Porphyry, Introduction (or Isagoge) to the

logical Categories of Aristotle (1853) vol. 2.

pp.609-633.

• Chap. I.--Object of the writer, in the

present Introduction.
• Chap. II.--Of the Nature of Genus and
Species.
• Chap. III.-- Of Difference.
• Chap. IV.--Of Property.
• Chap. V.-- Of Accident.
• Chap. VI.--Of Things common and
peculiar to the Five Predicates.
• Chap. VII.--Of the Community and
Distinction of Genus and Difference.
• Chap. VIII.--Of Community and Difference
of Genus and Species.
• Chap. IX.--Of Community and Difference
of Genus and Property.
• Chap. X.-- Of Community and Difference
 of Genus and Accident.
• Chap. XI.--Of Community and Difference
of Species and Difference.
• Chap. XII.--The same subject continued.
• Chap. XIII.-- Of Community and
Difference of Property and Difference.
• Chap. XIV.--Of Community and Difference
of Accident and Difference.
• Chap. XV.--Of Community and Difference
of Species and Property.
• Chap. XVI.--Of Community and Difference
of Species and Accident.
• Chap. XVII.-- Of Community and
Difference of Property and Accident.

[Translated by Octavius Freire Owen, M. A.

of Christ Church, Oxford. Rector of Burstow,
Surrey; and Domestic Chaplain to the Duke of
Portland]
INTRODUCTION OF PORPHYRY.1
Chap. I. --Object of the writer, in the present
Introduction.
Since it is necessary, Chrysaorius, both to the
doctrine of Aristotle's Categories, to know
what genus, difference, species, property, and
accident are, and also to the assignments of
definitions, in short, since the investigation of
these is useful for those things which belong
to division and demonstration,2 I will
endeavour by a summary briefly to discuss to
you, as in the form of introduction, what on
this subject has been delivered by the ancients,
abstaining, indeed, from more profound
questions, yet directing attention in a fitting
manner, to such as are more simple. For
instance, I shall |610 omit to speak about
genera and species, as to whether they subsist
(in the nature of things) or in mere
conceptions only; whether also if subsistent,
they are bodies or incorporeal, and whether
they are separate from, or in, sensibles,3 and
subsist about these,4 for such a treatise is most
profound, and requires another more extensive
investigation.5 Nevertheless, how the ancients,
and especially the Peripatetics, discussed these
and the other proposed subjects, in a more
logical manner, I will now endeavour to point
out to you.
Chap. II. --Of the Nature of Genus and
Species 6
Neither genus nor species appear to be simply
denominated, for that is called genus which is
a collection of certain things, subsisting in a
certain respect relatively to one thing, and to
each other, according to which signification
the genus of the |611 Heraclidae is
denominated from the habitude from one, I
mean Hercules, and from the multitude of
those who have alliance to each other from
him, denominated according to separation
from other genera. Again, after another
manner also, the principle of the generation of
every one is called genus, whether from the
generator or from the place in which a person
is generated, for thus we say that Orestes had
his genus from Tantalus, Hyllus from
Hercules, and again, that Pindar was by genus
a Theban, but Plato an Athenian, for country is
a certain principle of each man's generation, in
the same manner as a father. Still, this
signification appears to be most ready,7 for
they are called Heraclidae who derive their
origin from the genus of Hercules, and
Cecropidae who are from Cecrops; also their
next of kin. The first genus, moreover, is so
called, which is the principle of each man's
generation, but afterwards the number of those
who are from one principle, e. g. from
Hercules, which defining and separating from
others, we call the whole collected multitude
the genus of the Heraclidse.
Again, in another way that is denominated
genus to which the species is subject, called
perhaps from the similitude of these; for such
a genus is a certain principle of things under it,
and seems also to comprehend all the
multitude under itself. As then, genus is
predicated triply, the consideration by
philosophers is concerning the third, which
also they explain by description, when they
say that genus is that which is predicated of
many things differing in species, in answer to
what a thing is, e. g. |612 animal. For of
predicates some are predicated of one thing
alone, as individuals, for instance, "Socrates,"
and "this man," and "this thing;" but others are
predicated of many, as genera, species,
differences, properties, and accidents,
predicated in common, but not peculiarly to
any one. Now genus is such as "animal,"
species as "man," difference as " rational,"
property as " risible," accident as "white,"
"black," "to sit." From such things then, as are
predicated of one thing only, genera differ in
that they are predicated of many, but on the
other hand, from those which are predicated of
many and from species, (they differ) because
those species are predicated of many things,
yet not of those which differ in species, but in
number only, for man being a species, is
predicated of Socrates and Plato, who do not
differ from each other in species, but in
number, while animal being a genus is
predicated of man, and ox, and horse, which
differ also in species from each other, and not
in number only. From property, moreover,
genus differs because property is predicated of
one species alone of which it is the property,
and of the individuals under the species, as
"risible" of man alone, and of men
particularly, for genus is not predicated of one
species, but of many things, which are also
different in species. Besides, genus differs
from difference and from accidents in
common, because though differences and
accidents in common are predicated of many
things, different also in species, yet they are
not so in reply to what a thing is, but (what
kind of a thing) it is. For when some persons
ask what that is of which these are predicated,
we reply, that it is genus; but we do not assign
in answer differences and accidents, since they
are not predicated of a subject, as to what a
thing is, but rather as to what kind of a thing it
is. For in reply to the question, what kind of a
thing man is, we say, that he is rational, and in
answer to what kind of a thing a crow is, we
say that it is black, yet |613 rational is
difference, but black is accident. When
however we are asked what man is, we
answer, an animal, but animal is the genus of
man, so that from genus being predicated of
many, it is diverse from individuals which are
predicated of one thing only, but from being
predicated of things different in species, it is
distinguished from such as are predicated as
species or as properties. Moreover, because it
is predicated in reply to what a thing is, it is
distinguished from differences and from
accidents commonly, which are severally
predicated of what they are predicated, not in
reply to what a thing is, but what kind of a
thing it is, or in what manner it subsists: the
description therefore of the conception of
genus, which has been enunciated, contains
nothing superfluous, nothing deficient.8
Species indeed is predicated of every form,
according to which it is said, "form is first
worthy of imperial sway;"9 still that is called
species also, which is under the genus stated,
according to which we are accustomed to call
man a species of animal, animal being genus,
but white a species of colour, and triangle of
figure. Nevertheless, if when we assign the
genus, we make mention of species, saying
that which is predicated of many things
differing in species, in reply to what a thing is,
and call species that which is under the
assigned genus, we ought to know that, since
genus is the genus of something, and species
the species of something, each of each, we
must necessarily use both in the definitions of
both. They assign, therefore, species thus:
species is what is arranged under genus, and of
which genus is predicated in reply to what a
thing is: moreover, thus species is what is
predicated of many things differing in number,
in reply to what a thing is. This explanation,
however, belongs to the most special, |614 and
which is species only, but no longer genus
also,10 but the other (descriptions) will pertain
to such as are not the most special. Now, what
we have stated will be evident in this way: in
each category there are certain things most
generic, and again, others most special, and
between the most generic and the most
special, others which are alike called both
genera and species, but the most generic is that
above which there cannot be another superior
genus, and the most special that below which
there cannot be another inferior species.
Between the most generic and the most
special, there are others which are alike both
genera and species, referred, nevertheless, to
different things, but what is stated may
become clear in one category. Substance
indeed, is itself genus, under this is body,
under body animated body, under which is
animal, under animal rational animal, under
which is man, under man Socrates, Plato, and
men particularly. Still, of these, substance is
the most generic, and that which alone is
genus; but man is most specific, and that
which alone is species; yet body is a species of
substance, but a genus of animated body, also
animated body is a species of body, but a
genus of animal; again, animal is a species of
animated body, but a genus of rational animal,
and rational animal is a species of animal, but
a genus of man, and man is a species of
rational animal, but is no longer the genus of
particular men, but is species only, and every
thing prior to individuals being proximately
predicated of them, will be species only, and
no longer genus also. As then, substance being
in the highest place, is most generic, from
there being no genus prior to it, so also man
being a species, after which there is no other
species, nor any thing capable of division into
species, but individuals, (for Socrates, Plato,
Alcibiades, and this white thing, I call
individual,) will be species alone, and the last
species, and as we say the most specific. Yet
the media will be the species of such as are
before them, but the genera of things after
them, so that these have two conditions, one as
to things prior to them, according to which
they are said to be their species, the other to
things after |615 them, according to which
they are said to be their genera. The extremes
on the other hand, have one condition, for the
most generic has indeed a condition as to the
things under it, since it is the highest genus of
all, but has no longer one as to those before it,
being supreme, and the first principle, and, as
we have said, that above which there cannot
be another higher genus. Also, the most
specific has one condition, as to the things
prior to it, of which it is the species, yet it has
not a different one, as to things posterior to it,
but is called the species of individuals, so
termed as comprehending them, and again, the
species of things prior to it, as comprehended
by them, wherefore the most generic genus is
thus defined to be that which being genus is
not species, and again, above which there
cannot be another higher genus; but the most
specific species, that, which being species is
not genus, and which being species we can no
longer divide into species; moreover, which is
predicated of many things differing in number,
in reply to what a thing is.11
Now, the media of the extremes they call
subaltern species and genera, and admit each
of them to be species and genus, when referred
indeed to different things, for those which are
prior to the most specific, ascending up to the
most generic, are called subaltern genera and
species. Thus, Agamemnon is Atrides,
Pelopides, Tantalides, and lastly, (the son) of
Jupiter, yet in genealogies they refer generally
to one origin, for instance, to Jupiter; but this
is not the case in genera and species, since
being is not the common genus of all things,
nor, as Aristotle says, are all things of the
same genus with respect to one summum
genus. Still, let the first ten genera be
arranged, as in the Categories, as ten first
principles, and even if a person should call all
things beings, yet he will call them, so he says,
equivocally, but not synonymously, for if
being were the one common genus of all
things, all things would be synonymously
styled beings, but the first principles being ten,
the community is in name only, yet not in the
definition |616 also belonging to the name:
there are then ten most generic genera. On the
other hand, the most specific they place in a
certain number, yet not in an infinite one, but
individuals which are after the most specific
are infinite; wherefore, when we have come
down to the most specific from the most
generic, Plato exhorts us to rest,12 but to
descend through those things which are in the
middle, dividing by specific differences; he
tells us however to leave infinites alone, as
there cannot be science of these. In descending
then, to the most specific, it is necessary to
proceed by division through multitude, but in
ascending to the most generic, we must collect
multitude into one, for species is collective of
the many into one nature, and genus yet more
so; but particulars and singulars, on the
contrary, always divide the one into multitude,
for by the participation of species, many men
become one man; but in particulars and
singulars, the one, and what is common,
becomes many; for the singular is always
divisive, but what is common is collective and
reductive to one.13
Genus then, and species, being each of them
explained as to what it is, since also genus is
one, but species many, (for there is always a
division of genus into many species,) genus
indeed is always predicated of species, and all
superior of inferior, but species is neither
predicated of its proximate genus, nor of those
superior, since it does not reciprocate. For it is
necessary that either equals should be
predicated of equals, as neighing of a horse, or
that the greater should be predicated of the
less, as animal of man, but the less no longer
of the greater, for you can no longer say that
animal is man, as you can say that man is
animal. Of those things however whereof
species is predicated, that |617 genus of the
species will also be necessarily predicated,
also that genus of the genus up to the most
generic; for if it is true to say that Socrates is a
man, but man an animal, and animal
substance, it is also true to say that Socrates is
animal and substance. At least, since the
superior are always predicated of the inferior,
species indeed will always be predicated of the
individual, but the genus both of the species
and of the individual, but the most generic
both of the genus or the genera, (if the media
and subaltern be many,) and of the species,
and of the individual. For the most generic is
predicated of all the genera, species, and
individuals under it, but the genus which is
prior to the most specific (species), is
predicated of all the most specific species and
individuals; but what is species alone of all the
individuals (of it), but the individual of one
particular alone.14 Now, an individual is called
Socrates, this white thing, this man who
approaches the son of Sophroniscus, if
Socrates alone is his son, and such things are
called individuals, because each consists of
properties of which the combination can never
be the same in any other, for the properties of
Socrates can never be the same in any other
particular person;15 the properties of man
indeed, (I mean of him as common,) may be
the same in many, or rather in all particular
men, so far as they are men. Wherefore the
individual is comprehended in the species, but
the species by the genus, for genus is a certain
whole, but the individual is a part, and species
|618 both a whole and a part; part indeed of
something else, but a whole not of another, but
in other things, for the whole is in its parts.
Concerning genus then, and species, we have
shown what is the most generic, and the most
specific, also what the same things are genera
and species, what also are individuals, and in
how many ways genus and species are taken.
Chap. III. -- Of Difference.
Difference may be predicated commonly,
properly, and most properly: for one thing is
said to differ from another in common from its
differing in some respect in diversity of
nature, either from itself, or from something
else; for Socrates differs from Plato in
diversity of nature, and himself from himself
when a boy, and when become a man, also
when he does any thing, or ceases to do it, and
it is always perceived in the different ways in
which a thing is somehow effected. Again, one
thing is said to differ properly from another,
when one differs from another by an
inseparable accident; but an inseparable
accident is such as blueness, or crookedness,
or a scar become scirrhous from a wound.
Moreover, one is most properly said to differ
from another, when it varies by specific
difference, as man differs from horse by
specific difference, i. e. by the quality of
rational. Universally then every difference
acceding to a thing renders it different, but
differences common and proper render it
different in quality, and the most proper render
it another thing. Hence, those which render it
another thing are called specific, but those, |
619 which make it different in quality, are
simply (called) differences, for the difference
of rational being added to animal, makes it
another thing, (and makes a species of
animal,) but difference of being moved makes
it different in quality only from what is at rest,
so that the one renders it another thing, but the
other only of another quality.16
According then, to the differences which
produce another thing do the divisions of
genera into species arise, and the definitions
arising from genus and such differences are
assigned. On the other hand, as to those which
only make a thing different in quality,
diversities alone consist, and the changes of
subsistence of a thing; beginning then, again,
from the first, we must say that of differences
some are separable, others inseparable, thus to
be moved, and to be at rest, to be ill, and to be
well, and such as resemble these, are
separable, but to have a crooked, or a flat
nose, to be rational, or irrational, are
inseparable differences. Again, of the
inseparable, some exist per se, others by
accident, for rational, mortal, to be susceptible
of science, are inherent in man per se, but to
have a crooked or flat nose, accidentally, and
not per se. Wherefore, such as are present per
se, are assumed in the definition of substance,
and effect a different thing, but what are
accidental arc neither taken in the definition of
substance, nor render a thing another, but of
another quality. Those too, which are per se,
do not admit of the more and less, but the
accidental, even if they be inseparable, admit
of intention and remission, |620 for neither is
genus more and less predicated of that of
which it is the genus, nor the differences of
genus according to which it is divided. For
these are such as complete the definition of
each thing, but the essence of each is one and
the same, and neither admits of intention, nor
remission; to have however a crooked or a flat
nose, or to be in some way coloured, admits
both of intension and remission. Since then,
there are three species of difference
considered, some indeed separable, but others
inseparable, again, of the inseparable, some
are per se, but others accidental, moreover of
differences per se, some are those according to
which we divide genera into species, but
others according to which the things divided
become specific:--thus of all such differences
per se of animal as these, animated and
sensitive, rational and irrational, mortal and.
immortal, the difference of animated and
sensitive is constitutive of the essence of
animal, for animal is an animated substance,
endued with sense, but the difference of
mortal and immortal, and that of rational and
irrational, are the divisive differences of
animal, for through these we divide genera
into species: yet these very differences which
divide the genera are constitutive and
completive of species. For animal is divided
by the difference of rational and irrational, and
again, by the difference of mortal and
immortal; but the differences of rational and
mortal are constitutive of man, but those of
rational and immortal of God, those again, of
mortal and irrational, of irrational animals.17
Thus also, since the differences of animate and
inanimate, sensitive and void of sense, divide
the highest substance, animate and sensitive
added to substance, complete animal, but
animate and deprived of sense, form plant;
since then, the same |621 differences taken in
one way become constitutive, but in another
divisive, they are all called specific.
These indeed are especially useful for
divisions of genera, and for definitions, yet not
with regard to those which are inseparable
accidentally, nor still more with such as are
separable.18 And indeed defining these, they
say that difference is that by which species
exceeds genus, e. g. man exceeds animal in
being rational and mortal, for animal is neither
any one of these, (since whence would species
have differences?) nor has it all the opposite
differences, (since otherwise the same thing
would at the same time have opposites,) but
(as they allege) it contains all the differences
which are under it in capacity, but not one of
them in energy, and so neither is any thing
produced from non-entities, nor will opposites
at the same time subsist about the same thing.
Again, they define it (difference) also thus:
difference is that which is predicated of many
things differing in species in answer to the
question, of what kind a thing is,19 for rational
and mortal being predicated of man, are
spoken in reply to what kind of thing man is,
and not as to the question what is he. For when
we are asked what is man, we properly
answer, an animal, but when men inquire what
kind of animal, we say properly, that he is
rational and mortal. For since things consist of
matter and form, or have a constitution
analogous to matter and form, as a statue is
composed of brass, matter, but of figure, form,
so also man, both common and specific,
consists of matter analogous to genus, and of
form analogous to difference, but the whole of
this, animal, rational, mortal, is |622 man, in
the same manner as the statue there. They also
describe it thus, difference is what is naturally
adapted to separate things which are under the
same genus, as rational and irrational separate
man and horse, which are under the same
genus, animal. Again, they give it in this way:
difference is that by which each singular thing
differs, for man and horse do not differ as to
genus, for both we and horses are animals, but
the addition of rational separates us from
them; again, both we and the gods 20 are
rational, but the addition of mortal separates
us from them. They however who more nicely
discuss what pertains to difference, say that it
is not any casual thing dividing those under
the same genus, but such as contributes to the
essence, and to the definition of the essence of
a thing, and which is part of the thing. For to
be naturally adapted to sail is not the
difference, though it is the property of man,
since we may say that of animals, some are
naturally adapted to sail, but others not,
separating man from other animals; yet a
natural ability to sail does not complete the
essence, neither is a part of it, but only an
aptitude of it, because it is not such a
difference as those which are called specific
differences. Wherefore specific differences
will be such as produce another species, and
which are assumed in explaining the very
nature of a thing: and concerning difference
this is sufficient.
Chap. IV. --Of Property.
Property they divide in four ways: for it is that
which happens to some one species alone,
though not to every (individual of that
species), as to a man to heal, or to geometrize:
that also which happens to a whole species,
though not to that alone, as to man to be a
biped: that again, which happens to a species
alone, and to every (individual of it), and at a
certain time, as to every man to |623 become
grey in old age: in the fourth place, it is that in
which it concurs (to happen) to one species
alone, and to every (individual of it), and
always, as risibility to a man; for though he
does not always laugh, yet he is said to be
risible, not from his always laughing, but from
being naturally adapted to laugh, and this is
always inherent in him, in the same way as
neighing in a horse. They say also that these
are validly properties, because they
reciprocate, since if any thing be a horse it is
capable of neighing, and if any thing be
capable of neighing it is a horse.
Chap. V. -- Of Accident.
Accident is that which is present and absent
without the destruction of its subject. It
receives a two-fold division, for one kind of it
is separable, but the other inseparable, e. g. to
sleep is a separable accident, but to be black
happens inseparably to a crow and an
Ethiopian; we may possibly indeed conceive a
white crow, and an Ethiopian casting his
colour, without destruction of the subject.
They also define it thus; accident is that which
may be present and not present to the same
thing; |624 also that which is neither genus,
nor difference, nor species, nor property, yet is
always inherent in a subject.
Chap. VI. --Of Things common and peculiar
to the Five Predicates.
Having discussed all that were proposed, I
mean, genus, species, difference, property,
accident, we must declare what things are
common, and what peculiar to them. Now it is
common to them all to be predicated, as we
have said, of many things, but genus (is
predicated) of the species and individuals
under it, and difference in like manner; but
species, of the individuals under it; and
property, both of the species, of which it is the
property, and of the individuals under that
species; again, accident (is predicated) both of
species, and individuals. For animal is
predicated of horse and ox, being species, also
of this particular horse and ox, which are
individuals, but irrational is predicated of
horse and ox, and of particulars. Species
however, as man, is predicated of particulars
alone, but property both of the species, of
which it is the property, and of the individuals
under that species; as risibility both of man,
and of particular men, but blackness of the
species of crows, and of particulars, being an
inseparable accident; and to be moved, of man
and horse, being a separable accident.
Notwithstanding, it is pre-eminently
(predicated) of individuals, but secondarily of
those things which comprehend individuals.
Chap. VII. --Of the Community and
Distinction of Genus and Difference.
It is common to genus and difference to be
comprehensive of species, for difference also
comprehends species, though not all such as
the genera; |625 for rational, though, it does
not comprehend irrational, as animal does, yet
it comprehends man and divinity, which are
species. Whatever things also are predicated of
genus as genus, are predicated of the species
under it, and whatever are predicated of
difference as difference, will be also of the
species formed from it. For animal being a
genus, substance is predicated of it as of a
genus, also animated, and sensible, but these
are predicated of all the species under animal,
as far as to individuals. As moreover, rational
is difference, the use of reason is predicated of
it, as of difference, yet the use of reason will
not be predicated of rational only, but also of
the species under rational. This too is
common, that when genus or difference is
subverted, the things under them are also
subverted, for as when animal is not, horse is
not, nor man, thus also, when rational is not,
there will be no animal which uses reason.
Now, it is the property of genus to be
predicated of more things than difference,
species, property, and accident are, for animal
(is predicated) of man and horse, bird and
snake, but quadruped of animals alone, which
have four feet; again, man of individuals
alone, and capacity of neighing of horse alone,
and of particulars. Likewise, accident of fewer
things: yet we must assume the differences by
which the genus is divided, not those which
complete, but which divide the essence of
genus.
Moreover, genus comprehends difference in
capacity, for of animal one kind is rational, but
another irrational, but differences do not
comprehend genera. Besides, genera are prior
to the differences under them, wherefore they
subvert them, but are not co-subverted with
them. For animal being subverted, rational and
irrational are co-subverted, but differences no
longer co-subvert genus, for even if all of
them should be subverted, yet we may form a
conception of animated, sensible substance,
which is animal. |626
Yet more, genus is predicated in reference to
what a thing is, but difference in reference to
what kind of a thing it is, as was observed
before; besides there is one genus according to
every species; e. g. of man, animal (is the
genus), but there are many differences, as
rational, mortal, capable of intellect and
science, by which he differs from other
animals. Genus also is similar to matter, but
difference to form: however since there are
other things common and peculiar to genus
and difference, these will suffice.
Chap. VIII. --Of Community and Difference
of Genus and Species.
Genus and species possess in common, (as we
have said,) the being predicated of many
things, but species must be taken as species
only, and not as genus, if the same thing be
both species and genus. Moreover, it is
common to them both to be prior to what they
are predicated of, and to be each a certain
whole; but they differ, because genus indeed
comprehends species, but species are
comprehended by, and do not comprehend
genera, for genus is predicated of more than
species. Besides, it is necessary that genera
should be presupposed, and when formed by
specific differences, that they should
consummate species, whence also genera are
by nature prior. They also co-subvert, but are
not co-subverted, for species existing, genus
also entirely exists, but genus existing there is
not altogether species; genera too, are indeed
univocally predicated of species under them,
but not species of genera. Moreover, genera
exceed, from comprehending the species
which are under them, but species exceed
genera by their proper differences; |627
besides, neither can species become most
generic, nor genus most specific.
Chap. IX. --Of Community and Difference
of Genus and Property.
Both to genus and to property it is common to
follow species, for if any thing be man, it is
animal, and if any thing be man, it is risible.
Likewise to genus, to be equally predicated of
species, and to property, (to be equally
predicated) of the individuals which
participate it; thus man and ox are equally
animal, and Anytus and Melitus risible.21 It is
also common that genus should be univocally
predicated of its proper species, and property
of the things of which it is the property; still
they differ, because genus is prior, but
property posterior, for animal must first
necessarily exist, afterwards be divided by
differences and properties. Also genus indeed
is predicated of many species, but property of
one certain species of which it is the property.
Besides property is reciprocally predicated of
that of which it is the property, but genus is
not reciprocally predicated of any thing, for
neither if any thing is an animal, is it a man,
nor if a thing be animal is it risible, but if any
thing is a man it is risible, and vice versa.
Moreover, property is inherent in the whole
species, of which it is the property, in it alone,
and always, but genus in the whole species
indeed of which it is the genus, and always,
yet not in it alone; once more, properties being
subverted do not co-subvert genera, but genera
being subverted, co-subvert species, to which
properties belong; wherefore, also those things
of which there are properties, being subverted,
the properties themselves also, are co-
subverted. |628
Chap. X. -- Of Community and Difference of
Genus and Accident.
It is common to genus and accident to be
predicated, as we have said, of many things,
whether they (the accidents) be separable or
inseparable, for to be moved is predicated of
many things, and blackness of crows, and of
Ethiopians, and of certain inanimate things.
Genus however differs from accident, in that
genus is prior, but accident posterior to
species, for though an inseparable accident be
assumed, yet that of which it is the accident is
prior to the accident. Also the participants of
genus participate it equally, but those of
accident do not equally; for the participation
of accidents accepts intension and remission,
but not that of genera. Besides, accidents
primarily subsist about individuals, but genera
and species are by nature prior to individual
substances. Moreover, genera are predicated
of the things under them, in respect to what a
thing is, but accidents in respect to what kind
of a thing it is, or how each thing subsists; for
being asked, what kind of man an Ethiopian is,
you say that he is black; or how Socrates is,
you reply that he is sick or well.
Chap. XI. --Of Community and Difference
of Species and Difference.
We have shown then, wherein genus differs
from the other four, but each of the other four
happens also to differ from the rest, so that as
there are five, and each one of the four differs
from the rest, the five being four times (taken),
all the differences would appear to be twenty.
Nevertheless, such is not the case, but always
those successive being enumerated, and two
being deficient by one difference, from having
been already assumed, and the three by two
differences, the four by three, the five by four;
all the differences are ten, namely, four, three,
two, one. For in what genus differs from
difference, species, property, and accident, we
have shown, wherefore, there are four
differences; also we explained in what respect
|629 difference differs from genus, when we
declared in what genus differs from it. What
remains then, viz. in what respect it differs
from species, property, and accident, shall be
told, and three (differences) arise. Again, we
declared how species differs from difference,
when we showed how difference differs from
species; also we showed how species differs
from genus, when we explained how genus
differs from species; what remains then, viz. in
what species differs from property and from
accident, shall be told: these, then, are two
differences. But in what respect property
differs from accident, shall be discovered, for
how it differs from species, difference, and
genus, was explained before in the difference
of those from these. Wherefore, as four
differences of genus with respect to the rest,
are assumed, but three of difference, two of
species, and one of property with regard to
accident, there will be ten (differences
altogether), of which, four we have already
demonstrated, viz. those of genus, with respect
to the rest.
Chap. XII. --The same subject continued.
It is common then to difference and species to
be equally participated, for particular men
partake equally of man, and of the difference
of rational. It is also common always to be
present to their participants, for Socrates is
always rational, and always man, but it is the
property of difference indeed to be predicated
in respect to what kind a thing is of, but of
species in respect to what a thing is, for
though man should be assumed as a certain
kind of thing, yet he will not be simply so, but
in as far as differences according to genus
constitute him. Besides, difference is often
seen in many species, as quadruped in many
animals, different in species, but species is in
the individuals alone, which are tinder the
species. Moreover, difference is prior to the
species which subsists according to it, for
rational being subverted, co-subverts man, but
man being subverted, does not co-subvert
rational, since there is still divinity. Further,
difference is joined with another difference, |
630 (for rational and mortal are joined for the
subsistence of man,) but species is not joined
with species, so as to produce some other
species; for indeed a certain horse is joined
with a certain ass, for the production of a
mule, but horse simply joined with ass will not
produce a mule.
Chap. XIII. -- Of Community and Difference
of Property and Difference.22
Difference also and property have it in
common to be equally shared by their
participants, for rational are equally rational,
and risible (equally) risible (animals). Also it
is common to both to be always present, and
to every one, for though a biped should be
mutilated, yet (the term biped) is always
predicated with reference to what is naturally
adapted, since also risible has the "always"
from natural adaptation, but not from always
laughing. Now, it is the property of difference,
that it is frequently predicated of many
species, as rational of divinity and man, but
property (is predicated) of one species, of
which it is the property. Difference moreover
follows those things of which it is the
difference, yet does not also reciprocate, but
properties are reciprocally predicated of those
of which they are the properties, in
consequence of reciprocating.
Chap. XIV. --Of Community and Difference
of Accident and Difference.
To difference and accident it is common to be
predicated of many things, but it is common
(to the former) with inseparable accidents to
be |631 present always and with every one, for
biped is always present to man, and likewise
blackness to all crows. Still they differ in that
difference indeed comprehends but is not
comprehended by species; for rational
comprehends divinity and man, but accidents
after a certain manner comprehend from their
being in many things, yet in a certain manner
are comprehended from the subjects not being
the recipients of one accident, but of many.
Besides, difference indeed docs not admit of
intension and remission, but accidents accept
the more and less; moreover contrary
differences cannot be mingled, but contrary
accidents may sometimes be mingled. So
many then are the points common and peculiar
to difference and the others.
Chap. XV. --Of Community and Difference
of Species and Property.
In what respect species differs from genus and
difference, was explained in our enunciation
of the way in which genus, and also
difference, differ from the rest; it now remains
that we should point out how it (species)
differs from property and accident. It is
common then to species and property, to be
reciprocally predicated of each other, since if
any thing be man, it is risible, also if it be
risible, it is man, still we have frequently
declared that risible must be assumed
according to natural adaptation to risibility. It
is also common (to them) to be equally
present, for species are equally present to their
participants, and properties to the things of
which they are properties, but species differs
from property, in that species indeed may be
the genus of other things, but property cannot
possibly be the property of other things.
Again, species subsists prior to property, but
property accedes to species, for man must
exist, in order that risible may: besides,
species is always present in energy with its
subject, but property sometimes also in
capacity, for Socrates is a man always in
energy, but he does not always laugh, though
he is always naturally adapted to be risible.
Once more, things of |632 which the
definitions are different, are themselves also
different, but it is (the definition) of species to
be under genus, and to be predicated of many
things, also differing in number, in respect to
what a thing is, and things of this kind, but of
property it is to be present to a thing alone,
and to every individual and always.
Chap. XVI. --Of Community and Difference
of Species and Accident.
To species and accident it is common to be
predicated of many, but other points of
community are rare, from the circumstance of
accident, and that to which it is accidental,
differing very much from each other. Now, the
properties of each are these: of species, to be
predicated of those of which it is the species,
in respect to what a thing is, but of accident, in
reference to what kind a thing is of, or how it
subsists.23 Likewise, that each substance
partakes of one species, but of many accidents,
both separable and inseparable: moreover,
species are conceived prior to accidents, even
if they be inseparable, (for there must be
subject, in order that something should happen
to it,) but accidents are naturally adapted to be
of posterior origin, and possess a nature
adjunctive to substance. Again, of species the
participation is equal, but of accident, even if
it be inseparable, it is not equal; for an
Ethiopian may have a colour intense, or
remitted, according to blackness, with
reference to an(other) Ethiopian.
Chap. XVII. -- Of Community and
Difference of Property and Accident.24
It remains to speak of property and accident,
for how property differs from species,
difference, and |633 genus, has been stated. It
is common then to property and inseparable
accident not to subsist without those things in
which they are beheld, for as man does not
subsist without risible,25 so neither can
Ethiopian subsist without blackness, and as
property is present to every, and always, so
also is inseparable accident. Nevertheless, they
differ, in that property is present to one species
alone, as the being risible to man, but
inseparable accident, as black, is present not
only to an Ethiopian, but also to a crow, to a
coal, to ebony, and to certain other things.
Moreover, property is reciprocally predicated
of that of which it is the property, and is
equally (present), but inseparable accident is
not reciprocally predicated, besides, the
participation of properties is equal, but of
accidents one (subject partakes) more, but
another less. There are indeed other points of
community, and peculiarity of the above-
mentioned (predicables), but these are
sufficient for their distinction, and the setting
forth of their agreement.

[This translation appears in volume 2 of The

Organon, or logical treatises of Aristotle, with
the introduction of Porphyry, published by
Henry G. Bohn in London in 1853.
Note that only selected footnotes are included
and no marginalia. The urge to write a
commentary on this text appears to overwhelm
most translators, but since much of the
material is either references to other pages in
the book or refers to long obsolete texts on
logic it has been omitted.]
1. 1 At the request of Chrysaorius, his pupil,
who had recently met with the Categories of
Aristotle, Porphyry wrote this introduction, in
order to his comprehension of that treatise:
nearly the whole of it is composed from the
writings, and often almost in the very words of
Plato. As philosophers reduced all things
under ten common natures, as grammarians
also, with respect to eight words, so Porphyry
has comprehended every significant word,
except such as are significant of individuals,
under five terms. The five heads of
predicables therefore, taken from this Isagoge,
which was written in the third century, are an
addition to the Aristotelian Logic, in part of
which, (the Topics,) the doctrine laid down
differs from that enunciated here, in several
points, as Porphyry's view also differs from
that of Aldrich. Upon the subject generally,
the reader may compare Albertus Magnus de
Praedicab. Aquinas. Occam Logica. Abelard
de Gen. et Spec. ed Cousin. Trendelenb. Elem.
Crakanthorpe's, Whately's, Hill's, and Wallis'
Logics, also Boethius de Divisione.
2. 2 Dialectic, according to Plato, consists of
four parts, division, definition, demonstration,
and analysis; hence a treatise adapted to the
formation of these, will be evidently useful to
the dialectic of Plato. The difference between
the dialectic of Plato and that of Aristotle, is
noticed in the subsequent notes upon the
Organon, and the reader will find the subject
ably discussed in the introduction to Mansel's
Logic; here we need only observe that
Aristotle in the Topics, looks to opinion (in his
treatment of dialectic), while Plato disregards
it, and the former delivers many arguments
about one problem, but the latter, the same
method about many problems. Cf. Proclus.
MSS. commentary on the Parmenides, Philip.,
Schol. p. 143, ch, 4; Waitz, vol. ii. p. 137.
3. 1 On the metaphysical part of this question,
the opinions of philosophers are as vague as (I
may add) they are unprofitable, hence the term
"universals," is the best to be employed, as
least liable to commit the logician to any
metaphysical hypothesis; since the realist may
interpret it of "substances," the nominalist of
"names," the conceptualist of "notions." Cf.
Occam, Log. p. 1, Albertus Magnus, Abelard.
The agreement between the first and last,
proves that there is no real difference between
nominalism and conceptualism, since they
were both. Vide also Mansel, Appendix A,
where the authorities upon each side will be
found quoted.
4. 2 Genus and species, in short all forms,
have a triple subsistence, for they are either
prior to the many, or in the many, or posterior
to the many. Taylor. Philoponus, in his
extracts from Ammonius, illustrates this as
follows: Let a seal-ring be conceived, having
the image of Achilles upon it, from which seal
let there be many impressions taken in pieces
of wax, afterwards let a man perceiving the
pieces of wax to have all the impression of one
seal, retain such impression in his mind: then
the seal in the ring is said to be prior to the
many; the impression in the wax to be in the
many, and the image remaining in the
conception of the spectator, after the many,
and of posterior origin. This he applies to
genus and species.
5. 3 Viz. metaphysics; it is, in fact,
psychological. Cf. Leibnitz Meditat. de
Cognit. Ver. opera. ed Erdmann. and Mansel's
Prolegomena Logica.
6. 4 With this chapter compare ch. 5, of the
Categories, and Top. i. 5 and 8, whence the
discrepancies between the account of the
predicables given by Arist. and this by
Porphyry will appear, upon which see
Mansel's comment. Log. App. A, p. 9. Cf. also
Albertus Mag. de Predicab. Trac. 11, cap. 1,
Metap. iv. 28.
7. 1 Ammonius remarks that, "It is worth while
to doubt why Porphyry says that the first
signification of genus appears to be the one
easily adopted, and not the second
signification, which is the habitude of one
thing to one; since this nature first knows, for
she first produces one thing from one, and thus
many from many." But as Taylor observes, the
second signification of genus, which is second
with reference to us, is first to nature; for from
Hercules, one man is first produced, and thus
afterwards the multitude of the Heraclidae.
Universally, whatever is first to nature is
second to us, and vice versa, e. g. she begins
with form and matter, then flesh and bone; we
begin from man, so that things prior to nature
are posterior to our knowledge, wherefore the
first signification is clearer than the second.
8. 1 Porphyry does not recognise the
distinction between "quale quid" and "quale,"
(cf. Aldrich, Abelard de Gen. et Spe. ed.
Cousin,) but makes difference, property, and
accident to be all predicated ἐϝ τῷ ὁποῖόν τὶ
ἐστιν: Boethius distinguishes quale in
substantia, from quale non in substantia.
Moreover, Porphyry makes difference to be
always predicated de specie differentibus;
upon his consideration of property, vide note
to ch. 4, Isagog.
9. 2 Athenaeus attributes this verse to
Euripides. Vide Ath. lib. xiii. ch. 7.
10. 1 An infima species can be maintained by
none consistently but a Realist. Vide Mansel,
p. 21
11. 1 For the exemplification of the above, see
the "Arbor Porphyriana," (sometimes called by
the Greek logicians, the "ladder," κλίμαξ,)
given at page 7, ch. 5, of the Categories, with
the note. [Note to the online text: vol. 1 can
be found online at books.google.com]
12. 1 See notes to pp. 6 and 8, Categor. An
infima species implies a notion so complex as
to be incapable of further accessions, the
Realist maintains it to be the whole essence of
the individuals of which it is predicated. Cf.
Boethius; also Wallis, lib. i. 13, et seq.;
Whately, b. ii. ch. 5, sect. 3 and 5.
13. 2 Cf. Mansel, pp. 18 and 21, note;
Whately, p. 52, 138; Outline of Laws of
Thought, p. 44; Stewart, Philo. of Human
Mind, part i. ch. 4.
14. 1 Properly speaking, there cannot be more
than one highest genus, which is a cognate
term to every substance and quality supposed
to exist; yet a subaltern genus may be
relatively considered as a highest genus.
Species, when resolved into its component
parts, is found to be combined of genus and
difference, and in different points of view,
may be referred to different genera, also many
species have no appropriate name, but are
expressed by the combination of their
constituent parts, genus and difference, e. g.
"rectilinear-figure," " water-fowl;" indeed,
some are denoted by the difference alone, as "
repeater" (a watch which strikes the hour). Cf.
ch. 3, Cat. note; Crakanthorpe, Log. lib. ii.
Any singular term (denoting one individual)
implies, (vide Whately, b. ii. ch. 5, 5,) not only
the whole of what is understood by the species
it belongs to, but also more, namely, whatever
distinguishes that single object from others of
the same species, as London implies all that is
denoted by the term " city," and also all that
distinguishes that individual city. Cf. Wallis,
ch. 2.
15. 2 Hence, in describing an individual, we
do not employ properties (which belong to a
whole species), but generally, inseparable
accidents, i. e. such as can be predicated of
their subject at all times.
16. 1 According to Porphyry, difference is
always predicated "de specie differentibus,"
and he recognises only a relative difference
between two given species; thus "rational" is
not the difference of man per se, but of man as
distinguished from brutes. ...
17. 1 Porphyry's definition of man, "animal
rationale mortale," was adopted by Abelard,
Albertus Magnus, and Petrus Hispanus,
though sometimes with the saving clause, that
it must be understood with reference to the
Stoical notions of the gods. Aquinas first
removed the genus animal rationale from the
Arbor Porphy., and limited rationality to man,
distinguishing angels as intellectuales. Cf.
Summa, p. 1; Qu. lviii. 3; Opusc. xlviii. Tract
1. In the Aristotelian definition of man, ζῷον
πέζον δίπουν, the last would be regarded by
him as a difference.
18. 1 Boethius agrees with Porphyry, that
accidents, properly so called, are useless in
definition, (vide Opera, p. 3,) accidental
definition is, in fact, merely a description. Cf.
Albert. 1. c. Occam, pt. i. ch. 27. The only
proper definition is by genus and differentiae,
hence all definable notions will be species.
The definition here given of difference, as to
its being the excess of species over genus, is
clear, from a reference to what was stated in
the last note of the preceding chapter.
19. 2 "Ratione ejus, quale quid est
predicatur." Buhle; so Aldrich. There is no
warranty, as we have observed, by Porphyry,
for distinction between "quale quid" and
"quale."
20. 1 "Rationales enim sumus et nos et Dii,"
vetus interpres Latinus. Commonly the word
ἄγγελοι was substituted here, probably, as
Casaubon conjectures, from the emendation of
some Christian: Ammonius and Boethius
(Comment, v.) attest that Porphyry wrote
θεοὶ.
21. 1 The property of a subaltern genus is
predicated of all the species comprehended in
that genus; that of a lowest species is
predicated of all the individuals which partake
of the nature of that species: thus,
"Shape is the generic
property of body,
Growth is the generic
property of living
body,
Voluntary motion is
the generic property
of animal,
Risibility, the
specific property of
man."
Vide Hill's Logic.
22. 1 Whately observes, "It is often hard to
distinguish certain properties from differentia,
but whatever you consider as the most
essential to the nature of a species, with
respect to the matter you are engaged in, you
must call the differentia, as rationality to man,
and whatever you consider as rather an
accompaniment (or result) of that difference,
you must call the property, as the use of
speech seems to be a result of rationality. He
adds also, that the difference is not always one
quality, but is frequently compounded of
several together, no one of which would alone
suffice." Vide also Huyshe's Log., pp. 33, 34.
23. 2 Buhle retains the distinction here,
between quid and quale quid, upon which, see
notes on ch. 2 and 3. The reading is that of
Julius Pacius, whom all later editors have
followed: the Latin interpretation renders it,
"accidentis vero in eo, quod quale quiddam,
vel quomodo se habens."
24. 4 Accidents may be distinguished from
properties by the very definitions given of
them. The latter belong necessarily, and
therefore universally, to an essence, whereas
the former are those qualities which do not of
necessity belong to any essence, but are mere
contingencies. Huyshe. Vide also note ch. 4,
and cf. Albert de Predicab. Tract, vi. cap. I.
25. 1 Risibility is considered to be so
dependent upon rationality, as that the latter
could not exist without the former, and if this
were not so, the term risible would not be a
property of man, but only an inseparable
accident. Cf. Whately and Mansel.