The Categories

by

Ari stotle
Translated by E. M. Edghill

A Penn Sta te Electronic Classics Series Publication

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 Aristotle

The Categories what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one
case will be appropriate to that case only.
On the other hand, things are said to be named
‘univocally’ which have both the name and the definition
by answering to the name in common. A man and an ox are
both ‘animal’, and these are univocally so named, inas-
Aristotle much as not only the name, but also the definition, is
the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what
Translated by E. M. Edghill sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case
would be identical with that in the other.
Things are said to be named ‘derivatively’, which derive
Section 1 their name from some other name, but differ from it in
termination. Thus the grammarian derives his name from
Part 1 the word ‘grammar’, and the courageous man from the
word ‘courage’.
THINGS are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though
they have a common name, the definition corresponding Part 2
with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a
figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name ‘ani- FORMS of speech are either simple or composite. Examples
mal’; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they of the latter are such expressions as ‘the man runs’, ‘the
have a common name, the definition corresponding with man wins’; of the former ‘man’, ‘ox’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’.
the name differs for each. For should any one define in
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 The Categories
Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present
and are never present in a subject. Thus ‘man’ is predi- in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowl-
cable of the individual man, and is never present in a edge is present in a subject.
subject.
By being ‘present in a subject’ I do not mean present as Part 3
parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of ex-
istence apart from the said subject. WHEN one thing is predicated of another, all that which is
Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the
never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point subject. Thus, ‘man’ is predicated of the individual man;
of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is but ‘animal’ is predicated of ‘man’; it will, therefore, be
not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain white- predicable of the individual man also: for the individual
ness may be present in the body (for colour requires a man is both ‘man’ and ‘animal’.
material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything. If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differen-
Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject tiae are themselves different in kind. Take as an instance
and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present the genus ‘animal’ and the genus ‘knowledge’. ‘With feet’,
in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar. ‘two-footed’, ‘winged’, ‘aquatic’, are differentiae of ‘ani-
There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither mal’; the species of knowledge are not distinguished by
present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the same differentiae. One species of knowledge does not
the individual man or the individual horse. But, to speak differ from another in being ‘two-footed’.
more generally, that which is individual and has the char- But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is
acter of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in nothing to prevent their having the same differentiae:

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 Aristotle
for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas
all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae expressions which are not in any way composite such as
also of the subject. ‘man’, ‘white’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’, cannot be either true or false.

Part 4 Part 5

EXPRESSIONS which are in no way composite signify sub- SUBSTANCE, in the truest and primary and most definite sense
stance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a sub-
state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, ject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual
examples of substance are ‘man’ or ‘the horse’, of quan- man or horse. But in a secondary sense those things are
tity, such terms as ‘two cubits long’ or ‘three cubits long’, called substances within which, as species, the primary
of quality, such attributes as ‘white’, ‘grammatical’. substances are included; also those which, as genera,
‘Double’, ‘half’, ‘greater’, fall under the category of rela- include the species. For instance, the individual man is
tion; ‘in a the market place’, ‘in the Lyceum’, under that included in the species ‘man’, and the genus to which the
of place; ‘yesterday’, ‘last year’, under that of time. ‘Ly- species belongs is ‘animal’; these, therefore-that is to
ing’, ‘sitting’, are terms indicating position, ‘shod’, ‘armed’, say, the species ‘man’ and the genus ‘animal,-are termed
state; ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’, action; ‘to be lanced’, ‘to secondary substances.
be cauterized’, affection. It is plain from what has been said that both the name
No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an and the definition of the predicate must be predicable of
affirmation; it is by the combination of such terms that the subject. For instance, ‘man’ is predicted of the indi-
positive or negative statements arise. For every assertion vidual man. Now in this case the name of the species

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 The Categories
man’ is applied to the individual, for we use the term it could not be predicated of the species ‘man’ at all.
‘man’ in describing the individual; and the definition of Again, colour is present in body, therefore in individual
‘man’ will also be predicated of the individual man, for bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it
the individual man is both man and animal. Thus, both was present, it could not be present in body at all. Thus
the name and the definition of the species are predicable everything except primary substances is either predicated
of the individual. of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these
With regard, on the other hand, to those things which last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything
are present in a subject, it is generally the case that else to exist.
neither their name nor their definition is predicable of Of secondary substances, the species is more truly sub-
that in which they are present. Though, however, the stance than the genus, being more nearly related to pri-
definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain mary substance. For if any one should render an account
cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, ‘white’ of what a primary substance is, he would render a more
being present in a body is predicated of that in which it instructive account, and one more proper to the subject,
is present, for a body is called white: the definition, how- by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus,
ever, of the colour white’ is never predicable of the body. he would give a more instructive account of an individual
Everything except primary substances is either predi- man by stating that he was man than by stating that he
cable of a primary substance or present in a primary sub- was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the
stance. This becomes evident by reference to particular individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too
instances which occur. ‘Animal’ is predicated of the spe- general. Again, the man who gives an account of the
cies ‘man’, therefore of the individual man, for if there nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive
were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, account by mentioning the species ‘tree’ than by men-

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 Aristotle
tioning the genus ‘plant’. It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains,
Moreover, primary substances are most properly called when we exclude primary substances, we concede to spe-
substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities cies and genera alone the name ‘secondary substance’,
which underlie every. else, and that everything else is for these alone of all the predicates convey a knowledge
either predicated of them or present in them. Now the of primary substance. For it is by stating the species or
same relation which subsists between primary substance the genus that we appropriately define any individual
and everything else subsists also between the species man; and we shall make our definition more exact by
and the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject stating the former than by stating the latter. All other
is to predicate, since the genus is predicated of the spe- things that we state, such as that he is white, that he
cies, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it
genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting that is just that these alone, apart from primary substances,
the species is more truly substance than the genus. should be called substances.
Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are Further, primary substances are most properly so called,
genera, no one is more truly substance than another. We because they underlie and are the subjects of everything
should not give a more appropriate account of the indi- else. Now the same relation that subsists between pri-
vidual man by stating the species to which he belonged, mary substance and everything else subsists also between
than we should of an individual horse by adopting the the species and the genus to which the primary substance
same method of definition. In the same way, of primary belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is
substances, no one is more truly substance than another; not included within these, on the other. For these are the
an individual man is not more truly substance than an subjects of all such. If we call an individual man ‘skilled
individual ox. in grammar’, the predicate is applicable also to the spe-

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 The Categories
cies and to the genus to which he belongs. This law holds characteristics ‘terrestrial’ and ‘two-footed’ are predicated
good in all cases. of the species ‘man’, but not present in it. For they are
It is a common characteristic of all sub. stance that it not in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia
is never present in a subject. For primary substance is may be predicated of that of which the differentia itself
neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject; is predicated. For instance, if the characteristic ‘terres-
while, with regard to secondary substances, it is clear trial’ is predicated of the species ‘man’, the definition
from the following arguments (apart from others) that also of that characteristic may be used to form the predi-
they are not present in a subject. For ‘man’ is predicated cate of the species ‘man’: for ‘man’ is terrestrial.
of the individual man, but is not present in any subject: The fact that the parts of substances appear to be
for manhood is not present in the individual man. In the present in the whole, as in a subject, should not make us
same way, ‘animal’ is also predicated of the individual apprehensive lest we should have to admit that such parts
man, but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is are not substances: for in explaining the phrase ‘being
present in a subject, though the name may quite well be present in a subject’, we stated’ that we meant ‘other-
applied to that in which it is present, the definition can- wise than as parts in a whole’.
not be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only the It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in
name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we all propositions of which they form the predicate, they
should use both the definition of the species and that of are predicated univocally. For all such propositions have
the genus with reference to the individual man. Thus sub- for their subject either the individual or the species. It is
stance cannot be present in a subject. true that, inasmuch as primary substance is not predi-
Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the cable of anything, it can never form the predicate of any
case that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The proposition. But of secondary substances, the species is

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 Aristotle
predicated of the individual, the genus both of the spe- not an individual, but a class with a certain qualifica-
cies and of the individual. Similarly the differentiae are tion; for it is not one and single as a primary substance
predicated of the species and of the individuals. More- is; the words ‘man’, ‘animal’, are predicable of more than
over, the definition of the species and that of the genus one subject.
are applicable to the primary substance, and that of the Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality,
genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the like the term ‘white’; ‘white’ indicates quality and noth-
predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Simi- ing further, but species and genus determine the quality
larly, the definition of the differentiae will be applicable with reference to a substance: they signify substance
to the species and to the individuals. But it was stated qualitatively differentiated. The determinate qualification
above that the word ‘univocal’ was applied to those things covers a larger field in the case of the genus that in that
which had both name and definition in common. It is, of the species: he who uses the word ‘animal’ is herein
therefore, established that in every proposition, of which using a word of wider extension than he who uses the
either substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these word ‘man’.
are predicated univocally. Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary.
All substance appears to signify that which is individual. What could be the contrary of any primary substance,
In the case of primary substance this is indisputably true, such as the individual man or animal? It has none. Nor
for the thing is a unit. In the case of secondary sub- can the species or the genus have a contrary. Yet this
stances, when we speak, for instance, of ‘man’ or ‘ani- characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of
mal’, our form of speech gives the impression that we are many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing
here also indicating that which is individual, but the im- that forms the contrary of ‘two cubits long’ or of ‘three
pression is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is cubits long’, or of ‘ten’, or of any such term. A man may

9
 The Categories
contend that ‘much’ is the contrary of ‘little’, or ‘great’ of before, nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less
‘small’, but of definite quantitative terms no contrary what it is. Substance, then, does not admit of variation
exists. of degree.
Substance, again, does not appear to admit of varia- The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be
tion of degree. I do not mean by this that one substance that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is
cannot be more or less truly substance than another, for capable of admitting contrary qualities. From among things
it has already been stated’ that this is the case; but that other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to
no single substance admits of varying degrees within it- bring forward any which possessed this mark. Thus, one
self. For instance, one particular substance, ‘man’, can- and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can
not be more or less man either than himself at some the same one action be good and bad: this law holds
other time or than some other man. One man cannot be good with everything that is not substance. But one and
more man than another, as that which is white may be the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is
more or less white than some other white object, or as yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. The same in-
that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful dividual person is at one time white, at another black, at
than some other beautiful object. The same quality, more- one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at
over, is said to subsist in a thing in varying degrees at another bad. This capacity is found nowhere else, though
different times. A body, being white, is said to be whiter it might be maintained that a statement or opinion was
at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is said to an exception to the rule. The same statement, it is agreed,
be warmer or less warm than at some other time. But can be both true and false. For if the statement ‘he is
substance is not said to be more or less that which it is: sitting’ is true, yet, when the person in question has
a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was risen, the same statement will be false. The same applies

10
 Aristotle
to opinions. For if any one thinks truly that a person is If, then, a man should make this exception and contend
sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same opin- that statements and opinions are capable of admitting
ion, if still held, will be false. Yet although this exception contrary qualities, his contention is unsound. For state-
may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in ments and opinions are said to have this capacity, not
the manner in which the thing takes place. It is by them- because they themselves undergo modification, but be-
selves changing that substances admit contrary qualities. cause this modification occurs in the case of something
It is thus that that which was hot becomes cold, for it has else. The truth or falsity of a statement depends on facts,
entered into a different state. Similarly that which was and not on any power on the part of the statement itself
white becomes black, and that which was bad good, by a of admitting contrary qualities. In short, there is nothing
process of change; and in the same way in all other cases which can alter the nature of statements and opinions. As,
it is by changing that substances are capable of admitting then, no change takes place in themselves, these cannot
contrary qualities. But statements and opinions themselves be said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities.
remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the alteration in But it is by reason of the modification which takes place
the facts of the case that the contrary quality comes to be within the substance itself that a substance is said to be
theirs. The statement ‘he is sitting’ remains unaltered, but capable of admitting contrary qualities; for a substance
it is at one time true, at another false, according to cir- admits within itself either disease or health, whiteness
cumstances. What has been said of statements applies also or blackness. It is in this sense that it is said to be ca-
to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which the pable of admitting contrary qualities.
thing takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that,
it should be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it while remaining numerically one and the same, it is ca-
is by itself changing that it does so. pable of admitting contrary qualities, the modification

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 The Categories
taking place through a change in the substance itself. evident: for it is measured in long and short syllables. I
Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance. mean here that speech which is vocal. Moreover, it is a
discrete quantity for its parts have no common boundary.
Part 6 There is no common boundary at which the syllables join,
but each is separate and distinct from the rest.
QUANTITY is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for
quantities are such that each part of the whole has a it is possible to find a common boundary at which its
relative position to the other parts: others have within parts join. In the case of the line, this common boundary
them no such relation of part to part. is the point; in the case of the plane, it is the line: for
Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; the parts of the plane have also a common boundary.
of continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, Similarly you can find a common boundary in the case of
time and place. the parts of a solid, namely either a line or a plane.
In the case of the parts of a number, there is no com- Space and time also belong to this class of quantities.
mon boundary at which they join. For example: two fives Time, past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole.
make ten, but the two fives have no common boundary, Space, likewise, is a continuous quantity; for the parts of
but are separate; the parts three and seven also do not a solid occupy a certain space, and these have a common
join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it ever be boundary; it follows that the parts of space also, which
possible in the case of number that there should be a are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same
common boundary among the parts; they are always sepa- common boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not
rate. Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity. only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for
The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is its parts have a common boundary.

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 Aristotle
Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative each. This holds good also in the case of speech. None of
position each to each, or of parts which do not. The parts its parts has an abiding existence: when once a syllable
of a line bear a relative position to each other, for each is pronounced, it is not possible to retain it, so that,
lies somewhere, and it would be possible to distinguish naturally, as the parts do not abide, they cannot have
each, and to state the position of each on the plane and position. Thus, some quantities consist of parts which
to explain to what sort of part among the rest each was have position, and some of those which have not.
contiguous. Similarly the parts of a plane have position, Strictly speaking, only the things which I have men-
for it could similarly be stated what was the position of tioned belong to the category of quantity: everything
each and what sort of parts were contiguous. The same is else that is called quantitative is a quantity in a second-
true with regard to the solid and to space. But it would ary sense. It is because we have in mind some one of
be impossible to show that the arts of a number had a these quantities, properly so called, that we apply quan-
relative position each to each, or a particular position, titative terms to other things. We speak of what is white
or to state what parts were contiguous. Nor could this be as large, because the surface over which the white ex-
done in the case of time, for none of the parts of time tends is large; we speak of an action or a process as
has an abiding existence, and that which does not abide lengthy, because the time covered is long; these things
can hardly have position. It would be better to say that cannot in their own right claim the quantitative epithet.
such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being For instance, should any one explain how long an action
prior to another. Similarly with number: in counting, ‘one’ was, his statement would be made in terms of the time
is prior to ‘two’, and ‘two’ to ‘three’, and thus the parts of taken, to the effect that it lasted a year, or something of
number may be said to possess a relative order, though it that sort. In the same way, he would explain the size of a
would be impossible to discover any distinct position for white object in terms of surface, for he would state the

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 The Categories
area which it covered. Thus the things already mentioned, few, though those in the theatre far outnumber those in
and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature quantities; the house. The terms ‘two cubits long, “three cubits long,’
nothing else can claim the name in its own right, but, if and so on indicate quantity, the terms ‘great’ and ‘small’
at all, only in a secondary sense. indicate relation, for they have reference to an external
Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite standard. It is, therefore, plain that these are to be classed
quantities this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is as relative.
the contrary of ‘two cubits long’ or of ‘three cubits long’, Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not,
or of a surface, or of any such quantities. A man might, they have no contraries: for how can there be a contrary of
indeed, argue that ‘much’ was the contrary of ‘little’, and an attribute which is not to be apprehended in or by itself,
‘great’ of ‘small’. But these are not quantitative, but rela- but only by reference to something external? Again, if ‘great’
tive; things are not great or small absolutely, they are so and ‘small’ are contraries, it will come about that the same
called rather as the result of an act of comparison. For subject can admit contrary qualities at one and the same
instance, a mountain is called small, a grain large, in time, and that things will themselves be contrary to them-
virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others of selves. For it happens at times that the same thing is both
its kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference here to small and great. For the same thing may be small in com-
an external standard, for if the terms ‘great’ and ‘small’ parison with one thing, and great in comparison with an-
were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called other, so that the same thing comes to be both small and
small or a grain large. Again, we say that there are many great at one and the same time, and is of such a nature as
people in a village, and few in Athens, although those in to admit contrary qualities at one and the same moment.
the city are many times as numerous as those in the vil- Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed,
lage: or we say that a house has many in it, and a theatre that nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same

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 Aristotle
moment. For though substance is capable of admitting traries which, within the same class, are separated by the
contrary qualities, yet no one is at the same time both sick greatest possible distance.
and healthy, nothing is at the same time both white and Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of
black. Nor is there anything which is qualified in contrary degree. One thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater
ways at one and the same time. degree than another. Similarly with regard to number:
Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves what is ‘three’ is not more truly three than what is ‘five’
be contrary to themselves. For if ‘great’ is the contrary of is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than
‘small’, and the same thing is both great and small at the another set. Again, one period of time is not said to be
same time, then ‘small’ or ‘great’ is the contrary of itself. more truly time than another. Nor is there any other kind
But this is impossible. The term ‘great’, therefore, is not of quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with regard
the contrary of the term ‘small’, nor ‘much’ of ‘little’. And to which variation of degree can be predicated. The cat-
even though a man should call these terms not relative egory of quantity, therefore, does not admit of variation
but quantitative, they would not have contraries. of degree.
It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and
appears to admit of a contrary. For men define the term inequality are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quanti-
‘above’ as the contrary of ‘below’, when it is the region at ties is said to be equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is
the centre they mean by ‘below’; and this is so, because said to be equal or unequal to another; number, too, and
nothing is farther from the extremities of the universe time can have these terms applied to them, indeed can all
than the region at the centre. Indeed, it seems that in those kinds of quantity that have been mentioned.
defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would
spatial metaphor, for they say that those things are con- seem, be termed equal or unequal to anything else. One

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 The Categories
particular disposition or one particular quality, such as
whiteness, is by no means compared with another in terms
Section 2
of equality and inequality but rather in terms of similar-
Part 7
ity. Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity that it can
be called equal and unequal.
THOSE things are called relative, which, being either said
to be of something else or related to something else, are
explained by reference to that other thing. For instance,
the word ‘superior’ is explained by reference to some-
thing else, for it is superiority over something else that
is meant. Similarly, the expression ‘double’ has this ex-
ternal reference, for it is the double of something else
that is meant. So it is with everything else of this kind.
There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposi-
tion, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The signifi-
cance of all these is explained by a reference to some-
thing else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of
something, knowledge is knowledge of something, atti-
tude is the attitude of something. So it is with all other
relatives that have been mentioned. Those terms, then,
are called relative, the nature of which is explained by
reference to something else, the preposition ‘of’ or some
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 Aristotle
other preposition being used to indicate the relation. that admits of variation of degree. No term such as ‘double’
Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with admits of this modification. All relatives have correla-
son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute tives: by the term ‘slave’ we mean the slave of a master,
by comparison with something. Again, that which is called by the term ‘master’, the master of a slave; by ‘double’,
similar must be similar to something else, and all other the double of its hall; by ‘half’, the half of its double; by
such attributes have this external reference. It is to be ‘greater’, greater than that which is less; by ‘less,’ less
noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular than that which is greater.
attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to So it is with every other relative term; but the case we
stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but use to express the correlation differs in some instances.
take their name from the aforesaid attitudes. Thus, by knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by
It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus vir- the knowable, that which is to be apprehended by knowl-
tue has a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowl- edge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; by the
edge, too, has a contrary, ignorance. But this is not the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception.
mark of all relatives; ‘double’ and ‘triple’ have no con- Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not
trary, nor indeed has any such term. appear to exist. This comes about when a blunder is made,
It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of and that to which the relative is related is not accurately
degree. For ‘like’ and ‘unlike’, ‘equal’ and ‘unequal’, have stated. If a man states that a wing is necessarily relative
the modifications ‘more’ and ‘less’ applied to them, and to a bird, the connexion between these two will not be
each of these is relative in character: for the terms ‘like’ reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say that a bird is
and ‘unequal’ bear ‘unequal’ bear a reference to some- a bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the origi-
thing external. Yet, again, it is not every relative term nal statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to

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 The Categories
be relative to the bird qua bird, since many creatures is ‘headed’, than as that of an animal, for the animal
besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature. If, does not have a head qua animal, since many animals
then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will have no head.
be reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having refer- Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to
ence necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged which a thing is related, when a name does not exist, if,
creature as being such because of its wings. from that which has a name, we derive a new name, and
Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if apply it to that with which the first is reciprocally con-
no word exists by which a correlation can adequately be nected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived
explained. If we define a rudder as necessarily having the word ‘winged’ from ‘wing’ and from ‘rudder’.
reference to a boat, our definition will not be appropri- All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correla-
ate, for the rudder does not have this reference to a boat tive. I add this condition because, if that to which they
qua boat, as there are boats which have no rudders. Thus are related is stated as haphazard and not accurately, the
we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the word ‘boat’ two are not found to be interdependent. Let me state
cannot be said to find its explanation in the word ‘rud- what I mean more clearly. Even in the case of acknowl-
der’. As there is no existing word, our definition would edged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there
perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted,
‘ruddered’ as the correlative of ‘rudder’. If we express our- not by that name which expresses the correlative notion,
selves thus accurately, at any rate the terms are recipro- but by one of irrelevant significance. The term ‘slave,’ if
cally connected, for the ‘ruddered’ thing is ‘ruddered’ in defined as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a
virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A head will biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally con-
be more accurately defined as the correlative of that which nected with that in relation to which it is defined, for

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the statement is not exact. Further, if one thing is said to to exist, for if the man is not a master, the slave is not a
be correlative with another, and the terminology used is slave. Similarly, if the attribute ‘winged’ be withdrawn
correct, then, though all irrelevant attributes should be from ‘the bird’, ‘the wing’ will no longer be relative; for if
removed, and only that one attribute left in virtue of the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that
which it was correctly stated to be correlative with that ‘the wing’ has no correlative.
other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the cor- Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be
relative of ‘the slave’ is said to be ‘the master’, then, exactly designated; if there is a name existing, the state-
though all irrelevant attributes of the said ‘master’, such ment will be easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to con-
as ‘biped’, ‘receptive of knowledge’, ‘human’, should be struct names. When the terminology is thus correct, it is
removed, and the attribute ‘master’ alone left, the stated evident that all correlatives are interdependent.
correlation existing between him and the slave will re- Correlatives are thought to come into existence simul-
main the same, for it is of a master that a slave is said to taneously. This is for the most part true, as in the case of
be the slave. On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, the double and the half. The existence of the half neces-
one is not correctly termed, then, when all other attributes sitates the existence of that of which it is a half. Simi-
are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it larly the existence of a master necessitates the existence
was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master;
be found to have disappeared. these are merely instances of a general rule. Moreover,
For suppose the correlative of ‘the slave’ should be said they cancel one another; for if there is no double it fol-
to be ‘the man’, or the correlative of ‘the wing”the bird’; lows that there is no half, and vice versa; this rule also
if the attribute ‘master’ be withdrawn from’ the man’, the applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not appear to
correlation between ‘the man’ and ‘the slave’ will cease be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence

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simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to of perception. If the perceptible is annihilated, percep-
exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case tion also will cease to exist; but the annihilation of
that we acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it perception does not cancel the existence of the percep-
would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of tible. For perception implies a body perceived and a
knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was body in which perception takes place. Now if that which
contemporaneous with that of its object. is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is
Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if
exist, cancels at the same time the knowledge which was the body does not exist, it follows that perception also
its correlative, the converse of this is not true. It is true ceases to exist. Thus the annihilation of the perceptible
that if the object of knowledge does not exist there can involves that of perception.
be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything to But the annihilation of perception does not involve that
know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain of the perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it
object does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite follows that perception also is annihilated, but
well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring of the circle, perceptibles such as body, heat, sweetness, bitterness,
if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, though and so on, will remain.
it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the knowl- Again, perception is generated at the same time as the
edge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all perceiving subject, for it comes into existence at the same
animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, time as the animal. But the perceptible surely exists be-
but there might yet be many objects of knowledge. fore perception; for fire and water and such elements,
This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for out of which the animal is itself composed, exist before
the object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act the animal is an animal at all, and before perception.

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 Aristotle
Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists before which the things indicated are a part, and so it comes
perception. about that these appear to have a relative character. In-
It may be questioned whether it is true that no sub- deed, if our definition of that which is relative was com-
stance is relative, as seems to be the case, or whether plete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that
exception is to be made in the case of certain secondary no substance is relative. If, however, our definition was
substances. With regard to primary substances, it is quite not complete, if those things only are properly called
true that there is no such possibility, for neither wholes relative in the case of which relation to an external ob-
nor parts of primary substances are relative. The indi- ject is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps some
vidual man or ox is not defined with reference to some- explanation of the dilemma may be found.
thing external. Similarly with the parts: a particular hand The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives,
or head is not defined as a particular hand or head of a but the fact that a thing is explained with reference to
particular person, but as the hand or head of a particular something else does not make it essentially relative.
person. It is true also, for the most part at least, in the From this it is plain that, if a man definitely appre-
case of secondary substances; the species ‘man’ and the hends a relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend
species ‘ox’ are not defined with reference to anything that to which it is relative. Indeed this is self-evident:
outside themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so for if a man knows that some particular thing is relative,
far as it is some one’s property, not in so far as it is wood. assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which
It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance relation to something is a necessary condition of exist-
is not relative. But with regard to some secondary sub- ence, he knows that also to which it is related. For if he
stances there is a difference of opinion; thus, such terms does not know at all that to which it is related, he will
as ‘head’ and ‘hand’ are defined with reference to that of not know whether or not it is relative. This is clear, more-

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 The Categories
over, in particular instances. If a man knows definitely know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus these
that such and such a thing is ‘double’, he will also forth- are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be
with know definitely that of which it is the double. For if true to say that no substance is relative in character. It is
there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a posi-
double, he does not know at all that it is double. Again, tive statement without more exhaustive examination, but
if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it follows nec- to have raised questions with regard to details is not
essarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also without advantage.
than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know
indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which Part 8
is less beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowl-
edge. For if he does not know definitely that than which it BY ‘QUALITY’ I mean that in virtue of which people are said
is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to know defi- to be such and such.
nitely that it is more beautiful than something else which Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort
is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less of quality let us call ‘habit’ or ‘disposition’. Habit differs
beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man appre- from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly
hends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows established. The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue
that also definitely to which it is related. are habits, for knowledge, even when acquired only in a
Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character
and it is possible to know their essential character defi- and difficult to displace, unless some great mental up-
nitely, but it does not necessarily follow that we should heaval takes place, through disease or any such cause.
know that to which they are related. It is not possible to The virtues, also, such as justice, self-restraint, and so

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 Aristotle
on, are not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give Habits are at the same time dispositions, but disposi-
place to vice. tions are not necessarily habits. For those who have some
By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condi- specific habit may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to
tion that is easily changed and quickly gives place to its be thus or thus disposed; but those who are disposed in
opposite. Thus, heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are some specific way have not in all cases the correspond-
dispositions. For a man is disposed in one way or another ing habit.
with reference to these, but quickly changes, becoming Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for
cold instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it is with all example, we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy
other dispositions also, unless through lapse of time a or sickly: in fact it includes all those terms which refer to
disposition has itself become inveterate and almost im- inborn capacity or incapacity. Such things are not predi-
possible to dislodge: in which case we should perhaps go cated of a person in virtue of his disposition, but in vir-
so far as to call it a habit. tue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do something
It is evident that men incline to call those conditions with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind. Persons are
habits which are of a more or less permanent type and called good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such
difficult to displace; for those who are not retentive of and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capac-
knowledge, but volatile, are not said to have such and ity to accomplish something with ease. Men are called
such a ‘habit’ as regards knowledge, yet they are dis- healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resis-
posed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowl- tance to those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily
edge. Thus habit differs from disposition in this, that arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity.
while the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent Similarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness
and difficult to alter. is predicated of a thing because it has that capacity of

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resistance which enables it to withstand disintegration; ception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the
softness, again, is predicated of a thing by reason of the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the
lack of that capacity. rest of these qualities.
A third class within this category is that of affective Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other
qualities and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, colours, are not said to be affective qualities in this sense,
are examples of this sort of quality, together with all that but -because they themselves are the results of an affec-
is akin to these; heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, tion. It is plain that many changes of colour take place
and blackness are affective qualities. It is evident that because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he blushes;
these are qualities, for those things that possess them when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is
are themselves said to be such and such by reason of this, that when a man is by nature liable to such affec-
their presence. Honey is called sweet because it contains tions, arising from some concomitance of elements in his
sweetness; the body is called white because it contains constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the
whiteness; and so in all other cases. corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposi-
The term ‘affective quality’ is not used as indicating tion of bodily elements, which in the former instance was
that those things which admit these qualities are affected momentarily present in the case of an access of shame,
in any way. Honey is not called sweet because it is af- might be a result of a man’s natural temperament, so as
fected in a specific way, nor is this what is meant in any to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural
other instance. Similarly heat and cold are called affec- characteristic. All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if
tive qualities, not because those things which admit them caused by certain permanent and lasting affections, are
are affected. What is meant is that these said qualities called affective qualities. For pallor and duskiness of com-
are capable of producing an ‘affection’ in the way of per- plexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to

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 Aristotle
be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they origi- certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or al-
nate in natural constitution, but also if they come about together permanent, are called qualities, for in virtue of
through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to re- them men are said to be such and such.
move, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the same Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered
way we are said to be such and such because of these. ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose
Those conditions, however, which arise from causes that a man is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken
which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily re- of as a bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances
moved, are called, not qualities, but affections: for we he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be
are not said to be such virtue of them. The man who affected. Such conditions are therefore termed, not quali-
blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional ties, but affections.
blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale through fear The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that
said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather to have belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and
been affected. curvedness and any other qualities of this type; each of
Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities. these defines a thing as being such and such. Because it
In like manner there are affective qualities and affections is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have a
of the soul. That temper with which a man is born and specific character, or again because it is straight or curved;
which has its origin in certain deep-seated affections is in fact a thing’s shape in every case gives rise to a quali-
called a quality. I mean such conditions as insanity, irasci- fication of it.
bility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or irascible Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to
in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic states be terms indicating quality: yet these, it would appear,
which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of really belong to a class different from that of quality. For

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 The Categories
it is rather a certain relative position of the parts com- who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, is not
posing the thing thus qualified which, it appears, is indi- derived from that of any quality; for lob those capacities
cated by each of these terms. A thing is dense, owing to have no name assigned to them. In this, the inborn capac-
the fact that its parts are closely combined with one an- ity is distinct from the science, with reference to which
other; rare, because there are interstices between the men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is
parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called ‘box-
rough, because some parts project beyond others. ing’ or ‘wrestling’ as the case may be, and the name given
There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the
most properly so called have, we may safely say, been science. Sometimes, even though a name exists for the
enumerated. quality, that which takes its character from the quality has
These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their a name that is not a derivative. For instance, the upright
name from them as derivatives, or are in some other way man takes his character from the possession of the quality
dependent on them, are said to be qualified in some spe- of integrity, but the name given him is not derived from
cific way. In most, indeed in almost all cases, the name of the word ‘integrity’. Yet this does not occur often.
that which is qualified is derived from that of the quality. We may therefore state that those things are said to be
Thus the terms ‘whiteness’, ‘grammar’, ‘justice’, give us the possessed of some specific quality which have a name
adjectives ‘white’, ‘grammatical’, ‘just’, and so on. derived from that of the aforesaid quality, or which are in
There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality some other way dependent on it.
under consideration has no name, it is impossible that One quality may be the contrary of another; thus jus-
those possessed of it should have a name that is deriva- tice is the contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness,
tive. For instance, the name given to the runner or boxer, and so on. The things, also, which are said to be such

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 Aristotle
and such in virtue of these qualities, may be contrary the For if we should say that justice admitted of variation of
one to the other; for that which is unjust is contrary to degree, difficulties might ensue, and this is true with re-
that which is just, that which is white to that which is gard to all those qualities which are dispositions. There
black. This, however, is not always the case. Red, yellow, are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of variation
and such colours, though qualities, have no contraries. here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very
If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also well admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people
be a quality. This will be evident from particular instances, vary in the degree in which they possess these qualities,
if we apply the names used to denote the other catego- and that this is the case with grammatical learning and all
ries; for instance, granted that justice is the contrary of those qualities which are classed as dispositions. However
injustice and justice is a quality, injustice will also be a that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things
quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor in- which in virtue of these qualities are said to be what they
deed any other category but that of quality, will be appli- are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for one
cable properly to injustice. So it is with all other contrar- man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy
ies falling under the category of quality. or just, than another, and so on.
Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predi- The qualities expressed by the terms ‘triangular’ and ‘qua-
cated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of drangular’ do not appear to admit of variation of degree,
another. This is also the case with reference to justice. nor indeed do any that have to do with figure. For those
Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a quality things to which the definition of the triangle or circle is
in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is white, applicable are all equally triangular or circular. Those, on
it may become whiter. the other hand, to which the same definition is not appli-
Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. cable, cannot be said to differ from one another in degree;

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the square is no more a circle than the rectangle, for to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music, but
neither is the definition of the circle appropriate. In short, these, if relative at all, are relative only in virtue of their
if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable to genera; thus grammar is said be the knowledge of some-
both objects, they cannot be compared. Thus it is not all thing, not the grammar of something; similarly music is
qualities which admit of variation of degree. the knowledge of something, not the music of something.
Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative.
are peculiar to quality, the fact that likeness and unlike- And it is because we possess these individual branches of
ness can be predicated with reference to quality only, knowledge that we are said to be such and such. It is these
gives to that category its distinctive feature. One thing that we actually possess: we are called experts because we
is like another only with reference to that in virtue of possess knowledge in some particular branch. Those par-
which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar ticular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which
mark of quality. we are sometimes said to be such and such, are them-
We must not be disturbed because it may be argued selves qualities, and are not relative. Further, if anything
that, though proposing to discuss the category of qual- should happen to fall within both the category of quality
ity, we have included in it many relative terms. We did and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary
say that habits and dispositions were relative. In practi- in classing it under both these heads.
cally all such cases the genus is relative, the individual
not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by refer-
ence to something else, for we mean a knowledge of some-
thing. But particular branches of knowledge are not thus
explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to

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Section 3 Part 10

THE PROPOSED CATEGORIES have, then, been adequately dealt

Part 9
with. We must next explain the various senses in which
the term ‘opposite’ is used. Things are said to be opposed
ACTION AND AFFECTION both admit of contraries and also of varia-
in four senses: (i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as
tion of degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being
contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to positives,
heated of being cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus
(iv) as affirmatives to negatives.
they admit of contraries. They also admit of variation of
Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of
degree: for it is possible to heat in a greater or less de-
the use of the word ‘opposite’ with reference to correla-
gree; also to be heated in a greater or less degree. Thus
tives is afforded by the expressions ‘double’ and ‘half’;
action and affection also admit of variation of degree. So
with reference to contraries by ‘bad’ and ‘good’. Oppo-
much, then, is stated with regard to these categories.
sites in the sense of ‘privatives’ and ‘positives’ are’ blind-
We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when
ness’ and ‘sight’; in the sense of affirmatives and nega-
we were dealing with that of relation, and stated that
tives, the propositions ‘he sits’, ‘he does not sit’.
such terms derived their names from those of the corre-
(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of
sponding attitudes.
relation are explained by a reference of the one to the
As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily
other, the reference being indicated by the preposition
intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at
‘of’ or by some other preposition. Thus, double is a rela-
the beginning, that in the category of state are included
tive term, for that which is double is explained as the
such states as ‘shod’, ‘armed’, in that of place ‘in the
double of something. Knowledge, again, is the opposite
Lyceum’ and so on, as was explained before.
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 The Categories
of the thing known, in the same sense; and the thing animal. Odd and even, again, are predicated of number,
known also is explained by its relation to its opposite, and it is necessary that the one or the other should be
knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that which present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate be-
is known by something, that is, by knowledge. Such things, tween the terms of either of these two pairs. On the other
then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such
being correlatives are explained by a reference of the one necessity obtains, we find an intermediate. Blackness and
to the other. whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not
(ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in necessary that either the one or the other should be present
any way interdependent, but are contrary the one to the in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that every-
other. The good is not spoken of as the good of the bad, body must be white or black. Badness and goodness, again,
but as the contrary of the bad, nor is white spoken of as are predicated of man, and of many other things, but it is
the white of the black, but as the contrary of the black. not necessary that either the one quality or the other should
These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. Those be present in that of which they are predicated: it is not
contraries which are such that the subjects in which they true to say that everything that may be good or bad must
are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, be either good or bad. These pairs of contraries have inter-
must necessarily contain either the one or the other of mediates: the intermediates between white and black are
them, have no intermediate, but those in the case of grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between;
which no such necessity obtains, always have an inter- the intermediate between good and bad is that which is
mediate. Thus disease and health are naturally present in neither the one nor the other.
the body of an animal, and it is necessary that either the Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey
one or the other should be present in the body of an and sallow and all the other colours that come between

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 Aristotle
white and black; in other cases, however, it is not easy to is not equivalent to ‘sight’, ‘to be blind’ is not equivalent
name the intermediate, but we must define it as that to ‘blindness’. Blindness is a ‘privative’, to be blind is to be
which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which in a state of privation, but is not a ‘privative’. Moreover, if
is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust. ‘blindness’ were equivalent to ‘being blind’, both would be
(iii) ‘privatives’ and ‘Positives’ have reference to the predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said
same subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to be blind, he is by no means said to be blindness.
to the eye. It is a universal rule that each of a pair of To be in a state of ‘possession’ is, it appears, the oppo-
opposites of this type has reference to that to which the site of being in a state of ‘privation’, just as ‘positives’ and
particular ‘positive’ is natural. We say that that is ca- ‘privatives’ themselves are opposite. There is the same type
pable of some particular faculty or possession has suf- of antithesis in both cases; for just as blindness is op-
fered privation when the faculty or possession in ques- posed to sight, so is being blind opposed to having sight.
tion is in no way present in that in which, and at the That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirma-
time at which, it should naturally be present. We do not tion or denial. By ‘affirmation’ we mean an affirmative
call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind proposition, by ‘denial’ a negative. Now, those facts which
which has not sight, but rather that which has not teeth form the matter of the affirmation or denial are not propo-
or sight at the time when by nature it should. For there sitions; yet these two are said to be opposed in the same
are some creatures which from birth are without sight, or sense as the affirmation and denial, for in this case also
without teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind. the type of antithesis is the same. For as the affirmation
To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the is opposed to the denial, as in the two propositions ‘he
same as the corresponding ‘privative’ or ‘positive’. ‘Sight’ is sits’, ‘he does not sit’, so also the fact which constitutes
a ‘positive’, ‘blindness’ a ‘privative’, but ‘to possess sight’ the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to

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 The Categories
that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to his not stances. But those contraries which have an intermedi-
sitting. ate are not subject to any such necessity. It is not neces-
It is evident that ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ are not op- sary that every substance, receptive of such qualities,
posed each to each in the same sense as relatives. The should be either black or white, cold or hot, for some-
one is not explained by reference to the other; sight is thing intermediate between these contraries may very
not sight of blindness, nor is any other preposition used well be present in the subject. We proved, moreover, that
to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is not said to those contraries have an intermediate in the case of which
be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight. Rela- the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the
tives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject,
a relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation be- as it is a constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow
tween it and that with which it was correlative. But this to be white, it is necessary determinately that one of the
is not the case. Sight is not called the sight of blindness. two contraries, not one or the other, should be present in
That those terms which fall under the heads of ‘posi- the subject; for fire cannot be cold, or snow black. Thus,
tives’ and ‘privatives’ are not opposed each to each as it is not the case here that one of the two must needs be
contraries, either, is plain from the following facts: Of a present in every subject receptive of these qualities, but
pair of contraries such that they have no intermediate, only in that subject of which the one forms a constitu-
one or the other must needs be present in the subject in tive property. Moreover, in such cases it is one member of
which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predi- the pair determinately, and not either the one or the
cated; for it is those, as we proved,’ in the case of which other, which must be present.
this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. More- In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, on the other
over, we cited health and disease, odd and even, as in- hand, neither of the aforesaid statements holds good.

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For it is not necessary that a subject receptive of the pair should be present, and that in a determinate sense.
qualities should always have either the one or the other; It is, therefore, plain that ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ are
that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight not opposed each to each in either of the senses in which
is natural is not said either to be blind or to see. Thus contraries are opposed.
‘positives’ and ‘privatives’ do not belong to that class of Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there
contraries which consists of those which have no inter- should be changes from either into the other, while the
mediate. On the other hand, they do not belong either to subject retains its identity, unless indeed one of the con-
that class which consists of contraries which have an traries is a constitutive property of that subject, as heat
intermediate. For under certain conditions it is necessary is of fire. For it is possible that that that which is healthy
that either the one or the other should form part of the should become diseased, that which is white, black, that
constitution of every appropriate subject. For when a thing which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is
has reached the stage when it is by nature capable of bad, good. The bad man, if he is being brought into a
sight, it will be said either to see or to be blind, and that better way of life and thought, may make some advance,
in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity however slight, and if he should once improve, even ever
may be either present or absent; for it is not necessary so little, it is plain that he might change completely, or
either that it should see or that it should be blind, but at any rate make very great progress; for a man becomes
that it should be either in the one state or in the other. more and more easily moved to virtue, however small the
Yet in the case of those contraries which have an inter- improvement was at first. It is, therefore, natural to sup-
mediate we found that it was never necessary that either pose that he will make yet greater progress than he has
the one or the other should be present in every appropri- made in the past; and as this process goes on, it will
ate subject, but only that in certain subjects one of the change him completely and establish him in the contrary

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state, provided he is not hindered by lack of time. In the tioned so far consist of simple words.
case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, however, change in At the same time, when the words which enter into
both directions is impossible. There may be a change from opposed statements are contraries, these, more than any
possession to privation, but not from privation to pos- other set of opposites, would seem to claim this charac-
session. The man who has become blind does not regain teristic. ‘Socrates is ill’ is the contrary of ‘Socrates is well’,
his sight; the man who has become bald does not regain but not even of such composite expressions is it true to
his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not grow a say that one of the pair must always be true and the
new set. (iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and ne- other false. For if Socrates exists, one will be true and
gation belong manifestly to a class which is distinct, for the other false, but if he does not exist, both will be
in this case, and in this case only, it is necessary for the false; for neither ‘Socrates is ill’ nor ‘Socrates is well’ is
one opposite to be true and the other false. true, if Socrates does not exist at all.
Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of In the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, if the subject
correlatives, nor in the case of ‘positives’ and ‘privatives’, does not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even
is it necessary for one to be true and the other false. if the subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is
Health and disease are contraries: neither of them is true true and the other false. For ‘Socrates has sight’ is the
or false. ‘Double’ and ‘half’ are opposed to each other as opposite of ‘Socrates is blind’ in the sense of the word
correlatives: neither of them is true or false. The case is ‘opposite’ which applies to possession and privation. Now
the same, of course, with regard to ‘positives’ and if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be
‘privatives’ such as ‘sight’ and ‘blindness’. In short, where true and the other false, for when he is not yet able to
there is no sort of combination of words, truth and fal- acquire the power of vision, both are false, as also if
sity have no place, and all the opposites we have men- Socrates is altogether non-existent.

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But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether we see instances of this: in most, the contrary of an evil
the subject exists or not, one is always false and the is a good.
other true. For manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary
two propositions ‘Socrates is ill’, ‘Socrates is not ill’, is that if one exists the other should also exist: for if all
true, and the other false. This is likewise the case if he become healthy there will be health and no disease, and
does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he is again, if everything turns white, there will be white, but
ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true. Thus it is in the no black. Again, since the fact that Socrates is ill is the
case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two con-
sense in which the term is used with reference to affir- trary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same
mation and negation, that the rule holds good, that one individual at the same time, both these contraries could
of the pair must be true and the other false. not exist at once: for if that Socrates was well was a fact,
then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one.
Part 11 It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present
in subjects which belong to the same species or genus.
THAT THE CONTRARY of a good is an evil is shown by induction: Disease and health require as their subject the body of
the contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, an animal; white and black require a body, without fur-
and so on. But the contrary of an evil is sometimes a ther qualification; justice and injustice require as their
good, sometimes an evil. For defect, which is an evil, has subject the human soul.
excess for its contrary, this also being an evil, and the Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should
mean. which is a good, is equally the contrary of the one in all cases either belong to the same genus or belong to
and of the other. It is only in a few cases, however, that contrary genera or be themselves genera. White and black

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belong to the same genus, colour; justice and injustice, to that other.
to contrary genera, virtue and vice; while good and evil In the third place, the term ‘prior’ is used with refer-
do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual gen- ence to any order, as in the case of science and of ora-
era, with terms under them. tory. For in sciences which use demonstration there is
that which is prior and that which is posterior in order;
Part 12 in geometry, the elements are prior to the propositions;
in reading and writing, the letters of the alphabet are
THERE are four senses in which one thing can be said to be prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case of speeches,
‘prior’ to another. Primarily and most properly the term the exordium is prior in order to the narrative.
has reference to time: in this sense the word is used to Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth.
indicate that one thing is older or more ancient than That which is better and more honourable is said to have
another, for the expressions ‘older’ and ‘more ancient’ imply a natural priority. In common parlance men speak of those
greater length of time. whom they honour and love as ‘coming first’ with them.
Secondly, one thing is said to be ‘prior’ to another when This sense of the word is perhaps the most far-fetched.
the sequence of their being cannot be reversed. In this Such, then, are the different senses in which the term
sense ‘one’ is ‘prior’ to ‘two’. For if ‘two’ exists, it follows ‘prior’ is used.
directly that ‘one’ must exist, but if ‘one’ exists, it does Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there
not follow necessarily that ‘two’ exists: thus the sequence is yet another. For in those things, the being of each of
subsisting cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, that which implies that of the other, that which is in any way
when the sequence of two things cannot be reversed, the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature ‘prior’
then that one on which the other depends is called ‘prior’ to the effect. It is plain that there are instances of this.

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The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of same time neither is the cause of the other’s being. This
the proposition that he is, and the implication is recipro- is the case with regard to the double and the half, for
cal: for if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege these are reciprocally dependent, since, if there is a double,
that he is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein there is also a half, and if there is a half, there is also a
we allege that he is true, then he is. The true proposi- double, while at the same time neither is the cause of
tion, however, is in no way the cause of the being of the the being of the other.
man, but the fact of the man’s being does seem somehow Again, those species which are distinguished one from
to be the cause of the truth of the proposition, for the another and opposed one to another within the same
truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of genus are said to be ‘simultaneous’ in nature. I mean
the man’s being or not being. those species which are distinguished each from each by
Thus the word ‘prior’ may be used in five senses. one and the same method of division. Thus the ‘winged’
species is simultaneous with the ‘terrestrial’ and the ‘wa-
Part 13 ter’ species. These are distinguished within the same ge-
nus, and are opposed each to each, for the genus ‘animal’
THE TERM ‘SIMULTANEOUS’ is primarily and most appropriately has the ‘winged’, the ‘terrestrial’, and the ‘water’ species,
applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is and no one of these is prior or posterior to another; on
simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases the contrary, all such things appear to be ‘simultaneous’
neither is prior or posterior to the other. Such things are in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial, the winged,
said to be simultaneous in point of time. Those things, and the water species, can be divided again into subspe-
again, are ‘simultaneous’ in point of nature, the being of cies. Those species, then, also will be ‘simultaneous’ point
each of which involves that of the other, while at the of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are dis-

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tinguished each from each by one and the same method movement are distinct each from each. Generation is dis-
of differentiation. tinct from destruction, increase and change of place from
But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their diminution, and so on. But in the case of alteration it
being cannot be reversed. If there is the species ‘water- may be argued that the process necessarily implies one
animal’, there will be the genus ‘animal’, but granted the or other of the other five sorts of motion. This is not
being of the genus ‘animal’, it does not follow necessarily true, for we may say that all affections, or nearly all,
that there will be the species ‘water-animal’. produce in us an alteration which is distinct from all other
Those things, therefore, are said to be ‘simultaneous’ in sorts of motion, for that which is affected need not suf-
nature, the being of each of which involves that of the fer either increase or diminution or any of the other sorts
other, while at the same time neither is in any way the of motion. Thus alteration is a distinct sort of motion;
cause of the other’s being; those species, also, which are for, if it were not, the thing altered would not only be
distinguished each from each and opposed within the altered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase
same genus. Those things, moreover, are ‘simultaneous’ or diminution or some one of the other sorts of motion in
in the unqualified sense of the word which come into addition; which as a matter of fact is not the case. Simi-
being at the same time. larly that which was undergoing the process of increase
or was subject to some other sort of motion would, if
Part 14 alteration were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily
be subject to alteration also. But there are some things
THERE ARE SIX SORTS of movement: generation, destruction, which undergo increase but yet not alteration. The square,
increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place. for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it, undergoes in-
It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of crease but not alteration, and so it is with all other fig-

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ures of this sort. Alteration and increase, therefore, are is alteration in the contrary direction, since a change of
distinct. a qualitative nature takes place.
Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But
the different forms of motion have their own contraries in Part 15
other forms; thus destruction is the contrary of genera-
tion, diminution of increase, rest in a place, of change of THE TERM ‘TO HAVE’ is used in various senses. In the first
place. As for this last, change in the reverse direction would place it is used with reference to habit or disposition or
seem to be most truly its contrary; thus motion upwards is any other quality, for we are said to ‘have’ a piece of
the contrary of motion downwards and vice versa. knowledge or a virtue. Then, again, it has reference to
In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of quantity, as, for instance, in the case of a man’s height;
those that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state for he is said to ‘have’ a height of three or four cubits. It
what is its contrary. It appears to have no contrary, un- is used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man being
less one should define the contrary here also either as said to ‘have’ a coat or tunic; or in respect of something
‘rest in its quality’ or as ‘change in the direction of the which we have on a part of ourselves, as a ring on the
contrary quality’, just as we defined the contrary of change hand: or in respect of something which is a part of us, as
of place either as rest in a place or as change in the hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the
reverse direction. For a thing is altered when change of case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is
quality takes place; therefore either rest in its quality or said to ‘have’ wine, and a corn-measure wheat. The ex-
change in the direction of the contrary may be called the pression in such cases has reference to content. Or it
contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this way refers to that which has been acquired; we are said to
becoming white is the contrary of becoming black; there ‘have’ a house or a field. A man is also said to ‘have’ a

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wife, and a wife a husband, and this appears to be the
most remote meaning of the term, for by the use of it we
mean simply that the husband lives with the wife.
Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but
the most ordinary ones have all been enumerated.
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