FIRST DIVISION

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 164876

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairman),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
LEONILA P. CELADA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
January 23, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Respondent Leonila P. Celada owns 22.3167 hectares of agricultural land situated in Calatrava, Carmen, Bohol registered under TCT No. 16436,[1] of
which 14.1939 hectares was identified in 1998 by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The matter was then indorsed to petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for field investigation
and land valuation.

In due course, LBP valued respondents land at P2.1105517 per square meter for an aggregate value of P299,569.61.[2] The DAR offered the same
amount to respondent as just compensation, but it was rejected. Nonetheless, on August 27, 1999, LBP deposited the said sum in cash and bonds in
the name of respondent.[3]

Pursuant to Section 16(d) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, the matter was referred to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region VII-Cebu City, for summary administrative hearing on determination of just compensation. The case was
docketed as DARAB Case No. VII-4767-B-990.

While the DARAB case was pending, respondent filed, on February 10, 2000, a petition [4] for judicial determination of just compensation against LBP,
the DAR and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Carmen, Bohol, before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. The same was
docketed as Civil Case No. 6462 and raffled to Branch 3, the designated Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Respondent alleged that the current market
value of her land is at least P150,000.00 per hectare based on the following factors:

14.1. The land in question has been mortgaged to the defunct Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bohol), Inc., for P1,220,000.00 on July
23, 1998 since it was appraised at P15.00 per square meter;

14.2. Agricultural lands in said barangay are priced ranging from P140,000.00 to P150,000.00 per hectare and current land
transactions reveal said price range;

14.3. The land in question is titled or registered property, cultivated and fully developed with rice[5] and corn occupying the greater
portion thereof;

14.4. The topography of the land, its soil condition, climate and productivity of surrounding lots justify the just compensation
requested or asked for;

14.5. Even the class and base unit market value for agricultural lands in Bohol is about thirty (30) times higher than the price offered
per hectare by DAR/LBP.[6]

On April 27, 2000, LBP filed its Answer[7] raising non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as well as forum-shopping as affirmative defense.
According to petitioner, respondent must first await the outcome of the DARAB case before taking any judicial recourse; that its valuation was arrived
at by applying the formula prescribed by law whereas respondents was based only on the current value of like properties.

The DAR and the MARO likewise filed an Answer[8] averring that the determination of just compensation rests exclusively with the LBP. Thus, they are
not liable to respondent and are merely nominal parties in the case.
Meanwhile, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) issued an Order[9] dated April 12, 2000 affirming the valuation made by LBP. Respondent
failed to appear in the DARAB case despite due notice.

On June 4, 2001, the SAC issued an order resolving petitioners affirmative defense in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the Affirmative Defense of x x x Land Bank is hereby denied. Besides, in the mind of the court, the recourse to the
DARAB is x x x of no moment since it is only conciliatory to the parties.

Upon agreement of the parties, the pre-trial is reset to June 11, 2001 at 9:00 in the morning.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Thereafter, a pre-trial conference was conducted[11] and trial on the merits ensued. On March 1, 2003, the SAC rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby fixes the compensation of the land of petitioner at P2.50 per square
meter or a total of P354,847.50 for the portion of 14.1939 hectares subject of compulsory acquisition under the CARP which it
believes just, fair and equitable under the present circumstances and which shall earn legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from the time of its taking by the DAR. Furthermore, respondent Land Bank is hereby ordered to indemnify petitioner the
amount of P10,000.00 for attorneys fee and incidental expenses of P5,000.00 and costs.

SO ORDERED.[12]

LBP elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed the appeal outright on the following grounds:

1. The petition is not accompanied with an affidavit of service, although there is an explanation that respondent, respondents
counsel and Judge Venancio J. Amila were furnished with copies of the petition by registered mail x x x.

2. Petitioners counsel indicated his IBP and PTR but not his Roll of Attorneys Number x x x.

3. Copies of (a) PARAD Decision x x x adverted to in the petition which fixed the land valuation for just compensation at
P299,569.11 and (b) petitioners Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Tagbilaran City, Branch 3, were not attached as annexes, x x x. [13]

Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration,[14] LBP filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, alleging that:

A
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN X X X RIGIDLY OR STRICTLY APPLYING PROCEDURAL LAW AT THE
EXPENSE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO APPEAL.

B
THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST
COMPENSATION WHILE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS IS ON-GOING BEFORE THE DARAB, REGION VII, CEBU CITY.

C
THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN FIXING THE JUST COMPENSATION OF THE LAND BASED NOT ON ITS ACTUAL LAND
USE BUT ON THE VALUATION OF NEIGHBORING LANDS.

D
THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES AND INCIDENTAL EXPENSES X X X.[15]

On the first assigned error, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals should have liberally construed the rules of procedure and not
dismissed its appeal on technical grounds.

We agree with petitioner.

The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal on three technical grounds, namely: (a) lack of affidavit of service; (b) failure of counsel
to indicate his Roll of Attorneys number; and (c) failure to attach material portions of the records. However, the lack of affidavit of service is not deemed
fatal where the petition filed below is accompanied by the original registry receipts showing that the petition and its annexes were served upon the
parties.[16] On the other hand, the failure of counsel to indicate his Roll of Attorneys number would not affect respondents substantive rights, such that
petitioners counsel could have been directed to comply with the latter requirement rather than dismiss the petition on purely technical grounds. As for
petitioners failure to attach material portions of the records, we held in Donato v. Court of Appeals[17] that:
 [T]he failure of the petitioner to x x x append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records as
would support the petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition. It must be emphasized that the RIRCA (Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals) gives the appellate court a certain leeway to require parties to submit additional documents
as may be necessary in the interest of substantial justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of the RIRCA, the CA may
require the parties to complete the annexes as the court deems necessary, and if the petition is given due course, the CA may
require the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for under Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA x x x. [18]
An examination of the records and pleadings filed before the Court of Appeals reveals that there was substantial compliance with procedural
requirements. Moreover, we have held time and again that cases should, as much as possible, be determined on the merits after the parties have
been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfection.[19] After all, technical
rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily devised to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate
cases, therefore, the rules may be construed liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice. [20]

While a remand of the case to the appellate court would seem to be in order, we deem it proper to resolve the case on the merits if only to
write finis to the present controversy.

We do not agree with petitioners submission that the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondents petition for determination of just
compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[21] the
landowner filed an action for determination of just compensation without waiting for the completion of the DARABs re-evaluation of the land. The Court
nonetheless held therein that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over the action for the following reason:

It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for
the determination of just compensation to landowners. This original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if
the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for
the review of administrative decision. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the
RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases
is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into
appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent
is valid.[22]

It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State.[23] The
valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the
courts and not with administrative agencies.[24]Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondents petition for determination of just
compensation.

In the same vein, there is no merit to petitioners contention that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she directly filed
the petition for determination of just compensation with the SAC even before the DARAB case could be resolved. The issue is now moot considering
that the valuation made by petitioner had long been affirmed by the DARAB in its order dated April 12, 2000. As held in Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Wycoco,[25] the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable when the issue is rendered moot and academic, as in the instant
case.

With regard to the third assigned error, however, we agree with petitioner that the SAC erred in setting aside petitioners valuation of
respondents land on the sole basis of the higher valuation given for neighboring properties. In this regard, the SAC held:

It appears from the evidence of petitioner that the neighboring lands of similar classification were paid higher than what
was quoted to her land by respondent Land Bank as the value per square meter to her land was only quoted at P2.1105517 while
the others which were of the same classification were paid by respondent Bank at P2.42 more or less, per square meter referring
to the land of Consuelito Borja (Exh. D) and Cesar Borja (Exh. F). Furthermore, the land of petitioner was allegedly mortgaged for
a loan of P1,200,000.00 before the Rural Bank of San Miguel, Bohol and that it was purchased by her from a certain Felipe Dungog
for P450,000.00 although no documents therefor were shown to support her claim. Nevertheless, the Court finds a patent disparity
in the price quotations by respondent Land Bank for the land of petitioner and that of the other landowners brought under CARP
which could be caused by deficient or erroneous references due to the petitioners indifference and stubborn attitude in not
cooperating with respondent bank in submitting the data needed for the evaluation of the property. x x x At any rate, the price
quotation by respondent Land Bank on the land of the petitioner is low more so that it was done some four years ago, particularly,
on June 22, 1998 (Exh. 1) and the same has become irrelevant in the course of time due to the devaluation of the peso brought
about by our staggering economy.[26]

As can be gleaned from above ruling, the SAC based its valuation solely on the observation that there was a patent disparity between the
price given to respondent and the other landowners. We note that it did not apply the DAR valuation formula since according to the SAC, it is Section
17 of RA No. 6657 that should be the principal basis of computation as it is the law governing the matter.[27] The SAC further held that said Section 17
cannot be superseded by any administrative order of a government agency,[28]thereby implying that the valuation formula under DAR Administrative
Order No. 5, Series of 1998 (DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998),[29] is invalid and of no effect.
 While SAC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors [30] to determine just compensation, it is
equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of RA No.
6657.[31] As the government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DARs duty to issue rules and regulations to
carry out the object of the law. DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998 precisely filled in the details of Section 17, RA No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by
which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement
the said provision.

It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the
force of law, and are entitled to great respect.[32] Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute[33] and have in their favor a presumption of
legality.[34] As such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an
administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.

Thus, Section 17 of RA No. 6657 states:

SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current
value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers
and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

As stated earlier, the above provision is implemented through DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998, which provides that:

A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS or CA:

LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

Where: LV = Land Value

CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all three factors are present, relevant, and applicable.

A1. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = MV x 2

In no case shall the value of idle land using the formula MV x 2 exceed the lowest value of land within the same estate under
consideration or within the same barangay or municipality (in that order) approved by LBP within one (1) year from receipt of
claimfolder.
Accordingly, petitioner applied the formula under A1 above since the comparable sales factor (CS factor) was not present. As observed by
the SAC itself, respondent refused to cooperate with the local valuation office of petitioner and did not provide the necessary data to arrive at a proper
CS factor. DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998 defines CS factor as follows:

C. CS shall refer to any one or the average of all the applicable sub-factors, namely ST, AC and MVM:

Where: ST = Peso Value of Sales Transactions as defined under Item C.2

AC = Acquisition Cost as defined under Item C.3
MVM = Market Value Based on Mortgage as defined under Item C.4

xxxx

C.2. The criteria in the selection of the comparable sales transaction (ST) shall be as follows:
 a. When the required number of STs is not available at the barangay level, additional STs may be secured from the municipality
where the land being offered/covered is situated to complete the required three comparable STs. In case there are more STs
available than what is required at the municipal level, the most recent transactions shall be considered. The same rule shall apply
at the provincial level when no STs are available at the municipal level. In all cases, the combination of STs sourced from the
barangay, municipality and province shall not exceed three transactions.

b. The land subject of acquisition as well as those subject of comparable sales transactions should be similar in topography, land
use, i.e., planted to the same crop. Furthermore, in case of permanent crops, the subject properties should be more or less
comparable in terms of their stages of productivity and plant density.

c. The comparable sales transactions should have been executed within the period January 1, 1985 to June 15, 1988, and
registered within the period January 1, 1985, to September 13, 1988.

xxxx

C.3. Acquisition Cost (AC) AC shall be deemed relevant when the property subject of acquisition was acquired through purchase
or exchange with another property within the period January 1, 1985 to June 15, 1988 and registered within the period January 1,
1985 to September 13, 1988, and the condition of said property is still substantially similar from the date of purchase or exchange
to the date of FI.

xxxx

C.4. Market Value Based on Mortgage (MVM) For MVM to be relevant or applicable, the property subject of acquisition should
have been mortgaged as of June 15, 1988 and the condition of the property is still substantially similar up to the date of FI. MVM
shall refer to the latest available appraised value of the property.

In the case at bar, while respondent attempted to prove during the hearings before the SAC, comparable sales transactions, the acquisition
cost of the property as well as its mortgage value, she failed to submit adequate documentary evidence to support the same. Consequently, there was
nothing from which the CS factor could be determined.

In contrast, petitioner arrived at its valuation by using available factors culled from the Department of Agriculture and Philippine Coconut
Authority,[35] and by computing the same in accordance with the formula provided, thus

COMPUTATION (Applicable Formula) : LV = 0.90 CNI + 0.10 MV

Comparable Land Transactions (P x x x x ____ ) = P x-x-x

Capitalized Net Income: Cassava 16,666.67 x 0.90 = 15,000.00

Corn/Coco 26,571.70 = 23,914.53

Market Value Cassava 8,963.78 x 0.10 = 896.38

per Tax Declaration: Corn/Coco 10,053.93 = 1,005.39

Computed Value per Hectare: Cassava 15,896.38; Corn/Coco 24,919.92

xxx

Value per hectare used: Cassava 15,896.38 x 6.0000 has. = 95,378.28

Corn/Coco 24,919.92 x 8.1939 has. = 204,191.33

Payment due to LO : P299, 569.61

The above computation was explained by Antero M. Gablines, Chief of the Claims, Processing, Valuation and Payment Division of the
Agrarian Operations Center of the Land Bank, to wit:

ATTY. CABANGBANG: (On direct):

xxxx

q. What are the items needed for the Land Bank to compute?
 a. In accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998, the value of the land should be computed using the capitalized
net income plus the market value. We need the gross production of the land and its output and the net income of the
property.

q. You said gross production. How would you fix the gross production of the property?
a. In that Administrative Order No. 5, if the owner of the land is cooperative, he is required to submit the net income. Without
submitting all his sworn statements, we will get the data from the DA (Agriculture) or from the coconut authorities.

xxxx

q. In this recommended amount which you approved, how did you arrive at this figure?
a. We used the data from the Philippine (Coconut) Authority and the Agriculture and the data stated that Cassava production was
only 10,000 kilos per hectare; corn, 2,000 kilos; and coconuts, 15.38 kilos per hectare. The data stated that in the first
cropping of 1986, the price of cassava was P1.00 per kilo; corn was sold at P7.75 per kilo; and the Philippine Coconut
Authority stated that during that time, the selling price of coconuts was P8.23 per kilo.

q. After these Production data and selling price, there is here a cost of operation, what is this?
a. It is the expenses of the land owner or farmer. From day one of the cultivation until production. Without the land owners
submission of the sworn statement of the income, production and the cost, x x x Administrative Order No. 5 states that
x x x we will use 20% as the net income, meaning 80% of the production in peso. This is the cost of valuation.

q. 80 % for what crops?

a. All crops except for coconuts where the cost of expenses is only 20%.

q. Summing all these data, what is the value per hectare of the cassava?
a. The cassava is P15,896.38.

q. How about the corn x x x intercropped with coconuts?

a. P24,919.92.[36]

Under the circumstances, we find the explanation and computation of petitioner to be sufficient and in accordance with applicable laws.
Petitioners valuation must thus be upheld.

Finally, there is no basis for the SACs award of 12% interest per annum in favor of respondent. Although in some expropriation cases, the
Court allowed the imposition of said interest, the same was in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the
part of the government one of forbearance.[37] In this case, there is no delay that would justify the payment of interest since the just compensation due
to respondent has been promptly and validly deposited in her name in cash and LBP bonds. Neither is there factual or legal justification for the award
of attorneys fees and costs of litigation in favor of respondent.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 6462
dated March 1, 2003 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered fixing the just compensation for respondents land at P2.1105517
per square meter or a total of P299,569.61.

SO ORDERED.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEONILA CELADAFACTS:

Celada owns an agricultural land, 60% of which was identified in 1998 by theDepartment of

Agrarian Reform (DAR) as suitable for compulsory acquisition underthe Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Upon indorsement to
it forfield investigation and valuation, Land Bank valued the said land at P299,569.61.DAR offered the same amount to Celada as just compensation.
Celada, however,rejected the offer. The matter was then referred to the DAR Adjudication Board(DARAB) for summary administrative hearing on the
determination of justcompensation.

During the pendency of the DARAB case, Celada filed a petition for judicialdetermination of just compensation, alleging that the current market value
of herland was at least P2,129,085.00. In its answer, Land Bank raised the affirmativedefense of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. It
contended that Celadamust first await the outcome of the DARAB case before taking any judicial recourse.Meanwhile, the DARAB Provincial
Adjudicator affirmed the valuation made by Land
Bank. Thereafter, the Special Agrarian Court (SAC), where Celada’s petitio
n wasfiled, rendered judgment fixing the value of the land at P354,847.50, finding that
Celada’s evidence showed that the neighboring lands of similar classification werepaid higher than what was quoted by Land Bank. It denied Land
Bank’s affirmative
def
ense. The Court of Appeals dismissed Land Bank’s appeal.

Land Bank maintains that the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over Celada’s
petition for judicial determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB. It also contends
that the SACerred in fixing the just compensation of the land based on the valuation of neighboring lands instead of its actual land use.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for judicial determination of just compensation pending administrative
proceedingsbefore the DARAB;2.) Whether or not the SAC erred in fixing the just compensation of the land basedon the valuation of neighboring lands
HELD:
The petition is GRANTED.
SAC correctly assumed jurisdiction over determination of just compensation
The SAC did not err in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the administrative
proceedings beforethe DARAB. As the Court held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
the RTC, sitting as a SAC, has ‘original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions forthe determination of just compensation to landowners.’ This
‘original and exclusive’
jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if DAR would vest in administrativeofficials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC
an appellatecourt for the review of administrative decision. Although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs
sitting as SACs, theoriginal and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs.It should be emphasized that the taking of property under
the CARP is an exerciseof the power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property ordetermination of just compensation is a judicial
function. Thus, the SAC properly
took cognizance of Celada’s petition for determination of just compensation.

SAC erred in fixing just compensation based on valuation of neighboring lands

The SAC, however, erred in setting aside Land Bank’s valuation of the land on the
sole basis of the higher valuation given for neighboring properties. It did not applythe DAR valuation formula which considers capitalized net income,
comparablesales and market value per tax declaration as components of land value

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUZ LIM AND PURITA LIM CABOCHAN
529 SCRA 129 (2007), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore
administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue.

FACTS: Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) compulsorily acquired lands owned by Luz
Lim and Purita Lim Caochan. The Land Bank computed the value of the property. Lim however rejected Land Bank‘s valuation. A summary
administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the property.
Dissatisfied with the PARAD‘s decision, Lim and Cabochan filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court.

The RTC adopted the valuation submitted by the appointed commissioner. Both parties moved for reconsideration. The RTC then reconsidered its
earlier decision and increased the valuation.

Landbank, not satisfied, filed a petition for review on certiorari for fixing the valuation of Lim‘s property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in adopting the calculations of the LBP instead of the Administrative Order of DAR

HELD: In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Banal, the Court underscored the mandatory nature of Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92,
as amended by DAR AO 11-94 which provides that in determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the
property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.‖

It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of
law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As
such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is
declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.
FACTS: (chronological order)
1. Wycoco owns a 94 ha. Piece of land located in Nueva Ecija.
1.1 In line with the CARP, he offered to sell his land for 14.9m to the govt.
1.2 The govt. offered to buy 84 has. of land for 1.3m
1.3 This amount was later raised to 2.5m and then adjusted to 2.2m
1.4 Wycoco rejected the offer.
2. Since there was no amount agreed upon, the case was endorsed to the DARAB.
3. The DARAB deposited the amount into a trust fund with the amount offered to Wycoco, and in the
meantime the land was distributed.
4. Wycoco, instead of filing his memoranda as required by DARAB, decided to forego it and filed a case
for determination of just compensation with the RTC.
4.1 Wycoco informed the DARAB of the pending case with the RTC, thus DARAB dismissed the case to
give way to the case of determination of just compensation with the RTC.
5. DAR and the LBP filed their answers alleging that the determination of just compensation was in
accordance with law.
6. On the other hand, Wycoco presented the TCT and Land Valuations of the land.
7. RTC: in favor of Wycoco
7.1 the RTC ordered DAR and LBP to pay the 14.9m asked by Wycoco, plus 29k in unrealized profits,
and 8m for every year unpaid.
8. Both the DAR and LBP filed their appeal with the CA separately.
8.1 the petition of DAR was dismissed.
8.2 The petition of LBP was also dismissed but the CA modified the order of the RTC reducing the
amounts set by the RTC.
9. Hence, this petition to the SC by LBP.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the “just compensation” ordered by the RTC was supported by substantial evidence considering it was
based only on judicial notice of the prevailing market value of the land?
HELD: No, the RTC should have allowed the parties to present evidence instead of assuming valuations without basis

RATIO:
1. In arriving at the valuation of Wycoco’s land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing market
value of agricultural lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice
thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case.
2. Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial court should have
allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis.
2.1 While market value may be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily
arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property
e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax
declarations thereon.
2.2 Since these factors were not considered, a remand of the case for determination of just compensation is
necessary.
2.3 The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a
vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
2.4 To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court
assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed.
3. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge
of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
known, the basis of his action.

G.R. No. 132767, January 18, 2000

Philippine Veterans Bank
vs Court of Appeals, DAR, DARAB-Davao and Landbank of the Philippines
Ponente: Mendoza

Facts:
PVB owned 4 parcels of land in Tagum, Davao, and these lands were taken by the DAR for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to CARP.
Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by LBP and DARAB, PVB filed a petition for a determination of just compensation for the properties.
The petition was dismissed on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period.

CA affirmed this decision. CA added that the jurisdiction over the land valuation is lodged in the DARAB. PVB filed for reconsideration but was denied
too.

Issue:
Whether the jurisdiction over the fixing of just compensation is under DARAB.

Ruling:
There is nothing contradictory between the "agrarian reform matters" under the jurisdiction of DAR and the "all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform" [which includes just compensation] under the jurisdiction of the RTC. The first is an administrative proceeding while the second is
judicial.

CA is affirmed.
DAR VS. CUENCA
FACTS
Private respondent Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in La Carlota City and devoted principally to the planting of
sugar cane. The MARO of La Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the landholding under
the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657. The NOTICE OF COVERAGE also stated that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) will determine the value
of the subject land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405. Private respondent Cuenca filed with the RTC for Annulment of Notice of Coverage and
Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405. Cuenca alleged that the implementation of CARP in his landholding is no longer with authority of
law considering that, if at all, the implementation should have commenced and should have been completed between June 1988 to June 1992; that
Executive Order No. 405 amends, modifies and/or repeals CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional considering that then President Corazon Aquino
no longer had law-making powers; that the NOTICE OF COVERAGE is a gross violation of PD 399.
Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab initio. The respondent Judge denied MARO Noe
Fortunados motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist
from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the determination of the value of the subject land. The DAR thereafter
filed before the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but was mainly the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also had
the power to issue writs and processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties.

ISSUE
Whether the complaint filed by the private respondent is an agrarian reform and within the jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court

RULING

Yes. A careful perusal of respondents Complaint shows that the principal averments and reliefs prayed for refer -- not to the pure question
of law spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 -- but to the annulment of the DARs Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the main thrust of the
allegations is the propriety of the Notice of Coverage, as may be gleaned from the following averments. The main subject matter raised by private
respondent before the trial court was not the issue of compensation. Note that no amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the DAR. Hence,
there was no occasion to invoke the courts function of determining just compensation. To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage constitutes
the first necessary step towards the acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation
of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency
of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, petitioner, vs. ROBERTO J. CUENCA and Hon. ALFONSO B. COMBONG JR., in His Capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, La Carlota City, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the
DAR, since the law has granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 15, 2002 Decision [2] and the June 18, 2002
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 58536. In the challenged Decision, the CA disposed as follows:

As previously stated, the principal issue raised in the court below involves a pure question of law. Thus, it being clear that the court a quo has jurisdiction
over the nature and subject matter of the case below, it did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed order denying petitioners
motion to dismiss and granting private respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied due course and is accordingly DISMISSED.[4]

The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts

The CA narrated the facts as follows:

Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 816-A and covered by TCT No. 1084, containing
an area of 81.6117 hectares, situated in Brgy. Haguimit, La Carlota City and devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane.

On 21 September 1999, Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of La Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to
private respondent Cuenca placing the above-described landholding under the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The NOTICE OF COVERAGE also stated that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) will
determine the value of the subject land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990.

On 29 September 1999, private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, La Carlota City, a complaint against Noe Fortunado
and Land Bank of the Philippines for Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405, Series of 1990, With
Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 713.

In his complaint, Cuenca alleged, inter alia, that the implementation of CARP in his landholding is no longer with authority of law considering that, if at
all, the implementation should have commenced and should have been completed between June 1988 to June 1992, as provided in the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL); that the placing of the subject landholding under CARP is without the imprimatur of the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCOM) as required by R.A. 7905; that Executive Order No. 405
dated 14 June 1990 amends, modifies and/or repeals CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional considering that on 14 June 1990, then President
Corazon Aquino no longer had law-making powers; that the NOTICE OF COVERAGE is a gross violation of PD 399 dated 28 February 1974.

Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab initio and Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990
be declared unconstitutional.

On 05 October 1999, MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the
nature and subject matter of the action, pursuant to R.A. 6657.

On 12 January 2000, the respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing MARO and LBP to cease and desist from implementing
the Notice of Coverage. In the same order, the respondent Judge set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
on January 17 and 18, 2000.

On 14 January 2000, MARO Fortunado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order granting the TRO contending inter alia that the DAR, through
the MARO, in the course of implementing the Notice of Coverage under CARP cannot be enjoined through a Temporary Restraining Order in the light
of Sections 55 and 68 of R.A. 6657.

In an order dated 16 February 2000, the respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunados motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding
with the determination of the value of the subject land.

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) [thereafter filed before the CA] a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It is the submission of the petitioner that the assailed order is in direct defiance of Republic Act 6657, particularly Section 55 and 68 thereof, which
read:

SECTION 55. NO RESTRAINING ORDERS OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the PARC or any of its duly authorized or designated agencies in any case, dispute or
controversy arising from, necessary to, or in connection with the application, implementation, or enforcement or interpretation of this Act and other
pertinent laws on agrarian reform.

SECTION 68 IMMUNITY OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FROM COURTS INTERFERENCE No injunction, Restraining Order, prohibition or
mandamus shall be issued by the lower court against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in the implementation of their program.
Petitioner contends that by virtue of the above provisions, all lower courts, such as the court presided over by respondent Judge, are barred if not
prohibited by law to issue orders of injunctions against the Department of Agrarian Reform in the full implementation of the Notice of Coverage which
is the initial step of acquiring lands under R.A. 6657.

Petitioner also contends that the nature and subject matter of the case below is purely agrarian in character over which the court a quo has no
jurisdiction and that therefore, it had no authority to issue the assailed injunction order.[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but was mainly the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 405, the CA ruled that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also had the
power to issue writs and processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties.
The appellate court likewise held that petitioners reliance on Sections 55 and 68 of RA 6657 had been misplaced, because the case was not
about a purely agrarian matter. It opined that the prohibition in certain statutes against such writs pertained only to injunctions against administrative
acts, to controversies involving facts, or to the exercise of discretion in technical cases. But on issues involving pure questions of law, courts were not
prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
Hence, this Petition.[6]

Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error by not taking into cognizance that the issues raised in the complaint filed by the private
respondent, which seeks to exclude his land from the coverage of the CARP, is an agrarian reform matter and within the jurisdiction of the DAR, not
with the trial court.

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, gravely abused its discretion by sustaining the writ of injunction issued by the trial court, which
is a violation of Sections 55 and 68 of Republic Act No. 6657.[7]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has merit.

First Issue:
Jurisdiction

In its bare essentials, petitioners argument is that private respondent, in his Complaint for Annulment of the Notice of Coverage, is asking for the
exclusion of his landholding from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). According to the DAR, the issue involves the
implementation of agrarian reform, a matter over which the DAR has original and exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 50 of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657).
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that his Complaint assails mainly the constitutionality of EO 405. He contends that since the
Complaint raises a purely legal issue, it thus falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. We do not agree.
Conflicts involving jurisdiction over agrarian disputes are as tortuous as the history of Philippine agrarian reform laws. The changing jurisdictional
landscape is matched only by the tumultuous struggle for, and resistance to, the breaking up and distribution of large landholdings.

Two Basic Rules

Two basic rules have guided this Court in determining jurisdiction in these cases. First, jurisdiction is conferred by law.[8] And second, the nature
of the action and the issue of jurisdiction are shaped by the material averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.[9] The defenses
resorted to in the answer or motion to dismiss are disregarded; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend entirely upon the whim of the
defendant.[10]

Grant of Jurisdiction

Ever since agrarian reform legislations began, litigants have invariably sought the aid of the courts. Courts of Agrarian Relations (CARs) were
organized under RA 1267[11] [f]or the enforcement of all laws and regulations governing the relation of capital and labor on all agricultural lands under
any system of cultivation. The jurisdiction of these courts was spelled out in Section 7 of the said law as follows:

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction of the Court. - The Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide,
and settle all questions, matters, controversies or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of
persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land, and shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
First Instance over employer and farm employee or labor under Republic Act Numbered six hundred two and over landlord and tenant involving
violations of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655, as amended) and of inflicting the penalties provided therefor.

All the powers and prerogatives inherent in or belonging to the then Courts of First Instance [12] (now the RTCs) were granted to the CARs. The
latter were further vested by the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the following matters:

(1) All cases or actions involving matters, controversies, disputes, or money claims arising from agrarian relations: x x x

(2) All cases or actions involving violations of Chapters I and II of this Code and Republic Act Number eight hundred and nine; and

(3) Expropriations to be instituted by the Land Authority: x x x.[13]

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 946 thereafter reorganized the CARs, streamlined their operations, and expanded their jurisdiction as follows:

Sec. 12. Jurisdiction over Subject Matter. - The Courts of Agrarian Relations shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over:

a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land except those cognizable by the National Labor
Relations Commission; x x x ;

b) Questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, Instructions, Rules and Regulations issued and
promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program; Provided, however, That matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of
the land to the tenant-farmer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and amendatory and related decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall
be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, namely:

(1) classification and identification of landholdings;

(2) x x x;
(3) parcellary mapping;
(4) x x x;
xxxxxxxxx

m) Cases involving expropriation of all kinds of land in furtherance of the agrarian reform program;

xxxxxxxxx

p) Ejectment proceedings instituted by the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank involving lands under their administration and disposition,
except urban properties belonging to the Land Bank;

q) Cases involving violations of the penal provisions of Republic Act Numbered eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, Republic Act Numbered
thirty eight hundred and forty-four, as amended, Presidential Decrees and laws relating to agrarian reform; Provided, however, That violations of the
said penal provisions committed by any Judge shall be tried by the courts of general jurisdiction; and

r) Violations of Presidential Decrees Nos. 815 and 816.

 The CARs were abolished, however, pursuant to Section 44[14] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[15] (approved August 14, 1981), which had fully been
implemented on February 14, 1983. Jurisdiction over cases theretofore given to the CARs was vested in the RTCs. [16]
Then came Executive Order No. 229.[17] Under Section 17 thereof, the DAR shall exercise quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture [DA]. The DAR shall also have the powers to punish for contempt
and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions.
In Quismundo v. CA,[18] this provision was deemed to have repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946, which vested the
then Courts of Agrarian Relations with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by
presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program.
Under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DAR was also made responsible for implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. In accordance with Section 5 of the same EO, it possessed the following powers and functions:

(b) Implement all agrarian laws, and for this purpose, punish for contempt and issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, writs of execution of its
decisions, and other legal processes to ensure successful and expeditious program implementation; the decisions of the Department may in proper
cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such appeal;

xxxxxxxxx

(h) Provide free legal services to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems as may be provided for
by law;

xxxxxxxxx

(l) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as
may be provided x x x."

The above grant of jurisdiction to the DAR covers these areas:

(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;

(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and

(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-
agricultural uses.

The foregoing provision was as broad as those theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court by Presidential Decree No. 946, as the Court ruled
in Vda. de Tangub v. CA,[19] which we quote:

x x x. The intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition stressed by the rules formulated
and promulgated by the Department for the implementation of the executive orders just quoted. The rules included the creation of the Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board designed to exercise the adjudicatory functions of the Department, and the allocation to it of

x x x [O]riginal and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter vested upon it by law, and all cases, disputes, controversies and matters or incidents
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Executive Order No. 229, Executive Order No. 129-A, Republic
Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6289, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

The implementing rules also declare that (s)pecifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to x x x (that theretofore vested in the
Regional Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws x x x.[20]

In the same case, the Court also held that the jurisdictional competence of the DAR had further been clarified by RA 6657 thus:

x x x. The Act [RA 6657] makes references to and explicitly recognizes the effectivity and applicability of Presidential Decree No. 229. More particularly,
the Act echoes the provisions of Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 229, supra, investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with original
jurisdiction, generally, over all cases involving agrarian laws, although, as shall shortly be pointed out, it restores to the Regional Trial Court, limited
jurisdiction over two groups of cases. Section 50 reads as follows:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].

xxxxxxxxx

It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports, compel the production of books and
documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly
deputized officers. It shall likewise have the power to punish direct and indirect contempt in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as
provided in the Rules of Court.[21]

Nonetheless, we have held that the RTCs have not been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657
confers special jurisdiction on Special Agrarian Courts, which are actually RTCs designated as such by the Supreme Court. [22] Under Section 57 of the
same law, these Special Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the following matters:

1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners, and

2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under x x x [the] Act.

The above delineation of jurisdiction remains in place to this date. Administrative Circular No. 29-2002[23] of this Court stresses the distinction
between the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR under Sections 50 and 55 of RA 6657 and the jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Courts referred to by
Sections 56 and 57 of the same law.

Allegations of the Complaint

A careful perusal of respondents Complaint[24] shows that the principal averments and reliefs prayed for refer -- not to the pure question of law
spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 -- but to the annulment of the DARs Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the main thrust of the allegations
is the propriety of the Notice of Coverage, as may be gleaned from the following averments, among others:

6. This implementation of CARP in the landholding of the [respondent] is contrary to law and, therefore, violates [respondents] constitutional right not
to be deprived of his property without due process of law. The coverage of [respondents] landholding under CARP is NO longer with authority of law. If
at all, the implementation of CARP in the landholding of [respondent] should have commenced and [been] completed between June 1988 to June
1992 as provided for in CARL, to wit: x x x;

7. Moreover, the placing of [respondents] landholding under CARP as of 21 September 1999 is without the imprimatur of the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC) and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCOM) as mandated and required by law pursuant to R.A.
7905 x x x;

xxxxxxxxx

9. Under the provisions of CARL, it is the PARC and/or the DAR, and not x x x Land Bank, which is authorized to preliminarily determine the value of
the lands as compensation therefor, thus x x x;

xxxxxxxxx

12. That the aforementioned NOTICE OF COVERAGE with intendment and purpose of acquiring [respondents] aforementioned land is a gross violation
of law (PD 399 dated 28 February 1974 which is still effective up to now) inasmuch as [respondents] land is traversed by and a road frontage as
admitted by the DARs technician and defendant FORTUNADO (MARO) x x x;

13. That as reflected in said Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, copy of which is hereto attached as annex D forming part hereof, [respondents] land is
above eighteen percent (18%) slope and therefore, automatically exempted and excluded from the operation of Rep. Act 6657, x x x.[25] (Italics supplied)

In contrast, the 14-page Complaint touches on the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 by merely making these two allegations:

10. Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990 (issued by the then President Corazon Aquino) is unconstitutional for it plainly amends, modifies
and/or repeals CARL. On 14 June 1990, then President Corazon Aquino had no longer law-making powers as the Philippine Congress was by then
already organized, existing and operational pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. A copy of the said Executive Order is hereto attached as Annex B
forming part hereof.

11. Our constitutional system of separation of powers renders the said Executive Order No. 405 unconstitutional and all valuations made, and to be
made, by the defendant Land Bank pursuant thereto are null and void and without force and effect. Indispensably and ineludibly, all related rules,
regulations, orders and other issuances issued or promulgated pursuant to said Executive Order No. 405 are also null and void ab initio and without
force and effect.[26]

We stress that the main subject matter raised by private respondent before the trial court was not the issue of compensation (the subject matter
of EO 405[27]). Note that no amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to invoke the courts function
of determining just compensation.[28]
To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage[29] constitutes the first necessary step towards the acquisition of private land under the
CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus,
the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that
is clearly agrarian.
In view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points pleaded by respondent in relation to the jurisdictional issue. We need only
to point that in case of doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies, even if the question[s] involved [are] also judicial in character, [30] as in this case.
Second Issue:
Preliminary Injunction

Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows that the RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of
authority to issue the assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity. Such nullity is particularly true in
the light of the express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Courts Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002. These Circulars enjoin
all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657, which reads:

Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by
the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Decision and Resolution REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
February 16, 2000 Order of the RegionalTrial Court of La Carlota City (Branch 63) is ANNULLED and a new one entered, DISMISSING the Complaint
in Civil Case 713. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein is also expressly VOIDED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 173386 February 11, 2014

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, now represented by OIC-SEC. NASSER PANGANDAMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, FRANNIE GREENMEADOWS PASTURES, INC., ISABEL GREENLAND AGRI-
BASED RESOURCES, INC., ISABEL GREENMEADOWS QUALITY PRODUCTS, INC., ERNESTO BARICUATRO, CLAUDIO VILLO and EFREN
NUEVO, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 174162

GRACE B. FUA, in her capacity as the PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, JOSELIDO S. DAYOHA, JESUS
S. DAYOHA and RODRIGO S. LICANDA, Petitioners,

vs.
TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, FRANNIE GREENMEADOWS PASTURES, INC., ISABEL GREENLAND
AGRI-BASED RESOURCES, INC., ISABEL EVERGREEN PLANTATIONS INC., MICHELLE FARMS, INC. ISABEL GREENMEADOWS QUALITY
PRODUCTS, INC., ERNESTO BARICUATRO, CLAUDIO VILLO and EFREN NUEVO, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No.183191

TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, FRANNIE GREENMEADOWS PASTURES, INC., ISABEL GREENLAND AGRI-
BASED RESOURCES, INC., ISABEL GREENMEADOWS QUALITY PRODUCTS, INC., ERNESTO BARICUATRO,CLAUDIO VILLO and EFREN
NUEVO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The consolidated petitions before us raise intertwined issues of jurisdiction over cases involving the implementation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988" (hereinafter, RA 6657). The petitions likewise question whether a regional trial court may
exercise jurisdiction if the case also assails the constitutionality of administrative orders, regulations and other related issuances implementing the said
law.

The following facts are common to the three cases under consolidation:

Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, Frannie Greenmeadows Pastures, Inc., Isabel Greenland Agri-based Resources, Inc., Isabel
Evergreen Plantations, Inc., Michelle Farms, Inc., Isabel Greenmeadows Quality Products, Inc., Ernesto Baricuatro, Claudio Villo, and Efren Nuevo
(hereinafter, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al.) are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Vallehermoso,1 Negros
Oriental. The landholding consists of a total area of 641. 7895 hectares - about 200 hectares thereof are devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed 479.8905 hectares of the said landholding under the coverage of RA 6657 between March 1995 and
July 2000. Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were subsequently issued in favor of the agrarian
reform beneficiaries.2

On June 10, 2004, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Guihulngan,
Negros Oriental, a Petition for Declaration of Unconstitutionality Through Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction and Restraining Order3 against the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the DAR, and the beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP), docketed as Special Civil Action No. 04-02-V. In their Petition, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al.
made the following main allegations:

1. That the DAR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it committed the following acts: it passed
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 and other related issuances which allowed the DAR to unilaterally choose beneficiaries other
than those intended by the Constitution as beneficiaries; it subjected Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al.' s properties
to compulsory acquisition, when it ordered the Land Bank to determine the valuation of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation,
et al.' s land without any judicial pronouncement on just compensation; and, it unilaterally ordered the cancellation of petitioner's title without
court intervention when it issued final CLOAs to beneficiaries who are not yet owners of the land and without any court proceeding.

2. The valuation by Land Bank is not just compensation.

3. The Register of Deeds cannot cancel Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al.'s title without a court order.

4. The Land Bank, the LRA and the Register of Deeds also committed grave abuse of discretion when they cooperated to commit the
aforementioned acts.4
The DAR5 filed its Answer6 asserting that (a) jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters is exclusively vested in the DAR; (b) the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules provides that the power to cancel or annul CLOAs is vested in the DARAB; and the jurisdiction
of the R TC in agrarian reform matters is limited only to the determination of just compensation and prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657;
(c) the RTC has no jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in agrarian reform cases, which is vested by Section 54 of RA
6657, in the Court of Appeals (CA); (d) the transfer of ownership and physical installation of the beneficiaries is authorized by RA 6657 as laid down in
Association of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform;7 (e) the petition is defective in form and substance; and (f)
the CLOAs partake of the nature of a Torrens Title and their validity cannot be collaterally attacked.

Subsequently, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Petition and for Admission of the Amended
Petition8 in order to change the nature of the action from a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to an ordinary action of annulment
of land titles. The DAR, et al. opposed the motion in its Opposition9 dated July 28, 2004.

On August 13, 2004, the RTC conducted a hearing on the propriety of admitting the amended petition. On October 26, 2004, it issued the assailed
Order10 admitting the amended petition and ruling that it had jurisdiction over the case, viz.:

WHEREFORE, this Court rules and so holds that:

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the instant case;

2. The Amended Petition is admitted and defendants may file responsive pleadings or amendments to their original answers within ten [10]
days from receipt hereof; and

3. The plaintiffs have not made out a case for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction,
and therefore the plaintiffs' prayer for its issuance is denied.

SO ORDERED.11

In an Urgent Omnibus Motion12 dated December 2, 2004, LRA, et al. moved for reconsideration on the ground of lack of merit and jurisdiction. The
DAR similarly filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 dated December 8, 2004 on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction. Both motions were denied by
the RTC in its Order14 dated January 7, 2005.

In a petition for certiorari15 filed with the CA, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, and the LRA sought to annul the
subject Order of the R TC on the following grounds: (1) the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the petition and amended petition of Trinidad Valley
Realty and Development Corporation, et al. in view of Section 54 of RA 6657; (2) the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the
amended petition; and (3) the R TC did not acquire jurisdiction over the amended petition as the correct docket and other legal fees had not been paid.

By Decision16 and Resolution17 dated June 28, 2007 and May 21, 2008, respectively, the CA reversed and set aside the Order of the RTC, viz.:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Order of the court a quo is hereby ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE. The court a quo is hereby directed to DISMISS Civil Action No. 04-02-V, entitled "Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al. vs. The Honorable Jose Mari B. Ponce, et al." for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

SO ORDERED.18

The CA ratiocinated that the R TC did not have jurisdiction over both the petition and amended petition filed by Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al. in view of Section 54 of RA 6657 which clearly provides that it is the CA, and not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.19 The
CA also reiterated the ruling of this Court in the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform20 declaring the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law" constitutional. Quoting the following portion of the landmark decision, the CA stressed
that the ruling therein has, in effect, foreclosed any possible attack on the constitutionality of the law, viz.:

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true
freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and
from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It
will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep
despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities
and dark resentments and 'rebuild in it the music and the dream.'21

On the issue of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended petition, the CA declared that while the Rules of Court
allow amendments which substantially alter the nature of the cause of action in order to serve the higher interest of substantial justice, prevent delay
and promote the objective of the Rules to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, the admission by the RTC
of the amended petition was not proper and should have been denied.22 Prescinding from its ruling that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the
original petition, the CA held that the RTC consequently did not have authority to order the admission of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al.' s amended complaint in order for it to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.23 In view of these dispositions, the CA deemed it
unnecessary to discuss the third issue.

Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. moved for reconsideration24 and reiterated that judicial review was within the jurisdiction of
the lower court and that the requirements for raising the constitutionality issues had been complied with. It also stressed that the amendment of the
complaint did not change the cause of the action of unconstitutionality and that the case was already pending before this Court.

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that no new arguments were raised to warrant a reexamination of its ruling on the issue
of the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC.25 As to the averment of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. that the CA' s assailed June
28, 2007 Decision was already rendered moot and academic by a judgment of the RTC dated October 17, 2005 in Civil Case No. 04-013-V, entitled
"Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. v. The Honorable Rene Villa, in his capacity as Secretary of DAR, et al.," the CA pointed
out that what was challenged in the petition filed before it was Special Civil Action No. 04-02-V, entitled "Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al. v. Jose Mari B. Ponce, in his capacity as Secretary of DAR, et al."26 The CA further stated in its assailed Resolution, viz.:

Be that as it may, it must be emphasized that the subject matter of the instant petition is the jurisdiction of the court a quo to try and hear [Special Civil
Action] No. 04-02-V. Accordingly, this Court ruled that the court a quo does not have jurisdiction to try the case.

Granting arguendo that Civil Case No. 04-013-V and [Special Civil Action] No. 04-02-V are the same, the June 28, 2007 Decision of this Court cannot
be rendered moot and academic by the judgment of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 04-013-V. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor
General, a decision rendered by a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it's as if no decision was ever rendered by the court a
quo.

Accordingly, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.27

Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. now appeals to this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari28 raising substantially
the principal issue of whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the original and amended petitions.

We shall resolve this issue in consolidation with two other petitions filed before this Court - G.R. No. 173386 (DAR, et al. v. Trinidad Valley Realty &
Development Corporation, et al.) and G.R. No. 174162 (Grace B. Fua, in her capacity as Provincial Reform Officer of Negros Oriental, et al. v. Trinidad
Valley Realty & Development Corporation, et al.). Both petitions stemmed from the assailed Decision 29 later issued by the RTC dated October 17,
2005 - the same RTC Decision that Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. had brought to the attention of the CA in their motion
for reconsideration. The RTC Decision was reached after it issued its assailed Order in Special Civil Action No. 04-02-V - ruling that it had jurisdiction
over the original petition (special civil action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus) and therefore had the authority to admit the amended petition
(ordinary action of annulment of land titles). Pre-trial proceeded in the ordinary action which was re-docketed as Civil Case No. 04-013-V. There being
no factual issue involved, the case was submitted for judgment based on the pleadings. The resulting assailed judgment on the pleadings declared as
unconstitutional and void the following administrative issuances of the DAR and the LRA, Executive Order No. 405, and other related issuances, viz.:

i. Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1989 - Registration/Selection of Beneficiaries - DAR chooses beneficiaries under A.O. No. 10, Series
of 1989 using as its basis, Section 22 of RA 6657 allowing farmers, farmworkers, or any person who is landless to become a beneficiary of
any private agricultural land. Under this Administrative Order, not only farmworkers or farmers working on a particular land are entitled to
become beneficiaries, but any person who is landless, in short a non-tiller of the land, as long as he is capable and willing to become such
a beneficiary.

ii. Administrative Orders No. 12, Series of 1989, No. 9, Series of 1990 and No. 2, Series of 1996 allows DAR to place under compulsory
coverage all private agricultural land by merely sending a notice of coverage; these administrative orders covering the same subjects,
supersede one another from its earliest which is A.O. 12, Series of 1989, through Administrative Order No. 9, and polished into its last
reincarnation, Administrative Order No 2, Series of 1996. Under these Orders, DAR granted itself the following powers which it has enforced:
[1] to compulsorily acquire all private agricultural lands; [2] to order Land Bank to determine just compensation; and [3] to cancel the
landowner's title and transfer the land to the Republic of the Philippines [RP];

iii. Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1990 authorizes DAR to cancel the RP title and issue final titles called Certificate of Land Ownership
Award [CLO As] which in turn it uses as basis to distribute private agricultural lands covered to beneficiaries;

iv. Joint DAR-LRA Memorandum Circular No. 20, Series of 1997 and all other previous DAR-LRA Memorandum Circulars are a series of
agreements whereby DAR and the LRA agreed that the Registers of Deeds under LRA shall cancel landowners' titles upon the request or
directive of DAR. and thereafter register final titles to beneficiaries called Certificates of Land Ownership A ward;
 v. Executive Order No. 405 promulgated by President Aquino which is interpreted by DAR as authorizing Land Bank to determine just
compensation;

vi. All other Administrative Orders and related issuances that prescribe substantially the same procedure as the above-foregoing Orders and
Regulations existing or to be issued by the DAR with the same intent and effect in prescribing a non-judicial process of land acquisition.30

The RTC also annulled the CLOAs issued by the DAR and issued a permanent prohibitory injunction31 restraining private defendant beneficiaries, DAR
defendants and other entities from exercising acts of possession, dispossession or ownership over any portion of the subject property, and preventing
the DAR from subjecting the landholdings of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. under the coverage of agrarian reform through
the implementation of the administrative orders and issuances.32

Hence, the Petitions for Review on Certiorari filed in G.R. Nos. 17338633 and 17416234 posing the same intersecting jurisdictional question in these
consolidated cases: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the original and amended petitions filed by Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al.

It is a cardinal principle in remedial law that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action is determined by the law in force at the time
of the filing of the complaint and the allegations of the complaint.35Jurisdiction is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law and cannot be
conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties. It cannot also be acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission,
nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court. It is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in
character.36 The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments
in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also
remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.37

In the case at bar, the CA has correctly and succinctly synthesized that both the original petition for the "Declaration of Unconstitutionality Through
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining Order" and the amended petition for "Judicial
Review Through an Action to Annul Titles, and Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunctions with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining
Order" contain the same allegations, viz.:

x x x that beneficiaries are not those intended by the Constitution as beneficiaries; that subject properties cannot be subjected to compulsory acquisition
because its farm operations are under labor administration; that the valuation of the land was not judicially determined; that the cancellation of
petitioners' title over the subject properties and the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership A ward were effected without any court intervention;
that a case for expropriation should have been filed in court; and that certain DAR Administrative Orders are unconstitutional. 38

We also agree with the assessment of the appellate court that these allegations assail the acts of the DAR in awarding the CLOAs to the beneficiaries
and question the procedure in fixing the compensation - acts which pertain to the very "application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation"39 of
RA 6657 or the agrarian reform law and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform.

Section 54 of RA 6657 leaves no room for doubt that decisions, orders, awards or rulings of the DAR may be brought to the CA by certiorari and not
with the RTC through an ordinary action for cancellation of title, as in the instant case:

SECTION 54. Certiorari. - Any decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by
certiorari except as otherwise provided in this Act within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of a copy thereof.

The findings of fact of the DAR shall be final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

An examination of the records40 in the instant case would show that Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation had actually brought the
matter to the DAR prior to its filing of the original and amended petitions with the RTC. The following incidents on record reveal an acknowledgment
by Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation that the case indeed involves issues relating to the application, implementation, enforcement
or interpretation of RA 6657, viz.:

1. Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation had originally filed a case with the DARAB for Cancellation of CLOA, Injunction and
Damages with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. The subject property covered the same landholding in the instant
case covering the same area of 641. 7895 hectares. The case was dismissed by the DAR Provincial Adjudicator in an Order dated March
31, 1997 on the ground that the matters raised by Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation involved the administrative
implementation of RA 6657. The case was then treated as a protest against CARP coverage. It was again dismissed in an Order dated
November 19, 1997 for lack ofmerit.41
 2. A Motion for Reconsideration dated December 15, 1997 was filed seeking for a reversal and exemption of those areas with a slope of
18% and above from CARP coverage. An addendum to the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 2, 1998 was also filed wherein
Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation manifested, among others, its voluntary offer to sell to the government a one hundred-
hectare portion of the subject land. For utter lack of merit, both motions were dismissed by the DAR Regional Director on August 7, 1998
and the order dated November 19, 1997 was affirmed.42

3. On September 25, 1998, an appeal was filed before the Office of the Secretary. An Appeal Memorandum later filed on November 10,
1998 raised the following issue on whether the subject landholding was properly subjected to CARP coverage. The Office of the Secretary
denied the appeal for lack of merit in an Order dated March 17, 2004. The Order stated that the subject lands have a slope of 18% and were
already developed as of June 15, 1988. Furthermore, the Order also stated that at the time of the resolution of the Appeal therein, the subject
land was already being occupied by farmer-beneficiaries with their respective CLOAs which cannot be attacked collaterally. The Order also
held that Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that the areas that it wanted to be
exempted from CARP coverage due to the 18% slope limitation are non-productive and less suitable for agricultural use.43

This Order which was issued by the then DAR OIC-Secretary was not appealed by protestant Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation to
the CA. This Order is exactly in the nature of any such "decision, order, award or ruling" of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining
to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform which may be brought to the
CA by certiorari, except as otherwise provided in RA 6657, within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof - and not to the RTC. It is also significant to
note that in the proceedings before the DAR involving the protest of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, the issue on the
unconstitutionality of the subject administrative issuances promulgated to implement RA 6657 was never raised - an issue that must have been raised
at the earliest possible opportunity.

The jurisdictional shifts on the authority to hear and decide agrarian reform matters is instructive:

x x x in 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the Courts of Agrarian Relations
were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts.

However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987, the Regional Trial Courts were divested of their
general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which took effect on June 15, 1988, contains provisions which evince and support
the intention of the legislature to vest in the Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters.

Section 50, of said law substantially reiterates Section 17, of Executive Order No. 229, vesting in the Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive and
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, to wit:

"SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)."

In addition, Sections 56 and 57, thereof provide for the designation by the Supreme Court of at least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial Court within
each province to act as a special agrarian court. The said special court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction only over petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of criminal offenses under said Act. Said provisions thus delimit the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts in agrarian cases only to these two instances. Thus:

"SEC. 56. Special Agrarian Court. - The Supreme Court shall designate at least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within each province
to act as a Special Agrarian Court.

"The Supreme Court may designate more branches to constitute such additional Special Agrarian Courts as may be necessary to cope with the number
of agrarian cases in each province. In the designation, the Supreme Court shall give preference to the Regional Trial Courts which have been assigned
to handle agrarian cases or whose presiding judges were former judges of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations.xx x."

"SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the
Special Agrarian Courts unless modified by this Act.1âwphi1

"The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for
decision."44
The case at bar deals with acts of the DAR and the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of RA 6657 - issues which do not involve
the "special jurisdiction" of the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court. Hence, when the court a quo heard and decided the instant case, it did so
without jurisdiction.

The Court likewise ruled in the similar case of DAR v. Cuenca45 that "[a]ll controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or
constitutional in nature." In said case, it was noted that the main thrust of the allegations in the Complaint was the propriety of the Notice of Coverage
and "not x x x the 'pure question of law' spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 - but x x x the annulment of the DAR' s Notice of
Coverage."46 The Court thus held that:

To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage constitutes the first necessary step towards the acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly
then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR
could not be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly
agrarian.47(Emphasis supplied)

The legal recourse undertaken by Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. is on all-fours with the remedy adopted by the private
respondents in Cuenca. In this case, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. cloaked the issue as a constitutional question -
assailing the constitutionality of administrative issuances promulgated to implement the agrarian reform law - in order to annul the titles issued therein.
In Cuenca, private respondents assailed the constitutionality of EO 45 in order to annul the Notice of Coverage issued therein. The only difference is
that in Cuenca, private respondents directly filed with the R TC their complaint to obtain the aforesaid reliefs while in this case, Trinidad Valley Realty
and Development Corporation, et al. filed their original petition for certiorari with the R TC after the protest of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation against the coverage of its landholding under CARP was dismissed by the DAR Regional Director and such dismissal was affirmed by
DAR OIC Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce. But in both cases, it is evident that the constitutional angle was an attempt to exclude the cases from the
ambit of the jurisdictional prescriptions under RA 6657.

The Court further stated in Cuenca that "in case of doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters
that demand the special competence of administrative agencies, 'even if the question[s] involved [are] also judicial in character."'48 In the instant case,
however, there is hardly any doubt that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Consequently, it did not have authority to
perform any of the following: order the admission of the amended petition of Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al., decide the
amended petition on the merits, or issue a permanent prohibitory injunction. In any case, such injunction issued by the RTC is a nullity in view of the
express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Court's Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002 enjoining all trial judges to strictly
observe Section 68 of RA 6657, viz.:

SECTION 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. - No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued
by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program.

Given our ruling that the R TC lacked jurisdiction over the instant case, we find no necessity to address the other issues raised in the three consolidated
petitions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 183191 is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88512 dated June 28, 2007 and May 21, 2008, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 173386 and 174162 are hereby
GRANTED. The challenged Order in Special Civil Action No. 04-02-V, entitled Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. v. Jose Mari
B. Ponce, in his capacity as Secretary of DAR, et al. dated October 26, 2004 and the Decision in Civil Case No. 04-013-V, entitled Trinidad Valley
Realty and Development Corporation, et al. v. The Honorable Rene Villa, in his capacity as Secretary of DAR, et al. dated October 1 7, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental is likewise ordered to DISMISS herein Special Civil Action No. 04-02-V and Civil Case No. 04-013-V for lack
of jurisdiction. The Writ of Permanent Prohibitory Injunction dated April 18, 2006 issued by the said court by virtue of its Order on even date is hereby
LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

With costs against the petitioners in G .R. No. 183191.

SO ORDERED.
 LA CAMPANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 154152
Petitioner, Present:

- versus CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,
PERALTA
ABAD, and

ARTURO LEDESMA, HON. JUDGE ESTRELLA T. MENDOZA, JJ.

ESTRADA, in her capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon City, and the HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, Promulgated:
Respondents.

August 25, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February
13, 2002, ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and its Resolution [2] dated June 28, 2002 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration, be declared null and void ab initio.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
Petitioner filed an ejectment case with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) against private respondent Ledesma, alleging that despite expiration of
the contract of lease executed between them and demands to vacate subject premises and pay rentals therefor, the latter failed to comply with such
demands. Private respondent countered in his Answer that he had paid the rentals over subject premises and petitioner no longer had the right to
possess the property as it had been foreclosed by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Private respondent further pointed out that subject
premises had in fact been in the possession of the DBP since March or April of 1997, so since that time, it was with the DBP that he made arrangements
for his continued occupation of the subject premises.
The MeTC then rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, ordering private respondent to surrender possession of subject premises to petitioner. Private
respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), and to stay execution of said judgment, private respondent filed a supersedeas bond with the
MeTC.
The RTC affirmed the MeTC judgment. Petitioner then moved for the immediate execution of the RTC Decision, which motion was granted by the
RTC. Meanwhile, private respondent elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. A temporary restraining order was issued by the CA, effectively staying implementation of the writ of
execution issued by the RTC. Eventually, the CA also issued a writ of preliminary injunction per Resolution dated February 13, 2002. In justification of
the issuance of said writ, the CA stated in said Resolution that:
Based on the evidence before Us, We are convinced that the execution of the assailed decision of the RTC at this stage will probably
cause injustice to the petitioner [herein private respondent].We cannot ignore Our ruling in CA-GR CV No. 34856 which had already
attained finality. The facts on hand show that the DBP is the present owner of the leased premises. The only person who can lawfully
eject an unwelcome tenant from the leased premises is the owner thereof or persons deriving rights from said owner, of which
private respondent [herein petitioner], in its Opposition to the present motion, does not pretend to be. Contrary to the stand of the
respondent, the petitioner is not estopped from questioning the title of respondent over the leased premises as the rule on estoppel
against tenants is subject to a qualification. It does not apply if the landlord's title has expired, or has been conveyed to another, or
has been defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the commencement of lessor-lessee relationship. In other words, if there
was a change in the nature of the title of the landlord during the subsistence of the lease, then the presumption does not apply.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Resolution was denied on June 28, 2002.
Thus, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the aforementioned CA Resolutions.
The issues boil down to whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ordered the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the immediate execution of the RTC judgment and whether mandamus lies to compel respondent RTC Judge
to issue a writ of execution.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
For the Court to issue a writ of certiorari against the CA, it is incumbent upon petitioner to show that said lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion. In Quasha Ancheta Pea & Nolasco Law Office v. Special Sixth Division, Court of Appeals,[3] the Court stated that:
Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation or law.[4]
A showing of such grave abuse of discretion is sorely wanting in this case.
It is true that Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that [t]he judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be
immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. However, the Court ruled in Benedicto v. Court of
Appeals[5] that on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so require. x x x even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer
cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. Citing Amagan v. Marayag[6] and Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao,[7] the Court
explained in Benedicto that:
Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises
is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical
possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership
or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case
in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. x x x [8]
Moreover, the Court also stressed in City of Naga v. Asuncion[9] that:
As a rule, the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and
will not be interfered with, except in cases of manifest abuse. x x x
xxxx
x x x Be it noted that for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules of Court do not require that the act complained of
be in clear violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in violation
of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy. x x x [10]
In the afore-quoted case, the Court reiterated that when exigencies in the case warrant it, the appellate court may stay the writ of execution issued by
the RTC in an action for ejectment if there are circumstances necessitating such action. An example of such exceptional circumstance can be seen
in Laurel v. Abalos.[11] Therein, a defendant was ordered by the trial court to vacate the premises of the disputed property and return possession thereof
to the plaintiffs, but while the ejectment case was on appeal, a judgment was promulgated in a separate case where the sale of the property to said
plaintiffs was declared null and void, making the plaintiffs' right to possess the disputed property inconclusive. The Court ruled in said case that:
Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes the
execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances,
the court may stay immediate execution of the judgment.[12]
Based on the foregoing earlier ruling in Laurel,[13] the Court also considered it just and equitable to stay the execution of the RTC judgment in an
ejectment case against the City of Naga, stating that:
Needless to reiterate, grave and irreparable injury will be inflicted on the City of Naga by the immediate execution of the June 20,
2005 RTC Decision. x x x the people of Naga would be deprived of access to basic social services. It should not be forgotten that
the land subject of the ejectment case houses government offices which perform important functions vital to the orderly operation of
the local government. x x x[14]
In the present case, there also exists a material change in the situation of the parties. The CA properly took into serious consideration the fact that in
its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856 entitled La Campana Food Products, Inc. v. Development Bank of the Philippines, which has become final and
executory, it ordered herein petitioner, formerly known as La Campana Food Products, Inc., to surrender possession of subject properties
to the Development Bank of the Philippines. Evidently, a serious cloud of doubt has been cast on petitioners right of possession, making it
questionable whether the RTC Decision, ordering private respondent to surrender possession of subject premises to petitioner, should be immediately
implemented. Therefore, the CA did not gravely abuse its discretion in this case; rather, it acted prudently when it stayed execution of the RTC Decision
until such time that a final resolution of the main case is reached.
Petitioner's contention, that it was improper for the CA to have granted private respondent's motion to consider the supersedeas bond it posted with
the Metropolitan Trial Court as sufficient to cover the bond required for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, is likewise incorrect. Petitioner
argues that, said supersedeas bond is posted solely and primarily to answer for a specific purpose which is for the payment of unpaid rentals accruing
up to the final judgment. This cannot be held answerable for damages to petitioner should it later be found out that the private respondent is not entitled
to the issuance [of a writ of preliminary injunction].[15]
Note that Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that:
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond
executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party
or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued;
However, in Hualam Construction and Dev't. Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[16] the Court expounded on what damages may be recovered in actions for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, to wit:
As to damages, We have on several occasions ruled that since the only issue raised in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases is
that of rightful physical possession, the damages recoverable in these cases are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as
a mere possessor, i.e., those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may
have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. x x x Simply put, damages in the context of
Section 8 of Rule 70 [now Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] is limited to rent or fair rental value for the use and occupation
of the property.[17]
Since the only damages that petitioner may be entitled to in an action for unlawful detainer are those arising from its loss of the use
or occupation of subject premises, the only damages petitioner can claim by reason of the stay of execution of the RTC judgment
is also only for the rent or fair rental value for the property in question. Therefore, the CA did not err in considering
the supersedeas bond filed with the MTC, which answers for unpaid rentals, as sufficient bond for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
In light of the foregoing, it is quite clear that there is no reason to compel the RTC to immediately implement the writ of execution in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated February 13, 2002 and June 28, 2002,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66668, are AFFIRMED.

CREBA v. Agrarian Reform Secretary (G.R. No. 183409; June 18, 2010)

CASE DIGEST: CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) v. THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

FACTS:

Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses.
The said AO embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced and all untitled agricultural lands and
agricultural lands reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988. March 1999, Sec DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non AgriculturalUses, it covers the following: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial,
institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond
─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-
agricultural use other than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on
or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and
regulations, and are to be converted to such uses. The 2 earlier AOs was further amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 - 2002 Comprehensive Rules
on Land Use Conversion; covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.The AO was
amended again in 2007 to include provisions particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. To address the conversion
to lands to non agricultural, Sec of DAR suspended processing and approval of land conversion through DAR Memo 88. CREBA claims that there is
a slowdown of housing projects because of such stoppage

ISSUES: Is DAR's AO unconstitutional?

HELD:

RA 6657 and 8435 defines agricultural land as lands devoted to or suitable for the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising
of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction
with such farming operations done by a person whether natural or juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. However, he issued an AO included in this definition - lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses before 15 June 1988. In effect, lands reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses
after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. This is violation of RA 6657 because
there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require
that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority. It also violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it
was not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or that the DARs approval or
clearance must be secured to effect reclassification.The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the constitutional
mandate on local autonomy under Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. There is deprivation of liberty and
property without due process of law because under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DARs jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily
and oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on pain of administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is discrimination and
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased in favor of the peasantry at the
expense of all other sectors of society.