was immersed in teach-
ing the plays, editing the poems and rereading the critics, and immersed
also in my own life and a second marriage—of true minds, of course, or
maybe . . . or maybe not. And, at that point, I discovered an altogether
different 116. It was not, as I had previously thought, the expression of
the poet as Polonius, intoning sentimental sententiae on the virtue of
remote virtues but, rather, the poet as Troilus or Hamlet or Lear, in a
fury of despair, attempting to sustain the existence, by sheer assertion, of
something which everything in his own expérience denied. So (I might
hâve said then), to be sure, the arguments are frail and the sentiments
false and strained: but this is nonetheless a powerful sonnet because,
among other things, that very frailty and strain and falseness are expres
sive of what is strong and true, namely the impulse not to know, not to
acknowledge, not to "admit" what one does know and would wish to
be otherwise.
A lovely reading of the poem, I think . . . when I believe it. And it
does hâve the virtue of rescuing, for me, the value of one sonnet: which
is to say, of letting me hâve, as something good, what would otherwise
be something bad—which, in the total economy of the universe, must
be reckoned as a profit. But, as for evaluating the sonnet: that I cannot
do. Not only does its value, for me, dépend upon which of two mutually
incompatible interprétations I give it (and I still can give it either) but
I'm also aware of the fact that I sometimes enjoy it even when I’m giving
it the weak interprétation, and sometimes enjoy éléments of it when I'm
barely giving it any interprétation at ail. For example, it's sometimes
nice just to expérience again the semi-abstract symmetries of its syntax
and sound patterns, those boldly balanced mouth-filling clauses: Love is
not love / Which alters when it alteration finds / Or bends with the remover to
remove . . . a pleasure to say. Or again, like Professor Booth, I sometimes
enjoy "bombast," and can take pleasure in the sheer excesses of the
poem, as such.2 Experienced against a daily background of scrupulously
qualified professional précision, in which one has heard one's col-
leagues or oneself saying, often enough, things like: "Well, it seems to
me that, in a sense, it might be possible, under certain circumstances, for
7
some forms of what is commonly referred to as 'love' to hâve a relatively

lengthy duration. . . it's really nice to hear a good, strong, unqualified
absolute or two:
O no, it is an ever fixèd mark
That looks on tempests and is never shaken . . .
Love alters not. . .
But bears it out even to the edge of doom.
It's just an element of the poem, but it's there among the others; and
sometimes it just hits the spot. But, of course, nothing hits the spot ail
the time, because the spot is always different.
Now, before I draw the moral that justifies my imposing on you this
autobiographical excursion, I should grant the possibility that I am un-
usually, atypically, even pathologically, unstable in my responses. But I
don't want to grant it, and don't really believe it. To be sure, the spec-
trum of value I've outlined here is mightily "acquainted with shifting
change" ("as is false women's fashion," saith the poet); I would main-
tain, however, that its ranges and extremes are not atypical but, on the
contrary, precisely représentative. What is peculiar in my relation to the
sonnets is not a matter of my tempérament but of my profession, one
conséquence of which is that I hâve had both the reason and the occa
sion to read and deal with the same work of literature many times over,
in many moods, in many circumstances, over a long span of years—
during which time many things (or a sufficient number of them) hâve
happened to me. Aside from professors, poets, and other spécial types
(such as actors and directors), most people, taken one by one, simply do
not expérience literary works that way; and even professors and poets,
because they are mortal, can't expérience a great many of them that
way.
But out of this peculiarity emerges a kind of universality: for what I
hâve been describing here, a bit melodramatically perhaps, would, I
think, be the shape of the expérience of anyone who had the reason and
occasion to do the same. Moreover, and more pertinently, I think it is
also the shape of the entire culture's expérience of the sonnets' value,
over the entire history of their existence: past, présent, and future. In
other words, I should like to claim that the two historiés I hâve briefly
chronicled here are mirrors and containers of each other: that while the
history of the sonnets' value must include, as one brief chapter, the
history of their value for me, my personal history is also a picture and
parable of the total history of the sonnets' value for ail their readers, ever.
8
Fixed Marks and Variable Constandes
This monstrous piece of immodesty, however, amounts to saying no

more than I said at the beginning. Evaluation is always compromised
because value is always in motion: a never-fixèd mark, whose worth's
unknown although his height be taken: "unknown" not because, like
true love, it is beyond mortal cognition, but because it is constantly
variable and etemally indeterminate.
Critical Problematics
The foregoing discussion was designed, it should be clear, not to raise
doubts about my colleagues' powers of discemment but rather to sug-
gest that at least as problematic as the true value of Shakespeare's son
nets are the very concepts of literary value and évaluation. To begin to
appreciate the nature and complexity of these problems, we may retum
briefly to what I referred to as "the reading public" or, more broadly, as
ail those outside the academy "for whom the sonnets hâve figured in
some way" but the record of whose valuations are not preserved in the
armais of literary history. Of course, if we were to chronicle in eamest
the total history of the sonnets' value, we should hâve to add to this
group ail those for whom the sonnets hâve not figured at ail: children
and illiterates, for example, plus ail those who do not know English,
those who do know and read English but hâve never even heard of the
sonnets, those who hâve only "heard o f ' them—that is, who know the
poems exist but hâve little idea of what they are like—and so forth. My
concem here is not only with the well-known social parochialism of
academie critics but also with the more fundamental question of what
any literary assessment is, in fact, an assessment of: not only who does
the computing but who and what, implicitly or explicitly, get "taken
into account" in the computations and, as a corollary question, the
nature of the assumptions presupposed by évaluative statements. For, as
I shall suggest later, such statements are neither empty nor idle; on the
contrary, they are much richer and perform much more significant so
cial, cultural, and political functions than is commonly supposed.
A related point was implied in my allusion to anthologies: for ex
ample, to my own youthful disdain of them. That had been, of course,
perverse as well as snobbish of me; there had also been a measure of
self-delusion in it, for no one's literary tastes can be formed, sustained,
or exercised independently—or, as it might be said, "free of extemal
influence." The problem for the theory of literary value, then, is how
9
they are formed, sustained, and exercised; and anthologies themselves

may be taken as a metaphor for the operation of various social détermi
nants of literary value. The recommendation of value represented by the
repeated inclusion of a particular work in anthologies of "great poetry"
not only promûtes but goes some distance toward creating the value of
that work, as does its repeated appearance on reading lists or its frequent
citation or quotation by professors, scholars, critics, poets, and other
elders of the tribe; for ail these acts hâve the effect of drawing the work
into the orbit of attention of potential readers and, by making the work
more likely to be experienced at ail, they make it more likely to be
experienced as "valuable." In this sense, value créâtes value. We may
think here of the young woman who dwelt among untrodden ways, a
maid (or violet, or poem) whom there were none to praise and very few
to love: unknown, unseen, therefore unpraised, therefore without
value—unless or until discovered, known, and praised by someone; and
then “Oh, the différence to me," and the possibility of the différence to
others.
One of the most tangled problems touched upon above is the relation
of value to meaning or of évaluation to interprétation. For example, I
spoke of sonnets that appear and disappear for me by virtue of interpré
tations of them that suddenly become possible or that were once possi
ble but are no longer so. What I meant to suggest was that comparable
appearances and disappearances occur throughout literary history, not
only with respect to other individual readers and works but with respect
to entire communities of readers and sometimes entire styles, modes,
and genres of literature. For, in accord with the changing interests and
other values of a community, various potential meanings of a work will
become more or less visible (or "realizable"), and the visibility—and
hence value—of the work for that community will change accordingly.
The problem here can be seen as the interlooping of two circles, the
hermeneutic and the évaluative. Our interprétation of a work and our
expérience of its value are mutually dépendent, and each dépends upon
what might be called the psychological "set" of our encounter with it:
not the "setting" of the work or, in the narrow sense, its context, but
rather the nature and potency of our own assumptions, expectations,
capacities, and interests with respect to it—our “préjudices" if you like,
but hardly to be distinguished from our identity (or who, in fact, we are)
at the time of the encounter. Moreover, ail three—the interprétation,
the évaluation, and the "set"—operate and internet in the same fashion
10
Fixed Marks and Variable Constandes
as the hermeneutic circle itself: that is, simultaneously causing and

validating themselves and causing and validating each other. While
these circles are no doubt logically vicious or at least epistemologically
compromising, they are also, I believe, both psychologically inévitable
and experientially benign. Undue distress at their philosophical status
coupled with a failure to appreciate their inevitability will produce mis-
guided and futile attempts to escape from them, as reflected in the
familiar searches for "true" or objective value and for uniquely "cor
rect” interprétations or determinate meanings. There is, however, no
way out of these circles for the individual reader: only the récognition of
their existence and, of course, the pleasure and interest of the particular
expériences they yield—and, for the theorist, the possibility of describing
and explaining the dynamics of their interrelation. Which brings me to
the heart and true moral of my parable.
One of the central concepts introduced above was "contingency,"
and one of the central propositions that both chronicles were meant to
exemplify was that literary value is radically relative and therefore "con-
stantly variable." What I should like to emphasize now is, first, that
none of the terms here—"contingent," "relative," or "variable"—is
équivalent to "subjective," and, second, that my intention was—and
is—not to close the doors to inquiry but rather to open them. In aes-
thetic axiology, the invocation of the terni "subjective" has traditionally
yielded two dead-end conclusions: either De gustibus non disputandum
est, which (at least under one understanding of the proverb, itself a
matter of dispute) explicitly closes the doors to inquiry, or—less despon
dent and more energetic but still, I think, misguided—the conviction
that there exists and that we must seek to uncover a converse to "subjec
tive value," namely "objective value." To suggest that the concept of
objective value is vacuous is not, however, to be left with the presumed
vagaries of individual taste. The botanist who observed that the growth
rate of the plant he was studying varied under different conditions
would not murmur De gustibus and end his research at that point but, on
the contrary, begin it. If we recognize that literary value is "relative" in
the sense of contingent (that is, a changing function of multiple variables)
rather than subjective (that is, personally whimsical, locked into the con-
sciousness of individual subjects and/or without interest or value for
other people), then we may begin to investigate the dynamics of that
relativity. Such an investigation would, I believe, reveal that the vari
ables in question are limited and regular—that is, that they occur within
11
ranges and that they exhibit patterns and principles—and that in that
sense, but only in that sense, we may speak of "constancies" of literary
value.
I shall retum below to the nature of these constancies. They will be
better appreciated, however, if we give some attention first to the prob-
lem of literary évaluation, what Northrop Frye, in a mémorable and
influential piece of counteraxiology, referred to as "ail those ditherings,
vacillatings and reactings that constitute the history of taste": a history,
Frye remarked (quite erroneously, I think), in which "there are no
facts," and which, he concluded (precipitously and also, I think, illogi-
cally), must be firmly ejected from "the systematic and progressive study
of literature."3
As I hâve already suggested, "évaluation" is a concept that could
embrace a wide range of forms of behavior, not ail of them overt and
certainly not ail of them verbal. (Thus, the poet Crossing out a line or
tossing out a poem is engaged in acts of évaluation, as is the fellow who
publishes a volume of the poems and the one who buys a copy of it as a
graduation présent for his daughter.) Once the range is granted, we may
also acknowledge that there are certain forms of évaluation that are, for
certain purposes, of particular interest, namely those acts that are overt
and verbal: that is, explicit statements of value, the sort of act we per-
form when, provoked by some occasion, we say, "It's the greatest lyric
in English," or "What a godawful movie," or "It's even better than his
first novel."
Now, traditional value-theory offers a number of competing notions
of what we are doing when we make such statements: for example, that
we are essentially doing nothing at ail, or at least nothing that is philo-
sophically respectable—just giving public vent to private preferences or
engaging in what Frye calls "literary chit-chat" and "leisure-class gos-
sip." Or, it has been suggested that we are essentially trying to push
people around, telling them what they should do or how they should feel
when they do it. Or, of course, it has been maintained that, at their
best—when delivered by duly qualified persons and supported by duly
organized reasons of the proper sort, or when delivered in the form of
fine-grained descriptions, thorough analyses, and sufficiently subtle ex
plications—such judgments are philosophically respectable and cogni-
tively substantial statements: not merely the expressions of personal
preferences or directives to other people but, indeed, valid assessments
or démonstrations of the value of literary works. I shall not take the time
here to explain why I think each of these notions is faulty or inadéquate.
12
though it should be noted that there is no reason to suppose that ail

évaluative statements conform to a single logical or functional type. I
also shall not pause here to classify further or to identify by their tradi-
tional names the various positions alluded to above—though auto-
taxonomy appears to be a préoccupation of axiology.4 I should, how-
ever, like to outline an alternative conception of literary évaluation, one
that is in accord with the view of literary value as variable and contin
gent but that also recognizes the considérable social force and significant
social functions of ail forms of évaluative behavior.
I would suggest, then, that what we may be doing—and, I think,
often are doing—when we make an explicit value judgment of a literary
work is (a) articulating an estimate of how well that work will serve
certain implicitly defined functions (b) for a spécifie implicidy defined
audience, (c) who are conceived of as experiencing the work under
certain implicitly defined conditions. I shall briefly elaborate each of the
clauses here.
First, when we State the value of a literary work, we are usually not
only (and certainly not necessarily, and perhaps not at ail) declaring its
past or présent value for ourselves but also estimating its probable value
for others. Not ail others, however, but some others: the nature and
limits of the group may be implied by the context of the évaluation (for
example, the set of “others" implied by a book review in Art News
would be different from the set implied by a review in Scientific Ameri
can—though the two sets might, of course, overlap) and may, in fact, be
quite explicitly indicated, as in "A fine book for children between the
âges of 8 and 12 who hâve an interest in animais." If not otherwise
characterized, however, that implicitly defined audience would presum-
ably consist of people who are like ourselves in the pertinent respects,
though it is perhaps worth remarking that some evaluators evidently
believe that everyone is—or should be—like themselves in those respects.
Second, when we allude to a work as great, good, bad, or middling,
we usually imply great, good, bad, or middling for something and also,
thereby, as something: that is, with respect to whatever functions or
effects works of that kind might be expected or desired to serve or
produce. The functions and effects are usually not made explicit; they
may not be recognized or even covertly formulated by the evaluator as
what is desired or expected; and they are likely to differ from one
community of audiences to another. Nevertheless, the assumption of
certain characteristic functions and effects will not only direct the
evaluator's judgment of the work but will also be part of what consti-
13
tûtes, for him and presumably for his community, the classification of the
work as whatever it is classified as: bedtime story, détective novel, non-
sense verse, or, of course, “work of literature.” Thus, and of spécial
significance, when teachers and academie critics commend a work as
“good literature," they are implicitly indicating that it is good as what
ever teachers and academie critics mean by "literature" and for what
ever they believe such works can or should be good for.
Finally, when we judge the value of a work, we usually conceive of it
as experienced under certain implicitly defined circumstances: defined,
that is, by the conventions and assumptions which, in our community,
govem the conception of the circumstances in which a work of that kind
is typically (and hence, it may be thought, "properly") experienced.
Thus, to draw a vivid parallel example here from music rather than
literature, the New Yorker who commends a certain opéra and the West
African who commends a certain cérémonial drum-piece are each pre
sumably conceiving of the work in question as experienced under
spécifie—and rather different—conditions of performance and récep
tion. (Whether typical in a certain community is équivalent to "proper"
is, of course, another question.)
A number of lines of inquiry are suggested by the foregoing concep
tion of évaluative behavior. Among them are the exploration of the
particular assumptions and conventions that do govem what is implied
by évaluative acts, the manner in which those assumptions and conven
tions arise and are maintained and transmitted, and in response to what
variables they change (when they do change). Also, recognizing the
extern to which évaluation is a form of social behavior, we may ask what
social occasions provoke or elicit judgmental acts, how the forms of
those acts are determined and constrained by the social conditions in
which they occur, and what social functions they perform. While it is
clear that the answers to such questions will vary for various com-
munities, that does not mean that we may look forward to replacing the
impasse of individual subjectivity with a higher-level sociological De
gustibus. For, as I suggested earlier, research does not conclude with the
discovery of variability: we must seek to account for the variabilities
themselves and, once again, we may expect and endeavor to find pat
terns, principles, regularities, and, in that sense, constancies—here,
constancies of évaluative behavior.
It is important at this point that the "constancies" to which I hâve
referred be distinguished from other kinds and conceptions of in
variance that are associated with théories of literary or aesthetic value.
14
First, the constancies are not équivalent to what are sometimes referred
to as the "universals" of human nature. This is not to say that there are
no such universals or that they are not pertinent to the sources of
literary value. On the contrary, as I hâve argued elsewhere, there is
reason to believe that the expérience of much that we call "aesthetic
value" is, to some extent, a function of species-wide mechanisms of
perception and cognition and, with regard to the value of literary works,
a function of such mechanisms as they relate to what may be universals
of verbal behavior. Nevertheless, such presumably biophysiological
mechanisms will always operate differentially in different environments
and interact with a broad range of other variables (historical, cultural,
situational, etc.) and, therefore, the expérience of literary and aesthetic
value cannot be altogether accounted for, reduced to, or predicted by
them. 5
Second, the constancies are not to be identified with what are some
times conceived of as the fundamental "traits," récurrent "features," or
shared "properties" of valued works. The attempt to locate invariance in
the nature (or, latterly, the structure) of the works themselves is, I be
lieve, no less misguided than the search for essential or objective
value—and is, in fact, only another form of that search, though often
presented in contradistinction to it as a matter for "empirical" or "in
ductive" investigation. It is misguided, however, not only because dif
ferent features or properties will be valued differently by different audi
ences, and so on, but, more significantly, because the very perception of
those presumed properties will itself vary. Thus, when David Hume, in
his essay "Of the Standard of Taste," observed with complacency that
"the same Homer who pleased at Athens and Rome two thousand years
ago is still admired at Paris and London," we hâve reason to wonder if it
is indeed quite "the same" Homer. The constancies are not to be found,
then, in the properties of literary works because those properties are
themselves among the variables of literary value—along with such other
fixed marks and putative models of stability and reliability as the un-
clouded perceptions of ail men of discrimination and the enduring
values of Western civilization.
The moral of the parable of Shakespeare's sonnets was that, with
respect to value, everything is always in motion with respect to every-
thing else. If there are constancies of literary value, they will be found in
those very motions: that is, in the relations among the variables. For, like
ail value, literary value is not the property of an object or of a subject
but, rather, the product ofthe dynamics of a System. As readers and critics of
15
literature, we are within that System; and, because we are neither om
niscient nor immortal and do hâve particular interests, we will, at any
given moment, be viewing it from some perspective. It is from such a
perspective that we expérience the value of a work and also from such a
perspective that we estimate its probable value for others. There is noth-
ing illusory in the expérience, however, or necessarily inaccurate in the
estimate. From that real (if limited) perspective, at that real (if transient)
moment, our expérience of the value of the work is its value. Or, in the
terms I should prefer: our expérience of “the value of the work" is
équivalent to our expérience of the work in relation to the total economy ofour
existence. And the reason our estimâtes of its probable value for other
people may be quite accurate is that the total economy of their existence
may, in fact, be quite similar to that of our own.
The expériences and activities that constitute the valuing and evaluat-
ing of literature are important components of the System out of which
literary value arises; indeed, they are what keeps the System "alive"—
active and continuous rather than still and stagnant. And while neither
of them—that is, neither the valuing of literary works nor the making of
value judgments about them—can as such be regarded as literary theory,
it does not follow that literary theory (or Frye's "systematic and progres
sive study of literature") should not concem itself with them. On the
contrary, it is surely among the tasks of literary theory to explore and
describe the dynamics of that System and to relate its operations to
everything else that we know about human behavior and culture. The
issues that attend the concept of literary value and the activities that
constitute literary évaluation are a central part of the network of prob-
lems and phenomena that constitute the domain of literary theory, and
therefore they must be permitted and encouraged to retum from their
présent exile.
16
2
The Exile of Evaluation
Fact and Value in th e Literary Academy

It is a curious feature of literary studies in America that one of the most
venerable, central, theoretically significant, and pragmatically inescap-
able set of problems relating to literature has not been a subject of
serious inquiry for the past fifty years. I refer here to the fact not merely
that the study of literary évaluation has been, as we might say, "ne-
glected," but that the entire problematic of value and évaluation has
been evaded and explicitly exiled by the literary academy. It is clear, for
example, that there has been no broad and sustained investigation of
literary évaluation that could compare to the constant and recently
intensified attention devoted to every aspect of literary interprétation.
The past décades hâve witnessed an extraordinary prolifération of théo
ries, approaches, movements, and entire disciplines focused on interpre-
tive criticism, among them (to recite a familiar litany) New Criticism,
structuralism, psychoanalytic criticism, reader-response criticism, récep
tion aesthetics, speech-act theory, deconstruction, communications the-
ory, semiotics, and hermeneutics. At the same time, however, aside
from a number of scattered and secondary essays by theorists and critics
who are usually otherwise occupied,1 no one in particular has been
concemed with questions of literary value and évaluation, and such
questions regularly go begging—and, of course, begged—even among
those whose inquiries into other matters are most rigorous, substantial,
and sophisticated.
Reasons for the spécifie disparity of attention are not hard to locate.
One is the obvious attachment of problems of interprétation and mean-
17
The Exile o f Evaluation
ing to the more general préoccupation with language that has domi-
nated the entire century; another, no doubt, is the fact that disciplines
such as linguistics and the philosophy of language are more accessible to
literary scholars than the corresponding disciplines, especially économ
ies and sociology, that are more broadly concemed with the nature of
value and évaluative behavior. The reasons for the general neglect and
exile, however, are more complex, reflecting, among other things, the
fact that literary studies in America, from the time of its inception as an
institutionalized academie discipline, has been shaped by two conflict-
ing and mutually compromising intellectual traditions and idéologies,
namely—or roughly namely—positivistic philological scholarship and
humanistic pedagogy. That is, while professors of literature hâve sought
to daim for their activities the rigor, objectivity, cognitive substantiality,
and progress associated with science and the empirical disciplines, they
hâve also attempted to remain faithful to the essentially conservative
and didactic mission of humanistic studies: to honor and preserve the
culture's traditionally esteemed objects—in this case, its canonized
texts—and to illuminate and transmit the traditional cultural values
presumably embodied in them. One conséquence or manifestation of
this conflict has been the continuous absorption of “literary theory” in
America with institutional debates over the proper methods and objec
tives of the academie study of literature and, with respect to the topic at
hand, the drastic confinement of its concem with literary évaluation to
debates over the cognitive status of évaluative criticism and its proper
place, if any, in the discipline.
A bit of history will be helpful here. In accord with the traditional
empiricist doctrine of a fundamental split or discontinuity between fact
and value (or description and évaluation, or knowledge and judgment),
it was possible to regard the emerging distinction within literary studies
between "scholarship" and "criticism" as a reasonable division of labor.
Thus, the scholar who devoted himself to locating and assembling the
historical and philological facts necessary to edit and annotate the works
of, say, Bartholomew Griffin might remark that, althpugh Griffin was no
doubt a less "fashionable" poet than such contemporaries as Spenser
and Shakespeare, the serious and responsible scholar must go about his
work in a serious and responsible manner, leaving questions of literary
merit "to the critics." The gesture that accompanied the remark, how
ever, was likely to signal not professional deference but intellectual
condescension; for the presumably even-handed distribution of the in
tellectual responsibilities of literary study—the détermination of facts to
18
the scholar and value to the critic—depended on an always question-

able and increasingly questioned set of assumptions: namely, that liter-
ary value was a determinate property of texts and that the critic, by
virtue of certain innate and acquired capacities (taste, sensibility, and so
forth, which could be seen as counterparts to the scholar's industry and
érudition), was someone specifically equipped to discriminate it.
The magisterial mode of literary évaluation that issued from this set of
assumptions (and which, in Anglo-American criticism, characteris-
tically reproduced itself after the image—and in the voice—of Dr. John
son and also of such latter-day "master-critics" as Matthew Arnold and
T. S. Eliot) was practiced most notably by F. R. Leavis in England and, in
the United States, perhaps most egregiously by Yvor Winters. Its reaches
and a taste of its once-familiar flavor can be recalled in this passage from
Leavis's Revaluation:
There are, of course, discriminations to be made: Tennyson, for example, is

a much better poet than any of the pre-Raphaelites. And Christina Rossetti
deserves to be set apart from them and credited with her own thin and
limited but very valuable distinction . . . There is, too, Emily Brontë, who
has hardly yet had full justice as a poet. I will record, without offering it as a
checked and deliberated judgment, the remembered. impression that her
Cold in the earth is the finest poem in the nineteenth-century part of The
Oxford Book of English Verse.2
Such unabashed "debaucheries of judiciousness" (as Northrop Frye

would later characterize them) were, however, increasingly seen as em-
barrassments to the discipline, and the practice of évaluative criticism
became more défensive, at Ieast partly in response to the renewed and
updated authority given to axiological skepticism.
In the 1930s and 40s, a number of prominent philosophers, among
them A. J. Ayer and Rudolph Camap, began tp argue that value judg-
ments are not merely distinct from empirically vérifiable statements of
fact but vacuous pseudostatements, at best suasive and commendatory,
at worst simply the emotive expressions of Personal sentiment, and in
any case neither reflecting nor producing genuine knowledge.3 For the
positivistic literary scholar, such arguments reinforced his impression
that the work of his critical colleague was the intellectually insubstantial
activity of a dilettante whereas the true discipline of literary studies was
exhibited in his own labors, in which he had always sought to achieve a
rigor and objectivity as free as possible from the contamination of value
ascription. In the institutional struggles that ensued, various maneuvers
19
were developed to secure for "criticism" not only a central place in the
discipline but also an intellectual status equal in respectability to that of
empirical science and what was commonly refenred to as "serious schol-
arship."
One obvious tactic, still favored in many quarters of the literary
academy, was to invoke the humanistic mission of literary studies and
tum the fact-value split against the scholars' claim of centrality. Thus,
Yvor Winters would maintain that whereas science was value-neutral—
or, as he put it, “amoral"—literary studies had moral responsibilities.
The function of historical scholarship and philology was, accordingly,
andllary: specifically it was "to lay the groundwork for criticism,"4
while the important job was, precisely, to evaluate literature. For Win
ters, this meant to déclaré, forthrightly and unequivocally, what was
good and bad literature (which was to say, "moral" or "décadent"
literature) and he did not hesitate, himself, to rank-order not only poets
and poems but also literary genres, verse forms, and entire centuries.
Winters had a genius for unequivocality that was imitated, but never
matched, by his numerous followers. In any case, a more common
tactic, exemplified by a number of the New Critics, was to devise some
formulation of critical activity that bridged the fact-value split or at least
unobtrusively edged the two sides together. Thus, in 1951, W. K. Wim-
satt, Jr., in an important essay titled "Explication as Criticism," observed
that it was necessary to find "an escape between the two extremes of
sheer affectivism and sheer scientific neutralism," and attempted to
demonstrate how évaluation could be assimilated into the typical New
Critical production of increasingly exquisite explications and fine-
grained analyses: "But then, finally, it is possible to conceive and pro
duce instances where explication in the neutral sense is so integrated
with spécial and local value intimations that it rises from neutrality
gradually and convincingly to the point of total judgment."5
It may be recalled here that Wimsatt's attempt to expose "the affective
fallacy" was directed largely at the "psychological theory of value"
developed by I. A. Richards in the 1920s, which Wimsatt charged with
amounting to subjectivism and leading to impressionism and relativism.
Richards's theory was, however, in efifect an updated rehearsal of the
eighteenth-century empiricist-normative account and, like the latter,
designed to rebut axiological skeptidsm.6 An adéquate theory of criti
cism, Richards wrote, must be able to answer such questions as "What
gives the expérience of reading a poem its value?" and "Why is one
opinion about Works of art not as good as others?"7 And while the first
20
of these questions no doubt seemed to Wimsatt altogether different from

what, for him, would hâve been the more proper question of what gives
the poem itselfits value, the second of them makes Richards's normative
objectives quite clear. Indeed, he consistently put his psychoneurolog-
ical account of value in the service of canonical judgments and re-
peatedly translated it into versions of évaluative absolutism and ob-
jectivism. Thus, the remarkable chapter on "Badness in Poetry" in
Principles of Literary Criticism concludes its excruciating examination of
the failure of a sonnet by Ella Wheeler Wilcox to produce a "high level
or organization" of "adéquate [neural] impulses" with Richards's ob
servation that, although "those who enjoy [the sonnet] certainly seem to
enjoy it to a high degree," nevertheless, with good and bad poetry, as
with brandy and beer, the "actual universal preference of those who
hâve tried both fairly is the same as superiority in value of one over the
other. Keats, by universal qualified opinion, is a more efficient poet than
Wilcox, and that is the same as saying his works are more valuable."8
The invocation of an "actual" universality coupled with such question-
begging hedges as "fairly" and "qualified" is, as we shall see, character-
istic of traditional empiricist-normative accounts. It was not, one sus
pects, its alleged relativism that made Richards's theory so unabsorbable
by the literary academy, but rather the raw jargon and unedifying physi-
ology that attended it.
The boldest move in the mid-century effort to give disciplinary re-
spectability and cognitive substance to criticism was, of course, North
rop Frye's call upon it to redefîne itself as a project that banished évalua
tion altogether. In his "Polemical Introduction" to The Anatomy of
Criticism, Frye insisted that if criticism was ever to become a "field of
genuine leaming" (significantly exemplified by "chemistry and philol-
ogy"), it would hâve to "snip off and throw away" that part that had
"no organic connection with it," namely évaluation.9 For Frye, the
shifting assessments and rank-orderings made by critics were not only a
noncumulative accumulation of subjective judgments, but also irrele
vant to "real criticism," since he believed, echoing and endorsing T. S.
Eliot, that "the existing monuments of literature form an idéal order
among themselves." "This," Frye commented, "is criticism, and very
fundamental criticism. Much of this book attempts to annotate it" (AC,
p. 18).
In what proved to be a mémorable passage, he derided "ail the liter
ary chit-chat which makes the réputations of poets boom and crash in
an imaginary stock-exchange," and observed: "This sort of thing cannot
21
be part of any systematic study, for a systematic study can only progress;
whatever dithers or vacillâtes or reacts is merely leisure-class gossip. The
history of taste is no more a part of the structure of criticism than the
Huxley-Wilberforce debate is a part of the structure of biological sci
ence" (AC, p. 18). In view of Frye's Platonic conception of literature and
positivistic conception of science, it is not surprising that he failed to
recognize that his analogy here cuts both ways. For not only could the
Huxley-Wilberforce debate be seen as very much a part of the "struc
ture" of biological science (which, like that of any other science, includ-
ing any science of literature, is by no means independent of its own
intellectual, social, and institutional history), but, since the "order" of
the "existing monuments of literature" is the distinctly sublunary prod-
uct of, among other things, évaluative practices, any truly systematic
study of literature would sooner or later hâve to include a study of those
practices. In other words, the structure of criticism cannot be so readily
disengaged ffom the history of taste because they are mutually implicat-
ing and incorporating.
Joining as it did both an appeal to scientific objectivity and a human-
istic conception of literature while at the same time extending the prom
ise of a high calling and bright future to a project pursued in the name of
"criticism," Frye's effort to banish évaluation from literary study was
remarkably effective, at least to the extent of haunting a génération of
literary scholars, critics, and teachers, many of whom are still inclined to
apologize for making overt value judgments, as if for some temporary
intellectual or moral lapse.10 It was hardly the last word on the subject,
however, and as late as 1968 we find E. D. Hirsch, Jr. attempting to
rehabilitate the cognitive status of évaluative criticism in an essay
significantly titled “Evaluation as Knowledge." In the essay, Hirsch ar
gues that the value judgment of a literary work, when properly directed
to the work itself and not to a "distorted version of it," closely coor-
dinated with a correct interprétation of its objective meaning, and ra-
tionally justified with reference to spécifie criteria, does constîtute a
genuine proposition and, therefore, like a "pure description," does
"qualify as objective knowledge."11 Since just about every concept en-
gaged by Hirsch's argument is at issue in contemporary epistemology
and critical theory, it is not surprising that it did not settle the question
of the intellectual status of évaluative criticism—for Hirsch or anyone
else.12
The debate over the proper place of évaluation in literary studies
remains unresolved and is, I believe, unresolvable in the ternis in which
22
it has been formulated. Meanwhile, although évaluative criticism re

mains intellectually suspect, it certainly continues to be practiced as a
magisterial privilège in the classrooms of the literary academy and
granted admission to its joumals as long as it cornes under cover of other
presumably more objective types of literary study, such as historical
description, textual analysis, or explication. At the same time, however,
the fact that literary évaluation is not merely an aspect of formai aca
demie criticism but a complex set of social and cultural activities central
to the very nature of literature has been obscured, and an entire domain
that is properly the object of theoretical, historical, and empirical explo
ration has been lost to serious inquiry.
Although I confine my comments here primarily to the literary
academy in the United States and to Anglo-American critical theory,
the situation—and its intellectual and institutional history—has not
been altogether different in continental Europe. The dominance of lan-
guage- and interpretation-centered théories, movements, and ap-
proaches, for example, is clearly international, and versions of the
positivist/humanist conflict hâve shaped the development of literary
studies in Europe as well. Certain exceptions are, however, instructive.
When, in the 1920s and 30s, East European theorists also sought to
transform literary studies into a progressive, systematic science, the
problematic of value and évaluation was not excluded from the project.
For example, the historically variable functions of texts and the interre
lations among canonical and noncanonical works and other cultural
Products and activities were recognized and documented by, among
others, Jurij Tynjanov and Mikhail Bakhtin, and Jan Mukaïovskÿ's
explorations of the general question of aesthetic value were both origi
nal and substantial.13 Also, studies in the sociology of literature, espe-
cially in France and Germany, and the project of réception aesthetics
hâve concemed themselves with aspects of literary évaluation.14 It
should be noted, however, that the study of value and évaluation
remained relatively undeveloped in the later work of formalists and
structuralists,15 while Marxist literary theory has only recently begun to
move from minimal révisions of orthodox aesthetic axiology toward a
radical reformulation.16 It may be added that, although the theoretical
perspective, conceptual structures, and analytic techniques developed
by Jacques Derrida are potentially of great interest here (especially in
conjunction with the renewed attention to Nietzsche), their radical ax-
iological implications remain largely unexplored and, insofar as it has
been appropriated by Anglo-American critical theory, deconstruction
23
has been put almost entirely in the service of antihermeneutics, which is

to say that it has been absorbed by our preemptive occupation with
interpretive criticism.17 Recent moves in the direction of opening the
question of value and évaluation in the literary academy hâve corne
primarily from those who hâve sought to subject its canon to dramatic
revaluation, notably feminist critics. Although their efforts hâve been
significant to that end, they hâve not amounted as yet to the articulation
of a well-developed noncanonical theory of value and évaluation.18
The Politics of Evaluative Criticism

One of the major effects of prohibiting or inhibiting explicit évaluation is
to forestall the exhibition and obviate the possible acknowledgment of
divergent Systems of value and thus to ratify, by default, established
évaluative authority. It is worth noting that in none of the debates of the
1940s and 50s was the traditional academie canon itself questioned, and
that where évaluative authority was not ringingly affirmed, asserted, or
self-justified, it was simply assumed. Thus, Frye himself could speak
almost in one breath of the need to "get rid o f . . . ail casual, sentimental
and préjudiciai value judgments" as “the first step in developing a
genuine poetics," and of "the masterpieces of literature" which are “the
materials of literary criticism" (AC, pp. 18, 15). The identity of those
masterpieces could, it seemed, be taken for granted or followed more or
less automatically from "the direct value-judgment of informed good
taste" or "certain literary values . . . fully established by critical expéri
ence" (AC, pp. 27, 20).
In a passage of particular interest, Frye wrote: "Comparative esti
mâtes of value are really inferences, most valid when silent ones, from
critical practice . . . The critic will find soon, and constandy, that Milton
is a more rewarding and suggestive poet to work with than Blackmore.
But the more obvious this becomes, the less time he will want to waste
belaboring the point" (AC, p. 25). In addition to the noteworthy corré
lation of validity with silence (comparable, to some extent, to Wimsatt's
discreet "intimations" of value), two other aspects of Frye's remarks
here repay some attention. First, in claiming that it is altogether obvious
that Milton, rather than Blackmore, is "a more rewarding and sugges
tive poet [for the critic] to work with," Frye begged the question of what
kind of work the critic would be doing. For surely if one were concemed
with a question such as the relation of canonical and noncanonical texts
24
in the System of literary value in eighteenth-century England, one

would find Blackmore just as rewarding and suggestive to work with as
Milton. Both here and in his repeated insistence that the "material" of
criticism must be "the masterpieces of literature" (he refers also to "a
feeling we hâve ail had that the study of médiocre works of art remains a
random and peripheral form of critical expérience"—AC, p. 17), Frye
exhibits a severely limited conception of the potential domain of literary
study and of the sorts of problems and phenomena with which it could or
should deal. In this conceptual and methodological confinement, how-
ever (which betrays the conservative force of the ideology of traditional
humanism even in the laboratories of the new progressive poetics), he
has been joined by just about every other member of the Anglo-
American literary academy during the past fifty years.
The second point of interest in Frye's remarks is his significant con-
joining of Milton with Blackmore as an illustration of the sort of com
parative estimate that is so obvious as not to need belaboring. Black
more, we recall, was the author of an ambitious epic poem, The Création,
notable in literary history primarily as the occasion of some faint praise
from Dr. Johnson and otherwise as a topos of literary disvalue; its
fimction—indeed, one might say its value—has been to stand as an
instance of bad poetry. This handy conjunction, however (and similar
ones, such as Shakespeare and Edgar Guest, John Keats and Joyce
Kilmer, T. S. Eliot and Ella Wheeler Wilcox, that occur repeatedly in the
debates outlined above), évadés the more difficult and consequential
questions of judgment posed by genuine évaluative diversity and con-
flict: questions that are posed, for example, by spécifie daims of value
made for noncanonical works, such as modem texts, especially highly
innovative ones, and such culturally exotic works as oral or tribal litera
ture, popular literature, and so-called ethnie literature, and also by
daims and judgments of literary value made by or on behalf of what
might be called noncanonical audiences, such as ail those readers who are
not now students, critics, or professors of literature and perhaps never
were and never will be within the academy or on its outskirts.
Perhaps because the latter daims and judgments touch on personally
as well as ideologically sensitive matters of social stratification, their
political significance is even more résistant to récognition than daims of
value made for noncanonical works. What is being missed and obscured
here is the fact that there is a politics of personal taste as well as a politics
of institutional évaluation and explicit évaluative criticism. This résis
tance is displayed, moreover, not only by conservative members of the
25
literary academy but also by those who are otherwise most concemed to
indicate the political implications of these issues; and the révulsion of
academies and intellectuals at the actual literary préférences, forms
of aesthetic enjoyment, and general modes of cultural consumption of
nonacademics and nonintellectuals—induding those whose political
émancipation they may otherwise seek to promote—has been a familiar
feature of the cultural-political scene since at least the 1930s. It will not
do, of course, simply to label this "snobbery" or "elitism," for it is the
product of multiple and quite complexly related psychological, sociolog-
ical, and ideological éléments which, moreover, are played out differ-
ently under different historical, social, and institutional conditions and
therefore require very careful analysis.19 It is clear, however, that oppo-
sitional cultural theory and conservative humanism hâve repeatedly
generated strictly parallel (and, indeed, often indistinguishable) ac-
counts to explain the tastes of other people in such a way as to justify the
academie intellectuars révulsion at them.
The historical-psychological-ideological complex operating here
might be referred to as "The-Other's-Poison Effect," meaning not only
that one man's méat is sometimes the other's poison but that one man
sometimes gets sick just watching the other fellow eat his méat and,
moreover, that if one of them is also a cultural theorist (left-wing or
conservative as otherwise measured), he or she may be expected to
generate an account of how the other fellow is himself actually being
poisoned by the méat he likes and eats. It is no surprise, perhaps, that
the often self-consciously historicist accounts referred to here operate in
strict complidty with the universalist accounts developed by Hume, Kant,
and the tradition of aesthetic axiology examined in Chapters 3 and 4,
below.
The évasion mentioned above is dramatized when conflicts of judg-

ment arising ffom fundamental and perhaps irreconcilable diversity of
interest are exhibited in a currently charged political context. A spécifie
example will illustrate my point here. In 1977 a study of Langston
Hughes's poetry was published by Onwuchekwa Jemie, a Nigerian-
bom, American-educated poet and critic, at that time associate profes-
sor of English and Afro-American literature at the University of Min
nesota. In one section of his study, Jemie discussed Hughes's poetic
cycle “Madame" in relation to Eliot's "The Love Song of J. Alfred
Prufrock" and Ezra Pound's "Hugh Selwyn Mauberly," comparing vari-
26
ous formai and thematic aspects of the three works. He observed, for
example, that each of them is “consistent in language, tone and attitude
with the socio-psychological milieu which it explores: the ghetto dialect
and sassy humor [in Hughes's work], the cynical polished talk of literary
London [in Pound], and the bookish ruminations of Prufrock's active
mind in inactive body," and then concluded pointedly: “In short, to
fault one poem for not being more like the other, for not dealing with
the matter and in the manner of the other, is to err in judgment."20 Soon
after its publication, a reviewer of Jemie's book in the London Times
Literary Supplément took it very much to task for, among other things, its
“painfully irrelevant comparisons," citing the passage quoted above.21
And, a few weeks later, there appeared in TLS an extraordinary letter to
the editor from Chinweizu, himself a Nigerian-bom, American-
educated writer and critic. Responding to the review and particularly to
the phrase, “painfully irrelevant comparisons," he shot back:
Painful to whom? Irrelevant to whom? To idolators of white genius? Who

says that Shakespeare, Aristophanes, Dante, Milton, Dostoevsky, Joyce,
Pound, Sartre, Eliot, etc. are the last word in literary achievement, un-
equalled anywhere? . . . The point of these comparisons is not to thrust a
black face among these local idols of Europe which, to our grave injury,
hâve been bloated into “universality"; rather it is to help heave them out of
our way, clear them from our skies by making clear . . . that we hâve
among our own the equals and betters of these chaps. . . In this day and
âge, British preferences do not count in the Black World. As Langston
Hughes put it half a century ago: "If white people are pleased, we are glad.
If they are not, it doesn't matter."22
This brief épisode in the history of literary évaluation illustrâtes, among

other things, what genuine évaluative conflict sounds like. (It also illus
trâtes that, contrary to Frye's assertion, the history of taste is not “a
history where there are no facts," though we hâve barely begun to
recognize either how to chronicle its épisodes and shape its narrative or
how to assess its significance not only for "the structure of criticism" but
also for the structure of "literature.") I would suggest that it is, also
among other things, the very possibility of that sound that is being
evaded in Anglo-American literary studies and, furthermore, that when
the sound reaches the intensity that we hear in Chinweizu's letter, the
literary academy has no way to acknowledge it except, perhaps, in the
language of counter-outrage.23
27
A n Alternative Project
It is clear that, with respect to the central pragmatic issues as well as
theoretical problems of literary value and évaluation, American critical
theory has simply painted itself out of the picture. Beguiled by the
humanist's fantasy of transcendence, endurance, and universality, it has
been unable to acknowledge the most fondamental character of literary
value, which is its mutability and diversity. And, at the same time,
magnetized by the goals and ideology of a naïve scientism, distracted by
the arid concems of philosophie axiology, obsessed by a misplaced quest
for "objectivity" and confined in its very conception of literary studies
by the narrow intellectual traditions and professional allegiances of the
literary academy, it has foreclosed from its own domain the possibility of
investigating the dynamics of that mutability and understanding the
nature of that diversity.
The type of investigation I hâve in mind here would not seek to
establish normative "criteria," to devise presumptively objective évalua
tive procedures, or to discover grounds for the “justification'' of critical
judgments or practices. It would not, in short, be a literary axiology or, in
effect, the counterpart for évaluative criticism of what a literary her-
meneutics offers to be for interpretive criticism. It would seek, rather, to
clarify the nature of literary—and, more broadly, aesthetic—value in
conjunction with a more general rethinking of the concept of “value”; it
would explore the multiple forms and fonctions of literary évaluation,
covert as well as overt, nonverbal as well as verbal, institutional as well
as individual; it would account for the features of literary and aesthetic
judgments in relation to the multiple social, political, circumstantial,
and other constraints and conditions to which they are responsive; it
would chronicle "the history of taste" in relation to a more general
model of historical cultural dynamics and spécifie local conditions; and
it would devise descriptions and accounts of ail the other phenomena
and activities involved in literary and aesthetic évaluation in relation to
our more general understanding—as it is and as it develops—of human
culture and behavior.
The sort of inquiry suggested here (which obviously could not be
pursued within the confines of literary study or critical theory as they
are presently conceived and demarcated) might be expected to make its
accounts intemally consistent, extemally connectible, and amenable to
continuous extension and refinement; for it is thus that the theoretical
power and productivity of those accounts would be served and secured.
28
This is not, however, to imagine a monolithic intellectual project that

would offer to yield an ultimately comprehensive, unified, and objective
account of its subject; for to imagine it thus would, of course, be to
repeat, only on a grander scale, éléments of the raw positivism and
naïve scientism that hâve been responsible, in part, for both the exile of
évaluation and the confinements of modem critical theory. What is
désirable, rather, is an inquiry pursued with the récognition that, like
any other intellectual enterprise, it would consist, at any given time, of a
set of heterogeneous projects; that the conceptual structures and meth-
odological practices adopted in those projects would themselves be his-
torically and otherwise contingent, reflecting, among other things, pre-
vailing or currently interesting conceptual structures and methods in
related areas of inquiry; that whatever other value the descriptions and
accounts produced by any of those projects might and undoubtedly
would hâve (as, for example, indices of twentieth-century thought to
future historians), their spécifie value as descriptions and accounts
would be a function of how well they made intelligible the phenomena
within their domain to whoever, at whatever time, and from whatever
perspective, had an interest in them; and that its pursuit would be
shaped by—that is, energized and transformed in response to—those
various, historically emergent interests, and its descriptions and ac
counts variously interpreted and employed accordingly.24 The présent
study is designed to suggest a theoretical framework for such an inquiry.
3
Contingency and Interdependence

Ail value is radically contingent, being neither a fixed attribute, an
inhérent quality, or an objective property of things but, rather, an effect
of multiple, continuously changing, and continuously interacting vari
ables or, to put this another way, the product of the dynamics of a
System, specifically an économie System. It is readily granted, of course,
that it is in relation to such a System that commodities such as gold,
bread, and paperback éditions of Moby-Dick acquire the value indicated
by their market prices. It is traditional, however, both in économie and
aesthetic theory as well as in informai discourse, to distinguish sharply
between the value of an entity in that sense (that is, its exchange value)
and some other type of value that may be referred to as its utility or use
value or, especially with respect to so-called nonutilitarian objects such
as artworks or works of literature, as its intrinsic value. Thus, it might be
said that whereas the fluctuating price of a particular paperback édition
of Moby-Dick is a function of such variables as supply and demand,
production and distribution costs, the publisher's calculation of corpo-
rate profits, and so forth, these factors do not affect the value of Moby-
Dick as experienced by an individual reader or its intrinsic value “as a
work of literature.” These distinctions, however, are not as clear-cut as
they may appear.
Like its price in the marketplace, the value of an entity to an individ
ual subject is also the product of the dynamics of an économie System:
specifically, the personal economy constituted by the subject's needs,
interests, and resources—biological, psychological, material, experien-
30
Contingencies o f Value
tial, and so forth. Like any other economy, moreover, this too is a
continuously fluctuating or shifting System, for our individual needs,
interests, and resources are themselves functions of our continuously
changing States in relation to an environment that may be relatively
stable but is never absolutely fixed. The two kinds of économie System
described here are, it should be noted, not only analogous but also
interactive and interdependent, for part of our environment is the mar
ket economy and, conversely, the market economy is composed, in part,
of the diverse personal économies of individual producers, distributors,
consumers, and so forth. At the same time, it must be emphasized that
any particular subject's “self”—or that in behalf of which he or she may
be said to act with “self-interest”—is also variable, being multiply and
differently configurable in terms of different rôles, relationships, and, in
effect, identities (citizen, parent, woman, property owner, teacher, ter-
restrial organism, mortal being, etc.), in relation to which different
needs and interests acquire priority (and, as may happen, corne into
conflict) under different conditions.
The traditional discourse of value—including a number of terms I
hâve used here, such as “subject,” "object,” "needs,” "interests,” and
indeed “value" itself—reflects an arbitrary arresting, segmentation, and
hypostasization of the continuous process of our interactions with our
environments or what could also be described as the continuous inter
play among multiply configurable Systems. While it would be difficult to
devise (and perhaps impossible to sustain) a truly Heraclitean discourse
that did not reflect such conceptual operations, we may nevertheless
recognize that, insofar as such terms project images of discrète acts,
agents and entities, fixed attributes, unidirectional forces, and simple
causal and temporal relationships, they obscure the dynamics of value
and reinforce dubious concepts of noncontingency: that is, concepts
such as "intrinsic," “objective," "absolute," "universal," and "tran
scendent." It is necessary, therefore, to emphasize a number of other
interactive relationships and forms of interdependence that are frag-
mented by our language and commonly ignored in critical theory and
aesthetic axiology.1
First, as I hâve already suggested, a subject's expérience of an entity is
always a function of his or her personal economy: that is, the spécifie
"existence" of an object or event, its integrity, cohérence, and bound-
aries, the category of entities to which it “belongs," and its spécifie
“features," "qualities," or "properties" are ail the variable products of
the subject's engagement with his or her environment under a particular
31
Contingentiez o f Value
set of conditions. Not only is an entity always experienced under more

or less different conditions, but the various expériences do not yield a
simple cumulative (corrected, improved, deeper, more thorough or
complété) knowledge of the entity because they are not additive.
Rather, each expérience of an entity frames it in a different rôle and
constitutes it as a different configuration, with different "properties"
foregrounded and repressed. Moreover, the subject's expériences of an
entity are not discrète or, strictly speaking, successive, because recollec
tion and anticipation always overlay perception, and the units of what
we call "expérience” themselves vary and overlap.
Second, what we speak of as a subject's "needs," "interests," and
"purposes" are not only always changing, but they are also not al-
together independent of or prior to the entities that satisfy or implement
them; that is, entities also produce the needs and interests they satisfy
and evoke the purposes they implement. Moreover, because our pur
poses are continuously transformed and redirected by the objects we
produce in the very process of implementing them, and because of the
complex interrelations among human needs, technological production,
and cultural practices, there is a continuous process of mutual
modification between our desires and our universe.2
Of particular significance for the value of "works of art" and "litera-
ture" is the interactive relation between the classification of an entity and
the functions it is expected or desired to perform. In perceiving an object
or artifact in terms of some category—as, for example, "a dock," "a
dictionary," "a doorstop," "a curio"—we implicitly isolate and fore-
ground certain of its possible functions and typically refer its value to the
extent to which it performs those functions more or less effectively. But
the relation between function and classification also opérâtes in reverse:
thus, under conditions that produce the "need" for a doorstopping
object or an "interest" in Victorian artifacts, certain properties and pos
sible functions of various objects in the neighborhood will be fore
grounded and both the classification and value of those objects will
follow accordingly. As we commonly put it, one will "realize" the value
of the dictionary as a doorstop or "appreciate" the value of the dock as a
curio.3 (The mutually defining relations among classification, function,
and value are nicely exhibited in the OED's définition of "curio" as "an
object of art, piece of bric-a-brac, etc. valued as a curiosity," which is, of
course, something like—and no less accurate than—defining clock as
"an object valued as a dock.") It may be relevantly noted here that
human beings hâve evolved as distinctly opportunistic créatures and
32
that our survival, both as individuals and as a species, continues to be

enhanced by our ability and inclination to reclassify objects and to
"realize" and "appreciate" novel and altemate fonctions for them—
which is also to "misuse” them and to fail to respect their presumed
purposes and conventional generic classifications.
The various forms of interdependence emphasized here hâve consid
érable bearing on what may be recognized as the économies of literary
and aesthetic value. The traditional—idealist, humanist, genteel—
tendency to isolate or protect certain aspects of life and culture, among
them works of art and literature, from considération in économie terms
has had the effect of mystifying the nature—or, more accurately, the
dynamics—of their value. In view of the arbitrariness of the exclusion, it
is not surprising that the languages of aesthetics and économies never-
theless tend to drift toward each other and that their ségrégation must
be constantly patrolled.4 (Thus, an aesthetician déplorés a pun on "ap
préciation" appearing in an article on art investment and wams of the
dangers of confosing "the uniqueness of a painting that gives it scarcity
value . . . with its unique value as a work of art.")5 To those for whom
terms such as "utility," "effectiveness," and "fonction" suggest gross
pragmatic instrumentality, crass material desires, and the satisfaction of
animal needs, a concept such as use value will be seen as irrelevant to or
clearly to be distinguished from aesthetic value. There is, however, no
good reason to confine the domain of the utilitarian to objects that serve
only immédiate, spécifie, and unexalted ends or, for that matter, to
assume that the value of artworks has altogether nothing to do with
pragmatic instrumentality or animal needs.6 The récurrent impulse and
effort to define aesthetic value by contradistinction to ali forms of utility
or as the négation of ail other nameable sources of interest or forms of
value—hedonic, practical, sentimental, omamental, historical, ideolog-
ical, and so forth—is, in effect, to define it out of existence; for when ail
such utilities, interests, and other particular sources of value hâve been
subtracted, nothing remains. Or, to put this in other terms: the "essen-
tial value" of an artwork consists of everything from which it is usually
distinguished.
To be sure, various candidates hâve been proposed for a pure,
nonutilitarian, interest-free, and, in effect, value-free source of aesthetic
value, such as the eliciting of "intrinsically rewarding" intellectual, sen-
sory, or perceptual activities, or Kant's "free play of the cognitive facul-
ties." The question remains, however, whether a strict accounting of
any of these seemingly gratuitous activities would not bring us, sooner
33
or later, to their interest, utility, and thus value in some—and perhaps

many—senses for those who pursue them.
Three points may be made here. First, in speaking of certain objects
and activities as "intrinsically rewarding" or done “for their own sake,”
what we usually mean is that the rewards involved (a) are not predict-
able or quantifiable; (b) are likely to be heterogeneous and ongoing
rather than spécifie and terminal; and, in the case of an object (for
example, a painting or a child), (c) are produced more or less uniquely
by that object as distinct from any other of its kind. Of course, the
provision of a variety of ongoing satisfactions is itself a contingent util
ity, and uniqueness is itself contingent (not everyone would dérivé irre-
placeable satisfaction from that painting or that child). Second, although
we may be individually motivated to engage in various ludic, aesthetic,
or artistic activities only for the sake of the ongoing pleasure they pro
vide (or other, less readily nameable or specifiable, ongoing satisfac
tions), our doing so may nevertheless yield a long-term profit in en-
hanced cognitive development, behavioral flexibility, or other kinds of
advantage for survival, and our general tendency to find pleasure in such
activities may, accordingly, be the product or by-product of our evolu-
tionary development.7 Third, the occasioning of “intrinsically reward
ing" activities (or “expériences") obviously cannot be confined to
"works of art" and therefore cannot, without circularity, be said to
constitute the defining “aesthetic function" of the objects so labeled.8
Indeed, since there are no functions performed by artworks that may be
specified as generically unique and also no way to distinguish the “re
wards" provided by art-related expériences or behavior from those
provided by innumerable other kinds of expérience and behavior,
any distinctions drawn between "aesthetic" and "nonaesthetic" (or
"extra-aesthetic") value must be regarded as fundamentally prob-
lematic.
It should be noted in passing that, except for allusions to other usages,
“art" and "aesthetic" in the présent study are équivalent, respectively,
to "that which is called 'art' in the indicated discourse(s)" and “that
which is related to that which is called 'art' (etc.)." Their use here is, in
short, thoroughly nominalistic. Indeed, the point needs some emphasis
in view of the fact that essentialist and circular usages of these terms are
key operators in contemporary aesthetic axiology.
“Aesthetic" has, of course, a number of currently viable senses in
addition to the nominalistic one just noted. For example, following
Baumgarten and early nineteenth-century usage as influenced by Kant,
34
it can also indicate a certain type of cognitive activity and/or sensory

expérience, specifically the type elicited by àrtworks either uniquely or
among other things. At the same time, it can indicate a certain type of
property of any object: specifically, the type of "purely formai" property
which, according to Kant's analysis, uniquely elicits the sorts of expéri
ences which, if ail else is in order, constitute genuine judgments of taste.
A combination or conflation of these three senses issues in the familiar
recursive use of the term to name certain types of expérience and
certain types of objects and certain types of properties of objects, so that
"aesthetic" cornes to be roughly équivalent to "relating to certain cogni-
tive/sensory expériences, these being the ones elicited by objects that
hâve certain formai properties, these being the ones that identify objects
as àrtworks, these being the kinds of works that elicit certain cognitive/
sensory expériences, these being . . . and so forth around again.9 The
academie aesthetician trained to flourish in this sort of circle can spend
his or her professional career describing (a) the nature of the "expéri
ences" that are produced by those objects that are readily identifiable as
works of art by virtue of their having the properties that elicit such
expériences, and (b) the nature of the "properties," unquestionably
possessed by what are unquestionably works of art, that elicit the expé
riences that only àrtworks can elicit. (This is a parody, but not by much.)
In addition to the circularities thus generated, these academie exer
cises also perpetuate a thoroughly unproblematized conception of art,
which is to say an essentialist définition of the label "art." The aestheti
cian who takes for granted the identity of those objects—"works of
art"—that exemplify the possession of "aesthetic properties," or, in an
only slightly more sophisticated move, who acknowledges the fact of
historical and variable usage only to dismiss its force with an appeal to
some "core" of examples "that would be acknowledged as works of art
by everyone," thereby effaces both the historicity and cultural specificity
of the term "art" and also the institutionally and otherwise contingent
variability of the honorific labeling of cultural productions. Since the
"core" examples cited will always be drawn from the Western academie
canon (typically a handful of classic forms, works, and figures recur-
rently invoked in just these discourses: for example, sculpture, tragedy,
symphony; Homer, Rembrandt, Mozart; King Lear, Don Giovanni, and,
to indicate that there are modem masterpieces too, Guemica), and will
also typically be attended by the tacit presumption of canonical audi
ences experiencing those works under canonical conditions plus the
tacit exclusion of noncanonical (that is, non-Westem, nonacademic,
35
nonadult, or non-high-culture) audiences and noncanonical (for ex

ample, folk, tribal, or mass-mediated) conditions of production and récep
tion, it is no surprise that "essentially aesthetic expériences” always
conform to those typical of the Western or Westem-educated consumer
of high culture and that "essentially aesthetic properties" and "essential
aesthetic value” always tum out to be located in ail the old familiar
places and masterpieces.
Matters of Taste
Suggestions of the historical or cultural contingency of aesthetic value
are commonly countered by evidence of apparent noncontingent value:
the endurance, for example, of certain classic canonical works (the in
vocation of Homer being a topos of the critical tradition) and, if not
quite Pope's "gen'ral chorus of mankind," then at least the convergent
sentiments of ail people of éducation and discrimination. Certainly any
theory of aesthetic value must be able to account for continuity, stabil-
ity, and apparent consensus as well as for drift, shift, and diversity in
matters of taste. The tendency throughout formai aesthetic axiology,
however, has been to explain each in a quite different way: specifically,
to explain the constancies of value and convergences of taste by the
inhérent qualities of certain objects and/or some set of presumed human
universals, and to explain the variabilities of value and divergences of
taste by historical accident, cultural distortion, and the defects and
deficiencies of individual subjects.
This asymmetrical type of explanation recalls—and is, in intellectual
history, of a piece with—the tendency in traditional philosophy of sci
ence to explain the credibility of so-called rational or true beliefs (for
example, that the earth revolves around the sun) by the fact that they
are rational or true, and the credibility of other beliefs (for example, that
the sun revolves around the earth) by spécial historical, institutional,
social, psychological, or otherwise "extemal" factors. I appropriate here
the characterization of this tendency by two of its critics, Barry Bames
and David Bloor, who offer in opposition to it a postulate for historians
and sociologists of science that States, in part, that ”the incidence of ail
beliefs without exception . . . must be accounted for by finding the
spécifie, local causes of their credibility."10
The classic development of this account of taste is found in Hume's
essay "Of the Standard of Taste," where the "catholic and universal
beauty" is seen to be the resuit of
36
the relation which nature has placed between the form and the sentiment
. . . We shall be able to ascertain its influence . . . from the durable
admiration which attends those works that hâve survived ail the caprices of
mode and fashion, ail the mistakes of ignorance and envy.
The same Homer who pleased at Athens two thousand years ago, is still
admired at Paris and London. Ail the changes of climate, govemment,
religion and language hâve not been able to obscure his glory . . .
It appears then, that amidst ail the variety and caprice of taste, there are
certain general principles of approbation and blâme, whose influence a
careful eye may trace in ail the operations of the mind. Some particular
forms or qualities, from the original structure of the internai fabric, are
calculated to please, and others to displease; and if theyfail of their effect in
any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection in the
organ.
Many and frequent are the defects . . . which prevent or weaken the
influence of those general principles.11
We shall retum to this passage in the next chapter, where, together with
Kant's Critique of Judgment, Hume's essay will be examined in connec
tion with the general structure of axiological argumentation. For the
présent, we may observe that two linked notions are central to the
account of tastes in traditional aesthetic axiology: first, the idea that
certain objects or forms please us "naturally" by virtue of certain human
universals; and second, the belief that a norm and thus “standard" of
correct and defective taste can be derived accordingly. This set of notions
obliged—or, rather, permitted—Hume, as it did and still does many
others, to conclude that, in matters of taste, most people in the world are
substandard or déviant. Perhaps, from a certain perspective, they are.
But that still leaves us with a very peculiar sort of norm, and perhaps it
can be seen otherwise.
Before tuming to that alternative conceptualization, we may recall
here I. A. Richards's remarkable explanation of how the very fact that
someone is capable of taking pleasure in a sonnet by Ella Wheeler
Wilcox is evidence of that person's inability to survive in a complex
environment and therefore of his or her biological unfitness (and note as
well the general observations on popular culture and the mass media to
which Richards is led) :
Those who hâve adéquate impulses. . . are not appeased [by the sonnet's
conclusion]. Only for those who make certain conventional, stereotyped
maladjustments instead does the magic work.
. . . At présent bad literature, bad art, the cinéma [sic], etc. are an
37
influence of the first importance in fixing immature and actually inappli

cable attitudes toward most things . . .
. . . The strongest objection to, let us say, the sonnet we hâve quoted is
that a person who enjoys it, through the very organization of his responses
which enables him to enjoy it, is debarred ffom appreciating many things
which, if he could appreciate them, he would prefer.12
We can readily recognize the familiar moves of axiologic logic in
Richards's proposai, set forth here with egregious circularity, that the
Other's enjoyment of his bad méat is possible only because of something
suboptimal about his physiology, some problem in the organization of
his responses that keeps him from "appreciating” certain "things"—
really or objectively good méat, presumably, though Richards avoids
saying so explicitly—that he would prefer if his responses were properly
organized. Whether the debility is attributed to defective "organs" or
defective "organization," to innate deficiencies or the "influence" of
popular culture and the mass media, the privileging of the self through
the pathologizing of the Other remains the key move and defining ob
jective of axiology.
An alternative view of these matters is, however, possible. Specifi-
cally, the array of individual preferences that Hume and Richards re-
garded as reflecting the proper operation of healthy organs of taste and
also the individual preferences that they interpreted as so many in
stances of Personal pathology could both be seen as functions of interac
tions among the following variables:
a) various psychophysiological structures, mechanisms, and tenden-
cies that are relatively uniform among human beings;
b) other psychophysiological structures, mechanisms, and tendencies
that vary quite widely among individuals;
c) such more or less obvious particulars of personal identity and his-
tory as gender, âge, the particular physical and social environment into
which one was bom, ethnie and national culture, formai and informai
éducation, and so forth;
d) other more subtle, volatile, and, accordingly, less readily specifiable
or measurable particulars of personal identity, including individual
"tempérament," "mood" on any given occasion, and current "inter
ests"—each of which, it might be noted, is itself a product of the interac
tions of the other variables listed here; and, finally,
e) innumerable social, cultural, institutional, and contextual variables
operating at every level of analysis, from broad though culturally
spécifie ways of classifying objects to the most subde and minute contex-
tually spécifie circumstances of individual encounters with them.
38
The traditional axiological tendency, noted above, to provide two

different kinds of explanation for human preferences—one for canon-
ical tastes and the stability of preferences (convergence on an objective
norm, the intrinsic value of certain objects) and another for déviant
tastes and the mutability of preferences (defective organs, mists, mis-
takes, the "whirligig of fashion," and so forth)—would be replaced by a
single account that explained ail these phenomena symmetrically. That
is, in accord with such an account, évaluative divergences and the exhi
bition of so-called bad taste would be seen as the product of the same
dynamics—the playing out of the same kinds of variables, but with
different spécifie values—that produce évaluative convergences and the
exhibition of so-called good taste. These points can be elaborated further
with regard to human preferences generally—that is, “tastes” for any-
thing, from artworks to lifestyles and from types of food to types of
explanation or even types of logic.
Within a particular community, the tastes and preferences of subjects
will sometimes be conspicuously divergent or indeed idiosyncratic; that
is, members of the community will tend to find more satisfaction of a
certain kind (aesthetic, erotic, consummatory, or whatever) in quite
different items from some array of comparable items and will also tend to
select among them accordingly. This occurs when and to the extent that
the satisfactions in question are themselves functions of types of needs,
interests, and resources that vary individually along a relatively wide
spectrum, are relatively résistant—if not altogether intractable—to cul
tural channeling, and are especially responsive to différences of circum-
stantial context. Conversely, their tastes and preferences will tend to be
convergent—that is, they will tend to find satisfactions of certain kinds in
the same items or types of items and to select them accordingly—to the
extent that the satisfactions in question are functions of types of needs,
interests, and resources that vary individually within a relatively narrow
spectrum, are relatively tractable to cultural channeling, and remain
fairly stable under a variety of conditions.
Insofar as satisfactions (again, "aesthetic" or any other: erotic, for
example) with regard to some array of objects are functions of needs,
interests, and resources of thefirst kind, individual preferences for those
objects will appear "subjective," "eccentric," "stubborn," and "capri-
cious." Insofar as they are functions of the second, preferences will seem
so obvious, "natural," and "rational" as not to appear to be matters of
taste at ail. Indeed, it is precisely under these latter conditions that the
value of particular objects will appear to be inhérent, that distinctions or
gradations of value among them will appear to reduce to différences in
39
the "properties" or "qualifies" of the objects themselves, and that ex-

plicit judgments of their value will appear to be—and for many, but not
ail, purposes will be—"objective." In short, here as elsewhere, a
co-intidence of contingentiez among individual zubjectz who internet az memberz
of zome community will operatefor them as noncontingency and be interpreted
by them accordingly.
Because we are speaking here not of two opposed sets of discrète
déterminants (or "contraints" or "forces") but of the possibility of
widely differing spécifications for a large number of complexly interact-
ing variablez, we may expect to find a continuous exhibition of every
degree of divergence and convergence among the subjects in a particular
community over the course of its history, depending in each instance on
the extent of the disparity and uniformity of each of the relevant contin-
gencies and on the strength of various social practices and cultural
institutions that control the exhibition of extreme "déviance."13 It may
be noted in passing that the normative mechanisms within a commu
nity that suppress divergence—and thereby obscure as well as deny
the contingency of value—will always hâve, as their counterpart, a
coHMfermechanism that permits a récognition of that contingency and a
more or less génial acknowledgment of the inevitability of divergence:
hence the ineradicability, in spite of the efforts of establishment axiol-
ogy, of what might be called folk-relativism: " Chacun a zon goût," "De
guztibuz . . . "One man's méat is another's poison," and so forth.
As the preceding account suggests, the prevailing structure of

tastes and preferences within some community (and conséquent illu
sion of a consensus based on objective value) will always be implicitly
threatened or directly challenged by the divergent tastes and preferences
of some subjects within the community (for example, those not yet
adequately acculturated, such as the young, and others with "uncul-
tivated" tastes, such as provincials and social upstarts), as well as by
most subjects who are outside it or, more significantly, on its periphery
and who thus hâve occasion to internet with its members (for example,
exotic visitors, immigrants, colonials, and members of various minority
or marginalized groups). Consequently, institutions of évaluative au-
thority will be called upon repeatedly to devise arguments and proce
dures that validate the community's established tastes and preferences,
thereby warding off barbarism and the constant apparition of an immi
nent collapse of standards and also justifying the exercise of their own
normative authority.
40
Contingentiez of Value
Both informally, as in the drawingrooms of men of cultivation and

discrimination or in the classrooms of the literary academy, and for-
mally, as in Hume's essay and throughout the central tradition of West
ern critical theory, that validation typically takes the twofold form of,
first, privileging absolutely—that is, “standard"-izing, making a standard
out of—not simply the preferences of the members of the group but,
more significantly and also more powerfully because more invisibly, the
particular contingentiez that govem their preferencez; and, second but simul-
taneously, dizcounting or pathologizing not merely other people's tastes
but, again more significantly and effectively, ail other contingentiez.
Thus, it is assumed or maintained:
a) that the particular functionz that the established members of the
group expect and desire the class of objects in question (for example,
“works of art" or “literature") to perform are their proper or intrinsic
functions, ail other expected, desired, or emergent functions being inap-
propriate, irrelevant, and extrinsic—abuses of the true nature of those
objects or violations of their authorially intended or generically intrinsic
purposes;
b) that the particular conditionz (circumstantial, technological, institu-
tional, and so forth) under which the members of the group typically
interact with those objects are suitable, standard, or necessary-for-their-
proper-appreciation, ail other conditions being exceptional, peculiar,
irregular, unsuitable, or substandard; and, most significantly of course,
c) that the particular zubjectz who constitute the established and au-
thorized members of the group are of sound mind and body, duly
trained and informed, and generally competent, ail other subjects being
defective, déficient, or deprived: suffering from crudenesses of sensibil-
ity, diseases and distortions of perception, weaknesses of character, im-
poverishment of background-and-education, cultural or historical
biases, ideological or personal préjudices and/or undeveloped, cor-
rupted, or jaded tastes.
A few points deserve spécial notice here. The first is that communities
(and drawingrooms) corne in ail sizes and that, insofar as the provin-
cials, colonials, and other marginalized groups mentioned above—
including the young—constitute social communities in themselves,
they also tend to hâve prevailing structures of tastes and may be ex
pected to control them in much the same ways as do more obviously
“establishment” groups. (“Folk-relativism” is neither confined to the
folk nor always exhibited by them.)
Second, with regard to (c) above, we may recall the familiar
41
spécifications of the “idéal" critic as one who, in addition to possessing

various exemplary natural endowments and cultural competencies, has,
through exacting feats of self-liberation, freed himself of ail forms of
particularity and individuality, ail spécial interests (or, as in Kant, ail
interests whatsoever), and thus of ail bias—which is to say, one who is
"free" of everything in relation to which any expérience or judgment of
value occurs. In these respects, it may be added, the idéal critic of
aesthetic axiology is the exact counterpart of the “idéal reader" of liter-
ary hermeneutics.
Finally, we may note that the privileging of a particular set offunctions
for artworks or works of literature (cf. (a), above) is often itself justified
on the ground that the performance of such functions serves some
higher individual, social, or transcendent good, such as the psychic
health of the reader, the brotherhood of mankind, the glorification of
God, the project of human émancipation, or the survival of Western
civilization. Any sélection from among these altemate—and clearly to
some extern mutually exclusive—higher goods, however, would itself
require justification in terms of some yet higher good, and there is no
absolute stopping point for this theoretically infinité regress of judg-
ments and justifications. This is not to say that certain functions of
artworks do not serve higher (or at least more general, comprehensive,
or longer-range) goods better than others. It is to say, however, that our
sélection among higher goods, like our sélection among any array of
goods, will always be contingent.14
Processes of Evaluation
It follows from the conception of value outlined above that évaluations
are not discrète acts or épisodes punctuating expérience but indistin-
guishable from the very processes of acting and experiencing them-
selves. In other words, for a responsive créature, to exist is to evaluate.
We are always, so to speak, calculating how things “figure" for us—
always pricing them, so to speak, in relation to the total economy of our
Personal universe.15 Throughout our lives, we perform a continuous
succession of what are, in effect, rapid-fire cost-benefit analyses, es-
timating the probable "worthwhileness" of altemate courses of action
in relation to our always limited resources of time and energy, assessing,
reassessing, and classifying entities with respect to their probable capac-
ity to satisfy our current needs and desires, and to serve our emergent
42
Contingertcies o f Value
interests and long-range plans and purposes. We tend to become most

conscious of our own évaluative behavior when the need to select
among an array of altemate "goods" and/or to résolve an internai "con-
test of sentiments” 16 moves us to specifically verbal or other symbolic
forms of accounting: thus we draw up our lists of pros and cons, lose
sleep, and bore our friends by overtly rehearsing our options, estimating
the risks and probable outcomes of various actions, and so forth. Most of
these "calculations,” however, are performed intuitively and inarticu-
lately, and many of them are so récurrent that the habituai arithmetic
becomes part of our personality and comprises the very style of our
being and behavior, forming what we may call our principles or tastes—
and what others may call our biases and préjudices.
I hâve been speaking up to this point of the évaluations we make for
ourselves. We do not, however, move about in a raw universe. Not only
are the objects we encounter always to some extent pre-interpreted and
pre-classified for us by our particular cultures and languages; they are
also pre-evaluated, bearing the marks and signs of their prior valuings
and évaluations by our fellow créatures. Indeed, pre-classification is
itself a form of pre-evaluation, for the labels or category names under
which we encounter objects not only, as I suggested earlier, foreground
certain of their possible functions, but also operate as signs—in effect, as
culturally certified endorsements—of their more or less effective per
formance of those functions.
Like ail other objects, works of art and literature bear the marks of
their own evaluational history, signs of value that acquire their force by
virtue of various social and cultural practices and, in this case, certain
highly specialized and elaborated institutions. The labels "art” and "lit
erature" are, of course, commonly signs of membership in distinctly
honorific categories. The particular functions that may be endorsed by
these labels, however, are, unlike those of "doorstops" and "docks,"
neither narrowly confined nor readily specifiable but, on the contrary,
exceptionally heterogeneous, mutable, and elusive. To the extent—
always limited—that the relation between these labels and a particular
set of expected and desired functions is stabilized within a community, it
is largely through the normative activities of various institutions: most
significantly, the literary and aesthetic academy which, among other
things, develops pédagogie and other acculturative mechanisms directed
at maintaining at least (and, commonly, at most) a dépopulation of the
community whose members "appreciate the value" of works of art and
literature "as stich." That is, by providing them with "necessary back-
43
grounds," teaching them "appropriate skills," "cultivating their inter-

ests/' and generally "developing their tastes,” the academy produces
génération after génération of subjects for whom the objects and texts
thus labeled do indeed perform the functions thus privileged, thereby
ensuring the continuity of mutually defining canonical works, canonical
functions, and canonical audiences.17
Artistic Création as a Paradigm of Evaluative Activity

It will be instructive at this point (and also for later analysis) to consider
the very beginning of a work's valuational history—that is, its initial
évaluation by the artist (here, the author)—for it is not only a
préfiguration of ail the subséquent acts of évaluation of which the work
will become the subject but is also a model or paradigm of ail évaluative
activity generally. I refer here not merely to that ultimate gesture of
authorial judgment that must exhibit itself negatively—that is, in the
author's either letting the work stand or ripping it up—but to the
thousand individual acts of approval and rejection, preference and as-
sessment, trial and révision, that constitute the entire process of literary
composition. The work we receive is not so much the achieved consum-
mation of that process as its enforced abandonment: ''abandonment"
not because the author's techniques are inadéquate to her goals, but
because the goals themselves are inevitably multiple, mixed, mutually
competing and thus mutually constraining, and also because they are
inevitably unstable, changing their nature and relative potency and
priority during the very course of composition. The completed work is
thus always, in a sense, a temporary truce among contending forces,
achieved at the point of exhaustion, that is, the literal déplétion of the
author's current resources or, given the most fundamental principle of
the économies of existence, at the point when she simply has something
else—more worthwhile—to do: when, in other words, the time and
energy she would hâve to give to further tinkering, testing, and adjust-
ment are no longer compensated for by an adequately rewarding sense
of continuing interest in the process or increased satisfaction in the
product.
It is for comparable reasons that we, as readers of the work, will later
let our own expérience of it stand: not because we hâve "fully ap-
preciated" the work, not because we hâve exhausted ail its possible
sources of interest and hence of value, but because we, too, ultimately
hâve something else—more worthwhile—to do. The reader's experi-
44
ence of the work is pre-figured—that is, both calculated and pre-

enacted—by the author in other ways as well: for, in selecting this
word, adjusting that tum of phrase, preferring this rhyme to that,
she is ail the while testing the local and global effectiveness of each
decision by impersonating in advance her various presumptive audi
ences, who thereby themselves participate in shaping the work they will
later read. Every literary work—and, more generally, artwork—is thus
the product of a complex évaluative feedback loop that embraces not
only the ever-shifting economy of the artist's own interests and re-
sources as they evolve during and in reaction to the process of composi
tion, but also ail the shifting économies of her assumed and imagined
audiences, including those who do not yet exist but whose emergent
interests, variable conditions of encounter, and rival sources of gratifi
cation she will attempt to predict—or will intuitively surmise—and to
which, among other things, her own sense of the fittingness of each
decision will be responsive.18
The inévitable évaluative and prefigurative aspects of literary compo
sition, or of what is commonly referred to as “the créative process" in
relation specifically to aesthetic/cultural production, mark significant
continuities not only between "créative" and "critical" activities but
also between "artistic" and "scientific" production, and thereby make
quite problematic the traditional effort to maintain clear distinctions
among any of these. I shall retum in Chapter 5 to the relation between
the simultaneously critical and productive processes of artistic composi
tion and some characteristic aspects of scientific activity.19
The description, above, of the évaluative processes of the author and,

analogously, the individual reader, may be extended even further.
For it also describes ail the other diverse forms of évaluation by which
the work will be subsequently marked and its value reproduced and
transmitted: that is, the innumerable implicit acts of évaluation per-
formed by those who, as may happen, publish the work, purchase,
preserve, display, quote, cite, translate, perform, allude to, and imitate
it; the more explicit but casual judgments made, debated, and negoti-
ated in informai contexts by readers and by ail those others in whose
Personal économies the work, in some way, "figures"; and the highly
specialized institutionalized forms of évaluation exhibited in the more or
less professional activities of scholars, teachers, and academie or jour-
nalistic critics: not only their full-dress reviews and explicit rank-
orderings, évaluations, and revaluations, but also such activities as the
45
Two related points need emphasis here. One is that the current value
of a work—that is, its effectiveness in performing desired/able functions
for some set of subjects—is by no means independent of authorial de
sign, labor, and skill. To be sure, the artist does not hâve absolute
control over that value, nor can its dimensions be simply equated with
the dimensions of his artistic skill or genius. But the common anxiety
that attention to the cultural déterminants of aesthetic value makes the
artist or artistic labor irrelevant is simply unfounded. The second point is
that what may be spoken of as the "properties" of a work—its “struc
ture," “features," "qualities," and of course its “meanings"—are not
fixed, given, or inhérent in the work "itself ' but are at every point the
variable products of particular subjects' interactions with it. Thus, it is
never "the same Homer."22 This is not to deny that some aspect, or
perhaps many aspects, of a work may be constituted in similar ways by
numerous different subjects, among whom we may include the author: to
the extent that this duplication occurs, however, it will be because the
subjects who do the constituting are themselves similar, not only or
simply in being human créatures (and thereby, as it is commonly sup-
posed, "sharing an underlying humanity" and so on) but in occupying a
particular universe that may be, for them, in many respects récurrent or
relatively continuous and stable, and/or in inheriting from one another,
through mechanisms of cultural transmission, certain ways of interacting
with texts and "works of literature."
To continue, however, the account of the cultural-historical dynamics
of endurance. An object or artifact that performs certain desired/able
functions particularly well at a given time for some community of sub
jects, being perhaps not only "fit" but exemplary—that is, "the best of
its kind"—under those conditions, will hâve an immédiate survival
advantage; for, relative to (or in compétition with) other comparable
objects or artifacts available at that time, it will not only be better pro-
tected from physical détérioration but will also be more frequently used
or Widely exhibited and, if it is a text or verbal artifact, more frequently
read or recited, copied or reprinted, translated, imitated, cited, com-
mented upon, and so forth—in short, culturally re-produced—and thus
will be more readily available to perform those or other functions for
other subjects at a subséquent time.
Two possible trajectories ensue:
1. If, on the one hand, under the changing and emergent conditions
of that subséquent time, the functions for which the text was earlier
valued are no longer desired/able or if, in compétition with comparable
48
works (including, now, those newly produced with newly available

materials and techniques), it no longer performs those original fonctions
particularly well, it will, accordingly, be less well maintained and less
frequently cited, recited, etc., so that its visibility as well as interest will
fade and it'will survive, if at ail, simply as a physical relie. It may, of
course, be subsequently valued specifically as a relie (for its archeolog-
ical or "historical" interest), in which case it will be performing desired/
able fonctions and pursue the trajectory described below. It may also be
subsequently "rediscovered" as an "unjustly neglected masterpiece,"
either when the fonctions it had originally performed are again desired/
able or, what is more likely, when different of its properties and possible
fonctions become foregrounded by a new set of subjects with emergent
interêsts and purposes.
2. If, on the other hand, under changing conditions and in compéti
tion with newly produced and other re-produced works, it continues to
perform sortie desired/able fonctions particularly well, even if not the
same ones for which it was initially valued (and, accordingly, by virtue
of other newly foregrounded or differently framed or configured proper
ties—including, once again, emergent "meanings"), it will continue to
be cited and recited, continue to be visible and available to succeeding
générations of subjects, and thus continue to be culturally re-produced.
A work that has in this way survived for some time can always move
into a trajectory of extinction through the sudden emergence or graduai
conjunction of unfavorable conditions of the kind described above.
There are, however, a number of reasons why, once it has
achieved canonical status, it will be more secure from that risk.
For one thing, when the value of a work is seen as unquestionable,
those of its features that would, in a noncanonical work, be found
alienating—for example, technically crade, philosophically naïve, or
narrowly topical—will be glozed over or backgrounded. In particular,
features that conflict intolerably with the interests and idéologies of
subséquent subjects (and, in the West, with those generally benign
"humanistic'' values for which canonical works are commonly cele-
brated)—for example, incidents or sentiments of bratality, bigotry,
and racial, sexual, or national chauvinism—will be repressed or
rationalized, and there will be a tendency among humanistic scholars
and academie critics to "save the text" by transferring the locus of its
interest to more formai or structural features and/or by allegorizing its
potentially alienating ideology to some more general ("universal") level
where it becomes more tolerable and also more readily interprétable in
49
ternis of contemporary idéologies. Thus we make texts timeless by sup-

pressing their temporality. (It may be added that to those scholars and
critics for whom those features are not only palatable but for whom the
value of the canonical works consists precisely in their "embodying"
and "preserving" such “traditional values," the transfer of the locus of
value to formai properties will be seen as a descent into formalism and
"aestheticism," and the tendency to allegorize it too generally or to
interpret it too readily in terms of "modem values" will be seen not as
saving the text but as betraying it.)
Second, in addition to whatever various and perhaps continuously
differing functions a work performs for succeeding générations of indi-
vidual subjects, it will also begin to perform certain characteristic cul
tural functions by virtue of the very fact that it has endured—that is, the
functions of a canonical work as such—and be valued and preserved
accordingly: as a witness to lost innocence, former glory, and/or appar-
ently persistent communal interests and "values" and thus a banner of
communal identity; as a réservoir of images, archétypes, and topoi—
characters and épisodes, passages and verbal tags—repeatedly invoked
and recurrently applied to new situations and circumstances; and as a
stylistic and generic exemplar that will energize the production of subsé
quent works and texts (upon which the latter will be modeled and by
which, as a normative "touchstone," they will be measured). In these
ways, the canonical work begins increasingly not merely to survive
within but to shape and create the culture in which its value is produced
and transmitted and, for that very reason, to perpetuate the conditions
of its own flourishing. Nothing endures like endurance.
To the extern that we develop within and are formed by a culture that
is itself constituted in part by canonical texts, it is not surprising that
those texts seem, as Hans-Georg Gadamer puts it, to "speak" to us
"directly" and even "specially": "The classical is what is preserved pre
cisely because it signifies and interprets itself; [that is,] that which
speaks in such a way that it is not a statement about what is past, as
mere testimony to something that needs to be interpreted, but says
something to the présent as if it were said specially to us . . . This is just
what the word 'classical' means, that the duration of the power of a
work to speak directly is fundamentally unlimited."23 It is hardly, how-
ever, as Gadamer implies here, because such texts are uniquely self-
mediated or unmediated and hence not needful of interprétation but,
rather, because they hâve already been so thoroughly mediated—
evaluated as well as interpreted—for us by the very culture and cultural
50
institutions through which they hâve been preserved and by which we

ourselves hâve been formed.
What is commonly referred to as "the test of time" (Gadamer, for
example, characterizes "the classical" as "a notable mode of 'being
historical,' that historical process of préservation that through the con
stant proving of itself sets before us something that is true")24 is not, as
the figure implies, an impersonal and impartial mechanism; for the
cultural institutions through which it opérâtes (schools, libraries, the-
aters, muséums, publishing and printing houses, éditorial boards, prize-
awarding commissions, State censors, and so forth) are, of course, ail
managed by persons (who, by définition, are those with cultural power
and commonly other forms of power as well); and, since the texts that
are selected and preserved by "time" will always tend to be those which
"fit" (and, indeed, hâve often been designed to fit) their characteristic
needs, interests, resources, and purposes, that testing mechanism has its
own built-in partialities accumulated in and thus intensifled by time. For
example, the characteristic resources of the culturally dominant mem-
bers of a community include access to spécifie training and the opportu-
nity and occasion to develop not only compétence in a large number of
cultural codes but also a large number of diverse (or "cosmopolitan")
interests. The works that are differentially reproduced, therefore, will
tend to be those that gratify the exercise of such competencies and
engage interests of that kind: specifically, works that are structurally
complex and, in the technical sense, information-rich—and which, by
virtue of those qualifies, may be especially amenable to multiple re
configuration, more likely to enter into relation with the emergent inter
ests of various subjects, and thus more readily adaptable to emergent
conditions. Also, as is often remarked, since those with cultural power
tend to be members of socially, economically, and politically established
classes (or to serve them and identify their own interests with theirs),
the texts that survive will tend to be those that appear to reflect and
reinforce establishment idéologies. However much canonical works
may be seen to "question" secular vanities such as wealth, social posi
tion, and political power, "remind" their readers of more elevated
values and virtues, and oblige them to "confront" such hard truths and
harsh realities as their own mortality and the hidden griefs of obscure
people, they would not be found to please long and well if they were
seen radically to undercut establishment interests or effectively to subvert
the idéologies that support them. (Construing them to the latter ends, of
course, is one of the characteristic ways in which those with anti-
51
establishment interests participate in the cultural re-production of ca-

nonical texts and thus in their endurance as well.)
Two final points should be added here. First, it should be noted that
“structural complexity" and “information-richness" are, of course,
subject-relative as “qualities" and also experientially subject-variable.
Since we differ individually in our tolérance for complexity in various
sensory/perceptual modalities and also in our ability to process informa
tion in different codes, what is interestingly complex and engagingly
information-rich to one subject may be intolerably chaotic to another
and slickly academie to yet a third. Moreover, these tolérances and
compétences are themselves the complex and variable products of cul-
turally spécifie conditions. For these reasons, and pace the more naïvely
ambitious daims of “empirical aesthetics," such features cannot operate
as “objective" measures of aesthetic value.25
Second, it is clear that the needs, interests, and purposes of culturally
and otherwise dominant members of a community do not exclusively or
totally détermine which works survive. The antiquity and longevity of
domestic proverbs, popular taies, children's verbal games, and the entire
phenomenon of what we call "folklore," which occurs through the same
or corresponding mechanisms of cultural sélection and re-production as
those described above specifically for "texts," demonstrate that the "en
durance" of a verbal artifact (if not its achievement of academie canonical
status as a "work of literature"—many folkloric works do, however,
perform ail the functions described above as characteristic of canonical
works as such) may be more or less independent of institutions con-
trolled by those with political power. Moreover, the interests and pur
poses of the latter must always operate in interaction with non- or
antiestablishment interests and purposes as well as with various other
contingencies and "accidents of time" over which they hâve limited, if
any, control, ffom the buming of libraries to political and social révolu
tion, religious iconodasms, and shifts of dominance among entire lan-
guages and cultures.
As the preceding discussion suggests, the value of a literary work is

continuously produced and re-produced by the very acts of implicit and
explicit évaluation that are frequently invoked as "reflecting" its value
and therefore as being evidence of it. In other words, what are com-
monly taken to be the signs of literary value are, in effect, its springs. The
endurance of a classic canonical author such as Homer, then, owes not
to the alleged transcultural or universal value of his works but, on the
52
Contingentiez of Value
contrary, to the continuity of their circulation in a particular culture.

Repeatedly cited and recited, translated, taught and imitated, and thor-
oughly enmeshed in the network of intertextuality that continuously
constitutes the high culture of the orthodoxly educated population of the
West (and the Westem-educated population of the rest of the world),
that highly variable entity we refer to as "Homer" recurrently enters our
expérience in relation to a large number and variety of our interests and
thus can perform a large number of various functions for us and obvi-
ously has performed them for many of us over a good bit of the history
of our culture. It is well to recall, however, that there are many people in
the world who are not—or are not yet, or choose not to be—among the
orthodoxly educated population of the West: people who do not en-
counter Western classics at ail or who encounter them under cultural
and institutional conditions very different from those of American and
European college professors and their students. The fact that Homer,
Dante, and Shakespeare do not figure signifîcantly in the personal écon
omies of these people, do not perform individual or social functions that
gratify their interests, do not hâve value for them, might properly be taken
as qualifying the daims of transcendent universal value made for such
Works. As we know, however, it is routinely taken instead as evidence
or confirmation of the cultural deficiency—or, more piously, "depriva-
tion"—of such people. The fact that other verbal artifacts (not necessar-
ily "works of literature" or even "texts") and other objects and events
(not necessarily "works of art" or even artifacts) hâve performed and do
perform for them the various functions that Homer, Dante, and Shake
speare perform for us and, moreover, that the possibility of performing
the totality of such functions is always distributed over the totality of
texts, artifacts, objects, and events—a possibility continuously realized
and thus a value continuously "appreciated"—commonly cannot be
grasped or acknowledged by the custodians of the Western canon.
53
4
Axiologic Logic
No illusion is more powerful than that of the inevitability and propriety

of one's own beliefs and judgments. The conviction of the necessity of
one's convictions survives the most strenuous opposition and extensive
contradiction. Indeed, it feeds off them: self-privileging opérâtes not
merely as a self-sustaining mechanism but as a productive one, generat-
ing new perceptual and conceptual articulations—new beliefs, descrip
tions, interprétations, judgments, and justifications—even from "évi
dence” and "arguments" to the contrary. Since the self, even as it is
transformed by its interactions with the world, also transforms how that
world seems to itself, its System of self-securing is not thereby unhinged
nor is it "corrected" by cosmopolitanism. Rather, in enlarging its view
"from China to Peru," it may become ail the more imperialistic, seeing
in every horizon of différence new périphéries of its own centrality, new
pathologies through which its own normality may be defined and must
be asserted.
The project of axiology—that is, the justification of the claim of cer
tain norms, standards, and judgments to objective validity, which is to
say the démonstration of the noncontingency of the contingent—must,
by the définition of it just given, fail. And, in a sense, it always does fail.
That is, ail axiological arguments, no matter what their epistemological
tradition or explicit logical method, whether empiricist or rationalist,
positivist or phenomenological, and also no matter what the domain—
aesthetic, cognitive, or moral—of the judgments and standards at issue,
enact a characteristic array of ultimately self-canceling moves. Never-
theless, the axiological account of the phenomena of human preferences
54
Axiologic Logic
has been and remains the dominant one in Western thought. The struc
ture of argumentation in the two classic axiologies of Western critical
theory, Hume's essay “Of the Standard of Taste" and Kant's Critique of
Judgment, will be examined here, as will also the persistence, domi
nance, and indeed historical success of the logic they exemplify.
Hume's Natural Standard

Hume's essay opens with what had already become, and remains, the
preferred gambit of axiological argumentation, namely an urbane—-and
here, pointedly cosmopolitan—acknowledgment of the diversity of in-
dividual judgments:
The great variety of Taste, as well as of opinion, which prevails in the
world, is too obvious not to hâve fallen under every one's observation . . .
Those who can enlarge their view to contemplate distant nations and
remote âges, are still more surprised at the great inconsistence and contra-
riety. We are apt to call barbarous whatever départs widely from our own
taste and appréhension; but soon find the epithet of reproach retorted
upon us. And the highest arrogance and self-conceit is at last startled, on
observing an equal assurance on ail sides, and scruples, amidst such a
contest of sentiment, to pronounce positively in its own favor.1
We see already, however, in the very terms of the move, the shadow of
what will corne, as “variety" becomes "contest," a zero-sum game with
winners and losers. For it is, of course, precisely that "scruple" that must
be removed and that "arrogance and conceit" that must be justified.
Hume's next move is to grant even more expansively the cultural
diversity of judgments. Indeed, he observes that "from the very nature
of language" apparent agreement may cover disagreement, and illus
trâtes the point as follows:
The admirers and followers of the Alcoran [i.e., the Koran] insist on the
excellent moral precepts interspersed throughout that wild and absurd
performance. But it is to be supposed, that the Arabie words, which corre
spond to the English, equity, justice, tempérance, meekness, charity, were
such as . . . must always be taken in a good sense . . . But would we know,
whether the pretended prophet had really attained a just sentiment of
morals, let us attend to his narration, and we shall soon find, that he
bestows praise on such instances of treachery, inhumanity, cruelty, re
venge, bigotry, as are utterly incompatible with civilized society. (ST, p. 5)
55
Axiologic Logic
Having before us an example of sentiments "utterly incompatible

with civilized society," we are prepared for the pivotai tum: "It is natu-
ral for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule by which the various senti
ments of men may be reconciled; at least a decision afforded confirming
one sentiment, and condemning another" (ST, p. 5). What makes that
search natural is a question that remains unanswered in the essay, as is
also the question of whose interests are served by either a réconciliation
of divergent sentiments of taste or a decision confirming one sentiment
and condemning another. One answer—but itself problematic—is sug-
gested by the analogies, récurrent in Hume and elsewhere in the critical
tradition, between the exercise of judgment in matters of taste and the
use of instruments of measurement (docks, watches, scales, yardsticks)
in the pursuit of such affairs as trade, navigation, engineering, and
property settlements. The analogy appeals to our récognition that, in the
latter affairs, where disruptions and confusions would resuit ffom diver
gent units, instruments, or procedures of measurement, a standard that
regularizes or "reconciles" them benefits ali parties concemed. For such
purposes, it is certainly advantageous (and in that sense "natural") for
those affected to seek a standard, and they commonly find it by establish-
ing it: for example, by selecting and arbitrarily privileging a unit
identified with some commonly accessible and/or relatively durable réf
érencé point (such as the meridian at Greenwich or a métal rod depos-
ited in the National Bureau of Standards), with respect to which mea-
surements are conventionally (and only in the relevant community, of
course) determined as "correct."
When the analogy is thus drawn out, however, the inadequacy of the
answer is évident, for it not only reminds us of the arbitrariness (in the
sense of conventionality or un-"naturalness") of other standards and
norms, but it leaves us with the question of what communal good is
served by establishing a standard of taste. A different sort of answer to
the initial question is implied in the second part of Hume's observation
and emerges with increasing force as the essay unfolds: for what appears
to be perhaps even more désirable than "a rule by w hich. . . sentiments
. . . may be reconciled" is one that affords "a decision. . . confirming one
sentiment and condemning another," which is a different matter. For in
the latter case, what is implemented by the standard is not—or at least
not self-evidently—a general interest or communal goal but the évalua
tive authority of some members of the community over others.
The latter point is important and will receive further discussion be-
low. I continue hère, however, to follow Hume's argument. The search
56
Axiologic Logic
for the standard of taste is represented as not only natural and in the
service of peace, justice, and convenience, but also as heroic, for it must
do battle with despair and impotence, that is, axiological skepticism: “a
species of philosophy, which cuts off ali hopes of success in such an
attempt, and represents the impossibility of ever attaining any standard
of taste" (ST, p. 6). The skeptic's argument, as Hume présents it, is as
follows: whereas in questions of empirical knowledge there is an exter-
nal standard of correctness, namely conformability to "real matter of
fact," in questions of taste "sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond
itself, and is always real, wherever a man is conscious of it" (ibid.).
Therefore, the skeptic concludes, "every individual ought to acquiesce
in his own sentiment, without pretending to regulate that of others," a
conclusion which. Hume points out, is in accord with "common sense";
and, he adds, if the skeptic is right, then "the proverb has jusdy deter-
mined it to be fruitless to dispute conceming tastes" (ibid.)—in short, De
gustibus.
Because of what is at stake, however, this apparently génial conclu
sion cannot be the last word. Hume's initial move against it is to invoke
"a certain [other] species of common sense, which opposes it, or at least
serves to modify and restrain it":
Whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between Ogilby

and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison, would be thought to defend no less
an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-hill to be as high as
Teneriffe, or a pond as extensive as the océan. Though there may be found
persons, who give the preference to the former authors; no one pays atten
tion to such a taste; and we pronounce, without scruple, the sentiment of
these pretended critics to be absurd and ridiculous. (ST, p. 7; emphasis
added)
This drawingroom vignette has considérable rhetorical force, and

some version of it occurs repeatedly—or is spontaneously recreated—as
a triumphant clincher in arguments against axiological skepticism.
Three points, however, aside from that remarkable sequence of pro-
nouns, may be noted immediately. The first, which I shall not pursue
further here, is that Hume's skeptic is wrong, but not in the ways or for
the reasons that Hume indicates: rather, in concluding from the non-
objectivity of taste that ail judgments of taste are "equally valid," the
skeptic falls into the significant error discussed in Chapters 5 and 7 as
the Egalitarian Fallacy, as does thereby Hume. The second, a more
obvious point though its implications are often evadéd, is the embar-
57
Axiologic Logic
rassment of the argument by the examples, a not infrequent occurrence

in axiological démonstrations where the force of supposedly self-evident
evidence is continuously being historically uridermined by precisely
those operations of historical (and other) contingency that are thereby
being denied. It is not irrelevant that the embarrassment is discreetly
glossed over by Hume's twentieth-century editor who, alluding to this
moment in the argument, tacitly substitutes "Shakespeare's poetry" and
"doggerel" for Hume's equivocal examples, evidently counting on the
vividness and direction of that contrast to hold up somewhat longer (ST,
p. xx). The force of any such contrast, however, is just as historically and
otherwise contingent as that of any other.2 For example, someone might
"give the preference" to doggerel over Shakespeare's poetry to illustrate
the nature and effects of certain verse forms. To object that such a
purpose is "atypical" or "not what people usually hâve in mind" when
they say one work is better than another is only to restate the contin
gency of the value typically asserted: its dependence, in other words,
on the performance of a particular—assumed, "had in mind," if not
stated—set of functions. The third and most important point is Hume's
explicit recouping for "us" of the privilège that was only temporarily set
aside in the opening paragraph of the essay as "the highest arrogance
and conceit," namely the privilège, when "pretended critics" with "ab-
surd and ridiculous sentiments" contest our own judgments, to "pro-
nounce positively in [our] own favor"—“without scruple.” As noted
above, the removal of that scruple and the justification of that privilège
are central motives of the construction of the Standard of Taste—and, it
may be added hère, of the entire axiological project per se.
In view of certain objections that the foregoing analysis recurrently
elicits, two additional points may be made hère. One is that much of the
force of Hume's argument in this passage dépends on his crucial but
complex switch of the skeptical and/or philistine daims he undertakes
to rebut. Thus, affirming an "equality of genius and elegance" between
two authors is not the same as observing in general terms that one author
is "just as good as" (or even "better than") another, and very different
from observing an "equality of taste" among ail critics. Hume obscures
these différences when he moves from the spécifie examples to speak of
the absurdity of someone's "giving the preference to the former au
thors," where it is not clear whether this means someone's (a) stating
his own preference for Ogilby over Milton and Bunyan over Addison, or
(b) stating that Ogilby and Bunyan are—objectively and absolutely, as it
were—better than Milton and Addison, or (c) stating that the former
58
Axiologic Logic
are equal or superior to the latter in "elegance" and "genius." In the

first case, where the judgment or claim is weakest or most highly
qualified (as in "Well, m'Luds, the fact o' the matter is I'd rather read
Bunyan than Addison any day"), "we" may find the preference con-
temptible or hard to imagine, but the only thing that is thereby demon-
strated is that tastes can diverge quite widely, and, since no one ever
claimed otherwise, the example proves nothing. In the last two cases,
where the claim or judgment is most unqualified (as in "Unquestion-
ably, gentlemen, Ogilby is as great a genius as Milton"), what is re-
vealed is how ridiculous an opinion will be to "us" in view of what
"we" ail believe to be necessarily and self-evidendy otherwise, a re-
sponse that is evidence not, of course, of the necessity or rightness of our
convictions but only of the strength of our illusion to that effect.
The other point is that, although daims of equality of value among
authors or works may indeed become harder to maintain as the terms of
the comparison become more spécifie, this is not, as is commonly main-
tained, because the daims are more readily seen as "factually" correct
or incorrect as they corne doser to being "descriptions" but, rather,
because the more spécifie terms call into play the strong operation of
linguistic conventions and thus, in effect, another form of communal
consensus. The question then becomes why or how such terms (or what
are called "aesthetic predicates") operate with spécifie meaning and
effect, and, in particular, whether it is a matter of their correctly naming
the "objective features" of artworks; it becomes, in short, nothing other
than the issue of the viability of the traditional correspondence-to-
reality theory of language, truth, and validity. Although that issue is too
broad and complex for considération at this point (I will discuss it in
Chapter 5), it may be noted here that Madame A's sense of the self-
evident absurdity of Lord B's saying that Ogilby is as great a genius as
Milton, or of Mistress C's saying that Bunyan is as élégant a writer as
Addison, cannot be separated from how, within spécifie verbal com-
munities that coincide to a large degree with spécifie social classes, each one of
them has learned to use the words "genius" and "elegance."
We hâve yet to consider the central axiological move of Hume's argu

ment, which is to ground the standard of taste in (naturally, one might
say) nature: specifically, the presumed psychophysiological nature of ail
human beings. Thus, granting that the skeptic is correct in maintaining
that beauty is not an objective property of things but only a sentiment
produced in us by objects (or, as he indicates later, certain of their
59
Axiologic Logic
formai qualities), Hume observes that there is nevertheless "a catholic

and universal beauty" that results from "the relation which nature has
placed between the form and the sentiment.” The core of the argument,
then, is that by virtue of our "structure," "organs," or "machine,"
certain "forms and qualities" naturally produce "feelings of pleasure or
displeasure" in us, and these feelings are simultaneously the source of
ail general rules of art and the empirical underpinnings for the standard
of taste.
No sooner is this claim put into place, however, than it must be
qualifîed; for, it seems, men do not always feel in accord with the
common feelings of men or, as Hume puts it: "But though ail the
general rules of art are founded only on expérience, and on the observa
tion of the common sentiments of human nature, we must not imagine,
that, on every occasion, the feelings of men will be conformable to these
rules" (ST, p. 8). And not only " n o t . . . on every occasion" but on very
few occasions; for, as the next wave of qualifications insists, these feel
ings require "the concurrence of many favorable circumstances" to
make them "play . . . according to their general and established princi-
ples." If we want to "make an experiment" and "try the force of any
beauty or deformity" (either, it appears, in order to test which of the two
it is or, assuming "we" already know that, to give ourselves clear évi
dence of the relation between "the form" and "the sentiment"), "we
must choose with care a proper time and place, and bring the fancy to a
suitable situation and disposition. A perfect serenity of mind, a recollec
tion of thought, a due attention to the object; if any of these circum
stances be wanting, our experiment will be fallacious, and we shall be
unable to judge of the catholic and universal beauty" (ST, pp. 8-9,
emphasis added).
In view of how difficult it is to arrange the conditions under which the
natural and common feelings of men will exhibit themselves ("The least
exterior hindrance to such small springs, or the least internai disorder,
disturbs their motion, and confounds the operation of the whole ma
chine"—ST, p. 8), Hume suggests that we not dépend on this experi
ment for evidence of the natural relation between forms and sentiments,
but tum instead to another, more reliable crucible, namely the test of
time.3 Hence the familiar passage:
We shall be able to ascertain its influence . . . from the durable admiration

which attends those works that hâve survived ail the caprices of mode and
fashion, ail the mistakes of ignorance and envy.
60
Axiologic Logic
The same Homer who pleased at Athens and Rome two thousand years
ago, is still admired at Paris and at London. Ail the changes of climate,
govemment, religion, and language, hâve not been able to obscure his
glory . . .
It appears, then, that amidst ail the variety and caprice of taste, there are
certain general principles of approbation or blâme, whose influence a care-
ful eye may trace in ail operations of the mind. Some particular forms or
qualities, from the original structure of the internai fabric are calculated to
please, and others to displease; and if they fail of their effect in any particu
lar instance, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection in the organ.
Many and frequent are the defects . . . (ST, pp. 9-10)
As I pointed out in Chapter 3, the passage is a mémorable instance of
the sort of asymmetrical explanation of preferences that is one of the
definitive marks of axiological logic: intrinsic qualities of objects plus
universal, underlying principles of human nature are invoked to explain
stability and convergence; historical accident and error and the defects
and imperfections of individual subjects are invoked to explain their
divergence and mutability—and also, thereby, to explain the failure of
the universal principles to operate universally.
Hume goes on to enumerate and elaborate the defects at great length,
introducing the familiar catalogue (already given vivid expression in,
among other places, Pope's Essay on Criticism) with an analogy, also a
commonplace of the tradition, between "the perfect beauty" as agreed
upon by men "in a sound State of the organ" and the "true and real
color" of objects as they appear "in daylight, to the eye of a man in
health" (ST, p. 10). This analogy too, however, ultimately controverts
the point it was designed to support. For, whereas standardized usage
with respect to color-labels can be explained (or, if one likes, "jus-
tified") by the overwhelming numerical prédominance of persons with
the sort of color-vision which we therefore call "normal," it appears from
the very length of the catalogue of defects provided by Hume that, in his
words, "the generality of men labor under some imperfection [of the
organs of taste] "—and, indeed, that a man with healthy organs is "so
rare a character" that "a true judge in the fine arts is difficult to discover
even in the most polished âges" (ST, p. 17).
Hume acknowledges the difficulty as follows; "But where are such
critics to be found? By what marks are they to be known? How distin-
guish them from pretenders? These questions are embarrassing; and
seem to throw us back into the same uncertainty from which, during the
course of this Essay, we hâve endeavored to extricate ourselves" (ST,
61
Axiologic Logic
p. 17). He extricates himself here by firmly begging the question and

casually substituting one dubious universal for another: “But if we con-
sider the matters aright, these are questions of fact, not of sentiment. . .
It is sufficient for our présent purpose, if we hâve proved, that the taste
of ail individuals is not upon an equal footing, and that some men in
general, however difficult to be particularly pitched upon, will be ac-
knowledged by universal sentiment to havé a preference above others"
(ST, pp. 17-18; emphasis added). But this alleged universal acknow-
ledgment of the “preference" of some art critics above others must en-
counter the same difficulties as the initially alleged universal acknow-
ledgment of the superiority of some art works above others, and the
argument thus moves us inexorably toward the same uncertainties from
which it was designed to extricate us. For the same exceptions to the
general raie would hâve to be acknowledged and explained, the same
defects would hâve to be imputed to those people who do not, in fact,
prefer those critics preferred by universal sentiment,4 and the same
questions would hâve to be raised or begged ail over again.
The characteristic difficulties encountered by axiological logic are ex-
hibited most dramatically in the conduding pages of the essay, where
Hume grants that the skeptic's De gustibus view is “unavoidable" in
certain cases. Since, however, these presumably spécial cases (or excep
tions to the raie) are defined by a principle that must embrace ail cases,
Hume is edged toward a total tumabout, which he almost—but not
quite—executes :
But not withstanding ail our endeavors to fix a standard of taste, . . .

there still remain two sources of variation, which . . . will often serve to
produce a différence in the degrees of our approbation or blâme. The one is
the different humors of particular men; the other, the particular manners
and opinions of our âge and country . . . Where there is such a diversity in
the internai frame or extemal situation as is entirely blameless on both
sides,. . . in that case a certain degree of diversity in judgment is unavoid
able, and we seek in vain for a standard, by which we can reconcile the
contrary sentiments. (ST, pp. 19-20)
The qualification that keeps this from being a total reversai—for, after
ail, what other sources of différence are there besides those of the "inter
nai frame" and "extemal situation"?—is the phrase "as is entirely
blameless on ail sides." But this qualification also introduces a new
normative considération, here a moral one; for how—on what basis, in
reference to what standard, grounded on what other universal—do we
know or décidé that something in the internai frame or extemal situa-
62
Axiologic Logic
tion is blâmable or not? And so the argument moves again toward that
infinité regress of norm and justification, and justification of justifi
cation, toward which the essay repeatedly slips and into which ail ax-
iologies typically tumble.
As we hâve seen, each piece of evidence for the existence of "general

principles of approbation and blâme" must be repeatedly hedged and
severely qualified: the universality of the appeal of certain authors is not
quite universal; the underlying shared psychophysiological structure of
ail human beings is usually defective; and "the whole machine" by
virtue of which certain feelings are naturally produced by certain forms
can operate only under very spécial conditions and, even then, very
unreliably. Moreover, when the evidence is restated with ail its nec-
essary hedges, acknowledged qualifications, and rigorously detailed
spécifications in place, its claim to foundational status collapses; for it
then becomes équivalent to a statement of the conditionality of aesthetic
preferences and also the conditionality of their convergence, which is of
course the very opposite of an unconditioned (unchanging, fixed, abso-
lute, objective) foundation for a standard of taste.
The point evidently needs emphasis, for it is often argued that these
qualifications and spécifications show that Hume recognized and "al-
ready allowed for" the various exceptions to his rules mentioned here.
To be sure; what such arguments fail to recognize, however, is that
when the qualifications and spécifications are in place, the universals
are no longer universals, the unconditional foundations are no longer
unconditional, and whatever standards are built upon them lose the
force of absolûtes. Hume's claim is that there is empirical, factual evi
dence for a natural norm of taste. When restated with the conceded
qualifications, however, the foundation of that norm, the alleged fact
that some objects, by the very structure of the mind, are naturally cal-
culated to please and others to displease, becomes the limp truism, some
objects tend to please or displease some people under some conditions, that is,
the simple observation of the simple fact that people hâve preferences—
or the not much more interesting truism, different objects please different
people differently, and please the same people differently under different condi
tions, that is, the simple observation of the simple fact of diversity, none
other than the very one which Hume noted, at the beginning of the
essay, as "too obvious not to hâve fallen under every one's observa
tion." Neither of these commonplace observations can be a foundation
for deciding which tastes are "normal" or "defective," or which judg-
ments are "correct" or "absurd"; on the contrary, it is always in the face
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of the fact of the diversity of preferences that the axiological argument

seeks to discover underlying normative principles—principles, that is,
that validate the privileged status of some of those preferences. As in
Hume's essay, however, so also in any other instance of axiological
logic: the argument always either dissolves into infinité régresses, or is
supported in circular or bootstrap fashion by unacknowledged self-
privileging a priori norms, or amounts to an axiologically impotent
restatement of the diversity and conditionality of ail preferences and the
contingency of ail value.
Hume's essay is, to my mind, more interesting and theoretically richer

than any other text in the classic axiological tradition, not excepting
Kant's Critique of Judgment—though this, of course, is a matter of taste.
As I hâve sought to indicate, however, the essay also appears to be
deeply at odds with itself. The buts that recur at the beginning of a good
number of the paragraphs quoted above are characteristic of the entire
essay, which moves repeatedly from some strong general statement to
an acknowledgment and examination of the exceptions and thence to a
qualified but highly unstable recovery of the initial generalization, re-
quiring further acknowledgment and accounting for (or discounting of)
further exceptions, and so on. Given that this structure govems not only
the major line of argument but every subsidiary element of it, recurring
throughout the essay and sometimes several times within a single para-
graph, it may be suspected that strong but antagonistic forces were
operating here: specifically, it seems, the power of Hume's tempera-
mental skepticism and cosmopolitan personal history continuously con-
spired to subvert, but was in tum subverted by, both the momentum of
his traversing the already well-established (and in some ways quite
"natural") routes of axiological logic and also his perspectives and inter
ests as an eighteenth-century man of letters and member of polite soci
ety. The significance of these possibilities will be considered again below
in connection with the more general taste for axiologic logic displayed
throughout the history of Western critical theory.
Kant's Pure Judgments
The topics that dominate the first part of the Critique of Judgment con
tinue to define the domain of formai aesthetics and the text itself re
mains scriptural within it. What is most instructive about Kant's analy
sis for our présent purposes, however, is the extent to which its
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axiological argument duplicates or mirrors that of Hume in the essay

discussed above. The interest here is not the evidence of any spécifie
"influence" or "dérivation" (Kant's close and exercized reading of
Hume is a commonplace of the history of philosophy), but the general-
ity and apparent inevitability of the logical moves set into motion by the
defining objectives of axiology. Certain distinctly Kantian features of the
argument should, however, be indicated at the outset.
First, Kant's objective is considerably more circumspect than Hume's,
for he offers not to justify the claim to objective validity of certain
("our") judgments of taste but only to inquire into the conditions of the
possibility of the rightfulness of such a claim. Second, "the judgment of
taste" (das Geschmacksurteil) as initially identified by Kant has the quite
confined sense of the spécifie act of mental discrimination expressed in
the spécifie verbal statement ' ‘Es ist schôn ' ' and is subsequently subjected
by the internai impératives of the analysis itself to even more exacting
spécifications. Indeed, and that is the third point here, it should be
remembered that the characteristic mode of a Kantian analysis is con-
summate reflexivity, so that “initially identified" and “subsequently sub
jected" are not really appropriate for describing its course: in a sense, it
is no surprise that a genuine judgment of taste, as Kant defines it, can be
said to rightfully claim universal validity, for the very process of his
définition of it consists of his successively distinguishing it from any-
thing that could not make that claim. As we shall see, however, the
question remains whether, having rigorously refined out everything in
the définition, occasion, and execution of the judgment of taste that
might compromise the rightfulness of its claim to universal validity,
Kant is left with anything at ali.
Like Hume, Kant begins by acknowledging the wide diversity of tastes
and also notes the apparently intractable diversity of at least certain
judgments:
To one [man], violet color is soft and lovely; to another, it is washed out
and dead. One man likes the tone of wind instruments, another that of
strings. To strive here with the design of reproving as incorrect another
man's judgment which is different from our own . . . would be folly. As
regards the pleasant, therefore, the fundamental proposition is valid: every-
one has his own taste [that is, his own sense of taste: ein jeder hat seinen
eigenen Geschmack (der Sinne)].5
As in Hume's essay, however, this acknowledgment is only a foil to the

major point and contrast that follows, here set up by the observation
that "everyone" would agréé that, if "reproved" for not doing so, he
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ought to say not just "It is pleasant" but "It is pleasant to me." This is
apparently an “ought" of linguistic propriety: that is, saying it would
make explicit what is, according to Kant, presupposed by the use of the
term pleasant. Or to put this another way, in not adding the first-person
qualification, the speaker fails to make explicit the merely Personal force
(or reference or applicability) which, according to Kant, is involved in
someone's saying that something is pleasant, as pointedly opposed to a
judgment of "the beautiful" which daims not merely Personal but ob
jective—in the sense of universal subjective—validity:
It would (on the contrary) be laughable if a man who imagined anything to

his own taste thought to justify himself by saying: "This object (the house
we see, the coat that person wears, the concert we hear, the poem sub-
mitted to our judgment) is beautiful for me" . . . [For] if he gives out
anything as beautiful, he supposes in others the same satisfaction; he
judges not merely for himself, but for everyone. . . Here, then, we cannot say
each man has his own particular taste. For this would be as much as to say
that there is no taste whatever, i.e. no aesthetical judgment which can
make a rightful claim upon everyone's assent. (sect. 7, emphasis added)
In addition to the swift dismissal of the other alternative in the last

tum here (that is, Kant's question-begging élimination of the possibility
that there may indeed be no aesthetical judgment that can make the
claim at issue), what is notable in this passage is how much the force of
the argument owes to presumed empirical facts about linguistic usage or
convention, bolstered by what appears to be the tacitly universalized
testimony of personal introspection or, as it might be called now, "lin
guistic intuition": "Further, this claim to universal validity so essentially
belongs to a judgment by which we describe anything as beautiful that, if
this were not thought in it, it would never corne into our thoughts to use
the expression at ail" (sect. 8).
Although Kant's expressivist conception of the relation of language to
thought may hâve prevented his récognition of it ("judgment" in the
Critique can mean both a mental discrimination and an overt verbal
statement because, it appears, the latter is, for Kant, simply an "expres
sion"—Ausdruck—of the former), the force of any appeal to linguistic
propriety, usage, or convention is, of course, itself historically and other-
wise contingent. Thus, someone could always say: "Well, that may be
what everyone meant by schôn in 1790, at least in the salons of Kônigs-
berg, but hardly anyone means that anymore; these days nobody would
laugh and only a handful of professors of philosophy would even be
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given pause if someone said 'You and your friends may not like my
wife's poetry, but it's beautiful to me' or 'This coat may be shabby and
old-fashioned, but I've had it since my student days and it's beautiful to
me.' " It is also questionable (though empirically indéterminable)
whether, when people refer to something as ''beautiful/' it always or
even typically does—or ever did—corne into their thoughts that every-
one ought to agréé with them. Although it may be suspected that Kant
was accurately reporting the implicit provincial universalism of the
drawingroom conversation with which he was familiar, the point re
mains that the historicity of linguistic convention (and, thereby, of lin-
guistic “intuition") and the contingency of usage deprive such observa
tions of any epistemic authority or axiological force.6
We may tum now to the major lines of Kant's analysis of judgments
of taste. Though notoriously angular and elusive in its discursive articu
lation, its skeletal logic may be paraphrased as follows. If we assume
that everyone has the same cognitive apparatus, then if someone's judg-
ment regarding some object were to reflect only the operations of that
apparatus, uncontaminated by any other kind of personally individuat-
ing mental activity or sensation and also uncontaminated by any cir-
cumstantially contingent factors, then that judgment would necessarily
be the same as anyone else's under any conditions. It follows that, if
someone's judgment of some object as "beautiful" has really been pro-
duced only by the operations of this (assumedly) uniformly shared cog
nitive apparatus as elicited by that object, then such a judgment could
rightfully daim to be universally valid.
Kant defers to the end of the "Analytic of the Beautiful" the cmcial
question of whether the assumption of a uniform cognitive machine is
itself well grounded. Up to that point, he is concemed to specify the
exacting conditions that would hâve to obtain if the logic outlined above
was, otherwise, to "take." His explicit objective and method in detailing
these spécifications is, of course, neither to characterize the phenom-
enological nature of aesthetic expériences nor to détermine (empirically,
as it were) the properties of the objects that elicit such expériences, but
to détermine strictly through transcendental logic the conditions of pos-
sibility required by the hypothesis just outlined.7 What concems Kant,
in other words, is not what certain objects, expériences, and judgments
are like but, rather, what they must be like for the démonstration to
work.
What they must be like is very pure. Much of the "Analytic of the
Beautiful" is devoted to demonstrating that there can be and is a sensa-
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tion which, while necessarily subjective (because it is a sensation), is

nevertheless so decisively independent of anything individual, personal,
private, or peculiar to the subject having that sensation that it is, in
efïect, not subjective. After several other candidates are examined and
rejected, the sensation/judgment8 of the beautiful tums out to meet the
requirements, but only when it is free of concepts and also "troubled
and interrupted by no foreign sensation" (sect. 14). (As Kant explains, a
sensation/judgment of the beauty of some object can rightfully claim
objective validity when—but only when—it is independent of any
identification of the object's meaning, purpose, or even existence and is
thus also free of émotion, interest, desire, and such compromising
gratifications as might be offered by the object's charm, perfection, eth-
ical goodness, or practical utility.) Further analysis reveals that these
spécifications can be met only when the judgment of beauty has been
truly elicited by a pure reflection on the pure sensation of the pure
operation of the mental faculties responding to pure form.
Although he emphasizes that mistakes of judgment can occur (and
indeed must occur, for otherwise it would be hard to say why we do not
in fact always agréé with each other's judgments of taste), Kant dismis
ses surprisingly casually the idea that there could be any great difïiculties
involved in arriving at or identifying the required State of purity. Thus,
he suggests at one point that we can readily confirm our conviction that
our sensation of beauty is a true one by a bit of experimental introspec
tion: "He [i.e., the man who believes he is laying down a judgment of
taste] can be quite certain of this for himself by the mere consciousness
[dos blosse Bewusstsein] of the separating ofif everything belonging to the
pleasant and the good from the satisfaction which is left" (sect. 8). The
kinds of purity that Kant's logic posits as necessary for objective judg
ments of taste do not, however, appear possible at ail, at least not for
sublunary créatures. On the contrary, it appears that we never do and
never could encounter pure forms and qualities purely: neither in what
are labeled "works of art" (including those of abstract expressionism, art
povera, or any other allegedly purist or minimalist style), nor in even the
most pared-down "stimuli" presented in the most rigorously controlled
experiments of contemporary empirical aesthetics, nor in the most
highly focused and intensely gratifying or arousing "nonaesthetic" or
"extra-aesthetic" expériences, including sexual, ritual, and drug-
induced ones. Rather, that which Kant called "sensation" (Empfindung)
and which we still, informally, call "sensation" and/or "perception" is
now understood as the always complexly contingent product of a global
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interaction in which the subject selects and configures éléments of her

environment in relation to the current State of her own System as that
System has been produced by her own quite individual history.9 This
means that, no matter how "simple" the "stimulus" or "pure" the
"form," the human créature always expériences it through her total
sensory/perceptual/cognitive System and in relation to memory, context,
and meaning: in relation, that is, to (a) the structural traces of prior
perceptions and actions with regard to "stimuli" or "forms" of that and
related kinds, (b) the circumstantial conditions of the interaction itself,
including, where relevant, social conditions (and, in a sense, social con
ditions are always relevant), and (c) ail the other cognitive and intégra
tive aspects of the interaction that would be in place for any créature
that develops in a cultural and linguistic universe and expériences its
world accordingly.10 Contrary to the key requirements of Kant's analy
sis, then, our interactions with our environments are always and inevi-
tably multiply contingent and highly individuated for every subject: our
"sensations" and "perceptions" of "forms" or of anything else are in
séparable from— or, as it might be said, thoroughly contaminated by—
exactly who we are, where we are, and ail that has already happened to
us, and there is therefore nothing in any aspect of our expérience of
anything that could ever be, in the required sense, pure.11
The need for purity produced by the impératives of Kant's logic génér
âtes a récurrent drawing of distinctions and subdistinctions throughout
the "Analytic of the Beautiful." Since every spécification of the kind of
object, expérience, or judgment that exemplifies the posited purity is
seen to admit of contaminating exceptions, Kant must engage in a re-
peated refining process of first distinguishing the exceptions from the real
thing, then bracketing them out, then distinguishing and bracketing out
the contaminating exceptions from what remains, and so forth.12 It
appears, however, that Kant is not left with that pure residue which the
analysis/demonstration requires but, rather, that the exceptions exhaust
the possibilities and the residue is nothing at ail.
Kant's repeatedly refined and ultimately refined-out-of-existence

spécifications of the conditions under which judgments of taste would be
validated by his own logic recall the continuously expanded and ulti
mately extended-to-everything qualifications which, as we hâve seen,
Hume was obliged to attach to the operation of the standard of taste to
make it empirically responsible. Although proceeding from two tradi-
tionally opposed positions, then, both end up axiologically empty-
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handed. As Hume's detailing of the conditions affecting human préfér

ences becomes richer and more subtle, his claim that there is an
objective standard of taste grounded in nature becomes weaker; as
Kant's spécifications of what would make a judgment of taste totally
objective become tighter, purer, and more foolproof, his démonstration
becomes more remote ffom the conditions of any sublunary world and
more irrelevant to any sublunary axiology. Before any further comment
can be made on this parallel in reverse, however, the final and crucial
theoretical move played out in the "Analytic of the Beautiful" must be
considered.
As Kant here insists, the existence of a universal cognitive apparatus
is the keystone of his axiological édifice: "Hence it is only under the
presupposition that there is a common sense [Gemeinsinn, meaning not
everyday reasoning or ordinary beliefs but, as he explains, our common
capacity for shared cognition] . .. it is only under this presupposition, I
say, that the judgment of taste can be laid down" (sect. 20). In the
passage that follows, he demonstrates the necessity of a universal
knowing-machine on the ground of its being presupposed by the neces-
sarily universal communicability of knowledge—which is, for Kant,
équivalent to the objectivity of knowledge:
Cognitions and judgments m u st. . . admit of universal communicability;
for otherwise there would be no harmony between them and the object,
and they would be collectively a mere subjective play of the représentative
powers, exactly as scepticism desires.
. . . Since now this accordance itself must admit of universal communica
bility, and consequently also our feeling of i t . . . , and since the universal
communicability of a feeling présupposés a common sense, we hâve
grounds for assuming the latter. And this common sense is assumed . . .
simply as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our
knowledge, which is presupposed in every logic and in every principle of
knowledge that is not skeptical. (sect. 21)
In short, if everyone's cognitive faculties did not operate in the same
way, then the objectivity of knowledge itself would not be possible, and
everyone knows that knowledge is objective . . . except, as everyone
knows, skeptics. So, there must be a universal knowing-machine, be-
cause otherwise skepticism would be right and the entire argument of
the “Analytic" (and perhaps even more than that) would be wrong.
It is clear from the perplexity or inconclusiveness of the conclusion of
the “Analytic of the Beautiful" that Kant recognizes the tautologous
nature of the entire démonstration. The récognition is hedged and to
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Axiologic Logic
some extern obscured, however, by the salvaging alternative left in its

wake: that is, the suggestion that even if the daims of taste to universal
validity cannot be ultimately justified, it may yet be Reason's labyrin-
thine way to hâve them seem justifiable so that a higher good, namely
the institution of a perhaps illusory but nevertheless inspirational—and,
therefore, properly regulatory—idéal of unanimity or consensus, can
thereby be effected:
Whether there is in fact such a common sense . . . or whether a yet higher
principle of reason makes it only into a regulative prindple for producing
in us a common sense for higher purposes; whether, therefore, taste is an
original and natural faculty or only the idea of an artificial one yet to be
acquired, so that a judgment of taste with its assumption of a universal
assent in fact is only a requirement of reason for producing such harmony
of sentiment; whether the ought, i.e. the objective necessity of the con
fluence of the feeling of any one man with that of any other, only signifies
the possibility of arriving at this accord, and the judgment of taste only
affords an example of the application of this principle—these questions we
hâve neither the wish nor the power to investigate as yet . . . (sect. 22,
emphasis added)
The daim of judgments of taste to universal validity being, it appears,
ultimately ungroundable, what remains is only the daim itself, which is
where the analysis/demonstration began—but not quite; for, though
not rightful by transcendental necessity, the daim can be justified in
another way, which tums out to be the same way that the ultimately
uninstantiable Standard of Taste was justified in Hume's essay: that is,
as an idéal norm or regulative principle by which “harmony of senti
ment” may be produced—or, at least, when "tasteless persons propose
to avoid blâme" by invoking the proverbial De gustibus (sect. 56), per
sons with taste will hâve Reason's own rational rebuttal in hand.13
Kant is able to salvage the otherwise thoroughly compromised daim

of judgments of taste to universal validity by invoking the higher good
that such daims serve. That invocation, however, only displaces one
axiological question with another and leads into the usual infinité ré
gressions. For one may always ask how high and how good that higher
good is, and also for whom it is good at ail. Is it (that is, unanimity,
consensus, “the confluence of any one man's feeling with that of any
other") a good in itself? Is universal concordance self-evidently better
than diversity, or even better in ail cases than conflict? Is prior agree-
ment indeed presupposed by human communication? And is it, as Kant
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does not question here and as Hume did not question in regard to the
Standard of Taste, good for everyone?
Or is it not the case, rather, that ail these questions may be answered
negatively and that the invocation of an ideally achievable consensus is
not only not good for everyone but tends inevitably to operate to the
advantage of the majority and those with de facto social power and to
the disadvantage of the more “different," "idiosyncratic," "singular,"
and otherwise innovative and/or marginal members of any community?
We are evidently concemed here, however, not with logic but with
social politics or, perhaps, with the inseparability of the two.
Logical Tastes and The Other's Poison

The relative concreteness of the passage from section 56 of the Critique of
Judgment cited above may appear, with its évocation of drawingroom
upstarts and putdowns, somewhat incongruous juxtaposed to the ab
stract rigors of the “Analytic of the Beautiful." The drawingroom, how
ever—and, in our own era, the classroom—is never too far out of sight
in the discourses of the axiological tradition. For, as we hâve seen, what
is at stake in the axiological project is always the contested legitimacy of
someone's évaluative authority; and, though not ali the battles are
fought out in drawingrooms or classrooms, they are inevitably fought
out in social arenas and along Unes of authority and power deüned by
social, institutional, and économie categories: âge and gender, class and
political status, teacher versus student, censor versus citizen, bureaucrat
versus artist, art producer versus art distributor versus art consumer, and
so forth.14
The arguments of Hume's essay and Kant's analysis are transparently
circular and altogether self-canceling—at least, as the présent analysis
attests, it now appears so to some of us. Nevertheless, the logic they
exhibit and to a great extent share has been continuously perpetuated,
appropriated, and recreated for at least the past two hundred years and
continues to dominate disciplinary aesthetics and critical theory. What,
one might ask, could account for such peculiar taste in logic? The polit
ical answer to that question—that is, that aesthetic axiology has
operated as an official ideology serving the interests of established
évaluative authority—is obviously available but not, I think, adéquate.
To be sure, Hume's asymmetrical account of human preferences and
Kant's spécifications of purity hâve been invoked repeatedly to rule out
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the tastes and discount the daims of upstarts and philistines. It must be
remarked, however, that corresponding asymmetrical accounts hâve
also been invoked repeatedly to challenge established évaluative author-
ity and to daim, through a duplicate or mirror logic, an “equal" legiti-
macy for ofïicially substandard or déviant tastes. Though the latter invo
cations hâve perhaps not operated so decisively, we must nevertheless
acknowledge that the value of aesthetic axiology has never consisted
wholly in its justification of dite preferences and established cultural
power. It appears rather that, like other dominant discourses, it has
developed an account of the "phenomena” that has continuously
served, for those who hâve reproduced and appropriated it, a number
and variety of fundamental interests: not only social and political inter
ests but other equally significant though perhaps less readily namable
ones, among them what we may think of as vested cognitive interests.
It is clear, for example, that the success of eighteenth-century aesthet-
ics in justifying dite patterns of cultural consumption depended on the
cohérence of its norm-and-deviation account of human preferences
with other current knowledge and beliefs, including contemporary con
ceptions of cultural history, psychophysiology, genetics, and the causal-
ity of human behavior. Extending the point, we might say that the more
general success of axiologic logic seems to be a product of its continuous
cohérence with and participation in our favored—most comfortable,
most familiar, and in some ways most functional—cognitive styles: that
is, the répertoire of conceptual/discursive steps, moves, and tums that
Derrida identifies as Western metaphysics or logocentrism. The contem
porary deconstruction of the latter and its displacement, in some places,
by other cognitive styles are discussed in the next chapter. We may
antidpate the point here, however, by observing that there are
intellectual fashions as well as aesthetic ones and, it appears, tastes for
logic as well.15
Also, and no less importantly, the arguments of the axiological tradi
tion evidently confirm and are confirmed by the deeply felt intuition of
the manifest rightness of certain judgments and utter absurdity of
others, and, in aesthetics, the almost palpable expérience of the beauty
of certain objects and deformity of others: intuitions and expériences
that become no less deeply felt and palpable when confronted by the
apparent contrary intuitions and expériences of other people. Indeed, it
may be here that we reach the fundamental principle or mechanism of
axiologic logic. If we thereby also reach a fundamental principle of ail
cognitive process, namely the will to epistemic self-maintenance—a
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Axiologic Logic
conservativism that may be even deeper than that of politics or, in the
literal sense, économie self-interest—then, as we hâve leamed to sus
pect from other evidence, Reason and rationalization are not altogether
distinct. The question, dearly a major one for contemporary theory in
ali disciplines, cannot be pursued here as such, but a number of related
points may be briefly indicated.
First, it is important to recognize that “intuitions" (of rightness,
wrongness, absurdity, and so forth) hâve no spécial daim to epistemic
authority, being different from other convictions only in being less read-
ily formulated or explicated in terms of other current explanatory ac-
counts and, it seems, in having been acquired more informally. While
intuitions are therefore no less historically and otherwise contingent
than other beliefs, they may be exceptionally powerful—that is, less
responsive to changed conditions and less readily modified by new con-
ceptual formulations—precisely because, in having been leamed more
informally and thus imperceptibly, they are especially résistant to the
reflection that they were leamed at ail or could hâve been leamed other
wise.16
Second, the sense of gratification or distress, rapture or révulsion one
can expérience in relation to artworks and other cultural objects seems
to be simultaneously socially engendered and physically inscribed. The
complex dynamics involved here recall what I hâve described as The-
Other's-Poison Effect: not only would one man's méat poison the other,
but just looking at the méat—and, even more, watching the man eat
it—would make the other sick. Thus, Hume alludes to the pain experi-
enced by a person "conversant in the highest excellence of the kind"
when confronted by the coarse daubings and vulgar ballads that "would
affect the mind of a peasant or Indian with the highest admiration" (ST,
p. 14), and it is reported that Theodor Adomo had a "viscéral distaste
for mass culture."17 But, of course, the authenticity of the pain does not
vouch for the accuracy of the diagnosis. This is worth emphasizing in
the view of the fact that The-Other's-Poison Effect may join aesthetic
axiology to yield the conviction that the other man is himself being
poisoned by the méat he is eating, that his eating and enjoying it is
evidence that he has already been poisoned by something else, and/or
that his eating it is poisoning everyone in the community: in théories,
that is, that interpret the consumption of non-elite culture as a cause and
sign of broader social corruption and cultural décliné.
We may recall here the familiar diagnoses by academie critics and
joumalists of the cultural symptomatology of rock music, télévision.
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Axiologic Logic
commercial films, and romance fiction and their degenerative effects on

the educationally lower classes, and the accounts by Frankfurt School
theorists and others of the central rôle of the mass media (and, recently,
of ''postmodem'' art, architecture, and writing) in marking and hasten-
ing the decay of Western civilization. In relation to each, Marxist cul
tural critics join Amoldian humanists in deploring the novel/alien cul
tural productions of the late (wentieth century and also in depicting
them in apocalyptic terms.18
The issues here are obscured by the familiar and commonly unques-
tioned categories of cultural criticism itself. Thus, by way of simulta-
neously apologizing for and excusing Adomo's vimlent ''insensitivity”
to ''negro jazz” (that is, his horror at what he saw—or heard—as its
fraudulent affirmations, sadomasochism, frantic sexuality, deepening of
alienation, and so on), Martin Jay remarks that it was the resuit of
Adomo's "failure to make the appropriate distinction" between "the
commercial variety chumed out by Tin Pan Alley" and "the less popu-
lar variety rooted in black culture itself."19 But this, of course, begs the
key questions of the nature of popular culture and aesthetic value, and is
historically questionable in every element. Who, or what kinds of peo-
ple, "chumed out" the jazz of Tin Pan Alley? Were their motives and
constraints any more simply or exclusively "commercial" than those of
other contemporary composers and performers? Was Tin Pan Alley
music not "rooted" in some culture(s), including "black culture itself"?
What, in short, is "the appropriate distinction" to be made?
The ideological complexity of these accounts and diagnoses is sug-
gested by Pierre Bourdieu's important postaxiological analysis, Distinc
tion: A Social Critique of the Judgement ofTaste. According to that analysis,
patterns of cultural consumption emerge in highly stratified societies in
accord with a "symbolic logic" of social distinction that opérâtes simul-
taneously to identify and also to maintain class différences. The logic is
itself based on distinction: "legitimate" (that is, elite or canonical) cul
ture and the elective tastes of the socially dominant classes define them-
selves and acquire their distinguishing features in contradistinction to
the ("ordinary," "vulgar," "barbarie") tastes of the socially domi-
nated.20 In particular, the ascetic ideals of disinterest, disembodiment,
purity, and autonomy that are associated with "the Kantian aesthetic"
and exhibited in aristocratie tastes emerge as a symbolic counterpart and
active sign of the objective and subjective distance of members of the
dominant classes from practical urgency and économie necessity,
whereas the inverse—that is, the "popular aesthetic," which favors
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Axiologic Logic
substance over form, quantity over quality, and utility, immédiate con
sumption, and bodily sensation over the "detached gaze" of aesthetic
contemplation—is the symbolic counterpart and objective product of
the socioeconomic status, history, and trajectory of members of the
dominated classes (Distinction, pp. 41-65).
Bourdieu points out that tastes cluster predictably and correlate
highly with social strata largely because tendencies and compétences in
the consumption of cultural goods are leamed in the course of a life
history that itself dépends crucially on dass origins and on the spécifie
types of formai and informai éducation thereby made possible. So much
would, perhaps, be granted by any contemporary sociological account.21
What he emphasizes, however, is that, because these leamed patterns of
cultural consumption tend to be experienced as internai preferences and
interpreted as evidence of different natural inclinations and compé
tences, taste also fonctions to legitimate the power of the socially domi
nant. Specifically, the cultural objects and practices favored by the dom
inant classes (these include types of dothing, sports activities, food
préparation, and so on, as well as music and other artforms) are
legitimated as intrinsically superior by the normative institutions con-
trolled by those very classes; at the same time, the tastes of the dominant
for those objects and practices are interpreted as evidence of their own
natural superiority and cultural enlightenment and thus also their right
to social and cultural power. Moreover, this doubly legitimating inter
prétation is accepted and reproduced not only by those who benefit
most directly ffom it but by everyone, including those whose subordina
tion it implicitly justifies.22
It would follow ffom Bourdieu's analysis that ail normative théories
of culture, including those mounted from or in the name of the political
left, serve vested tastes and vested interests: that is, deeply inscribed
individual aesthetic and cultural tastes and also, though indirectly, the
more general class stratifications that those tastes identify and maintain.
Among the questions we are thereby (and otherwise) led to ask are
whether nostalgic/apocalyptic accounts of popular and mass culture
may not represent a reactionary response to the increasing contempo
rary destratification of cultural arenas and practices, and a misdiagnosis
of the cognitive dislocation, dissonance, and nausea—literally, dis-
gust—experienced as a resuit by high-culture cultural critics. We may
also ask whether the familiar images of contemporary cultural degener-
ation—narcissism, hedonism, videots, zombies, one-dimensional men,
and so on—may not be products of the increased occasion that the mass
media give for close contact with The Other and pollution by his méat
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Axiologic Logic
(his music on one's radio, his reading on one's drugstore bookracks, his
revels and revelings on one's télévision screen and thus in one's very
home) and the increasing unavoidability of mingling with The Other in
the midst of his cultural consumptions in public spaces such as streets,
malls, and terminais: that is, on sites and grounds that not only fail to
segregate classes and cultures but also fail to confer distinction on the
high-culture cultural critic's preferences or authority on his politico-
philosophical justifications of them. It seems that wherever Systems of
more or less strictly segregated hierarchical strata begin to break down
and différentiations become more numerous, rapid, complex, less pre-
dictable, and less controllable, the resulting émergences, mixtures, and
minglings will look, from the perspective of those in the historically
upper strata, like flattenings, falls, and collapses—in short, like lasses of
distinction,23 It is certainly to some extent destratification itself that has
put The Other in our company and classrooms and his méat on our plate
and palate. If, as perhaps ail would agréé, the sense of the décliné of
civilization is the by-product (or "other side of the coin") of the success-
ful—if, from some perspectives, noisome—expansion of democracy,
then it must also be acknowledged that the politics of cultural criticism is
a very complex matter indeed.
Aesthetic axiology and latter-day normative théories hâve preempted

alternative theoretical explorations of the dynamics of taste, and thereby
also inhibited and postponed other practical—including pédagogie—
responses to the problems of cultural change. We can hardly hope to
understand the social mechanisms and political conséquences of popu-
lar culture and the mass media so long as we regard any contact with
them as pollution, complicity, or "lax" tolérance; nor can we move
toward adéquate analyses of their complex and differentiated effects so
long as we begin and end with assumptions of mental and moral torpor,
cultural stupéfaction, and mass exploitation. Unless cultural criticism
moves beyond the self-privileging logic and foregone conclusions of the
axiological tradition, it will hâve no intellectual or practical force be
yond assuaging the pain of The Other's Poison.
Three Postaxiological Postscripts

Nature, Culture, and Human Preferences
Contemporary accounts of human preferences are haunted not only by
the aporias of traditional axiological logic but by other related ideological
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Axiologic Logic
and conceptual issues. One is the significance of what are cailed genetic
or biological factors as distinct from and opposed to what are cailed
environmental, social, or cultural factors. In the account outlined in this
study, ail human preferences, and the variations and convergences
among them, are referred to the particular values of certain fairly gen
eral variables, including historical, social, and institutional conditions
and psychophysiological structures, mechanisms, and tendencies. The
first point to be emphasized here is that the latter, in this account, are
seen to operate not as a substratum of underlying "déterminants,"
"forces," or "constraints" but, precisely, as variables—that is, they de-
velop and function differently among different human beings and,
equally significantly, always interact, for each of us, with the other
variables mentioned. With respect to human preferences, nothing is
uniform, universal, natural, fixed, or determined in advance, either for
the species generally, or for any spécifie individual, or for any portion or
fraction of the species, by whatever principle, sociological or other, it is
segmented and classified (gender, âge, race, nation, and so forth). In
view of the fact that interactions among the relevant variables occur
continuously throughout the life history of each individual and at every
level of description or analysis, the question of whether some given
behavioral variation or convergence among people (for example, erotic
preferences, cognitive styles, compétences in music, or tastes in logic) is
the product of their "genetic" différences or similarities as distinct from
and opposed to différences or similarities in their "environments" be-
comes not merely difficult to answer but altogether meaningless in such
oppositional terms. In other words, the issue here, as it is commonly
framed and argued, poses choices that one need not and cannot make.
We hâve corne to recognize that invocations of the "natural" are
always ideologically loaded. Ail the terms in play here, however (and
this is the second point to be emphasized), "environmental" as well as
"genetic," "cultural" and "social" as well as "biological," are im-
plicated in a long history of conceptually problematic dichotomization.
Merely shooting out one leg of any of these dichotomies does not,
therefore, solve any of the relevant problems; on the contrary, it partici
pâtes in the continuous deferral of the more difficult but important task
of disarming the entire "nature/culture" opposition of its ideological
power. The task is not made any easier, of course, by the fact that these
dichotomies are reflected in and reinforced by the institutional ségréga
tion of the relevant disciplines (for example, psychology and biology
versus sociology and anthropology) and by the corollary différences of
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Axiologic Logic
training, tempérament, intellectual identity, political and ideological

commitments, and so forth among the practitioners of each. For various
reasons, themselves both “social" and "psychological" and also quite
complexly interrelated, these disciplinary différences hâve tended to
play themselves out as compétition and conflict within academie institu
tions and also in that arena we call "intellectual history." While one
must, for these very reasons, be wary of any facile daims of “synthesis"
in this area, recent responses to various intellectual and political pres
sures—for example, demands on both sides in the debates over socio-
biology for richer and better-knit formulations, and the necessity for
intellectual collaboration among feminists in different academie disci
plines—indicate that the possibility of more integrated perspectives may
yet be looked for.24
The Developmental Fallacy

The fallacy so named here is the quite common idea of a teleologically
directed "normal" maturing of aesthetic tastes and judgments and, ac-
cordingly, an ultimate "fullness" of development at which point, having
moved beyond the dark glass of their "undeveloped" and "immature"
likes and dislikes, now-grown children, unless innately defective,
pathologically fixated, or culturally deprived or corrupted, will "recog-
nize" the inhérent value of canonical artworks and, like their erstwhile
teachers and other elders, properly and naturally prefer them. Not re-
stricted to questions of literary or aesthetic judgment, the notion and
fallacy are typically found in empiricist or putatively "empirical" ac-
counts of value, whether aesthetic, moral, or other. Thus, in debates
over the "objectivity" of some such type of value, great significance will
often be attached to the observation that, as it appears, people's préfér
ences tend to emerge in a particular sequence or, as it also appears,
direction—for example, from rock music to symphonie works, or, in the
case of moral tastes, from invocations of ad hoc "faimess" to citings of
Universal Principles of Justice—and not the other way around. This
apparent uniformity and directionality is routinely offered as evidence
of, if not quite the spécifie "organ" invoked by Hume and others, then at
least an innate developmental vector of aesthetic taste (or moral con-
sciousness) and thereby an équivalent naturel basis for positing an ob
jective norm and standard of value.25
The empirical validity and theoretical significance of such observa
tions are, however, altogether dubious. For one thing, it is questionable
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Axiologic Logic
whether sequences of that kind are actually duplicated in any but the
most limited populations. Thus (to restrict ourselves to aesthetic préfér
ences), the more precisely one spécifiés the items in such a sequence
(from the Grateful Dead to Bach, from Edna St. Vincent Millay to Dante,
and so forth) the more limited the population in which the sequence as
such is predictable and the more readily the similarities among people
can be accounted for not by the "natural" maturing of value-detecting
organs but by contingent similarities of éducation and cultural expéri
ence. The question is as much theoretical and interpretive as it is empir-
ical, however, which means, as always, that question-begging formula
tions are to be expected. Thus, not only is there a strong tendency for the
degree of age-correlation and extern of subject-similarity to be exagger-
ated, but once the (limited) general tendencies hâve been standard-ized
into an axiological norm, the exceptions (babies who like Bach, senior
citizens who like rock) will typically be seen not as qualifying the daims
of universality and inevitability but as spécial cases of prodigiousness,
retardation, régression, or simply as pathological in the usual ways.
It must be emphasized that the issue here is not whether age-
correlated changes of aesthetic preference do occur, or whether there
really are similarities of taste-change among different people. Our indi-
vidual sensory/perceptual Systems no doubt change as we âge26 and, to
the extern that the systemic States and environmental conditions of
different subjects are similar, the ways their personal économies change
will themselves be similar and so also will be the general nature of
the changes in their preferences. The questions at issue are, rather,
(a) whether such changes are "developments" in the sense of moving
from an objectively inferior toward an objectively superior position on
some normative scale, (b) whether their occurrence is evidence of an
inévitable telos of taste, that is, an objectively superior "end-stage," and
(c) whether their co-occurrence among different people is evidence of
the objective value of the objects preferred at that temporally latest
point. The answer to ail these questions is no: for, even if it were the case
that people throughout the world uniformly and universally preferred
"X" at âge five, "Y" at âge twenty-five, and "Z" at âge fifty, that array of
common différences would not be evidence of the objective superiority of
any particular point on it (whether the superiority of "Z" to "X" or the
other way around) ; nor would it be evidence of the increasing correctness
of people's preferences as they grow older unless, of course, the prefer
ences of middle-aged adults per se had already been arbitrarily
privileged as more "correct." (To better grasp the arbitrariness of the
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Axiologic Logic
latter, one may imagine a Romantic-type culture, not altogether remote

from some aspects of our own, in which the tastes of the fresh and
innocent eye, before the closing down of the prison-house shades, were
seen as truer and more blessed than those of the effete and jaded con-
noisseur.) Of course, there are reasons why we (or some of us) com-
monly privilège the tastes of middle-aged adults as the most natural and
désirable ones to hâve: they are the same as the reasons why Japanese
privilège Japanese tastes, Javanese privilège Javanese tastes, and school-
children privilège the tastes of their own cliques.
Comparative Pleasure
The idea here, quite common in casual debates on these issues and
encountered above in I. A. Richards's reflections on the emotional
pathology of the sort of person who prefers a sonnet by Ella Wheeler
Wilcox to one by John Keats, is that some people enjoy what they enjoy
more than others do. This may, of course, be the case as a general
proposition, but its invocation on any particular occasion will always be
problematic. The notion has been put into play fairly recently by the
American sociologist Herbert Gans, and his equivocations on the subject
are instructive.
Gans, a génial pluralist, argues in his book Popular Culture and High
Culture that different groups of people—or, as he calls them, "taste
publics”—make “equally valid” choices expressing their own "taste
standards,” and also that "both [high and popular culture publics]
dérivé emotional and intellectual rewards from their choices."27 He also
concédés, however, (a) that "if only the content of the reward is mea-
sured, and the person's background and expérience is left out, it is
possible that individuals from a high culture public dérivé more reward
from their content choice than do persons from a lower culture public
. . . ," (b) that the objects of "higher cultures may be better than the
lower ones because they may be able to provide greater and perhaps
more lasting aesthetic gratification," and (c) that “if one compared the
[objects of] taste cultures alone, without taking into account the taste publics
who choose them, it would be fa ir to say that the [objects of] higher cultures
are better or at least more comprehensive and more informative" (pp. 171
and 125).
Although Gans's general objective in his study is to establish and
support a "to each his own" conception of cultural preferences, it is
clear from these last two remarks that he is pressed—perhaps by his
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Axiologic Logic
own background-and-experience as an intellectual and member of the

academy, perhaps by anxious humanist colleagues or critics—to find
some way of relating "high" and "low" cultural preferences to each
other so that the former can be seen as, in effect, objectively better. The
point, of course, and it should hâve been Gans's point, is that "one"
(who?) cannot "compare the cultures [i.e., objects of cultural consump-
tion] alone" and that, if we do not "take into account" some subject or
population, even if it is only the high-culture sociologist and some of his
friends, then there is no one with respect to whose interests, desires,
expériences, and general perspective those objects of cultural con-
sumption could be "better," "more comprehensive," or "more infor
mative."28
Evidently uncomfortable with his own line of argument here, Gans
observes in a footnote, "I believe that ail cultures provide genuine
gratifications, and I am only suggesting that the higher cultures may do
so more effedively" (pp. 170-171, emphasis added). The terms of the
distinction here recall once again, of course, Richards's observation that
a Keats sonnet is better than one by Wilcox (the way brandy is better
than beer) because the former is "more efficient"; and, with this sugges
tion that certain cultural objects are superior in themselves, Gans is
backed even further into the corner he evidently wishes to avoid
(though he keeps good company there). Moreover, and this is my cen
tral point here, the suggestion that certain people (such as high-culture
publics or, as in Richards, those who are neurologically well organized)
"get more" from the art they prefer than other people (such as low-
culture publics or those with "inadéquate impulses") get from their
preferences is absurd or meaningless. For not only does the question of
what they get more o f remain unanswered or begged,29 but the facile
allusions to "measuring" and "comparing" the "content" of different
people's aesthetic "rewards" must sooner or later confront the classic
epistemological conundrum of how to détermine the quality of other
people's expériences. Is my airplane-neighbor reading Rebecca enjoying
it less than I am enjoying Emma ? Is there any way (by the différence in
our EEG-waves? rates of heartbeat? muscle tone?) it could be demon-
strated that the teenager listening to Pink Floyd is not feeling as good as I
do when I listen to ParsifaÛ
Gans seems unaware of these difficulties and their implications for his
analysis, but one of his suggestions here is especially revealing. The
reason that "individuals from a high culture public dérivé more reward
from their content choice than do persons from a lower culture public"
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Axiologic Logic
may be, he observes, "the training the former hâve received in the
aesthetic standards of their culture. As a resuit, they draw more from
culture and are able to relate what they hâve drawn to many other facets
of their emotional and intellectual lives" (p. 171, emphasis added). Not
only may we ask here, again, what exactly it is that high-culture publics
“draw more" o f from the objects they prefer but, even more signifi-
cantly, what the active verb “relate" means here and, specifically,
whether it is indeed the case, as the formulation suggests, that low-
culture publics are less able to expérience the objects they prefer in
relation to "other facets of their emotional and intellectual lives." May it
not be, rather, that what members of the high culture are able to do
better than members of low-culture by virtue of "the training [they] . . .
hâve received in the aesthetic standards of their culture" (and for rea-
sons that Gans obscures by his indefatigably upbeat as well as
evenhanded descriptions of what makes different "taste publics" differ
ent) is to articulate certain quite spécifie kinds of relations in a certain
quite spécifie idiom?
Gans, like other academies (egalitarian and otherwise), attempts to
give an account of cultural preferences that makes sense of the fact that
what looks like aesthetic éducation (and what apparently gratifies those
who receive as well as those who administer it) does seem to take place:
the fact, for example, that students from working-class and lower-
middle-class families, and whose parents and other relatives still watch
TV, drink beer, and read pulp magazines or bestsellers, do corne to
"appreciate" and enjoy Shakespeare and Milton. There is no reason to
doubt that such acculturation takes place and is, in various ways, désir
able, or to question the authenticity of those students' gratifications. The
question raised above is, rather, the extent to which we, that is, high-
culture academies, identify their "appréciation" by the fact—and indeed
locate it in the fact—that those working-class and lower-middle-class
students hâve also leamed to articulate their expériences of high-culture
objects through the descriptive categories and interpretive and évalua
tive idiom of the high culture: leamed, for example, to speak of stanzas,
fines, images, metaphors, characters, and plots; leamed to make inter-
textual connections and to identify allusions and influences; leamed to
ascribe meanings in terms of general thèmes and oppositions; and
leamed to evaluate authors in terms of the "irony" and "imagination"
they exhibit just as, in Hume's rime, members of high-culture publics
leamed to evaluate authors in terms of their "elegance" and "genius."
What obscures these processes is the powerful illusion, very likely
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Axiologic Logic
shared by those students and their professors, that in learning to use that
idiom they hâve literally moved from darkness into light and that, com-
pared to their current expériences of French films, Milton, and Remy
Martin V.S.O.P., their former expériences (and their own family-
members' current expériences) of TV, beer, and bestsellers were thinner,
cruder, less connected, less reflective, less discriminating, and not as
good as expériences. That illusion also obscures the fact (and rich field for
postaxiological exploration) that there are extensive demotic languages
of popular criticism: that is, discourses of description, évaluation, com-
parison, and discrimination of films, TV shows, beer, sports, rock music,
and so forth that are well known to “the fans” and used among them
with considérable communicative subtlety, force, and social effec-
tiveness. The epistemological conundrum, however (that is, the puzzle
of how to find out how The Other's méat tastes to him), remains un-
crackable, and other questions are raised for normative cultural criticism
and its associated pédagogie and missionary impératives, including
whether the quality of other people's lives or cultures is appropriately or
usefully measured by the extern to which either the objects of their
expérience duplicate our own or their articulations of those expériences
are produced in the idioms of our own cultural discourses.
84 1
5
TrutfiA/alue
The préoccupation of formai value-theory with specifically verbal forms

of évaluation, and the corresponding préoccupation of traditional criti-
cal theory and disciplinary aesthetics with debates over the "validity,”
"verifiability," and "truth-value” of aesthetic judgments, hâve obscured
the operation and significance of the institutional and other less overt
and explicit forms of judgment discussed in Chapter 3. Because the
issues in these debates remain current, however, and also because
évaluative discourse, as such, is of interest in relation to contemporary
analyses of language and truth, verbal judgments, as such, require our
attention here. In later sections of this chapter, I will be concemed with
the récurrent question of how to acknowledge, assess, and compare the
value of verbal judgments in the absence of such classic parameters as
objectivity, correctness, and truth-value, and also with the implications
of the présent analysis and other contemporary formulations, including
those of deconstruction, for classic questions of truth and error in intel-
lectual history. It will be useful to approach these issues, however,
through an examination of the strictly dualistic typology of judgments
that is invoked recurrently in relation to them and which, it appears, is
fundamental to traditional axiology.
Judgment Typology and Maclntyre's Fall
It is a commonplace of traditional value theory that there are two funda-

mentally distinct types of évaluative discourse, one exemplified by state-
ments such as "I like it,” ”1 want to do it,” or ”1 think so,” the other by
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Truth/Value
statements such as "It is beautiful," "It is right," or "It is true," the first
expressing a subjective and merely personal preference (or desire or
opinion), the second constituting an impersonal judgment of the value
(aesthetic, moral, or cognitive) of something and daiming universal
validity. A key instance (and perhaps the founding one) of the distinc
tion was developed by Kant in the opening pages of the Critique of
Judgment. A lay version of it is the familiar observation that, since one
can say "It's good, but I don't like it" and "I like it though I know it's no
good," it must be because we intuitively recognize and/or "our language
embodies" a fundamental différence between personal feelings and ob
jective value.1
These distinctions also operate crucially in Alisdair Maclntyre's After
Virtue, an axiologically nostalgie méditation on the décliné of moral
discourse and practice in modem times.2 Early in his first chapter,
Maclntyre contrasts two kinds of reply to the question "Why should I
do so-and-so?" Reply #1 has a form such as “Because I wish it, " whose
"reason-giving force," Maclntyre observes, is confined to "the personal
context of the utterance." It "dépends on certain characteristics pos-
sessed [by the speaker] at the time of hearing or otherwise leaming of
the utterance by [the listenerj" (AV, p. 9). (These confining contexts
and characteristics are exemplified, in the discussion, by situations
where the speaker is "a police or army ofïîcer" who has "power or
authority" over the listener, or where the listener "love[s] or fear[s] or
want[s] something from" the speaker.) In contrast to this, the reason-
giving force of Reply #2, which has a form such as “Because it is your
duty, “ is said by Maclntyre not to be so confined but, on the contrary, to
be altogether unconditional, quite independent of who utters it or, he
adds, even whether it is uttered at ail. He continues:
Moreover the appeal [of a statement such as "Because it is your duty"] is to

a type of considération which is independent of the relationship between
speaker and hearer. Its use présupposés the existence of impersonal crite-
ria—the existence, independently of the preferences or attitudes of speaker
and hearer, of standards of justice or generosity or duty. The particular link
between the context of utterance and the force of the reason-giving which always
holds in the case of expressions of personal preferences or desire is severed in the
case of moral and other évaluative utterances. (AV, p. 9, emphasis in last
sentence added)
According to Maclntyre, the emotive theory of value judgments—

which he explains as the view that expressions such as "It is good"
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Truth/Value
really mean "I like it and urge it on or recommend it to you"— "is

dedicated to characterizing as équivalent in meaning two kinds of ex
pression which . . . dérivé their distinctive function in our language in
key part from the contrast and différence between them. I hâve already
suggested that there are good reasons for distinguishing between what I
called expressions of personal preference and évaluative (including
moral) expressions” (AV, p. 13). Therefore, he concludes, the emotive
theory is really "a theory about the use—understood as purpose or
function—of members of a certain class of expressions rather than about
their meaning—understood as including ail that Frege intended by
'sense' and 'référencé' " (AV, p. 13).
Maclntyre goes on to posit the remarkable hypothesis on which the
major argument of After Virtue is subsequently constructed:
Clearly the argument so far shows that when someone utters a moral
judgment such as "This is right" or “This is good,” it does not mean the
same as "I approve of this; do so as well” or "Hurrah for this!” . . .
. . . [If it could be demonstrated] that in using such sentences to say
whatever they mean, the agent was in fact doing nothing other than express
ing hisfeelings or attitudes and attempting to influence thefeelings and attitudes of
others . . . it would follow that the meaning and the use of moral expres
sions were, or at the very least had become, radically discrepant with each
other. Meaning and use would be at odds in such a way that meaning
would tend to conceal use. We could not safely infer what someone who
uttered a moral judgment was doing merely by listening to what he said.
Moreover the agent himself. . . might be assured that he was appealing to
independent impersonal criteria, when ail that he was in fact doing was
expressing his feelings to others in a manipulative way. How might such a
phenomenon corne to occur? (AV, pp. 13—14, emphasis added)
How, indeed? Or, rather, we might ask: in accord with what conception
of language could the occurrence of any such phenomenon corne to be
imagined?
The significant features of that conception become clear as Maclntyre
develops his "philosophical/historical” narrative, which goes as follows.
When ail was well and there were still objective standards accepted by
ail the members of the polis (with a few exceptions about which nothing
further need be said), moral discourse was such that there was always a
dependable correspondence between (a) what moral expressions said
and meant in themselves, and (b) what the people who used those expres
sions meant by them, and believed they were doing with them, and
really did with them. In such a time, a listener could “safely infer" what
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Truth/Value
someone was doing with a moral expression "merely by listening" to

what that person said. And, in those good days gone, there was no
confusion between expressions (or sentences) such as "I like it" and
others such as “It is good."3 The first, which in itself expresses some
purely personal preference was then used only to express purely Per
sonal preferences; the second, which présupposés impersonal standards
and in z'fsd/embodies an appeal to them, was used only to appeal to such
standards.
Now, alas, the story continues, ail is schism and confusion: that
which was once one and united is now many and ffactured, those
things which once corresponded and matched are now "discrepant"
and “at odds," and that which was once clear and dependable has
become cloudy and shifting. Now, what passes for morality is an "un-
harmonious mélange" of "ill-assorted fragments," and there is no estab-
lished way of deciding between conflicting daims (AV, p. 10). Now,
“ 'virtue' and 'justice' and 'piety' and 'duty' and even 'ought' hâve
become other than they once were," so that "moral judgments lose any
clear status and the sentences which express th e m . . . lose any undebat-
able meaning" (AV, pp. 10, 60). Now, people still say "It is good" and
think they mean "It is good," but, without knowing it, they are really
doing only what people used to do when they said "I like it" or "I want
it," namely expressing their own feelings and trying to get other people
to feel, do, or believe certain things. And everyone is deceived: listeners
are deceived about what speakers are doing, speakers are deceived
about what they themselves are doing, and moral philosophers are
either deceived, complacent, or complicitous.4
Maclntyre wants to remind us what it was like before after-virtue,
and what it is still like in a few places ("among . . . some Catholic Irish,
some Orthodox Greeks and some Jews of an Orthodox persuasion,. . .
in Scotland . . . [and in] Protestant communities in the United States,
especially perhaps those in or from the South"—AV, p. 252), and what,
in our heart of hearts, the rest of us really wish it would be like again.
We reveal that we wish it by the very fact that we still say things such as
"It is good," "It is right," and "Because it is your duty." For even
though we are using those expressions only to disguise front each other
and from ourselves what we are really doing—that is, expressing our
merely personal preferences and desires in manipulative ways—
nevertheless, because those expressions in themselves embody imper
sonal appeals to objective standards, our very use of them "expresses at
least an aspiration to be or to become rational in this area of our lives"
(AV, p. 10).
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The question that must be asked of this as of any other account of the
Fall is not merely whether, with respect to every posited prelapsarian
element, anything ever did or could happen that way but, no less impor-
tantly, whether, with respect to every deplored pos/lapsarian element,
anything ever did or could happen otherwise. Thus, here, the significant
questions would be whether expressions ever mean things "in them-
selves," whether anyone ever deduced motives directly from verbal
forms, whether judgments could ever hâve undebatable meaning, and
whether there is any use of language that does not try to get people to
feel, do, and believe certain things.
The answer to ail these questions is, of course, no. In particular, no
verbal form has any meaning or force in itself or ever did hâve, even
before the Fall. Nothing is "in" the form. Everything is "in" the verbal
agents themselves, specifically in their tendencies to produce verbal
forms under certain conditions and to respond to them in certain ways:
tendencies that are themselves the corporéal traces of the differential
conséquences of those agents' using and responding to those forms in
prior interactions with each other in particular verbal communities. The
general dynamics through which a listener cornes to respond in some
way to a so-called impersonal and unconditional (or "context-
independent" or "objective") judgment such as "Murder is wrong,"
“Es ist schôn, " or "Business is business," is no different from the dy
namics through which she cornes to respond to any other type of state-
ment, including such manifestly personal and otherwise conditional (or
"context-bound" or "subjective") ones as "I want to kill now," "I just
happen to find it appealing," or "For my money, business is business."
We are quite familiar by now with the idea that the "meaning," in the
sense of force or effect, of any utterance can be "severed" from—or,
rather, cannot be decisively attached to—the conditions of its produc
tion, including the intentions and identity or other characteristics of the
speaker. There is no "type" of expression, however, whose force or
effect is uniquely and characteristically so severed, and none, even the
most Mosaic or otherwise oracular in form, and even where manifestly
anonymous, that opérâtes with the sort of autonomy that Maclntyre
describes.5 The degeneracy and homesickness of contemporary moral
thought cannot be exhibited in the disparity between "the meaning" of
moral expressions and " our use" of them because there is not and
cannot be any such disparity. Expressions such as "It is right," "It is
good," "Murder is wrong," and "Business is business" cannot embody
objectivist appeals in spite of how they are being used because, asidefrom
how they are being used, there is no way for them to embody anything
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at ail. To say that an expression has been "severed" from some “origi
nal" set of meanings is to say only that it has corne to be used under a
different set of conditions in relation to which it now "really means"
something else.6 Or, to put this another way, the notion of a disparity
between the meaning and the use of a verbal form consists simply of
privileging one set of conditions of usage—and more or less corre-
sponding effects—over another. Commonly, as in Maclntyre's case, us
ages that were common at some earlier moment in the life of the com-
munity are privileged (as more authentic, inhérent, or proper) over later
ones—or perhaps it is here only earlier in the moral theorist's own life
and, for that very reason, intuitively felt as more fundamental, more
authentic, and embodied in the forms themselves.
The "meaning," in the sense of "force," "functions," and apparent

"daims," of <i//judgments and justifications and, indeed, of ail statements
or “expressions" are conditional, contingent, and variable. To be sure,
the ranges of variability tend to become relatively stabilized within some
verbal community, but this is the emergent effect of the interactive
practices of the members of the community themselves and not the
product of some essential/residual semantic force inhering in verbal
forms. Moreover, plausible situations can always be specified in which
forms that tend to operate one way under most conditions would operate
otherwise. Thus, ostensible "expressions of personal preference" such
as "It's just my cup of tea" could, under readily imaginable circum-
stances, be replaced by ostensibly "impersonal and objective" forms
such as "It's absolutely the greatest ever" with very little différence in
fonction, force, apparent daim, or, in those senses, meaning. Indeed, the
supposed binary distinctions between judgment "types" can always be
observed to break down in verbal practice, for any verbal form can serve
any discursive function—évaluative or other—under certain circum-
stances, and each of the two supposedly contrastive forms will, under
some circumstances, serve the functions, operate with the force, make
the daims, and hâve the meanings that, in classic axiological discourse-
typology, are the distinguishing features of the other one.
As should be dear, the point of this analysis is not that there are no
différences among the various verbal forms or discourse-types
dichotomized in traditional value theory: it is, rather, that there are
many différences, that they are not only and always contrastive, that
they include many that are not commonly cited, and that those com
monly cited must be described otherwise. A final point may be noted
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here by way of transition to the next section, which examines the rela
tion between value judgments and other types of discourse with respect
to their "validity" or "truth-value." Not only can one not tell from its
form alone what the force of an évaluative judgment is; one cannot
even tell whether an "expression" is évaluative at ail. Virtually any
verbal form ("How odd!"; "Is this the one you brought back from
Rome?"; "It's ten o'clock already, let's go"; "Don't forget your um-
brella") can, under some conditions, operate as a mark and sign of
someone's "personal préférences," and there is a virtually unlimited
range of forms ("cool," "the pits," "***," "XXX") through which some-
one can offer an ("objective," "impersonal") observation or estimate of
the value of something for other people. Moreover, even such appar-
ently simple and impoverished forms as appear in these examples may
be expressively and informationally quite rich, subde, and spécifie: as,
for example, when the listener has prior knowledge of the speaker's
tastes, interests, and, especially, his verbal habits or, as in published film
ratings or travel guides, where the reader interprets the symbols in
accord with some more or less elaborate "key" that she has already
leamed. These cases, however, are not very different from each other,
and, in fact, represent the ways "expressions" of ail "types" in ail lan-
guages operate.
I suggested above that the syntactic and modal form of a judgment—
whether it is "Gee, you could try Archie's, ail the fellows at the office
go there" as opposed to "It's the best restaurant in town"; or "I think
it's horrible to hurt other people deliberately" as opposed to "Torture is
wrong"; or, in the case of a justification, "Do it because I want you to"
as opposed to "Do it because it is your duty"—may be responsive to,
and indicate to a listener, quite subtle and spécifie matters. These are
characteristically matters not about the objects or practices being evalu-
ated but, rather, about the nature of the evaluator's relationship to those
he addresses (precisely, to use Maclntyre's examples, whether he is the
listener's superior ofïicer or her lover, and whether he is afraid of
the listener or wants something from her, and so forth) and also the
evaluator's own beliefs conceming various relevant matters—for ex
ample, the extensiveness and stability of the conditions under which his
judgment would be applicable, the extern to which relevant aspects of
his personal economy, perspective, and assumptions are shared by his
listeners, the nature of his listeners' interest in his judgment, and also
the degree of his own confidence in his beliefs conceming ail these
matters. Although it is unlikely that any of these matters could be
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specifically articulated as such by the evaluator or his listeners, they are

nevertheless what both (or ail) of them will hâve leamed in leaming the
conditions of usage of the forms of évaluative language in their shared
verbal community—which is, of course, why évaluations hâve any
communicative force at ail.
Because of other general aspects of communication to be discussed at
length in the next section, particularly those involving inévitable dis-
parities, différences, and asymmetries between what is "transmitted" by
a speaker and "received" by a listener, a listener cannot (and never
could, even before the Fall) “infer" any of these matters—or anything
else—“safely" from the form of a judgment. To the extern, however,
that certain verbal practices tend to occur with some regularity in our
own verbal communities, we may observe that (a) the broader and
more stable the range of conditions under which an evaluator believes
the judgment she offers would be applicable, (b) the more extensive the
set of people for whom she believes it would be appropriable, (c) the
more closely she believes her personal economy and relevant assump-
tions coincide with those of her listeners, (d) the more she believes her
listeners' interest in her judgment is in the object or practice evaluated
rather than in her personal responses as such, and (e) the more
confident she is in her own beliefs conceming ail these matters, the less
likely it is that her évaluation will take the form of a contextually
qualified statement of personal preference and the more likely that it will
tend to be "unconditioned" and "impersonal" in form and hence appear
to be an “impersonal" judgment appealing to "objective standards."
Thus, and contrary to a crucial axiological supposition, when some-
one makes a formally unconditional and otherwise unqualified évalua
tive statement such as “It's nifty," “It's nauseating," “It's cheap," "It's
bad manners," the fact that she does not name explicitly any limiting
group of people need not imply that she is "daiming universal validity"
for the judgment or that she takes the agreement of "everybody" to be
its idéal limit. It may be and often is, rather, because she assumes that
the defining features of the spécifie set of people for whom the judgment
would be appropriable7 can be taken for granted by her listeners: com-
monly as consisting of herself plus them, plus ail other people like them
in the relevant respects (lovers of New Wave music, students of
cinematic art, electronic engineers, communicants of the Catholic
Church, professional people of means and leisure, etc.), but also quite
often as inferable from the context of the judgment itself (for example,
the book-review section of The New Yorker as distinguished from that of
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Popular Mechanics, or the current Michelin Guide to Italy rather than a

1950 édition of How to See Europe on $5 a Day, or the policy recom
mendations of a sociological study of teenage pregnancy rather than a
Vatican Encyclical). The evaluator's assumptions conceming what her
audience knows or takes for granted may of course be mistaken, but the
possibility of error of that kind is an ineradicable condition of ail verbal
transactions and does not undermine the appropriability of value judg-
ments—or their “force" or interest of any other kind—any more than
that of any other type of utterance.
A concluding word on the political implications of Maclntyre's analy

sis of value judgments may be added. It could be shown to follow from
the account outlined above that the conditions for truly universally
shared objective standards would be achieved insofar as the members of
a community approached total homogeneity and the community itself
approached the status of a closed and static System, both immured from
extemal interactions and secured against internai sources of instability.
Since in such a community the conditions of expérience and judgment
would always be the same, and the same for everybody, there would be,
in effect, no contingencies and ail judgments would be, in effect, "objec
tive." Moreover, since everything would be presupposed by everyone in
the same way, évaluative authority would be located in a truly universal
consensus backed up by the combined power of the entire community
except, perhaps, for a few unregenerately unassimilable malcontents.
It is doubtless the case that communal life requires shared goals or
norms—or at least more or less congruous inclinations among the
members of the community—and routines of action, reaction, and in
teraction that are, at least in the long run, mutually and generally
bénéficiai (the two are not, of course, the same). It appears to be the
characteristic belief of current social critics who pursue the nostalgie
mode, however, that these are simple corrélations or purely linear func-
tions: that a community prospers, in other words, in proportion to the
extern that its members hâve achieved consensus or that it prospers
more as communal norms become more uniform, cohérent, and stable.8
But the well-being of any community is also a function of other and
indeed opposed conditions, including the extent of the diversity of the
beliefs and practices of its members and thus their communal resource-
fulness, and the flexibility of its norms and patterns and thus their
responsiveness to changing and emerging circumstances.
For, of course, with the exception of Paradise and some other tran-
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scendental polities, no community can be immured from interactions

with a changing environment, nor can the heterogeneity of its members
be altogether eradicated and their potential conflicts altogether pre-
vented. Where différence continuously emerges, it must be either con-
tinuously negotiated or continuously suppressed, the latter always at
somebody's cost and often enough, it appears, at, in the long run, con
sidérable communal cost. Given such sublunary conditions, it is perhaps
just as well for "our society" that its norms are a "mélange," that they
constantly multiply, collide, and transform each other, that conflicts of
judgment are negotiated ad hoc, and that normative authority itself is
multiple and recurrently changes hands, variously strengthening and
becoming diffuse. And, given such conditions, it is perhaps also just as
well that malcontents continue to be engendered and Falls continuously
enacted.
Value without Truth-Value

Two corollaries of the conception of value as radically contingent are of
particular interest for classic and contemporary conceptions of "truth-
value." The first is that a verbal judgment of “the value" of some en-
tity—for example, an artwork, a work of literature, or any other kind of
object, event, text, or utterance—cannot be a judgment of any indepen-
dently determinate or, as we say, "objective" property of that entity. As
seen above, however, what it can be (and typically is) is a judgment of
that entity's contingent value: that is, the speaker's observation or esti-
mate of how the entity will figure in the economy of some limited
population of subjects under some limited set of conditions.
The second corollary is that no value judgment can hâve truth-value
in the usual sense. The usual sense, however, is no longer ail that usual.
When interpreted in accord with some version of the traditional télé
graphie model of discourse in which communication is seen as the
duplicative transmission of a code-wrapped message from one conscious-
ness to another, "truth-value" is seen as a measure of the extern to
which such a message, when properly unwrapped, accurately and ade-
quately reflects, represents, or corresponds with some independently
determinate fact, reality, or State of affairs. As we know, that model of
discourse, along with the entire structure of conceptions, epistemolog-
ical and other, in which it is embedded, is now felt in many places to be
theoretically unworkable. It has not, however, been replaced by any
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other widely appropriated model. There hâve been, of course, through-

out the century, sophisticated démonstrations of precisely that unwork-
ability; and there hâve also been attempts, some of them quite painstak-
ing, to rehabilitate the key terms, concepts, and conceptual syntax of the
traditional model.9 What appears to be needed, and is perhaps emerg-
ing, is a total and appropriately elaborated reformulation, and, in partic-
ular, one in which the various fundamentally problematic explanatory
structures involving duplicative transmission, correspondence, équiva
lence, and recovery are replaced by an account of the dynamics of vari
ous types of consequential interaction.
With respect to its epistemological component or what is traditionally
referred to as "perception,” "knowledge," "belief," and so forth, this
would be an account of how the structures, mechanisms, and behaviors
through which subjects interact with—and, accordingly, constitute—
their environments are modified by those very interactions.10 With re
spect to what we now call "communication," it would be an account of
the dynamics of the differentially constrained behaviors of subjects who
interact with, and thereby act upon, each other, for better and for worse.
I shall retum to this latter suggestion below, but for the moment it is
enough to observe that, whatever its emergent shape (or, more likely,
shapes), an altemate account of our commerce with the universe and our
commerce with each other is not yet available.
In the meantime, the télégraphie model of communication, along
with its associated conception of truth as correspondence to an indepen-
dently determinate reality, continues to dominate theoretical discourse,
and the theoretical interest of the term "truth" itself continues to be
reinforced by its numerous—and, it must be emphasized here, irreduc-
ibly various—idiomatic and technical uses. Indeed, the term appears to
be irreplaceable and, economically speaking, priceless: for its rhetorical
power in political discourse alone—and there is perhaps no other kind
of discourse—would seem to be too great to risk losing or even com-
promising. Nevertheless, as already indicated, the theoretical value of
the concept of truth-value has already been compromised. Indeed, the
value of truth and of truth-value seem to be as contingent—as histori-
cally and locally variable—as that of anything else.
The question of the truth-value of value judgments has, of course,
been debated endlessly and unresolvably in formai axiology, and the
continued préoccupation of disciplinary aesthetics with corresponding
debates over the logical status and cognitive substance of aesthetic judg
ments, typically posited and examined as totally unsituated (or, at best,
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minimally situated) instances, has no doubt contributed to its réputation

for dreariness and perhaps to its terminal sterility as well. Other, poten-
tially more productive projects, however, may be undertaken more or
less independently of such debates. One, which I hâve already outlined,
is the exploration of the institutional and broader cultural and historical
operation of literary and aesthetic évaluations, verbal and otherwise. An-
other, to be broached below, is the analysis of verbal value judgments
considered not as a dass of “propositions" identified through certain
formai features but, rather, as a type of communicative behavior re-
sponding to and constrained by certain social conditions. The latter sort
of analysis avoids but makes apparent the theoretical impoverishment
as well as the fundamentally problematic dualism of more traditional
"analytic" approaches. For, as will be seen, the classic dichotomies
thereby produced (personal/impersonal, conditional/unconditioned, ex
pressing subjective preferences versus making objective judgments,
speaking for oneself alone versus daiming universal validity, trying to
persuade and manipulate people versus indicating the true value of
things, and so forth) hâve obscured not only the enormous range, vari-
ety, richness, and modulation of individual verbal judgments, but also
the crucially relevant continuities between évaluative and other types of
discourse, and, most significantly, the social dynamics through which ail
utterances, évaluative and otherwise, acquire value.
The Value o f Value Judgments

“The work is physically small— 18 by 13 inches—but massive and dis-
turbingly expressive in impact."
"Brava, brava!"
"It's not up to his last one, but that's just my opinion."
"Yes, if you're looking for a teachable text; no, if you want the most
current research."
"Absolutely beautiful, though not, of course, for ail tastes."
"They gave it the Booker Prize in England, but I'il bet the Americans
will pan it."
"XXX"
Value judgments appear to be among the most fondamental forms of

social communication and also among the most primitive benefits of
social interaction. It appears, for example, that insects and birds as well
as mammals signal to other members of their group, by some form of
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specialized overt behavior, not only the location but also the "quality”
of a food supply or territory. And, créatures such as we are, we too not
only produce but also eagerly solicit from each other both, as it might be
said, "expressions of personal sentiment" (How do you like it?) and "ob
jective judgments of value" (Is it any good?). We solicit them because,
although neither will (for nothing can) give us knowledge of any deter-
minate value of an object, both may let us know, or—and this will be
significant here—at least appear to let us know, other things that we
could find interesting and useful.
It is évident, for example, that other people's reports of how well
certain things hâve gratified them, though "mere expressions of their
subjective likes and dislikes," will nevertheless be interesting to us if we
ourselves—as artists, say, or manufacturers, or cooks—hâve produced
those objects, or if—as parents, say, or potential associâtes—we hâve an
independently motivated interest in the current States of those people or
in the general structure of their tastes and preferences. Also, no matter
how magisterially delivered and with what attendant daims or convic
tions of universality, unconditionality, impersonality, or objectivity, any
assertion of “the value” of some object can always be unpacked as a
judgment of its contingent value and appropriated accordingly: that is, as
that speaker's observation and/or estimate of how well that object, com-
pared to others of the same (even though only implicitly defined) type,
has performed and/or is likely to perform some particular (even though
unstated) desired/able functions11 for some particular (even though only
implicitly defined) subject or set of subjects under some particular (even
though not specified) set or range of conditions.
Any évaluation, then, no matter what its manifest syntactic form,
ostensible "validity daim," and putative propositional status, may hâve
social value in the sense of being appropriable by other people. The
actual value of a particular évaluation, however, will itself be highly
contingent, depending on such variables as the spécifie social and in-
stitutional context in which it is produced, the spécifie social and institu-
tional relation between the speaker and his listener(s), the spécifie struc
ture of interests that motivâtes and constrains the entire social/verbal
transaction in which the évaluation figures, a vast and not ultimately
numerable or listable set of variables relating to, among other things, the
social, cultural, and verbal historiés of those involved, and of course the
particular perspective from which that value is being figured.
In the case of someone's verbal évaluation of an artwork, for ex
ample, the value of that évaluation would obviously be figured differ-
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ently by (a) the evaluator himself, who, we should note, could be anyone
from the artist's teacher, student, brother, or agent to some casual gal-
lery visitor, a Warburg Institute art historian, or a member of a Commit-
tee for the Préservation of Cultural Standards and Ideological Purity,
(b) the artist herself, whose interest in the évaluation would be different
from that of the evaluator but whose évaluation of it would still dépend
on the latter's identity and/or relationship to her and/or institutional
rôle, (c) any of various specifically addressed listeners or some interested
bystander or eavesdropper: for example, a potential patron, a gallery-
going reader of Art News, a fellow art historian, or someone who just
likes to know what's going on and what other people think is going on.
For each of these, the évaluation would be "good" or "bad" in relation
to a different configuration of heterogeneous interests: interests that
might be unique but that might also be more or less shared by other—
perhaps many other—people.
We may take note here of the récurrent anxiety/charge/claim—I shall
refer to it as the Egalitarian Fallacy—that, unless one judgment can be
said or shown to be more "valid” than another, then ail judgments must
be "equal" or "equally valid.” Although the radical contingency of ail
value certainly does imply that no value judgment can be more "valid"
than another in the sense of an objectively truer statement of the objective
value of an object (for these latter concepts are then seen as vacuous), it
does not follow that ail value judgments are equally valid. On the con-
trary, what does follow is that the concept of "validity" in that sense is
unavailable as a parameter by which to measure or compare judgments
(or anything else). It is évident, however, that value judgments can still
be evaluated, still compared, and still seen and said to be "better" or
"worse" than others. The point, of course, is that their value—
"goodness" or "badness"-—must be understood, evaluated, and com
pared otherwise, that is, as something other than "truth-value" or "va
lidity" in the objectivist, essentialist sense. I shall retum to this point
below.
The social value of value judgments is illustrated most concretely,
perhaps, by the most obviously commercial of them, namely the sorts of
assessments and recommendations issued by professional evaluators:
film and book reviewers, commissioned art connoisseurs, and those
who préparé consumer guides, travel guides, restaurant guides, race-
track tipsheets, and so forth. Such évaluations are not only regularly
produced but also regularly sought and bought by the citizens of late
capitalist society who live in what is, in effect, a vast supermarket, open
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twenty-four hours a day, with an array of possible goods that is not only
enormous but that constantly increases and changes and, moreover,
does so at a pace that constantly outstrips our ability to obtain current
information about them and thus to calculate how they might figure in
our personal économies. Indeed, if we were the "rational consumers" so
beloved by economists—that is, consumers who, given total informa
tion about market conditions, always buy the best for their money—we
would hâve to spend so much of our time acquiring the necessary
information that there would be little time left to buy, much less to
consume, anything at ail.12
The supermarket described here is, to be sure, a flagrant feature of
contemporary Western society. It is not, however, as recent or as cultur-
ally unique as is sometimes suggested. For we always live in a market,
always hâve limited resources—including limited time, energy, and oc
casion to locate and sample for ourselves the entire array of possible
goods in it—and therefore always find it economical to pay others to
locate and sample some of those goods for us. Professional évalua
tions—reviews, ratings, guides, tips, and so forth—are only highly spe-
cialized and commoditized versions of the sorts of observations and
estimâtes of contingent value commonly exchanged more informally
among associâtes in any culture; and though we do not always pay each
other for them in hard coin, we do pay for them in coin of some sort,
such as gratitude and good will, redeemable for return favors and future
services.
It appears, then, that évaluations—of artworks along with anything
else consumable, and what isn't?—are themselves commodities of con
sidérable value, and this in spite of what is sometimes alleged to be their
tenuous cognitive substance and suspect propositional status as com-
pared with other kinds of utterances: "factual descriptions," for ex
ample, or "empirical scientific reports." Of course, the cognitive sub
stance and propositional validity of aesthetic judgments hâve been
strenuously defended. Indeed, the dominant tradition in post-Kantian
aesthetic axiology has characteristically offered to demonstrate that such
judgments do hâve truth-value, or at least that they can properly
"daim " to hâve it under the right conditions—which, however, always
tum out to be excruciating ones to meet and also rather difficult, or
perhaps impossible, to certify as having been met. We are, however,
approaching the issue from a different—in fact, reverse—direction, the
procedure and objective here being not to demonstrate that value judg
ments hâve as much daim to truth-value as factual or descriptive state-
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ments but, rather, to suggest that, just as value judgments do not hâve
but also do not need truth-value in the traditional sense, neither, it
seems, do any of those other forms of discourse.
There is, of course, no way for us to be certain that our associâtes'
reports of their Personal likes and dislikes are sirtcere, or that the ratings
and rankings produced by professional connoisseurs and local men and
women of taste are, as we might say, "honest" and “objective." Indeed,
we may grant more generally that any évaluation, aesthetic or other-
wise, will be shaped by the speaker's own interests, both as a party to
the verbal transaction in which the évaluation figures and in other ways
as well. It may also be granted that, since value is especially subject-
variable for certain classes of objects, among them artworks, the appro-
priability of value judgments of such objects may be correspondingly
highly subject-variable. For these reasons—that is, because we do tend
to leam that there's no such thing as an honest opinion and that one
man's méat is the other's poison—we typically supplément and discount
the value judgments we are offered “in the light," as we say, of knowl
edge we hâve from other sources: knowledge, for example, of the re-
viewer's Personal and perhaps idiosyncratic preferences, or the connois-
seur's spécial interests or obligations and thus suspect or clearly
compromised motives.
Or, rather, knowledge we think we hâve. For there is no way for us
to be certain of the accuracy, adequacy, or validity of this sup-
plementary knowledge either, and we may therefore seek yet further
supplementary information from yet other sources: some trustworthy
guide to travel guides, perhaps, or a reliable review of the reliability of
film reviewers, or an inside tip on what tipsheet to buy. It is clear,
however, that there can be no end to this theoretically infinité regress of
supplementing the suppléments and evaluating the évaluations, just as
there is none to that of justifying the justifications of judgments, or
grounding the grounds of knowledge of any kind—though, in practice,
we do the best we can, ail things considered . . . at least as far as we
know those things, or think we know them. We need not linger over the
epistemological regress here. What is more pertinent to observe is that in
ail the respects mentioned, value judgments are not essentially different
from “descriptive" or “factual" statements, and that their reliability and
objectivity are no more compromised by these possibilities—or, for that
matter, any less compromised by them—than the reliability or objectiv
ity of any other type of utterance, from a pathetic plea of a headache to
the solemn communication of the measurement of a scientific in
strument.13
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Not essentially different: there are, however, relative différences of vari-

ous kinds. That is, these types of discourse may be seen not as absolutely
distinct by virtue of their radically opposed daims to "truth" or “objec
tive validity," but as occupying different positions along a number of
relevant continua. Thus, although the value of ail objects is to some
extent subject-variable, the value of some objects will be relatively more
uniform than others among the members of some community—as will
be, accordingly, the judgments conceming their value exchanged within
that community. Similarly, although the conditions under which a par-
ticular judgment or report can be appropriated by other people are
always to some extent limited, they will be relatively broader for some
judgments and reports than for others. And, as I shall discuss below,
although fraud, exploitation, and oppression are possibilities in any
verbal interaction, their occurrence will be relatively better controlled by
certain types of social and institutional constraints than others. Indeed,
the familiar distinctions and contrasts among types of discourse that are
at issue here—that is, between “merely subjective" and "truly objec
tive" judgments, or between mere value judgments and genuine factual
descriptions, or between statements that can and cannot daim truth-
value—are no doubt continuously reinforced by the undeniability of
just such relative différences which, however, in accord with certain
conceptual operations perhaps endemic to human thought, are typically
binarized, polarized, absolutized, and hierarchized.
We may retum here briefly to the the Egalitarian Fallacy: the idea that
a déniai of objective value commits one to the view that ail judgments
are "equal," "equally good," or "equally valid." As noted above, this is
a strict non sequitur since, if one finds "validity" in the objectivist, essen-
tialist sense vacuous, one could hardly be committed to accepting it as a
parameter by which to measure or compare judgments, whether as
better or worse or as "equal." What feeds the fallacy is the objectivist's
unshakable conviction that "validity" in his objectivist, essentialist sense
is the only possible measure of the value of utterances. (The Egalitarian
Fallacy is thus another illustration of the more general rule that, to the
dualist, whatever is not dualistic is reductionist, or If it's not distin-
guishable by my dualistic description of différences, then it's the same.) What I
am suggesting throughout this study is not only that there are other
parameters by which the value—goodness or badness—of utterances
can be measured,14 but that there are other ways in which ail value,
including that of utterances, can be conceived.
As we hâve seen, value judgments may themselves be considered
commodities. What may be added here, glandng at the issue of their
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alleged “equality" under this account, is that some of them are evidently
worth more than others in the relevant markets. Thus, the Michelin guides
to Italian hôtels, restaurants, and altar paintings hâve, we might say, a
well-attested réputation for objectivity and reliability, at least among
certain classes of travelers. This is not, however, because there is, after
ail, just a little bit of objective—or universal subjective—validity to
which some judgments can properly lay claim. On the contrary, it may
be seen as a conséquence of précisely those compromising conditions
described earlier and summed up in the lesson that there's no such thing
as an honest opinion: no judgment, that is, totally unaffected by the
particular social, institutional, and other conditions of its production or
totally immune to the (assumed) interests and desires of its (assumed)
audience—or, we could say, because it cuts both ways and that is the
point, no judgment altogether unresponsive to those interests and desires.
For, if we do not regard them as the regrettable effects of fallen human
nature or as noise in the channels of communication or, in the ternis of
one account, as “distortions" of the idéal conditions "presupposed" by
ail genuine speech-acts,15 then we may be better able to see them as the
conditions under which ail verbal transactions take place and which give
them—or are, precisely, the conditions of possibility for—whatever value
they do hâve for those actually involved in them.
The Economies of Verbal Transactions

That which we call “communication" is a historically conditioned social
interaction, in many respects also an économie one and, like other or
perhaps ail économie transactions, a political one as well. It is histori
cally conditioned in that the effectiveness of any particular interaction
dépends on the differential conséquences of the agents' prior verbal acts
and interactions with other members of a particular verbal community.
It is an économie interaction—and thus, one could say, transaction—to
the extent that its dynamics operate on, out of, and through disparities
of resources (or "goods," such as material property, information, skills,
influence, position, and so on) between/among the agents and involve
risks, gains, and/or losses on either or ail sides. Communication is also a
political interaction, not only in that its dynamics may operate through
différences of power between the agents but also in that the interaction
may put those différences at stake, threatening or promising (again, it
must eut both ways) either to confirm and maintain them or to subvert
or otherwise change them.
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Not ail the implications of this conception of communication can be

spelled out here.16 What is significant for our présent concems is that ail
discourse—descriptive and factual as well as évaluative—opérâtes by
social économies and that, under certain conditions, speakers are con-
strained (so that it is, we would say, "in their own interest") to serve the
interests of their assumed listeners in the ways we commonly charac-
terize as "objectivity" and "reliability."
Thus, certain conditions relevant to the publishing industry (for ex
ample, the need for the Michelin guides or Art News to secure a
minimum number of regular readers and subscribers plus the actual or
potential compétition from other such guides or individual evaluators)
will make it more profitable for professional raters and reviewers to
produce évaluations appropriable by a relatively large but still relatively
spécifie set of people and, accordingly, less profitable for them to accept
bribes for favorable ratings or to play out idiosyncratic or inappropri-
ately specialized personal preferences. We recall the familiar disclaimer
commonly attached to such judgments (here an obviously somewhat,
but not altogether, disingenuous one): "Note that we hâve no fies to
manufacturers or retailers, we accept no advertising, and we're not
interested in selling products. The sole purpose of this book is to help
you make intelligent purchases at the best prices."17 To increase the
likelihood that the review or rating of a particular object (such as a new
play opening in Philadelphia or an altar painting to be seen in Palermo)
will be appropriable by that group of readers, the evaluator will, of
course, typically sample it for himself or herself, operating as a stand-in
for those subjects or, we might say, as their métonymie représentative,
and, to that end, will typically be attentive to the particular contingen-
cies of which the value of objects of that kind appear to be a function for
people of that kind. To do this reliably over a period of time, the
evaluator will also be attentive to the shifts and fluctuations of those
contingencies: that is, to the current States of the personal économies of
those readers, to what can be discovered or surmised conceming their
relevant needs, interests, and resources, to the availability of comparable
and compétitive objects, and so forth.18
As this suggests, competent and effective evaluators—those who
know their business and stay in business (and, of course, there are
always many who don't do either)—operate in some ways very much
like market analysts. But professional market analysis is itself only a
highly specialized and commoditized version of the sorts of informai or
intuitive research, sampling, and calculating necessarily performed by
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any evaluator, and if we are inclined to reserve particular loathing for

professional market analysts as compared to professional critics, it is no
doubt because the latter typically operate to serve our interests as con-
sumers whereas the former typically operate to serve the interests of our
marketplace adversaries: those who seek to predict, control, and
thereby to profit from, our actions and choices, that is, producers and
sellers. But it must be remembered that some of us—or, indeed, ail of
us, some of the time—are producers and sellers, too, a point to which I
will retum below.
Given the general conditions and dynamics described above, profes
sional evaluators will typically seek to secure as large a group of clients
as possible. The size of that group will always be limited, however, for,
given also that one man's méat is the other's poison, the more respon-
sive a judgment is to the needs, resources, desires, and tastes of one
client, the less appropriable it will be by another. It is désirable ail
around, then, that verbal judgments, professional or amateur, be (as
they usually, in fact, seem to be) more or less explicitly "tailored" and
“targeted" to particular people or sets of people rather than offering or
claiming to be appropriable by everybody or, in the ternis of classic
axiology, "universally valid."
Validity in Science and the Value o f " Beauty "

The market conditions that constrain evaluators to produce what we call
objective and reliable judgments hâve their counterpart in social and
institutional conditions that characteristically constrain scientists' be-
havior to comparable ends. Western disciplinary science has been able
to pursue so successfully its defining communal mission—which we
might characterize here as the génération of verbal/conceptual struc
tures appropriable by the members of some relevant community under
the broadest possible range of conditions19—because it has developed
institutional mechanisms and practices, induding incentives or Systems
of reward and punishment, that effectively constrain the individual sci-
entist to serve that particular mission in the conduct and reporting of his
or her research.20
Physicists and other scientists often recall that, in the course of their
pursuit, production, and testing of altemate models or théories, they
were drawn to what tumed out to be the “right" one by their sense of its
“beauty” or “aesthetic” appeal. Attempts to account for this commonly
focus either on what are seen as the formai and hence aesthetic proper-
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ties of the model or theory itself (for example, its "simplicity" or "ele-
gance") or on what is seen as its correspondence to or conformity with
comparable aesthetic features in nature (for example, the latter's "or-
der," “pattern," or “regularity").21 What makes such explanations
somewhat questionable, however—that is, their ignoring of the histor-
ical, social, and institutional conditions under which scientific con-
structs are produced and appropriated, and their assumption of a “na
ture" with independently determinate features—suggests an altemate
explanation more pertinent to our présent concems.
No matter how insulated his laboratory or solitary his research, the
scientist always opérâtes as a social being in two fundamental respects.
First, the language or symbolic mode of his conceptualizations—both its
lexicon and syntax (that is, the tokens, chains, routes, and networks of
his conceptual moves)—has necessarily been acquired and shaped, like
any other language, through his social interactions in a particular verbal
community, here the community of scientists in that discipline or field.
Second, in the very process of exploring and assessing the "rightness" or
“adequacy" of altemate models, the scientist too, like professional and
other evaluators, characteristically opérâtes as a métonymie représenta
tive of the community for whom his product is designed and whose
possible appropriation of it is part of the motive and reward of his own
activity. In this respect, the scientist also opérâtes as does any other
producer of consumer goods, including, significantly enough here, the
artist, for, as mentioned earlier, a significant aspect of the “créative"
process is the artist's pre-figuring of the shifting économies of her as-
sumed and imagined audiences, whose emergent interests, variable
conditions of encounter, and rival sources of gratification she will intui-
tively surmise and to which, among other things, her sense of the
fittingness and fitness of her creative/productive decisions will be respon-
sive.
The point here is that the process of testing the adequacy of a scientific
model or theory is never only—and sometimes not at ail—a measuring
of its fit with what we call “the data," "the evidence," or "the facts," ail
of which are, themselves, the products of comparable conceptual and
évaluative activities already appropriated to one degree or another by
the relevant community; it is also a testing, sampling, and, in effect,
tasting in advance of the ways in which the product will taste to other
members of that community—which is to say also a calculating in
advance of how it will "figure" for them in relation to their personal
économies, including (though not necessarily confined to) those aspects
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of those économies that we call "intellectual" or "cognitive." Thus,

what is commonly called "elegance" in a theory or model is often a
matter of how sparing it is in its introduction of novel conceptual struc
tures (novel, that is, relative to conceptualizations current in the com-
munity), in which case its "beauty" would indeed be a matter of its
"economy" for its consumers: in effect, minimum cognitive processing
and hence expenditure would be required for its effective appropriation,
application, or "consumption." The sense of "beauty" or aesthetic ap-
peal that draws the scientist in one direction rather than another may
indeed, then, be a proleptic glimpse of its "fit," "fittingness," or "right-
ness": not, however, in the sense of its correspondence with or confor-
mity to an independently determinate reality but, rather, in the sense of
its suitability for eventual communal appropriation.22
I hâve not specified anÿ of the numerous and quite diverse ways in
which a scientific construct could "figure" for the members of some
relevant community. Considération of such matters would be exces-
sively digressive here, but one further point relating to the social éco
nomies of validity should be emphasized. Insofar as the development of
a theory, model, or hypothesis has been directed toward the solution of
some relatively spécifie set of technological and/or conceptual problems,
its structure will hâve been produced and shaped in accord with the
scientist's sense—perhaps largely intuitive—of its fitness or potential
utility to that end, and its appropriability and hence social value will be
largely a matter of the extern to which that surmised or intuited utility is
actually realized. Or, it might be said, its validity will be tested by "how
well it works" and consist, in effect, in its working well. Pragmatist
conceptions of validity, however, are not much improvement over static
essentialist or positivist ones if they obliterate the historically and other-
wise complex processes that would be involved in the multiple and inevi-
tably diverse appropriation of any verbal/conceptual construct (or, to
appropriate Jacques Derrida's useful term and concept here, its "dis
sémination").
Pragmatist reconceptualizations of scientific validity, then, must give
due récognition to the fact that théories and models that work very
badly or not ail—or no longer work—in the implémentation of spécifie
projects or the solution of spécifie problems may nevertheless "work"
and acquire social value otherwise. They may, for example, corne to
figure as especially fertile metaphoric structures, evoking the production
and élaboration of other verbal and conceptual structures in relation to a
broad variety of interests and projects under quite diverse historical and
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intellectual conditions. One may think here of Marxist économies,

psychoanalytic theory, and various ancient and modem cosmological
models, including more or less “mystical," "metaphysical," and “primi
tive" ones—ail of these, we might note, also classic examples of
"nonfalsifiability" and/or nonscientificity in positivist philosophies of
science.
The Other Side of the Coin

To remark, as we hâve been doing here, the ways in which verbal
Products and wares hâve value without tmth-value is not to imply that
that value is always high or positive, or positive for everyone. Indeed,
what follows from the présent analysis is that the value of any utter-
ance—aesthetic judgment, factual statement, mathematical theorem, or
any other type—may be quite minimal or négative, at least for someone
and perhaps for a great many people. As has been stressed here, value
always cuts both, or ail, ways. An aesthetic judgment, for example, how-
ever eamestly offered, may—under readily imaginable social condi
tions—be excruciatingly uninteresting and worthless to some listen-
er(s); or, conversely, though a factual report may be highly informative
to its audience, it may—under readily imaginable political conditions—
hâve been extorted from an unwilling speaker at considérable risk or
cost to himself.
Such possibilities do not require us to posit any deficiencies of truth-
value or breakdowns in the conditions that "normally" obtain in verbal
transactions or are "presupposed" by them.23 On the contrary, if any-
thing is thus presupposed it is precisely such négative possibilities. Or, to
put this somewhat differently, the possibility of cost or loss as well as of
benefit or gain is a condition of any transaction in the linguistic market
where, as in any other market, agents hâve diverse interests and per
spectives, and what is gain for one may be, or may involve, loss for the
other.24
We engage in verbal transactions because we leam that it is some-
times the only and often the best—most effective, least expensive—way
to do certain things or gain certain goods. As speakers, it is often the best
way to affect the beliefs and behavior of other people in ways that serve
our interests, desires, or goals; as listeners, it is often the best way to
leam things that may be useful for us to know and perhaps otherwise
unknowable, including things about the people who speak to us.25 And
such transactions may be quite profitable for both parties. For listeners
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do—not always, but often enough—respond to utterances in ways that

serve their speakers' interests: sometimes because a listener is indepen-
dently motivated to do so but also because she will hâve leamed that, in
so doing, she makes it at least minimally worthwhile for speakers to
speak and thereby, possibly, to say something of interest to her. Simi-
larly, speakers do—again, not always but often enough—tell listeners
things they find interesting: typically because it is only through a listen-
er's knowing or believing those things that the latter can serve the
speaker's interests, but also because ail speakers leam that, in so doing,
they make it at least minimally worthwhile for people to listen and
thereby to be affected in the ways they desire. It must be emphasized
here—though the télégraphie and most other models of communication
miss and obscure this crucial aspect of the reciprocality of verbal trans
actions—that listeners, like speakers, are verbal agents, and that their
characteristic and even optimal re/actions are not confined to the rela-
tively passive and altogether internai or mental ones suggested by such
terms as “receiving," “interpreting," "decoding," and “understanding,"
but embrace the entire spectrum of responsive human actions, including
acts that are quite energetic, overt, "material," and, what is most
significant here, consequential for the speaker.
Verbal transactions are also risky, however, and in some ways struc-
turally adversarial.26 For, given the dynamics and constraints of recip
rocality just described, it will tend to be in the speaker's interests to
provide only as much “information” as is required to affect the listener's
behavior in the ways he himself desires and no “information” that it
may be to his general d/sadvantage that she know or believe;27 at the
same time, it will tend to be in the listener's interest to leam whatever it
may be useful or interesting for her to know, whether or not her know
ing it happens also to be required or desired by the speaker. Thus, to
describe what is presupposed by ail communication is to describe the
conditions not only for mutually effective interactions but also and si-
multaneously for mutual mis-"understanding," deceit, and exploitation;
and although the more extravagant reaches of these latter possibilities
are no doubt commonly limited by their ultimately négative consé
quences for those who hazard them too often or indiscriminately, the
converse possibilities remain radically excluded: specifically, the kinds
of équivalences, symmetries, duplications, and gratuitous mutualities
that are commonly posited as normally achieved in verbal transactions
or as deffning “communication."
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Indeed, by the account outlined here, there is no “communication" in

the sense either of a making common of something (for example, “knowl
edge") that was previously the possession of only one party or in the
sense of a transferral or transmission of the same (information, feelings,
beliefs, and so on) from one to the other. What there is, rather, is a
differentially consequential interaction: that is, an interaction in which each
party acts in relation to the other differently—in different, asymmetric
ways and in accord with different spécifie motives—and also with dif
ferent conséquences for each. It is inévitable that there will be disparities
between what is "transmitted" and what is “received" in any exchange
simply by virtue of the different States and circumstances of the
"sender" and “receiver," including what will always be the différ
ences—sometimes quite significant ones—produced by their inevitably
different life-histories as verbal créatures. In addition, the structure of
interests that motivâtes and govems ail verbal interactions makes it
inévitable that there will also be différences—sometimes very great
ones—between the particular goods offered for purchase and those that
the customer/thief actually makes ofî with, and also between the price
apparently asked for those goods and what the customer/gull ends up
paying. Caveat emptor, caveat vendor,
It appears, then, that the same économie dynamics that make it
worthwhile or potentially profitable for both parties to enter into a
verbal transaction in the first place operate simultaneously to generate
conditions of risk for each. It also appears that the various normative or
regulative mechanisms (ethical impératives, maxims, discourse rules,
social conventions, and so forth) invoked by speech-act theorists and
others to account for the fact that speakers are ever honest, and that
listeners do ever understand their "intentions" and behave accordingly,
must be seen as descriptions of a System of constraints that emerges not
in opposition to but by virtue of the interests (or, which seems to be the
same, "self-interests") of the agents involved. To be sure, as already
indicated, the motivating interests of the speaker or listener may consist
largely of an independently motivated concem for the other's welfare or
for some more general social welfare.28 Also, both parties may very well
hâve interests in common (which is to say coincident interests and/or
goals) that could be better, or only, implemented by their reciprocal
and, in effect, cooperative exchanges. It must be emphasized, however,
that any of these possibilities, which perhaps occur quite frequendy,
nevertheless occur within the general structure of motives that energize
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and sustain verbal interactions, not outside of or in contrast to their

économie dynamics.
Habermas and the Escape from Economy

The preceding point requires emphasis in view of the current but dubi-
ous attractiveness of accounts of communication that produce exclu
sions and draw contrasts of that kind. Thus, Habermas regards genuine
communication as occurring only when and insofar as the participants'
actions are "oriented" toward an "agreement" that présupposés the
mutual récognition by both parties of "corresponding validity daims of
comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness [in the sense of 'sincerity'], and
rightness [in the sense of 'moral justness']'' and, moreover, that “termi
nâtes in the intersubjective mutuality of [their] reciprocal understand-
ing, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another."29
“Genuine communication" so defined must, according to Habermas,
be strictly distinguished from what he refers to as “strategie" or “instru
mental" actions, which he defines as those "oriented to the actor's
success" and glosses as "modes of action that correspond to the utilita-
rian model of purposive-rational action."30 In terms of the analysis
outlined here, it is clear that, in defining genuine communication as
something altogether uncontaminated by strategie or instrumental ac
tion, Habermas has secured a category that is quite sublime (and, as
such, apparently necessary to ground his views of the altemate pos-
sibilities of human society) but also quite empty: for, having thus
disqualified and bracketed out what is, in effect, the entire motivational
structure of verbal transactions, he is left with an altogether bootstrap
operation or magic reciprocality, in which the only thing that generates,
sustains, and Controls the actions of speakers and listeners is the gratui-
tous mutuality of their presuppositions.
It is significant in this connection that Habermas does not recognize
that listeners—as such, and not only in their altemate rôle as speakers—
perform any acts relevant to the dynamics of communication; or, rather,
he conceives of their relevant actions as consisting only of such al
together passive, covert, and internai ones as "understanding" and
"presupposing." What is thereby omitted is, of course, the whole
range—one might say arsenal or warehouse—of acts, including quite
overt and physically efficient or materially substantial ones, by which a
listener can serve a speaker's interests in ail that might be meant by her
“response" to the speaker. It should be noted, in addition, that a listen-
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er's or reader's responses, including here what might be meant by her

“interprétation" or “understanding," always extend beyond the mo
ment of hearing or reading—a unit of time that could, in any case, be
only arbitrarily specified. Indeed, it may be questioned whether the
boundaries of a “speech act" can be, as Habermas and many other
communications-theorists evidently assume, readily or sharply demar-
cated from the speaker's and listener's other—prior, ongoing, and sub
séquent—activities.
In connection with the more or less utopian théories of communica
tion mentioned above, a final point may be emphasized here. The lin-
guistic market can no more be a “free" one than any other market, for
verbal agents do not characteristically enter it from positions of equal
advantage or conduct their transactions on an equal footing. On the
contrary, not only can and will that market, like any other, be rigged by
those with the power and interest to do so, but, no less significantly, it
always interacts with other économies, including social and political
ones. Individual verbal transactions are always constrained, therefore,
by the nature of the social and political relationships that otherwise ob-
tain between the parties involved, including their nonsymmetrical obli
gations to and daims upon one another by virtue of their nonequivalent
rôles in those relationships, as well as by their inevitably unequal re-
sources and nonsymmetrical power relations within the transaction it-
self. (The latter inequalities and nonsymmetries are inévitable because
they are a function of ail the différences among us.) To imagine speech
situations in which ail such différences hâve been eradicated or
equalized and which are thus “free" of ail so-called distortions of com
munication is to imagine a superlunary universe—and even there, it
seems, the conditions of perfection will always call forth someone, an
archangel perhaps, who will introduce différence into the company.31
Some of the inequalities and nonsymmetries indicated above are no

doubt often negotiated or adjusted under conditions of partnership,
patemalism, or mutual good will, and a case could certainly be made for
the desirability of more extensive negotiations and adjustments of that
kind and/or for more extensive good will generally. It is unclear, how-
ever, how—or, indeed, by what kinds of “strategie actions"—any more
radical social engineering along these lines would be pursued, and un
clear also how (since equalization does not hâve equal conséquences for
everyone) the costs and benefits would fall out. Even more fundamen-
tally, however, especially in view of the supposed political implications
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of Habermas's program for the reconstruction of the presuppositions of

ail speech acts, one must wonder what those implications could actually
be for a sublunary universe. For, of course, the doser one moved to the
idéal speech situation of Habermas's fantasy, the less motive there
would be for any verbal transactions to occur at ail and the more redun-
dant any speech act would become.
The image of a type of communication that excludes ail strategy,
instrumentality, (self-)interest, and, above ail, the profit motive, reflects
what appears to be a more general récurrent impulse to dream an escape
from economy, to imagine some spécial type, realm, or mode of value
that is beyond économie accounting, to create by invocation some place
apart from the marketplace—a kingdom, garden, or island, perhaps, or
a plane of consciousness, form of social relationship, or stage of human
development—where the dynamics of economy are, or once were, or
some day will be, altogether suspended, abolished, or reversed: where
no winds blow ill and there need be no tallies of cost and benefit, where
there are no exchanges but only gifts, where ail debts are paid by unre-
payable acts of forgiveness, ail conflicts of interest resolved, harmonized,
or subsumed by a comprehensive communal good, and exemplary acts
of self-sacrifice are continuously performed and commemorated. Given
what seems to be the inexorability of économie accounting in and
throughout every aspect of human—and not only human—existence,
from the base of the base to the tip of the superstructure, and given also
that its operations implicate each of us in loss, cost, debt, death, and
other continuous or ultimate reckonings, it is understandable that the
dream of an escape from economy should be so sweet and the longing
for it so pervasive and récurrent. Since it does appear to be inescapable,
however, the better (that is, more effective, more profitable) alternatives
would seem to be not to seek to go beyond economy but to do the best
we can going through—in the midst of and perhaps also by means of—
it: "the best," that is, ail things considered, at least as far as we know
those things, or think we know them.
' 'Self-Réfutation ’'

I anticipate here two questions—or, rather, two versions of the same
question/objection—that the foregoing account frequently elicits. The
first asks: If there is no truth-value to what anyone says, then why are
you bothering to tell us ail this and why should anyone listen? The
second, a quite classic taunt, goes as follows: But are you not making
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truth-claims in the very act of presenting these views, and isn't your
account, then, self-refuting?
By way of reply I would point out first that, since these questions and
objections appeal to the very network of concepts that are at issue, they
simply beg the question. Thus, when someone (an objectivist, for ex
ample) insists that I make truth-claims when I speak, he merely reas-
serts his inability to entertain any altemate structure of conceptions of
what he calls "truth." It is équivalent to his saying that I can exist only
under his description of me and, specifically, that I can speak only under
his (objectivist) description of language.32 According to the analysis of
language that maintains that I make truth-claims in the very act of
opening my mouth (“to communicate" or “to assert" as distinguished
from just yawning), my dog likewise makes truth-claims in the very act
of opening his. Indeed, in accord with a transcendental analysis of lan
guage, our mutual interactions (that is, mine with my dog) flourish only
because of our mutual presuppositions of truth and sincerity: my dog
assumes that when I call “Here, Fido, dinner!" his dinner is really there,
and I assume that when he barks at my arrivai home, he is sincerely
happy to see me. (Of course, we could just be trying to manipulate each
other.) My point here is not to ridicule such an account per se, but to
emphasize that what neo-Kantian transcendental analysis describes as
the "presuppositions" of speech are redescribable as the récurrent ten-
dencies of verbal agents, human or otherwise, as the products of the
differentially effective conséquences of their prior interactions.33
What I am offering here is neither an “assertion" of some p nor a
"déniai" of assertion-in-itself or truth-in-itself, but an altemate descrip
tion of what is otherwise described as "assertion," "déniai," and "truth."
Moreover, this altemate description of what the other fellow (Platonist,
objectivist, neo-Kantian speech-act theorist, and so on) describes other
wise is, under its own rather than his description, not self-refuting but
self-exemplifying. Thus, my reply to the charge of self-refutation con-
sists of everything I hâve already said here, from which my own
saying of it is, of course, not exempt. Having designed this verbal/
conceptual construct to be of value—interest, use, and perhaps even
beauty—to the members of a certain community, I exhibit it here for
sale, hoping that some of its readers will, as we say, "buy it," but by no
means expecting ail of them to do so. For, as the account itself indicates
and as I very well recognize, each reader enters such a transaction with
only so much coin and with other investments to secure: most
significantly, prior cognitive investments, but also, perhaps, other (for
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example, professional or specifically religious) ones. My hope and ex

pectation is that this account, or a piece of it, will find some buyers and,
among those who cannot afford any of it, at least some admirers and,
among those who do not admire it, at least some who are nevertheless
affected by it. For it is thus—in part anyway, and in this respect like
both the scientist and artist—that I am paid. As the account indicates,
however, and as I also recognize, I cannot, in spite of my efforts to do so,
predict or control either the fact or the manner of its consumption, now
or henceforth, for both are as radically contingent as the value of the
account itself. These conditions apply, it appears, to ail those doing
business in a market of this kind: such are the constraints, such are the
risks, such are the possible rewards.
Economie Metaphorics
Of course, objections to the foregoing analysis of verbal transactions
could also be made to the économie analogies as such. Such objections
commonly take one of three lines and sometimes ail three together. One
of them, already mentioned, is that an analysis of communication as
reciprocal exchange projects the Western liberal's idealized conception
of économie behavior and ignores the différences of power in actual
verbal interactions.34 As noted above, however, since the présent ac
count stresses those différences (along with other inequalities and asym-
metries among the parties in verbal exchanges), this objection has no
force here. A second, related objection is that the analysis I develop in
this book adopts an ethnocentric and historically limited model that
characterizes only the behavior of and relations among parties in the
markets of capitalist societies—the assumption being, it appears, that
reciprocal exchanges, the possibility of profit and loss, exploitation, and
perhaps even economy itself are features only of capitalism. This objec
tion, however, begs the question of just what the historical and cultural
limits of those features are. Although the answer to that question is to
some extern an empirical matter and thus cannot be taken for granted in
advance (and there is also no reason to suppose that the alternatives
must be either some human universal— homo economicus—or what I
describe further on as a putative Fall into Commerce), it must be added
that even where archeological and ethnographie data are available, the
possibility of circularity in their interprétation is very strong. That is, the
discovery of apparent market-like exchanges in archaic or otherwise
simple tribal societies could be taken either as a réfutation of the belief
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that their features are characteristic only of late capitalism or as evidence

that the serpent had entered Eden earlier than was previousiy thought.35
Among anthropologists, it was apparently Karl Polanyi who first
raised the question of the theoretical propriety and methodological de-
sirability of extending the concepts and techniques of postindustrial
Western économies to the description and analysis of other (for ex
ample, archaic, tribal, primitive, or peasant) socioeconomic Systems,
and it remains a central issue in économie anthropology. Although
these controversies are relevant to the présent discussion, a number of
different issues should be distinguished. One is whether the extension of
Western économies to the analysis of other économies is good an
thropology. Although aspects of the issue fall beyond my compétence, I
find the more skeptical, anti-universalist views of Polanyi, Dalton, and
Sahlins more congenial and persuasive here.36 A quite different issue,
whether the ternis and concepts of Western économies can be extended
to other forms of social interaction (in the West or elsewhere), has been
decided affirmatively by the development of social-exchange theory,
decision science, and game theory, each of which consists of precisely
such extensions (or, from another perspective, “réductions'').37 The lat-
ter developments do not, of course, résolve the further issue of whether
such extensions, however possible, are altogether legitimate or, to put it
differently, altogether to be welcomed. This, however, is clearly another
kind of question and, as it happeris, one deeply implicated in what I will
describe later as “the double discourse of value": that is, the emergence
of, and effort to maintain, a strict séparation between two different and
perhaps fundamentally antagonistic—sacred versus profane or, in
contemporary terms, humanistic versus economistic—articulations of
economy.
It is here also that we find the third line of objections raised against
the présent account, namely that, in describing the motives and pro
cesses of verbal communication and other social interactions in terms
drawn from the marketplace, I express and encourage a cynical (or,
altemately, "pessimistic") conception of human beings as inevitably
self-serving and incurably calculating and adversarial. One way to reply
to such objections is by recalling that, in spite of the segregating efforts
mentioned just above, metaphors of economy—of the gain, loss, circu
lation, and exchange of goods; of price, coin, purchase, and payment;
and of debt and rédemption—are ancient and pervasive in our lan-
guage, occurring both in formai discourses (including, as suggested
above, theological ones) and in songs, poems, games, and proverbs. This
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reply will not, however, answer ail such objections, for they—and the
sense of unease produced by the particular économie metaphorics de-
veloped here—often reflect the radical diversity of conceptual styles that
can exist between, on the one hand, certain aspects of traditional
humanistic thought and, on the other, alternative conceptualizations (of
"man," “social relations," “communication," and so forth) that diverge
from or challenge it, the names of which are not confined to those
usually invoked here (utilitarianism, economism, biologism, sociolog-
ical reductionism, and so forth) but are, so to speak, légion. The analysis
of the dynamics of verbal transactions outlined above is not, I think,
cynical. Nor is it “pessimistic" except in the question-begging sense that
any analysis must be so if it does not underwrite a particular script for
the salvation or émancipation of mankind. The diversity and resulting
conflict of conceptual styles just mentioned are, however, certainly cru
cial for this study; for, as I will discuss further in Chapter 6, insofar as
such a metaphorics flagrantly transgresses the borders that segregate the
two discourses of value, it threatens not only the security of those bor
ders but the entire—dualistic—conception of the universe that defines
humanistic redemptionism and that grounds its belief in, and promise
of, an ultimate deliverance from ail economy.
Changing Places: Truth, Error, and Deconstruction

The implications for intellectual history of Jacques Derrida's and other,
related critiques of traditional conceptions of “truth" 38 hâve been devel-
oped within deconstruction itself and are also exemplified by it. Thus,
Samuel Weber suggests that there has been a transformation of the
genre by which deconstruction thinks of Western thought: that is, the
genre in which Derrida's texts describe Western intellectual history and
inscribe his own project within it—or, if not quite within, then not
altogether outside it either.39 Specifically, Weber suggests that there has
been a shift from drama, where that history is presented as a scene of
opposition played out upon a single stage, to narrative, the telling of what
is seen as an endless taie in which there is "alteration without opposi
tion," where time is réversible so that anticipation is also répétition, and
where the single stage, scene, or “unity of place" is replaced by "places
that are constantly in movement or on the move."40
This transformation of genre is illustrated, in Weber's account of it, by
“the distance traversed" from Derrida's La Voix et le phénomène (1967) to
La Carte postale (1980). Although the earlier text anticipâtes the "motifs
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of répétition, itération and réversible circulation" that are foregrounded

and played out more consistently in the later one, "the dynamics of
différence is [in La Voix et le phénomène] still. . . contained and confined
within the space of an opposition." Thus, for example, Derrida's text
could still "assume an argumentative stance," could still offer to dem-
onstrate or "show" how Husserl, conceived as an intégral sublect,
moves "against himself," and could still describe the metaphysics of
presence as a stubbom self-delusion, "a desire that obstinately seeks to
save presence" and seeks also to efface or repress the processes of itéra
tion. As deconstruction becomes a narrative, however (as in La Carte
postale, particularly the section entitled "Spéculer— sur 'Freud'"), that
récurrent desire is reinscribed not as psychomachia, not as a tragicomic
drama in which the same battle is repeatedly fought and repeatedly lost,
but as an economically motivated activity, pursued "in the hopes of
reaping a profitable retum."
Weber suggests that the fulfillment of this reinscribed desire may now
be seen not so much as fatally doomed and self-contradictory, but as
inescapably constrained. The desire for presence is, at heart, a desire for
profit and power. One puts one's text or coin (or indeed self) in circula
tion, sometimes or typically claiming to offer it gratis but counting on its
eaming one some interest when it arrives at its destination. Since, how
ever, one cannot fully control the System of circulation (the economy or,
as in La Carte postale, the postal System), one cannot détermine—predict
or control—how one's coin, in changing hands, will be spent, how
one's text, in being multiply read, will be multiply rewritten, how one's
self will be appropriated by others to their own profit. And whereas, in
an oppositional drama, deconstruction could inscribe its own rôle, or
the rôle of its writing, as the tripping up of logocentrism (the hapless
antihero of Western metaphysics), in a narrative of alteration without
opposition, where every telos becomes a tele, a distance traversed but
also a "gap never closed," it is seen that the desire in question—that is,
the desire not only to be read but to control the reading—is unavoid-
able, that ail writing, "even the most self-consciously deconstructive,"
cannot help repeating it. Deconstruction, then, inscribes itself as but one
more thing that cornes and goes, its place among the places that are
constantly in movement being, perhaps, to articulate the very inevitabil-
ity of that desire, as in La Carte postale, in which the desire is no longer
demonstrated elsewhere but conspicuously self-enacted.
The transformation of which Weber speaks is, I think, significant and,

as he suggests, seems to hâve been inévitable given the defining perspec-
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tive and project of deconstruction. I should like to pursue here some of

its implications for the conceptualization of truth and error and will
begin by considering the scope of that project: what is sometimes called
the dismantling or, as in Weber's essay, "the unraveling" of the meta-
physics of Western thought.
When the taie of deconstruction is told or dramatized in accord with
the familiar masterplot of intellectual historiography (that is, the opposi-
tional plot from which deconstruction itself has shifted), it is seen to
hâve overthrown or undermined certain errors, follies, and delusions in
past and prevailing thought: certain pseudodoxia. The root folly, if one
adopts the related metaphor of root and branch, is identified as
"logocentrism" or "the metaphysics of presence."41 It is seen, however,
not merely as a deeply rooted and highly ramified folly, but as a con
stitutive one: that is, Western thought is not simply implicated in the
metaphysics of presence, but consists of it; logocentrism is not merely a
loose or discolored strand that can be plucked from the fabric, but the
very thread of which it is woven, so that to begin to pluck at it is to
unravel the whole of it.
The extent of the whole of it can hardly be overestimated. For it is clear
that what deconstruction describes as the metaphysics of Western
thought is not confined to the conceptual operations and structures that
happen—by an unlucky accident, as it were—to hâve developed in
Western philosophy: the classic philosophie texts are merely its most
systematic and self-reflexive articulation. Neither is it distinct from some
other type of Western Mowmetaphysical thought—scientific thought, for
example, or poetic or everyday thought; for these, too, can be seen to
articulate the metaphysics of presence and to be thoroughly implicated
in it. Neither is it—or need it be—confined to Western thought; for
although the récurrent insertion of the qualifier "Western" may be
taken as a mark of scholarly caution, modesty, or responsibility, there is
no reason to believe that the metaphysics of Western thought is distinct
from that of Eastem thought, or tribal thought, or the thought of illiter-
ates or of preverbal or as yet unacculturated children. On the contrary, I
would suggest here that what deconstruction names "the metaphysics
of Western thought" is thought, ali of it, root and branch, everywhere
and always: that is, the operations and structures of ail human—and, I
think, not only human—intelligence, and thus, insofar as it is seen as
the producer and product of error and delusion, the ultimate, universal
pseudodoxia epidemica.
In that connection, we may note that certain characteristic ontological
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formulations produced by deconstruction—that is, formulations of

what is and isn't or, in its kinetic phase, w hatgoes on and doesn'tgo on—
pose an anthropological and more broadly epistemological question.
For example, when Derrida writes "Nothing is, anywhere, simply prés
ent or absent. There are only, everywhere, différences and traces of
traces,"42 the question is why, if there are only, everywhere, différences
and traces of traces, we should ever hâve corne to think that anything
was, anywhere, simply présent or absent. Similarly, when Weber writes,
"What goes on . . . , what has never ceased to go on, is that the being-
named, the being of the name, cornes and goes, be-comes without ever
arriving at its proper destination,"43 the question is why we should ever,
as appears to be the case, hâve corne to think otherwise.
These are not rhetorical questions: they are not self-answering, nor do
the answers go without saying. Weber suggests one way to put the
answer—in effect, the will to power and the profit motive: "The key to
presence is power"; "Presence is something that must be gained." An-
other way to put the answer—though not another answer—follows
from the identification, proposed above, of "the metaphysics of pres
ence" or "Western thought" with ail thought; for we may then say that
we could never hâve thought otherwise because that is the way thought
works. That being so, however, the anthropological question reverses
itself: If that is how thought works, how is it possible for us to escape its
working, to escape the metaphysics of presence and to think in some
other way?
This, too, is not a rhetorical question. The answer that Weber sug
gests, and which I mean to endorse here, is that we cannot think other
wise but that escape, like opposition, is an inappropriate move or desire.
We cannot escape the workings of thought—we can only repeat them;
but we always repeat differently. It was appropriate, then, for decon
struction to move from the familiar oppositional drama of overtuming
and undermining to the narration of an endless taie in which its own
rôle is that of inévitable répétition—which, however, like ail répétition,
is always different and may always hâve, in Weber's words, "transfor
mative, alterative force" and "disruptive power." I shall tum to the
transformative force below, but focus first on the répétition.
It is possible to see the ontological formulations of deconstruction as

taking their place among (that is, repeating and no doubt anticipating)
other attempts by Western metaphysics to think what is, or what goes
on, independent of our thinking. It is also possible to see the project of
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deconstruction as another in the array of projects that hâve sought to

identify what it is in our thinking that prevents us from thinking what is
or what goes on. For example, it seems that many of the conceptual
operations and structures upon which deconstruction has focused atten
tion and which it has identified as root or branch of logocentrism hâve,
by other names, been repeatedly identified in the classic logocentric
texts of Western metaphysics as sources and conséquences of error,
distortion, or blindness—or, in the language of the metaphysics of prés
ence, as veiling the truth, obscuring reality, preventing us from seeing
nature as it really is.
A rather engaging classic text of this sort was produced in the year
1620 by Francis Bacon, who spoke of the pseudodoxia, “the false notions
which are deeply rooted [in men's minds]," as Idols and described them
in four categories: first, "The Idols of the Tribe," which are inhérent in
human nature and thus the very race or tribe of man—for example, our
natural tendency to suppose that our senses give us direct knowledge of
reality and to forget that the cohérence and regularity that we find in it
hâve been imposed on it by our desire for cohérence and regularity;
second, "The Idols of the Cave," which arise from the fact that each of
us inhabits the private cave of our individual tempéraments and Per
sonal historiés, in whose discolored light we interpret the whole of
nature by that part of it which we know (Bacon acknowledges the
répétition of Plato here); third, "The Idols of the Marketplace," which
arise from the commerce among men, particularly language, and which
lead us, among other things, to treat those words which name fictions as
if they were the names of real entities; and fourth, "The Idols of the
Theatre," or "those errors which hâve crept into men's minds from the
various dogmas and Systems of philosophy"—Systems which, Iike stage
plays, are merely charming inventions that do not give us a picture of
nature as it actually is.44
Bacon also describes at some length a set of strategies by which, he
thought, thought could escape its captivity to the idols. I will not re-
hearse them here but will recall that they amount, more or less, to what
was later elaborated and codified as "the scientific method" (the title of
Bacon's own text is Novum Organum, that is, "the new method"). We
may also note here, however, that that libération, which was certainly a
disruptive and transformative one in its place, became in due course
another form of captivity—indeed, another Idol of the Theatre—from
which it is presently the purpose of another project of Western thought
to liberate thought: a project still, as it happens, pursued in oppositional
terms, as "against method."45
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I do not mean to suggest here that the project of deconstruction is

simply a renaming of various classically named idols and errors (though
it may be noted that, just as répétition in intellectual history is never only
répétition, so also even renaming is never simply renaming either). For,
to focus now on différences, not only hâve ail the other projects that
named Error done so in a manner that articulated or were implicated in
what deconstruction exposes as the root error of logocentrism but, if it is
rigorously pursued, the logic of deconstruction must identify the very
opposition of Truth and Error, Reason and Folly, as ramifications of that
root, as oppositions to be unraveled along with the rest. Accordingly,
deconstruction is not truth and does not expose error; neither (also
accordingly) was the attempted exposure of error in the classic texts
itself folly or error.
To unravel the opposition of Truth and Error, we must reconceptualize
the structure of error and rename, in nonoppositional terms, the classic
idols whose names are légion, including what deconstruction has
named "logocentrism” or "the metaphysics of presence." It will be
useful here to retum to the observation that the metaphysics of Western
thought is thought, or what we may think of not as specifically concep-
tual, theoretical, cérébral, or, in the narrow sense, intellectual activity
but, rather, as the epistemic activities of ail organic Systems: that is, the
processes by which an organism's structure is continuously modified
through its interactions with its environment—an environment (or
"universe" or "manifold") whose spécifie features are themselves pro-
duced in their specificity by those very interactions.
The processes in question are something like Bacon's Idols in being
always both "of the tribe" and "of the cave," and sometimes of the
marketplace and the theater as well. That is, they are to some extern
innate, which is to say conditioned by structures and mechanisms pro-
duced in the course and as the conséquence of evolutionary history, but
also to some extent conditioned by the organism's interactions (always
constrained as well as energized by those very structures and mecha
nisms) with its particular environment, including other créatures of its
own kind and what they hâve produced—or, as we sometimes say,
conditioned by "culture." What sustains these epistemic processes, and
not only sustains but strengthens them, is that they are profitable: that
is, they work to the organism's benefit—not absolutely optimally, and
that, as will be seen, is very much to the point—but well enough to keep
him/her (the organism) and thus them (the processes) going. Or, to put
this in other terms, they hâve evolved and developed phylogenetically
and ontogenetically as competitively cost-efficient ways for the organ-
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ism to process information, to link, in an economical feedback loop, that

which we sometimes call "perception” and "action" but which we now
see as not really distinguishable.46
As just mentioned, the processes in question, though competitively
economical, nevertheless do not work absolutely optimally. If there had
ever been an organic System that worked truly optimally, there would
hâve been no évolution: that System would hâve comered ail markets; it
would still be here and there would be no others.47 This does not mean
that évolution moves toward overall optimality: rather, it moves toward
increased compétitive efficiency in some respects under current condi
tions, and thus toward the production of new structures and often more
complex processes—which, however, also do not work optimally. Or
ganic évolution is thus like the évolution of technology: the more mech-
anisms we add to make the machine work better in some respects under
current conditions, the more that can go wrong in those and other
respects under those and emergent conditions, and thus the more that
can be made better and go wrong, and so forth.48 It is an endless taie
without telos.
To retum, however, to the nonoptimality of thought, let me give an
example here—drastically simplified and somewhat spéculative, but de-
signed to suggest how it seems to happen. It appears that the cheapest
way for any System to process an array of information is by binary
classification, which is, of course, the minimal classification. Moreover,
because, in an organic System, the process of classification, like any
other activity, is itself economically energized—energized, that is, by
self-interest, or, if you like, the profit motive—any classification that is
produced is also likely to be an évaluative hierarchy. It is clear that, to the
extent that the organism's environment is stable and récurrent, it will be
profitable or at least cost- efficient for any category and its évaluative
hierarchy to survive beyond the occasion of its originating functionality;
for energy need not, then, be expended on the process of classification
and évaluation each time a similar array is produced. Thus, the catego
ries and their évaluations will become fixed—sometimes, through evo-
lutionary mechanisms, fixed in the DNA. Or, to glance at the other
extreme of complexity, we may note that language (that is, verbal or
symbolic behavior, which is not discontinuous with the other activities
described here but which could also be described as a product of cul-
tural/technological évolution) apparently facilitâtes both the subtlety of
the processes of categorization but also the fixity of its products, and
thus does everything better and makes everything worse. For it is also
clear that fixity (and I speak here not of language but of classification
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generally) will be unprofitable to the extent that the organism's envi

ronment is not récurrent or stable (and, of course, the more complex the
organism's own structure, the more complex and less stable and récur
rent will be the environment it can produce and interact with); the fixity
will be ««profitable, in other words, to the extent that it prevents the
organism from responding appropriately—that is, in a way that sustains
the organism itself—to novel and emergent conditions.
The general rule illustrated by this example—and there are compara
ble raies for other processes—is that stability and flexibility are both
profitable, but that one is always bought at the cost of the other so that
neither can be maximized at the same time or ail the time.49 Or, to
retum to Western thought (which we hâve never left), it appears that it
has its good and bad points and that they are the same. Thus also, to
retum us to the Idols, it appears that when Western thought reflects
upon itself, it identifies its own less profitable operations as Folly and
fallacy and their less profitable products as Error, and its own more
profitable operations as logic and Reason and their more profitable prod
ucts as Trath—thus repeating its own characteristic processes of binary
classification and polarized évaluation.
If, reflecting on the less profitable aspects of oppositional logic, West
ern thought strives to do otherwise, it may redescribe any of the spécifie
categories, hiérarchies, and binary oppositions produced by Western
thought—including such oppositions as Trath and Error and such
metaphysical and ontological structures as Reality and Being—as struc
tures which, while they are working, hâve a working integrity, cohér
ence, distinetness, and stability but which can always be altemately pro
duced as arbitrary, unbounded, indeterminate, unstable, otherwise
configurable, and more minutely différentiable. Moreover, because
Western thought has not only some good points but some quite remark-
able points, it can, in a strenuous exercise of its own flexibility and
capacity for disraption and alteration, also foreground and focus on that
very aspect of ail the structures it produces: that is, on the arbitrariness
of their production, their unboundedness, fluidity, indeterminacy, mul
tiple configurability, infinité regressibility, and infinitely minute differ-
entiability. In which case, it may produce texts that say things like
"Nothing is, anywhere, simply présent or absent; there are only,
everywhere, différences and traces of traces,” or “What goes on, what
has never ceased to go on, is that the being-named, the being of the
name, cornes and goes, be-comes without ever arriving at its proper
destination.”
The articulation of what thought produces as radical and ramified
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inarticulateness will necessarily sound like paradox, circumlocution,

violent metaphor, and nihilistic négation relative to the structures and
syntax of prevailing thought and the discourse that articulâtes it. How-
ever, that inarticulateness will hâve been produced precisely because—
and when, and by those for whom—the structure and syntax of prevail
ing thought and discourse hâve themselves become inoperative: often
because the latter hâve been interfered with and disrupted—that is,
both knotted and unraveled—by other more competitively effective or
profitable structures and syntax: perhaps richer, more subtle, more
comprehensive and connectible ones, or more élégant and parsimoni-
ous or, as it is said, "economical” ones. Thus, such discursive and con-
ceptual structures (words and concepts) as "meaning," "reality,"
"truth,” and "intrinsic value,” and also the syntax of their traditional
indication and prédication, may in some places simply stop working,
draw a blank. When and where this happens, it is not by virtue of some
spécial perverseness, stubbomness, or incapacity (or, for that matter,
transcendence), but through the operation of the satne processes that
produced and sustained those structures when they did work—or, in-
deed where they still do work; for, we recall, not only are the places
constantly in motion, but there is no unity of place.
It appears, then, that thought begins to unravel itself utterly when and
where it, and its products, are already pretty unraveled. But because
thought seems to work that way, the very process of its disintegration
produces new thought. Thus, the deconstruction of ontology is appro-
priated as new ontology; that which was "neither a word nor a con
cept” 50 begins to function as, and becomes, both word and concept; and
as figure and ground change places, the unraveling of Western thought,
marking another moment in its history, weaves another figure in the
fabric of Western thought.
124
6
The Critiques of Utility

Poor soûl, the center of my sinful earth,
[Thrall to] these rebel powers that thee array,
Why dost thou pine within and suffer dearth,
Painting thy outward walls so costly gay?
Why so large cost, having so short a lease,
Dost thou upon thy fading mansion spend?
Shall worms, inheritors of this excess,
Eat up thy charge? Is this thy body's end?
Then, soûl, live thou upon thy servant's loss.
And let that pine to aggravate thy store;
Buy ternis divine in selling hours of dross;
Within be fed, without be rich no more:
So shalt thou feed on Death, that feeds on men.
And Death once dead, there's no more dying then.
Shakespeare, Sonnet 146
Humanism, Anti-Utilitarianism, and the

Double Discourse of Value
In company with a cluster of related terms including "efficiency," "in-
strumentality," and "practicality," “utility” figures as a distinctly de-
moted, grudged ("mere” ), and profane good in the discourse of the
contemporary humanistic disciplines (for example, literary studies, aes-
thetics, and ethics), especially as distinguished from that of disciplinary
économies and such related fields as political science and économie
psychology. In these latter fields, "utility” figures as a technical term:
central to some accounts or models, useful enough in others and valued
accordingly, but by no means regarded everywhere as, in any sense, a
pure good.1 Indeed, an active critique and substantial modification of
the traditional utility-maximizing or "rational-choice” model of éco
nomie (and political) behavior is currently being generated within these
fields2 as well as in sociology, anthropology, and philosophy. Anti-
utilitarianism, however, whether as more or less casual aspersions and
demotions or as spécifie critiques of "utilitarianism" or “utility theory,"
seems to operate as a qualifying mark of the contemporary professional
125
The Critiques o f Utility
humanist and also as his or her perhaps most centrally self-defining

ideological stance.
The particular traits of contemporary anti-utilitarianism (its rhetorical
modes and moods, argumentative strategies, textual allusions, historical
and hypothetical examples ad horrendum, and so on) are the product of
a long and complex ideological and institutional history that cannot be
traced here. For the concems of this study, however, what is notable
about that history is that it involves, among other things, the continuous
mutually reinforcing interactions between both classical and modem
philosophie ethics and various forms of religious and secular redemp-
tionism, in ail of which certain kinds of good or gain are opposed to but
also seen as exchangeable for some other kind of good or gain. The first
(bad) kind of good or gain is characteristically identified with material
enlargement and individual welfare and associated with usury, greed,
commerce, Mammon, the bourgeoisie, and capitalism. The second kind
of (good) good or gain, for which the first is seen as well worth paying,
losing, or sacrificing, is identified with spiritual enlargement and collec
tive welfare and associated with charity, love, God, the aristocracy, the
poor, and pre- and/or post-capitalism. Although the language of the
literal marketplace often invades—or is pointedly invoked in—the ar
ticulation of this opposition/exchange of goods, it is always ultimately
rejected as inadéquate. Indeed, the distinctive feature of this economy
(system of distribution and exchange of goods) is its effort to escape or
transcend economy altogether, and the distinctive feature of its atten
dant discourse is the claim to hâve done so already or at least to know
how to do so. Thus, as in the epigraph to this chapter, spiritual médita
tion or contemptus mundi readily takes the form of prudential and, in
deed, rational économie calculation (Why so large cost, having so short a
lease?Buy terms divine in selling hours ofdross, etc.), but, at the end, moves
toward and counts on an ultimate transcendence of ail economy, ail
change and exchange, ail transformation, and ail possibility of loss:
"And Death once dead, there's no more dying then."
Although its specifically theological or religious content is not always
as évident as here, the dualistic structure of the economy just described
continues to dominate the discourses of humanistic studies. It recurs in
the familiar distinctions drawn between lower and higher—or, alter-
nately, "superficial" and more "profound"—types of value or modes of
valuing: between, for example, valuing things "instrumentally" or "as a
means to some end" and valuing them "for their own sake" or "as ends
in themselves." It also recurs wherever the value produced through
126
certain forms of production and consumption is conceived and defined

in pointed contradistinction to the value produced through other forms
of production and consumption, and, more generally, in the carefully
monitored boundaries between two discursive domains each of which is
centrally concemed with questions of value. On the one hand there is
the discourse of économie theory: money, commerce, technology, in-
dustry, production and consumption, workers and consumers; on the
other hand, there is the discourse of aesthetic axiology: culture, art,
genius, création and appréciation, artists and connoisseurs.3 In the first
discourse, events are explained in terms of calculation, preferences,
costs, benefits, profits, prices, and utility. In the second, events are ex
plained—or, rather (and this distinction/opposition is as crucial as any
of the others), "justified"—in terms of inspiration, discrimination, taste
(good taste, bad taste, no taste), the test of time, intrinsic value, and
transcendent value.
The décisive moves in the génération and maintenance of this double
discourse of value are commonly made under the quasi-logical cover of
We must distinguish between: for example, we must distinguish between
mere price and intrinsic value, between mere consumers and dis-
criminating critics, between true artistic creativity and mere technologi-
cal skill, and so forth. The question posed here and throughout this
study is must we and, indeed, can we? (The attendant question "Who are
'we'?" is of course as relevant here as everywhere else.)
Spécifie définitions and other kinds of elaborated usage indicate that
the conception of utility operating in the definitively humanistic anti-
utilitarianism is thoroughly dualistic, which is to say deeply implicated
in such familiar problematic dichotomies as mind-body, spirit-matter
and, especially in some anthropological versions, culture-nature. It is
also, both thereby and otherwise, arbitrarily limited. The arbitrariness
becomes évident if the utility of an object is conceived in a way that does
not already build in the dualism at issue: in accord, for example, with
the usage in one branch of contemporary économie theory, where the
utility of something for some subject is operationally defined as his or
her "revealed preference" for it4 or, altemately, in accord with much
informai idiomatic usage, where the utility of a thing seems to be
thought of as any positivity or positive effect that could be produced
through some subject's engagement with it at any time (its handiness or
suitability, for example, or its profitableness in some way, or the fact
that it contributes to the satisfaction of some kind of need or desire, and
so forth). Given either of these nondualistic conceptions of utility, what
127
is otherwise referred to as the "nonutilitarian" value of something or, in

explicit opposition to utility or use value, as its "symbolic" or "aes-
thetic" (etc.) value, could readily be redescribed as itself a utility, though
perhaps, in the case of things such as art, play, gifts, souvenirs, ffiend-
ship, or wildemess préservation, one that happens to be especially dif
fuse, deferred, remote, subtle, complex, multiple, heterogeneous, and/
or, for these or other reasons, difficult to measure or specifÿ.
Whatever their limits and other inadequacies, neither of the two con
ceptions of utility outlined above “reduces ail value to utility” in the
dualistically conceived senses of either "value" or "utility"; nor do they
identify utility either with such specifically "utilitarian" concepts
as overall ratios of pleasure to pain or with such literally économie bene-
fits as more coins in the pocket.5 Both points are worth emphasizing in
view of the fact that such réductions and identifications are commonly
thought to be necessarily entailed by any conception of value that does
not exhibit and explicitly afïirm the kind of dualistic conception being
questioned here. Such a conviction is, of course, itself a répétition and
playing out of precisely that dualism: in other words, to the dualist,
whatever is not dualistic is reductionist.
The charge of "reductionism" here has more than logical or intellec-
tual force, however, for, as suggested above, the dualistic conception of
utility is deeply implicated in the redemptionist and other religious as
well as ethical commitments of contemporary humanistic discourse.
Consequently, the location of use value where it was previously invis
ible, like the identification of éléments of self-interest in apparently
charitable acts, is not only an intellectually thankless achievement in
humanist circles but likely to be regarded as a self-excommunicating—
and, indeed, a specifically Mephistophelean—one. Quite conversely, of
course, the économie theorist who can demonstrate the operation of
utility-maximization in even the most apparently irrational économie
behavior will be considered as hayjng made a significant contribution to
the cohérence of his discipline.6
In certain respects, the oppositions here are no longer quite so stark as
they were even twenty-five years ago. We might note, for example, that
as research in decision science and social psychology indicates increas-
ingly subtle psychological, social, and symbolic constraints on choice—
and, accordingly, as économie theorists' efforts to retain the dassical
concept of rationality as utility-maximization oblige them to take into
account increasingly subtle utilities (such as, in one set of studies, the
relative anticipated emotional costs of regretting different choices)7—the
128
terms of the economist's analysis will begin to look increasingly like

those of the humanist and the double discourse of value begins to col-
lapse into one. ("Utility" and "rationality" certainly begin to lose their
specifically marketplace associations.) Moreover, the traditional ségré
gation of these discourses is being eroded from the other direction as
well, as literary critics, art historians, and others working in the human-
istic disciplines explore with increasing subtlety the complex ways in
which économie dynamics, at every level of analysis, condition the pro
duction and réception of artworks and, more generally, condition the
value of ail cultural objects and practices.8 It may appear, then, that a
deconstruction of the double domain of value is at hand. Perhaps it is.
Since, however, the distinction between humanistic studies and disci-
plinary économies is implicated in more fondamental conceptual and
ideological oppositions and is clearly a highly charged and to some
extent self-defining distinction on one side, there is no reason to think
this will happen easily or soon.
Also, we must recall that the double discourse of value is itself sus-
tained by and participâtes in other more fondamental—general, an-
cient, and perhaps ineradicable—conflicts. In accord with a familiar
difficulty, however, the appropriate (most accurate, adéquate, valid,
revealing, etc.) description of those conflicts is part of what is at stake in
them. Following Durkheim, for example, a numbej of sociological and
anthropological theorists maintain that there is a fondamental distinc
tion between "sacred" and "profane" spheres of value in any society or,
in a more recent formulation, at least a récurrent opposition between,
on the one side, the symbolizing and classifying practices of "culture"
and, on the other side, the "natural" forces of economy itself, particu-
larly the otherwise omnivorous and indiscriminately commoditizing ap-
petites of the market.9 In accord with such an account, those currently
called and calling themselves "humanists" could readily be seen as the
counterparts of the priestly agents of any society who présidé over the
démarcation of spheres of value, establish the classification of certain
objects as sacred, and protect them from the forces of "nature"—from
"the jungle," as we sometimes say, speaking of the operations of the
market itself, or from certain unregenerate aspects of "human nature"
as exemplified in the market's most egregious and distinctive agents, the
merchant, trader, and banker. Such an account would imply, among
other things, that the value of certain entities must be framed as abso-
lutely different in order for that value to be effectively maintained, or, in
other words, that mystification is necessary for the very operation of
129
culture or for the survival of civilization in the jungle clearing. It would

follow, of course, that any exposure of the continuities between the
calculable and incalculable, the marketable and priceless, must be vigor-
ously opposed or at least carefully confined lest one risk eroding the
protective barriers that constitute the only or most effective way to make
sure that everything is not sooner or later put up for cash sale.
Some version of this anthropological account seems, in fact, to figure
in the dominant self-conception of contemporary humanistic studies,
and the vigorous opposition just mentioned—that is, to any exposure of
the continuities between traditionally segregated spheres of value—is a
central feature of anti-utilitarianism. Among the various forms it takes
in the literary academy are such familiar ones as the révulsion at mer-
chant and banker (or "middleman," "shopkeeper," and “usurer"),10
the fear of the "collapse of standards" and "retum to the jungle," and
the charges of relativism, barbarism, vulgarity, and reductionism
("confusing" one kind of value with another, "flattening out" distinc
tions, and so on) that are regularly leveled at any theoretical critique of
its dualistic structure and, as well, at any practical transgression of the
spheres of value thus segregated.11
Even aside from its dubious transhistoricism and static dualism, how-
ever, this anthropological account présents serious theoretical and em-
pirical difficulties. It is not clear, for example, why mercantile practices
should be seen as any less cultural (or conversely, any more natural)
than those of classification or priestcraft; and, indeed, the associated
Christian-Marxist-humanist-redemptionist effort to draw a clear line
between societies before and after the Fall into Commerce is made in-
creasingly questionable by recent research and analysis in économie
history and sociology as well as in contemporary anthropology.12 In
deed, a number of such studies suggest an altemate account of the pre/
trans-history of the culture-versus-economics struggle that does not re-
quire myths of the Fall, gratuitous culture/nature oppositions, or an
elaborated intellectual Manichaeism.
In accord with such an account, the double discourse of value would
be seen not as the reflection of an etemal psychomachia but, rather, as an
instance of the more general tendency to dualistic thinking—with its
characteristic assemblage of hypostasization, binarization, polarisation,
and hierarchization—that, as discussed earlier, seems endemic to at
least Western thought. This tendency, when played out in conceptuali-
zations of the multiple, heterogeneously interactive relations between
and among diverse social practices (which are, it should be observed,
never inherently divided into "cultural," "natural," "symbolic," "aes-
130
thetic, “économie/' and so forth), yields the binarized réifications of

“culture" and “economy," their polarized opposition-ségrégation into
separate discourses of value, and their separate physical and metaphoric
sites: the temple and the marketplace. Insofar as these opposition-
ségrégations are also reproduced in the academy as separate disciplines
(say, departments of English and of Economies), each could be expected
to attract practitioners with rather different personal, social, and educa-
tional historiés and also different arrays of skills, tastes, tempéraments,
political identities, and ideological allegiances, ail of which both per-
petuate and sharpen their mutual opposition.
It may be suggested, as well, that this institutional-ideological opposi
tion tends to be exacerbated historically whenever, and to the extent
that, there is a sharp or acutely sharpening conflict between, on the one
hand, the more or less conservative (normative, standardizing, control-
ling, classifying, supervising, maintaining, regulating) practices of the
relevant community and, on the other hand, its destabilizing and trans
formative practices, mercantile or otherwise, including the more or less
innovative, entrepreneurial, and diversionary activities of those who
stand to gain from a reclassification, circulation, and redistribution of
commodities and cultural goods and, thereby, of social power—
including the profit and power to be had just from mediating their circu
lation. While it is clear that any community requires—and, as a whole,
stands to gain from—both types of practice and the dialectic between
them (that is, between continuity and cohérence on the one hand and
responsive innovation on the other), it is also the case that particular
individuals and groups stand to gain or lose differentially from any
particular redistribution of goods.13
In accord with this account, the market does not characteristically
operate as the site of desecration but, rather, as the arena for the negoti-
ation, transformation, and redistribution of value, including social-
symbolic-cultural value; and the traditionally despised trader, banker,
and merchant (“panderer," “usurer," “shopkeeper") are seen, accord-
ingly, as the most visible mediators of change as well as the most most
obvious profiteers of exchange.14 Also accordingly, the priest/humanist's
struggle to chase the money changers from the temple, to preserve the
sacred objects from the merchant, and to name and isolate their value as
absolutely different from and transcendent of exchange value and use
value, would be seen here as participating in the broader and more
continuous struggle between those with something to lose from a
reclassification and circulation of goods and those with something to
gain from them.
131
This account, it should be noted, does not make any general identi
fication between "those with something to lose" and "those with some-
thing to gain" and any spécifie class grouping, such as the wealthy
versus the poor or the socially established and powerful versus the
deprived, oppressed, or marginalized. For one could not say in advance,
or without specifying the particular économie, social, cultural, and other
conditions very carefully, which class of person stands to gain or lose—
and gain or lose what—by the mere fact that certain items or even types
of items go on the market and change hands. (The difficulties become
clear if one thinks of how differently the gains and losses might be
distributed, under different conditions, in the case of the commodifi-
cation of, say, a Byzantine altarpiece and the ivory from a herd of
slaughtered éléphants.) Nevertheless, since possession of certain sorts of
good(s)—for example, money, social dominance, and what Bourdieu
calls "cultural capital"—implies possession of or access to many others,
one would expect a general preference on the part of those who already
hâve those sorts of goods for practices that conserve the présent distribu
tion of ail goods. And one might accordingly also expect a certain degree
of complicity between the latter, that is, members of what we call the
established classes, and those whose characteristic rôle in the society is
to monitor and preserve established cultural classifications: that is, in
our own society, professional humanists.
Folded into the présent account, Bourdieu's analysis of the économies
of cultural capital illuminâtes the professional humanist's characteristic
insistence that what matters with respect to the value of cultural goods is
neither their marketplace price nor their utility in the sense of their
satisfaction of some obvious—for instance, bodily—need or desire.15
The humanist would be right inasmuch as these are not what matters in
marking and maintaining the value of cultural goods, but he would, in
Bourdieu's term, "mis-recognize" as their "intrinsic" or "nonutilita-
rian" value that which does matter, namely control over their classifica
tion as such—that is, as cultural goods (as "works of art" or "litera-
ture," for example)—and of the academie institutions that transmit the
culturally appropriate manner of their consumption (or, as we say, their
"true appréciation"). One could add, of course, that it is the exercise of
precisely this control that, in contemporary Western societies, defines
the rôle of the professional humanist.16
In the concluding section of this chapter I will suggest an alternative

to both classic utilitarianism and its humanist/redemptionist critiques. I
132
would like to add a brief word here, however, conceming the antago-
nisms at issue and the double bookkeeping that reflects them. Outside
the academy, the force of the opposition/segregation of the discourses of
value is most évident, perhaps, in the récurrent struggles between two
kinds of calculation or cost-benefit analysis: on the one hand, the kind,
so named, that frames its objective as the efficient arrivai at a spécifie
and readily specifiable (often, though not necessarily, monetary) "bot-
tom line” and, accordingly, ignores or downplays less readily measur-
able and less comparable costs, risks, and benefits, or acknowledges
them but precisely as “incalculable” ; and, on the other hand, and typi-
cally in agonistic relation to the first kind, another calculation, not named
as such, that characteristically foregrounds and promotes exactly what
was ignored by the first and counts exactly what was discounted: that is,
ail those (relatively more) subtle, diffuse, deferred, remote, heterogene-
ous, etc. costs, risks, and benefits which may or may not themselves be
named as such. Although they operate agonistically in political arenas
(conservationists versus land developers, antinuclear activists versus en-
ergy companies, animal-rights activists versus researchers in both com
mercial and "nonprofit" laboratoires, and so on) and are certainly an-
tagonistic in some more fundamental temperamental and ideological
respects, nevertheless, as the description just given indicates, these two
kinds of cost-benefit analysis could also be seen as parallel and com-
plementary, the categories and considérations with which they deal and
the operations they perform being only relatively and locally distin-
guishable from one another. Viewed merely as calculative processes, in
other words, the two kinds are not absolutely or essentially distin-
guishable from each other except from the perspectives that produce
them and in the discourses that inscribe them.
This being so, the question may arise as to whether it might not be
worthwhile—to someone's benefit and perhaps the benefit of many—to
integrate these two evidently not fundamentally discontinuous kinds of
cost-benefit analysis: not only theoretically and discursively, as in the
altemate conceptualization of value developed in this study, but also in
practice, which is to say in the practice of calculating. Indeed, it might be
claimed that this—that is, "counting” or “taking into account” not
merely économie (in the sense of short-range, monetary) considérations
but the entire range of costs, risks, and benefits (in effect, everything)—is
precisely what the anti-utilitarian humanist does and asks be done by
others. No doubt that is often the motive of the calculations accordingly
performed and certainly how they are publically articulated and de-
133
fended or, as we say, "justified." Moreover, their conséquences are

unquestionably often of considérable benefit to many. But is it really the
case that the entire range of costs, risks, and benefits has been taken into
account? Is it not, rather, that the professional humanist, in her rôle as
such, is asking not for a considération of everything but, rather, for a
spécifie arrangement of values or hierarchization of goods and benefits and,
in particular, for the promotion of those that she, by virtue of her
spécifie identity as a humanist (tempérament, training, institutional in
terests, ideological allegiances) calculâtes as préférable to whatever it is
that her adversary in the particular struggle has, in his rôle as industri-
alist, land developer, animal researcher, politician, or publisher, cal-
culated otherwise? The question here may also be framed as whether the
humanist per se or, indeed, anyone at ail could speak for the general
long-range benefit of any community (not to mention "mankind" or
"humanity") or, to put it the other way around, whether the concept of
“the benefit of the community," along with any other social-aggregate
or totalizing concept of value, is not only fundamentally questionable
but one of the most characteristic and dubious features of, precisely,
Benthamite utilitarianism.
Bataille's Expenditure
Every time the meaning of a discussion dépends on the fundamental value
of the word useful—in other words, every time the essential question
touching on the life of human societies is raised, no matter who intervenes
and what opinions are represented—it is possible to affirm that the debate
is necessarily warped and that the fundamental question is eluded. In fact,
given the more or less divergent collection of présent ideas, there is nothing
that permits one to define what is useful to m an.17 —Georges Bataille
To be sure. Indeed, precisely: there is nothing that permits one to
define it, to specify it, to name its limits; nothing, in fact, that permits
one to suppose that “what is useful to man" is anything in particular—
or any particular "principle"—that answers the "essential" or "funda
mental" question with something essential or fundamental. There is
nothing, moreover, that permits one to assume in advance what is
"man."
Bataille's writings hâve evidently figured centrally (whether

specifically acknowledged or not) for, among others, Jean Baudrillard,
Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari
134
(and, thereby, for many of those for whom the work of each of the latter
has figured) and are themselves marked deeply by the thought of Marx,
Nietzsche, Durkheim, and Mauss. They operate, therefore, as a Virtual
thoroughfare of continental anthropology and sociology and of twen-
tieth-century political and cultural theory more generally.18 Although
“the notion of expenditure" is elaborated more fully in his later work,
ail of it of considérable importance in twentieth-century French social
thought, the essay so-titled is, in the words of its current translator,
“crucial": in it, the latter writes, "Bataille lays his cards on the table"
(p. xvi). In its sophisticated exemplification of many of the problems as
well as thèmes I hâve been discussing, the essay also repays close atten
tion here.
The initial and centrally motivating observation of Bataille's essay is
that classic utility theory privilèges the acquisition, production, and con
servation of material goods and the reproduction and conservation of
life. He cites no spécifie theoretical formulation, but one may supply
here any positing, explicitly "utilitarian" or other, of material aggran-
dizement and the survival of the individual-as-bodily-organism as the
inévitable, fundamental, and/or ultimate "gôods" to which ail human
activity is subordinated.19 What he will offer in opposition to this—and
implicitly in opposition to every rational/economic account of human
action or to what he sees as the definitively bourgeois "reasoning that
balances accounts"—is the evidence of a fundamental human need for
"nonproductive expenditure" and interest in "absolute loss": that is, a
loss that is not otherwise compensated or reciprocated and thus does not
operate as a means to some gainful end.20
The question here is the extent to which Bataille's effort to produce a
counter-utilitarian principle of human motivation is successful, and the
answer I shall develop below is that its success is distinctly limited: that
is, however rhetorically powerful and intellectually fertile his critique of
utility theory (so defined) may hâve been, it appears that Bataille
managed only to reverse certain of its most familiar ternis while du-
plicating many of its most dubious features, including its implication in
classic dichotomies and dualisms, its sharp means-ends disjunctions, its
assumption of a clearly bounded subject or agent, and its positing of a
spécifie fundamental and universal human nature. As we shall see,
other less specular alternatives are available.
Human activity is not entirely reducible to processes of production and

conservation, and consumption must be divided into two distinct parts.
The flrst, reducible part is represented by the use of the minimum necessary
135
for the conservation of life and the continuation of individuals' productive

activity in a given society . . . The second part is represented by so-called
unproductive expenditures: luxury, mouming, war, cuits, the construction
of sumptuary monuments, games, spectacles, arts, perverse sexual activity
(i.e., deflected from génital finality)—ail these represent activities which, at
least in primitive circumstances, hâve no end beyond themselves . . .
[These forms of expenditure] constitute a group characterized by the fact
that in each case the accent is placed on a loss that must be as great as
possible in order for that activity to take on its true meaning. (p. 118)
The initial exemplifications of the operation of “the principle of loss"

in "irreducibly" unproductive forms of activity include the expenditure
of money, time, or energy on such things as expensive jewels, ritual
sacrifice, gambling, and artistic activities and/or the risk or loss of bodily
comfort or survival in relation to such activities. It is immediately appar
ent, however, that the unproductivity of these various activities is not at
ail irreducible for, in each case, Bataille himself gives—while denying its
possibility—a cost-benefit analysis of the expenditure at issue. That is, it
is as if, in his very description of these activities, he cannot avoid point-
ing out what is gained by the loss or what other value is, in his own
words, “produced" by the material expenditure or mortal risk involved.
Thus, he speaks of the enhancement of the "symbolic value" of jewels,
of the "production of sacred things" in the "bloody wasting of men and
animais," of the production of a "feeling of stupéfaction" (evidently in
some way désirable) through the energy "squandered" in compétitive
games, and of the provocation of laughter or "dread and horror" (again,
evidently in some way désirable) by literature and theater. In every case.
Bataille indicates that there is a gain in the economy of the individual or
the commuility: either an arithmetically summative (plus-over-minus,
"net," or, in effect, "bottom-line") gain, or an exchange of one kind of
"good" for some other kind which, in some respect, acquires a com-
manding priority either from the perspective of the individual subjects
or community involved and/or from Bataille's own perspective. In
either case, it is a gain or exchange that makes the particular expendi
tures and risks "rational" in an economistic/utilitarian sense: that is,
they hâve some more or less proportional relation to a desired/able
outcome. These activities do not, then, represent the pursuit of “absolute
loss." Whether or not one finds Bataille's spécifie analysis of each of
these practices persuasive, "the reasoning that balances accounts" can
always be discemed in that very analysis.21
The benefits or gains in these examples are not, to be sure, what are
136
usually spoken of or counted as material goods, nor can they readily be

seen to yield any enhanced préservation of the individual-as-organism's
life. In this respect, Bataille's critique of crude economism is quite telling.
It does not follow, however, that economy—that is, an apportionment
and circulation of goods—is not operating in the activities he describes
or that some new principle of économie psychology, specifically a funda-
mental interest in "absolute loss," must be invoked or created to ac-
count for them. What such examples demonstrate, rather, is that cer
tain—perhaps "classic"—identifications of "good(s)" or “utility" are
indeed "restricted," but (as suggested above) in the sense of being arbi-
trarily confined in accord with such familiar problematic dualisms as
matter/spirit, body/mind, and real/symbolic.22 Although Bataille is ex-
plicitly concemed to undo these dualisms,23 the apparent paradox that
he produces here—namely, that loss can itself be fundamentally desired/
able—nevertheless participâtes in them, only reversing their valence.
Thus, most egregiously here in his division of consumption into "two
distinct parts" but also elsewhere throughout the essay, he continues
the familiar opposition between, on the one hand, activities that yield
presumably "distinct" material and bodily gains and, on the other hand,
those that hâve "no end beyond themselves." Indeed, it may be noticed
that while Bataille valorizes the latter "nonutilitarian" forms of activity,
he simultaneously hedges the question of their use and value by assign-
ing them quite spécifie individual ends and/or social "functions." In this
respect, his account duplicates structurally the classic problems of
valorizations of play or artistic creativity in opposition to work or mate
rial productivity, where the value of certain practices or their products,
while pointedly characterized as "nonutilitarian" or as "ends-in-
themselves" and thus, presumably, as yielding no benefit to the individ
ual or community, is nevertheless defended through some démonstra
tion of, precisely, how those practices or products benefit the individual
or community. The general principle here is that no valorization of
anything, even of "loss" itself, can escape the idea of some sort of
positivity—that is, gain, benefit, or advantage—in relation to some
economy. I shall retum to this point below.
The difficulties of Bataille's account are especially évident in his Ro
mande characterization of poetry, which he sees as a "sacrifice" par
excellence, and of the poet, whose performance of that sacrifice "con-
demns him to the most disappointing forms of activity, to misery, to
despair, to the pursuit of inconsistent shadows that provide nothing but
vertigo or rag e,.. . [who] is often forced to choose between the destiny
137
qualitative change constantly realized by the movement of history"

(p. 129). That is, a degenerative entropie history—successive disappear-
ances and losses, expanding failure, and increased homogeneity—or, in
effect, an endless "fall," is precisely what one would expect.
Bataille continues with a brief analysis of the "agonistic social expen-
diture" that, in "bourgeois society," functions to maintain a disjunction
between "the masters" and "the workers" and specifically to "engender
[the latter's] abjection."33 "The end of the workers' activity is to produce in
order to live, but the bosses' activity is to produce in order to condemn the
working producers to a hideous dégradation" (pp. 125-126). Certain "sub
terfuges" are said to mask this agon: for example, the fact that bourgeois
society "announces. . . equality by inscribing that word on the walls" (p.
125) and that "in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and in particular in the
United States of America, the primary process takes place at the expense
of only a relatively small portion of the population . . . [while] to a
certain extent, the working class itself has been led to participate in it"
(p. 126).34 But, he adds,
these subterfuges . . . do not modify in any way the fundamental division

between noble and ignoble men. The cruel game of social life does not vary
among the different civilized countries, where the insulting splendor of the
rich loses and dégradés the human nature of the lower class.
It must be added that the atténuation of the masters' brutality—which in
any case has less to do with destruction itself than with the psychological
tendencies to destroy—corresponds to the general atrophy of the ancient
sumptuary processes that characterizes the modem era. (p. 126)
Thus, equality is the opiate of the people, drugging them into a com-
plicitous participation in the degenerate System that déniés them both
the ultimate gain of absolute loss and also the glory of brutal as well as
absolute dégradation.
In a section titled "Christianity and Révolution," Bataille suggests
that although Christianity made it possible "for the provoked poor to
refuse ail moral participation in a System in which men oppress men"
(p. 126), "only the word Révolution . . . carries with it the promise that
answers the unlimited demands of the masses" (p. 127) so that "class
struggle . . . becomes the grandest form of social expenditure" (p. 126):
"Class struggle has only one possible end: the loss of those who hâve
worked to lose 'human nature' " (p. 128). The familiar and indeed para-
digmatically Christian form of this apocalyptic paradox is notable,35 and,
of course, one might ask why the economy of loss should stop here: that
142
is, wouldn't the most glorious social expenditure of ail be not the loss,
but the loss of the loss, of those who cause "human nature” to be lost?36
Human life. . . cannot in any way be limited to the closed Systems assigned
to it by reasonable conceptions . . . Life starts only with the déficit in these
Systems [cf. Shakespeare's "Then soûl, live thou upon thy servants loss, /
And let that pine to aggravate thy store”] ; at least what it allows in the way
of order and reserve has meaning only from the moment when the ordered
and reserved forces liberate and lose themselves for ends that cannot be
subordinated to anything one can account for. It is only by such insubordi
nation—even if it is impoverished—that the human race ceases to be
isolated in the unconditional splendor of material things. (p. 128)
Bataille's rejection of accounts of human action in ternis of closed Sys
tems or narrowly economistic conceptions of rationality is, to be sure,
admirable as such. At the same time, however, one cannot but ac-
knowledge that this invocation of nonmaterialistic nonsubordinatable
ends hardly differs from the more commonplace invocations of higher
or transcendent goals, goods, interests, and values discussed in the pre-
vious section. He continues:
In fact, in the most universal way, isolated or in groups, men find them
selves constantly engaged in processes of expenditure . . . whose principle
is loss. . . [These processes are animated by] States of excitation, which . . .
can be defined as the illogical and irrésistible impulse to reject material or
moral goods that it would hâve been possible to utilize rationally (in con-
formity with the balancing of accounts). Connected to the losses that are
realized in this way . . . is the création of unproductive values; the most
absurd of these values . . . is glory. Made complété through dégradation,
glory . . . has never ceased to dominate social existence; it is impossible to
do anything without it when it is dépendent on the blind practice of Per
sonal or social loss. (pp. 128-129)
"Blind” is evidently inserted here not to question the implicit teleology

of classic utility theory but, rather, to secure these practices of tran
scendent loss from any accounting in terms of vulgar utilitarian/rational
calculation.37 But the question remains: Hâve they really escaped ail
économie accounting?
Apparently not. The essay concludes as follows:
If on the other hand one demonstrates the interest, concurrent with glory
(as well as with dégradation), which the human community necessarily
sees in the qualitative change constantly realized by the movement of
history, and if, finally, one demonstrates that this movement is impossible
143
to contain or direct toward a limited end, it becomes possible, having

abandoned ail reserves, to assign a relative value to utility. Men assure their
own subsistence or avoid suffering, not because these fonctions themselves
lead to a sufficient resuit, but in order to accédé to the insubordinate
fonction of free expenditure. (p. 129)
This final équation summarizes and encloses ail the previously elabo-
rated reversais in a sanctified utilitarianism: the ultimate value, end, and
true meaning of “utility,” of that which man produces in order to pré
serve life and avoid suffering, consists in its making possible the un-
limited exhibition of his irreducibly sovereign free will, his insubordi
nate subordination of matter to spirit, and thereby his uniquely and
definitively human transcendence. Bataille's critique of classical utili-
tarian logic is thus of a piece not only with that logic but also with the
strictly classical transcendental logic of its own equally classical forebears.
Endless (Ex) Change

While the difficulties of Bataille's critique of utility theory do not redeem
the latter, they do indicate directions for alternative critiques. The one
that I outline below follows from the présent reconceptualization of
value as discussed in earlier chapters and from a corollary conception of
économie activity as having no “end,” neither telos nor terminus. That is,
there is no overall, underlying, or ultimate goveming outcome toward
which each instance of human productive-acquisitive or consum-
matory-expenditive activity (ail making, getting, and spending, we
might say) is directed, and also no conclusion to the continuous ex
change and circulation of goods. Indeed, in accord with such an alter-
nate conceptualization, there is no "économie” activity per se. There is
simply activity, variously motivated or, in Bataille's terms, "animated,"
with various outcomes, ail of which may be viewed under various as
pects, including none at ail (in which case it could be seen as Brownian
motion, Heraclitean flux, or Nietzsche's pure "play of forces"),38 but
also including the "économie" aspect of the apportionment, circulation,
and exchange of goods. Viewed in the latter aspect, ail human (and not
only human) activity could be seen to consist of a continuous exchange
or expenditure (whether as payment, donation, sacrifice, loss, or de
struction) of goods of some (but any) kind, whereby goods of some
other (but, again, any) kind are secured, enhanced, or produced. Thus,
money or material provisions are expended whereby power is enlarged
144
and status confirmed, sumptuary goods are donated or destroyed

whereby social or symbolic value is marked and maintained, bodily
comfort and life are sacrificed whereby exhilaration and glory are
gained, “hours of dross” are sold to buy "terms divine/' and so forth—
and also, for any of these exchanges, vice versa: money is hoarded
whereby status is risked, glory is forgone whereby comfort is secured,
terms divine are sacrificed whereby hours of dross are gilded—
everywhere, in every archaic tribe and “modem era,” endlessly.39
“Whereby" in the formulation just outlined is not to say "in order
that." For one thing, the very nature of the causality operating in hu-
man activity is part of what is at issue here. Secondly and relatedly,
there is no “end" whatsoever required here, including the telos of "pur-
pose." To be sure, human agents can and often do produce verbally (or
otherwise) articulated calculations as part of their ongoing activities; but
purposiveness in the sense of a “conscious" or “deliberate" matching of
activities to specifically foreseen and desired outcomes is hardly the mie
and need not be invoked at ail. In a general formulation of the économ
ies of activity (and, in this form, not confined to human or verbal
agents), teleological accounts of motivation and behavior would be re-
placed by accounts of the ways that activities are sustained and trans-
formed by their own past and current conséquences for the agent. Ac
tivities are only arbitrarily describable as segmented into individual
"acts" or "choices," and what we refer to as “motivation"—the ener-
gizing and shaping or “animating" of human behavior—is no more a
matter of linear pushes (by "forces"—such as biological, cultural, or
ideological) than of linear pulls (by “ends," “goals," “objects of de
sire"). It is, rather, a matter of the continuous mutually modifying in
teractions between and among ongoing activities and current traces of
past activities—structures, mechanisms, tendencies, impulses, desires,
concepts, images, memories, plans, hungers, habits, and so forth—that
operate at every level of the agent's organization and are continuously
modified by their differential conséquences under different sets of condi
tions.40
It must be emphasized that the “goods" in question in the formula
tion outlined above may be of any kind whatsoever: none are privileged
by reference to any presumed fundamental or essential human necessity
or universal human nature. Indeed, they are constituted as "goods" (that
is, as profits, satisfactions, gains, benefits, etc.) only in relation to a
particular State of a particular agent's personal economy—that is, the
nature, distribution, and trajectory of her desires and resources at some
145
moment: “désirés" and "resources" that, in accord with the présent

analysis, must be understood as themselves the product of the continu
ons interaction between, and thus mutual production by, the agent and
an environment that is itself always socially and culturally constituted.
Goods, either one by one or collectively (as in "the good"), are not
reducible to anything else in particular, such as pleasure, the enhance-
ment of survival, or the promotion of communal welfare. This is not, as
some modem ethical theory suggests, because goodness is an essen-
tial, intuitively apprehended primary quality of things.41 The irreducibil-
ity is a function not of objective qualities but, rather, of Western (per-
haps human) thought and language within which "good" or some
counterpart term or set of terms opérâtes conceptually and discursively
as a generalized positivity that can be locally specified but not further
analyzed: in other words, (one) "good" can only be exchanged for
(an)other good, in discourse and otherwise. This seems to be a principle
of the most general economy or the most general principle of econ-
omy.42 As the récurrent tautologies, circularities, and infinité régresses
that mark the discourses of value suggest, the concept of "good" opér
âtes axiomatically within them: its radical positivity cannot be dispensed
with nor can it be defined, explained, or analyzed without recursion to
another concept of radical positivity, whether by the name of "good" or
one of its Virtual équivalents, such as "benefit," "profit," "gain," "pay-
off," "reward," "positive reinforcement," or, of course, "value" itself
used as a valenced (positive) term.43 Indeed, it appears that "good"
opérâtes within the discourse of value as does money in a cash econ
omy: good is the universal value-form of value and its standard "mea-
sure"; it is that "in terms of which" ail forms of value must be "ex-
pressed" for their commensurability to be calculated; and good is that for
which and into which any other name or form of value can—"on de-
mand," we might say—be (ex)changed. Bataille's effort to tum the
utilitarian model of economy upside down by privileging the classic
contrary cases (resource-destruction, individual or communal sacrifice,
self-annihilation, and so forth) as themselves constituting the funda-
mental good or as the necessary route to the ultimate good fails for that
very reason: that is, at the very moment that "absolute loss" is con
stituted as a good or a means to a good, it ceases to be absolute loss.
Like Baudrillard and others who seek to produce a discourse of value
that escapes or transcends an économie conceptualization,44 Bataille
sought to constitute and articulate a good that would successfully resist
being interpreted as (or exchanged for) gain, benefit, advantage, or
146
positivity: that is, a good without "good." It appears from the présent
analysis, however, that just as the classic "value-form," money, opér
âtes within a market economy to commoditize (that is, to “put a price
on" or assign a cash équivalence to) everything, so also, within the
economy of the discourse of economy, anything that is indicated, predi-
cated, or otherwise constituted either as a positivity within some econ
omy or as the object of a need, desire, or interest (individual or collec
tive) is measured, in the very moment that it is put forward as such, as
so much "good"; and this anything includes expenditure, consumption,
sacrifice, self-annihilation, death, universal destruction, and even "ab-
solute loss."
We may retum now to the initial flourish of Bataille's essay and to
what is indeed, from the perspective of the présent study, one of the
major "insufficiencies of the principle of classical utility."45 Not only is it
impossible to say "what is useful to man" in general, but it is also
impossible to say it for any individual subject. The question will always
be What is "man"? That is, what kind of entity is postulated in the
anthropological-économie accounts at issue here? What, for example, is
the nature of the "self" in relation to which the agent pursues (or, for
that matter, renounces) "self-interest"? By what mode of boundary can
we or should we delimit the "person" whose personal economy we
would describe? And by what kind of unit can we or should we indicate
the individual subject in adding her up with other "individuals" (or
"men" or "selves" or "persons") in the aggregate?
It is not that there are no answers to such questions but that there are
many answers and no obviously or fundamentally compelling (or other
wise noncontingent) reason for adopting one rather than another. Thus,
we may stress again that the personal economy of the subject (or
"agent" or "organism"—the range of names here indicates the possibil-
ity of altemate accounts) may always be conceived as a system of multi
ple économies, each of which interacts with a shifting environment and
ail of which not only continuously interact but also may at any point
corne into more or less radical conflict.46 What this suggests here is that
the organization of our activities—the relation between, on the one
side, our actions and, on the other side, our knowledge, beliefs, inter
ests, and goals (however any of these are ascertained)—is not "ra-
tional" in either the economist's or ethical philosophera sense: i.e., our
actions, choices, beliefs, desires, interests are neither in smooth mutual
coordination nor in perfect mutual adjustment in relation to higher ends
or more comprehensive goals. Neither are they, instead, specifically ir-
147
rational in either the psychoanalyst's or cultural anthropologist's sense:

that is, ultimately controlled either by libidinal energies or by “social
meanings." Neither are we (or our beliefs, actions, and the relation
between them) therefore either divinely "free" in the theological sense
or, what is sometimes suggested as the only alternative, utterly chaotic,
purely whimsical, and/or totally incohérent.
What I am suggesting hère, rather, is that what ail such terms and
accounts (homo economicus, homo ludens, man as rational créature, cul
tural créature, biological créature, and so forth) offer to conceptualize is
something that might just as well be thought of as our irreducible scrap-
piness. I wish to suggest with this term not only that the éléments that
interact to constitute our motives and behavior are incomplète and
heterogeneous, like scraps of things, but also (“scrap" being a slang
term for fight) that they are mutually conflicting or at least always
potentially at odds. That is, the relations among what we call our “ac
tions," "knowledge," "beliefs," "goals," and "interests" consist of con-
tinuous interactions among various structures, mechanisms, traces,
impulses, and tendencies that are not necessarily ("naturally" or
otherwise) consistent, coordinated, or synchronized and are therefore
always more or less inconsistent, out-of-phase, discordant, and conflic-
tual. It must be added, however, that although these interactions obey
no "rule" and hâve no "reason," they do nevertheless operate reliably
enough under récurrent conditions to permit their more or less cohérent
description through various modes of reflexive (that is, self-descriptive)
analysis and also yield local resolutions and provisional stabilities that,
for longer or shorter periods of time, are good enough to keep us—and
thus them, the interactions—going.47 It is out of these scrappy (hetero-
genous) éléments and the local resolutions and provisional stabilities
yielded by their continous scrappy (more or less conflictual) interactions
that we (and, from various perspectives, others) construct our various
versions of our various “selves" and, as necessary, explain or justify our
actions, goals, and beliefs. It is also out of the scrappy interactions of
these scrappy éléments—though on a more general scale—that theo-
rists in the different disciplinary traditions cited above construct, from
their accordingly different perspectives, their accordingly different gen
eral accounts of human behavior.
There is no single, particular, nonarbitrarily specifiable domain that
encloses ail the interactions indicated above. There is also no non
arbitrarily definable arena within which ail the conflicts are played out,
within which the ever-shifting priorities are ever "finally" assigned and
148
settled. (As Bataille saw, but not steadily, there is no "closed System.")
There is thus no particular single dimension or global parameter,
whether "biologicar7"material" or "cultural'7"spirituar7"psychologi-
cal," with respect to which entities can be tagged or tallied as, "in the
last analysis," good or bad—profit or cost, reward or punishment, plea-
sure or pain—for any subject or set of subjects, much less for man in
general. There is thus also no way for individual or collective choices,
practices, activities, or acts, "économie" or otherwise, to be ultimately
summed-up, compared, and evaluated: neither by the single-parameter
hedonic calculus of classic utilitarianism, nor by the most elaborate
multiple-parameter formulas of contemporary mathematical économ
ies, nor by any mere inversion or presumptive transcendence of either.
There is no way to give a reckoning that is simultaneously total and
final. There is no Judgment Day. There is no bottom bottom line any-
where, for anyone or for "man."
149
7
Matters of Conséquence
It's insofar as there's been an awakening to a whole sériés of
problems that the difficulty of doing anything cornes to be
felt. Not that this effect is an end in itself. But it seems to me
that "what is to be done” ought. .. to be determined. .. by a
long work of comings and goings, of exchanges, reflections,
trials, different analyses . .. The necessity of reform musn't be
allowed to become a form of blackmail serving to limit, re
duce, or hait the exercise of criticism. Michel Foucault
Critiques and Charges: The Objectivist Génération of

"Relativism"
It is recurrently said that the présent analysis, specifically its question-
ings of absolute value and of the idea of objective standards, is "quiet-
istic," or, as the latter term and associated objection are usually ex-
plained, that the positions that such questionings entail prevent one
from opposing bad things and promoting good ones. Allegedly, the
author of this study must look on bad things benignly as simply what
the other fellow prefers and on ail things, good and bad, with passive
"egalitarian tolérance.” 1 As a “relativist,” she must, it is said, face the
choice of being either morally and politically nerveless or logically in-
consistent. Someone might develop such views in theory, it is said, but
no one can hold them in practice; no one, she is told, can live that way.
The currency and répétition of these observations make the quietist
objection almost as common and casual in contemporary axiological
debates as the self-refutationist argument and Egalitarian Fallacy hâve
been in eras past. Indeed, it echoes both of them and can readily be seen
as their combined current versions, the major différence being the
sharpness of its ethical/political—as distinct from logical/epistemolog-
ical—edge. Although these charges must and will be given attention
here, they cannot, for reasons that touch on the heart of the matter, be
quite "refuted.” For part of what is at issue here is the viability of the
terms in which the charges themselves are framed and of the entire
System of conceptualizations and attendent conceptual syntax by which
they are generated and through which they are articulated. Objections
150
Matters o f Conséquence
registered by orthodox objectivists to this study and to its author's pre-

sumed political and moral life do indeed hinge on inconsistencies of
theory and practice: what is inconsistent with her theory is their theory;
what is inconsistent with her practice is their description of her theory. To
explain why this is so and also to broaden the scope of the discussion, it
will be useful to approach the quietist objection in relation to the more
general charge of "relativism."
There are, of course, many relativisms. Two will concem us here. One
is any more or less extensively theorized questioning—analysis, prob-
lematizing, critique—of the key éléments of traditional objectivist
thought and its attendant axiological machinery. In that sense, this
study is relativistic. The other is such questioning as perceived and inter-
preted by that which it questions: a phantom heresy dreamt by anxious
orthodoxy under siégé or, in other words, a “relativism". created by
traditional objectivism itself. In this second sense, the présent study is
not and could not be relativistic.
At the most general theoretical level, the relativism exhibited by this
study is not a “position," not a "conviction," and not a set of “daims"
about how certain things—reality, truth, meaning, reason, value, and so
forth—really are. It is, rather, a general conceptual style or taste,
specifically played out here as (a) a conceptualization of the world as
continuously changing, irreducibly various, and multiply configurable,
(b) a corresponding tendency to find cognitively distasteful, unsatisfy-
ing, or counterintuitive any conception of the world as fixed and inté
gral and/or as having objectively determinate properties,2 and (c) a cor
responding disinclination or inability to use ternis such as "reality,"
“truth," “meaning," "reason," or "value" as glossed by the latter objec
tivist conceptions.3 What is not exhibited in this study is the set of foolish
“positions," “convictions," and “daims" produced by objectivist
thought when, confronted by such alternative conceptualizations of the
world, it imagines itself tumed upside down. This is not to say that no
one either makes the foolish daims in question or believes the allegedly
entailed quietistic dispositions are appropriate ones to display. There
certainly are such people, including some more or less boisterous
sophomoric ones who may refer to themselves as “relativists" and who
are, it appears, objectivists standing on their heads. It is to say, rather,
that those positions and dispositions cannot be derivedfront the analyses
and formulations developed in this study (or in the works by Feyer-
151
abend, Goodman, Bames, and Bloor cited in the note above) except by
the exercise of the very objectivist logic that they question and reject.
It is just these latter products of génération by self-inversion, how-
ever, that must be dealt with in responding to the charges I mentioned
earlier. The most central, classic, and perhaps enduring of them—that
is, objectivist characterizations of and simultaneous objections to "rel-
ativism"—are:
a) its alleged claim/assertion that ail truth is relative, said to be self-
refuting in that it dissolves its own truth-claims and/or grants the
truth of the assertion that it is false;
b) the Egalitarian Fallacy: that is, its alleged belief/claim that ail judg-
ments are equally valid, ail objects equally good, ail practices
equally justifiable; and
c) "anything goes"—that is, its alleged belief/claim that reality is to-
tally subjective, that there are no constraints on belief or behavior,
that one can think and do anything one likes.
As I indicated in an earlier chapter and will discuss further below, the
first two of these are repetitions-in-reverse of the fondamental objectivist
conceptions of “truth" and “validity."4 The third is the joint product of
the traditional subjective/objective dichotomy, its attendant all-or-
nothing logic, and a related set of assumptions about the dynamics and
constraints of individual and social behavior that, as we shall see, are
crucial to objectivist thought.5
In addition to these alleged daims and positions, certain attitudes or
behavioral dispositions are seen to follow from the questioning or cri
tique of orthodox objectivism, and are routinely associated with "rel-
ativism." These include:
d) limp, lax, and indiscriminate aesthetic and intellectual tolérance;
fatuous forbearance; the inability to exert évaluative authority; the
disindination or refusai to recommend or criticize objeds, enforce
or oppose practices, or promote or argue against ideas; and
e) political and moral paralysis, torpor, and despair; Panglossism and
status-quoism; an inability, disinclination, or refusai to take a
stand or to work for change.
Here, of course, is where the quietist objection finds its place. Before
examining any of them more specifically, we may add to this list of
alleged positions and dispositions the set of intelledual, social, and
political calamities seen, again by self-inversion, to be the inévitable
152
conséquence of the critique or abandonnant of objectivist axiology—or,

as it is said, to which relativism "opens the gâte":
f ) the loss of the authority of truth, facts, logic, universal principles,
and natural rights;
g) the disappearance of genuine science, moral reasoning, and ra-
tional discourse;
h) the collapse of aesthetic standards;
i) the breakdown of law and morality, the takeover of démocratie
institutions by totalitarianism, the éruption of social chaos and
anarchy, the retum to the jungle;
j) the Gulag, the Nazi death camps.
It will be noticed that a number of these calamities—for example, (f),
(g), and (h)—amount simply to a description of the world in the ab
sence of the conceptual/discursive idiom of traditional axiology. These
dread occurrences consist, in other words, of the "loss," "breakdown,"
"collapse," and "disappearance" not of various moral, aesthetic, and
scientific practices, phenomena, and institutions, but, rather, of the pos
sibilité of describing and accounting for various practices, phenomena,
and institutions in familiar objectivist ways. Given the tendency of ob
jectivist thought to reify theoretical constructs, it is not surprising that it
regards the articulation of alternative conceptualizations as an attack on
fondamental entities. Unable to accommodate the idea of a world con-
ceived otherwise, objectivist thought concludes that, in the absence of
its own conceptualizations, there could not be a world, or any thought at
ail. Thus, Hilary Putnam remarks: "If one abandons the notions of
justification, rational acceptibility, warranted assertibility, right asserti-
bility, and the like, completely, then 'true' goes as well . . . But if ail
notions of rightness, both epistemic and (metaphysically) realist, are
eliminated, then what are our statements but noise-makings? The élimi
nation of the normative is attempted mental suicide."6 Of course, if one
defines "the normative" as the orthodox axiological machinery of
"justification, rational acceptibility, warranted assertibility, right asserti
bility, and the like," then, by définition, the rejection of those notions in
their traditional conceptualization is the "élimination of the norma
tive." If, however, "the normative" is taken in the non-question-begging
sense of either (a) the operations of sociocultural institutions of value
marking, value maintaining, value transforming, and value transmit-
ting, or, in relation to "true," (b) the self-regulating mechanisms of
verbal interaction, its dynamics can be quite otherwise described. The
153
question is whether, so described, they would still count as "the norma-

tive" from Putnam's perspective, and the answer is that they probably
would not, which is to say we are at the sort of impasse that seems
characteristic of these debates.7 One could, of course, ask Putnam how
he accounts for the apparent fact that some people do "abandon" those
notions and manage both to think and to live to tell the taie. If ail goes
true to form, however, he would reply to the effect that, if such people
hâve lived to tell the taie and do continue to think, it proves they hâve
not really abandoned those notions, for no one could live or think that
way.
Not ail the calamities listed above are, of course, merely alarmed
descriptions of a world without orthodox descriptions of the world. In
certain cases, notably (i) and (j), what sustains the idea that they are
engendered by the questioning and critique of objectivist thought—
which is to say by "relativism"—is the intractably self-privileging logic
of objectivist thought itself, here the conviction that only its own theo-
retical (logical, epistemological, theological, etc.) security and wide-
spread affirmation bar the gâte to the polis and keep the night, the
jungle, and the jackals at bay. That conviction obviously requires a
spécifie and highly dubious sociopolitical theory and, with it, a more
general and equally dubious theory of the mechanisms—psychological,
political, and other—by which individual and social behavior are
motivated and constrained: dubious because, among other reasons, it is
évident that the jackals, the Gulag, and the death camps hâve not been
kept from the polis in spite of what has been, up to now, the theoretical
dominance and widespread affirmation of objectivist thought.8
The question is often put: "But how would you answer the Nazi?"
The reply has two parts. The first part is, it dépends: it dépends on where
the Nazi and I—given, of course, my particular identity—each are, and
what resources and power, institutional and other, are available to each
of us. Under some conditions, I would not say anything at ail to him or
do anything else in particular (there are self-styled Nazis to whom I am
not now saying anything, and about whom I am not now doing any
thing in particular either); under other conditions, I would look for the
fastest and surest way to escape his power; under yet other conditions, I
would do what I could, no doubt with others, to destroy him. The
question to be asked in tum is whether, given a similar identity and
under comparable conditions, anyone else, including an objectivist,
could do or ever did otherwise. Second, I would suggest that "an-
swering" the Nazi, in the sense of getting one's ethical/epistemological
154
arguments in good axiological order, is not, in any case, what is wanted.

What is wanted, I think, is a theoretically subtle and powerful analysis
of the conditions and, even more important, dynamics of the Nazi's
emergence and access to power and, accordingly, a spécification of
political and other actions that might make that emergence and access
less likely, both in one's own neighborhood and elsewhere. It must be
added, however, that any such analysis must expect to compete with
others and, accordingly, with the spécification of other political efforts,
including—as we must never forget—those mounted by Nazis as well.
The point is that, whereas “answering" the Nazi with axiologically
grounded arguments will do nothing at ail to prevent or destroy his
power, developing theoretical analyses and political programs will not
do everything. The latter will not be décisive; nothing can guarantee that
the jackals will be kept at bay, neither axiology nor any spécifie alterna
tive that replaces it.
Richard Rorty's recent efforts to deal with the assignment of “the

traditional epithet" of relativism to views he has elaborated and en-
dorsed under the name pragmatism are instructive here. Referring to his
view “that there is nothing to be said about either truth or rationality
apart from the familiar procedures of justification which a given soci
ety—ours—uses in one or another area of inquiry," Rorty remarks: “It
is not clear why 'relativist' should be thought an appropriate term for
[this— 'ethnocentric,' as he calls it] view."9 After ail, he goes on to
explain: “the pragmatist is not holding a positive theory which says that
something is relative to something else. He is, instead, making . . . [a]
purely négative point" (p. 6). That négative point, in Rorty's restatement
of it, is that “there is nothing to be said about truth save that each of us
will commend as true those beliefs which he or she finds good to be-
lieve." This is not, Rorty insists, a positive theory about the nature of
truth. “If it were," he remarks in passing, “such a theory would, of
course, be self-refuting.“ “ But," he continues, “the pragmatist does not
hâve a theory of truth, much less a relativistic one. As a partisan of
solidarity, his account of the value of cooperative human inquiry has
only an ethical base, not an epistemological or metaphysical one. Not
having any epistemology, a fortiori he does not hâve a relativistic one"
(p. 6).
Rorty's more general difficulties—and, as he sees them, dilemmas—in
regard to charges of relativism will be discussed in some detail later.
What is important to note here is how difficult it is for him to unfix the
155
label with the sort of disclaimer just presented; for, as he recognizes,

even if the pragmatist does not hâve an epistemological/metaphysical
account of truth, he still appears to his realist adversary to be saying
things about it, "truth"; and even though he himself hears what he is
saying as an altogether négative point, the realist will hear it as équiva
lent to a positive and positively appalling point, namely that just some-
one's finding something good to believe is enough to make it "true" in
the realist/objectivist sense.10
Thus the relativism/anti-relativism match is recurrently constructed
and enacted: a game of pure nonengagement, ending in a draw by
default. Disclaimers of the label and réfutations of its alleged entailments
are difficult at best and, in many companies and under most informai
conditions and constraints of time, impossible. The various positions,
dispositions, and calamities that are typically alleged to follow from a
déniai of objectivism and which give any point to the charge of relativism
as such, will, despite ail déniais and indications of evidence to the con-
trary, continue to be generated unavoidably and unwittingly through
the self-inversion of objectivist thought.
We could observe here that ail the terms of the standard objectivist
objections to relativism, as listed above, are implicated in a radically
contingent—that is, historically, culturally, linguistically, and institu-
tionally local and particular—conceptualization and discourse of "real-
ity," "validity," "justification," "reason," "truth," "facts," and so forth.
We could also observe, accordingly, that the objectivist's élaborations of
his charges and the pragmatist/relativist's attempts to réfuté them or to
dissociate himself from the beliefs he is alleged to hold, both become,
perforce, only more or less emphatic restatements of the radically diver
gent views of each side: divergences of conceptual style, conceptual
tempérament, conceptual taste, and conceptual idiom that sooner or
later exhibit themselves as intractable conceptual/discursive impasses.
Observations such as these, however, can neither transcend the argu
ment nor break the cirde for, of course, the idea that conceptualizations
are radically contingent and that conceptual/discursive impasses may be
intractable will be, to the objectivist, a mark of relativism.
Quietism and the Active Relativist

In accord with the quietist objection, the situation just described would
be expected to produce in the relativist a condition of génial, torpid
156
philosophical che-serà-seràism. "Well," she might be expected to say,

"it takes ail kinds. Some like objectivism, some don't—it's like choco
laté and vanilla. Let's ail go out and sit on the porch swing.” As we shall
see, however, although that could happen and, under some conditions,
is pretty much what does happen, there are spécifie reasons why, and
conditions under which, the relativist will become quite energetic, both
as a social and political agent and as a promoter and defender of her
conceptual tastes as such.
We may observe, first, that someone's critique of objectivist thought
and axiology and, accordingly, déniai of "absolute value," "universal
standards," and "objective truth," could hardly be thought to produce
her total paralysis—to prevent her, in other words, from acting at ail, or
from acting, generally, more or less in accord with her particular beliefs,
perceptions, desires, interests, tastes, preferences, judgments, and so
forth. The question, then, is why it is thought she would be given to
such deep pause or immobility upon discovering that these (her percep
tions, desires, etc.) are not merely contingent "in theory” but are, in
practice and in vivo, at odds with other people's.
The answer, and an idea crucial to ail versions of the quietist objec
tion, seems to be that, although a nonobjectivist might undertake to do
things, nevertheless because she must believe that everybody "has a
right” to his own perceptions, beliefs, interests, and preferences, or that
ail the latter are "equally valid," she could not justify doing them or do
them and be consistent. As I hâve repeatedly indicated here, however,
what the nonobjectivist allegedly must believe is something that she not
only need not, but cannot, believe. Contrary to the self-refutationist argu
ment, an abandonment of objectivist conceptualizations of "truth” does
not (and hardly could) oblige one to acknowledge that objectivism itself
may be true in the objectivist sense. Nor, contrary to the Egalitarian
Fallacy, could a déniai of traditional conceptions of objective "validity"
oblige one to regard other people's opinions, beliefs, tastes, etc., as
equally valid. Since a nonobjectivist, by définition, does not concep-
tualize "truth" and "validity” the way an objectivist does, she cannot
give to "true” or "valid” the meanings those ternis hâve for him, which
are also the meanings that are required either for her position to be self-
refuting or for her to be committed to that form of egalitarianism which,
to the objectivist, defines relativism and entails quietism. In short, a
nonobjectivist by définition cannot be "committed to” what the objectiv
ist objects to in what he names "relativism," nor is she, then, behaving
inconsistently when she acts in a way inconsistent with those alleged
commitments.
157
Various versions and key variants of the quietist objection can be

handled accordingly.
(1) The first concems what the relativist can and cannot "say," the
way her verbal behavior is constrained by her alleged commitments. It is
sometimes objected, for example, that one cannot live as a nonobjectiv-
ist because, in the real world of real peasants, politicians, and police, one
must deal with people for whom only objectivist-type considérations
and justifications—appeals to "fundamental rights" and "objective
facts," not just to contingent conditions—will be acceptable and effec
tive. Two replies may be made here. One is that it would be no more
logically inconsistent for a nonobjectivist to speak, under some condi
tions, of fundamental rights and objective facts than for a Hungarian
ordering his lunch in Paris to speak French. Under some conditions:
what I refer to here as objectivism and nonobjectivism are, of course,
formally articulated conceptualizations and critiques which, as such, are
most commonly played out not in interactions with police, peasants,
and politicians but, rather, in arenas of theoretical discourse and ex
change. This is not to say that they hâve no implications for action in
other domains: far from it, as I hâve indicated throughout this study and
explicitly just above. The actions that follow from them, however, are
not necessarily verbal actions, and specifically neither the formai recita
tion of formai théories or, in the name of some altogether irrelevant
"consistency," the eamest substitution of technical ternis for idiomatic
ones. For the lexicon, syntax, and register of ail discourses are always
constrained by, and accommodated to, the particular features of a com
municative situation. The other and equally important reply, however,
is that the power, richness, subtlety, flexibility, and communicative ef-
fectiveness of a nonobjectivist idiom—for example, forceful recommenda
tions that do not cite intrinsic value, or justifications, accepted as such,
that do cite contingent conditions and likely outcomes rather than fun
damental rights and objective facts—are characteristically underes-
timated by those who hâve never leamed to speak it or tried to use it in
interactions with, among others, real policemen, peasants, and politi
cians.
(2) In relation to various forms of pedagogy or instruction, including

institutional teaching, academie literary criticism, domestic child rear-
ing, and missionary work, the quietist objection maintains that a nonob
jectivist conception of value, especially the idea that value is always seen
158
and measured from some perspective, commits one to the view that
people cannot or should not evaluate for other people: that it would be
wrong, for example, to remark, with regard to some object or practice
such as Seneca's Medea, or the concealment of the genitals in public, or
the study of Old Norse, a value that they had not remarked for them-
selves or evidently considered quite differently. It also maintains that
nonobjectivist conceptions of value commit one to the view that par
ents, teachers, and missionaries cannot or should not urge and, as neces-
sary, impose that unremarked value or unappreciated practice on chil-
dren, students, and various other persons understood to be immature,
benighted, or misled as to their true interests and desires by their up-
bringing, their cultures, or the mass media. For, such objections typi-
cally go on to argue, even though the object or practice in question may
appear undesirable, disagreeable, or outlandish from the perspective of
the latter persons, it might nevertheless be the case that it was really
(essentially, intrinsically, objectively) good, and/or that, even though
they did not (yet) realize it, the object or practice would perform funda-
mentally bénéficiai and ultimately désirable functions for them—for
example, edifying, économie, therapeutic, or salvational ones.
It is clear that this version of the quietist objection présupposés the
entire axiological machinery that the nonobjectivist problematizes and
thus begs ail the crucial questions at issue. Those questions are: first,
whether something's being really good (or really bad)11 could be deter-
mined from no perspective whatsoever or whether we don't hâve, in
such cases, a particular, other perspective masking itself as no perspective,
which is to say tacitly privileging itself or the perspective of some domi
nant group; second, whether it could be from no perspective or only
from some particular, other perspective that the alleged benefits would be
counted as fundamentally bénéficiai and ultimately désirable; and third,
whether the pédagogie version of the quietist objection doesn't, there-
fore, back up toward and slip irrevocably into the familiar infinité re-
gress of ail axiological daims. For the real goodness seen by the parent,
teacher, or missionary could not be self-evident or it would hâve already
been évident to the children, students, or benighted natives who hâve
failed to see it, and any attempt to justify those altemate judgments would
also hâve to justify the privilège accorded to the altemate perspective from
which they were made.12 None of this is to say that the observation of an
otherwise unnoticed contingent goodness cannot be made or should not be
urged on other people, or that the privilège involved could not be defended and
granted by some and perhaps ail concerned. It is to say, rather, that, since
159
the contingency of ail value cannot be evaded, whoever does the urging
cannot ultimately suppress, or ultimately évadé taking responsibility for,
the particularity of the perspective from which he does so.
The rejoinder typically entered at this point is that if a judgment is
particular and partial, it cannot be justified, a conclusion that follows
naturally and logically from the objectivist conception of “justification”
as a structure of objective/impersonal argumentation built on objective/
empirical (or transcendental) foundations. As I hâve suggested through-
out this study, however, the social, political, and communicative dy-
namics of verbal or other overt judgments and, accordingly, the structure
and operation of their justification can be reconceived along other lines.
Specifically, and within the particular domain of instruction and peda-
gogy, justifying a particular judgment to those whose welfare is one's
responsibility and over whom one has social, political, and/or institu-
tional power (the latter an aspect of the situation rarely mentioned)
may be conceived as making as explicit as necessary to them the various
considérations that produced that judgment (and conséquent recommen
dation, prohibition, or requirement), stopping not when the expli
cation hits "objective" rock bottom but when it tums the trick, that is,
secures their acquiescence. Of course, it could happen that it doesn't tum
the trick and seems never likely to do so, in which case some other form
of enlightenment and persuasion might seem called for: bribes or
threats, for example, or, of course, physical force. If and when one has
recourse to these alternatives, especially the last, might will not "make
right," but it will certainly hâve been exercised; and it may be granted
that the quietist objection has some substance in its suggestion that
someone who conceived of ail value as radically contingent would, in
dealing with those in her charge, be edged toward this last alternative
less readily than the absolutist/objectivist, and would be, under these
conditions, more reluctant to exercise that force.
There seems, however, to be a further subsidiary anxiety in the
pédagogie variant of the quietist objection. Though not usually given in
such terms, it is the fear that someone's acknowledging the fact and
partiality of her perspective would make her authority—that is, pre-
cisely the privilège of her perspective—vulnérable. And indeed, while
such acknowledgment would not necessarily or in itself undermine
someone's authority over her students, children, or native parishioners,
it might make it more subject to their interrogation; and, if her authority
was not otherwise and ultimately sustained for them by, for example,
what they acknowledged as her wider expérience, shrewder calculating
160
ability, access to better sources of knowledge, or demonstrable—for

whatever reason—concem for their welfare, it would put it at risk. But
the securing of authority from interrogation and risk could hardly be
thought an unqualified or intrinsic good. On the contrary, it might be
thought there was some communal value to ensuring that ail authority
was always subject to interrogation and always at risk. AU authority:
which must mean that of parent, teacher, and missionary as well as that
of tyrant, pope, and State flunky.13
(3) I hâve spoken of what does not follow, of alleged daims the non-
objectivist does not make, alleged positions she does not occupy, alleged
convictions she does not hold. What does follow? What, in particular,
may one expect a relativist to do as a sociopolitical or, as it is said, moral
or ethical agent? The answer, in the first instance, must continue to be
négative or at least undramatic; for it must be insisted that, given only
that déniai of objectivism which is sufficient to evoke the quietist objec
tion, no particular moral positions or types or modes of moral action follow
from it at ail, neither those typically attributed to "relativism," such as
liberalism, egalitarian tolérance, and passivity, or any others. The an
swer to the question of "what follows," then, cannot be a description
and célébration of what relativists per se characteristically do as moral
agents, but only the observation that various forms and modes of action
are altogether consistent with the déniai or questioning of objectivism,
including those forms and modes commonly said to be logically ex-
cluded or psychologically disabled by it.
Someone's distaste for or inability to grasp notions such as "absolute
value" and "objective truth" does not in itself deprive her of such other
human characteristics, relevant to moral action, as memory, imagina
tion, early training and example, conditioned loyalities, instinctive sym
pathies and antipathies, and so forth. Nor does it deprive her of ail
interest in the subtler, more diffuse, and longer-range conséquences of
her actions and the actions of others, or oblige her, more than anyone
else, to be motivated only by immédiate self-interest. What sustains
common views to the contrary is, of course, the traditional idea that the
only thing that prevents people from behaving like beasts or automatons
is their being leashed by/to some transcendental or otherwise absolute
authority. Accordingly, what could réfuté such views would not be a
roll-call of selfless and visionary relativists, for such a list would only be
re-cited by the objectivist as proof that no one can live that way, but the
development and widespread appropriation of alternative, nonobjectivist
161
accounts of the dynamics of human choice and action. I do not undertake

that project here, but my conception of its most profitable directions is
visible in what follows and elsewhere in this study.
Someone's abandonnant of the notion of absolute value does not per
se deprive her of morally relevant human characteristics, but neither
does it endow her with any. Indeed, a relativist in that sense could very
well be a moral monster: a resentful, self-absorbed, vengeful, stupid,
lazy, and, in ail technical and idiomatic senses, "irrational" créature—
as, of course, ail other people are from time to time, including, it seems,
objectivists. To ask what could prevent such a person from wreaking
social havoc—since, by définition, her actions are not govemed by ab
solute moral constraints—is, of course, another version of “if God is
dead, everything is permitted," and the reply to both is the same. Before
considering that reply, however, we must grant here that perhaps noth-
ing could, would, or will prevent it: individual relativists may very well
behave like the careless, cynical, vicious amoralists of history and litera-
ture, and secular society (or any chunk of it you like: post-Reformation
society, American consumer society, late capitalist postindustrial soci
ety, and so on) may very well be caught up in sociopathological patterns
of action that will conclude with some total apocalypse or universal
extinction. There is nothing in the postaxiological views of human judg-
ment and action presented in this study that can exclude such pos-
sibilities. To the extern that anything could prevent such individual
amoralism or social havoc, however, it would be the same things that
hâve always made some actions and patterns of action if not impermis-
sible, then at least unlikely—and that, I think, is as good as we can get.
Among the most important of those things—"constraints," if you
like, though the term is misleading in this connection—are the innu-
merable, subtle, continuously operating, nonformalized, usually un-
recognized, but nonetheless strong behavioral tendencies that emerge from
individual and social practices themselves. These are not, as ternis such
as "rules," "norms," "standards," and "contraints" suggest, extemal
forces that operate upon agents to direct or control their actions but are,
rather, the récurrent inclinations of the agents themselves: inclinations, to act
in certain ways rather than others, that are the corporeally inscribed
traces of the differential conséquences of their own prior and ongoing
actions and interactions.
In addition to these more or less récurrent and, among the members
of some community, more or less similar and congruent patterns and
inclinations (which could also, therefore, be called behavioral "tastes").
162
what prevents individual relativists and whole societies of pagans ffom

running amok is the tendency and power of social groups to channel the
practices of individual members through various more or less formai
and more or less institutionalized “sanctions/' or rewards and punish-
ments—ail of which, it may be noted, also operate on agents as differen-
tial conséquences of their own actions. This tendency is never an-
nihilated and power never altogether crippled—if diminished at ail—by
the failure or refusai of some, or indeed many, of the members of the
group to grasp the intrinsic value of those practices or to grant the
objectively grounded legitimacy of those sanctions.14
The feedback loop of differential conséquences—that is, the mecha-
nism whereby the different conséquences of different actions (whether,
for example, more effective or less so, and to what extents, and with
what variations under what varying conditions) produce in agents a
tendency to repeat, modify, or avoid those actions in the future—
opérâtes to adjust actions to the conditions in which they are practiced.
Or, bearing in mind (a) the earlier discussions of how constraints oper
ate both on speakers and listeners in verbal communication and also on
the activities of scientists and artists in the process of évaluation/
production that characterizes both (that process being, as I hâve pointed
out, a loop of just this kind), and also (b) the model of Darwinian
natural sélection invoked earlier at several points, we might say that the
feedback mechanism thus described tends to make practices and activi
ties more effective by making them “fit better" and thus “more fit."
While that process or mechanism does not correct our actions in the
sense of making them increasingly “right” or “better” from some tran
scendent perspective, it certainly does keep them—that is, ail our indi
vidual acts and moral practices, and also the characteristic activities of
speakers, interpreters, artists, critics, and scientists—from being, as in
"anything goes," anything.
(4) The relativist finds that other people's perceptions, beliefs, inter
ests, desires, preferences, and judgments are more or less different from
hers. This does not paralyze her will, however, or leave her frozen in
quandaries, since she also continuously finds, just as she expects and
assumes, other différences that are crucial for her social/political choices
and actions, the most significant of which are the various, different stakes
involved and the various, different resources available to her to change
things—or, for that matter, to preserve them. The relativist's social and
political choices and actions are “compelled," then (and, in effect, her
163
“stands" are “given a base"), by the spécifie, contingent conditions in

which she opérâtes as an agent, as she perceives, interprets, and consid
ère those conditions—or, in short, évaluâtes them.
Certain aspects of the dynamics and limits of “considering" must be
recalled here from the earlier discussions of the évaluative process, espe-
cially to distinguish it from the déduction of Right Action from Univer
sal Principles through Moral Reasoning. While "the best" the active
relativist could do can never be better than the-best-all-things-
considered, ail things can never, in fact, be considered. She cannot (nor
can any other agent) know how many things there are, or which are the
most important, or which should go first; and, because time is always a
constraint, some things must always be considered at the expense of the
considération of other things. In her inability to conceive of an objective
basis for determining or choosing even which things to consider, how-
ever, the relativist acknowledges and takes responsibility for the fact
that, for better or woree, it's a judgment call ail the way down.
The relativist's actions are differentially "compelled" or "con-
strained" by different contingent combinations of conditions. It may
happen, for example, that the disparity between her perceptions, de
sires, or judgments and those of some other fellow appeared to hâve
virtually no conséquences, now or in any imaginable future, for her or
for anyone or anything that mattered to her in any imaginable way; or it
could happen that she had virtually no interactions with the other fel
low and/or virtually no power to affect him. Under these extreme but by
no means uncommon conditions, she might very well behave exactly
like the torpid relativist of popular and philosophie fancy, and do virtu
ally nothing. Where the disparity was altogether theoretical or, as Ber
nard Williams puts it, "notional"15 (as, for example, the différence be
tween her cosmology and that of the members of some hypothetical
society on the other side of the moon), there would be no reason and, of
course, also no way for the relativist to take any substantial action. But,
then, there would be no way for anyone else to take any action either,
though, given an objectivist's missionary feelings about One Objective
Truth, he may think and also think it very important that he say that the
benighted Moonmen should be told how the universe really is.
Moonmen are sometimes not hypothetical and not especially far
away, but the relativist's inability to grasp the idea of "objectively
wrong" would not oblige her, when she heard of their practices, to
suppress her horror—if it was horror—and do nothing but murmur “De
gustibus" or "Live and let live." To be sure, whatever her reaction was,
164
she would not think of it as having any “objective grounds.” Indeed, she
might think of it as having no other basis than her “personal feelings";
and while she may hâve organized and elevated some of the latter into
relatively general and verbally articulated “principles," she might also
continue to conceive of them as a more or less scrappy assortment of
memories, habits, unconscious associations and identifications, instinc
tive sympathies and antipathies, cognitive consonances and disso
nances, aesthetic attractions and révulsions, and so forth. Still, nothing
in any of this would prevent her from acting, under various conditions,
in various ways, even in some way that an objectivist moral theorist
might consider the right way. The question, as always, is whether just
her thinking about her actions in these nonobjectivist ways would dif-
ferentially détermine the actual dynamics of her motivation and the
particular choices and actions she actually pursued and, specifically,
whether she would therefore act significantly differently ffom anyone
else, including some morally reasoning moral theorist. The answer be-
ing suggested here is, of course, négative on ail counts.
When the other fellows (or Moonmen) are real and close enough, the
stakes more or less substantial, and the relativist has at least minimal
resources, she may be expected to act, accordingly, quite actively and
energetically.16 Depending, as always, on various relevant conditions as
she saw and evaluated them, she might attempt to modify the other
fellow's different perceptions, beliefs, or desires by converting, educat-
ing, or enlightening him (either superficially or substantially, transiently
or permanently, and more or less violently), or by bribing, threatening,
fining, or shaming him, or by issuing stirring appeals, including, possi-
bly, some framed in absolutist terms.17 Where her resources, compared
to his, were relatively limited, she might offer to negotiate the différence
with the other fellow, or attempt to minimize her interactions and thus
conflicts with him: she might, for example, end the conversation, leave
the party (or the Party), change jobs, or emigrate. And, of course, she
might attempt to secure the assistance of other people in limiting the
other fellow's ability to act out his differing—and, for her and them,
disagreeably consequential—interests, desires, and preferences, perhaps
by voting him out of office, perhaps by paralyzing, imprisoning, or
exiling him, and perhaps by killing him.18
Insofar as the coopération, assistance, or noninterference of other
people was necessary for these or any other of her actions, nothing
would prevent the relativist ffom “justifying" her actions along the fines
indicated above: that is, from setting forth, in greater or less detail, how
165
she saw and evaluated the relevant conditions, what she believed the
stakes were for ail involved, what resources she thought were available
to them as a group, her own interest in the outcome, and also—since
nothing in her "position" would deprive her of access to such considér
ations—what she saw as the désirable conséquences, now or at some
time in the future, for those other people themselves and/or for some
collectivity she shared with them. Ail this considering and explicating
could be hard work, of course, but the idea that relativism makes one's
moral or political life easy is an especially absurd fantasy of objectivist
thought.
Nor, finally, would anything in her cognitive and theoretical tastes bar
the relativist, either logically or temperamentally, from conceiving of
and working for a collective good, or from proposing and participating
in a transcendent or transpersonal project. For she could, quite consis-
tently with her gagging at such notions as "objective truth" and her
inability to grasp the idea of "intrinsic value," perform actions that she
saw as part of a longer-range pattern of acts that appeared to hâve, as
their likely outcome, a State of affairs that she, along with other people,
saw and evaluated as désirable.
There is nothing remarkable or even interesting about any of this.
That is the point. The actions of the relativist per se—repeat, per se—are
not spécial in any way, not different from those of other agents with
other conceptual tastes, including objectivist moral theorists per se. A
final twist of the quietist objection may, however, be anticipated here—
namely that, however decent, appropriate, and effective the relativist's
modes of action, as described above, might appear, her acts would still
be "only instrumentally rational" and could not be described as exhib-
iting "genuine moral reasoning." But it is, of course, only a twist; for,
like the other objections to "relativism" listed earlier, this withholding
of legitimating labels from actions otherwise described is either one more
instance of the inability of objectivist thought to imagine any alternative
to itself or a répétition of its refusai to yield a monopoly over the terms of
theoretical discourse.
Community, Solidarity, and the Pragmatist's Dilemma
Richard Rorty's essay "Solidarity or Objectivity?" was examined briefly

above as an example of the difficulties of "refuting" the charge of rel
ativism. It is worth considering further, however, for, while Rorty's
166
general predicament is shared by ail who question orthodox objectivism

and still wish to dwell among their fellow men and women, his framing
and attempted resolution of that predicament create their own prob-
lems. Specifically, in an effort to produce an alternative both to objectiv
ism and also to the objectivist-generated phantom heresy of "relativ-
ism"—including its alleged self-refutation, egalitarianism, and quietism,
ail of which Rorty is unfortunately content to accept as descriptions of
something—he develops a complex of ideas involving "community" and
"solidarity" that are not only, from the perspective of this study, un-
satisfactory but also, to judge from other aspects of his thought and
work, at odds with Rorty's own more general conceptual tastes and
political bents. Indeed, although, in line with his other works, the essay
itself offers many bold, powerful, and important formulations, it fash-
ions and occupies positions that are not only, in Rorty's words, "provin
cial" (p. 12) but, it appears, determinedly naïve.
Difficulties appear in the title itself and in the explication of those
alternatives—that is, solidarity or objectivity—with which the essay
opens: "There are two principal ways in which reflective human beings
try, by placing their lives in a larger context, to give sense to those lives"
(p. 3). These two ways or, as Rorty also calls them, "stories" are, first,
those in which people "describe themselves as standing in immédiate
relation to a nonhuman reality," which, he says, reflect their desire for
objectivity or, second (this being the pragmatist's recommended alterna
tive), those that "tell the story of their contribution to a community"
and thus, he says, reflect their desire for solidarity. What is needed as a
productive alternative to "objectivity," however, is not another mono-
lithic principle but the development of an altogether different type of
conceptualization. It is not merely that there are more than two kinds
of stories that people tell about themselves and that Rorty's oversim-
plification here must be questioned as such; it is also that, given the
multiple, heterogeneous, shifting, and more or less mutually inconsis-
tent and conflictual (or, as the term was discussed above, "scrappy")
nature both of our desires, beliefs, and actions and also of the relations
among them, we must ask whether—and at the cost of what else—
any of us ever does or could "give sense to our lives" in some single,
particular way.
Nor can "solidarity" or "community" serve as a replacement for "ob
jectivity" in the sense of another monolithic principle by which the
pragmatist or anyone else can get around the continuous task of figuring
out and working out sociopolitical choices and actions. Indeed, to the
167
extern that the concept of communal solidarity déniés or obscures both

différence and dynamics, including internai différence and dynamics, it
can only encourage the illusion, undesirable for political theory and
dangerous for political practice, that there is some mode of thought or
set of principles that would ultimately eliminate ail difficult and dis-
agreeable encounters with other people.
Like others who currently and increasingly invoke "community" as a
solution to the problems revealed by contemporary nonobjectivist
thought (problems, especially, in traditional conceptualizations of "au-
thority," "validity," "truth," and "legitimacy"), Rorty ignores the mo-
bility, multiple forms of contact, and numerous levels and modes of
interconnectedness of contemporary life and forgets, accordingly, that
contemporary communities are not only intemally complex and highly
differentiated but also continuously and rapidly reconfigured. Clifford
Geertz's description of the "enormous collage” in which we are now
living is apt and vivid:
It is not just the evening news where assassinations in India, bombings in

Lebanon, coups in Africa, and shootings in central America are set amid
local disasters hardly more legible . . . It is also an enormous explosion of
translations . . . from and to languages—Tamil, Indonesian, Hebrew, and
Urdu—previously regarded as marginal and recondite; the migration of
cuisines, costumes, fumishings and décor . . . ; the appearance of gamelin
thèmes in avant garde jazz, Indio myths in Latino novels, magazine images
in African paintings. But most of ail it is that the person we encounter in
the greengrocery is as likely, or nearly, to corne from Korea as Iowa . . .
Even rural settings, where alikeness is likely to be more entrenched, are not
immune: Mexican farmers in the Southwest, Vietnamese fishermen along
the Gulf Coast, Iranian physicians in the Midwest.19
What Rorty's (and other current) invocations of community miss and

obscure, is that at any given time as well as over the course of anyone's
life history, each of us is a member of many, shifting communities, each
of which establishes, for each of its members, multiple social identities,
multiple principles of identification with other people, and, accordingly,
a collage or grab-bag of allegiances, beliefs, and sets of motives. Récog
nition of this situation requires a conception of "community” and an
image of individual social life and mental life that is considerably richer,
more subtly differentiated, and more dynamic than that articulated by
contemporary communitarians. Indeed, the current invocation of
"community” as a replacement for "objective reality" is not only a
168
problematic gesture but an empty one. Where it is not (as it seems to be

in Rorty's case) a conceptual retreat and apparent move toward socio-
political isolationism, it is usually a form of neo-objectivism.
This brings us to the pragmatist's dilemma—or, rather, to what he
thinks is his dilemma. As Rorty sees it, since the pragmatist knows he
has no ahistorical standpoint from which to endorse, as he wishes
to, the habits of modem democracies, he is faced with the choice of
either "attach[ing] a spécial privilège to [his] own community or
prétend [ing] an impossible tolérance for every other group." What
Rorty recommends is that the pragmatist firmly grasp the former hom,
which he calls "ethnocentrism," and thus both résolve the dilemma and
exculpate himself from the charge of "relativism": “The pragmatist,
dominated by the desire for solidarity, can only be criticized for taking
his own community too seriously. He can only be criticized for eth
nocentrism, not for relativism" (p. 13). The sort of dilemma that could,
at the end of the twentieth century, be thought to require a reflective
human being to embrace any kind of ethnocentrism must, I think, be
examined closely, as must also the nature of that ethnocentrism itself.
To be ethnocentric in a pragmatist way is, Rorty explains, "to divide
the human race into those to whom one must justify one's beliefs and
the others"—the former (one's ethnos, as he calls it) being further
glossed as "those who share enough of one's beliefs to make fruitful
conversation possible" (p. 13). Given almost any contemporary under-
standing of social dynamics, and given also the pragmatist's own other
commitments, this seems to be wrong in every way. First, an ethnos or
tribe—in the sense evidently intended and needed here of a social
grouping that commands its members' loyalties, produces their sense of
solidarity, and reinforces their beliefs—would not be constituted, at
least not in the first instance, of those who share beliefs but, rather, of
those who share situations or conditions and, therefore, also share his
toriés and économies and, accordingly, hâve developed, over time, more
or less congment routines and patterns of behavior, and, therefore,
engage in mutually consequential interactive practices. Shared beliefs
and the possibility of fruitful conversations neither establish nor sustain
tribes but are, rather, the emergent by-products of these other, more
significant and determinative aspects of cohesive social relations. More-
over, what will matter with regard to justifying our beliefs are not those
people whose beliefs we already share but, rather, those whose attitudes
and actions in relation to our beliefs (which perhaps they do not share)
hâve conséquences for us.
169
Further problems are created by Rorty's spécifie—and, with minor

variations, repeated—naming of "the liberal intellectuals of the secular
modem West" (p. 12) as the pragmatist's own ethnos. Most obviously,
perhaps, it raises the question of what attitude the pragmatist means to
take to the damage done by, and sometimes in the name of, the secular
modem West not only to the common physical environment but to
various other people, including some who are, perhaps, the pragmatist's
or liberal intellectual's own tribesmen in other ethnë—the latter a possi-
bility that, as we hâve seen, Rorty's formulation does not accommodate.
The more significant problem, however, is that, in defîning his ethnos in
tenus that do not engage with and effectively obscure the issues of
contemporary political life, the pragmatist virtually bows out of both
political analysis and political action; for, of course, the differential tribal
features in relation to which the most strenuous intertribal conflicts
occur are not, in our time, primarily matters of West per se versus East
per se, or of secular societies per se versus théocratie ones per se, or of
libérais per se versus anything else in particular, but, rather, the multiple
dashings of subhemispheric State powers and transnational social
classes, and, irrespective of the degree of reflectiveness of those in-
volved, clashings of racial ethnë and of gender.
After remarking the self-privileging circularity of ail sociopolitical
self-recommendations, Rorty reflects on the pragmatist's desire to justify
his belief that the liberal habits of modem democracies are superior to
the ways of ''primitive, théocratie or totalitarian societies." This
justification, he concludes, can ultimately take the form only of "a com-
parison between societies which exemplify these habits and those which
do not, leading up to the suggestion that nobody who has experienced both
would prefer the latter . . . Such justification is not by reference to a
criterion, but by reference to various detailed practical advantages" (pp.
11-12, emphasis added). Although the latter part of this formulation is,
to my mind, just what is wanted, the italicized clause cannot but recall
I. A. Richards's commonsense justification, examined earlier, of the
superiority of Keats's sonnets to those of Ella Wheeler Wilcox. A com-
parison by "qualified" persons who had experienced both was said by
Richards to show that the former were "more efficient," and "that's the
same as saying that [Keats's] works are more valuable."20 Like
Richards's justification, Rorty's, so phrased, is open to the same sorts of
questions and leads to the same infinité régresses as any alleged empirical
validation of value, including Hume's attempted validation of standards
of taste, as examined in Chapter 4. On the basis of what presumed
human universals could it ever be declared that " nobody who has expe-
170
rienced both" would prefer otherwise? And if it is not literally "no-

body," then whose preferences are being tacitly privileged here and
whose omitted or discounted? Are there not, in fact, people who hâve
experienced as much of modem democracies as Rorty has probably
experienced of primitive, théocratie, or totalitarian societies and who
hâve, in fact, chosen one or the other of the latter? And, finally, is the
identity of the societies that exemplify the virtues of contemporary
civilization (which Rorty specifically indicates as "toleration, free in-
quiry, and the quest for undistorted communication” ) altogether self-
evident? And so forth.
In a significant passage toward the end of the essay, where Rorty is
discussing the remnants of positivism in the thought of a few contempo
rary analytic philosophers, he observes: "If we could ever be moved
solely by the desire for solidarity, setting aside the desire for objectivity
altogether, then we should think of human progress as making it possi
ble for human beings to do more interesting things and be more inter-
esting people, not as heading toward a place which has somehow been
prepared for humanity in advance" (p. 10). What he pictures here, and
subsequently élaborâtes as the telos of the pragmatist's own theoretical
practices, appears to be an ultimate universal embrace of that "philoso-
phy of solidarity” which he sees as ”prepar[ed] for” by, among other
things, "Socrates' tum away from the gods [and] Christianity's tum
from an Omnipotent Creator to the man who suffered on the Cross" (p.
15). One must note here not only the exceptional force and spécial sense
of "interesting” this formulation requires, but also that, although Rorty
rejects the prepared-in-advance features of a fully teleologic conception
of progress, he retains the classic ideas of a general gradient and direc-
tionality. Both of the latter are equally expendable, however, and would
themselves be rejected in an "anarchist" conception of intellectual his-
tory, such as that of Paul Feyerabend in Against Method, or in the com
parable conception of "changing places" outlined here in Chapter 5. As
the pragmatist perhaps would hâve said himself if he were not so gun-
shy of charges of relativism, gradients and directionality are, to be sure,
perceptible, but only on a local/historical scale, in relation to confined
sets of problems, and from the perspective of spécifie populations of
observers.
The passage just cited continues: "So the pragmatist suggestion that
we . . . think of our sense of community as having no foundation except
shared hope and the trust created by such sharing . . . is put forth
on practical grounds . ... It is a suggestion about how we might think
of ourselves in order to avoid the kind of resentful belatedness—
171
characteristic of the bad side of Nietzsche [what Rorty had just referred
to as the latter's 'idiosyncratic idealizations of silence, solitude, and
violence']—which now characterizes much of high culture" (p. 15).
The vague but strongly demoting characterization of contemporary high
culture here (what does "resentful belatedness" mean? which spécifie
cultural practices exemplify it?) recalls the more or less reactionary
nostalgia of various other current social critics, such as Charles Taylor
and Alisdâir Maclntyre, who also invoke a (lost) sense of "commu-
nity." What, one must ask, is the relation between the pragmatist's
views and that of such theorists? One may also ask, finally, whether it is
not that Nietzsche, rather than idealizing "silence, solitude, and vio
lence," recognized, as Rorty perhaps resists doing, the practical necessity
of the first two of these for anyone who, in relation to the solid solidarity
of his tribe, is in some way "idiosyncratic," and a certain general in-
evitability of the third.
Rorty's resolution of the pragmatist's dilemma in favor of ethnocen-
trism is altogether dubious. But so also was his délinéation of that
dilemma to begin with. For the pragmatist, having abandoned epis-
temological objectivism, is not then obliged to choose between the objec-
tivist's "relativism" and "ethnocentrism," between "pretend[ing] an
impossible tolérance for everyone" and "attach[ing] a spécial privilège
to his own community." What he could always do instead is issue a
prompt, sharp, total, and, as necessary, repeated dismissal of the first
"hom "—which is, of course, the Egalitarian Fallacy—as a straw her-
ring, succeeded by the equally prompt, sharp, and total rejection of the
other as a régressive and self-deluded gesture, succeeded by the strenu-
ous and wary pursuit, as appropriate, of the following:
(a) insofar as the pragmatist opérâtes as a theorist, not the construction
either of new forms of self-privilege (grounded on alleged ethical bases
or otherwise) or of newly polarized and politically naïve descriptions of
human action and interaction, but the continuous development and
refinement of more richly articulated, broadly responsive, and subtly
differentiated nonobjectivist accounts of, among other things, "truth,"
"belief," "choice," "justification," and "community";
(b) insofar as he opérâtes as a social and political agent, not the préma
turé and catégorial embrace of some totally cérébral patria, but the
continuous effort to recognize and implement, situation by situation,
the practical implications of his own nonobjectivist accounts, which
would mean also his choosing courses of action in view of various
conditions and conséquences and his own various, sometimes conflict-
ing, beliefs, allegiances, and desires, plus as necessary, his arguing or
172
indeed battling for those courses of action in opposition to other people,

including those who don ’t already share his beliefs; and, finally,
(c) insofar as he has also rejected axiological universalism, maintaining
a State of acute skepticism with respect to ail utopian-redemptionist
invocations of "solidarity" and "community,"21 coupled with, as
among the most significant practical implications of the idea of the
irreducible diversity of one's fellow créatures, the récognition of the
possibility or indeed inevitability of their conflict with each other and his
own conflict with them.22
Politics and Justification
Among the audiences of a study such as this, there are two major areas
of practice in relation to which its critique of traditional axiology elicits
anxious questions concerning justification. One, of course, is the domain
of academie criticism and pedagogy, which I hâve already discussed.
The other, the domain of politics, I hâve touched on at many points but
would like to examine in more detail here in relation to what is cur-
rently called, in the sense indicated below, "critical theory."
In his instructive introduction to Jean Baudrillard's For a Critique of
the Political Economy of the Sign, Charles Levin notes the tautologies and
other logical difficulties of the Marxist account of exploitation and sur
plus value. Like others, however, who continue to find Marxist éco
nomies the most viable comprehensive grounding of oppositional polit
ical action, he rescues Marxism from his own critique of it. Thus, citing
and endorsing Herbert Marcuse's observation that “there are no 'tran-
scendental guarantees,' " Levin writes: “And so we hâve the autono-
mous subject, making free choices, independently. This is an indispens
able idea, so fondamental that if we do away with it completely, we
explode any recognizable version of 'émancipation/ as Habermas calls
it—not to mention 'révolution'—and implicitly, we abandon the possi
bility of critical theory."23 What is evidently not to be thought of here is
that perhaps “the possibility of critical theory" must be abandoned: that
is, that insofar as "critical theory" is understood as any analysis that
strives and daims to expose ideology or false consciousness and thereby
to reveal the true, underlying, actual workings of the présent State of
affairs or "system" (capitalism, postmodem industrial society, patriar-
chy, and so forth), it is problematic in itself. It is most obviously prob-
lematic in that it présupposés an asymmetric epistemology and posits a
173
sharply stratified and polarized collectivity with, on the one hand, those
who already know the objective truth and, on the other, those so cap-
tivated by the System in question that they cannot recognize their own
interests or desires, including what must be posited as their hidden,
distorted, or perverted but still fundamental and ineradicable tmderlying
desire for what the critical theorist sees as the necessarily désirable alter
native to the présent State of affairs: for example, a classless society,
sexual equality, or human émancipation. Since the existence of this
underlying desire is not self-evident, it must be posited as there in spite
of ail evidence to the contrary, and the critical theorist, in his effort to
explain how we, the enlightened, know that they, the unenlightened,
really do desire the radical transformations for which they seem disin-
clined to agitate, will always move, in strict accord with axiological
logic, to the creation-by-invocation of just the necessary human univer-
sals.
Levin himself is bitterly sharp in his parody of these various délinéa
tions of "the shadow of a hidden human substance waiting in the wings
to be liberated whole when the mask of alienation has ended":
Man is an animal who makes himself. He defines himself through his

work—give him back some real work. Man is a talking animai, a tool-
making animal, a desiring animal, an unconscious animal, etc. And so the
critical critics dance their way nimbly through a kind of essentializing
évasion of the practical conséquences implicit in their own vocabulary:
some kind of compulsory therapy, or social engineering on a massive
scale. Man at last becomes what he already was anyway by recovering in
pristine form the activity that defines his nature; the social infrastructure is
thus cleansed (or the other way around), and ail the mucky confusion that
normally froths atop is automatically eliminated.24
Although he is skeptical of efforts to explain how an underlying human

nature has been distorted or perverted by a benighting System, and also
alert to the évasion of the coercive implications of such conceptions,
Levin cannot formulate an alternative (and remains, accordingly, rather
captivated by Baudrillard's sensational account of these matters). As I
hâve suggested, however, there are alternative, nonobjectivist ways to
conceive of the relation between sociopolitical analysis and political
action; ways that would not be incompatible with other key aspects of,
for example, Marxist and feminist theory, and that might be more effec
tive than efforts such as Baudrillard's or Habermas's in helping to pro
duce—not everywhere and finally, but in some places and to some
extent—States of affairs accordingly seen as désirable.
174
There are no transcendental guarantees, and also no objective truths

of History, Expérience, Science, or Logic, and also no theoretical anal
yses, whether économie, anthropological, historical, political, or other,
that can expose any State of affairs as objectively (that is, empirically,
mathematically, or transcendentally) unjust or wrong and, thereby, jus-
tify objectively (that is, independent of our particular identities and
perspectives) our desire that it be otherwise.25 Rather, there are various
continuously developing analyses that account for, in the sense of make
sense of and imply ways of changing, particular current States of affairs that
we, given and in relation to our identities and conséquent perspectives, see as
undesirable.
The "autonomous subject freely choosing" is not the only alternative
to “transcendental guarantees." To be sure, since neither a Marxist,
feminist, or any other analysis can be developed as a transcendental
account of the objective wrongness of the current State of affairs, anyone
who desires a change must assert her desire and exert her will for it
independent of any such presumptively objective justificatory analysis.
The crucial point, however, is that, if the theoretical analysis is not
transcendental, then it must be historical, and if the justification is not
universal and unconditioned, then it must be restricted, partial, and
local, which is not to say, it must be heavily emphasized, “subjective" in
the usual limited objectivist senses of the latter, or “privatized" or "indi-
vidualistic" in their current polemical senses.
"The subject"—that is, any subject, and there are clearly many sub-
jects, and they clearly cannot be considered identical except by being
question-beggingly posited as so in some essential, underlying way—
has a particular, that is, individuated though not in ail respects unique,
identity/economy/perspective in relation to which the présent State of
affairs is undesirable or not and, accordingly, also in relation to which
she "makes her choice" that it be otherwise or that it remain the same.
Two points should be noted immediately. First, to anticipate a common
question or objection, it makes no différence in this formulation and
others below whether the State of affairs is undesirable (or not) in the
subject's view of it or, as might be said, "in fact": that is, whether by her
own calculations or by the calculations, perhaps subtler, that someone
else performs on her behalf (and by which her choices may be, at some
time, informed and transformed). Second, to emphasize the central
point here, it must always be recognized that the State of affairs that is
undesirable for "the subject" may be, and perhaps inevitably will be,
quite désirable for at least some of those many other subjects who also
exist; and, for yet other subjects, it may be at least not so undesirable
175
that they will want to risk a change or will find it profitable, on balance,
to put their limited resources of time, energy, capital, and so forth into
working for its change.
The choices that the subject makes with respect to some State of affairs
are ffee only in the sense that they must be made in the radical absence
of, and therefore independent of, any theoretical underwriting of those
choices, and, in particular, in the radical absence of any account of that
State of affairs that would objectively justify just and precisely her own
choices and no other subject's choices. But they are not free in the sense
of being altogether independent of anything and everything, for they
must be made in relation to the subject's identity/economy and her
conséquent perspective on that State of affairs. Someone may, of course,
make her choices altruistically, perversely, or otherwise "irrationally,"
that is, in more or less willful disregard of what appear, to her and/or
others, to be her personal interests. The possibility of such willed and
therefore chosen disregard, however, does not eradicate the dependence
of the subject's choices on her identity/economy/perspective, for it must
be in relation to some set of yet other of her interests, that is, other
aspects or configurations of her identity/economy/perspective, that that
willful disregard of certain of her interests has been made.26
The justification of more or less radical political action may be seen,
accordingly, not as the production of a theoretical underwriting of the
objective wrongness of some State of affairs and the objective desirability
or necessity of some particular alternative or particular corrective action
but, rather, as a rhetorical account: specifically, as some political agent's
description and analysis of the State of affairs in question that coordi-
nates and stabilizes her own interests, attitudes, and actions and/or
affects the attitudes and actions of some set of other people in some
relevantly désirable way. To explain this further: the agent who desires
change in the présent State of affairs and chooses to promote such
change "freely," without transcendental guarantees, may justify her
choices and conséquent actions by (a) verbally (though not necessarily
overtly) articulating her more or less heterogeneous and vagrant "rea-
sons for'' them, thus giving cohérence and stability to those reasons,
choices, and actions; and/or (b) producing an overt account or, indeed,
a full-blown "critical theory" of the présent State of affairs that makes
sense of it to some set of other people such that their actions are
motivated as she would wish them. "Political justification" in this sense
is, of course, a form of "manipulation"— but, by now, that can be no
surprise or objection.
176
In the sense described above, political justification can hâve only

limited success. The latter, however, should not, as such, be scomed. On
the contrary, and contrary also to the quietist objection, it appears that
doctrinaire absolutists hâve, historically, been more prone to despair
and paralysis than "technocrat” relativists; for the latter characteris-
tically do not scom limited successes or forgo any success in order to hold
out only for total ones. The point here, in any case, is that, since the
political agent's identity/economy/interests and conséquent perspective
will always be changing in relation to changing conditions, the power of
a justificatory theoretical account to organize and stabilize her percep
tions and choices can never be altogether secure. (Indeed, just in pro
portion to the degree of extemal shift and internai conflict, she may
become increasingly rigid and doctrinaire and, to that extent, unrespon-
sive and ineffective.) Moreover, since her interests and perspective will
always be partial (that is, though perhaps shared by many others, still
not shared by everyone), her analysis, choices, and proposed actions
always may and often will corne into conflict—which may be more or
less intractable—with the analyses, interests, and perpectives of some
other people, and she cannot expect to secure either a universal accep
tance of the unique propriety (historical, theoretical, etc.) of her account
of the présent State of affairs, or a universal acknowledgment of the
propriety or necessity (rational, logical, etc.) of her proposed actions to
change them. Although she may be able to make her perspective recog-
nizable as such to others, and even make cohérent to others how her
actions follow from her analysis, she will always and necessarily fail if
she sets her goal as having either her analysis or actions make such
compelling sense to everyone that there will be no opposition to them
and everyone will eventually take up arms to join her effort to change
the présent State of affairs in just that way. In other words, it remains the
case that there is no account, no matter how cohérent, intuitive, and self-
evident to the theorist herself or rhetorically effective for some time
among a certain broader group, that, as such, will eradicate or transcend
other people's significantly different identities/economies/perspectives
and will make them, autonomous subjects that they also are, willing to
forgo their own interests, desires, and advantages.27
It is, of course, récognition of the latter difficulty that has historically
motivated the search for some set of interests and perspectives which
transcend ail particularity, which belong to ail human beings by virtue
of the fact that they are human, and which, when known and duly
acknowledged, would necessarily take priority over—subsume, absorb,
177
or neutralize—ail otherwise individually different interests and perspec

tives. Hence the relation of political theory to traditional axiology. And
hence also the collapse of axiological political theory into an abyss of
infinité régresses, however concealed or patched up by the hopefül
theoretical machinery of Kantian transcendental analysis. It is always
possible to posit what seem to be "natural," "reasonable," or otherwise
objectively grounded universal interests and conséquent “natural" or
"rational" goals for humanity at large: universal individual freedom,
global peace and prosperity, the continuation of the species, and so
forth. As the long historiés of these various candidates demonstrate,
however, the positing of any one of them inevitably invites the citation
of contrary cases and leads, accordingly, to the familiar régresses of
judgment and justification. For example, there will always be someone,
such as Freud or Bataille, who will note death wishes, the economy of
loss, and the desire for sacrifice, bondage, war, self-annihilation, and so
forth; or it will be noted, by theologians or others, that perhaps it is
Personal spiritual immortality, and not physical survival or the historical
continuation of the species, that we ail fiindamentally do or should
want. Or it could be suggested that what we ail really want is any
number of mutually incompatible things. Moreover, given the inévita
ble vagueness or generality of candidates for transcendental interest or
universal value, there will always remain the question of how to inter-
pret them in relation to spécifie practices and conditions, and how to
implement them or even conceive of them in relation to spécifie goals.
Are we to take the not especially inspiring history of various prosely-
tizing creeds in these regards as evidence only that these transcendent
interests hâve not yet been correctly identified? Or does it attest only to
the blindness, stubbomness, and inhuman selfishness of certain people
(Jews and pagans, for example, in the case of Christianity; or techno-
crats, Systems theorists, aesthetes, and nihilists in the case of neo-
Marxist critical theory) to agréé to their interprétation and spécifie im
plémentation? Why is “man," in spite of his underlying essential
nature, so exasperatingly different from himself? Is it that some extemal
force remains potent, or is it the product of some deformity deep within
us, some original flaw that is as much an underlying universal of human
behavior as the alleged universal desire for peace, harmony, and non-
dominant intersubjective mutuality? Perhaps we need a savior to eut
through the mess, or an arbiter or committee of the elect to give the right
interprétation and implémentation. But how will we know that the
178
savior is not the antisavior? And, in the meantime, who will décidé, and
how will it be decided, who should be Arbiter or serve on the Commit-
tee? And so the infinité regress continues infinitely.
The history of the West, and also the East or any civilization that joins
theory with power, seems to consist of a fitful alternation between
intellectual/political totalitarianism (the effort to identify the presump-
tively universally compelling Truth and Way and to compel it univer-
sally) and the struggle to secure a freedom that consists in the opportu-
nity for individual agents and sets of agents to assess conditions and
explore resources in relation to their particular interests and projects,
and to act out their particular choices accordingly. So it seems. But it
must be acknowledged that the lessons of History are themselves in-
tractably divergent: from some perspectives, what these alternatives re-
veal is that we must press even harder for an ultimately universal Truth
and Way; from others, my own included, that we must create and
maintain structures and procedures that give as much scope as possible
to the laborious working out, individually and in concert, of courses of
action that are the “best" (ail things considered .. .) for each, and each
set, of us.
It seems unlikely that there can be a world altogether free of conflicts
of interests or of disparities of resources among individual subjects and
different sets, tribes, or communities of subjects: conflicts and disparities
that are structural and systemic, the residue of history, the traces of what
there is and how it has been, and the product also of what is differently
remembered and imagined as otherwise. This is not at ail to say that the
poor will always be with us or that any current disparities of resources—
those, for example, along sexual or racial lines—are natural or inévita
ble. It is to say, rather, that “the best" is always both heterogeneous and
variable: that it can never be better than a State of affairs that remained
more or less that good for some people, or got considerably better for
many of them in some respects, or became,/or a while, rather better on the
whole. If, as I believe, there can be no total and final éradication of
disparity, variance, opposition, and conflict, and also neither perfect
knowledge nor pure charity, then the general optimum might well be
that set of conditions that permits and encourages, precisely, évaluation,
and specifically that continuous process described here in relation to
both scientific and artistic activity: that is, the local figuring/working
out, as well as we, heterogeneously, can, of what seems to work better
rather than worse.
179
C o n c e p tu a l T a stes a n d Practical C o n sé q u e n c e s
Having been perhaps persuaded that relativism does no particular hann,

students, colleagues, and other audiences seem eager to hear what
benefits it bestows, how it can be applied, how they can buy some of it
and take it home. And, having gone through the always arduous task of
showing that it probably will not bring the world to an end, or at least
not any faster than any other conceptualization, I am often tempted to
oblige them with a show of the utility, practical power, and palpable
profit of these views—a démonstration that they are precisely what is
needed and what everyone has been looking for. Although the tempta-
tion will be resisted here (as it is always more or less resisted elsewhere),
I would like to offer some related points, of which three are especially
significant.
The first is that conceptualizations of the world, in the combined
sense of States of mind, processes of thought, and theoretical constructs,
do not usually originate in a will to value—that is, in some subjèct's
Personal desire to do some general good or to make something generally
useful or profitable—but, rather, as ongoing responses to more or less
ad hoc emergent conditions, including prior and ongoing conceptual
conditions. The second, however, is that unless a theoretical construct
can be applied or appropriated in some way, unless it can tum some coin,
it will dissolve or be radically transformed. (Objectivism and traditional
axiology hâve obviously tumed handsome profits in the past, and still
do.) The third, accordingly, is that, although there is no spécifie agenda
or heuristic—no set of practical things to be done, or method for doing
spécifie things the right way—that follows from this study per se, it may
be worthwhile to indicate some general activities through which the
views it présents often exhibit themselves and some tendencies that they
appear to encourage.
When the necessity or desirability of consensus, norms, and standards
is invoked, such views alert one to the inevitability and value, including
communal value, of différence, variety, and innovation. They discour
age utopianism, nostalgia, and apocalyptic reaction—the positing of
"idéal" conditions, the lament for "lost" ones, the anxious délinéation
of Falls and Déclinés—in favor of an analysis of conditions and of accord
ingly responsive actions. In the classroom, as anywhere else, they are
"applied" case by case or, rather, they encourage the handling of each
case, each occasion for critical judgment and pédagogie action, in
spécifie rather than categorical terms—which is not to say, of course, in
180
relation to short-term as distinct from long-term considérations but,

rather, in relation to historically, culturally, institutionally, and other-
wise individuated goals, stakes, means, and conséquences rather than to
putative transcendentally universalized ones.
According to the analyses presented in this study, when someone or
some group of people insist(s) on the objective necessity or propriety of
their own social, political, or moral judgments and actions, and deny the
contingency of the conditions and perspectives from which those judg
ments and actions proceed, it must be—and always is—a move to
assign dominant status to the particular conditions and perspectives that
happen to be relevant to or favored by that person, group, or class; it
must be—and always is—simultaneously a move to deny the existence
and relevance, and to suppress the daims, of other conditions and per
spectives. While ail this seems to occur everywhere and ail the time, it
sometimes happens that the subordinated members of a community
question and actively oppose the daims of "necessity" and "natu-
ralness" made for the conditions and perspedives of the dominant,
pointing out the existence of other conditions, namely those relevant to
their lives, and other perspectives, namely their own. This sort of ques-
tioning and opposition are politically significant actions, and a theoreti-
cal analysis such as the présent one may encourage and strengthen their
occurrence in the fields of cultural/aesthetic norms specifically discussed
here.
The political effectiveness of theoretical analysis in this and (as
stressed above) perhaps any domain is, however, limited. The situations,
felt as inéquitable and oppressive, that give rise to some people's oppos-
ing the normative dominance of other people are rarely changed
through argument alone and, it may be suspected, are never changed as
a conséquence of theoretical analysis alone in the sense of someone's
just producing or invoking such an analysis, no matter how rigorous
and persuasive it may, from certain perspectives, appear to be. Rather,
because situations of normative dominance emerge from particular
sociopolitical conditions and dynamics and give distinct advantages to those
who are dominant, such situations can be changed only through a
specifically motivated and directed change of those conditions or through
an intervention in the operation of those dynamics. Moreover, although
they are sometimes joined by those who are otherwise unsettled (for
example, cognitively or aesthetically) by the inequities in question, the
most energetic agents of such changes and interventions are usually
those who are actually put at a disadvantage by those conditions or
181
dynamics. In other words, a theoretical analysis such as the présent one

can do some things, but not everything, for some people, but not ail
people.28
A further word on the theory and politics of normativity may be
added here. I hâve spoken of situations in which communal norms that
tacitly privilège the conditions and perspectives of some members of a
community hâve effects that are felt to be inéquitable and oppressive by
other of its members. It may be objected that not ail norms are inéqui
table or oppressive in that way. Certain norms and standards, it may be
said—for example, standardized units of measurement, industrial safety
standards, or certification standards for registered nurses—are not like
customs or Iaws regarding eligibility for marriage. The former, it might
be thought, are based on conditions that really are objective; or, it may
be said, the establishment of such norms and standards, even when not
so based, will benefit everyone in the community. (Hume appealed to
comparable cases, we recall, in claiming that it was "natural" to seek a
standard of aesthetic taste.) In a certain sense, this is true: that is, while
ail norms and standards are conventional in the sense that they are
based on arbitrarily privileged conditions and perspectives, it may be
acknowledged that some phenomena occur under a quite broad range
of conditions and appear, if not quite the same, then at least similar
enough "for ail practical purposes" from the perspective of ail con-
cemed. Although such relative uniformities and constancies are just that
and therefore not, strictly speaking, absolute, nevertheless, to the extent
that they operate within some community as in effect unconditional and
universal, they may be said to be "contingently absolute," and norms
based on them can be said, accordingly, to be "contingently objective.”
Lest this be taken, however, as just what is needed to move right back
into traditional objectivist/axiological formulations or neo-objectivist/
communitarian ones, it must be remembered that a community is never
totally homogeneous, that its boundaries and borders are never al-
together self-evident, that we cannot assume in advance that certain
différences among its members are negligible or irrelevant, and that the
conditions that produced the relative unconditionality, local univer-
sality, and contingent objectivity are themselves neither fixed forever
nor totally stable now. Moreover, in view of the évident récurrence of
the sociopsychological dynamics through which self-privileging/other-
pathologizing norms emerge, and also in view of readiness with which
any social dominance becomes self-confirming and self-protecting, it
182
seems désirable to maintain a generalized theoretical and political

wariness on ail these matters.
"Relativism" in the sense of a conception of the world as continu-

ously changing, irreducibly various, and multiply configurable does not
conceive of itself as a logical déduction, or as an inescapable conclusion
drawn either from personal expérience or scientific experiment, or as an
insight into the underlying nature of things, or as a transcendental
révélation. Rather, it conceives of its own conception of the world as the
contingent product of many things: contingent in the sense that it is a
fonction not of "the way the world is" but of the States of numerous
particular Systems interacting at a particular time and place. This con
ception of the world requires that there be "something" other than
itself, other than the process of conceiving-the-world; but it cannot
conceive of a single other thing to say, or way to think, about that
"something"— not a single feature to predicate of it, or any way to
describe, analyze, or manipulate any of its properties—that would be
independent of that process.
Being not a conviction but a conceptualization, relativism in this
sense is not a proselytizing position, and, given especially the arduous
conceptual and practical work that its thinking-out and living-out
require, its alleged current "spread" must be quite confined and its
ultimate "triumph" very much to be doubted. Like any other cogni
tive taste, however, it prefers self-stabilizing confirmation to self-
destabilizing contradiction; and, insofar as its theoretical/discursive ar
ticulation is played out institutionally and thus—as in a market, game,
or battle—competitively, it must, to stay in the running, hâve something
to show and also must play to win. Relativism, in the sense of a contin
gent conceptualization that sees itself and ail others as such, cannot found,
ground, or prove itself, cannot deduce or demonstrate its own rightness,
cannot even lead or point the way to itself. In view of the interests and
pressures just mentioned, it will, of course, often attempt to point the
way quite energetically. It recognizes, however, that "the way" will be
perceived and pursued differently by each to whom it is pointed out.
Self-consistently, it conceives of itself as continuously changing, of ail
conceptions of the irreducibly various as irreducibly various, and of the
multiply configurable as always configurable otherwise.
Since the relativist knows that the conjoined Systems (biological, cul
tural, ideological, institutional, and so forth) of which her general con-
183
ceptual taste and spécifie conceptualization of the world are a contin

gent fonction are probably not altogether unique, she experts some
other people to conceptualize the world in more or less the same ways
she does and, like her, to find objectivist conceptualizations more or less
cognitively distastefol, unsatisfactory, and irritating along more or less
similar Unes. She may hâve found it worth her while to seek out such
fellow relativists, to promote conditions that encourage their émer
gence, and, where she has had the resources, to attempt to cultivate a
few of them herself: “worth her while" because, since she cannot her-
self live any other way, she's glad for a bit of company.
184
Notes
1. Fixed Marks and Variable Constancies

1. The first part of this chapter was prepared for delivery at a session of the
Modem Language Association titled "Evaluating Shakespeare's Sonnets."
Its convenor had suggested that the panelists focus their remarks on Sonnet
116:
Let me not to the marnage of true minds
Admit impediments: love is not love
Which alters when it alteration finds
Or bends with the remover to remove.
O no, it is an ever fixèd mark
That looks on tempests and is never shaken;
It is the star to every wandering bark,
Whose worth's unknown although his height be taken.
Love's not Time's fool, though rosy lips and cheeks
Within his bending sickle's compass corne;
Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks,
But bears it out even to the edge of doom.
If this be error and upon me proved,
I never writ, nor no man ever loved.
2. Stephen Booth was a copanelist.
3. Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, N.J., 1957), p. 18.
4. For two recent descriptions and assessments of the classical axiological
arguments (plus their updated versions and associated fallacies: emotivism,
prescriptivism, intuitionism, naturalism, panaestheticism, methodological
relativism, relative absolutism, sociohistorical relationism, and so forth), see
Stefan Morawski, Irtquiries into the Fundamentals of Aesthetics (Cambridge,
Mass., 1974), pp. 1-57, and Zdzislaw Najder, Values and Evaluations (Lon
don, 1975), esp. pp. 51-74. Both of these are adaptations from studies
originally published in Poland and, in fact, a number of unusually inter-
187
Notes to Pages 15-22
esting inquiries into aesthetic value hâve been pursued in Eastem Europe
(either as developments of or “in dialogue with" classical Marxist thought),
among the most original and penetrating of which is Jan Mukarovskÿ's
Aesthetic Function, Norm and Value as Social Facts (Prague, 1936), tr. Mark E.
Suino (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1970).
5. These observations are elaborated in Barbara Herrnstein Smith, On the Mar-
gins of Discourse: The Relation of Literature to Language (Chicago, 1978), pp.
116-124.
2. The Exile of Evaluation

1. The most recent of these include E. D. Hirsch, Jr„ The Aims of Interprétation
(Chicago, 1976), esp. the essays “Evaluation as Knowledge" (1968) and
"Privileged Criteria in Evaluation" (1969); Murray Krieger, "Literary Anal
ysis and Evaluation—and the Ambidextrous Critic," in Criticism: Spéculative
and Analytic Essays, ed. L. S. Dembo (Madison, Wis., 1968); a number of
brief essays by Anglo-American as well as continental European theorists
in Problems in Literary Evaluation, ed. Joseph Strelka (University Park, Pa.,
and London, 1969); and the chapters on value and évaluation in John Ellis,
The Theory of Literary Criticism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974), in John
Reichert, Making Sense of Literature (Chicago, 1977), and in Jeffrey Sam-
mons, Literary Sociology and Practical Criticism (Bloomington, Ind., and Lon
don, 1977). Ail of them either participate directly in the self-justifying
academie debates outlined below or are haunted by them into equivocation.
2. F. R. Leavis, Revaluation: Tradition and Development in English Poetry (Lon
don, 1936; New York, 1963), pp. 5-6.
3. See esp. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (London, 1936).
4. Yvor Winters, The Function of Criticism (Denver, 1957), p. 17.
5. W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., The Verbal Icon (Louisville, Ky., 1954), p. 250.
6. Cf. the discussions of David Hume in Chapters 3 and 4, below.
7. I. A. Richards, Prindples of Literary Criticism (1924; London, 1960), pp. 5-6.
"The two pillars upon which a theory of criticism must rest," Richards
declared, "are an account of value and an account of communication"
(p. 25). It was, of course, the latter that subsequently became the overriding
concem of critical theory.
8. Ibid., p. 206.
9. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton, N.J., 1957), pp.
18, 19; ail further references to this work, abbreviated AC, will be included
in the text.
10. It should be recalled that, like màny others (e.g., E. D. Hirsch, Jr.), Frye
continued to maintain that interpretive criticism could lay daim to objectiv-
ity. See his remarks in a paper delivered in 1967: "The fundamental critical
a c t.. . is the act of récognition, seeing what is there, as distinguished from
merely seeing in a Narcissus mirror of our own expérience and social and
moral préjudice . . . When a critic interprets, he is talking about his poet;
188
when he évaluâtes, he is talking about himself. .. " ("Value Judgments," in

Criticism: Spéculative and Analytic Essays, p. 39).
11. Hirsch, The Aims of Interprétation, p. 108.
12. In a more recent essay, "Literary Value: The Short History of a Modem
Confusion" (unpub., 1980), Hirsch argues that although literary meaning is
determinate, literary value is not. With respect to the latter, however, he
concludes that "there are some stable principles"—namely ethical ones—
"that escape the chaos of purely personal relativity" (p. 22). As will be seen
in the analysis below, "personal relativity” neither produces chaos nor is in
itself chaotic.
13. See Jurij Tynjanov, "On Literary Evolution" (Moscow, 1927), tr. L. Ma-
tejka and K. Pomorska, in Readings in Russian Poetics, ed. Matejka and
Pomorska (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His
World (Moscow, 1965), tr. Helene Iswolsky (Cambridge, Mass., 1968); and
Jan Mukaïovskÿ, Aesthetic Function, N om and Value as Social Facts (Prague,
1936), tr. Mark E. Suino (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1970).
14. For surveys and discussions, see Sammons, Literary Sodology and Practical
Criticism, and Rien T. Segers, The Evaluation of Literary Texts: An Experimental
Investigation irtto the Rationalization of Value Judgments with Reference to
Semiotics and Esthetics of Réception (Lisse, The Netherlands, 1978). For a
recent study of considérable interest, see Jacques Leenhardt and Pierre
Jôzsa, Lire la lecture: Essai du sociologie de la lecture (Paris, 1982). See also
Pierre Bourdieu's extensive and very important sériés of studies on the
social dynamics of cultural value and évaluation which include, most rele-
vantly for the issues considered in this chapter, "The Production of Belief:
Contribution to an Economy of Symbolic Goods," Media, Culture and Society
2, no. 3 (July 1980): 261-293; "The Field of Cultural Production or the
Economie World Reversed," Poetics 12, nos. 4 -5 (November 1983): 311—
356; "Le Champ littéraire," Lendemains 36 (1984): 5-20; "The Market of
Symbolic Goods," Poetics 14 (1985): 13-44; and the massive study Distinc
tion: A Social Critique of the Judgement ofTaste, tr. Richard Nice (Cambridge,
Mass., 1984).
15. It is not mentioned as such, for example, in Jonathan Culler's Structuralist
Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature (Ithaca, N.Y.,
1975).
16. See, e.g., the thoroughly equivocal discussions of "objective value" in Ste
fan Morawski, Inquiries into Fundamentals of Aesthetics (Cambridge, Mass.,
and London, 1974), and the revalorization of the standard Eng. Lit. canon
in Terry Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology: A Study in Marxist Literary Theory
(London, 1976), pp. 162-187. "[Is] value," Eagleton asks rhetorically, "to
be abandoned to some mere ideological relativism, some 'solipsism of the
citizen' in which any discourse of 'objective merit' or 'false estimation' is to
be jettisoned as immanentist and idealist?" (p. 168). His answer is a
strained attempt to justify “the value" of Jane Austen, W. B. Yeats, and the
whole Leavisite canon on Marxist (specifically, Althusserian) grounds. For
189
Notes to Pages 2 4 -2 7
other discussions of the point, see Hans Robert Jauss, “The Idealist Embar-
rassment: Observations on Marxist Aesthetics," New Literary History 7 (Au-
tumn 1975): 191-208; Raymond Williams, Marxism andLiterature (Oxford,
1977), esp. pp. 45-54 and 151-157; Tony Bennett, Formalism and Marxism
(London, 1979), esp. pp. 172-175; and Peter Widdowson, " 'Literary
Value' and the Reconstruction of Criticism," Literature and History 6 ( 1980) :
138-150.
More recent Anglo-American neo/post-Marxist accounts of literary value
and évaluation include Evan Watkins, The Critical Act: Criticism and Commu-
nity (New Haven, 1978); John Fekete, The Critical Twilight: Explorations in
the Ideology of Anglo-American Literary Theory from Eliot to McLuhan (London
and Boston, 1977); and Eagleton's own modified—certainly more enlight-
ened though otherwise still limited—account in Literary Theory: An In
troduction (Minneapolis, 1983), pp. 10-16.
17. For a sophisticated exploration in a Derridean lfamework, see Arkady Plot-
nitsky, Constraints of the Unbound: Transformation, Value, and Literary Inter
prétation, diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1982.
The period during which the Anglo-American literary academy assigned
to oblivion not only almost ail continental philosophy but also its own most
decisively postaxiological modem philosopher, John Dewey, coincided
with the years of the exile of évaluation chronicled above. That oblivion has
been lifted and exile increasingly revoked during the past decade, during
which time (and certainly not coincidentally) there has also been evidence
of increasingly strong interest in the thought and writings of both Nietzsche
and Dewey. See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Prince
ton, 1979), and idem. Conséquences of Pragmatism: Essays (Minneapolis,
1982), for Dewey's significance for contemporary thought. See Daniel T.
O'Hara, ed., Why Nietzsche Now? (Bloomington, 1985), and Alexander
Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), for recent
Anglo-American essays on Nietzsche; and John Rajchman and Comell
West, eds., Post-Analytic Philosophy (New York, 1985), for a general review
of these and related developments during this period. The developments
themselves should not, however, be exaggerated: there is no sign that the
Anglo-American philosophie or literary academie mainstreams will soon be
flowing toward or incorporating "posts" of any kind.
18. A similar point has been made by Annette Kolodny in "Dancing through
the Minefield: Some Observations on the Theory, Practice and Politics of
Feminist Literary Criticism," Feminist Studies 6 (Spring 1980): 1-25, esp.
pp. 7 and 15.
19. Attempts at such analysis are found later in this chapter and elsewhere in
this study.
20. Onwuchekwa Jemie, Langston Hughes: An Introduction to the Poetry (New
York, 1976), p. 184.
21. C. W. B. Bigsby, "Hand in Hand with the Blues," Times Literary Supplément,
17 June 1977, p. 734.
190
22. Chinweizu, letter to the editor, Times Literary Supplément, 15 July 1977,
p. 871.
23. Thus, Sammons, in his embattled book, writes of “the éléments. . . in the
canon of great literature" to which we should be attentive so that, faced
with charges of elitism, “we will not hâve to stand mute before daims that
inarticulateness, ignorance, occult mumbling, and loutishness are just as
good as fine literature" (Literary Sociology and Practical Criticism, p. 134).
24. Eléments of this description anticipate self-refutationists: that is, those who
complacently dismiss any challenge to traditional absolutist/objectivist for
mulations as necessarily self-exempting and thus self-contradictory. See
Chapters 5 and 7 for further discussions of the self-refutation argument.
3. Contingentes of Value
1. For related discussion of the linguistic and intellectual history of the term/
concept “value," see Barbara Herrnstein Smith, "Value/Evaluation," in
Critical Terms for Literary Study, ed. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas
McLaughlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).
2. The interrelations among human “needs and wants," cultural practices,
and économie production are examined in Marshall Sahlins, Culture and
Practical Reason (Chicago, 1976); Mary Douglas, The World of Goods (New
York, 1979); Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the
Sign (Paris, 1972), tr. Charles Levin (St. Louis, 1981); and Pierre Bourdieu,
Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (Paris, 1979), tr. Richard
Nice (Cambridge, Mass., 1984). Although Baudrillard's critique of the con
cept of “use value" and, with it, of “sign value" is of considérable interest,
his effort to develop "as a basis for the practical overthrow of political
economy" (p. 122) a theory of a value “beyond value" (created out of what
he calls “symbolic exchange") is less successful, partly because of its uto-
pian anthropology and partly because the value in question does not escape
économie accounting. See Chapter 6, below, for further discussion of Bau
drillard in relation to anti-utilitarian cultural theory.
3. For an excellent analysis of the relation between classification and value,
see Michael Thompson, Rubbish Theory: The Création and Destruction of Value
(Oxford, 1979), esp. pp. 13-56. The phenomenology and transformations
of these classifications are also examined by Susan Stewart in On Longing:
Narratives of the Miniature, theGigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection (Baltimore,
1984).
4. The magnetism or récurrent mutually metaphoric relation between éco
nomie and aesthetic—especially literary—discourse is documented and dis-
cussed by Marc Shell in The Economy of Literature (Baltimore, 1978), and by
Kurt Heinzelman in The Economies of the Imagination (Amherst, Mass.,
1980).
5. Andrew Harrison, Making and Thinking (Indianapolis, 1978), p. 100.
6. See George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker, “De Gustibus non est disputan-
191
dum," American Economies Review 67 (March 1977): 76—90, for an ingeni-

ous and influential attempt (at the opposite extreme, perhaps, of Baudril-
lard's) to demonstrate that différences and changes of behavior (including
aesthetic behavior) that appear to be matters of "taste" and, as such, be-
yond explanation in économie terms can be accounted for (a) as fonctions
of subtle forms of "price" and "income" and (b) on the usual economistic
assumption that we always behave, ail things considered, so as to maximize
utility. As Stigler and Becker acknowledge, however, recent experimental
studies of "choice behavior" in human (and other) subjects suggest that this
latter assumption itself requires modification. These points are discussed
further in Chapter 6.
7. See Robert Fagan, Animal Play Behavior (Oxford, 1981), pp. 248-358, for
an extensive analysis of "intrinsically rewarding" physical activities and a
suggestive account of the kinds of evolutionary mechanisms that could
produce and sustain them.
8. See the related discussion of "cognitive play" in Barbara Herrnstein Smith,
On the Margins of Discourse: The Relation of Literature to Language (Chicago,
1978), pp. 116-124.
9. Monroe Beardsley's "instrumentalist" theory of aesthetic value in Aesthet-
ics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York, 1958), pp. 524-576,
and Mukafovskÿ's otherwise quite subtle explorations of these questions in
Aesthetic Function, Norm and Value as Social Facts (Prague, 1936), tr. Mark E.
Suino (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1970), do not altogether escape the confine
ments and circularities of formalist conceptions of, respectively, "aesthetic
expérience" and "aesthetic function."
10. Barry Bames and David Bloor, "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology
of Knowledge," in Rationality and Relativism, ed. Martin Hollis and Steven
Lukes (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 25-26.
11. "Of the Standard of Taste ' ' and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapolis,
1965), pp. 8-10, emphasis added.
12. I. A. Richards, Principles ofLiterary Criticism (1924; London, 1960), pp. 202-
205.
13. See Morse Peckham, Explanation and Power: The Control of Human Behavior
(New York, 1979), for an account of déviance (or what he calls "the delta
effect") as the product of the relation between cultural practices and the
randomness of behavior and, more generally, for a highly original discussion
of the processes and institutions of cultural channeling.
14. See, in Chapter 4, the section entitled "Three Postaxiological Postscripts"
for further discussion of this account of tastes and of a set of related argu
ments repeatedly raised in defense of the asymmetrical account.
15. Speaking so, that is, describing these fluid and usually "unconscious"—or,
in the term to be used below for both, inarticulate—processes in terms
associated with political economy, requires spécial commentary: see the
discussion of "économie metaphorics" in Chapter 5 and of the "double
discourse of value" in Chapter 6.
192
Notes to Pages 4 3-48
16. The eighteenth-century phrase here anticipâtes the discussion of David

Hume's essay "Of the Standard of Taste" in Chapter 4 and is intended to
suggest a structural/dynamic homology between individual and social con-
flicts of preference.
17. Pierre Macherey and Etienne Balibar analyze some aspects of this process in
"Literature as an Ideological Form: Some Marxist Propositions," tr. James
Kavanagh, Praxis 5 (1981): 43-58. See aiso Bourdieu, Distinction, pp. 230-
244, for a related analysis of what he refers to as "the quasi-miraculous
correspondence" between "goods production and taste production."
18. For a description of some of the spécifie constraints that shape both the
process and its termination and, more generally, for a useful account of the
ways in which artworks are "produced" by social networks, see Howard
Becker, Art Worlds (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1982), pp. 198-
209.
19. For a related discussion of the continuities among theoretical, critical, and
aesthetic activities, see Barbara Herrnstein Smith, "Masters and Servants:
Theory in the Literary Academy," Explorations in Music, the Arts and Ideas: A
Festschrift for Leonard B. Meyer, ed. Eugene Narmour (fortheoming).
20. For a well-documented illustration of the point, see Nina Baym, "Melo-
dramas of Beset Manhood: How Théories of American Fiction Exclude
Women Authors," American Quarterly (Summer 1981): 125-139. In addi
tion to anthologies, Baym mentions historical studies, psychological and
sociological théories of literary production, and particular methods of liter
ary interprétation.
Since the time the original version of this section was written, there has
been an enormous expansion of the study of the rôle of academie institu
tions in the process of literary canon formation and, more generally, in the
activities of value marking and value transmission. For other studies rele
vant to the présent discussion, see Peter Uwe Hohendahl, The Institution of
Criticism (Ithaca and London, 1982); Edward Said, The World, the Text, and
the Critic (Cambridge, Mass., 1983); Paul Lauter, "Race and Gender in the
Shaping of the American Literary Canon; A Case Study from the Twen-
ties," Feminist Studies 9 (Fall 1983): 435-463; Jane Tompkins, Sensational
Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction, 1790-1860 (New York and
Oxford, 1985); and Gerald Graff, Professing Literature: An Institutional History
(Chicago, 1987).
21. Here and throughout this study the term "desired/able" indicates that the
valued effect in question need not hâve been specifically desired (sought,
wanted, imagined or intended) as such by any subject. In other words, its
value for certain subjects may hâve emerged independent of any spécifie
human intention or agency and, indeed, may hâve been altogether a prod-
uct of the chances of history or, as we say, a marier of luck.
22. For a careful neo-Marxist analysis of the continuous historical "rewriting"
of the Homeric texts, see John Frow, Marxism and Literary History (Cam
bridge, Mass., 1986), pp. 172-182.
193
23. Truth and Method (orig. pub. as Wahrheit und Méthode, Tübingen, 1960; tr.
New York, 1982), pp. 257-258.
24. Ibid., p. 255.
25. For a somewhat unguarded example of such daims, see Leonard B. Meyer,
"Some Remarks on Value and Greatness in Music," in his Music, the Arts
and Ideas (Chicago, 1967). See also Gerda Smets, Aesthetic Judgment and
Arousal (Louvain, 1973), and Sven Sandstrôm, A Common Taste in Art: An
Experimental Attempt (Lund, 1977), for two studies sympathetic to the Proj
ect of empirical aesthetics but relatively sophisticated about the implications
of its data.
4. Axiologic Logic
1. "Of the Standard of Taste" and Other Essays, ed. John W. Lenz (Indianapoiis,
1965), p. 3. Subséquent references to this édition of the essay, abbreviated
ST, will be given in the text.
2. That force is demonstrated as well in the examples Hume chooses to illus-
trate what he sees as the contrast between the historical mutability and
variability of cognitive tastes and the stability and universality of aesthetic
ones: "Nothing has been experienced more liable to the révolutions of
chance and fashion than these pretended decisions of science. The case is
not the same with the beauties of éloquence and poetry . . . Aristotle, and
Plato, and Epicurus, and Descartes, may successively yield to each other:
but Terence and Virgil maintain an universal, undisputed empire over the
minds of men" (ST, p. 18).
3. Like so many a fier (and no doubt also before) him. Hume evidently be-
lieved that true value is revealed by the supposedly impersonal "filtering"
operations of time itself. Although he does not use the expression "test of
time," the metaphor of test and crucible is dearly operating here. In our
own era, the metaphor often merges with a survival-of-the-fittest model of
cultural history that ignores the dynamics of natural sélection as developed
by Darwin and offers instead a social-Darwinist vulgarization.
4. Or—since the relevant phrase bears an altemate reading—who do not in
fart acknowledge what is universally acknowledged to be the superior judg
ment ("preference") of certain men.
5. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, tr. J. H. Bernard (New York and
London, 1951), section 7. Subséquent references to the Critique in this
translation and édition will be indicated in the text by section number.
6. Contemporary axiological appeals to language frequently recall or duplicate
Kant's. Thus, Alisdair Maclntyre has recently developed the remarkable
suggestion that even if, in a world gone ail subjectivist and individualistic,
nobody has thoughts of justice or duty anymore, those words still mean those
things in themselves and, when uttered, make moral daims independently
of their speakers. Cf. Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd
194
ed. (Notre Dame, Ind., 1984), esp. pp. 8-10, and the discussion in Chapter
5, below.
7. These other forms of analysis are cited here only to help characterize the
distinctive aspects of Kant's method and are not being recommended per se;
nor, for that matter, could it be said that what are termed in oùr own time
"phenomenological" or "empirical" aesthetics are themselves free of
apriorism.
8. "Sensation/judgment" is necessary here because, given Kant's analysis,
what has validity is the "sensation" but what claims validity is its "judg-
ment," the latter in the sense both of the mental act of discrimmating the
sensation and also the verbal expression or "giving out" of that mental act.
9. I summarize here, as we now explain them, things that Kant explained in
terms of the then-current models of human perception and cognition, in-
cluding of course his own models.
10. The "System" spoken of here always includes (though "inclusion" is not
really the proper term here) the subject's "body" and is never confined only
to that part of it which is above the neck. My concem here is the tendency
in genteel aesthetics and post-Kantian critical theory to distinguish among
expériences on the basis, it seems, of just that sort of dividing line. See, for
example, W. K. Wimsatt's allusion to our being "amorphously rubbed
against" things as distinguished from our experiencing them through vision
or hearing (The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry [Louisville, Ky.,
1954], p. 238), a distinction itself related to Kant's own hierarchy of the
senses in relation to their mediated distance from the source of stimulation.
The révulsion against the bestial/bodily involved in this tradition is exam-
ined by Jacques Derrida in "Economimesis," tr. Richard Klein, Diacritics 11
(Summer 1981): 3-25, and by Pierre Bourdieu in Distinction: A Social Cri
tique of the Judgement of Taste (Paris, 1979), tr. Richard Nice (Cambridge,
Mass., 1984), esp. pp. 487-491. For its relation to The-Other's-Poison Ef-
fect, see the discussion below.
11. Contrary to his own claims on the evidence of his own introspections, it
may be supposed that even for Kant, as for any other human créature—that
is, a créature characteristically haunted by images, ideas, words, and ver-
bally encoded memories—the expérience of "beauty" and "pure form"
must hâve had some mnemonic, verbal, and conceptual stuff sticking to it.
Indeed, it may be suspected that it was for this very reason—that is, the fact
that his sensations and concepts could not be "separated off" from each
other—that Kant's consciousness supplied him with introspections of pure
sensations of beauty in such good accord with his own conceptual model of
the mental faculties: a model, that is, in which sensations and concepts could
be "separated off." It appears, in other words, that Kant's sensations were
conditioned by his concepts to appear unconditioned by concepts.
12. In "Economimesis," Derrida discusses the comparable sériés of distinctions
and exclusions through which, especially in the "Analytic of the Sublime,"
Kant develops the opposition/relation of art and nature.
195
13. The cited passage appears not in the "Anaiytic of the Beautiful" but in a
later section of the Critique, the "Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgment,”
where Kant résumés the axiological analysis and where the perplexity re-
marked above appears even more intractable. Observing that "we can do
nothing more than remove the conflict between the daims and counter-
claims of taste," that is, between everyone has his own taste and there is no
disputing about taste (statements that Kant takes to be making diametrically
opposed daims for reasons that are, to say the least, strained), he goes on as
follows: "It is absolutely impossible to give a definite objective prindple of
taste in accordance with which its judgments could be derived, examined,
and established, for then the judgment would not be one of taste at ail. The
subjective prindple, viz. the indefinite idea of the supersensible in us, can
only be put forward as the sole key to the puzzle of this faculty whose
sources are hidden from us" (sect. 57). Here and elsewhere, Kant's rigorous
efforts to solve the central logical problems of the démonstration and to tie
up its évident incohérences appear to hâve repeatedly created further logical
problems and incohérences that required further rigorous working out.
(The general point is made implicitly, but not quite faced, by Paul Guyer in
his painstaking but ultimately «ncritical exegesis, Kant and the Claims of Taste
[Cambridge, Mass., 1979].) It is, perhaps, this very combination of rigor
and incohérence that is so addictive to commentators, the rigor continu-
ously attracting their intellectual energies and the incohérence continously
eluding their exegetical skills. It is as if the Critique were always on the verge
of making the most utterly airtight sense, if only one worked at it a bit
harder. For other recent efforts, see Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics, ed. Ted Cohen
and Paul Guyer (Chicago, 1982).
14. Conflicts among the latter trio over the détermination of aesthetic value are
reported regularly in the popular press and hâve become quite familiar. Cf.
the litigation over Richard Serra's sculpture "Tilted Arc," and related re
ports and discussions in a revealingly diverse array of publications, includ-
ing: "Wailing at the Wall," Newsweek 105 (May 13, 1985): 94; Calvin
Tompkins, "Tilted Arc," New Yorker 61 (May 20, 1985): 95; Margaret
Moorman, "Arc Enemies," Art News 84 (May 1985): 13; "Public Art:
Moving the Not-So-Great Wall," Time 125 (June 10, 1985): 35; Arthur C.
Danto, "Public Art and the General Will," Nation 241 (Sept. 28, 1985):
288; Andrew Decker, "Serra Goes to Court," Art News 86 (April 1987): 29.
The postaxiological study of public art or art in public places, with attention
to the disputes between experts deploring philistine taste and citizens out-
raged by expenditures of communal fonds on what they see as nonuplifting,
depressing, insulting, and/or ridiculous objects, remains to be pursued.
15. For Hume's own observation of intellectual fashions, see n. 2, above.
16. For a corrosive discussion of the appeal to intuitions of reality in contempo-
rary philosophy, see Richard Rorty, Conséquences of Pragmatism: Essays,
1972-80 (Minneapolis, Minn., 1982), pp. xxi-xxxvii.
17. Martin Jay, Adomo (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), p. 17. For an account of
196
Notes to Page 75
Adomo's critique of mass culture in the context of Frankfurt School cul

tural criticism, see also Jay's The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the
Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-50 (Boston, 1973),
pp. 173-218.
18. For influential statements earlier in the century, see José Ortega y Gasset,
The Revoit of the Masses ( 1930; New York, 1957), and Herman Broch, “Notes
on the Problem of Kitsch," in Kitsch: The World of Bad Taste, ed. Gillo Dorfles
(New York, 1969), pp. 49-76. See also Theodor W. Adomo, Négative
Dialectics, tr. E. B. Ashton (Frankfurt am Main, 1966; New York, 1973);
Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston, 1964); idem, The Aesthetic
Dimension (Boston, 1978); Dwight MacDonald, “Masscult and Midcult," in
MacDonald, Against the American Grain: Essays on the Effects of Mass Culture
(New York, 1962); André Malraux, "Art, Popular Art, and the Illusion of
the Folk," and Clement Greenberg, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," both of
which are in James B. Hall and Barry Ulanov, eds.. Modem Culture and the
Arts (New York, 1967).
For more recent versions, see Barbara Tuchman, "The Décliné of Qual-
ity," New York Times Magazine, Nov. 2, 1980, pp. 37-41, 102 (and Nov. 30,
1980, p. 170, for the full page of largely supportive letters to the editor in
response to the article); Murray Krieger, Arts on the Level: The Fail of the Elite
Object (Knoxville, Tennessee, 1981); Denis Donoghue, "The Promiscuous
Cool of Postmodemism" New York Times Book Review, June 22, 1986, p. 1;
Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, tr. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitch-
man (New York, 1983); idem, In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, tr. Paul
Foss, Paul Patton, and John Johnston (New York, 1983); Richard Wolin,
"Modemism vs. Postmodemism," Telos 62 (Winter 1984-85); 9-29;
Jürgen Habermas, "Modemity versus Postmodemity," New German Critique
22 (Winter 1981); 3-14; E. D. Hirsch, Jr„ Cultural Literacy: What Every
American Should Know (Boston, 1986); and Allan Bloom, The Closing of the
American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished
the Soûls ofToday's Students (New York, 1987). For a documentary history of
the American literary academy's self-defining résistance to mass and popu
lar culture, see Gerald Graff, Professing Literature: An Institutional History
(Evanston, 111., 1986). For a useful examination of Frankfurt School cultural
theory in relation to comparable apocalyptic analyses in Western intellec-
tual history, see Patrick Brantlinger, Bread and Cireuses: Théories of Mass
Culture and Social Decay (Ithaca and London, 1983), pp. 222-248.
There are, of course, important exceptions to these general tendencies.
For recent sophisticated studies of mass and popular culture, see Susan
Stewart, Nonsense: Aspects of Intertextuality in Folklore and Literature (Balti
more, 1979); idem, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the
Souvenir, the Collection (Baltimore, 1984); Janice A. Radway, Reading the
Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature (ChapelHill, 1984); and
Jane Tompkins, Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction,
1790-1860 (New York, 1985). See also Fredric Jameson's canny though
197
deeply ambivalent essay "Postmodemism, or The Cultural Logic of Late

Capitalisai," The New Left Review 146 (July-August 1984): 53-92.
19. Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, p. 187.
20. As Bourdieu puts it: "Taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier. Social
subjects, classified by their classifications, distinguish themselves by the
distinctions they make" (Distinction, p. 6). Although he is not altogether
evenhanded in the tone of his analyses, describing working-class practices
rather sympathetically and reserving his most elaborate satire for the self-
privileging grand bourgeois, hapless petit bourgeois, and "mis-recognitions" of
inteliectuals and academies, Bourdieu neither privilèges nor pathologizes
any practices theoretically and accounts for ail cultural preferences symmet-
rically by reference to general sociological dynamics.
21. Cf. Herbert Gans, Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and Evalua
tion of Taste (New York, 1975), esp. pp. 67-118.
22. Questions may be raised conceming the extern to which the generality of
the observations and conclusions in Distinction are historically, culturally,
and perhaps even nationally limited by Bourdieu's data (two surveys
conducted in France, largely in Paris, during the 1960s). They may also be
raised about its implication (by omission) that sociological dynamics alone
can account for ail variations among human tastes and preferences. The
crucial questions here, however, are whether the methodological limits of
the study compromise either the power of Bourdieu's critique of traditional
aesthetic axiology or the suggestiveness of his analyses for postaxiological
explorations of the social économies of culture, and whether, for those
factors that he omits, their inclusion would revalidate the traditional asym
metrical accounts of the phenomena of taste in terms of objective standards,
intrinsic value, natural powers of discrimination, and so forth. The answers
to these latter questions are, I believe, clearly négative.
23. For a general description of such processes and the suggestion that social
and political theory must develop new models to make them intelligible, see
Niklas Luhmann, The Différentiation of Society, tr. Stephen Holmes and
Charles Larmore (Columbia, 1982), esp. pp. 229-254.
24. See, for example, R. C. Lewontin, Steven Rose, and Leon J. Kamin, Not in
Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human Nature (New York, 1984); Jean
Grimshaw, Philosophy and Feminist Thinking (Minneapolis, 1986), esp. pp.
130-133; and, for an exceptionally subtle anàlysis and, in effect, decon-
struction of the traditional categories and oppositions discussed here, Susan
Oyama, The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and Evolution
(Cambridge, 1985).
25. Comparable and comparably dubious arguments for universals of moral
judgment and objective moral value hâve been drawn from research on the
alleged "stages" of moral development of children. For example: "Our
psychological theory daims that individuals prefer the highest stage of rea-
soning they comprehend, a daim supported by research. This daim of our
198
psychological theory dérivés from a philosophical claim that a later stage is

'objectively' préférable or more adéquate by certain moral criteria." Law
rence Kohlberg, "The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral
Judgment," Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 633. As this passage from
Kohlberg suggests, there is some question as to what "supports" what,
what is "derived" from what, and whether everything is not bootstrapped
into existence in the usual fashion of neo-Kantian transcendental logic. For
a shrewd critique of such studies in connection with Jürgen Habermas's ap-
peals to and appropriations of them, see Thomas McCarthy, "Rationality and
Relativism: Habermas's 'Overcoming' of Hermeneutics," in Habermas: Criti-
cal Debates, ed. John B. Thompson and David Held (Cambridge, Mass.,
1982), pp. 57-78, in which the passage from Kohlberg just quoted is cited
and discussed (pp. 289-290).
26. The fact that someone who, as child, loved bright colors, strong rhythms,
and nonsense verse now, in middle âge, seeks out muted colors, mimimalist
music, and biographies of Lincoln can certainly be attributed in part to
changes of that kind—though, as I emphasize above, by no means com-
pletely accounted for by them.
27. Herbert Gans, Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and Evaluation of
Taste (New York, 1974), p. 127. Further page references will be cited in the
text.
28. Neither comprehensiveness nor informativeness is, of course, an intrinsic or
objective property of objects. At the time Gans was writing, empirical aes-
thetics was still beguiled by an information-theory model and norm of
aesthetic value, in relation to which "informational richness" could be seen
as an objective property. See, for example, Leonard B. Meyer, "Some Re
marks on Value and Greatness in Music," in his Music, the Arts and Ideas
(Chicago, 1967).
29. Gans's spécifie suggestions here, namely "incrémental aesthetic reward" or
"the extent to which each person's choice adds something to his or her
previous expérience and his or her effort toward self-realization" (Popular
Culture and High Culture, p. 127), combine the clichés of 1950s and 60s
social-scientific liberal uplift and a perhaps more fundamental Kantian-
plus-American puritanism that cannot acknowledge the possibility that the
"gratification" sought and found by both high- and low-culture persons
might be a State of quite ephemeral pleasure that was noncumulative and
not only nonutilitarian but altogether unedifying.
5. Truth/Value
1. The view or alleged view that equates the two and which is thus supposedly
refuted is called, in Anglo-American philosophy, "emotivism": "alleged"
because any account that questions the concept of objective value and, with
it, the machinery of traditional axiology is commonly seen as, and said to
199
be, "emotivist." The allégation illustrâtes the general tendency of objectivist

thought to generate phantom heresies out of its own inversion. Its consé
quences are examined at length in Chaper 7, below.
2. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, 1984). Page
references to the book, abbreviated AV, will be cited in the text.
I shall not be concemed here with the specifically historical dimension of
Maclntyre's narrative or its goveming idea, namely that there has been a
continuai érosion of moral authority and moral consensus in Western
thought and life beginning, it appears (Maclntyre's dating is vague and not
altogether consistent), with the Reformation and accelerating from the time
of the Enlightenment. I would note, however, that, like many others who
chart the Décliné of the West along such Unes, he underestimates the extern
of the ranges and varieties of discourse and practice in any era, culture, or
"community," and, especiaUy through contrasts posed in such terms as
"our predecessor culture," "the présent âge," and "modem life," obscures
crucial and relevant différences—such as those of class, gender, place, race,
and historical expérience—that cannot readily be seen as matters of degen-
eration, loss, failure, or fragmentation.
3. As can be seen in the passages quoted above, Maclntyre uses terms such as
"expression" and "statement" in such a way that it is never altogether clear
whether he is talking about abstract verbal forms or about particular utter-
ances (of a certain form) produced in spécifie (if hypothetical) contexts.
Indeed, it appears that he does not recognize the différence or its
significance for the questions at issue here.
4. According to Maclntyre, a few philosophers such as G. E. Moore hâve
understood what modem people were really doing when they said "It is
good," but those philosophers hâve tried only to make postlapsarian life
more comfortable for the fallen by maintaining that objective standards and
wholesome moral discourse never existed anyway, or that appeals to them
were always manipulative: hence the emotive theory (AV, pp. 14-20). It
should be observed, however, that Maclntyre's own account of moral dis
course participâtes in the same dualism that produces both the standard
axiological account and, as its self-inversion, the so-called emotive theory.
Indeed, his "hypothesis" and its narrative development consist simply of
the temporalization of that dualism. Whereas the alleged emotivist aUegedly
says, "Since there are no objective standards, ail judgments, including os-
tensibly impersonal ones, are nothing more than expressions of personal
preference," Maclntyre says, "Since people no longer believe in objective
standards, ail judgments must now be—at heart, if not in form—nothing
more than expressions of personal preference." Here, as elsewhere, the
temporalization of a dualism yields a myth of the Fall.
5. See the related discussion of proverbs, maxims, and "sayings" in Barbara
Herrnstein Smith, On the Margins of Discourse: The Relation of Literature to
Language (Chicago, 1978), pp. 69-73.
6. Maclntyre writes of "the larger totalities" in which our moral concepts and
2 00
their corresponding expressions were "originally at home" and of which

they are now "deprived" (AV, p. 10). He fails to add the necessary corollary
of this, which is that, if they remain available as concepts and continue to be
used as expressions at ail, it must be because they are now "at home" in
other totalities. The latter may, of course, be more heterogeneous than those
"original" ones, or coexistent with more alternatives.
7. "Appropriability" here and below is not the extent to which an utterance
would secure explicit agreement but, rather, the extent to which people
other than the speaker could, so to speak, "make it their own"—that is, use
it or apply it to themselves in some way. It should be emphasized in relation
to later discussions that this is always a way more or less different front how
the speaker applies it to herself and wants them to, or believes they would,
apply it to themselves.
8. For other works in the same mode, see Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the
Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley, 1985); and
Charles Taylor, "Interprétation and the Sciences of Man," in Taylor, Philoso-
phy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1985),
pp. 15-57. For other critiques along the lines ofïered here, see Niklas
Luhmann, The Différentiation of Society (New York, 1982); and William Con-
nolly, Politics and Ambiguity (Madison, Wis., 1986). Michael Walzer at-
tempts to develop a positive pluralistic alternative in his Spheres of Justice: A
Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York, 1983). See also the discussion
of "community" and "solidarity" in Chapter 7, below.
9. Among the most recent of those—of course quite diversely produced, ar-
ticulated, and circulated—démonstrations (and critiques of those attempted
réhabilitations) are Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, tr. Gayatri C. Spivak
(Baltimore and London, 1974); idem, Margins of Philosophy, tr. Alan Bass
(Chicago, 1982): Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis,
1978); Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, 1979);
idem, The Conséquences of Pragmatism: Essays, 1972-1980 (Minneapolis,
1982); Gonzalo Munévar, Radical Knowledge: A Philosophical Inquiry into the
Nature and Limits of Science (Indianapolis, 1981); Barry Bames, T. S. Kuhn
and Social Science (New York, 1982); and David Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social
Theory of Knowledge (New York, 1983).
10. For an interesting approach to such an account, see Humberto R. Maturana
and Francisco G. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of Living
(Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, 1980).
11. Having particular effects rather than performing particular functions is a
more suitable unpacking in many cases.
12. As a current rating service puts it: " consumer guide knows what a chal
lenge it is to pick the 'best buy' that meets your requirements. . . So we call
in the experts to do the comparison shopping for you." Consumer Buying
Guide (Skokie, 111., 1987), p. 4.
13. The relation of scientific practice to évaluation will be examined further
below, but the following summary of why, contrary to standard views of
201
scientific method, the réplication of a "finding" does not constitute a test of

truth in sdence is relevant here: “The problem is that, since expérimenta
tion is a marier of skillful practice, it can never be clear whether a second
experiment has been done sufficiently well to count as a check on the first.
Some fürther test is needed to test the quality of the experiment—and so
forth . . . The failure of these 'tests of tests' to résolve the difficulty demon-
strates the need for further 'tests of tests of tests' and so on—a true re-
gress." H. M. Collins, Changing Order: Réplication and Induction in Scientific
Practice (London, Beverly Hills, New Delhi, 1985), p. 2.
14. The force of J. L. Austin's insight that there are other measures (e.g., "felic-
ity") has been ail but lost in the objectivist appropriation of his work in so-
called speech-act theory. It may be noted as well that Austin appreciated,
though he did not pursue his own emphasis of it, the radical contingency of
“truth": "It is essential to realize that 'true' and 'false'. . . do not stand for
anything simple at ail; but only for a general dimension of being a right or
proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to
this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions." How to Do
Things with Words (New York, 1962), p. 144.
15. Jürgen Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" in Communication and
the Evolution of Society, tr. Thomas McCarthy (Boston and London, 1979).
16. See Smith, On the Margins of Discourse, pp. 77-106, for an earlier version.
Other accounts along these Unes include Erving Goffman, Strategie Interac
tion (Oxford, 1970); idem. Relations in Public (New York, 1971); and Morse
Peckham, Explanation and Power: The Control ofHuman Behavior (New York,
1979). Pierre Bourdieu develops a somewhat different but compatible
sociological analysis of "the linguistic marketplace" in "The Economies of
Linguistic Exchange," Social Science Information 16 (1977): 645-688.
17. Consumer Buying Guide, p. 4.
18. Thus, readers of the Consumer Buying Guide are assured: "Oür experts are
also careful to match the products to the changing needs of consumers,
including, for instance, downsized appliances for smaU households" (p. 4).
19. The mission of disciplinary science is also the production of appropriable
technical skills and the two may not always be separable, but, in connection
with questions of verbal communication and the value of "propositions,"
our focus here is on its verbal/conceptual products: reports, statements,
writings, théories, measurements, models, and so forth.
20. For recent discussions of the structure and operation of social and institu-
tional constraints in disciplinary science, see David Bloor, "Essay Review:
Two Paradigms for Scientific Knowledge?" Science Studies 1 (1971): 105-
115; Pierre Bourdieu, "The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social
Conditions of the Progress of Reason," Social Science Information 14 (1975):
19-47; Barry Bames, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science, esp. pp. 64-93; H. M.
Collins, Changing Order: Réplication and Induction in Scientific Practice, esp. pp.
129-168; Bruno Latour and Steve Wolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Con-
202
struction of Scientific Facts (Beverly Hills and London, 1979), esp. pp. 151-
186; and Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Sdentists and Engineers
through Society (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), esp. pp. 21-62.
21. For a recent attempt to analyze the good-true-beautiful relation in modem
theoretical physics, see Paul Davies, Superforce: The Search for a Grand
Unified Theory of Nature (New York, 1984), pp. 50-69.
22. My account here shares many éléments with the analysis by Paul Davies in
Superforce. Davies points out, for example, that the "rightness" of certain
highly abstract features of a theory cannot be a matter of their validation
“by concrète expérience," that “beauty in physics is a value judgment
involving professional intuitions," and that, with regard to théories, "bet-
ter" means not truer (he does not, in fact, use the term) but more "useful,"
"more economical," "smoother," "more suggestive," and so on (pp. 66-
69). He nevertheless moves repeatedly toward gratuitously objectifying for
mulations (e.g., "Nature is beautiful" and "Nevertheless the aesthetic qual-
ity is there sure enough"—pp. 68, 69) that obscure the significance of the
relationship, here emphasized, between the scientist's intuitive sense of the
"beauty" of a theory and its suitability for appropriation by the members of
a relevant community.
23. I am ignoring here the other parameters of goodness and badness—
"comprehensibility," "syntactic well-formedness," "felicity," and so forth
—that are sometimes proposed, typically in addition to "truth-value," as
required for or presupposed by effective (or, as in Habermas, "genuine")
communication. Setting aside the serious questions of conceptualization
and détermination that might be raised conceming each of these criteria,
one can grant that defects of roughly these kinds may occur, in which case
the speaker (for example, one who mumbles, stutters, speaks "broken En-
glish," or produces malapropisms) would certainly be at a compétitive dis-
advantage in the linguistic market, and the économies of his or her individ-
ual verbal transactions would be affected accordingly. Such criteria can be
ignored here, however, since they are always said by those who invoke
them to be irrelevant to truth- value and are also irrelevant to the spécifie
kinds of négative value noted above. Thus, someone's évaluation of an
artwork may be exquisitely well-formed as well as eamest, but still ex-
cruciatingly uninteresting to her listeners, and a political prisoner's extorted
report may be pronounced altogether felicitously and "accurately," so that
it is readily understood and efïectively appropriated by his questioners, but
still at considérable cost to himself.
24. May, not must: this is certainly not to suggest that every verbal transaction
or other form of social interaction is a zero-sum game.
25. "Speakers" here are those who produce verbal forms in any mode or
medium; "listeners" are those who respond to (not who simply "receive")
such forms.
26. The adversarial quality described here coexists with whatever mutual be-
203
nevolence otherwise and simultaneously characterizes the relation between

the parties: it does not contaminate the latter, but neither does the latter
transcend it.
27. The term and concept "information" and also its traditional conceptual
syntax ("getting," "having," "giving," "transmitting" it, and so on) are
among those by which traditional discourse segments, arrests, and hypos-
tasizes the complex processes through which our behavior is modified by
our interactions with our environments. In an account more rigorous than
that offered here, the entire problematic terminology of "information"
would be replaced by a description of the spécifie dynamics of such interac
tions.
28. The présent account does not exclude what are called moral or ethical
(inter)actions though it would, in any élaboration, necessarily reconcep-
tualize their dynamics.
29. Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" p. 3.
30. Ibid., p. 41.
31. Mary Louise Pratt mounts a critique of the utopian models of verbal
exchange in speech-act theory in "Ideology and Speech-Act Theory," Poet-
ics Today 7, no. 1 (1986): 59-72. Observing that such models characteris-
tically project an idealized ("Western liberal") conception of exchange as a
relation of equality, reciprocality, and coopération, she notes that they
thereby obscure the significance of power relations among the parties both
in literal markets and in verbal interactions. Pratt's critique, which is
spirited and incisive, is properly directed against models of communica
tion such as those of Paul Grice and Habermas but is not properly directed
against the account outlined here, which not only stresses the significance
of those power relations but insists on the inévitable asymmetries and ine-
qualities—as well as inévitable différences—of motives, means, and consé
quences among the parties in every other aspect of verbal exchange. The
point needs emphasis in view of the fact that Pratt, observing that "Grice's
formulations now function widely . . . as the norm for non-literary verbal
interaction" (p. 65), cites without further comment my earlier study, On the
Margins of Discourse. As in the présent study, however, the model of verbal
exchange first developed in that book is quite otherwise inspired and its
formulations are crucially different front those of Grice, especially with
respect to the points at issue, that is, whether verbal interactions can be
appropriately described as govemed by categorical maxims and whether
they exhibit the behavior of rational agents.
The issue is complicated, of course, by the existence of a number of
different—and to some extent contradictory—relevant senses of "rational."
Thus, Pratt, having examined several notions of communication as ex
change, observes that the speech-art theorist's view of language as "essen-
tially a cooperative form of behavior, in which participants work together
rationally to achieve common goals," is decisively contradicted by the
204
Notes to Page 113
routine violation of Grice's conversational maxims in "almost any press

conférence, board meeting, classroom, or family room in the country"
(p. 66, emphasis added). No matter how unruly it is, however, in the sense
of either obstreperous or non-rule-govemed, and also no matter how self-
serving, compétitive, exploitative, and downright bestial, the behavior of
verbal agents may still be described as rational in the familiar economistic
sense of either self-consistent or as-if-utility-maximizing. To be sure, Grice's
Cooperative Principle and associated maxims (be brief, be sincere, be rele
vant, be clear) are altogether dubious: not, however, because verbal behav
ior is not "rational" in the latter sense, but because, being cast and con-
ceived in terms of neo-Kantian ethics, such principles and maxims neither
capture nor account for the force of verbal reciprocality, which, as I ex-
plained above, is the fact that the "things" that speakers and listeners "do"
to and for each other are, for better and worse, interdependently consequential.
(Significantly, Grice's maxims are addressed only to speakers: like Haber-
mas and speech-act theorists generally, he does not recognize that listeners
are also agents or that they do anything other than listen and "understand."
See Paul Grice, "Logic and Conversation," in Syntax and Semantics 111: Speech
Acts, ed. Peter Cole and Jerry Morgan [New York, 1975], pp. 41-58).
Whether verbal agents are properly described as "rational," then, dépends
on the sense in which the term is taken. The behavior of speakers and
listeners could certainly be seen as "rational" in the economistic sense
indicated above, though someone who saw it thus might be inclined to
redescribe Grice's conversational maxims not as general principles govem-
ing and presupposed by ail speech acts but, rather, as patterns of effective
social interaction under certain, limited, conditions in certain, historically
particular, verbal communities. If, on the other hand, one takes the term
"rational" in the philosophical/ethical sense of behaving in accord with
"good"—meaning, it seems, logically articulatable, morally justifiable, and/
or otherwise transcendentally proper—"reasons," one could either note, as
Pratt does, the typical w«rationality of actual (as opposed to idealized)
verbal interactions or one could insist, as does Habermas, on a strict (and, in
my view, altogether question-begging) distinction between "truly ra
tional"—and presumably ethical—communicative agents and those who
pursue effectiveness and thereby exhibit only "instrumental rational-
ity." I will retum to the question of human rationality in general in Chap-
ter 6.
32. Thus M. F. Bumyeat reformulates and reaffirms Plato's alleged démonstra
tion that Protagoras's "Man is the measure of ail things. . . " is self-refuting:
"No amount of maneuvering with his relativizing qualifiers will extricate
Protagoras from the commitment to truth absolute which is bound up with
the very act of assertion. To assert is to assert that p— . . . [i.e.] that
something is the case—and if p, indeed if and only if p, then p is true
(period). This principle, which relativism attempts to circumvent, must be ac-
205
knowledged by any speaker.” "Protagoras and Self-Réfutation in Plato's

Theaetetus,” Philosophical Review 85, no. 2 (April 1976): 195, emphasis
added.
33. For the view that we underestimate the communicative subtlety of our
interactions with animais, see Vicki Heame, Adam ’s Task: Calling Animais by
Name (New York, 1987). For a suggestive theory of the évolution of animal
communication as strategie interaction, see John T. Krebs and Richard
Dawkins, "Animal Signais: Mind-Reading and Manipulation," in Behav
ioral Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach, ed. J. R. Krebs and N. B. Davies,
2nd ed. (Sunderland, Mass., 1984), pp. 380-402.
34. See Mary Louise Pratt, "Ideology and Speech-Act Theory," and the discus
sion in note 31, above.
35. Insofar as this second objection also reflects the idea that the validity of a
model or analogy remains limited to the spécifie site of its dérivation, it
misunderstands the nature and operation of models, analogies, and
metaphors. If someone uses a current account of the motion of Satum's
rings to clarify his description of how the téléphoné System opérâtes, he is
not limited to describing how people téléphoné each other on Satum; nor, if
the latter account cornes into disfavor among astrophysicists, is the value of
his own description of the téléphoné System thereby undermined. Similarly,
even if there are no marketplaces in Bongo-Bongo, a marketplace analogy
could still illuminate how people communicate there. (The idea that how
people interact verbally is affected by the particular économie Systems in
which they live is not to be dismissed out of hand, but is not self-evident
and also not to be assumed in advance). And, of course, even if it was
conclusively demonstrated that neoclassic économies described nothing on
the face of the earth, its structure might still operate as a productive and
otherwise effective metaphor in a description of the dynamics of human
communication.
36. For représentative discussions of the controversies mentioned, see Karl
Polanyi, "Our Obsolète Market Mentality, Commentary 3 (1947): 109-117;
Cyril Belshaw, "Theoretical Problems in Economie Anthrology," in
Maurice Freedman, ed.. Social Organization: Essays Presented to Raymond Firth
(Chicago, 1968); George Dalton, "Theoretical Issues in Economie An-
thropology," in Economie Anthropology and Development: Essays on Tribal and
Peasant Economies (New York and London, 1971); Harold K. Schneider,
Economie Man: The Anthropology of Economies (New York and London,
1974); Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economies (Chicago, 1972); and idem.
Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago, 1976).
37. For an early and influential outline of social-exchange theory, see George
Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York, 1961; rev. ed.,
New York, 1974). For recent studies in decision science, see Daniel Kahne-
man, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge, 1982). For game theory, see Anatol Rap-
paport et al., Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Coopération (Ann
206
Arbor, 1965); and, more recently, Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Coopéra
tion (New York, 1984).
38. As has recently and increasingly been documented and explored, the most
historically significant and conceptually powerful related critique is that of
Nietzsche. For a useful bibliography and collection of pièces by, among
others, Martin Heidegger, Gilles Deleuze, Maurice Blanchot, and Sarah
Kofman, see David B. Allison, ed„ The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of
Interprétation (New York, 1977).
39. Samuel Weber, "Reading and Writing—Chez Derrida,'' Tildschrift voor
Filosofie 45, no. 2 (March 1983): 41-62, reprinted in Weber, Institution and
Interprétation (Minneapolis, 1987). I initially presented this discussion as a
response to the version that Weber delivered at the Conférence on Decon-
structive Theory, Temple University, Philadelphia, March 26, 1983.
40. The latter phrase is Derrida's, quoted and translated by Weber from La Carte
postale (Paris, 1980), p. 305. Elsewhere in this paragraph and in the two that
follow, I freely paraphrase Weber's text (which itself, at mâny points, both
incorporâtes and paraphrases Derrida's texts) and also, in the course of
giving my own version of the taie he tells, resituate a number of his evoca-
tive phrases and rearrange some links in his artfully forged chains of
metaphors.
41. I shall not attempt to summarize here that very thick cluster or tangle of
concepts, metaphors, and conceptual/textual moves that Derrida reveals,
analyzes, and disassembles—that is, deconstructs—as “the metaphysics of
presence." For the reader not otherwise familiar with Derrida's work, how-
ever, it may be noted that it includes what I describe above as (a) the
télégraphie model of communication, particularly insofar as such a model
posits an idéal of the duplicative transmission of messages in which sameness
is preserved perfectly across some channel or from one “medium'' to an-
other, (b) the epistemology in which that model is embedded, that is, a
concept of knowledge as an interiorization or mental mirroring of an exter-
nal reality that is both immediately available and also independently deter-
minate, and (c) the tendency to absolutize, binarize, polarize, and hierar-
chize arrays of relative différences.
42. Jacques Derrida, Positions, tr. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1980), p. 26.
43. Weber, "Reading and Writing—Chez Derrida," p. 55.
44. Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, ed. Thomas Fowler (Oxford, 1878), Book
I, Aphorisms 38-59.
45. I speak here of contemporary philosophy of science, particularly the text
entitied Against Method (London, 1975), by Paul Feyerabend.
46. For an interesting discussion of the point, see A. Newell and H. A. Simon,
Human Problem-Solving (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972).
47. This appears to be implied by the theory of the emergence of organic Sys
tems proposed by Manfred Eigen and Paul Schuster in The Hypercycle: A
Principle of Natural Self-Organization (Berlin, Heidelberg, and New York,
1979).
207
48. For a nice méditation on the relation between the imperfect operations of
natural sélection and those of the tinkerer (as opposed to the engineer), see
François Jacob, “Evolution and Tinkering," Science 196 (June 10, 1977):
1161-66.
49. For other examples, see Hillel J. Einhom, “Leaming from Expérience and
Suboptimal Rules," in Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, ed.
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (Cambridge, 1982), pp.
268—283. As is indicated by the other studies collected in this instructive
volume, there are numerous cognitive processes (“heuristics") that, as the
editors put it, "are highly economical and usually effective, b u t . . . lead to
systematic and predictable errors" (ibid., p. 20).
50. Thus is "différance" characterized in Derrida's essay of that title in his Speech
and Phenomena, tr. David Allison (Evanston, 111., 1973), p. 130.
6. The Critiques of Utility

1. Although technical définitions of “utility" in contemporary mathematical
économies (for example, the concept of a “utility fonction" as a représenta
tion of an ordered assembly of "displayed preferences") hâve historical and
other connections with both the assumption of utility-maximization in
dassic économie theory and the greatest-good-for-the-greatest-number
utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and other political theorists, the former
operational and indeed tautologous senses of "utility" should be distin-
guished from both of the latter, especially in relation to the more or less
philosophical critiques of "utility theory" examined below. For informative
discussions of the history of these terms and théories, see R. Duncan Luce
and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey
(New York, 1957), pp. 1-38; and Ross Harrison, Bentham (London, 1983).
2. For significant recent studies and surveys, see Herbert A. Simon, "A Behav
ioral Model of Rational Choice," Quarterly Journal of Economies 69 (1955):
99—118; idem, "Théories of Decision-Making in Economies and Behavioral
Science," American Economie Review 49 (June 1959): 253-283; Amartya
Sen, "Rational Fools," reprinted in his Choice, Welfare and Measurement
(Oxford, 1982); George Akerlof, "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Ex
change," Quarterly Journal of Economies 97 (1982): 543-569; Daniel Kahne
man, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge, 1982); Robert P. Abelson and Ariel L'evi,
"Decision-Making and Decision Theory," in Handbook of Social Psychology,
ed. G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (Reading, Mass., 1983); and Amitai Etzioni,
"Rationality Is Anti-Entropie," Journal of Economie Psychology 7 (March
1986): 17-36.
3. The broader division would actually be économies and axiology more gen-
erally. My focus hère, however, is designed to engage current theory and
analysis in the literary academy and cultural studies, from the perspective of
which the “humanistic" disciplines are commonly seen as those concemed
208
primarily with texts and other cultural products. From other perspectives,
"the humanities'' could be seen to center on philosophy and religious stud-
ies where, of course, aesthetics is traditionally secondary to ethics in the
broader discursive domain of axiology.
4. That is, an ordered assembly of a subject's preferences (however specified or
ascertained) among some set of things is taken as a représentation of the
relative utility of each of those things to that subject. The strict operational-
ity—and thus substantive generality or indeed vacuousness—of this notion
of utility has been emphasized as follows: “In this theory it is extremely
important to accept the fact that the subject's preferences. . . came prior to
our numerical characterization of them. We do not want to slip into saying
that he preferred A to B because A has the higher utility; rather, because A
is preferred to B, we assign A the higher utility." (Luce and Raiffa, Games
and Decisions, p. 22.)
5. The altemate (nondualistic) conceptions of utility outlined above are not
themselves without problems, including problems shared with various for
mulations of classic utility theory. The crucial question here, however, is not
the validity (or utility) of any spécifie theory of utility but, rather, whether
the most extensive and corrosive detailing of the individual and shared
problems of ail such théories would, in itself, necessarily underwrite the
definitively humanistic anh-utilitarianism described here and, with it, the
entire dualistic conceptualization of value in which it is embedded and
which it perpétuâtes. For a set of unusually sophisticated critiques of currerit
économie conceptions of utility, see the essays assembled in Utilitarianism
and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (New York, 1982). In
view of the title of that volume, we could restate the question here as
whether "beyond" utilitarianism can only be équivalent to back to essential-
ist and dualistic conceptions of value.
6. Such studiès—e.g., Stephen R. G. Jones, The Economies of Conformism (Ox
ford and New York, 1984), and those by Loomes and Sugden cited in note 7
below—as opposed to the critical ones cited above in note 2, offer to
rehabilitate the conventional assumptions of rationality and utility-
maximization apparently undermined by various inconsistencies, irregu-
larities, and other types of puzzles observed in people's économie and polit-
ical behavior.
7. See, for example, G. Loomes and R. Sugden, "Regret Theory: An Alterna
tive Theory of Rational Choice under Uncertainty," Economie Journal 92
(1982): 805-824; idem, "Regret Theory and Measurable Utility," Economies
Letters 12 (1983): 19-21; idem, "A Rationale for Preference Reversai,"
American Economie Review 73 (1983): 428-432; R. Sugden, "Regret, Ré
crimination and Rationality," Theory and Decision 19 (1985): 77-99; and
Richard E. Nisbett, Eugene Borgida, Rick Crandall, and Harvey Reed,
"Popular Induction: Information Is Not Necessarily Informative," in
Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty, pp. 101-116.
8. As might be expected, these explorations are to some extent Marxist in
209
inspiration and orientation but by no means exdusively so and, in any case,

by no means confined to the économie determinism of classical Marxist
cultural analysis.
9. The concept of the sacred as a distinct realm of value set apart from the
profane was developed most notably by Emile Durkheim in The Elementary
Forms of the Religious Life [Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse] (Paris,
1912), tr. Joseph Ward Swain (Glencoe, 111., 1947). Much of Durkheim's
deeply and, indeed, emphatically dualistic conceptualization is retained in
Marshall Sahlins's important critique of Marxist and other forms of econo-
mistic "naturalism," Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago, 1976), and, com-
bined with the related analyses developed by Marcel Mauss, in the essay by
Georges Bataille examined below. For an excellent recent discussion of
sacralization and commoditization that emphasizes their dynamic aspects
(but retains a gratuitous culture-nature opposition), see Igor Kopytoff, "The
Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as Process," in The Social
Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, ed. Aijun Appadurai
(Cambridge, 1986).
10. However ridiculous in relation to the large social and political struggles of
the first half of the century, the anti-Semitism of T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, et
al. was neither incidental nor extraneous to the development and articula
tion of contemporary Anglo-American humanism. For a study of the
moral-allegorical force of images of Mammon's agents in English literature,
see Kurt Heinzelman, The Economies of the Imagination (Amherst, Mass.,
1980).
11. Cf. Pierre Bourdieu's discussion of what he terms "mis-recognition" and
associâtes with the high culture "disavowal [dénégation] of the 'éco
nomie,' " characterized as a "collective repression of narrowly 'économie'
interest and of the real nature of practices revealed by 'économie' analysis."
Bourdieu, "The Production of Belief: Contribution to an Economy of Sym-
bolic Goods," tr. Richard Nice, Media, Culture and Society 2 (1980): 261-
293; orig. pub. in Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 13 (1977): 3-43.
Of course, as already noted, it is in the nature of the conflicts described here
(or the mis-recognitions that Bourdieu himself delineates) that there must
always be a question of which description of these practices is to be
privileged as revealing their "real nature."
12. See Anne Chapman, "Barter as a Universal Mode of Exchange," L'Homme
20, no. 3 (July-Sept., 1980): 33-83; Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of Com
merce [Les Jeux de l'échange] (Paris, 1979), tr. Sian Reynolds (New York,
1982); J. W. Leach and E. Leach, eds., The Kula: New Perspectives on Massim
Exchange (Cambridge, 1983); Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of
the Judgement of Taste (Paris, 1979), tr. Richard Nice (Cambridge, Mass.,
1984); and, especially, the excellent discussion by Aijun Appadurai, "In
troduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value," in The Social Life of
Things, pp. 1—63, from which a number of éléments in the following ac-
count hâve been drawn.
210
13. The general principle here was examined in Chapter 5 as “Value always
cuts both, or ail, ways." Cf. also “ 'Tis an ill wind that blows no man good."
14. For the marketplace as a site of spectacle, subversion, camival, and transfor
mation, see Peter Stallybrass and Allen White, The Politics and Poetics of
Transgression (Ithaca, 1986), esp. pp. 27-43; and Jean-Christophe Agnew,
Worlds Apart: The Market and the Theater in Anglo-American Thought, 1550-
1750 (Cambridge, 1986).
15. See Distinction for Bourdieu's extensive discussion of the complex relations
among cultural, social, and économie value and power.
16. For discussion of the crucial signifkance of classification in relation to value
and, in particular, the value of “literature" and “art," see Chapter 3. See
also Michael Thompson, Rubbish Theory: The Création and Destruction of Value
(Oxford, 1979).
17. “The Notion of Expenditure" [“La Notion de dépense"] (1933), in Bataille,
Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939, tr. Allan Stoekl, with Cari R.
Lovitt and Donald M. Leslie, Jr. (Minneapolis, 1985), p. 116. Page référ
encés for subséquent passages are given in the text.
18. A number of these paths are usefully traced by Michèle H. Richman in
Reading Georges Bataille: Beyond the Gift (Baltimore and London, 1981).
19. "Utility theory” so defined is, however, fairly remote ffom any formulations
produced by the classic eighteenth- and nineteenth-century utilitarians or
operating in modem économies.
20. Along with a need for expenditure and absolute loss, he posits a desire for
"violent, orgiastic pleasure" in opposition to what he sees as the privileging
of “moderate" pleasure by utilitarianism. Also, as the metaphorics of the
essay implies and as Bataille makes more or less explicit at various points,
he associâtes utilitarianism with the official social theory of the (bourgeois)
father (God) while the posited "principle of loss” is associated with the
actual practices of the (prodigal) son (Satan).
21. Récurrences of économie accounting in discourses that seek either to indi-
cate its spécifie irrelevance or, as in Shakespeare's sonnet and Bataille's
essay, to escape it altogether, are common. For a recent attempt by a noted
political economist to establish a category of activities not explicable in
utilitarian/instrumentalist terms, see Albert O. Hirschman, "Against Par-
simony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economie
Discourse," Economies and Philosophy 1 (1985): 7-21. In elaborating and
exemplifying this category, Hirschman repeatedly invokes the terms of the
very économie ("cost-benefit") analysis that he seeks to exceed, as in the
following passage, where he reflects on activities that recall Pascal's obser
vation that "the hope Christians hâve to possess an infinité good is mixed
with actual enjoyment" (Pensées, 540, Hirschman's translation): "This
savoring, this fusion of striving and attaining, is a fact of expérience that
goes far in accounting for the existence and importance of noninstrumental
activities. As though in compensation for the uncertainty about the outcome,
and for the strenuousness or dangerousness of the activity, the striving effort
211
is colored by the goal and in this fashion makes for an expérience that is
very different from merely agreeable, pleasurable, or even stimulating: in
spite of its frequently painful character it has a well-known, intoxicating qual-
ity" (pp. 13-14, emphasis added). The discussion of "intrinsically reward-
ing" activities in Chapter 3, above, is relevant here as well.
22. For a noneconomistic analysis of expenditure that does not reproduce these
dualisms, see Clifford Geertz's account of the complex social dynamics and
diverse stakes of Balinese cockfighting in his classic essay "Deep Play: Notes
on the Balinese Cockfight," in The Interprétation of Cultures (New York,
1973), esp. pp. 432-436, for his discussion of gambling in relation to
Bentham and utility theory.
23. His notion of "heterogeneity" is elsewhere elaborated accordingly: compare
the discussion in Richman, Reading Georges Bataille, pp. 40-60; and in
Jacques Derrida, "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism
without Reserve," in Derrida, Writing and Différence, tr. Alan Bass (Chicago,
1978).
24. The kind of "calculation" indicated here and below need not be and usually
is not verbally articulated—or, as is said, "conscious"—but, rather, what I
described in Chapter 3 as the continuous process of inarticulate and intui
tive cost-benefit analysis that can be seen as characterizing the systemic
behavior of ail responsive organisms.
25. The idea of measure of relative positivity has been associated with the terms
"value" and "worth" (and their cognâtes in other European languages)
from the time of their first recorded occurrences.
26. Distinction, p. 55. It should be emphasized that Bourdieu is concemed here
with how patterns of cultural consumption operate agonistically between
classes and what he calls "class fractions" in, presumably, any stratified
society; as the quoted passage indicates, he does not duplicate Bataille's
theoretically and empirically dubious oppositions between the noble, cou-
rageous économie practices of an original primitive society and the degener-
ate styles of consumption and expenditure in our own postlapsarian "moldy
society." Indeed, Bourdieu also calls attention to the agonistic social and
économie fimetions of the very aristocratic/aesthetic ethos through which
Bataille frames his own analysis: "The tastes of freedom can only assert
themselves as such in relation to the tastes of necessity, which are thereby
brought to the level of the aesthetic and so defined as vulgar. . . This means
that the games of artists and aesthetes. . . are less innocent than they seem"
(Distinction, pp. 56-57).
27. Alfred Gell, "Newcomers to the World of Goods: Consumption among the
Muria Gonds," in Appadurai, The Social Life ofThings, p. 131.
28. Cf. John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago, 1939), pp. 40-50, for a
démonstration of the infmitely regressible alternation of means and ends
whereby that which is said to be an end is always redescribable as a means.
29. Marcel Mauss, Essai sur le Don (1925), which, it may be noted, is itself a
retelling of ethnographie material collected by other anthropologists. Au-
212
thenticity or reliability of ethnographie data is not, however, at issue here.

30. I refer to the implications of deconstruction or poststructuralist thought
generally, but Derrida's discussion of dubious anthropological paradigms is
especially relevant here. See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, tr. Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London, 1976), pp. 95-140. See also
the discussion of Alisdair Maclntyre's Myth of the Fall in Chapter 5, above.
31. Richman speaks of the “tension" in Bataille's work between "nostalgia"
and "critical thought." As she puts it: “The heuristic contribution of an
thropological data must be safeguarded from ideological appropriation. Yet
it is precisely the sense of deprivation motivating nostalgia which draws
individuals together and constitutes the impetus for collective criticism of
the status quo" (Reading Georges Bataille, p. 139).
32. The “reasoning that balances accounts" is encountered in other neo/post-
Marxist texts: for example, in Frankfurt School theory—initially in Adomo
and Horkheimer, later in Habermas—under the name "instrumental rea-
son." Habermas's effort to constitute "genuine communication" as a trans
action free of instrumentality is, of course, related to this conception.
33. See Bourdieu's exploration of the general dynamics of cultural agon in
Distinction, pp. 56-57, for a comparable analysis. Although the relation
between the two is not clear (Bataille is nowhere explicitly mentioned by
Bourdieu), much of the latter's study could be read as an élaboration—
minus the myth of the Fall and in a (relatively) less sensational idiom—of
just this insight.
34. This process is seen as “facilitated [in the United States] by the preliminary
existence of a class [namely, blacks] held to be abject by common accord"
(p. 126).
We might note also that it becomes hard to see what claim “workers" per
se hâve to any spécial regard under an account in which "unproductivity"
is posited as fondamental to human life and, more generally, that Bataille is
caught repeatedly in the contradictions—or, in Richman's words, "ten
sions"—produced by his Marxian self-identifications and his simultaneous
attachment to an aristocratie ethos that valorizes "honor and glory."
35. Cf. again the concluding line of Sonnet 146: "And Death once dead, there's
no more dying then." There is, of course, a historical continuity between
the transcendental arithmetic of Christianity and that of Marxist redemp-
tionism, and the fact that Bataille took neither his (ex-)Catholicism or
(vagrant) Marxism straight did not make him immune to their classic for
mulations.
36. The quotation marks here are mysterious, since Bataille invokes the concept
of human nature repeatedly throughout the essay without problematizing
it. See, for example, the quite comparable invocation of "human life" in the
passage quoted just below.
37. In a familiar move (cf. Dostoevsky's "Notes from Underground"), irration-
ality, self-destruction, perversity, and so forth are taken as the signs of a
theologically defined free will or what Bataille names "the sovereign opera-
213
tion." This is not a move that could be found in Nietzsche and one may,
accordingly, question any facile assimilation of "sovereignty" to the latter's
"will to power."
38. The évocation of a totally disassembled or nihilistic perspective on human
activity or ail activity has its purposes in certain theoretical discourses, and it
is evidently thus that Derrida would restate and thereby conserve the
value and productivity of Bataille, translating his paradoxes and absolute
inversions into a neutral nihilism: "What has happened? In sum, nothing
has been said" ("From Restricted to General Economy," p. 274). The neu-
trality itself or, as Derrida writes, “from left to right or from right to left, as a
reactionary movement or as a revolutionary movement, or both at once"
(ibid., p. 276), is a theoretical position that Bataille indeed seems always on
the verge of occupying but from which, nevertheless, he repeatedly retreats
to both left (that is, revolutionary Marxism) and right (that is, the reaction
ary aristocratic/aesthetic ethos repeatedly noted above).
39. My concem here is to question the décisive break that Bataille and human-
istic anthropology generally mark between "primitive societies" and mod
em ones after the Fall into Commerce, not to suggest that there are no
différences among societies in relation to économie organization and prac
tice. The discussion in Chapter 5 of contemporary controversies in éco
nomie anthropology is relevant here as well.
40. These and comparable principles are the subject of research and theoretical
development in contemporary evolutionary biology. For an interesting dis
cussion of the analogical relation between the conditioning of individual
organisms and the mechanisms of natural sélection, see B. F. Skinner,
"Sélection by Conséquences," Science 196 (June 10, 1977): 1161-66.
41. This appears to be the conception of "good" proposed in G. E. Moore,
Principia Ethica (New York, 1959; orig. pub. 1903).
42. The extern to which these are historically confined and otherwise spécifie
matters (that is, Western, European, etc.) remains a question for another
type of exploration. See Chapter 7, below, for a related discussion of
Richard Rorty's suggestion that "true" (or, presumably, some counterpart
wordform) is a universal terni of commendation for beliefs.
43. If "the good" is not simply tautologousiy constituted as whatever "seems
good to" or "is good for" the subject or, in an only slightly alternative
formulation, as what benefits or has some sustaining or stabilizing "func-
tion" for the community or "the species," then it is constituted as some-
thing objective or absolute to which the subject's desires and welfare must
be or should be subordinate, and which—if the "must" or "should" is
pressed—yields either a tautologous restatement of the objective/absolute
goodness of the objective/absolute good (an infinité regress of goods) or
some arbitrarily selected ultimate good.
44. See Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, tr.
Charles Levin (St. Louis, Mo., 1981), for a related and comparably strained
214
attempt to demonstrate the existence of a value "beyond value” (au-delà de

la valeur). Referring to this value-free value as "symbolic exchange" and
exemplifying it with personal reciprocal exchange, that is, gift giving, Bau
drillard continents:
The objects involved in reciprocal exchange, whose uninterrupted circulation
establishes social relationships, i.e., social m e a n in g , annihilate themselves in this
continuai exchange without assuming any value of their own (that is, any
appropriable value) . . . [However,] once symbolic exchange is broken, this
same tnaterial is abstracted into utility value, commercial value, statutory value.
The symbolic is transformed into the instrumental, either commodity or sign.
Any one of the various codes may be specifically involved, but they are ail
joined in the single form of political economy which is opposed, as a whole, to
symbolic exchange, (p. 125)
The symbolic is not a value (i.e., not positive, autonomisable, measurable or
codifiable). It is the ambivalence (positive and négative) of personal exchange—
and as such it is radically opposed to ail values, (p. 127)
Among the questions raised here are whether anything, including any of
the examples given, actually exemplifies "symbolic exchange" so defined
and how or in what sense objects "annihilate themselves." And among the
questions begged are whether no value really is assumed thereby (that is,
whether no exchange value or use value is produced in and through the
very act of gift giving), whether "social meaning" is itself without value,
and, finally, whether these values are really immeasurable and the mean-
ings thereby established really not themselves "codifiable." Cf. Marshall
Sahlins's analysis of gifts as disguised exchanges in Stone Age Economies
(Chicago, 1972), pp. 149-183; and Bourdieu's analysis of gifts as tempo-
rally deferred exchanges in Outline of a Theory of Practice, tr. Richard Nice
(Cambridge, 1977), pp. 3-9.
45. Thus Bataille titles the first section of "The Notion of Expenditure" (p. 116).
46. Indeed, the notion of "system" here is itself no more than a theoretically
enabling construct: there are no observer-independent or theory-
independent boundaries to that or any other System. While certain tenden-
cies within this interplay of forces may be described from various perspec
tives and articulated in the ternis of various classic or current conceptual
structures (Bataille's anthropological économies or, altemately, Christian-
Aristotelian ethics, Freudian psychology, sociobiology, etc.), it is obvious
that these perspectives and descriptions do not "converge" on each other
and cannot be hierarchically ordered: that is, they are not simply a matter of
different "levels" of description, and they are otherwise irreducibly various.
47. See Humberto Maturana and Francisco G. Varela, Autopoesis and Cognition:
The Realization of Living (Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, 1980), for an
analysis of reflection or self-description as an activity of certain living Sys
tems.
215
7. Matters of Conséquence
Epigraph: "Questions of Method: An Interview with Michel Foucault,"
in After Philosophy: End or Transformation? ed. Kenneth Baynes, James
Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), p. 114.
1. For the phrase and characterization, see W. J. T. Mitchell, "The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly: Three Théories of Value," Raritan 6, no. 2 (Fall 1986):
63-76. Other spécifie objections and examples cited in this chapter are
drawn from the queries and comments of respondents, reviewers, and
others who hâve read or heard parts of this book over the past ten years or
so.
2. It readily accommodâtes the idea, however, that some things change more
slowly than others and that some varieties and configurations are more
recunrent, widespread, and stable than others.
3. "Relativists" in the general sense just indicated are rarely self-designated.
Notable contemporary exceptions are Paul Feyerabend, whose spirited and
free-spirited discussions of "The Spectre of Relativism" in his Science in a
Free Society (London, 1978) can, in some respects, hardly be bettered; Nel
son Goodman, who in his Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis and Cam
bridge, Mass., 1978) refers to his carefully articulated (and, in relation to
this study, congenial) views as "Radical Relativism"; and the group at the
University of Edinburgh associated with the "strong programme" in the
philosophy and sociology of science. The latter include Barry Bames and
David Bloor, whose "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowl
edge" is the only instance of unqualified self-labeling in the influential
collection Rationality and Relativism, ed. Martin Hollis and Stephen Lukes
(Cambridge, Mass., 1982).
Other recent studies and collections include Michael Krausz and Jack W.
Meiland, eds., Relativism: Cognitive and Moral (Notre Dame, 1982); Richard
J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and
Praxis (Philadelphia, 1983); and The Monist 67, no. 3 (1984), on the topic
"Is Relativism Defensible?" Although Anglo-American philosophers on
the whole regard what they name "relativism" as an unmitigated menace
and folly, a small number of them, including Joseph Margolis, in Pragma-
tism without Foundations: Reconciling Realism and Relativism (Oxford and New
York, 1986), and Bernard Williams, in "The Truth in Relativism," Proceed-
ings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1974-75): 215-228, give highly qualified
endorsement to various deeply hedged positions under that label. What
Bernstein offers as "beyond" objectivism and relativism is a precariously
poised neo-objectivism pieced together from salvaged remnants of the
thought of Popper, Gadamer, and Habermas. Bernstein reports and to some
extent echoes critiques of these works and also of classic epistemology but
does not acknowledge the intellectual force of those critiques for the ques
tions at issue and moves repeatedly toward reaffirmations of orthodoxy.
For a wide-ranging, sharp-shooting rejoinder to several of the essays in
216
the Hollis and Lukes collection (and others elsewhere), see Clifford Geertz,
"Anti-Anti-Relativism," American Anthropologist 86, no. 2 (June 1984):
263-278. (It must be added that Geertz's views on these issues are complex
and apparently ambivalent, as will be seen below.) For a skeptical assess-
ment of Margolis's versions of relativism, see Joseph Valente, "Against
Robust Relativism," PhilosophicalForum 17, no. 4 (Summer 1986): 296—321.
4. For a lucid discussion of the charge of self-refutation in relation to
Nietzsche's "perspectivism," see Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Liter-
ature (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 65-68.
5. The phrase "anything goes" is associated with Feyerabend's critique, espe-
cially in his Against Method (London, 1975), of traditional conceptions of
sdentific methodology. His own comments on the phrase and association
are very pointed and altogether pertinent here. Referring to the historical
case studies he offers in the book, Feyerabend writes (Science in a Free
Society, p. 188):
I not only try to show the failure of traditional méthodologies, I also try to show
what procedures aided scientists and should therefore be used. I criticize some proce
dures but I defend and recommend others . . . I point out that it is such a study of
concrète cases rather than the arid exercises of rationalists that should guide a
sdentist and I argue for an anthropological and against a logical study of stan
dards . . . None of these suggestions seem to hâve been noticed by my reviewers
and this despite the fact that their discussion fllls more than half of my book. Ail
they notice are my somewhat ironical summaries and the only positive state-
ment they find [, which they] immediately elevate into a "central thesis," or a
"principle" of "[Feyerabend's] methodology [,]" is the slogan "anything goes."
But ‘ 'anything goes ' ’ does not express any conviction o f mine, it is a jocular summary of
the predicament o f the rationalist: if you want universal standards, I say, if you
cannot live without prindples that hold independently of situation, shape of
world, exigencies of research, temperamental peculiarities, then I can give you
such a prindple. It will be empty, useless, and pretty ridiculous—but it will be a
"principle." It will be the "principle" "anything goes."
6. Hilary Putnam, "Why Reason Can't be Naturalized," in Baynes et al., After

Philosophy, pp. 240-241. Putnam is specifically concemed here with the
invocation, by W. V. Quine and others, of Alfred Tarski's "disquotational"
theory of truth. The passage continues: "But it is pointless to make further
efforts in this direction. Why should we expend our mental energy in con-
vincing ourselves that we aren't thinkers, that our thoughts aren't really
about anything . . . that there is no sense in which any thought is right or
wrong (including the thought that no thought is right or wrong) beyond the
verdict of the moment, and so on? This is a self-refuting enterprise if there
ever was one!" (pp. 241-242).
7. Putnam reports, with mixed bafflement and gratification, that Quine has
repeatedly said (apparently in private conversation and one can only imagine
217
with what weariness) that "he didn't mean to 'rule out the normative' "
(ibid., p. 239).
8. In view of the gravity of the charge, one may ask by exactly what mecha-
nisms the déniai of orthodox objectivism, per se, is supposed to hâve yielded
the death camps. In the absence of any précisé spécification of such mecha-
nisms, the association must be regarded as classic scapegoating: a dangerous
pastime, even among philosophers, and also an évasion of the difficult tasks
of political analysis and corresponding political action described below.
9. Richard Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" in Post-Analytic Philosophy, ed.
John Rajchman and Comell West (New York, 1985), p. 6. Page references
to the essay will be cited in the text.
10. Rorty's account of "truth" in this essay is, at points, more positive than he
acknowledges, as in his quasi-empirical observations suggesting a universal
usage of "true" as "commendatory." "[It] means the same in ail cultures,",
he remarks (as do, he daims, "here," there," "good," "you," and "me"),
though it has "diversity of reference among them." In view of the fact that
even within our "culture" (that is, the Anglophone verbal community), the
"reference" of the terni "true" is diverse or, as I think it better to say here,
the conditions of its usage are irreducibly varions, this must be seen as a
crucial oversimplification. Moreover, it is no quibble to note that most
"cultures" or verbal communities do not hâve the term "true" at ail. For to
imply that different wordforms are the same "term” is to make a key move in
the related debates over (un)translatability and (in)commensurability and,
one would think, just the move that Rorty should not be making here. (See,
e.g., Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in his
Inquiries into Truth and Interprétation [Oxford, 1984], an important piece
but considerably more elusive and equivocal than one would suspect
from its frequent citation as décisive on these matters.) Although Rorty
clearly rejects the objectivist correspondence-to-reality criterion of "truth,"
he does not sufficiently problematize the term/concept itself; that is, retain-
ing Frege's highly questionable distinctions, he also retains the idea that
"true," even if it "refers to" diverse things, still "means" some single thing in
particular. It is just the latter idea, however, and the semantic theory in
which it is embedded, that must be rejected in the development of alterna
tive, nonobjectivist accounts of "truth" and, more generally, of "mean-
ing," "language," and "communication." To the extern that Rorty's prag-
matist retains that idea and theory in his discussions of truth, he encourages
the confusions of his realist adversary.
11. Value in ail these instances can, of course, be rfisvalue: thus, frequently cited
along with the unappreciated objective goodness or bettemess of reading
Seneca's Medea or studying ancient languages is the unrecognized objective
badness or worseness of wife beating, bride buming, clitoridectomy, and
watching télévision crime-dramas. The added piquancy of examples in
which the victims are female can hardly be missed.
12. For a recent example of charges of academie relativism, quietism, and "lax-
218
ity," coupled with more or less egregiously reactionary proposais, see Allan
Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed
Democracy and Impoverished the Soûls of Today's Students (New York, 1986).
13. The items in these two sériés hâve not been chosen in flagrant disregard of
"fundamental distinctions" but to emphasize that the value of authority,
like the value of anything else, cuts both (or ail) ways, an important princi-
ple obscured by the usual examples of altogether benevolent parents and
teachers, and altogether malevolent institutional officiais—with mis-
sionaries, serving as the hinge here, historically invoked as both.
14. Rorty makes a similar point forcefully: "To say that [cultures] hâve 'in-
stitutionalized norms' is only to say, with Foucault, that knowledge is never
separable from power—that one is likely to suffer if one does not hold
certain beliefs at certain times and places. But such institutional backups for
beliefs take the form of bureaucrats and policemen, not of 'rules of lan-
guage' and 'criteria of rationality.' To think otherwise is the Cartesian fal-
lacy of seeing axioms where there are only shared habits, of viewing state-
ments which summarize such practices as if they reported constraints
enforcing such practices" ("Solidarity or Objectivity?" p. 9).
15. In "The Truth of Relativism," Williams argues for the necessity of distin-
guishing between "real" and "notional" conflicts or "confrontations" of
ethical judgment. The distinction moves in a useful direction, but not far
enough, for the real/notional dualism itself obscures the range of dimen
sions along which conditions relevant to disparities of judgment may vary
and also the range of their individual modulations and mutual interactions.
Indeed, Williams's distinction continuously hedges the issue of ethical rel
ativism and ultimately opérâtes to deny the radical contingency of ethical
judgment and action. It is disappointing but not altogether surprising to find
him, in a later discussion of the point, explicitly recanting its more radical
implications. Cf. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cam
bridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 160 and 220.
16. The relativist may, even when sorely baited, forbear entering into seri-
ous arguments with other people when she recognizes that the stakes
would be much greater for them than for her: for example, their continued
conviction of their personal salvation and immortality or the value of their
life's work versus her relatively superficial pleasure in self-confirmation or
in the exercise of skill or power. Forbearance under such conditions is not,
of course, restricted to relativists, but only in them is it taken as a sign of
intellectual torpor rather than of human charity.
17. These formulations speak of individual agents for the sake of clarity and
vividness, not in order to obscure—or as a conséquence of forgetting—the
possibility and necessity of communal action. Just as "the other fellow" is
always pluralizable here (extendable, in other words, into "other people"
or other communities: societies, nations, entire cultures, and so forth), so
also, to the extent that the relativist acts as a member of a group of agents,
"she" is herself pluralizable here.
219
18. The challenge of "how one answers the Nazi," and, as discussed above, one
of the ways of replying (namely, "It dépends") are obviously relevant here.
19. Clifford Geertz, "The Uses of Diversity," Tanner Lectures on Human Values,
vol. 7 (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 272-273.
20. I. A. Richards, The Principles of Literary Criticism (1924; London, 1960),
p. 206.
21.1 would myself also maintain an attitude of skepticism toward ail appeals to
putatively redemptive sacrifices and sufferings, but Rorty's pragmatist and I
may well differ deeply here.
22. Geertz's own resolution to the anthropologist's related "relativism"/
"ethnocentrism" predicament is to rejea the latter as a dangerous surrender
to "the pleasure of invidious comparison" but, like Rorty, to déclaré the
former, which Geertz glosses here as "counsels of indiscriminate tolérance,"
to be necessarily insincere ("The Uses of Diversity," p. 274). The sentiment
through which Geertz ffames his own recommended alternative, "We must
leam to grasp what we cannot embrace," is certainly unexceptionable, but
one must wonder if any of the cultural relativists of anthropological shame
and philosophical scandai—Ruth Benedict, for example—would hâve said
anything different or, indeed, if they meant anything different by the tolér
ance they urged. For there remains the question, of course, of what, once it
was clear one could not embrace it, one should do with what one had
"grasped"; and there is no reason to think that in every case "indiscrimi-
nately," including the ad horrendum case of Nazism in 1939 (which is when
Benedict's Patterns of Culture, with its mémorable "counsels of tolérance,"
appeared), those relativists would hâve counseled just putting it down
gently and letting it go its way.
23. Charles Levin, "Introduction," in Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the
Political Economy of the Sign (St. Louis, Mo., 1981), p. 7.
24. Ibid., p. 12.
25. Cf. the dassic Marxist analysis of surplus value and exploitation in which
capitalism is seen as objectively unjust because the relation of profits to
production costs is, in effect, mathematically unequal. For discussion of the
analysis in relation to contemporary économie theory, see G. A. Cohen,
"The Labour Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation," Philosophy
and Public Affairs 8 , no. 4 (1979), repr. in lan Steedman et al., The Value
Controversy (London, 1981), pp. 202-223.
26. Although the concept of "interest" is not innocent, its guilt is not as re
demptive as is sometimes claimed; for the mere fact that the terni has had a
particular intellectual history, or even that it has kept bad theoretical com
pany (specitically eighteenth- and nineteenth-century classic économies),
does not in itself validate such reactive notions as a will to transcendent
nonmaterial sovereignty or a fundmental human impulse to self-sacrifice.
Baudrillard's critique of "use-value" in For a Critique of the Political Economy
of the Sign has évident affinities to that of Bataille, discussed earlier in
relation to such reactive redemptionist notions. For the history of the notion
2 20
of "interest" in relation to économie theory, see Albert O. Hirschman, The

Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph
(Princeton, N.J., 1977). For a shrewd discussion of ambivalent invocations
of (and attacks on) "interests" by contemporary political theorists and polit
ical historians, see T. J. Jackson Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony:
Problems and Possibilities," American Historical Review 90, no. 3 (June
1985): 567-593, esp. 579-586.
27. Although this account is designed to apply to any sort of oppositional
political theory and action, its spécifie relevance to contemporary feminist
theory and politics is intentionally highlighted by the pronouns.
28. Stanley Fish has notoriously observed that theory has no conséquences; see
Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities
(Cambridge, Mass., 1980), pp. 370-371. This is right, in the sense that a
new analysis of institutional practices does not in itself change those prac
tices and (as Fish evidently wishes to assure his audiences) that the familiar
world, under a novel and unorthodox description of it, does not disappear.
It does not follow from the former, however, nor does Fish himself daim,
that théories hâve no conséquences whatsoever; and it does not follow from
the latter ("We hâve everything that we hâve always had—texts, standards,
norms . . . and so on"—p. 367) that he is especially eager to preserve the
status quo. For not only do théories hâve, along the lines described above,
considérable rhetorical power (a form of practical efficiency which, given the
centrality of "persuasion" versus "démonstration" in his own analyses,
Fish could hardly regard as inconsequential), but even more significantly,
and in accord with his own antiobjectivist formulations, in changing—in
some places—the ways in which "the world" is conceptualized and per-
ceived, theory, including Fish's own, also and thereby changes, predsely, the
world.
221
Index
Abelson, Robert P., 208n2 Bacon, Francis, 120-121

Adomo, Theodor W., 74, 75, 197nl8, Bakhtin, Mikhail, 23
213n32 Balibar, Etienne, 191nl7.
Aesthetic: as term, 34-36 Bames, Barry, 36, 152,192nl0, 201n9,
Aesthetics, 52, 64, 68, 72, 95-96, 195n7. 202n20, 216n3
S ee a lso Axiology, aesthetic; Critical the- Bataille, Georges, 134-144, 146, 147, 149,
ory; Value, aesthetic 178, 210n9, 211nnl7,20,21, 212n23,
Agnew, Jean-Christophe, 21 ln l4 213nn31,32,34-37, 214n38, 215n46,
Akerlof, George, 208n2 220n26
Anthologies, 3, 4, 6, 9-10, 46 Baudrillard, Jean, 134, 146, 173, 174,
Anti-Semitism, 210nl0 191n2, 192n6, 197nl8, 214n44,
Anti-utilitarianism: and humanism, 125- 220n26
126, 130, 133; in Bataille, 135, 136, Baumgarten, Alexander G., 34
141, 143-144, 146-147, 149. S ee a lso Baym, Nina, 193n20
Utilitarianism, critiques of Beardsley, Monroe, 192n9
"Anything goes," 152, 163, 217n5 Beauty; Hume on, 60-61; Kant on, 66-
Appadurai, Aijun, 210nn9,12 69; in science, 104-106
Art: as classification and label, 32, 43-44; Becker, Gary S., 191n6
as term, 34-35 Becker, Howard, 193nl8
Artists: and évaluation, 44-45, 47, 98; Bellah, Robert, 201n8
and aesthetic value, 48; and sdentists, Belshaw, Cyril, 206n36
105. See a ls o Creative process Benedict, Ruth, 220n22
Austin, J. L., 202nl4 Bennett, Tony, 190nl6
Axelrod, Robert, 207n37 Bentham, Jeremy, 208nl
Axiology, 13, 28, 182, 187n4: and skepti- Bernstein, Richard, 216n3
cism, 19-20, 57, 62, 70; aesthetic, 23, Bigsby, C. W. B., 190n21
26, 31, 34, 36-37, 42, 73, 74, 77, 99; Blackmore, Richard, 24-25
explanations in, 36-39; logic of, 38, Bloom, Allan, 197nl8, 219nl2
54-84, 174; language and, 66-67, 85- Bloor, David, 36, 152, 192nl0, 201n9,
96; and truth-value, 95-96, 99-100; 202n20, 216n3
and relativism, 150-154. See a lso Criti Booth, Stephen, 7, 187n2
cal theory; Value theory Bourdieu, Pierre, 75-76, 132, 139,
Ayer, A. J., 19 189nl4, 191n2, 193nl7, 198nn20,22,
223
Index
Bourdieu, Pierre— Continued Cultural critidsm, 26, 74—77, 84

202nnl6,20, 210nnll,12, 211nl5, Culture: 43, 80, 131, 153, 192nl3,
212n26, 213n33, 214n44 198n22, 2 1 0 n ll; and évaluation, 14,
Brantlinger, Patrick, 197nl8 26-27, 28, 47, 51; and taste, 26, 38, 40,
Braudel, Fernand, 21 On 12 77-78, 81; and re-production of value,
Broch, Herman, 197nl8 47-53; opposition to nature, 77-79,
Bumyeat, M. F., 205n32 129-131; and économies, 129-132. See
Byron, George Gordon, Lord, 4 ako Popular culture
Canons: literary, 18, 23, 24, 35-36, 44; Dalton, George, 115, 206n36
formation of, 45-53, 193n20. See ako Dante, Alighieri, 53, 80
Literary academy; Standards; Value, Danto, Arthur C., 196nl4
literary Darwin, Charles, 194n3
Camap, Rudolph, 19 Darwinism, 163, 194n3. See ako Evolu
Chapman, Anne, 210nl2 tion; Fitness
Chinweizu, 27 Davidson, Donald, 218nl0
Christianity, 130, 140, 142, 178, 213n35, Davies, N. B., 206n33
215n46 Davies, Paul, 203nn21,22
Classification: and évaluation, 14; and Dawkins, Richard, 206n33
value, 32-33, 43; and tastes, 38; and Degustibus . . . (proverb), 11, 14, 40, 57,
thought, 122-123 62,71
Cohen, Ted, 196nl3 Decker, Andrew, I96nl4
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 4 Deconstruction, 23-24, 73, 116-124,
Collins, H. M„ 202nn 13,20 213n30
Communication: models of, 94-96, 108, Deleuze, Gilles, 134, 207n38
110, 112, 115-116; value judgments as, Dembo, L. S., 188nl
96-102, 107; as économie transaction, Derrida, Jacques, 23, 73, 106, 116-117,
102-104, 107-112, 114-116, 206n; 1 1 9,134,195nl0, 201n9, 207nn40,41,
Habermas on, 110-112 208n50, 212n23, 213n30, 214n38
Communitarianism, 168-169, 171, 182 Developmental fallacy, 79-81
Communities: and norms, 40, 92-94, Dewey, John, 190nl7, 212n28
131, 180-182; Rorty on, 166-172; Donoghue, Denis, 197nl8
heterogeneity of, 168-169 Dostoevsky, Feodor, 213n37
Connolly, William, 201n8 Double discourse of value. See Value, dis
Consensus, 71-72, 93, 180 course of
Consumer Buying Guide, 201nl2, Douglas, Mary, 191n2
202nnI7,18 Durkheim, Emile, 129, 135, 210n9
Contingency: concept of, 11-12, 30-31
Cost-benefit analyses, 42, 133-134, 136- Eagleton, Terry, 189-190nl6
140, 21 ln21, 212n24 Economies: of aesthetic value, 33-34; of
Creative process: évaluation in, 44-47; value judgments, 96-104; of communi
and science, 105. See ako Artists cation, 102-104, 107-112, 113-116;
Critical theory: as theory of cridcism, 9, of sdence, 104-106; metaphorics of,
12, 17-24, 28-29, 31, 41-42, 72; as 114-116; and anthropology, 114-115,
political critique, 173-179 129-131; of thought, 121-124; andre-
Critidsm. See Critical theory; Cultural demptionism, 126-127; andhum an-
criüdsm; Evaluation; Judgments; Liter ism, 125-134; of loss, 135-144, 147;
ary critidsm tribal, 139-141. See ako Economy;
Culler, Jonathan, 189nl5 Good(s); Value
224
Index
Economy: and value, 7, 16, 30-31, 144— Frankfurt School, 75, 197nnl7,18,
149; Personal, 30-32, 42-43, 147- 213n32
149, 175-177; escapefrom, 112, 116, Frege, Gottlob, 218nl0
126, 137, 143, 146, 149 Freud, Sigmund, 178
Egalitarian fallacy, 57, 98, 101, 150, 152, Freudian psychology, 215n46
157, 172 Frow, John, 193n22
Eigen, Manfred, 207n47 Frye, Northrop, 12, 16, 19, 21-22, 24-25,
Einhom, Hillel J„ 208n49 27, 188n9
Eliot, T. S., 19, 21, 25, 26, 210nl0
Ellis, John, 188nl Gadamer, Hàns-Georg, 50-51
Emotivism, 86, 199nnl,4 Gans, Herbert, 81-83, 198n21, 199nn28,
Empiricism, 15, 20, 21, 79, 170-171 29
Endurance, 47—48, 50-53. See a lso Can Geertz, Clifford, 168, 212n22, 217n3,
ons, formation of; Test of time 220n22
Ethics: 158-166, 209n3. S ee a lso Judg- Gell, Alfred, 139-140
ments, moral Gifts, 215n44
Etzioni, Amitai, 208n2 God, 42, 126, 138, 162, 211n20
Evaluation: contingency of, 1, 42; literary, Goffman, Erving, 202nl6
1-16, 17-28; implidt, 3, 10, 12, 4 5 - Good(s): higher, 42, 71, 126; in verbal
47, 52; as estimate of value, 5, 13, 16, transactions, 107, 109; (ex)change of,
97, 103; and interprétation, 7, 10-11, 126, 131-132,144-149; concept of,
22; as social behavior, 14, 96-102; as 146-147, 214n43
process, 42-47; and artistic création, Goodman, Nelson, 152, 201n9, 216n3
44-45,47; and canon-formation, 52- Graff, Gerald, 193n20, 197nl8
53; verbal, 85-102; aesthetic, 97-98; Grice, Paul, 204-205nl3
professional, 98-99, 101, 103-104; and Grimshaw, Jean, 198n24
relativism, 158—161, 164; andpolitics, Guattari, Félix, 134
179. S ee a ls o Criticism; Judgments Guest, Edgar, 25
Evolution: andthought, 121-122; and Guyer, Paul, 196nl3
human organization, 214n40
Exchange: and redemptionism, 126-127; Habermas, Jürgen, 110-112, 173, 174,
and circulation, 131; endlessness of, 197nl8, 199n25, 202nl5, 203n23,
144-149. S ee a ls o Value, exchange 204n31, 213n32, 216n3
Hallam, Henry, 4
Fact-value split, 18-19, 20 Harrison, Andrew, 191n5
Fagan, Robert, 192n7 Harrison, Ross, 208nl
Fall into Commerce, 114-115, 130, Hazlitt, William, 4
214n39 Heame, Vicki, 206n33
Fekete, John, 190nl6 Heidegger, Martin, 207n38
Feminism, 24, 79, 174-175, 221n27 Heinzelman, Kurt, 191n4, 210nl0
Feyerabend, Paul, 151-152, 171, 207n45, Heraditean discourse, 31
216n3, 217n4 Heraditean flux, 144
Fish, Stanley, 220n28 Hermeneutic circle, 10
Fitness: and evaluation/selection, 45, 105- Hirsch, E. D„ Jr„ 22, 188nl, 188nl0,
106; and "survival" of artworks, 48, 51 189nl 1, 189nl2, 197nl8
Folklore, 52 Hirschman, Albert O., 211n21, 220n26
Folk-relativism, 40, 41 Hohendahl, Peter Uwe, 193n20
Formalism, 23 Hollis, Martin, 192nl0, 216-217n3
Foucault, Michel, 150 Homans, George, 206n37
225
Index
Homer, 15, 35, 36, 48, 52-53 Kahneman, Daniel, et al., 206n37,
Horkheimer, Max, 213n32 208n49, 208n2, 209n7
Human nature: universals of, 14-15, 67, Kamin, Leon J., 198n24
135,174; and testes, 15, 37, 59-63, Kant, Immanuel, 26, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37,
77-81; Bataille on, 134-144, 145; con 42, 55, 86, 92, 194nn5,6, 195nn7-12,
ceptions of, 134, 144-149; as scrappy, 196nl3; on judgments of teste, 64-72
148, 165, 167; andpolitical theory, 154, Kantianism, 75, 113, 178, 199n25,
174-179; and ethics, 161-163. S ee a lso 205n31
Subject Keats, John, 5, 21, 25, 81, 82
Humanism: and literary academy, 18-20, Kilmer, Joyce, 25
22, 26; and economism, 115; and anti- Kofinan, Sarah, 207n38
utiliterianism, 125-134; and anti- Kohlberg, Lawrence, 199n25
Semitism, 210nl0 Kolodny, Annette, 190nl8
Hume, David, 15, 26, 38, 41, 83, 170, Kopytoff, Igor, 210n9
182, 188n6, 193nl6, 194nn2-3, Krausz, Michael, 216n3
196nl5; on standard of teste, 36-37, Krebs, John T., 206n33
55-64; compared to Kant, 65, 69-70, Krieger, Murray, 188nl, 197nl8
71, 72; and Other's-Poison-Effect, 74
Language: and aesthetics, 33-36, 59; and
Information: and aesthetic value, 51-52; axiology, 66-67, 85-96, 194n6; and
in verbal transactions, 108-109, value judgments, 85-93; norms in, 109;
204n27 économies of, 113-114; and évolution,
Interests: and value, 31, 32, 34, 46, 51; 122-123. See a ls o Communication; In
and évaluation, 43, 100; and politics, tuitions, linguistic; Judgments; Value,
176, 177; concept of, 220-221n26 discourse of
Interprétation: and évaluation, 7, 10-11, Latour, Bruno, 202n20
22, 49-51; and critical theory, 17-18, Lauter, Paul, 193n20
23. S ee a lso Meaning Lears, T. J. Jackson, 220n26
Intuitions: linguistic, 66-67, 86, 90; and Leavis, F. R., 19, 188n2; 189nl6
axiologic logic, 73—74 Leenhardt, Jacques, 189nl4
Lenz, John W., 58, 194nl
Jacob, François, 208n48 Levin, Charles, 173
Jameson, Fredric, 197nl8 Lewontin, R. C„ 198n24
Jauss, Hans Robert, 190nl6 Literary academy: and critical theory 17-
Jay, Martin, 75, 196-197nl7, 197nl9 24; and standards, 41; and value, 4 3 -
Jemie, Onwuchekwa, 26-27, 190n20 44, 45-47; and canon-formation, 4 9 -
Johnson, Samuel, 4, 19, 25 50
Jones, Stephen R. G., 209n6 Literary criticism, 1-16, 24-27, 45-47,
Jôzsa, Pierre, 189nl4 58-59. See a ls o Critical theory; Evalua
JudgmentDay, 149 tion; Judgments
Judgments: of teste, 64-72; and language, Literary theory, 16, 17-18, 23-24. See a lso
85-102, 107; typology of, 85-93, 101; Critical theory
moral, 86-90, 162, 164-166, 198n25, Literature: évaluation of, 1-16, 19, 21-
219nl5; and truth, 94-101; validity of, 23, 26-28; as classification and label,
104-107; and relativism, 158-161. See 14, 32, 43-44, 47; and canon-forma
a ls o Criticism; Evaluation tion, 47-53
Justification: infinité regress of, 63, 100, Logic: in axiological arguments, 38, 54-
178; and relativism, 159-166; Rorty 84, 174; testes in, 72-73
on, 170-173; and politics, 173-179 Loomes, G., 209n6
226
Index
Luce, Duncan, 208nl, 209n4 guage, 109-110; and relativism, 153-

Luhmann, Niklas, 198n23, 201n8 154, 162, 180-182
Lukes, Steven, 192nl0, 216-217n3
Objectivism, 98, 101, 113-114; and re
MacDonald, Dwight, 197nl8 lativism, 150-173, 180-184
Macherey, Pierre, 193nl7 Objectivity: of value, 11, 101; inliterary
Maclntyre, Alisdair: on value judgments, study, 19-20, 22, 28; apparent, 40, 92,
86-94, 194n6, 200nn2-4,6, 212n30; 93; of judgments, 70, 101-102, 103-
on communities, 93-94, 172 104; Rorty on, 167; and standards, 182
Malraux, André, 197nl8 Ortega y Gassett, José, 197nl8
Marcuse, Herbert, 173, 197nl8 Other's-Poison-Effect, The, 26, 74-77
Margolis, Joseph, 216-217n3 Oyama, Susan, 198n24
Marx, Karl, 135
Marxism: and aesthetics, 23, 188n4, Peckham, Morse, 192nl3, 202nl6
189nl6, 190nl6, 2 0 9 -2 10n8; and cul Plato, 120, 205n32
tural criticism, 75; and redemptionism, Platonism, 113
130, 213n35; and Bataille, 140, Plotnitsky, Arkady, 190nl7
214n38; and political theory, 174, 175, Polanyi, Karl, 115, 206n36
178; and économie theory, 220n25 Political theory: and relativism, 154-155,
Mass media, 37-38, 75, 77 173-179; and communitarianism, 168-
Maturana, Humberto, 201nl0, 215n47 169,171-173; and Marxism, 174,175,178
Mauss, Marcel, 135, 140, 141, 210n9, Politics: and literary criticism, 24-27; and
212n29 Maclntyre, 93-94; and Rorty, 168,
McCarthy, Thomas, 199n25, 216 170-171; and justification, 173-179;
Meaning: and value, 48, 49; and linguistic and Personal économies, 175-178
usage, 89-90, 92. S ee a lso Interprétation Pope, Alexander, 36, 61
Meiland, Jack W., 216n3 Popular culture: I. A. Richards on, 37-38;
Meyer, Leonard B., 194n25, 199n28 vs. high, 74-77, 81-84
Michelin guides, 93, 103 Postaxiology, 75, 77, 190nl7, 196nl4
M o n is t (journal), 216n3 Pound, Ezra, 210nl0
Moonmen, 164-165 Pragmatism: and validity, 106; Rorty's,
Moore, G. E., 214n41 and relativism, 155-165, 166-173
Moral value. See Ethics; Judgments, Pratt, Mary Louise, 204-205n31, 206n34
moral Preferences. See Tastes
Morawski, Stefan, 187n4, 189nl6 Protagoras, 205n32
Mukafovskÿ, Jan, 23, 188n4, 192n9 Putnam, Hilary, 153-154, 217nn6,7
Munévar, Gonzalo, 201n9
Quietism, 150; and relativism, 151-152,
Najder, Zdzislaw, 187n4 153-155, 156-166
Nazism: and relativism, 153-155, 220nl8 Quine, W. V., 217nn6,7
Nehamas, Alexander, 190nl7, 2l7n4
New Criticism, 17, 20 Radway, Janice A., 197nl8
Newell, A., 207n46 Raiffa, Howard, 208nl, 209n4
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 23, 135, 144, 171, Ransom, John Crowe, 4
190nl7, 207n38, 217n4 Rappaport, Anatol, 206n37
Nisbett, Richard E„ et al., 209n7 Rationality; économie, 99, 126, 136,
Norms: and standards, 37, 40-41, 181- 209n6; concept of, 147-148, 204-
183; and communities, 40, 93-94, 131, 205n31; and relativism, 163-166
181-183; and institutions, 43; in lan- Reason, 71, 74, 164
227
Index
Redemptionism, 126, 128, 130, 213n35 Smets, Gerda, 194n25

Reichert, John, 188nl Smith, Barbara Herrnstein, 188nl, 191nl,
Relativism: and I. A. Richards, 20-21; 192n8, 193nl9, 202nl6
and humanism, 130; charges of, 1SO Societies: and constraints, 162-163. See
IS?; and objectivism, 150-173, 180- also Communities
183; Rorty on, 154-156, 166-173; and Social theory. See Communitarianism;
moral/political action, 156-166, 173- Political theory
179; and authority, 158-161; and Social-exchange theory, 115
justification, 158-161, 173-179; and Sociobiology, 79
rationality, 163-166; and political the- Speech-act theory, 109,110-112,113,
ory, 173-179; as conceptual taste, 180- 202nl4, 204-205n31
184; and philosophy, 216-217n3; Stallybrass, Peter, 211nl4
Geertz on, 217n3, 220n22. See also Standards, 37; validation of, 40-41; of
Folk-relativism taste, 55-64; establishment of, 56, 180-
Richards, I. A., 20-21, 37-38, 81, 170, 182. See also Canons; Norms
188n7 Stewart, Susan, 191n3, 197nl8
Richman, Michèle H., 211nl8, 212n23. Stigler, George J., 191n6
213nn31,34 Strelka, Joseph, 188nl
Rollins, Hyder, 3 Strong programme, 216n3
Rorty, Richard, 190nl7, 220n21; and re- Structuralism, 23
lativism, 155-156, 166-173; on intui Subject (person); conceptions of, 30-31,
tion,' 196nl6; on truth, 201n9, 214n42, 147, 148-149, 175; andpolitics, 173-
218nl0; on noims, 219nl4 176. See also Human nature
Rose, Steven, 198n24 Sugden, R., 209n6
System: économie, and value, 15-16, 30-
Sahlins, Marshall, 115, 191n2, 206n36, 31; subject as, 147; concept of, 215nl6
210n9, 214n44
Said, Edward, 193n20 Tarski, Alfred, 217n6
Sammons, Jeffrey, 188nl, 189nl4, Tastes: déterminants of, 9, 38—40, 77-79;
191n23 history of, 12, 22, 27, 28; and human
Sandstrom, Sven, 194n25 nature, 15, 37, 59-63, 78-81; accounts
Schneider, Harold K., 206n36 of, 21, 36-41, 73, 77, 192n6; standards
Schuster, Paul, 207n47 of, in Hume, 55-63, 65, 69-70; and
Science: validity in, 104-107, 201nl3 measurement, 56; judgments of, in
Scrappiness: concept of, 148, 165, 167 Kant, 64—72; and logic, 72-74; sociol-
Segers, Rien T., 189nl4 ogy of, 75-77, 81-84; and nature-cul
Self-interest, 31,147 ture opposition, 77-79; comparisons of,
Self-refutation, 112-114, 152, 157, 81-84; and sdentific validity, 105-106;
191n23, 217n4 conceptual, 151, 180,183-184
Sen, Amartya, 208n2, 209n5 Taylor, Charles, 172, 200n8
Serra, Richard, 196nl4 Teleology, 122, 144-149, 171
Shakespeare, William, 18, 25, 53, 83; Ring Test of time, 51-52, 60, 194n3
Lear, 1, 35; Sonnets, evaluating, 1-9, Thompson, John B., 199n25
10, 15; Sonnet 116, 6-8, 187nl; Sonnet Thompson, Michael, 191n3, 211nl6
146, 125-126, 21 In21,213n35 Tompkins, Calvin, 196nl4
Shell, Marc, 191n4 Tompkins, Jane, 193n20, 197nl8
Sidney, Sir Philip, 4 Truth: of (value) judgments, 85, 94-101;
Simon, Herbert A., 207n46, 208n2 as correspondence, 94-95; daims of,
Skinner, B. F., 214n40 112-114; opposition to error, 116-124;
228
Index
and relativism, 152-153, 155-156; and 127-134; re-production of, 45-53; sur
politics, 179; Rorty on, 218nl0. See a lso plus, 220n25. See a lso Economies;
Truth-value Good(s); Tastes; Utility
Truth-value, 85, 94-96, 99-100, 107, Value judgments. See Criticism; Evalua
112-114 tion; Judgments
Tuchman, Barbara, 197nl8 Value theory, 9-16, 28-29, 85-88. See
Tynjanov, Jurij, 23 a lso Axiology; Critical theory
Varela, Francisco G., 201nl0, 215n47
Ulanov, Barry, 197nl8 Verbal transactions. See Communication
Use value. S ee Utility
Utilitarianism: andhumanism, 125-134, Walzer, Michael, 201n8
209n; critiques of, 125, 132, 144, Watkins, Evan, 190nl6
208nnl,2, 209n5, and Bataille, 134- Weber, Samuel, 116-119, 207nn39,40
144, 147. S ee a lso Anti-utilitarianism White, Allen, 21 ln l4
Utility: concept of, 30, 33, 125-128, 144, Widdowson, Peter, 190nl6
208nl, 209nn4,5 Wilcox, Ella Wheeler, 21, 25, 37, 81, 82,
170
Valente, Joseph, 217n3 Williams, Bernard, 164, 209n5, 216n3,
Value: literary, 1-16, 28, 30, 33, 45, 4 7 - 219nl5
53, 58-59; objective vs. subjective, 11, Williams, Raymond, 190nl6
101; contingency of, 11, 30-31, 64; Wimsatt, W. K., Jr., 20-21, 24, 188n5,
concept of, 11, 30, 209n5, 210n9, 195nl0
212n25; aesthetic, 14-15, 34-36, 4 3 - Winters, Yvor, 4, 19, 20, 188n4
44, 48, 75, 81-84, 196nl4; intrinsic, Wolin, Richard, 197nl8
30, 33-34, 212n21; exchange (of), 30, Woolgar, Steve, 202n20
146; discourse of, 31, 33, 115-116, Wordsworth, William, 4
229

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Barbara H errnstein Sm ith

Barbara Herrnstein Smith

Harvard University Press

First Harvard University Press paperback édition, 1991

Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Smith, Barbara Herrnstein.

For their important contributions to the shaping and sharpening of the

An earlier version of Chapter 1 appeared in Poetics Today 1, nos. 1-2

and updated référencés—as Chapters 2 and 3; a portion of Chapter 5

1 Fixed Marks and Variable Constancies:

2 The Exile of Evaluation 17

6 The Critiques of Utility 125

7 Matters of Conséquence 150

Critiques and Charges: The Objectivist Génération of "Relativism" 150

Fixed Marks and Variable Constancies:

Evaluating Shakespeare's Sonnets

"works of literature," the sonnets must be judged insofar as they appeal

but also of Keats, Millay, and Berryman, we, untrammeled by historical

some forms of what is commonly referred to as 'love' to hâve a relatively

This monstrous piece of immodesty, however, amounts to saying no

they are formed, sustained, and exercised; and anthologies themselves

as the hermeneutic circle itself: that is, simultaneously causing and

though it should be noted that there is no reason to suppose that ail

The Exile of Evaluation

Fact and Value in th e Literary Academy

the scholar and value to the critic—depended on an always question-

There are, of course, discriminations to be made: Tennyson, for example, is

Such unabashed "debaucheries of judiciousness" (as Northrop Frye

of these questions no doubt seemed to Wimsatt altogether different from

it has been formulated. Meanwhile, although évaluative criticism re­

has been put almost entirely in the service of antihermeneutics, which is

The Politics of Evaluative Criticism

in the System of literary value in eighteenth-century England, one

The évasion mentioned above is dramatized when conflicts of judg-

Painful to whom? Irrelevant to whom? To idolators of white genius? Who

This brief épisode in the history of literary évaluation illustrâtes, among

This is not, however, to imagine a monolithic intellectual project that

Contingency and Interdependence

set of conditions. Not only is an entity always experienced under more

that our survival, both as individuals and as a species, continues to be

or later, to their interest, utility, and thus value in some—and perhaps

it can also indicate a certain type of cognitive activity and/or sensory

nonadult, or non-high-culture) audiences and noncanonical (for ex­

influence of the first importance in fixing immature and actually inappli­

The traditional axiological tendency, noted above, to provide two

the "properties" or "qualifies" of the objects themselves, and that ex-

As the preceding account suggests, the prevailing structure of

Both informally, as in the drawingrooms of men of cultivation and

spécifications of the “idéal" critic as one who, in addition to possessing

interests and long-range plans and purposes. We tend to become most

grounds," teaching them "appropriate skills," "cultivating their inter-

Artistic Création as a Paradigm of Evaluative Activity

ence of the work is pre-figured—that is, both calculated and pre-

The description, above, of the évaluative processes of the author and,

works (including, now, those newly produced with newly available

ternis of contemporary idéologies. Thus we make texts timeless by sup-

institutions through which they hâve been preserved and by which we

establishment interests participate in the cultural re-production of ca-

As the preceding discussion suggests, the value of a literary work is

it has been formulated. Meanwhile, although évaluative criticism re

nonadult, or non-high-culture) audiences and noncanonical (for ex

influence of the first importance in fixing immature and actually inappli

We hâve yet to consider the central axiological move of Hume's argu

handed. As Hume's detailing of the conditions affecting human préfér

A concluding word on the political implications of Maclntyre's analy

example, professional or specifically religious) ones. My hope and ex