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Health Aff (Millwood). Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 March 10.
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Health Aff (Millwood). 2007 ; 26(3): 841–852.
Malpractice Liability Costs And The Practice Of Medicine In The

Medicare Program
Katherine Baicker, Elliott S. Fisher, and Amitabh Chandra

Katherine Baicker is an associate professor of public policy in the School of Public Affairs, University
of California, Los Angeles. Elliott Fisher is a professor at Dartmouth Medical School in Hanover,
New Hampshire, and a member of the Veterans Affairs Outcomes Group, Veteran Affairs Medical
Center, White River Junction, Vermont. Amitabh Chandra ([email protected]) is an
assistant professor of public policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, in
Cambridge, Massachusetts. All authors are associates of the Center for the Evaluative Clinical
Sciences, Dartmouth Medical School. Baicker and Chandra are also faculty research fellows at the
National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Abstract
Mounting malpractice liability costs might affect physician practice patterns in many ways, such as
increasing the use of diagnostic procedures while reducing major surgeries. This paper quantifies the
association between malpractice liability costs and the use of physician services in Medicare. We
find that higher malpractice awards and premiums are associated with higher Medicare spending,
especially for imaging services that are often believed to be driven by physicians’ fears of malpractice.
The 60 percent increase in malpractice premiums between 2000 and 2003 is associated with an
increase in total Medicare spending of more than $15 billion.
Recent increases in physician malpractice premiums and rapid growth in the number and size
of awards to plaintiffs have raised wide-spread concerns about the medical malpractice liability
system.1 Although some argue that the current system plays an important role in maintaining
the quality of care, others point out that it fails to compensate most patients who suffer avoidable
injuries and punishes many physicians for adverse events that were not caused by negligence.
2 Perhaps even greater concerns have been raised about how rising malpractice premiums and
payments affect the way that medicine is practiced.3
We focus on state-level variation in malpractice costs and health care use and spending patterns
in the Medicare population from 1993 to 2001. We hypothesize that the practice of medicine
—and the use of physician services in particular—will be different in states in which physician
malpractice liability costs are higher (as measured by higher premiums or malpractice
payments).4
Previous research on the effect of malpractice costs on the practice of medicine has focused
on the use of a relatively small set of specific procedures, physician surveys of “consciously
defensive” medicine, or comparisons of hospital spending on heart attack patients in states with
and without tort-reform initiatives.5 These analyses do not quantify the aggregate effect of an
increase in malpractice liability on clinical practice, total spending, or spending on physician
services. Further-more, many of these studies were conducted prior to the mid-1990s. Since
then, there have been major changes in medical technology, including the increased use of
diagnostic imaging tests, medical management, and minimally invasive surgery.6
We hypothesize that the effect of increasing liability will be most pronounced for common,
discretionary physician services (such as visits, consultations, diagnostic tests, imaging
services, and minor procedures, where errors of omission are perceived to carry greater
malpractice risks than errors of commission) or for discretionary procedures where physicians
Baicker et al. Page 2
may decline treatment for risky patients altogether. The effect on total use is ambiguous. On
the one hand, increased testing might lead to some additional downstream treatment as a result
of the additional medical services required to treat conditions not identified in areas with lower
testing rates.7 On the other hand, concerns about malpractice could lead to lower rates of
elective surgery if physicians leave areas with unfavorable malpractice climates or seek to
avoid some higher-risk procedures or patients.8 We therefore hypothesize that any effect on
total spending will be smaller than the effect on low-risk discretionary physician services.
Health care spending that is induced by malpractice costs and that costs more than it benefits
patients (through improvements in mortality, morbidity, and patient satisfaction) is often
labeled “defensive medicine.”9 Our analysis speaks primarily to the changes in use that are
associated with changes in malpractice costs, but we also provide some evidence on whether
additional spending is associated with improvements in mortality.
Study Data And Methods

Analysis
We report regression-adjusted estimates of the association between the growth of state-level
malpractice payments per physician (or malpractice premiums) and the growth of use of and
spending on several different types of procedures between 1993 and 2001. We performed our
analysis at the state level because many aspects of the medical liability and medical practice
environment (such as tort reforms) are set at that level.10 We focused on changes in malpractice
costs and changes in health care spending within states, to account for any confounders that
are time-invariant within each state. For example, if a certain state was more urban or had a
more heavily regulated health care sector (which might influence both practice patterns and
malpractice liability exposure) than others, the effect of that factor would be netted out of our
longitudinal analysis. This longitudinal analysis also accounted for tort reforms that were
implemented before 1993 or remained unchanged through 2001 (as the vast majority of reforms
were).11 Our choice of study periods was further motivated by data availability and by the fact
that the long window reduces the effect of measurement error.12
To control for factors that vary over time at the state level and might be correlated with
malpractice liability and medical care use rates, we included covariates for per capita income,
unemployment rate, education levels, racial composition, hospital beds per capita, and health
maintenance organization (HMO) penetration.13 To validate these results, we examined
whether our measures of malpractice liability were associated with outcomes that were unlikely
to be uninfluenced by that liability, such as hospitalizations for hip fracture and acute
myocardial infarction. It is unlikely that the incidence of or hospitalizations for these diseases
were driven by the malpractice environment, although they were likely affected by potential
confounders such as the underlying health of the population, so estimating the effect of
malpractice liability costs on these outcomes can help test our methodological design.
Defining “malpractice liability.”

We constructed two independent measures of malpractice liability costs. Our primary measure
was the mean dollar value of malpractice payments (arising from both judgments and
settlements) per physician in each state. Our choice of this measure was motivated by research
finding that physicians respond to the number of claims as well as to the average size of
malpractice awards: Being sued imposes costs on physicians, including lost time at work and
psychic costs.14
We constructed this measure using data from the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).
15 We examined payments that resulted from either a court judgment or a settlement made
outside of the courts. We averaged data for each of two periods, 1991–1993 and 1999–2001.
Although the number of claims per physician would provide an additional measure of the
burden of malpractice liability on practicing physicians, no national data on claims were
available, and studies suggest that payments per physician are highly correlated with claims
per physician.16 Despite limitations (such as the “corporate shield” loophole and potential
underreporting), researchers report that the NPDB is the most representative national database
on medical malpractice payments and that the size of these potential biases is limited.17
Nevertheless, to address concerns that some payments might be missed by the NPDB and that
payments reported to the NPDB reflect claims filed a few years ago, we constructed a second
measure of malpractice liability costs based on physician malpractice insurance premiums. A
further advantage of using malpractice premiums as a measure of malpractice liability is that
they reflect insurers’ estimates of open and future claims—a factor that will be missed by the
NPDB. Our measure was constructed from premiums reported in the Medical Liability
Monitor (MLM), whose annual national survey of insurers provides premium data for internal
medicine, general surgery, and obstetrics-gynecology by state. We calculated average
premiums faced by a typical physician in a state by weighting premium data across specialties
by the physician mix in each state and averaging three years of data to minimize idiosyncrasies.
Our final data consist of average premiums by state for 1991–1993 and 2000–2002, adjusted
for inflation.18
Use of medical care

Our measures of use and spending were both based on the Medicare population, chosen because
of the unusually rich data available. Our primary dependent variables were (1) total Medicare
spending per beneficiary, (2) spending per beneficiary on each major component of total
professional and laboratory services (evaluation and management, diagnostic tests, imaging,
minor procedures, major procedures) based on the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS)
classification system, and (3) rates of use of the specific physician services (screening tests,
diagnostic and imaging procedures) and major elective surgical procedures that are available
in the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care.19 We combined data from the fee-for-service (Part B)
claims and the Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MEDPAR) files.20 Data for these
analyses were all adjusted for the age, race, and sex composition of the population, and all
spending measures were adjusted for inflation and differences in prices across states.21
Study Results
Exhibit 1 reports summary statistics for our primary analysis. Between 1993 and 2001, total
Medicare spending per beneficiary grew 35 percent and averaged $6,500 in 2001 (all dollar
figures are reported in 2001 dollars). Over the same time period, there was a 31 percent increase
in spending on total physician services; the subcomponent of reimbursement for evaluation

and management and imaging claims grew the most quickly. Between 1993 and 2001, mean
malpractice payments per physician grew 12 percent, whereas malpractice premiums grew 8
percent. These national numbers mask considerable heterogeneity in growth rates across states.
Malpractice payments and Medicare spending

We first examined the simple association between malpractice payments per physician and
two categories of Medicare spending of particular interest: Medicare spending on total
physician services (Exhibit 2), and Medicare spending on the imaging subcomponent of
physician services (Exhibit 3). These regressions suggest that increases in malpractice
payments were associated with significant increases in Medicare spending on physicians in
general and in spending on imaging in particular. These univariate regression results are quite
consistent with the main multivariate regression results presented below; the scatterplots show
that the results are not driven by outlier states, larger states, or idiosyncratic functional form.
Having documented a strong correlation in the raw data, we next turn to our main specification:
a multivariate analysis controlling for both fixed state-specific factors and state characteristics
that might change over time, such as population demographics and the economic climate.
Exhibit 4 reports the regression-adjusted association between 10 percent growth within a state
over time in our two liability measures and the growth of various Medicare spending
components. These associations controlled both for any state-level characteristics of the
malpractice environment or population and for the covariates noted above. Increases in
payments per physician were statistically significant for spending on total physician services,
the evaluation and management subcomponent, reimbursement for imaging services, and
payments for minor surgical procedures. There was no statistically significant effect on the use
of diagnostic procedures and major procedures. Thus, for example, a state with 10 percent
higher growth in malpractice payments than its neighbor saw a little more than 1 percent higher
growth in total spending on physician services, holding constant each stat’s idiosyncrasies as
well as changes in the economic and demographic covariates. The second panel of Exhibit 4
reports results using premiums as an alternative measure of malpractice liability. These results
are quite similar. Both measures of malpractice liability have a positive but statistically
insignificant association with total Medicare spending. Specification tests using alternative
models yielded strikingly similar results.22
Specific services and malpractice costs

To identify the specific services that increase with higher malpractice costs, we studied the
effect on procedure specific utilization rates (Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 6). A 10 percent increase
in malpractice payments increases use of carotid duplex, echocardiography, electrocardiogram
(EKG), and computed tomography (CT)/magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanning by 1.5–
1.8 percent (p < 0.05). Increases in the use of prostate-specific antigen (PSA) testing, cardiac
catheterization, and chest x-rays were not significant at conventional levels. We did not find
an increase in the use of mammograms (Exhibit 5). In contrast to the increased use of diagnostic
and imaging procedures, we did not find that increases in malpractice costs were associated
with increases in the use of major surgical procedures (Exhibit 6). The only exception to this
finding is the use of lower extremity bypass—here, a 10 percent increase in malpractice
payments was associated with a 1.0 percent increase (p < 0.01) in procedure use. In fact, there
was a significant decrease in the use of back surgery, potentially the type of procedure that
physicians might avoid when malpractice costs are higher. We found, however, only a
statistically insignificant negative association between increased malpractice liability costs and
overall spending on major procedures. This might be because the set of patients and conditions
in which surgeons avoid surgery is relatively small.
There is always the possibility that confounders affected our analysis, so we performed several
analyses to test the robustness of our findings. In particular, we were concerned about
confounding variables that are positively correlated with premiums and payments and with
diagnostic intensity but not with use of medical procedures. We studied the association between
our measures of medical malpractice and the incidence of heart attacks, hip fractures, and
mortality from cardiovascular disease and malignant neoplasms.23 If there were a positive
association between these variables, we would be concerned that an omitted variable such as
population health could be driving both the increase in malpractice liability and the use of
imaging services. The prevalence of neither heart attack nor hip fracture was affected by either
of our measures of malpractice liability exposure.
Mortality and malpractice costs

We also examined the association between mortality from various causes and our measures of
malpractice costs.24 Here, too, there was no significant association. This lack of correlation
suggests not only that unmeasured changes in patient illness did not drive our results but also
that the increased Medicare spending associated with rising malpractice costs did not
measurably reduce mortality, although it certainly might have affected patient well-being in
other ways.
Another possibility is that patients in some areas are becoming more “certainty oriented,”
thereby explaining the use of diagnostic testing as well as an increase in litigation arising from
allegations of failure to diagnose. To explore this hypothesis, we used data from a recent study
and were unable to find evidence of geographic variation between census regions in patients’
preferences for routine cancer screening, free total-body CT scans, and the choice between
receiving $1,000 or a free body scan.25 This result, although not definitive, is reassuring.
Finally, the NPDB specifies whether a malpractice payment was made for alleged malpractice
in the areas of diagnosis, surgery, obstetrics, medication, equipment, anesthesia, or treatment.
If the “certainty orientation” hypothesis were correct, we might expect an increase in payments
associated with “failure to diagnose” and “delay in diagnosis” in states where malpractice
liability increased. We found no evidence of such a relationship: The correlation between the
percentage increase in malpractice payments per physician and the percentage increase in the
number of diagnostic payments was 0.17 (p < 0.24). The correlation between the percentage
increase in malpractice payments per physician and the percentage increase in the number of
diagnostic payments in the narrower categories of “failure to diagnose” and “delay in
diagnosis” was −0.03 (p < 0.83). Although neither of these tests irrefutably rejects the certainty-
orientation hypothesis, they suggest that it was not a first-order source of bias.
Discussion
Our study used fairly recent data to estimate the association between increases in malpractice
liability costs and changes in medical spending and practice patterns. We found that a 10
percent increase in average malpractice payments per physician within a state was associated
with a 1.0 percent increase in Medicare payment for total physician services and a 2.2 percent
increase in the imaging component of these services. We obtained similar results using
malpractice premiums as an alternative measure of liability costs.
In addition to the increase in the use of imaging services, we saw a somewhat weaker increase
in the use of other discretionary, generally low-risk services such as physician visits and
consultations, diagnostic tests, and minor procedures. A recent survey of physicians found that
more than 93 percent ordered additional tests and performed additional diagnostic procedures
in response to growing malpractice costs.26 This survey also reported a substantial increase in
the use of imaging technologies and a reduction in major surgeries among certain patient
populations. Our results are consistent with these self-reports.
Our estimates shed some light on the magnitude of the relationship between malpractice
liability and the use of medical services. States in the top quartile of malpractice payments per
physician have 70 percent more payments per physician than states in the bottom quartile. Our
estimates suggest that relative to states in the bottom quartile, all else equal, these states with
high malpractice liability will have total Medicare spending that is 4.2 percent higher and
spending on physicians that is 7.0 percent higher.
To put these estimates into perspective, consider the 60 percent increase in average malpractice
premiums between 2000 and 2003. Our results suggest that this increase was associated with
an increase Medicare spending of about $16.5 billion total and $7.1 billion on physician
services (since Medicare outlays in 2003 were $275 billion).27
Although our analysis suggests an important association between malpractice costs and the use
of imaging services, this link might have been missed in previous studies that focused on an
earlier era, when the use of imaging procedures and outpatient services was less prevalent. Our
estimates do not imply that any change in spending was necessarily “defensive medicine.” To
the extent that additional malpractice costs mean greater precautionary testing with some
medical value, any additional procedures might be protective of patient health or valued
regardless of their therapeutic properties. We did not find that higher malpractice liability costs
were associated with reductions in total or disease-specific mortality. This evidence is clearly
not sufficient to rule out a potential benefit from malpractice liability–induced medical
spending, but there is also some evidence from other studies that the increases in use associated
with malpractice liability costs could actually lead to harm.28
Our study is not without limitations. First, our sample was limited to the Medicare population;
although this population accounts for a sizable share of overall health spending, our results
might not generalize to other parts of the health care system. Second, although our longitudinal
analysis was designed to account for all fixed unobservable confounders that operate at the
state level and all national trends, unobserved confounders that vary within states over time
might have affected our analysis. The specification tests we reported suggest that this was not
the case, ruling out many of the most likely potential sources of bias, but outside of an
experimental setting, it is difficult to prove causality conclusively.
Acknowledgements
This research was funded in part by the National Institute on Aging, NIA P01 AG19783-02. The opinions in this paper
are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the NIA or any institution with which they are affiliated.
NOTES
1. Mello MM, Studdert DM, Brennan TA. The New Medical Malpractice Crisis. New England Journal
of Medicine 2003;348(no 23):2281–2284. [PubMed: 12788991]Studdert DM, Mello MM, Brennan
TA. Medical Malpractice. New England Journal of Medicine 2004;350(no 3):283–292. [PubMed:
14724310]
2. Brennan TA, et al. Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of
the Harvard Medical Practice Study I. New England Journal of Medicine 1991;324(no 6):370–376.
[PubMed: 1987460]Localio AR, et al. Relation between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due
to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III. New England Journal of Medicine
1991;325(no 4):245–251. [PubMed: 2057025]
3. Studdert DM, et al. Defensive Medicine among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile
Malpractice Environment. Journal of the American Medical Association 2005;293(no 21):2609–2617.

[PubMed: 15928282]
4. We used the term “malpractice liability costs” to refer to both malpractice insurance premiums and the
size and number of malpractice judgments and settlements. As discussed below, the term is not
intended to imply any specific causal relationship between these components of the malpractice
liability environment and physician behavior or the value of services performed.
5. Studdert, et al. Defensive Medicine among High-Risk Specialist Physicians. Baldwin LM, et al.
Defensive Medicine and Obstetrics. Journal of the American Medical Association 1995;274(no 20):
1606–1610. [PubMed: 7474245]Localio AR, et al. Relationship between Malpractice Claims and
Cesarean Delivery. Journal of the American Medical Association 1993;269(no 3):366–373. [PubMed:
8418343]Dubay L, Kaestner R, Waidmann T. The Impact of Malpractice Fears on Cesarean Section
Rates. Journal of Health Economics 1999;18(no 4):491–522. [PubMed: 10539619]U.S. Congress
Office of Technology Assessment. Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice, Report no. OTA-
H-602. Washington: OTA; 1994. Kessler DP, McClellan MB. Do Doctors Practice Defensive
Medicine? Quarterly Journal of Economics 1996;111(no 2):353–390.
6. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. Healthcare Spending and the Medicare Program.
Washington: MedPAC; 2005. Iglehart JK. The New Era of Medical Imaging—Progress and Pitfalls.
New England Journal of Medicine 2006;354(no 26):2822–2828. [PubMed: 16807422]
7. Verrilli D, Welch HG. The Impact of Diagnostic Testing on Therapeutic Interventions. Journal of the
American Medical Association 1996;275(no 15):1189–1191. [PubMed: 8609687]
8. Kessler DP, Sage WM, Becker DJ. Impact of Malpractice Reforms on the Supply of Physician Services.
Journal of the American Medical Association 2005;293(no 21):2618–2625. [PubMed: 15928283]
Baicker, K.; Chandra, A. The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Delivery of Health Care. In: Cutler,
D.; Garber, AM., editors. Frontiers of Health Policy Research. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press; 2005.
p. 16-18.
9. Kessler, McClellan. Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?
10. We weighted each state according to its population in the 2000 census (so that results can be interpreted
as applying to the average person).
11. Kessler, McClellan. Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine? Kessler DP, McClellan MB. How
Liability Law Affects Medical Productivity. Journal of Health Economics 2002;21(no 6):931–955.
[PubMed: 12475119]
12. Griliches Z, Hausman JA. Errors in Variables in Panel Data: A Note with an Example. Journal of
Econometrics 1985;31(no 1):93–118.
13. National Center for Health Workforce Analysis, Area Resource File (Rockville, Md.: Health
Resources and Services Administration, 2003). Sensitivity to these choices, discussion of other
potentially omitted factors, and estimates with additional controls are included in an online appendix,
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/26/3/841/DC1.
14. Kessler, McClellan. How Liability Law AffectsMedical Productivity.
15. Chandra A, Nundy S, Seabury SA. The Growth of Physician Malpractice Payments: Evidence from
the National Practitioner Data Bank. Health Affairs 2005;24:w240–w249.published online 31 May
2005; 10.1377/hlthaff.w5.240
16. Black B, et al. Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988–2002.
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 2005;2(no 2):207.
17. Baicker, Chandra. The Effect of Malpractice Liability. Chandra, et al. The Growth of Physician
Malpractice Payments.
18. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator. [accessed 14
February 2007]. http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/GDPDEF.txt
19. Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) Codes2005accessed 12 March
2007http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HCPCSReleaseCodeSets/20_BETOS.asp WennbergJCooperMThe
Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care1999ChicagoAmerican Hospital Association Press This study, and
its underlying protocol guaranteeing the confidentiality of the Medicare claims data, was approved
by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Dartmouth College.
20. A 5 percent sample of Medicare fee-for-service physician (Part B) claims was used to calculate age-,
race-, and sex-adjusted rates of spending on total physician services and for each of the major BETOS
categories. Total Medicare spending per beneficiary was also ascertained from the same 5 percent
sample, using records from the Continuous Medical History Sample File. Rates of major elective
inpatient surgical procedures were based upon a 100 percent sample drawn from the Medicare
Provider Analysis and Review (MEDPAR) file, and rates of specific physician services were
calculated from a 20 percent sample of Part B physician claims in later years and a 5 percent sample
in earlier years. The population denominator for all rates was the midyear population of fee-for-
service Medicare beneficiaries, age sixty-five and older, who were eligible for both Parts A and B.
21. We used a state-level cost-of-living adjustment to adjust all premium, payment, and spending dollar
values for state-level variation in prices, although as shown in the appendix, this does not affect
subsequent regression results. See Note 13.
22. In the appendix exhibits we report a number of specification tests, including results from models
using two alternative sets of weights (state population from the 1990 census and the number of
physicians in each state) as well as including other covariates. See Note 13.
23. See Appendix Exhibit 3; ibid.

24. Ibid.
25. SchwartzLMEnthusiasm for Cancer Screening in the United States. Journal of the American Medical
Association2004291no 17178 Geographic identifiers in this study were limited to the four major
census regions. We performed a chi-square test to examine if there were geographic differences in
preferences for screening. [PubMed: 14709578]
26. Studdert, et al. Defensive Medicine among High-Risk Specialist Physicians.
27. Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005 to 2014, January
2004, http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4985&sequence=0&from=0#anchor (accessed 14
February 2007).We focused on the responsiveness of health care spending to malpractice liability in
the Medicare population. There is evidence that elderly beneficiaries are much less likely than others
to litigate, which suggests that our analysis might understate the response in the general population.
However, most beneficiaries are enrolled in fee-for-service, where, unlike capitated plans, there are
few restrictions on a physician’s ability to order additional tests—a possibility that suggests that
results from Medicare might be larger than the economy wide responsiveness of physicians to
malpractice costs. If these effects roughly offset each other, extrapolating these estimates to the
general population would suggest that the 60 percent increase in mal-practice premiums between
2000 and 2003 would be associated with a 6 percent, or $95 billion, increase in national health
spending. Given that our data drew only from the Medicare population, however, the true effect on
national health spending might be quite different.
28. Fisher ES, Welch HG. Avoiding the Unintended Consequences of Growth in Medical Care: How
Might More Be Worse? Journal of the American Medical Association 1999;281(no 5):446–453.
[PubMed: 9952205]
EXHIBIT 1
Growth In Medicare Spending And Malpractice Liability, 1993–2001
1993 ($) 2001 ($) Percent growth, 1993–2001

Measure of malpractice liability per physician

Malpractice payments per physician 4,756 5,221 11.7
Malpractice premiums per physician 25,762 26,608 7.8
Measure of Medicare spending per beneficiary

Total spending 4,858 6,534 34.7
Total physician (Medicare Part B) services 1,669 2,169 30.8
Evaluation and management 547 854 57.6
Diagnostic tests 158 141 −9.8
Imaging 159 261 64.2
Minor procedures 466 573 23.6
Major procedures 77 67 −12.1
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on data below.
NOTES: Medicare spending data are from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care project, adjusted for age, race, and sex composition and inflation. Physician
charges are classified using Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) codes. Malpractice payments per physician were obtained from the National
Practitioner Data Bank. Malpractice premiums per physician were obtained from the Medical Liability Monitor. “Percent growth” column reports the
average percentage growth across all states. Dollar amounts are reported in 2001 dollars.
EXHIBIT 2
Longitudinal Association Between Growth In Malpractice Payments Per Physician And Medicare Spending On
Total Physician Services, 1993–2001
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
NOTES: Univariate regression implies that a 10 percent increase in malpractice payments per physician is associated with a 0.88 percent (standard error
= 0.43 percent) increase in spending. Regression line is population weighted. In 2001, average malpractice payments per physician were $5,221.
EXHIBIT 3
Longitudinal Association Between Growth In Malpractice Payments Per Physician And Medicare Spending On
Imaging Services, 1993–2001
NOTES: Univariate regression implies that a 10 percent increase in malpractice payments per physician is associated with a 1.73 percent (standard error
= 0.74 percent) increase in spending. Regression line is population weighted. In 2001, average malpractice payments per physician were $5,221.
EXHIBIT 4
Longitudinal Association Between Malpractice Liability And Medicare Spending, 1993–2001
Effect of 10 percent growth in malpractice Effect of 10 percent growth in malpractice

payments per physician (N = 50 states) premiums per physician (N = 50 states)
Measure of Medicare spending per Percent increase p value Percent increase p value
beneficiary
Total spending 0.6 0.18 1.0 0.17

Total physician (Medicare Part B) 1.0 0.00 1.3 0.01
services
Evaluation and management 0.9 0.00 2.7 0.01
Diagnostic tests 0.0 0.95 0.2 0.77
Imaging 2.2 0.00 2.1 0.03
Minor procedures 1.0 0.01 0.9 0.03
Major procedures −0.3 0.24 −0.1 0.90
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on data below.
NOTES: Medicare spending data are from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care project, adjusted for age, race, and sex composition and inflation. Physician
charges are classified using Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) codes. Malpractice payments per physician were obtained from the National
Practitioner Data Bank. Malpractice premiums per physician were obtained from the Medical Liability Monitor. “Percent increase” column reports the
average percentage growth across all states. Dollar amounts are reported in 2001 dollars. Regressions are at the state level, weighted by state population,
with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Covariates include per capita income, unemployment rate, percentage black, health maintenance
organization (HMO) penetration, and percentage with high school degree. All variables were measured as the percentage growth within each state between
1993 and 2001.
EXHIBIT 5
Association Between A 10 Percent Increase In Malpractice Payments Per Physician And The Use Of Diagnostic
And Imaging Procedures
NOTES: Bars represent regression-adjusted coefficients from regression of log of procedure use on log of number of malpractice judgments or settlements
per physician, with 95 percent confidence intervals indicated by the horizontal ruling lines. CT is computed tomography. MRI is magnetic resonance
imaging. PSA is prostate-specific antigen.
EXHIBIT 6
Association Between A 10 Percent Increase In Malpractice Payments Per Physician And The Use Of Major
Surgical Procedures
NOTES: Bars represent regression-adjusted coefficients from regression of log of procedure use on log of number of malpractice judgments or settlements
per physician, with 95 percent confidence intervals indicated by the horizontal ruling lines. AAA is abdominal aortic aneurysm. CABG is coronary artery
bypass graft. PCI is percutaneous coronary intervention.

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Health Aff (Millwood). 2007 ; 26(3): 841–852.

Malpractice Liability Costs And The Practice Of Medicine In The

Katherine Baicker, Elliott S. Fisher, and Amitabh Chandra

Study Data And Methods

Defining “malpractice liability.”

Use of medical care

in spending on total physician services; the subcomponent of reimbursement for evaluation

Malpractice payments and Medicare spending

Specific services and malpractice costs

Mortality and malpractice costs

Malpractice Environment. Journal of the American Medical Association 2005;293(no 21):2609–2617.

23. See Appendix Exhibit 3; ibid.

1993 ($) 2001 ($) Percent growth, 1993–2001

Measure of malpractice liability per physician

Measure of Medicare spending per beneficiary

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on data below.

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Effect of 10 percent growth in malpractice Effect of 10 percent growth in malpractice

Total spending 0.6 0.18 1.0 0.17

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on data below.

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

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