Case Study of the Use of API 581

Soudabeh A. Noori on HK and HP Material Furnace

John W. H. Price
Professor
e-mail: [email protected]
Tubes
Risk-based inspection guidelines have been created by several technical societies, most
Mechanical Engineering, notably the ASME and API. This study intends to show how one of these techniques,
Monash University, American Petroleum Institute, API 581 assesses risk and determines inspection intervals
PO Box 197, of furnaces tubes. The paper also explains the difficulties of applying API 581 and dis-
Caulfield East, Victoria, 3145 cusses the meaning of the results and the inspection program proposed in API 581.
关DOI: 10.1115/1.1845475兴

Keywords: Risk Based Inspection, RBI, Furnace Tubes, API 581

1 Introduction Reformer tubes are generally made from cast creep resistant aus-
tenitic steel HK grade 共25 Cr, 20 Ni, 0.4 C兲 or HP grade 共26 Cr, 35
Inspection to detect potential failures has been an important
Ni, 0.4 C兲. Although the furnace tubes are usually designed for a
activity in industry for more than 100 years. The traditional view
normal life of 100,000 h 共11.4 years兲, their actual service life,
of inspection is that it should reduce the probability of failure of however, varies from 30,000 to 180,000 h, which is 5–20 years
the components being inspected. Design codes and standards in depending on the service conditions and the quality of materials
this area are written to deal with structural integrity but they were 关1兴.
not as helpful for managing inspections.
Risk in the formal definition is the product of consequence and
frequency. The failure of pressure equipment can have several
undesirable consequences such as fires, toxic releases, major en- 2 Semi-Quantitative RBI Analysis Furnace Tubes
vironmental damage, and business interruption losses. Given this, Semi-quantitative RBI analysis here is done using the organized
it should be the intention that not only the frequency of failure but methodology developed by API as outlined in the API Base Re-
also the consequence of failures should be reduced by inspection/ source Document API 581. API RBI Appendix J considers the
maintenance activities. furnace tube failures because of creep or overheating. Materials
In the 1990s it became apparent that the lack of uncomplicated data provided in API RBI Appendix J are ferritic steel 共carbon
and suitable quantitative guidance for determining risk was a ma- steel and low alloy steels up to 12 Cr兲 and austenitic stainless steel
jor problem for any pressure system user trying to determine the 共types 304, 316, 321, and 347兲.
priorities of an inspection program. Guidance on inspection pro- In this case study reducing gas furnaces tubes have designed
gramming had to be practical and had to take account of damage based on API 530 procedures but the tubes are made of materials
mechanism, inspection techniques, inspection effectiveness, rate which are not considered in API 581, namely HK40 and HP. Pro-
of damage progression, and other technical factors. In addition an cess and design data are shown on Table 1.
approach to considering the consequences of a failure had to be
developed. 2.1 Likelihood Analysis. Likelihood analysis is the result
The American Petroleum Institute 共API兲 initiated the Risk of a number of factors but in semi-quantitative RBI only the tech-
Based Inspection 共RBI兲 Project in May 1993. The intention of API nical module subfactor 共TMSF兲 is used to determine the probabil-
RBI is to be a useable and understandable tool at a plant inspec- ity of failure. The TMSF identifies damage mechanisms and
tion level by simplification of complex models using a practical equipment age in current service to estimate damage rate. The
procedure standardized for petrochemical plants. The RBI analy- technical module subfactors can range as high as 1000 or more,
sis is an attempt to analyze risk and inspection effectiveness quali- while the other subfactors are relatively small 共⬍10兲 关2兴.
tatively and quantitatively and looks at the factors required to The key to understanding TMSF is found in paragraph 9.4.3 of
API 581. Here it becomes clear that if TMSF is less than 10 then
develop an inspection plan including both the likelihood and con-
there is very little damage occurs. Over 10 and the damage rate
sequence of failure. The technical modules in API 581, the re-
becomes more significant and there are increasing demands on
source document for RBI, include thinning, stress corrosion crack-
inspections and other preventative measures 共see Tables 9-15 to
ing, high temperature hydrogen attack, mechanical fatigue 共piping
9-17, of API 581兲. With TMSF above 500 there is a concern that
only兲, long-term creep, short-term over heating, brittle fracture,
lifetime may have been exhausted.
equipment linings, and external damage.
Likelihood analysis starts with calculating tube current diam-
This paper is an exploration of the difficulties with applying
eter and determining tube elastic temperature limit and elastic
API RBI to furnace tubes of gas generation plant. Note that be-
stress limit. If actual tube metal temperature 共TMT兲 is less than
cause API uses British units, these units are used in some of our
elastic temperature limit or the actual tube stress 共which is calcu-
tables. Because of the complexity of some of the equations in-
lated by considering operating pressure and tube diameter兲 is less
volved, conversion of all the units to Systeme International is not than the elastic stress limit, then long-term creep is not a concern
necessarily appropriate.
In this study we are examining some typical reformer tubes. TMT⬍T elas and S⬍S elas
The actual tube metal temperature, which was determined by
Contributed by the Pressure Vessels and Piping Division for publication in the
JOURNAL OF PRESSURE VESSEL TECHNOLOGY. Manuscript received by the PVP
direct measurement, is TMT⫽905°C. API 581 defines elastic
Division August 30, 2004; revision received September 7, 2004. Review conducted metal temperature limit or critical tube metal temperature as ‘‘a
by: S. Zamrik. temperature at which a tube would have 100,000 h design life

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 Table 1 Process and design data of HK and HP furnace tubes 3 ⫹0.2854X 2 ⫺0.5905X⫺0.3001
FFLT⫽min共 1,10⫺0.6723X 兲 (3)
Pipe Return bend 180
Part name position 1 pos 12/13 TMSFLT⫽0.55e 13FF (4)
TMSFadjusted⫽TMSFLT
Material
Wall thickness 共mm兲
HK40
14
HP
15 * Inspection effectiveness
Design pressure 共MPa兲 1.73 1.68 reduction factor (5)
Inside diameter 共mm兲 110 110
Design temperature 共°C兲 925 1015 lm is defined by API 581 as Larson–Miller parameter in current
Actual tube metal temperature 共°C兲 905 905 operational condition. Equation 共1兲 was used to calculate lm for
Allow strength 共MPa兲 13.4*0.8共T44兲 9.8*0.8共T64兲
Actual tube stress 共MPa兲 5.49 5.17 HP and HK, at the current operating conditions.
P in 共MPa) 1.24 1.24 LMdelta is defined as average difference between mean and
P out 共MPa) 1.17 1.17 minimum Larson–Miller curves in API 530. Here LMdelta is cal-
T in共°C) 557 557 culated by using mean and minimum Larson–Miller curves in API
T out共°C) 860 860 530 and also the manufacture’s data sheet. To calculate mean
Larson–Miller parameter for HP and HK Microsoft Excel ‘‘least-
square regression method’’ is used. The results for HK and HP
were approximately same. Analysis of this data illustrates that HP
using minimum rupture strength curve per API 530 关2兴.’’ Elastic and HK have TMSF less than one for different stresses. Results of
temperature limits for some materials are provided on Table J-4 long-term creep analysis are shown on Table 2.
API 581. API 581 introduces credits based on inspection effectiveness to
Since the materials we are studying are not in API 581, the T elas adjust TMSFLT. By considering, inspection category of ‘‘usually
data of identified materials from table J-4 共API RBI Appendix J兲 effective’’ which is defined as ‘‘visual inspection, UT thickness
were plotted on Larson–Miller curves in API 530 to compare and measurements of all tubes’’ and N 共number of inspections兲 equal
predict the elastic metal temperature for HP and HK40. 共HK40 to 1, TMSF is adjusted for HP and HK and is about 0.1366.
does appear in API 530 but HP is not mentioned.兲 It is noted that 2.1.2 Determination of Short-Term Failure Probability. API
Larson–Miller curves show this temperature as a point at which 581 states that short-term failure is a result of unpredicted condi-
elastic allowable stress line and rupture allowable stress line meet tions, such as mistakes in operation or human error and it is dif-
each other. ficult to assess quantitatively. Probability of short-term failure,
The elastic allowable stress is two thirds the yield strength at accordingly TMSFST is calculated by considering time of expo-
temperature for ferritic steels and 90% of the yield strength at sure to overheating and excess tube metal temperature. To calcu-
temperature for austenitic steels 关3兴. For HK and HP the Larson– late TMSFST API 581 introduces formulas as cited later
Miller curves show that the elastic allowable stress is greater than
100 MPa. As a result, the Larson–Miller curve of HK 共API 530兲 ⌬T 5% ⫽35.5 ln共 1029/t oh兲 (6)
and HP shows that when the elastic allowable stress curve moves
higher, it will meet the rupture allowable stress curve at a tem- FFST⫽min共 0.05e 0.0422共 ⌬T oh-⌬T 5% 兲 ,1兲 (7)
perature around or less than 600°C. So the estimated value for TMSFST⫽0.55e 13FF
(8)
T elas could be around 600°C. Hence, the determination of long-
term creep is necessary because T elas is less than TMT. ⌬T 5% ⫽The overheating temperature, ⌬T 5% corresponds to values
The elastic limit 共proportional limit兲 is the greatest load a ma- of ⌬T oh that result in a 5% probability of failure in the LM curves
terial can withstand and still spring back to its original shape 关2兴. ⌬T oh⫽overheating temperature. t oh⫽time exposure to over-
when the load is removed 关4 –5兴. Table J-5 API 581 contains the heating.
elastic stress limit for creep consideration for specified materials. API 581 states that ⌬T oh can be up to 149°C more than design
This table does not include the tube materials of this case study tube metal temperature for 10–1000 h and it depends on plant
and the elastic stress limit for HK and HP materials were calcu- history of overheating, heavy coking, operation, or burner control
lated by reference to data published 共in advertising literature兲 by problems. Table 3 shows failure factor and TMSFST for overheat-
the manufacturers. Elastic stress limit was estimated to be 4 – 6 ing at 100, 50, and 10°C for one day, one week, and one month
MPa at the design temperature limit. Table 1 shows that tube without considering online monitoring. For overheating around
actual stress could be more than elastic stress limit. From this it is 10°C for one month the TMSFST is more than 10. By using on-
evident that long-term creep should be considered for furnace line monitoring method consisting of daily visual and burner ad-
tubes. justment by operators, TMSFST will be reduced to 0.24.
In this study, there was not any organized historical data to
2.1.1 Determination of Long Term Creep Failure Probability. provide information on plant overheating problems or unpredicted
The equations below from API 581 Appendix J are used for cal- conditions. It is assumed overheating up to 40°C for 20–30 h
culating long-term technical module subfactor might happen by faulty operating conditions or human error.
lm⫽ 共 TMT⫹460兲 * 共 Log t i ⫹C 兲 /1000 (1) Short-term technical module subfactor (TMSFST), in this range is
less or equal to 1. API 581 states that the ‘‘on-line monitoring
X⫽ 共 LMavg⫺lm兲/LMdelta (2) factor’’ should be used to adjust TMSFST. Table J-9 in Appendix J

Table 2 Larson–Miller parameter and long-term failure probability

Larson–Miller parameter HK HP
lm 44.16 57
LMdelta 0.8 0.3
LMavg 46.02481–1.88469 ln S 65.05956 –2.17933 ln S
Long-term creep analysis HK HP
FFLT 共failure factor兲 1.00E⫺300 0
TMSFLT 共technical module subfactor兲 0.55 0.55

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 Table 3 Short term over heating failure factor and TMSFST Table 5 Release rates for each hole size for hydrogen
without considering online monitoring
Hydrogen
Overheating Overheating *C d ⫽0.85
period temperature 共°C兲 FFST TMSFST
Amount of gas release
One day 100 17 Very high Hole W lb/s in 3 min 共lb兲 Time to deinventory 共min兲
50 0.4 0.82 1 in. 0.84 151.2 99.15
10 0.019 0.56 4 in. 13.44 2419.2 6.19
One week 100 330 Very high Rupture 30.25 5445 2.75
50 7.40 906 *C d ⫽discharge coefficient.
10 0.35 0.78
One 100 2923 Huge
month
50 65 Very high Release rate is calculated for each hole size by using Eq. 共10兲:
10 3.14 12

W g 共 sonic兲 ⫽C d A P 冋冉 冊 冉 冊
KM g c 2
RT 144 K⫹1 册
k⫹1/k⫺1 1/2
(10)

API 581 models all releases as an immediate or continuous

is used to calculate the on-line monitoring factor. If the on-line
form and has established a simplified method for modeling release
monitoring method is daily visual and burner adjustment by op-
by identifying hole size and amount of release in 3 min. In this
eration, TMSFST is reduced to 0.02.
study amount of release in 3 min was calculated to confirm the
2.2 Consequence Analysis. Having examined likelihood of type of release and it was found to be less than 10,000 lb in 3 min.
failure as represented by the TMSF and its effects, the other half This supports Appendix J the release type for furnace tubes is in
of risk analysis is consequence analysis. Consequence analysis continuous form. We have calculated release rates and amount of
starts with determination of representative fluid and its properties, release in 3 min for each hole size for hydrogen are shown in
calculation of possible release rate, identification release type, and Table 5.
phase after release. Finally, release mass is determined for each of Finally, to determine release, the inventory category is found
the hole sizes to calculate flammable and toxic consequence area. from Table B-3 Appendix B API 581. The inventory category is B,
Consequence analysis of furnace tube does not consider vapor so 5000 lb as an inventory is used to calculate consequence area.
cloud explosion, fireball, or flash fire outcomes because the fire- In addition to inventory data the analyst should be notice to rep-
box serves as a source of ignition. This decreases the possibility of resentative fluid autoignition temperature to calculate the conse-
cloud of vapor over 10,000 lb to very low levels. quence area of flammable and toxic consequence. In this case the
At first, it should be noted that, it is difficult to find out all release is in continuous form and autoignition temperature of hy-
necessary data of a mixture for RBI analysis 关6兴. Reducing gas is drogen is 400°C. API 581 states that autoignition is not likely if
not a pure material. So it is recommended by API 581 to choose process temperature is less than autoignition temperature plus
one material based on that material’s properties in mixture. API 27°C. From the process data, it is found that in this case autoigni-
581 recommends selecting a representative fluid with a lower nor- tion is likely and a flame would come from the hole.
mal boiling point 共NBP兲 than the fluid being considered. In this Prior to calculating the consequence area, release rate should be
case, the hydrogen has the highest percentage in reducing gas, adjusted for mitigation, detection, and isolation systems, which
with lowest NBP in this mixture, so after elimination of inert may reduce consequence area. In this case plant detection systems
materials as an alternative for modeling. The representative fluid is designed to detect release by changes in operating in the system
here is modeled as hydrogen representative fluid properties are and also shutdown systems intended to be activated without op-
shown on Table 4. erator involvement. The adjusted release rate is introduced as
To calculate release rate, initially it is identified that release X correct in Table 6. API 581 gives adjusted consequence area for
occurs in gas form. Gas flows through an orifice at sonic or sub- mitigation system, which in this case, is assumed to be firewater
sonic velocity. Equation 共9兲 is used to find out the nature of gas deluge system and monitors, 20% less than calculated values. Ad-
flow. If the process pressure is greater than P trans sonic flow will justed consequence area is showed as A correct in Table 6. An event
occur. The result from Eq. 共9兲 gives P trans⫽0.17 MPa and process tree is used to determine the probability of outcomes for flam-
data shows upstream pressure is equal to 1.24 MPa, so gas dis- mable consequence. An event tree shown in Fig. 1 is used
charge at sonic velocity to determine the probability of outcomes for flammable

冉 冊 k/k⫺1
consequence.
k⫹1 Considering toxic consequences in this case, it was necessary to
P trans⫽ P a (9)
2 consider that hydrogen sulphide is very toxic by inhalation and

Table 4 Reducing gas composition and properties for radiant and convection section

Reducing gas **AIT

composition vol % MW 共°C兲 **NBP 共°C兲 Density 共kg/m3兲 *C p *K
H2 52.37 2 400 ⫺252 71 1.64E⫹01 1.14E⫹00
CH4 24.03 16 595 59.4 1.81 1.43E⫹01 1.16E⫹00
CO2 3.33 44.01 N/A ⫺78.5 1.954 ⫺7.38E⫺01 2.71E⫺01
CO 9.39 28 620 ⫺191.6 0.961 2.61E⫺01 ⫺1.51E⫺01
H2 O 1.53 18 N/A 100 997.95 1.95E⫺01 ⫺1.09E⫺02
N2 9.24 28.02 N/A 195.7 1.16 1.69E⫺01 ⫺9.27E⫺01
H2 S 25 ppmv 34.08 260 ⫺59.4 61.993 ¯ ¯
**Propertymix 11.8533 410.67 ⫺118.8 1.62 3.06E⫹01 2.22E⫹00

*C p ⫽A⫹BT⫹CT 2 ⫹DT 3 , K⫽Cp /Cp ⫺R, R⫽1.987BTU/共lb mol兲共F兲.

**Propertymix⫽ 兺 x i* Propertyi , AIT⫽autoignition temperature, NBP⫽normal boiling point.

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 Table 6 Total release mass and consequence area for each hole size

X⫽total release rate or mass, A⫽area ft2 hydrogen

continuous release autoignition likely
Area of equipment A * ⫽1146X a Area of fatalities A⫽3072X a
X⫽0.84 X correct⫽0.21 A⫽240.66 A correct⫽48.13 X⫽0.84 X correct⫽0.21 A⫽645.12 A correct⫽129.02
X⫽13.44 X correct⫽3.36 A⫽3850.56 A correct⫽770.11 X⫽15.5 X correct⫽3.36 A⫽10,321 A correct⫽2064.36
X⫽30.25 X correct⫽7.56 A⫽8666.62 A correct⫽1733.3 X⫽35.25 X correct⫽7.56 A⫽23,232 A correct⫽4646.4
Probabilities of outcome processed above AIT
Ignition Jet fire Flash fire VCE
0.9 0.9 Negligible Negligible

may cause damaging effects to the nervous system. Reducing gas than just a comparative importance between different parts of the
includes 25 ppmv H2 S. The exposure limit value for H2 S is iden- same plant. Clearly equipment operating in the H or high risk area
tified from the material safety data sheet to be 10 ppm. From this could potentially be dangerous. If we look at the major hazard
it is found that hydrogen sulphide may cause toxic effects after regulations for Victoria Guidance Note 19 关8兴 also gives a similar
release. Release rate and duration was used to determine conse- graph in Appendix 1. Here, however, the upper reaches of the
quence area for this toxic gas. The results of consequence analysis graph are identified as not being acceptable ‘‘societal risks’’ in the
are shown in Table 7. state of Victoria. The results of the work based on all clauses of
API 581 are also shown on Table 8. The simplified method of
3 Risk Calculation Appendix A only is also shown.
API 581 provides a semi-quantitative method of assessing the
risk for each component. This analysis uses a matrix with fre-
quency on the vertical axis 共listed in categories 1–5 with 5 the
highest frequency event兲 and consequences on the horizontal axis 4 Inspection Intervals
共listed as A – E with E having the highest consequences. Parts of To plan inspection intervals API 581 recommends inspections
the matrix is indicated to have a high, medium high, medium, and intervals for furnace tubes based on TMSF less or greater than 10.
low risk, which is shown by the letters H, M H, M, L on risk If the current TMSF is less than 10, increment t i 共operating hours兲
matrix. This matrix is a reinterpretation of the Farmer curve first by 10,000 共⬃1 year兲 until a TMSF of 10 is reached. The number
published as a risk criterion in 1967 关7兴. of increments is the time to the next inspection, T insp 关2兴. In this
The risk matrix for this case for four different types of conse- case TMSF is less than ten by increasing operating hours the
quences is shown in Fig. 2. The result of this analysis is not really TMSF was not changed. Considering API RBI Table 9-16 the
discussed in enough detail in API 581 though the result has more inspection plan is shown in Table 9.

Fig. 1 Outline event tree „from Fig. 7-3 API 581…

Table 7 Consequence analysis for each hole size

Consequence analysis for Each Hole Size

Hole size 1 in. 4 in. Rupture
⫺6 ⫺6
Generic failure frequency long term creep 4.62⫻10 1.32⫻10 6.60⫻10⫺7
Fraction contribution for each hole size 0.7 0.2 0.1
Flammable consequence 共equipment兲 55.58 891.58 2006.07
Flammable consequence 共equipment兲 for each hole size 38.90 178.31 200.60
Flammable consequence 共fatalities兲 148.92 2390.01 5377.53
Flammable consequence 共fatalities兲 for each hole size 104.24 478.00 537.75
Toxic consequence ⬃7000 ⬃100,000 ¯
Toxic consequence for each hole size ⬃4900 ⬃20,000 ¯
Sum of the failure frequencies 6⫻10⫺6 6⫻10⫺6 6⫻10⫺6
Flammable consequence area 共equipment兲 417.82 417.82 417.82
Flammable consequence area 共fatalities兲 1119.99 1119.99 1119.99
Toxic consequence area 24,900 24,900 24,900

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 Fig. 2 Semi-quantitative and qualitative risk matrix for HK and HP tubes

5 Discussion • using risk matrix which considers both consequence and like-
lihood to assign risk
5.1 How Simplified is the Method? API 581 is a simplified
method for furnace RBI analysis. The document is very useful but Some gaps are that materials such as HP and HK40 which are
has some gaps. used to manufacture furnace tubes are not modeled in API 581. A
Some good features are: number of activities such as searching the literature, using manu-
facturer’s data were used in this paper to generate the necessary
• a predefined set of hole sizes is used for the likelihood data. It is noticeable that RBI analysis in this way is time-
analysis consuming method and the data may not be accurate.
• a consequence model of flammable, toxic, environmental, API 581 states that general thinning mechanism H2 S/H2 for
and business interruption events is included. This is very high temperature should be considered to find out the effect on
helpful for such modeling is not easily available in open lit- wall thickness and accordingly on actual stress. This calculation
erature. The consequence model includes:
actually turns out to be quite complicated because it has to be
–a simple method for modeling the release
repeated several times during life. A computer program is avail-
–an approach for modeling releases of mixtures
able but we have not included these calculations in the current
–a simple procedure to determine the mass of fluid that is
released in the event paper.
–a method for determining the area that is effected by each 5.2 Inspections. Risk in API 581 is used to recommend in-
release type spection frequency based on both the consequences and likelihood
–standardized event trees are used of failure. API RBI introduces inspection intervals based on
–developing a simplified methodology for assessing the TMSF or likelihood analysis. The main factor in finding TMSF is
effectiveness of various types of mitigation systems mean Larson–Miller parameter, which cannot be accurately deter-
–providing simple guideline to calculate the inventory mined by using manufacturer’s data.
In the formulas for calculating TMSF for long term creep the
only factor which changes during time is ‘‘operating hours’’ which
Table 8 Inspection methods and intervals for furnace tubes is used for finding time to next inspection. In the case studied in
based on TMSF this paper the operating hours up to 100 years was calculated but
Inspection Intervals the TMSF was approximately constant at less than 1. As a result
for furnace tubes with medium risk highly effective inspection is
Inspection Nature of inspection recommended only at 20 years. This is a long period of time and
20 years Highly effective would be attractive to operators. However, the question remains
10 years Usually effective what exactly is being proposed.
5 years Fairly effective The highly effective inspection proposed in API 581 is defined
as UT thickness measurements of all tubes, and strapping at UT
Table 9 Summary of RBI results measurement locations and FMR at various locations. Questions
concerning these inspection regimes immediately present
Semi-quantitative results 共Appendix B兲 HK HP themselves.
FFLT 1.00E⫺300 0
TMSFLT 0.55 0.55 • FMR is not defined in API 581. FMR is used in a paper by
TMSFST 0.02 0.02 Valbuena et al. 关9兴 to mean field metallographic replication. This
Flammable consequence category 共equipment兲 C C is a method of detecting creep damage but in one of the authors
Flammable consequence category 共fatalities兲 D D 共J.W.H.P.兲 experience it is also highly unreliable unless used fre-
Toxic consequence category E E
Likelihood category 1 1 quently, say at one year interval and also only if a sample of
Simple qualitative results 共Appendix A兲 original, noncreep affected material is available.
Overall consequence category D D • UT thickness measurements are not normally a measure of
Likelihood category 2 2 creep damage, so the question of what is being tested for is not
clear.

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 • Strapping is not described in the standard, but if it means K⫽Cp/C v ⫽ usually 1.4 for air
applying mechanical straps; the purpose and long-term survival of LMP ⫽ Larson–Miller parameter
such straps is not clear. Lm ⫽ Larson Miller parameter at the current operat-
• The inspections proposed do not include diameter measure- ing conditions
ment, oxide measurement or crack measurement each of which LMdelta ⫽ average difference between mean and mini-
could be important in detecting creep problems. mum Larson–Miller curves in API 530
LMavg ⫽ mean Larson–Miller parameter
Once this detail is considered it is not clear how the inspection M ⫽ MW⫽molecular weight, lb/lb mol
regimes are an effective response to the different risk categories, NBP ⫽ normal boiling point
especially those in the high or H area. Clearly other responses are P trans ⫽ transition pressure 共psia兲
required, such as operational or process changes, if high risk items P ⫽ upstream pressure 共psia兲
were identified. P a ⫽ atmospheric pressure 共psia兲
R ⫽ gas constant 共10.73 ft3 psia/lb mol °R兲
6 Conclusions
T ⫽ upstream temperature 共°R兲
We have applied API 581 to a furnace tube example. The fur- TMT ⫽ tube metal temperature
nace tubes considered were not listed in the code and API 581 was TMSFLT ⫽ long term technical module subfactor
quite difficult to apply. TMSFST ⫽ short term technical module subfactor
There are also difficulties knowing what the implications of t oh ⫽ time exposure to overheating
RBI are for inspections. In the case studied, the main result is that W g 共sonic兲 ⫽ gas discharge rate, sonic flow, lb/s
risk of failure 共measured by TMSF being less than 10兲 for a very
long period so that the only inspections required were ‘‘highly
effective’’ inspections every 20 years. Since the design is gener-
ally for 20 years operation this means that even these moderately References
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A ⫽ cross-section area, in.2 关6兴 Reid, R. C., and Prausnitz, T. K. S., 1977, Properties of Gases and Liquids, 3rd
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AIT ⫽ autoignition temperature 关7兴 Farmer, F. R., 1967, ‘‘Reactor Safety and Siting: A Proposed Risk Criterion,’’
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54 Õ Vol. 127, FEBRUARY 2005 Transactions of the ASME

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