1

III. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS The Ombudsman immediately proceeded to the OMB-Visayas office in Cebu City to personally deal with
the office rebellion. Reaching Cebu, the Ombudsman was informed by Petitioner that Petitioner wanted
to proceed to Manila, apparently because of his alienation and the fear for reprisal from his alleged lady
D. IMPEACHMENT victims’ husbands. Petitioner in fact already had a ticket for the plane leaving two hours later that day.
The Ombudsman assented to the quick movement to Manila for Petitioner’s safety and the interest of
the Office’s operations. Subsequently, the Ombudsman installed Assistant Ombudsman Nicanor J. Cruz
SECOND DIVISION as the Officer-in-Charge of OMB-Visayas.

G.R. No. 146486. March 4, 2005 Acting on the formal complaint against petitioner, the Ombudsman directed his Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to conduct a verification and fact-finding investigation on the matter. The FFIB,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioners, later in its Report, found the evidence against Petitioner strong on the charges of acts of extortion,
vs. sexual harassment and oppression. The FFIB report was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORMER DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS ARTURO C. Committee of Peers composed of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, The Special Prosecutor and the
MOJICA, respondents. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.

DECISION The Committee of Peers initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for
purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman after careful
study, and following the established stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment. As succintly (sic) stated by the
Ombudsman in his Memorandum dated March 27, 2000 (in reiteration of the March 13, 2000 Order of
This is a "petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Overall Deputy Ombudsman) -
alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65" of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals of 18 December 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58460 entitled, Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Acting on your query as to whether or not the Ombudsman confirms or affirms the disapproval by
Ombudsman for the Visayas v. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Margarito Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., of your recommendation to conduct instead an
Gervacio, Jr. and the Committee of Peers composed of Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero, Deputy investigation of the complaint against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica solely for the purpose of
Ombudsman Rolando Casimiro and Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo. impeachment, I hereby confirm the action of disapproval.

The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office Moreover, as demonstrated in many previous cases against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica,
of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint2 with Deputy Ombudsman Manuel B. Casaclang, Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero, Special Prosecutor
the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Leonardo P. Tamayo and former Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa, the official position of
Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following: the Office is that the Constitution, R.A. 6770 and the Supreme Court in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, G.R. No.
80578, 19 May 1988, exclude the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor from the list of
1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona; impeachable officials and the Jarque case involves Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto as respondent,
hence, the mention therein of the Deputy Ombudsmen is merely an obiter dictum. Two of your present
members in fact participated in the investigation of the previous Mojica cases and thereafter
2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and recommended the dismissal thereof for lack of merit.

3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the ₱7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees In the same Memorandum, the Ombudsman directed the Committee of Peers to evaluate the merits of
on the date the said amount was due for release. the case and if warranted by evidence, to conduct administrative and criminal investigation(s)
immediately thereafter. Upon evaluation, the Committee recommended the docketing of the complaint
The complainants further requested that an officer-in-charge from the OMB-Manila be appointed to as criminal and administrative cases. The Committee of Peers’ Evaluation dated 30 March 2000, stated as
manage their office to prevent the Deputy Ombudsman from harassing witnesses and wielding his follows:
influence over them. To underscore the seriousness of their intentions, they threatened to go on a mass
leave of absence, and in fact took their cause to the media.3 On the basis of the foregoing facts, duly supported with sworn-statements executed by all concerned
parties, the undersigned members of the COP find sufficient cause to warrant the conduct of preliminary
The subsequent events, as stated by the Ombudsman and adopted by the Court of Appeals,4 are as investigation and administrative adjudication against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica for the
follows: following criminal and administrative offenses, namely:

I. CRIMINAL
 2

Violation of Section 3, paragraph[s] (b) and (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act); Aggrieved, the private respondent filed a petition9 for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals praying that
a resolution be issued:
Violation of R.A. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995),
1. . . . issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) upon the filing of the petition to enjoin and restrain
the respondents, (the Ombudsman, the Over-all Deputy Ombudsman, the Committee of Peers, and the
II. ADMINISTRATIVE
Special Prosecutor) their agents and representatives, from suspending the petitioner (herein private
respondent Mojica);
a. Dishonesty
2. thereafter, converting said TRO into a Writ of Preliminary Injunction;
b. Grave Misconduct
3. after hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the following acts of the Ombudsman null and void ab
c. Oppression initio:

d. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service a. detailing and assigning indefinitely the petitioner to OMB-Manila "in a [special] capacity," thus
effectively demoting/suspending petitioner, and preventing him from preparing his defense;
e. Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of
his Office; (Section 22, paragraphs (A), (C), (N), (T) and (U), Rule XIV of Executive Order No. 292, b. authorizing or directing the docketing of the complaints against the petitioner, which is equivalent to
otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987".) authorizing the filing of the administrative and/or criminal cases against the petitioner, who is an
impeachable official;
Accordingly, let the instant case be docketed separately, one for the criminal case and another for the
administrative case covering all the offenses specified above and, thereafter, a formal investigation be c. denying the request of petitioner for leave of absence, which acts were done without lawful authority,
simultaneously and jointly conducted by the Committee of Peers, pursuant to Administrative Order No. in a malevolent and oppressive manner and without jurisdiction.
7.
On 04 May 2000, the Court of Appeals resolved to grant the prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Accordingly, on 6 April 2000, the Committee of Peers (COP) directed the herein private respondent required the Ombudsman to comment and show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should be
Mojica in OMB-0-00-0615 entitled, Padua-Varona v. Mojica, for violation of Republic Act No. 7877 (Anti- issued, which reads in part:
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) and Sec. 3, par. (b) and (c) of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) to submit his controverting evidence.
Meanwhile, to maintain the status quo and in order to forestall the petition at bench from becoming
moot and academic, and considering that upon examination of the records we believe that there is an
On 10 April 2000, the complainants in OMB-0-00-0615 filed a Motion to Place Respondent Under urgent need for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent great and irreparable injury
Preventive Suspension,5 claiming that the offenses for which private respondent Mojica was charged that would result to herein petitioner before the matter could be heard on notice, the herein
warranted removal from office, the evidence against him was strong, and that Mojica’s continued stay in respondents, their agents and representatives acting for and in their behalf or under their authority, are
office would prejudice the case, as he was harassing some witnesses and complainants to recant or hereby enjoined and restrained from proceeding with the hearing of the Motion to Place Respondent
otherwise desist from pursuing the case. Under Preventive Suspension dated April 10, 2000, which hearing is set on May 9, 2000 at 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon and/or from conducting any further proceedings relative to the suspension from (o)ffice of
On the same date, the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum6 to the COP, directing them to conduct the herein petitioner until further order and/or notice from this Court.10
administrative proceedings in OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 entitled, OMB Visayas Employees v. Mojica (for
dishonesty, grave misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, Nevertheless, on 6 June 2000, the COP issued an Order11 in both OMB-0-00-0615 and OMB-ADM-0-00-
and directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval 0316 to the effect that having failed to submit the required counter-affidavits despite the lapse of
of his office), and submit a recommendation on the propriety of putting Mojica under preventive seventeen days from the expiration of the extended reglementary period for filing the same, respondent
suspension. Mojica was deemed to have waived his right to present his evidence. The COP thus deemed both
criminal and administrative cases submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
Subsequently, the COP issued an Order7 in OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 finding prima facie evidence against
Mojica and requiring him to submit an answer to the above-mentioned offenses within ten days, as well Thus, on 13 June 2000, the private respondent thus filed an urgent motion12 before the Court of Appeals
as his counter-affidavit and supporting evidence.8 to enjoin the Ombudsman from taking any action whatsoever in the criminal and administrative cases
aforementioned. The following day, the private respondent filed another urgent motion, this time
praying that the Court of Appeals issue an order requiring the Ombudsman to show cause why it should
not be cited for contempt for failing to conform with the 4 May 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
 3

On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed13 the Ombudsman to comment on the above pleadings, special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules," of the above decision, on the
and to comply with the former’s Temporary Restraining Order of 4 May 2000. following grounds:

The parties subsequently exchanged various pleadings that culminated in a Resolution14 by the Court of I
Appeals on 5 July 2000 that, among other things, directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining all therein respondents from taking any action whatsoever in cases No. OMB-0-00-0615
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ERRONEOUSLY RULING THAT
(criminal) and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 (administrative) against Mojica, and deemed the instant
PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AS THEN DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, IS AN IMPEACHABLE
petition submitted for resolution on the merits upon the submission of the comment or explanation on
OFFICIAL, CONSIDERING THAT THE PLAIN TEXT OF SEC. 2, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AS WELL
the appellate court’s show cause Resolution of 20 June 2000.
AS THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS THEREOF, EXCLUDES A DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FROM THE LIST OF
IMPEACHABLE OFFICIALS.
Meanwhile, on 19 June 2000, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military directed the private
respondent Mojica ostensibly to answer a different set of charges for "violation of Art. 266 and Sec. 3(e)
II
of Rep. Act No. 3019" (OMB-00-0-1050) and for "grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service"15 (OMB-ADM-0-00-0506). Feeling that this was merely an
attempt at circumventing the directives of the Court of Appeals, Mojica filed an urgent motion before THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE MAY NOT BE INVOKED TO PERPETUATE AN
the Court of Appeals for respondents to show cause again why they should not be cited for contempt. ERRONEOUS OBITER DICTUM.

By way of opposition, the Ombudsman pointed out that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the III
appellate court was against any action taken in cases No. OMB-0-00-0615 and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316,
and not against any new cases filed against the private respondent thereafter. The Ombudsman further THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF A CRIMINAL
pointed out that since Mojica’s term of office had already expired as of 6 July 2000, the private CASE AGAINST A RETIRED DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, WHICH IS STILL PENDING PRELIMINARY
respondent could no longer invoke his alleged immunity from suit. INVESTIGATION BEFORE PETITIONER OMBUDSMAN.19

On 14 August 2000, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military issued an order deeming that At the outset, it bears noting that instead of assailing the Court of Appeals Decision solely by petition for
cases No. OMB-0-00-1050 and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 had been deemed submitted for resolution on review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner lodged the present
the basis of the evidence at hand. On 17 August 2000, the private respondent filed an urgent motion for petition "alternatively" as "an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same
the immediate issuance of an order enjoining the Ombudsman from taking any further action rules."
whatsoever in OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 and OMB-0-00-1050.16

It is settled that the appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under
On 18 December 2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojica’s term of office, the Court of Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 45 is clear
Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision17 on the grounds of public interest. that the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the
nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review,
In essence, the appellate court held that although the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Under Rule 45, the
the commentaries of noted jurists, all indicate that a Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable official, reglementary period to appeal is fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or denial of motion for
it was nevertheless constrained to hold otherwise on the basis of this Court’s past rulings. Thus, the reconsideration.20
dispositive portion thereof reads:
The records show that following the petitioner’s receipt on 5 January 2001 of a copy the Court of
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the order of the Committee of Peers in its Evaluation dated Appeals Decision, it filed the present petition on 16 January 2001, well within the reglementary period so
March 30, 2000 directing the docketing separately of the criminal case as well as the administrative case indicated.
against the petitioner is hereby SET ASIDE and DECLARED NULL AND VOID. Accordingly, the complaints
in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, respectively, We go now into the substantive aspect of this case, where we are presented an attack upon a prior
filed against the petitioner are hereby DISMISSED. All acts or orders of the Ombudsman, the Overall interpretation of Article XI, Sec. 2 in relation to Article XI, Sec. 8 of our Constitution.
Deputy Ombudsman and the Committee of Peers, subjecting the petitioner [herein private respondent]
to criminal and administrative investigations, or pursuant to such investigations, are likewise
hereby DECLARED INVALID.18 The interpretation in question first appears in Cuenco v. Fernan,21 a disbarment case against then
Associate Justice Marcelo Fernan filed by Atty. Miguel Cuenco, a former member of the House of
Representatives, where we held in part:
Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court "a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original
 4

There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the court stated that it had to "defer to the loftier principle of adherence to judicial precedents, otherwise
Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7)(1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and known as the doctrine of Stare Decisis.... necessary for the uniformity and continuity of the law and also
may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for to give stability to society."27
disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s incumbency, would in effect be to
circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be
Nevertheless, the court a quo took pains to point out that the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations
removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of
thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman
the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his
is not an impeachable officer.
deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on
Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), and the members of the Commission on
Audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are constitutionally Is the Deputy Ombudsman, then, an impeachable officer? Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
required to be members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis supplied.) states that:

Barely two months later, we issued another Resolution in In Re: Raul M. Gonzales,22 concerning the same Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
charges for disbarment brought against Justice Fernan, wherein we cited the above ruling to underscore Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
the principle involved in the case, that "[a] public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
officer."23
To determine whether or not the Ombudsman therein mentioned refers to a person or to an office,
In 1995, we subsequently anchored our Resolution in Jarque v. Desierto,24 a disbarment case against reference was made by the appellate court to the Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as
then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, on the above ruling, adding that: to the opinions of leading commentators in constitutional law. Thus:

. . . [T]he court is not here saying that the Ombudsman and other constitutional officers who are . . . It appears that the members of the Constitutional Commission have made reference only to the
required by the Constitution to be members of the Philippine Bar and are remova[ble] only by Ombudsman as impeachable, excluding his deputies. The pertinent portions of the record read, to wit:
impeachment, are immunized from liability possibly for criminal acts or for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or other claimed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is here a MR. REGALADO. Yes, thank you.
fundamental procedural requirement which must be observed before such liability may be determined
and enforced. The Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from office via the constitutional
route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of On Section 10, regarding the Ombudsman, there has been concern aired by Commissioner Rodrigo about
the Ombudsman be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally who will see to it that the Ombudsman will perform his duties because he is something like a guardian of
or administratively – e.g., in disbarment proceedings – for any wrong or misbehavior which may be the government. This recalls the statement of Juvenal that while the Ombudsman is the guardian of the
proven against him in appropriate proceedings. (Emphasis supplied) people, "Quis custodiet ipsos custodies," who will guard the guardians? I understand here that the
Ombudsman who has the rank of a chairman of a constitutional commission is also removable only by
impeachment.
Finally, in Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella,25 the
Court, citing its Resolution in Jarque v. Desierto,26 dismissed, in a minute resolution, the complaint for
disbarment against the herein private respondent Mojica in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the MR. ROMULO. That is the intention, Madam President.
Visayas, stating that:
MR. REGALADO. Only the Ombudsman?
Anent the complaint for disbarment against respondent Arturo C. Mojica in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas, suffice it to state that a public officer whose membership in the Philippine Bar MR. MONSOD. Only the Ombudsman.
is a qualification for the office held by him and removable only by impeachment cannot be charged with
disbarment during his membership (In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771, 774 [1988]; Cuenco vs.
Fernan, 158 SCRA 29, 40 [1988]). And we have held in the case of Jarque vs. Desierto (A.C. No. 4509, En MR. REGALADO. So not his deputies, because I am concerned with the phrase "have the rank of." We
Banc Resolution December 5, 1995), that the Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from know, for instance, that the City Fiscal of Manila has the rank of a justice of the Intermediate Appellate
office via impeachment before they may be held to answer for any wrong or misbehavior which may be Court, and yet he is not a part of the judiciary. So I think we should clarify that also and read our
proven against them in disbarment proceedings. discussions into the Record for purposes of the Commission and the Committee.

The above Resolution was subsequently made the basis of the appellate court’s assailed Decision of 18 MR. ROMULO. Yes. If I may just comment: the Ombudsman in this provision is a rank in itself really. That
December 2000. Thus, in holding that a Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, the appellate is how we look at it. But for purposes of government classification and salary, we thought we have to
give him a recognizable or an existing rank as a point of reference more than anything else.
 5

MR. REGALADO. Yes, but my concern is whether or not he is removable only by impeachment, because THE PRESIDENT. Yes, the Gentleman may proceed.
Section 2 enumerates the impeachable officials, and it does not mention public officers with the rank of
constitutional commissioners.
MR. DAVIDE. The proposed amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo was the total deletion of the Office of
the Ombudsman and all sections relating to it. It was rejected by the body and, therefore, we can have
MR. ROMULO. But we do mention them as the Ombudsman is mentioned in that enumeration. We used individual amendments now on the particular sections.
the word "Ombudsman" because we would like it to be his title; we do not want him called "Chairman"
or "Justice." We want him called Ombudsman.
THE PRESIDENT. The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to include the
Ombudsman among those officials who have to be removed from office only on impeachment. Is that
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist. right?

On lines 13 and 14, I move for the deletion of the words "and the Ombudsman." The Ombudsman should MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Madam President.
not be placed on the level of the President and the Vice-President, the members of the judiciary and the
members of the Constitutional Commissions in the matter of removal from office.
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question?

MR. MONSOD. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO. The Ombudsman, is this only one man?

MR. MONSOD. We regret we cannot accept the amendment because we feel that the Ombudsman is at
MR. DAVIDE. Only one man.
least on the same level as the Constitutional Commissioners and this is one way of insulating it from
politics.
MR. RODRIGO. Not including his deputies.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, to make the members of the Ombudsman removable only by
impeachment would be to enshrine and install an officer whose functions are not as delicate as the MR. MONSOD. No.
others whom we wanted to protect from immediate removal by way of an impeachment.
Moreover, this Court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries
MR. MONSOD. We feel that an officer in the Ombudsman, if he does his work well, could be stepping on on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of
a lot of toes. We would really prefer to keep him there but we would like the body to vote on it, although them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986
I would like to ask if we still have a quorum, Madam President. Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
Foremost among them is the erudite Justice Isagani A. Cruz (ret.), who opined:
THE PRESIDENT. Do we have a quorum? There are members who are in the lounge.
The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the
Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec.
The Secretary-General and the pages conduct an actual count of the Commissioners present.
2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The power to
impeach is essentially a non-legislative prerogative and can be exercised by the Congress only within the
THE PRESIDENT. We have a quorum. limits of the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution. This authority may not be expanded by the
grantee itself even if motivated by the desire to strengthen the security of tenure of other officials of the
government.
MR. MONSOD. May we restate the proposed amendment for the benefit of those who were not here a
few minutes ago.
It is now provided by decree (see P.D. No. 1606) that justices of the Sandiganbayan may be removed only
through process of impeachment, the purpose evidently being to withdraw them from the removal
MR. DE LOS REYES. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry. I thought that amendment was already
power of the Supreme Court. This prohibition is of dubious constitutionality. In the first place, the list of
covered in the amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo. One of those amendments proposed by
impeachable officers is covered by the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Secondly, Article
Commissioner Rodrigo was to delete the word "Ombudsman" and, therefore, we have already voted on
VIII, Section 11, of the Constitution states that all judges of inferior courts – and this would include the
it.
Sandiganbayan – are under the disciplinary power of the Supreme Court and may be removed by it. This
view is bolstered by the last sentence of Article XI, Section 2, which runs in full as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, may I comment on that.
 6

Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the The legal maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere" (follow past precedents and do not disturb what
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for and has been settled) states that where the same questions relating to the same event have been put
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.32
provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Cruz, Isagani A., Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., pp. 333-
334)
The succeeding cases of In Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Jarque v. Desierto do not tackle the impeachability
of a Deputy Ombudsman either. Nor, for that matter, does Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy
Equally worth noting is the opinion of no less than Rev. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., himself who was a Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella, which, as previously mentioned, is a minute
member of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution, (who) asserted: resolution dismissing a complaint for disbarment against the herein private respondent on the basis of
the questioned obiter in Cuenco v. Fernan and the succeeding cases without going into the merits.
Q. Is the list of officers subject to impeachment found in Section 2 exclusive?
Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the
court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question
A. As presently worded, yes.
presented.33

(Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Philippine Constitution, A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 401)
As to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held
criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner.
Last but certainly not the least is the equally erudite Representative Antonio B. Nachura himself, who, as
a professor of law, commented that the enumeration of impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI of
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which
the 1987 Constitution, is exclusive. (Nachura, Antonio B., Outline/Reviewer in Political Law, 1998 ed., p.
constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.34 Hence, the moment he is
192)28
no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to
his criminal prosecution in the courts.35
From the foregoing, it is immediately apparent that, as enumerated in Sec. 2 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, only the following are impeachable officers: the President, the Vice President, the
Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent,
members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold
Ombudsman.29
in view of the provisions of Sections 1236 and 1337 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

How then to explain our earlier pronouncement in Cuenco v. Fernan, as later cited in In Re: Raul M.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2000 is hereby REVERSED and SET
Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Dep. Ombudsman Mojica and Graft
ASIDE. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-
Investigator Labella? By way of reiteration, said Resolution reads in part:
00-0316 are hereby REINSTATED and the Office of the Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the
investigation relative to the above cases.
. . . To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s incumbency,
would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of
SO ORDERED.
the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed
in Article XI [2] of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and
his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2]), . . . all of whom are constitutionally required to be The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office
members of the Philippine Bar.30 (Emphasis supplied) of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy
In cross-referencing Sec. 2, which is an enumeration of impeachable officers, with Sec. 8, which lists the Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following: 1. Sexual
qualifications of the Ombudsman and his deputies, the intention was to indicate, by way of obiter harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona; 2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta
dictum, that as with members of this Court, the officers so enumerated were also constitutionally and Eden Kiamco; and 3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of
required to be members of the bar.
OMB-Visayas employees. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case
No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, were dismissed.
A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made
without argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court “a petition for
of stare decisis.31
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original
special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules,
 7

ISSUE: Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional
Constitution? Commissions, and the Ombudsman.

RULING: Facts:

The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office
indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with
account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy
whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following:
impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their
belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The impeachable officers are the 1) Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona;
President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not 2) Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and
be increased or reduced by legislative enactment.
3) Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316,
constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.Hence, the moment he is no were dismissed. Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court “a
longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an
criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules.
proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s
retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti- Issue: Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Constitution?

OMBUDSMAN VS MOJICA Ruling:

GR No. 146486, March 4, 2005 The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all
indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into
FACTS: account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on
whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the
Arturo Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman of Visayas was investigated from the averment of two (2) officials impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their
and employee on the basis of committed sexual harassment, mulcting money from confidential belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The impeachable officers are the
employees and oppression against all employees. The recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
following the established stand that the deputy Ombudsman and special prosecutor cannot be Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not
impeached. be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be
criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his
ISSUE: Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or
officer? permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement
bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as
HELD: pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the
provisions of the Republic of the Philippines.
No. the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into account the
commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not
the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers
enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the
Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The impeachable officers are the President of the
 8

EN BANC In Justice Azcuna’s opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable was
the stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to the time that the Committee on Justice (the
Committee) report reaches the floor of the House.4 Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules of
G.R. No. 193459 March 8, 2011
the 12th Congress that were successfully challenged in Francisco provided that an impeachment
proceeding was to be "deemed initiated" upon the Committee’s finding of sufficiency of substance or
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner, upon the House’s affirmance or overturning of the Committee’s finding,5 which was clearly referred to as
vs. the instances "presumably for internal purposes of the House, as to the timing of some of its internal
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. action on certain relevant matters."6 Definitely, "constructive initiation by legal fiction" did not refer to
LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG the aspects of filing and referral in the regular course of impeachment, for this was precisely the gist
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF of Francisco in pronouncing what initiation means.
PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS
(KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S
The Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between those who want
LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION
to stretch and those who want to shrink the term "initiate," either of which could disrupt the provision’s
AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE
congruency to the rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioner’s imputation that the Court’s
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.
Decision presents a sharp deviation from Francisco as it defers the operability of the one-year bar rule
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.
rings hollow.

RESOLUTION
Petitioner urges that the word "initiate" must be read in its plain, ordinary and technical meaning, for it
is contrary to reason, logic and common sense to reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process
CARPIO MORALES, J.: from its end or conclusion.

For resolution is petitioner’s "Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011)" Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as "no
dated February 25, 2011 (Motion). initiation process of the impeachment proceeding shall be commenced against the same official more
than once within a period of one year," in which case the reckoning would literally point to the "start of
Upon examination of the averments in the Motion, the Court finds neither substantial nor cogent reason the beginning." To immediately reckon the initiation to what petitioner herself concedes as the start of
to reconsider its Decision. A plain reading of the Decision could very well dispose of petitioner’s previous the initiation process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation.
contentions, raised anew in the Motion, but the Court finds it proper, in writing finis to the issue, to draw
petitioner’s attention to certain markers in the Decision. In re-affirming what the phrase "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated" means, the Court
closely applied Francisco on what comprises or completes the initiation phase. Nothing can be more
I unequivocal or well-defined than the elucidation of filing-and-referral in Francisco. Petitioner must come
to terms with her denial of the exact terms of Francisco.

Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that the Court sharply deviated from the ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The
House of Representatives,1 the Decision of February 15, 2011 reaffirmed and illuminated Petitioner posits that referral is not an integral or indispensable part of the initiation of impeachment
the Francisco doctrine in light of the particular facts of the present case. proceedings, in case of a direct filing of a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House.7

To argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a simultaneous referral of two impeachment
complaints as they were actually referred to the committee "separately, one after the other"2 is to The facts of the case do not call for the resolution of this issue however. Suffice it to restate a footnote in
dismantle her own interpretation of Francisco that the one-year bar is to be reckoned from the filing of the Court’s Decision that in such case of "an abbreviated mode of initiation[, x x x] the filing of the
the impeachment complaint. Petitioner’s Motion concedes3 that the Francisco doctrine on the initiation complaint and the taking of initial action [House directive to automatically transmit] are merged into a
of an impeachment proceeding includes the House’s initial action on the complaint. By recognizing the single act."8 Moreover, it is highly impossible in such situation to coincidentally initiate a second
legal import of a referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim that per Francisco an impeachment impeachment proceeding in the interregnum, if any, given the period between filing and referral.
proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment complaint.
Petitioner’s discussion on the singular tense of the word "complaint" is too tenuous to require
Having uprooted her reliance on the Francisco case in propping her position that the initiation of an consideration. The phraseology of the one-year bar rule does not concern itself with a numerical
impeachment proceeding must be reckoned from the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on actual limitation of impeachment complaints. If it were the intention of the framers of the Constitution to limit
initiation and not "constructive initiation by legal fiction" as averred by Justice Adolfo Azcuna in his the number of complaints, they would have easily so stated in clear and unequivocal language.
separate opinion in Francisco.
Petitioner further avers that the demonstrated concerns against reckoning the period from the filing of
the complaint are mere possibilities based on a general mistrust of the Filipino people and their
 9

Representatives. To her, mere possibility of abuse is not a conclusive argument against the existence of IN SUM, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing and referral in the present
power nor a reason to invalidate a law. case, with Francisco as the guiding light. Petitioner refuses to see the other half of that light, however.

The present case does not involve an invalidation of a legal provision on a grant of power. Since the issue II
precisely involves upholding an express limitation of a power, it behooves the Court to look into the
rationale behind the constitutional proscription which guards against an explicit instance of abuse of
Petitioner, meanwhile, reiterates her argument that promulgation means publication. She again cites her
power. The Court’s duty entails an examination of the same possible scenarios considered by the framers
thesis that Commonwealth Act No. 638, Article 2 of the Civil Code, and the two Tañada v. Tuvera11 cases
of the Constitution (i.e., incidents that may prove to disrupt the law-making function of Congress and
mandate that the Impeachment Rules be published for effectivity. Petitioner raises nothing new to
unduly or too frequently harass the impeachable officer), which are basically the same grounds being
change the Court’s stance on the matter.
invoked by petitioner to arrive at her desired conclusion.

To reiterate, when the Constitution uses the word "promulgate," it does not necessarily mean to publish
Ironically, petitioner also offers the Court with various possibilities and vivid scenarios to grimly illustrate
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8),
her perceived oppression. And her own mistrust leads her to find inadequate the existence of the
Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of "to make known" as it should be generally
pertinent constitutional provisions, and to entertain doubt on "the respect for and adherence of the
understood.
House and the respondent committee to the same."9

Petitioner continues to misapply Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
While petitioner concedes that there is a framework of safeguards for impeachable officers laid down in
Investigations12where the Court noted that the Constitution unmistakably requires the publication of
Article XI of the Constitution, she downplays these layers of protection as illusory or inutile without
rules of procedure pertaining to inquiries in aid of legislation. If the Constitution warranted the
implementation and enforcement, as if these can be disregarded at will.1avvphi1
publication of Impeachment Rules, then it could have expediently indicated such requirement as it did in
the case of legislative inquiries.
Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Court left in the hands of the House the question as to when an
impeachment proceeding is initiated, the Court merely underscored the House’s conscious role in the
The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively promulgate its
initiation of an impeachment proceeding. The Court added nothing new in pinpointing the obvious
Impeachment Rules. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government on how to do so
reckoning point of initiation in light of the Francisco doctrine. Moreover, referral of an impeachment
when such prerogative is lodged exclusively with it.
complaint to the appropriate committee is already a power or function granted by the Constitution to
the House.
Still, petitioner argues that the Court erred when it ruled that "to require publication of the House
Impeachment Rules would only delay the impeachment proceedings and cause the House of
Petitioner goes on to argue that the House has no discretion on the matter of referral of an
Representatives to violate constitutionally mandated periods…" She insists that the Committee, after
impeachment complaint and that once filed, an impeachment complaint should, as a matter of course,
publishing the Impeachment Rules, would still have a remainder of 45 days out of the 60-day period
be referred to the Committee.
within which to finish its business.

The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an impeachment complaint that is filed without a subsisting
Petitioner is mistaken in her assertion. Note that the Court discussed the above-mentioned scenario only
bar. To refer an impeachment complaint within an existing one-year bar, however, is to commit the
"in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress." Section 3, Article XI of
apparently unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment proceeding, which may be struck
the Constitution contains relevant self-executing provisions which must be observed at the start of the
down under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion. It bears recalling that the one-year bar rule itself is a
impeachment process, the promulgation of the Impeachment Rules notwithstanding.
constitutional limitation on the House’s power or function to refer a complaint.

Petitioner rehashes her allegations of bias and vindictiveness on the part of the Committee Chairperson,
Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly constitutionally-prohibited second
Rep. Niel Tupas, Jr. Yet again, the supposed actuations of Rep. Tupas partake of a keen performance of
impeachment complaint on the matter of whether to make the appropriate referral goes precisely into
his avowed duties and responsibilities as the designated manager of that phase in the impeachment
the propriety of the referral and not on the merits of the complaint. The House needs only to ascertain
proceeding. Besides, the actions taken by the Committee were never its Chairperson’s sole act but rather
the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one year, without any regard to the claims set forth in
the collective undertaking of its whole 55-person membership. The Committee members even took to
the complaint.
voting among themselves to validate what actions to take on the motions presented to the Committee.

To petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever completes the initiation
Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise. Petitioner thus
of an impeachment proceeding is immaterial in mitigating the influx of successive complaints since
cannot demand that the Court apply the stringent standards it asks of justices and judges when it comes
allowing multiple impeachment charges would result to the same harassment and oppression. She
to inhibition from hearing cases. Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules do not provide for any provision
particularly cites Constitutional Commissioner Ricardo Romulo’s concerns on the amount of time spent if
regarding the inhibition of the Committee chairperson or any member from participating in an
"multiple impeachment charges"10 are allowed. She fails, however, to establish whether Commissioner
impeachment proceeding. The Committee may thus direct any question of partiality towards the
Romulo limited or quantified his reference to not more than one complaint or charge.
 10

concerned member only. And any decision on the matter of inhibition must be respected, and it is not Petitioner: She invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction to "determine whether or not there
for this Court to interfere with that decision. has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Except for the constitutionally mandated periods, the pacing or alleged precipitate haste with which the
Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her
impeachment proceeding against petitioner is conducted is beyond the Court’s control. Again,
disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public
impeachment is a highly politicized intramural that gives the House ample leg room to operate, subject
respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition on
only to the constitutionally imposed limits.13 And beyond these, the Court is duty-bound to respect the
September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and
discretion of a co-equal branch of government on matters which would effectively carry out its
substance of the two complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing.
constitutional mandate.
1. The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14 September 2010, the majority of the
FINALLY, the Court has, in its February 15, 2011 Decision, already lifted its September 14, 2010 Status Court voted to issue a status quo ante order suspending the impeachment proceedings against
Quo Ante Order14 which, as said Order clearly stated, was "effective immediately and continuing until petitioner. (Note: In urgent cases, it is a matter of practice for the Court that all the Justices should
further orders from this Court."15 Such "further order" points to that part of the disposition in the have been given time, at least an hour or two, to read the petition before voting on the issuance of
February 15, 2011 Decision that directs the lifting of the Status Quo Ante Order. the status quo ante order. Unfortunately, this was not done.)
2. Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no impeachment proceedings shall
The lifting of the Status Quo Ante Order is effective immediately, the filing of petitioner’s motion for be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
reconsideration notwithstanding, in the same way that the Status Quo Ante Order was made effective
immediately, respondents’ moves to reconsider or recall it notwithstanding. There is thus no faulting the Issue #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to determine whether public respondent committed
Committee if it decides to, as it did proceed with the impeachment proceeding after the Court released a violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its discretion relating to impeachment proceeding?
its February 15, 2011 Decision.
Held:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter
of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or
SO ORDERED. in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the
exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011 There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral
Facts: components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch
of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment complaint (First Complaint) against Ombudsman
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez (petitioner) based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply
Constitution. upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.
On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by Reyes, et al. against the same respondent also based Issue #2: Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication?
on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.
Held:
On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice
at the same time. NO. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on the validity of the simultaneous
referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of
On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the First and Second Complaints sufficient in Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional
form. On 7 September 2010, the Committee on Justice, found the First and Second Complaints were vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.
sufficient in form.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents
On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted
Court seeking to enjoin the Committee on Justice from proceeding with the impeachment proceedings. prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment
The petition prayed for a temporary restraining order. proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.

Issue #3: When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated?

 11

Held: Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in any
medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation."
There are two components of the act of initiating the complaint: the filing of the impeachment complaint While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference in their
AND the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint usage. The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times. A number of those instances
has been initiated (meaning, filed and initiated), another impeachment complaint may not be filed involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, the
against the same official within a one year period. Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices.

Issue #4: Do the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible standards in determining the To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish," the case of
sufficiency of form and substance? the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Supreme Court has invariably
Held: required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is
concerned, however, PROMULGATION means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for
YES. Contrary to petitioner’ contention, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional filing and publication.
requirements and providing that there must be a "verified complaint or resolution," and that the
substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood—that is, to make
determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. known. Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former
should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to
In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is
of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court
Constitution which merely requires a "hearing." ( Section 3[2], Article XI). In the discharge of its for filing and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to
constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court
impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process, hence, such is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
Inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the
Issue #5: May the Supreme Court look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. (Neri vs.
petitioner’s submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints? Senate)

Held: Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken
prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing
NO. This issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run
discretion of the legislature (Francisco vs. House of Representatives.) or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of
the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on
Issue #6: Was petitioner denied of due process, because of the delay in the publication of the the impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement. (Just like what
Impeachment Rules? happened in this case, where the complaint was filed even before the 15th Congress open its first
session)
Held:
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at
NO. The Supreme Court discussed the difference between publication and promulgation. "effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the "effective"
provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional
September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate
Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation. its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.

Citing Tañada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or
Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given
sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws does not
Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
out the purpose of this section." objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws." In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.
 12

It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the impeachable offense.
punishment of the offender.
Petitioner’s claim deserves scant consideration.
Issue #7: When do we reckon the start of the one-year ban?
Petitioner contends that it is reckoned from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in
July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that carrying out the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress,
within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to and without delving into the practicability of the application of the one offense per complaint rule, the
public respondent. initial determination of which must be made by the House93 which has yet to pass upon the question, the
Court finds that petitioner’s invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice
Held: it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each
charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of
Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate" means to file the complaint and referral of the Impeachment."94 It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
complaint to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachable offense.
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore,
the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation,
referred to the House Committee on Justice. petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within
one year.
Petitioner submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because "something prior
to that had already been done.” This is wrong. Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, the verification of Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson
the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House – steps done prior to the filing – would Rep. Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[;
already initiate the impeachment proceedings. c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and
substance," and that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to
Issue #8: Does an impeachment complaint need to allege only one impeachable offense? consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate."95 Petitioner’s petition, in fact, initially describes
Petitioner argues that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own the consolidation as merely "contemplated."96
Impeachment Rules, which provides that "the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court
shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House." Petitioner invokes the Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the
application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on one offense per complaint rule. Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or
To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each anticipatory.97
charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust.
Even if the Court assumes petitioner’s change of stance that the two impeachment complaints
were deemedconsolidated,98 her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioner’s theory
Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her obviously springs from her "proceeding = complaint" equation which the Court already brushed aside.
defense; expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment process;
constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official functions as well as FACTS:
that of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report within the deadline.
Two impeachment complaints were filed against Ombudsman Gutierrez, both were based betrayal of
Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. The House Plenary referred the two complaints to
complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the
the House of Representative Committee on Justice. After hearing, the House of Representative
application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined with
the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the grounds for Committee on Justice issued a Resolution finding both complaints sufficient in form and substance.
impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor also considers as Consequently, Ombudsman Gutierrez contended that the issued the Resolution violated the one-year
non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a political process and not a bar provision under Article XI, Section 3, paragraph 5 of the Constitution.
criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the complaint or information referred
thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment complaint, must already be in the name of the ISSUE: Whether the HR Committee on Justice violated the one-year bar provision when it issued the
People of the Philippines. Resolution.

Held:
HELD:
The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge
representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of No. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution provides that, no impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. The act of
 13

initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment complaint and the referral by the House
Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore,
the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is
referred to the House Committee on Justice. Hence, in this case, the HR Committee did not violate the
one-year bar provision of the Constitution when it accepted the second impeachment complaint after
the first impeachment complaint was filed.

Also, it was held that the HR committee did not abuse its discretion in finding the complaints sufficient in
form in substance. The Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and
providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance requirement is
met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the committee.
 14

EN BANC 2.1. It is provided for in Art. XI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that "a public officer or
employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law,
submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
G.R. No. 200242 July 17, 2012
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and other constitutional offices,
and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to
CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA, Petitioner, the public in the manner provided by law."
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
2.2. Respondent failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE "KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-
worth as required by the Constitution.
AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS, RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA,
REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES (ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES), Respondents. 2.3. It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his
declaration of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt
practices act.
RESOLUTION

2.4. Respondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth,
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits. It has been
reported that Respondent has, among others, a 300-sq. meter apartment in a posh
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of
Mega World Property development at the Fort in Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is constitutionally-
this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of
required under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net
the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines.
Worth (SALN)? Is this acquisition sustained and duly supported by his income as a public official? Since
his assumption as Associate and subsequently, Chief Justice, has he complied with this duty of public
On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified disclosure?
complaint for impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on
Justice. After a brief presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188
ARTICLE III
Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required by the Constitution.

RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE

On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an
PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII,
impeachment court the following day, December 14, 2011.
SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT "[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A
PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE" IN ALLOWING THE
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF
of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption, allegedly committed as follows: FLIP-FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE
ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN
ARTICLE I DISCUSSING WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.

RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND ARTICLE IV
SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS
APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE
CHIEF JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT. CONSTITUTION WHEN HE BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY
ISSUING A "STATUS QUO ANTE" ORDER AGAINST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE
ARTICLE II CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ.

RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE ARTICLE V
PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OFASSETS, LIABILITIES
AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH WANTON ARBITRARINESS AND PARTIALITY IN
CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16
NEWLY-CREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A PROVINCE.
 15

ARTICLE VI issued by the Impeachment Court, took the witness stand and submitted the SALNs of petitioner for the
years 2002 to 2010. Other prosecution witnesses also testified regarding petitioner’s SALNs for the
previous years (Marianito Dimaandal, Records Custodian of Malacañang Palace, Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio,
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF, AND TO A COMMITTEE HE
Register of Deeds of Taguig and Atty. Carlo V. Alcantara, Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City).
CREATED, THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE A JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION IS
PROPERLY REPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VIA IMPEACHMENT. In compliance with the directive of the Impeachment Court, the prosecution and defense submitted their
respective memoranda on the question of whether the prosecution may present evidence to prove the
allegations in paragraphs 2.3 (failure to report some properties in SALN) and 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten
ARTICLE VII
wealth and failure to disclose in SALN such bank accounts with huge deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld
property at the Fort in Taguig) under Article II (par. 2.2. refers to petitioner’s alleged failure to disclose to
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRANTING A TEMPORARY the public his SALN as required by the Constitution).
RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER
HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION
On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a Resolution5 which states:
AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT’S OWN TRO. ARTICLE VIII RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR IN SUM, THEREFORE, this Court resolves and accordingly rules:
COMMITTED GRAFT AND CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED AND REFUSEDTO ACCOUNT FOR THE
JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ)
1. To allow the Prosecution to introduce evidence in support of Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Article II of the
COLLECTIONS.1
Articles of Impeachment;

On December 26, 2011, petitioner filed his Answer2 assailing the "blitzkrieg" fashion by which the
2. To disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 of the Articles of Impeachment, with
impeachment complaint was signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted to the
respect to which, this Court shall be guided by and shall rely upon the legal presumptions on the nature
Senate. Citing previous instances when President Aquino openly expressed his rejection of petitioner’s
of any property or asset which may be proven to belong to the Respondent Chief Justice as provided
appointment as Chief Justice and publicly attacked this Court under the leadership of petitioner for
under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379.
"derailing his administration’s mandate," petitioner concluded that the move to impeach him was the
handiwork of President Aquino’s party mates and supporters, including"hidden forces" who will be
benefited by his ouster. As to the charges against him, petitioner denied the same but admitted having SO ORDERED.6
once served the Offices of the President and Vice-President during the term of former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and granted the request for courtesy call only to Mr. Dante Jimenez of the Volunteers In a subsequent Resolution7 dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted the prosecution’s
Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) while Mr. Lauro Vizconde appeared with Mr. Jimenez without prior request for subpoena directed to the officersof two private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited
permission or invitation. Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed to him millions in peso and dollar currencies, as follows:
were either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the outright
dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the
Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the majority votes to grant the Prosecution’s Requests for
Subpoenae to the responsible officers of Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and Bank of the Philippine
Island (BPI), for them to testify and bring and/or produce before the Court documents on the alleged
Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent Representatives held a press conference bank accounts of Chief Justice Corona, only for the purpose of the instant impeachment proceedings, as
revealing evidence which supposedly support their accusations against petitioner. The following day, follows:
newspapers carried front page reports of high-priced condominium units and other real properties in
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig and Quezon City allegedly owned by petitioner, as disclosed by prosecutors led by
respondent Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr. The prosecution told the media that it is possible that these properties a) The Branch Manager of the Bank of Philippine Islands, Ayala Avenue Branch, 6th Floor, SGV
were not included by petitioner in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) which had Building, 6758 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00
not been made available to the public. Reacting to this media campaign, Senators scolded the p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of the account opening
prosecutors reminding them that under the Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials3 they are forms/documents for Bank Account no. 1445-8030-61 in the name of Renato C. Corona and
not allowed to make any public disclosure or comment regarding the merits of a pending impeachment the bank statements showing the balances of the said account as of December 31, 2005,
case.4 By this time, five petitions have already been filed with this Court by different individuals seeking December 31, 2006, December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and
to enjoin the impeachment trial on grounds of improperly verified complaint and lack of due process. December 31, 2010.

On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced b) The Branch Manager (and/or authorized representative) of Philippine Savings Bank,
trial proceedings against the petitioner.Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary hearing was denied. On Katipunan Branch, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, is commanded to bring
January 18, 2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of this Court, in compliance with a subpoena before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of
the account opening forms/documents for the following bank accounts allegedly in the name
 16

of Renato C. Corona, and the documents showing the balances of the said accounts as of (iv) Making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction permanent.
December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010:
Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for.9
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno on the
On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to ground of partiality, citing their publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner aside from the fact that
enjoin the Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid subpoena they have been openly touted as the likely replacements in the event that petitioner is removed from
requiring PSBank thru its authorized representative to testify and to bring the original and certified true office.10
copies of the opening documents for petitioner’salleged foreign currency accounts, and thereafter to
render judgment nullifying the subpoenas including the bank statements showing the year-end balances
On February 9, 2012, this Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 200238 enjoining the Senate from implementing
for the said accounts.
the Resolution and subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum issued by the Senate sitting as an
Impeachment Court, both dated February 6, 2012. The Court further resolved to deny petitioner’s
On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave motion for the inhibition of Justices Carpio and Sereno "in the absence of any applicable compulsory
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis ground and of any voluntary inhibition from the Justices concerned."
of the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and
defective for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the
On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition11 claiming that his right to due process is
complaint which, aside from being a "hodge-podge" of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in
being violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-Judges have lost the
law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that
coldneutrality of impartial judges by acting as prosecutors. Petitioner particularly mentioned Senator-
the retention of Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court to retain Par. 2.3 effectively
Judge Franklin S. Drilon, whose inhibition he had sought from the Impeachment Court, to no avail. He
allows the introduction of evidence under Par. 2.3, as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its earlier
further called attention to the fact that despite the Impeachment Court’s January 27, 2012 Resolution
resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief, bringing no real protection to petitioner; (3) allowed
which disallowed the introduction of evidence in support of paragraph 2.4 of Article II, from which no
the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates
motion for reconsideration would be entertained, "the allies of President Aquino in the Senate abused
petitioner’s right to due process because first, Art. II does not mention "graft and corruption" or
their authority and continued their presentation of evidence for the prosecution, without fear of
unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment, and second, it is clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of
objection". In view of the persistent efforts of President Aquino’s Senator-allies to overturn the ruling of
the Constitution that "graft and corruption" is a separate and distinct ground from "culpable violation of
Presiding Officer Juan Ponce Enrile that the prosecution could not present evidence on paragraph 2.4 of
the Constitution" and "betrayal of public trust"; and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of
Article II -- for which President Aquino even thanked "his senator allies in delivering what the
petitioner’s alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of
prosecution could not"-- petitioner reiterates the reliefs prayed for in his petition before this Court.
an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree") considering that those documents submitted by the
prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign
Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof. Petitioner thus prayed for the In the Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti12 filed on behalf of the respondents, the Solicitor
following reliefs: General argues that the instant petition raises matters purely political in character which may be decided
or resolved only by the Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the comment is being filed by the
respondents "without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court and
(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of
without conceding the constitutional and exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of
preliminary injunction enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the Impeachment Court; (ii)
impeachment and of
implementation ofResolution dated 6 February 2012; (iii) the officers or representatives of
BPI and PSBank from testifying and submitting documents on petitioner’s or his family’s bank
accounts; and (iv) the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment." Citing the case of
and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;
Nixon v. United States,13 respondents contend that to allow a public official being impeached to raise
(b) After giving due course to the Petition, render judgment: before this Court any and all issues relative to the substance of the impeachment complaint would result
in an unnecessarily long and tedious process that may even go beyond the terms of the Senator-Judges
hearing the impeachment case. Such scenario is clearly not what the Constitution intended.
(i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null and void ab initio;

Traversing the allegations of the petition, respondents assert that the Impeachment Court did not
(ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on
commit any grave abuse of discretion; it has, in fact, been conducting the proceedings judiciously.
paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;
Respondents maintain that subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very
essence of impeachment. They contend that the constitutional command of public accountability to
(iii) Annulling the Impeachment Court’s Resolution dated 27 January 2012 and 6 petitioner and his obligation to fully disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim of
February 2011 [sic], as well as any Subpoenae issued pursuant thereto; and confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of this case were correctly and judiciously
issued. Considering that the ongoing impeachment proceedings, which was initiated and is being
 17

conducted in accordance with the Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle of public Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.16 we ruled that the power of
accountability and ensure that the transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected, the injury judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
being claimed by petitioner allegedly resulting from the impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis. proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice,17 the Court
It is thus prayed that the present petition, as well as petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a TRO/preliminary resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints
injunction, be dismissed. against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one-
year bar provision.
The core issue presented is whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail
matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents
violations of right to due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court. committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require
corrective measures from the Court.
Impeachment and Judicial Review

Mootness
Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,"14 was foreseen
as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest
danger that "the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more
demonstrations of innocence or guilt."15Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and
judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of
the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new
Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC.
those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his
with grave abuse or arbitrariness. own acts.1âwphi1

Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so
misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.18 In such cases, there is no actual
impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the
English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution. dismissal of the petition.19

Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. Petitioner WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is
was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS.
accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause.
Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the
No pronouncement as to costs.
alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during
the hearings.
SO ORDERED.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding
the behavior of certain Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not FACTS:
concern, or allege any violation of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the
Senate’s sole power to try and decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear This is a petition for certiorari andprohibition with prayer for immediate issuance oftemporary
transgression of these constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminaryinjunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court,
judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the nature of the functions Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondentMembers of the House of
they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound
Representatives (HOR) and trialbeing conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines.
questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any
semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules
were followed or not, is a political question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded judicial On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by themajority bloc of the HOR during which a verified
review. complaintfor impeachment against petitioner was submitted by theleadership of the Committee on
Justice. After a briefpresentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted insession and 188 Members
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v. signed and endorsed it, wayabove the one thirdvote required by the Constitution.
 18

On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmittedto the Senate which convened as an Otherprosecution witnesses also testified regarding petitioner’sSALNs and other properties. In a
impeachment court the following day. subsequent Resolution dated February 6, 2012, theImpeachment Court granted the prosecution’s
request forsubpoena directed to the officers of two private bankswhere petitioner allegedly deposited
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of thecomplaint charging him with culpable violation millions in peso anddollar currencies.
of theConstitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and Corruption, which alleged that:
On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition forcertiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking
I. Betrayed the public trust through his track record marked by partiality and subservience in cases toenjoin the Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutorsfrom implementing the aforesaid subpoena
involving the Arroyo Administration from the time of his appointment As Supreme Court justice requiringPSBank thru its authorized representative to testify and tobring the original and certified true
and until his dubious appointment as a midnight chief justice to the present; copies of the openingdocuments for petitioner’s alleged foreign currencyaccounts, and thereafter to
II. Respondent committed culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayed the public trust render judgment nullifying thesubpoenas including the bank statements showing theyearendbalances
when he failed to disclose to the public his SALN as required under sec. 17, art. XI of the 1987 for the said accounts.
Constitution;
III. Respondent committed culpable violations of the constitution and/or betrayed the public trust by On the same day, the present petition was filed arguingthat the Impeachment Court committed grave
failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under the constitution that provides that “[a] abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a
Member of the judiciary must be a person of Proven competence, integrity, probity, and Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to due process is beingviolated in the ongoing
independence” in allowing the supreme court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which impeachment proceedings becausecertain Senator Judgeshave lost the cold neutrality ofimpartial judges
Caused the issuance of flip-floppingDecisions inFinal and executory cases; in creating an excessive by acting as prosecutors.
entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office; and in discussing
with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court. The Petitioner was eventually impeached based on evidence presented to the Senate sitting as
impeachment court.
IV. Respondent betrayed the public trust and/or committed culpable violation of the Constitution
when he blatantly disregarded the principle of separation of powers by issuing a “status quo ante” ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion
order against the House of Representatives in the case concerning the Impeachment of then in ruling for the former Chief Justice’s impeachment.
Ombudsman MerceditasNavarro-Gutierrez.
HELD:

And such other allegations of arbitrariness in relation to his office and his relationship with former Pres. No. Impeachment refers to the power of Congress toremove a public official for serious crimes or
Arroyo and her husband, as well, failure to account for collections of the JDF. misconduct asprovided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to checkabuse of power,
impeachment has its roots in Athens and wasadopted in the United States (US) through the influence
Petitioner filed his answer and assailed the swift manner by which the impeachment complaint as ofEnglish common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
initiated and transferred from the HOR to the Senate.
By the nature of the functions theydischarge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator Judgesare
Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds oroffenses imputed to him were either false or clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses,prosecutors and counsel during the trial.
baseless, andotherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for theoutright dismissal of the complaint for Petitioner thus failed toprove any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator Judges.But whether
failing to meet therequirements of the Constitution or that the ImpeachmentCourt enter a judgment of the Senate Impeachment Rules werefollowed or not, is a political question that is not within thisCourt’s
acquittal for all the articles ofimpeachment. power of expanded judicial review.

Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed ofrespondent Representatives held a press An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when itceases to present a justiciable controversy so
conferencerevealing evidencewhich supposedly support their accusations against petitioner, which was that a determinationthereof would be without practical use and value. In such cases,there is no actual
carried on front page newspaper reports, the following day. substantial relief to which the petitioner wouldbe entitled to and which would be negated by the
dismissal of thepetition.
On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of thePhilippines acting as an Impeachment Court,
commencedtrial proceedings against the petitioner. Petitioner’s motionfor a preliminary hearing was
denied. On January 18,2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of thisCourt, in compliance with a
subpoena issued by theImpeachment Court, took the witness stand and submittedthe SALNs of
petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010.
 19

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under
P.A. SERENO. DIGEST Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc] warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude
Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having
omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if
it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed Contentions:
during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of
a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):
act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action,
if otherwise. OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question the
FACTS: validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar,
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed
of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of the SC may be removed
employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, through modes other than impeachment.
and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule
Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover,
of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum
of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the
from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign
by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is applicable to the OSG, considering that
were recovered. SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know the disqualification.
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft
declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all and corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that this is not a
previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, political question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of the
2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.
incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a
became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under
three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC
“considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her
reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UP SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she
HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and
Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Sereno was appointed Chief Justice. Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum,
wherein malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that
Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to Sereno (respondent):
hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of
the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2
as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First
in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T.
1998 SALN only in 2003 Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an
exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise.
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield
the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original them from harassment suits that will prevent them from performing their functions which are vital to
 20

the continued operations of government. Sereno further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding,
Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.
Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of separation of
powers
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because the Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on the Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function
basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political question outside the
judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President. There is no Court’s supervisory and review powers;
such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief Justice.
is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the
Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations
Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly and
to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and promptly.
administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative power If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids
over all courts and the personnel thereof. the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;
In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent
Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.
Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition
for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the HELD:
“discovery” of the disqualification.
Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as a
public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest
administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only be decided that may be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but rests
by the JBC and the President. on the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and
the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. The justification of one’s “sense of
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to patriotism and their common desire to protect and uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the
the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an inference to a Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ intervention that their would-be participation in the impeachment trial
pattern of filing, not of non-filing. as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment
court will be taken away is not sufficient. The interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial,
Intervenors’ arguments: material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo
warranto is brought in the name of the Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the individual or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of
integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel among rival claimants.
the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what is
only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such as Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in the
citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence, integrity, case.
probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations.
It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
ISSUES: completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of a party to
seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested,
Preliminary issues: impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide
Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention cases without fear of repression. Bias must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Those justices
Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices who were present at the impeachment proceedings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the
Court En Banc, given that the Members are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge.
Main Issues: The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge
Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto. is without basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it
Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
 21

speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and meaning of the answers the Justices may for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in
have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings before the House. quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public
Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in entertaining office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed
the quo warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.
discordance between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one, Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged
except to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a
inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met consistent litigation success conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from
before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be received in the present quo warranto action. the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person
As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The best person to determine from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.
the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be disqualified. [yourlawyersays] Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is not
the impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The impeachment case
Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment,
jurisdiction. there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the House is merely
inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo
warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or
are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.
that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of
transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against
power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may”
– it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle which denote discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere
actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express
deference to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other
impeachment court through the Senate. methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for this express provision.”
To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally
validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be
impeachment is a political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment.
warrantoproceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or
appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a
warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it public petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of
interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of whom are impeachable officers.
the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible
latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those
and the government policy on the matter at hand. enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If other
Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not causes of removal are available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the
forum shopping and is allowed. view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their
appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even
and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for determining forum violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.
shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of
action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would
determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core
impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate.
 22

Again, the difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC
warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo complies with its own rules.
warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo
warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the
Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment. authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute
autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is
However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or
conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not
Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process
controversy simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be
would be to sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to
the entire membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an
on impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that
be unqualified under existing laws and case law. the Court is barred from resolving. [yourlawyersays]

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person
appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the of provencompetence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not,
requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable
to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by the New
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court has always viewed
warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must be a person
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise. of provencompetence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State. Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption
an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his
within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to
position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may
individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case where no private individual claims title result in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set
to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself which commenced the present for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency
petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person holding the highest position in and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the
the Judiciary. public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-
compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also
Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the result in disqualification to hold public office.
President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that
any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a
may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting
proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are
for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject
prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government. themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the performance of those duties. More
warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies importantly, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably· reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a
for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity
up to the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in se.
defect on Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect
rendered obscure.
 23

thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is
completely immaterial. attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious
circumstances include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997
Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received
law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct. the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount
from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were
In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have seen in her first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in
easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before complying with the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity,
the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal against
The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-
of the head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly disclosures.
transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are
neither proven to be in the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant
Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were to the JBC rules.
neither established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover,
the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent
[Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been
conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN. considered for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was
singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years
For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still required
HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno who was not able to
evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by the substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter
State in that the burden rests upon the respondent. containing justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from
U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her government service is not
In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her SALN continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and
because it is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did not that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.
receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker “serving in an
honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays] These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to
the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply.
Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the course of her
when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC
Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials and betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme Court. [yourlawyersays]
employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but there
compliance order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from
expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor and
yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts
clearance is limited only to clearing Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a
and property accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the date of her resignation. public officer or employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Sereno for
Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the interview.
shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her
inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false
with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC representations that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for
En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible because it does not appear that Sereno’s the government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with
failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of SALNs requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs
nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this Court from for the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused
looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government funds
party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting,
issued a TRO in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELECcontrary to the
Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of
Constitutional and statutory requirements . the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of
survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of
deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ
 24

Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving national security against the latter Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and
among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity. EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council
Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that is directed to commence the application and nomination process.
her integrity was not established at the time of her application This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.
Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be
The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position of sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for
Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the
requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through. Supreme Court.
Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the
opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In
Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically
useless for the years that she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same
matches the entries indicated in the SALN.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of appointment
and assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The
voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is
ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for
said position follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the
necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC
members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such
further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all
the parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office
constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination process is
evident from the composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the
only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the Court
surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to
the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are
satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably
valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack
of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely
holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an
impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The
remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from the
appointive position of Chief Justice. [yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

 25

E. SANDIGANBAYAN AND OMBUDSMAN In the morning of August 23, 2010, news media scampered for a minute-by-minute coverage of a
hostage drama that had slowly unfolded right at the very heart of the City of Manila. While initial news
accounts were fragmented it was not difficult to piece together the story on the hostage-taker, Police
Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza. He was a disgruntled former police officer attempting to secure his
EN BANC
reinstatement in the police force and to restore the benefits of a life-long, and erstwhile bemedaled,
service. The following day, broadsheets and tabloids were replete with stories not just of the deceased
G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012 hostage-taker but also of the hostage victims, eight of whom died during the bungled police operation to
rescue the hapless innocents. Their tragic deaths triggered word wars of foreign relation proportions.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner, One newspaper headline ran the story in detail, as follows:
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and represented by EXECUTIVE MANILA, Philippines - A dismissed policeman armed with an assault rifle hijacked a bus packed with
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. tourists, and killed most of its passengers in a 10 hour-hostage drama shown live on national television
AMORANDO, Officer in Charge, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY. until last night.
RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITOD.
CATAYONG, Respondents.
Former police senior inspector Rolando Mendoza was shot dead by a sniper at past 9 p.m. Mendoza
hijacked the bus and took 21 Chinese tourists hostage, demanding his reinstatement to the police force.
DECISION
The hostage drama dragged on even after the driver of the bus managed to escape and told police that
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: all the remaining passengers had been killed.

The Case Late into the night assault forces surrounded the bus and tried to gain entry, but a pair of dead hostages
hand-cuffed to the door made it difficult for them. Police said they fired at the wheels of the bus to
These two petitions have been consolidated not because they stem from the same factual milieu but immobilize it.
because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to
remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the Police used hammers to smash windows, door and wind-shield but were met with intermittent fire from
constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman. the hos-tage taker.

The first case, docketed as G.R. No. 196231, is a Petition for Certiorari (with application for issuance of Police also used tear gas in an effort to confirm if the remaining hostages were all dead or alive. When
temporary restraining order or status quo order) which assails on jurisdictional grounds the the standoff ended at nearly 9 p.m., some four hostages were rescued alive while Mendoza was killed by
Decision1 dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 a sniper.
dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of
Initial reports said some 30 policemen stormed the bus. Shots also rang out, sending bystanders
Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition primarily seeks to
scampering for safety.
declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the
Office of the Ombudsman. It took the policemen almost two hours to assault the bus because gunfire reportedly rang out from
inside the bus.
The second case, docketed as G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with
application for issuance of a temporary restraining order or status quo order) seeking to annul, reverse Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus in the morning and took the tourists hostage.
and set aside (1) the undated Order2 requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit a written
explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in relation to Mendoza, who claimed he was illegally dismissed from the police service, initially released nine of the
the Plea Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the hostages during the drama that began at 10 a.m. and played out live on national television.
April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary Investigation,3 both issued by the Office of the President in OP-DC-
Case No. 11-B-003, the administrative case initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman. The petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. Live television footage showed Mendoza asking for food for those remaining in the bus, which was
No. 6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman. delivered, and fuel to keep the air-conditioning going. The disgruntled former police officer was
reportedly armed with an M-16 rifle, a 9 mm pistol and two hand grenades.

The facts from which these two cases separately took root are neither complicated nor unfamiliar.
 26

Mendoza posted a handwritten note on the windows of the bus, saying "big deal will start after 3 p.m. In a completely separate incident much earlier in time, more particularly in December of 2003, 28-year-
today." Another sign stuck to another window said "3 p.m. today deadlock." old Juan Paolo Garcia and 23-year-old Ian Carl Garcia were caught in the United States smuggling
$100,000 from Manila by concealing the cash in their luggage and making false statements to US
Customs Officers. The Garcia brothers pleaded guilty to bulk cash smuggling and agreed to forfeit the
Stressing his demand, Mendoza stuck a piece of paper with a handwritten message: "Big mistake to
amount in favor of the US Government in exchange for the dismissal of the rest of the charges against
correct a big wrong decision." A larger piece of paper on the front windshield was headed, "Release final
them and for being sentenced to time served. Inevitably, however, an investigation into the source of
decision," apparently referring to the case that led to his dismissal from the police force.
the smuggled currency conducted by US Federal Agents and the Philippine Government unraveled a
scandal of military corruption and amassed wealth -- the boys' father, Retired Major General Carlos F.
Negotiations dragged on even after Mendoza's self-imposed deadline. Garcia, former Chief Procurement Officer of the Armed Forces, had accumulated more than ₱ 300
Million during his active military service. Plunder and Anti-Money Laundering cases were eventually filed
Senior Police Officer 2 Gregorio Mendoza said his brother was upset over his dismissal from the police against Major General Garcia, his wife and their two sons before the Sandiganbayan.
force. "His problem was he was unjustly removed from service. There was no due process, no hearing,
no com-plaint," Gregorio said. G.R. No. 196231

Last night, Gregorio was arrested by his colleagues on suspicions of being an accessory to his brother's Sometime in 2008, a formal charge5 for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and
action. Tensions rose as relatives tried to prevent lawmen from arresting Gregorio in front of national physical injuries) was filed before the Philippine National Police-National Capital Region (PNP-NCR)
television. This triggered the crisis that eventually forced Mendoza to carry out his threat and kill the against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza, and four others, namely,
remaining hostages. Police Inspector Nelson Lagasca, Senior Police Inspector I Nestor David, Police Officer III Wilson Gavino,
and Police Officer II Roderick Lopena. A similar charge was filed by the private complainant, Christian M.
Negotiators led by Superintendent Orlando Yebra and Chief Inspector Romeo Salvador tried to talk Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Manila, docketed as I.S. No. 08E-09512.
Mendoza into surrendering and releasing the 21 hostages, mostly children and three Filipinos, including
the driver, the tourist guide and a photographer. Yebra reportedly lent a cellphone to allow On July 24, 2008, while said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National
communications with Mendoza in-side the bus, which was parked in front ofthe Quirino Grandstand. Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
Children could be seen peeking from the drawn curtains of the bus while police negotiators hovered near administrative adjudication.6 Subsequently, Case No. OMB-P-A-08-0670-H for Grave Misconduct was
the scene. lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers, who filed their respective
verified position papers as directed.

Manila Police District (MPD) director Chief Superinten-dent Rodolfo Magtibay ordered the deployment
of crack police teams and snipers near the scene. A crisis man-agement committee had been activated Meanwhile, on August 26, 2008, I.S. No. 08E-09512 was dismissed7 upon a finding that the material
with Manila Vice Mayor Isko Moreno coordinating the actions with the MPD. allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the
indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP
issued a Resolution8 dated October 17, 2008 recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the
Earlier last night, Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez had a meeting with Moreno to discuss Mendoza's administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3)
case that led to his dismissal from the service. Ombudsman spokesman Jose de Jesus said Gutierrez gave consecutive hearings despite due notice.
a "sealed letter" to Moreno to be delivered to Mendoza. De Jesus did not elaborate on the contents of
the letter but said Moreno was tasked to personally deliver the letter to Mendoza.
However, on February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a
Decision9 in Case No. OMB-P-A-08-0670-H finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police
MPD spokesman Chief Inspector Edwin Margarejo said Mendoza was apparently distraught by the slow officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. The dispositive portion of said
process of the Ombudsman in deciding his motion for reconside-ration. He said the PNP-Internal Affairs Decision reads:
Service and the Manila Regional Trial Court had already dismissed crim-inal cases against him.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondents P/S Insp. ROLANDO DEL ROSARIO
The hostage drama began when Mendoza flagged down the Hong Thai Travel Tourist bus (TVU-799), MENDOZA and PO3 WILSON MATIC GAVINO of PRO-ARMM, Camp Brig. Gen. Salipada K. Pendatun,
pretend-ing to hitch a ride. Margarejo said the bus had just left Fort Santiago in Intramuros when Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan; P/INSP. NELSON URBANO LAGASCA, SPO1 NESTOR REYES DAVID and PO2
Mendoza asked the driver to let him get on and ride to Quirino Grandstand. Upon reaching the Quirino RODERICK SALVA LOPEÑA of Manila Police District, Headquarters, United Nations Avenue, Manila, be
Grandstand, Mendoza an-nounced to the passengers that they would be taken hostage. "Having worn meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the Service, pursuant to Section 52 (A), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on
his (police) uniform, of course there is no doubt that he already planned the hostage taking," Margarejo Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits
said. - Sandy Araneta, Nestor Etolle, Delon Porcalla, Amanda Fisher, Cecille Suerte Felipe, Christi-na and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service pursuant to Section 58,
Mendez, AP Grandstand Carnage, The Philippine Star, Updated August 24, 2010 12:00 AM, Val Rodri- Rule IV of the same Uniform Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, for having
guez.4 committed GRAVE MISCONDUCT.
 27

On November 5, 2009, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the foregoing Decision, followed by a proceedings, Christian Kalaw did not also affirm his complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman
Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration11 on November 19, 2009. On December 14, 2009, the or submit any position paper as required.
pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were assigned for review and recommendation to Graft
Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who released a draft Order12 on April 5, 2010 for
(c) Subsequently, Mendoza, after serving preventive suspension, was adjudged liable for
appropriate action by his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and
grave misconduct by Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales (duly approved on May 21, 2009) based
forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than ten (10) days after,
on the sole and uncorroborated complaint-affidavit of Christian Kalaw, which was not
more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the case records, for
previously sustained by the City Prosecutor's Office and the PNP Internal Affairs Service. From
final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it remained pending for final
the said Resolution, Mendoza interposed a timely motion for reconsideration (dated and filed
review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of
November 5, 2009) as well as a supplement thereto. No opposition or comment was filed
August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
thereto.

In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong
(d) Despite the pending and unresolved motion for reconsideration, the judgment of dismissal
Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public
was enforced, thereby abruptly ending Mendoza's 30 years of service in the PNP with
outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation
forfeiture of all his benefits. As a result, Mendoza sought urgent relief by sending several
and Review Committee (IIRC),13 chaired by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and vice-chaired by Interior
hand-written letter-requests to the Ombudsman for immediate resolution of his motion for
and Local Government Secretary Jesus Robredo. It was tasked to determine accountability for the
reconsideration. But his requests fell on deaf ears.
incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as
the Ombudsman herself, refused to participate in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that the Office of
the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body. By allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for nine long (9) months without any
justification, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed complete and wanton
violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rule to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative
Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the IIRC eventually identified petitioner Gonzales
disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission (Sec. 8, Ombudsman Rules of Procedure). The
to be among those in whom culpability must lie. In its Report,14 the IIRC made the following findings:
inaction is gross, there being no opposition to the motion for reconsideration.

Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their
Besides, the Ombudsman, without first resolving the motion for reconsideration, arbitrarily enforced the
own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than
judgment of dismissal and ignored the intervening requests for immediate resolution, thereby rendering
nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve
the inaction even more inexcusable and unjust as to amount to gross negligence and grave misconduct.
motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The
inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the
desperate resort to hostage-taking. SECOND, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious disregard of due
process, manifest injustice and oppression in failing to provisionally suspend the further implementation
of the judgment of dismissal against Mendoza pending disposition of his unresolved motion for
More so, Mendoza's demand for immediate resolution of his motion for reconsideration is not without
reconsideration.
legal and compelling bases considering the following:

By enforcing the judgment of dismissal without resolving the motion for reconsideration for over nine
(a) PSI Mendoza and four policemen were investigated by the Ombudsman involving a case
months, the two Ombudsman officials acted with arbitrariness and without regard to due process and
for alleged robbery (extortion), grave threats and physical injuries amounting to grave
the constitutional right of an accused to the speedy disposition of his case. As long as his motion for
misconduct allegedly committed against a certain Christian Kalaw. The same case, however,
reconsideration remained pending and unresolved, Mendoza was also effectively deprived of the right to
was previously dismissed by the Manila City Prosecutors Office for lack of probable cause and
avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to challenge the judgment of dismissal before the higher
by the PNP-NCR Internal Affairs Service for failure of the complainant (Christian Kalaw) to
courts and seek a temporary restraining order to prevent the further execution thereof.
submit evidence and prosecute the case. On the other hand, the case which was filed much
ahead by Mendoza et al. against Christian Kalaw involving the same incident, was given due
course by the City Prosecutors Office. As such, if the Ombudsman cannot resolve with dispatch the motion for reconsideration, it should have
provisionally suspended the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal without prejudice to its
re-implementation if the reconsideration is eventually denied. Otherwise, the Ombudsman will benefit
(b) The Ombudsman exercised jurisdiction over the case based on a letter issued motu
from its own inaction. Besides, the litigant is entitled to a stay of the execution pending resolution of his
proprio for Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzalez III, directing the PNP-NCR - without citing
motion for reconsideration. Until the motion for reconsideration is denied, the adjudication process
any reason - to endorse the case against Mendoza and the arresting policemen to his office
before the Ombudsman cannot be considered as completely finished and, hence, the judgment is not yet
for administrative adjudication, thereby showing undue interest on the case. He also caused
ripe for execution.
the docketing of the case and named Atty. Clarence V. Guinto of the PNP-CIDG-NCR, who
indorsed the case records, as the nominal complainant, in lieu of Christian Kalaw. During the
When the two Ombudsman officials received Mendoza's demand for the release of the final order
resolving his motion for reconsideration, they should have performed their duty by resolving the
 28

reconsideration that same day since it was already pending for nine months and the prescribed period for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) on February 8, 2011. Petitioner Gonzales alleged,21 however, that on February
for its resolution is only five days. Or if they cannot resolve it that same day, then they should have acted 4, 2011, he heard the news that the OP had announced his suspension for one year due to his delay in
decisively by issuing an order provisionally suspending the further enforcement of the judgment of the disposition of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration. Hence, believing that the OP had
dismissal subject to revocation once the reconsideration is denied and without prejudice to the arrest already prejudged his case and that any proceeding before it would simply be a charade, petitioner no
and prosecution of Mendoza for the hostage-taking. Had they done so, the crisis may have ended longer attended the scheduled clarificatory conference. Instead, he filed an Objection to
peacefully, without necessarily compromising the integrity of the institution. After all, as relayed to the Proceedings22 on February 7, 2011. Despite petitioner's absence, however, the OP pushed through with
negotiators, Mendoza did express willingness to take full responsibility for the hostage-taking if his the proceedings and, on March 31, 2011, rendered the assailed Decision,23 the dispositive portion of
demand for release of the final decision or reinstatement was met. which reads:

But instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to review a pending motion WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales III guilty
for review of the case, thereby prolonging their inaction and aggravating the situation. As expected, of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust, and hereby meted
Mendoza - who previously berated Deputy Gonzales for allegedly demanding Php150,000 in exchange out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service.
for favorably resolving the motion for reconsideration - rejected and branded as trash ("basura") the
Ombudsman [sic] letter promising review, triggering the collapse of the negotiations. To prevent the
SO ORDERED.
situation from getting out of hand, the negotiators sought the alternative option of securing before the
PNP-NCRPO an order for Mendoza's provisional reinstatement pending resolution of the motion for
reconsideration. Unfortunately, it was already too late. But had the Ombudsman officials performed Hence, the petition.
their duty under the law and acted decisively, the entire crisis may have ended differently.
G.R. No. 196232
The IIRC recommended that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be referred to the Office of
the President (OP) for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of In April of 2005, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major
the proper administrative proceedings. General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and
Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder (Criminal Case No. 28107) and Money
On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge15 against petitioner Gonzales for Gross Neglect Laundering (Criminal Case No. SB09CRM0194) before the Sandiganbayan.
of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent Civil On January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding
that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. On March 16, 2010, however, the
Service Laws, rules and regulations, and for Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit ("Barreras-Sulit") and
Corrupt Practices Act.16 Petitioner filed his Answer17 thereto in due time. her prosecutorial staff sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter
referred to as "PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential
Shortly after the filing by the OP of the administrative case against petitioner, a complaint dated October
guidelines.
29, 2010 was filed by Acting Assistant Ombudsman Joselito P. Fangon before the Internal Affairs Board of
the Office of the Ombudsman charging petitioner with "directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing
contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability
official capacity has to intervene under the law" under Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt for serious public offenses, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public
Practices Act, and also, with solicitation or acceptance of gifts under Section 7(d) of the Code of Conduct hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed
and Ethical Standards.18 In a Joint Resolution19 dated February 17, 2011, which was approved by and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,24recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, the complaint was dismissed, as follows: Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants
before the appropriate government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to
culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding no probable cause to indict respondent Emilio A. Gonzales III
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.
for violations of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713, the complaint is hereby
be [sic] DISMISSED.
The Office of the President initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003 against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. In her
written explanation, petitioner raised the defenses of prematurity and the lack of jurisdiction of the OP
Further, finding no sufficient evidence to hold respondent administratively liable for Misconduct, the
with respect to the administrative disciplinary proceeding against her. The OP, however, still proceeded
same is likewise DISMISSED.
with the case, setting it for preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011.

Meanwhile, the OP notified20 petitioner that a Preliminary Clarificatory Conference relative to the
Hence, the petition.
administrative charge against him was to be conducted at the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
 29

The Issues Re-stated, the primordial question in these two petitions is whether the Office of the President has
jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
In G.R. No. 196231, petitioner Gonzales raises the following grounds, to wit:

The Court's Ruling

(A)

Short of claiming themselves immune from the ordinary means of removal, petitioners asseverate that
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS,
the President has no disciplinary jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to
HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR VALID STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO SUBJECT PETITIONER TO AN
which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence and that they, as Deputy Ombudsman
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION AND TO THEREAFTER ORDER HIS REMOVAL AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN.
and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of said office.

(B)
The Court is not convinced.

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS,
The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prose-
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
cutor is not exclusive.
CONDUCTED ITS INVESTIGATION AND RENDERED ITS DECISION IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS.
It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations
proceeds from its constitutional mandate to be an effective protector of the people against inept and
(C)
corrupt government officers and employees,27 and is subsumed under the broad powers "explicitly
conferred" upon it by the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770.28
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT
The ombudsman traces its origins to the primitive legal order of Germanic tribes. The Swedish term,
PETITIONER COMMITTED DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION OF MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
which literally means "agent" or "representative," communicates the concept that has been carried on
into the creation of the modern-day ombudsman, that is, someone who acts as a neutral representative
(D) of ordinary citizens against government abuses.29 This idea of a people's protector was first
institutionalized in the Philippines under the 1973 Constitution with the creation of the Tanodbayan,
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY which wielded the twin powers of investigation and prosecution. Section 6, Article XIII of the 1973
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT Constitution provided thus:
PETITIONER TOOK UNDUE INTEREST IN MENDOZA'S CASE.
Sec. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan,
(E) which shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice
as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative case before the
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY proper court or body.
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAULTING PETITIONER
FOR NOT RELEASING THE RESOLUTION ON MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR NOT
SUSPENDING MENDOZA'S DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE DURING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. The framers of the 1987 Constitution later envisioned a more effective ombudsman vested with
authority to "act in a quick, inexpensive and effective manner on complaints against administrative
officials", and to function purely with the "prestige and persuasive powers of his office" in correcting
(F) improprieties, inefficiencies and corruption in government freed from the hampering effects of
prosecutorial duties.30 Accordingly, Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY following powers, functions, and duties of the Office of the Ombudsman, viz:
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT PETITIONER DEMANDED A BRIBE FROM MENDOZA.25 (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 196232, petitioner Barreras-Sulit poses for the Court the question - inefficient.

AS OF THIS POINT IN TIME, WOULD TAKING AND CONTINUING TO TAKE ADMINISTRATIVE (2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING AGAINST PETITIONER BE LAWFUL AND JUSTIFIABLE?26 any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled
 30

corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, 3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;
prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
compliance therewith.

6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into
by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government
to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action. officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by
impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive.
Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. Thus:
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.-

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the
Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of
grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
ethics and efficiency.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or
part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a
duties as may be provided by law.31
hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A construction that would render a provision inoperative should
be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts
Congress thereafter passed, on November 17, 1989, Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of of a coordinated and harmonious whole.33Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in truncated parts.
1989, to shore up the Ombudsman's institutional strength by granting it "full administrative disciplinary Every part thereof must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
power over public officials and employees,"32 as follows: intent of the whole enactment.34

Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government- concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only
by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.(Emphasis supplied)
Prosecutor, respectively. This sharing of authority goes into the wisdom of the legislature, which
prerogative falls beyond the pale of judicial inquiry. The Congressional deliberations on this matter are
In the exercise of such full administrative disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman was quite insightful, viz:
explicitly conferred the statutory power to conduct administrative investigations under Section 19 of the
same law, thus:
Senator Angara explained that the phrase was added to highlight the fact that the Deputy Tanodbayan
may only be removed for cause and after due process. He added that the President alone has the power
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. - The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not to remove the Deputy Tanodbayan.
limited, to acts or omissions which:
Reacting thereto, Senator Guingona observed that this might impair the independence of the
1. Are contrary to law or regulation; Tanodbayan and suggested that the procedural removal of the Deputy Tanodbayan...; and that he can be
removed not by the President but by the Ombudsman.
2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
 31

However, the Chair expressed apprehension that the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman may try drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi,
to protect one another. The Chair suggested the substitution of the phrase "after due process" with the i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform
words after due notice and hearing with the President as the ultimate authority. system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be
resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give
Senator Guingona contended, however, that the Constitution provides for an independent Office of the
effect to all laws on the subject.37
Tanodbayan, and to allow the Executive to have disciplinary powers over the Tanodbayan Deputies
would be an encroachment on the independence of the Tanodbayan.
While Hagad v. Gozo Dadole38 upheld the plenary power of the Office of the Ombudsman to discipline
elective officials over the same disciplinary authority of the President under R.A. No. 7160, the more
Replying thereto, Senator Angara stated that originally, he was not averse to the proposal, however,
recent case of the Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero39 tempered the exercise by the Ombudsman of
considering the Chair's observation that vesting such authority upon the Tanodbayan itself could result in
such plenary power invoking Section 23(2)40 of R.A. No. 6770, which gives the Ombudsman the option to
mutual protection, it is necessary that an outside official should be vested with such authority to effect a
"refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate
check and balance.35
administrative proceedings against erring public officers or employees." The Court underscored therein
the clear legislative intent of imposing "a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in connection with administrative proceedings involving public school teachers"41 with the enactment of
the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers." It thus declared that,
would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special while the Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary authority over a public school teacher is concurrent
Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman with the proper investigating committee of the Department of Education, it would have been more
over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and prudent under the circumstances for the Ombudsman to have referred to the DECS the complaint
balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his against the public school teacher.
Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out
This would not be the first instance that the Office of the President has locked horns with the administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.
Ombudsman on the matter of disciplinary jurisdiction. An earlier conflict had been settled in favor of However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent authority with respect to
shared authority in Hagad v. Gozo Dadole.36 In said case, the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Mandaue City, removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified
and a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, were charged before the Office of the Deputy conditions. Considering the principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the
Ombudsman for the Visayas with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 6713, and the Revised Penal Code. President was the first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have prompted the
The pivotal issue raised therein was whether the Ombudsman had been divested of his authority to Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against petitioner through its Internal Affairs Board,
conduct administrative investigations over said local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent and to defer instead to the President's assumption of authority, especially when the administrative
enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), the pertinent provision of which charge involved "demanding and soliciting a sum of money" which constitutes either graft and
states: corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds reserved for the President's exercise of his authority to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman.
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.- A verified complaint against any erring local
elective official shall be prepared as follows: In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly conducted a subsequent
and parallel administrative action against petitioner, its earlier dismissal of the charge of graft and
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent corruption against petitioner could not have the effect of preventing the Office of the President from
component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the President. proceeding against petitioner upon the same ground of graft and corruption. After all, the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative
powers.42 In Montemayor v. Bundalian,43 the Court sustained the President's dismissal from service of a
The Court resolved said issue in the negative, upholding the ratiocination of the Solicitor General that Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) who was found liable for
R.A. No. 7160 should be viewed as having conferred on the Office of the President, but not on an unexplained wealth upon investigation by the now defunct Philippine Commission Against Graft and
exclusive basis, disciplinary authority over local elective officials. Despite the fact that R.A. No. 7160 was Corruption (PCAGC). The Court categorically ruled therein that the prior dismissal by the Ombudsman of
the more recent expression of legislative will, no repeal of pertinent provisions in the Ombudsman Act similar charges against said official did not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case.
was inferred therefrom. Thus said the Court:

By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law.
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific
matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one
and strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power to appoint the
and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely Ombudsman and his Deputies, viz:
incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
 32

Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six MR. DAVIDE. Only one man.
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy
thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three
MR. RODRIGO. Not including his deputies.
months after they occur.

MR. MONSOD. No.47 (Emphasis supplied)

While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is
by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision
similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is Implied from
matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running his Power to Appoint.
afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under
Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove.48 As a
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment. general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him.49 The
exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is
That the Deputies of the Ombudsman were intentionally excluded from the enumeration of impeachable expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the
officials is clear from the following deliberations45 of the Constitutional Commission, thus: Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the President's power to appoint. Under
Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be removed
MR. REGALADO. Yes, thank you. On Section 10, regarding the Ombudsman, there has been concern aired
after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts
by Commissioner Rodrigo about who will see to it that the Ombudsman will perform his duties because
may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its
he is something like a guardian of the government. This recalls the statement of Juvenal that while the
personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service
Ombudsman is the guardian of the people, "Quis custodiet ipsos custodies", who will guard the
Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the
guardians? I understand here that the Ombudsman who has the rank of a chairman of a constitutional
Commission on Audit Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they
commission is also removable only by impeachment.
may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself
shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by impeachment
MR. ROMULO. That is the intention, Madam President. (Section 2, Article XI).

MR. REGALADO. Only the Ombudsman? In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress
simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional
authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
MR. MONSOD. Only the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Ombudsman is charged with monumental tasks that have been generally categorized
MR. REGALADO. So not his deputies, because I am concerned with the phrase "have the rank of". We
into investigatory power, prosecutorial power, public assistance, authority to inquire and obtain
know, for instance, that the City Fiscal of Manila has the rank of a justice of the Intermediate Appellate
information and the function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures.50 In order to
Court, and yet he is not a part of the judiciary. So I think we should clarify that also and read our
ensure the effectiveness of his constitutional role, the Ombudsman was provided with an over-all deputy
discussions into the Record for purposes of the Commission and the Committee.46
as well as a deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. However, well into the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, a provision for the appointment of a separate deputy for the military
THE PRESIDENT. The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to include the establishment was necessitated by Commissioner Ople's lament against the rise within the armed forces
Ombudsman among those officials who have to be removed from office only onimpeachment. Is that of "fraternal associations outside the chain of command" which have become the common soldiers'
right? "informal grievance machinery" against injustice, corruption and neglect in the uniformed service,51 thus:

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Madam President. In our own Philippine Armed Forces, there has arisen in recent years a type of fraternal association
outside the chain of command proposing reformist objectives. They constitute, in fact, an informal
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question? grievance machinery against injustices to the rank and file soldiery and perceive graft in higher rank and
neglect of the needs of troops in combat zones. The Reform the Armed Forces Movement of RAM has
kept precincts for pushing logistics to the field, the implied accusation being that most of the resources
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized. are used up in Manila instead of sent to soldiers in the field. The Guardians, the El Diablo and other
organizations dominated by enlisted men function, more or less, as grievance collectors and as mutual
MR. RODRIGO. The Ombudsman, is this only one man? aid societies.
 33

This proposed amendment merely seeks to extend the office of the Ombudsman to the military of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman
establishment, just as it champions the common people against bureaucratic indifference. The and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid
Ombudsman can designate a deputy to help the ordinary foot soldier get through with his grievance to down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states
higher authorities. This deputy will, of course work in close cooperation with the Minister of National that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman
Defense because of the necessity to maintain the integrity of the chain of command. Ordinary soldiers, may be removed through impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
when they know they can turn to a military Ombudsman for their complaints, may not have to fall back bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly
on their own informal devices to obtain redress for their grievances. The Ombudsman will help raise said that giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for
troop morale in accordance with a major professed goal of the President and the military authorities that matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the
themselves. x x x Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies
and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be had on grounds
provided by law.
The add-on now forms part of Section 5, Article XI which reads as follows:

In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman,54 the Court elucidated on the nature of the Ombudsman's
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
independence in this wise -
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one over-all Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon,
Visayas and Mindanao. A separate deputy for the military establishment shall likewise be
appointed.(Emphasis supplied) The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To
insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as RA 6770
has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from
The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking
legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This Court consistently refrains from interfering with the
into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is
exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who,
certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role asCommander-in-Chief of the
'beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public
Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent
service.
disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.

Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling short of
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish the
constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust.
Independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Having now settled the question concerning the validity of the President's power to remove the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, we now go to the substance of the administrative findings in OP
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy
Case No. 10-J-460 which led to the dismissal of herein petitioner, Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A.
Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of
Gonzales, III.
the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was
intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector
of the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political At the outset, the Court finds no cause for petitioner Gonzales to complain simply because the OP
independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and proceeded with the administrative case against him despite his non-attendance thereat. Petitioner was
discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."52 And admittedly able to file an Answer in which he had interposed his defenses to the formal charge against
so it was that Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the independent him. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are described as opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
"protectors of the people" and constitutionally mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government Section 12, Article XI. Pertinent minimum requirements of due process.55 Due process is simply having the opportunity to explain one's
provisions under Article XI prescribes a term of office of seven years without reappointment Section 11, side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.56
prohibits a decrease in salaries during the term of office Section 10, provides strict qualifications for the
office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14 and ensures the exercise of constitutional functions
The essence of due process is that a party is afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit
Section 12 and 13. The cloak of independence is meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's
any evidence he may have in support of his defense.57 Mere opportunity to be heard is sufficient. As long
institutional strength to effectively function as official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional
as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of
watchdog53 and protector of the people. It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and
due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of
permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape administrative discipline.
opportunity to be heard.58 Besides, petitioner only has himself to blame for limiting his defense through
the filing of an Answer. He had squandered a subsequent opportunity to elucidate upon his pleaded
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from political defenses by adamantly refusing to attend the scheduled Clarificatory Conference despite notice. The OP
influences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the recounted as follows -
President's exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal
 34

It bears noting that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez was given two separate opportunities to misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust. To say that petitioner's offenses, as they factually
explain his side and answer the Formal Charge against him. appear, weigh heavily enough to constitute betrayal of public trust would be to ignore the significance of
the legislature's intent in prescribing the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor
for causes that, theretofore, had been reserved only for the most serious violations that justify the
In the first instance, respondent was given the opportunity to submit his answer together with his
removal by impeachment of the highest officials of the land.
documentary evidence, which opportunity respondent actually availed of. In the second instance, this
Office called a Clarificatory Conference on 8 February 2011 pursuant to respondent's express election of
a formal investigation. Despite due notice, however, respondent Deputy Ombudsman refused to appear Would every negligent act or misconduct in the performance of a Deputy Ombudsman's duties
for said conference, interposing an objection based on the unfounded notion that this Office has constitute betrayal of public trust warranting immediate removal from office? The question calls for a
prejudged the instant case. Respondent having been given actual and reasonable opportunity to explain deeper, circumspective look at the nature of the grounds for the removal of a Deputy Ombudsman and a
or defend himself in due course, the requirement of due process has been satisfied.59 Special Prosecutor vis-a-vis common administrative offenses.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to the
evidence,60 which is more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind existing grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption and
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.61 The fact, therefore, that petitioner later refused to other high crimes. While it was deemed broad enough to cover any violation of the oath of office,65 the
participate in the hearings before the OP is not a hindrance to a finding of his culpability based on impreciseness of its definition also created apprehension that "such an overarching standard may be too
substantial evidence, which only requires that a decision must "have something upon which it is broad and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by the legislature."66 Indeed, the catch-all
based."62 phrase betrayal of public trust that referred to "all acts not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but,
nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office"67 could be easily utilized for every conceivable
misconduct or negligence in office. However, deliberating on some workable standard by which the
Factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling when supported by substantial evidence.63 The
ground could be reasonably interpreted, the Constitutional Commission recognized that human error
OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of
and good faith precluded an adverse conclusion.
the corresponding penalty of removal from office was based on the finding of gross neglect of duty and
grave misconduct in office amounting to a betrayal of public trust, which is a constitutional ground for
the removal by impeachment of the Ombudsman (Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution), and a MR. VILLACORTA: x x x One last matter with respect to the use of the words "betrayal of public trust" as
statutory ground for the President to remove from office a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor embodying a ground for impeachment that has been raised by the Honorable Regalado. I am not a
Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act. lawyer so I can anticipate the difficulties that a layman may encounter in understanding this provision
and also the possible abuses that the legislature can commit in interpreting this phrase. It is to be noted
that this ground was also suggested in the 1971 Constitutional Convention. A review of the Journals of
The OP held that petitioner's want of care and wrongful conduct consisted of his unexplained action in
that Convention will show that it was not included; it was construed as encompassing acts which are just
directing the PNP-NCR to elevate P/S Insp. Mendoza's case records to his office; his failure to verify the
short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power,
basis for requesting the Ombudsman to take over the case; his pronouncement of administrative liability
inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers. I understand from
and imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal on P/S Insp. Mendoza based upon an unverified
the earlier discussions that these constitute violations of the oath of office, and also I heard the
complaint-affidavit; his inordinate haste in implementing P/S Insp. Mendoza's dismissal notwithstanding
Honorable Davide say that even the criminal acts that were enumerated in the earlier 1973 provision on
the latter's non-receipt of his copy of the Decision and the subsequent filing of a motion for
this matter constitute betrayal of public trust as well. In order to avoid confusion, would it not be clearer
reconsideration; and his apparent unconcern that the pendency of the motion for reconsideration for
to stick to the wording of Section 2 which reads: "may be removed from office on impeachment for and
more than five months had deprived P/S Insp. Mendoza of available remedies against the immediate
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, and other high crimes, graft and
implementation of the Decision dismissing him from the service.
corruption or VIOLATION OF HIS OATH OF OFFICE", because if betrayal of public trust encompasses the
earlier acts that were enumerated, then it would behoove us to be equally clear about this last provision
Thus, taking into consideration the factual determinations of the IIRC, the allegations and evidence of or phrase.
petitioner in his Answer as well as other documentary evidence, the OP concluded that: (1) petitioner
failed to supervise his subordinates to act with dispatch on the draft resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's
MR. NOLLEDO: x x x I think we will miss a golden opportunity if we fail to adopt the words "betrayal of
motion for reconsideration and thereby caused undue prejudice to P/S Insp. Mendoza by effectively
public trust" in the 1986 Constitution. But I would like him to know that we are amenable to any possible
depriving the latter of the right to challenge the dismissal before the courts and prevent its immediate
amendment. Besides, I think plain error of judgment, where circumstances may indicate that there is
execution, and (2) petitioner showed undue interest by having P/S Insp. Mendoza's case endorsed to the
good faith, to my mind, will not constitute betrayal of public trust if that statement will allay the fears of
Office of the Ombudsman and resolving the same against P/S Insp. Mendoza on the basis of the
difficulty in interpreting the term."68 (Emphasis supplied)
unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim Christian Kalaw.

The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal of
The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only
public trust to refer to "acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness
be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.64 In the instant case, while the
against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross
evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing on the part of petitioner, the Court seriously doubts
exercise of discretionary powers."69 In other words, acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust as
the correctness of the OP's conclusion that the imputed acts amount to gross neglect of duty and grave
 35

to warrant removal from office may be less than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the
gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment. President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a
betrayal of public trust.
A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers. However, by providing for
their removal from office on the same grounds as removal by impeachment, the legislature could not
have intended to redefine constitutional standards of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, This is not to say, however, that petitioner is relieved of all liability for his acts showing less than diligent
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, as well as betrayal of public trust, and apply them less performance of official duties. Although the administrative acts imputed to petitioner fall short of the
stringently. Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of impeachment, was not intended to constitutional standard of betrayal of public trust, considering the OP's factual findings of negligence and
cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain true even for misconduct against petitioner, the Court deems it appropriate to refer the case to the Office of the
purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the Ombudsman for further investigation of the charges in OP Case No. 10-J-460 and the imposition of the
grounds for impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a corresponding administrative sanctions, if any.
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor the
acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly "overreach" to cover acts that are not
Inasmuch as there is as yet no existing ground justifying his removal from office, petitioner is entitled to
vicious or malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeachment.
reinstatement to his former position as Deputy Ombudsman and to the payment of backwages and
benefits corresponding to the period of his suspension.
The tragic hostage-taking incident was the result of a confluence of several unfortunate events including
system failure of government response. It cannot be solely attributed then to what petitioner Gonzales
The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively against
may have negligently failed to do for the quick, fair and complete resolution of the case, or to his error of
petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for her removal from office
judgment in the disposition thereof. Neither should petitioner's official acts in the resolution of P/S Insp.
as provided for under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.
Mendoza's case be judged based upon the resulting deaths at the Quirino Grandstand. The failure to
immediately act upon a party's requests for an early resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross neglect
of duty amounting to betrayal of public trust. Records show that petitioner took considerably less time Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been resisting the President's authority to remove her
to act upon the draft resolution after the same was submitted for his appropriate action compared to from office upon the averment that without the Sandiganbayan's final approval and judgment on the
the length of time that said draft remained pending and unacted upon in the Office of Ombudsman basis of the PLEBARA, it would be premature to charge her with acts and/or omissions "tantamount to
Merceditas N. Gutierrez. He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration within culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust," which are grounds for removal from
nine (9) calendar days reckoned from the time the draft resolution was submitted to him on April 27, office under Section 8, paragraph (2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989; and which also constitute a
2010 until he forwarded his recommendation to the Office of Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6, 2010 for violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) -
the latter's final action. Clearly, the release of any final order on the case was no longer in his hands. causing undue injury to the Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
With reference to the doctrine of prejudicial procedural antecedent, petitioner Barreras-Sulit asserts that
Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an unexplained
the propriety of taking and continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must
failure on petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt disposition, the same cannot be
depend on the final disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the
considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting his removal for betrayal of public trust. More so
Sandiganbayan would uphold the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of complaint against
because the neglect imputed upon petitioner appears to be an isolated case.
her; if not, then the situation becomes ripe for the determination of her failings.

Similarly, petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the
The argument will not hold water. The incidents that have taken place subsequent to the submission in
Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of his
court of the PLEBARA shows that the PLEBARA has been practically approved, and that the only thing
undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking
which remains to be done by the Sandiganbayan is to promulgate a judgment imposing the proper
cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the
sentence on the accused Major General Garcia based on his new pleas to lesser offenses. On May 4,
constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The factual
2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution declaring that the change of plea under the PLEBARA was
circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request;
warranted and that it complied with jurisprudential guidelines. The Sandiganbayan, thereafter, directed
that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private
the accused Major General Garcia to immediately convey in favor of the State all the properties, both
complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately implemented; or
real and personal, enumerated therein. On August 11, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution,
that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be
which, in order to put into effect the reversion of Major General Garcia's ill-gotten properties, ordered
simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of
the corresponding government agencies to cause the transfer of ownership of said properties to the
any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have
Republic of the Philippines. In the meantime, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) informed the
impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of
Sandiganbayan that an Order70 had been issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 on
any corrupt intention or questionable motivation.
November 5, 2010 allowing the transfer of the accused's frozen accounts to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to the terms of the PLEBARA as approved by the Sandiganbayan. Immediately after
Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the the OSP informed the Sandiganbayan that its May 4, 2010 Resolution had been substantially complied
imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the with, Major General Garcia manifested71 to the Sandiganbayan on November 19, 2010 his readiness for
 36

sentencing and for the withdrawal of the criminal information against his wife and two sons. Major cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case."76Hence, in light of the apparently strong case against
General Garcia's Motion to Dismiss,72 dated December 16, 2010 and filed with the Sandiganbayan, reads: accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining authority would be hard-pressed not to look into the
whys and wherefores of the prosecution's turnabout in the case.
1.0 The Co-Accused were impleaded under the theory of conspiracy with the Principal Accused MGen.
Carlos F. Garcia (AFP Ret.), (Principal Accused) with the allegation that the act of one is the act of the The Court need not touch further upon the substantial matters that are the subject of the pending
others. Therefore, with the approval by the Honorable Court of the Plea Bargaining Agreement executed administrative proceeding against petitioner Barreras-Sulit and are, thus, better left to the complete and
by the Principal Accused, the charges against the Co-Accused should likewise be dismissed since the effective resolution of the administrative case before the Office of the President.
charges against them are anchored on the same charges against the Principal Accused.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act has, nonetheless, failed to
On December 16, 2010, the Sandiganbayan allowed accused Major General Garcia to plead guilty to the obtain the necessary votes to invalidate the law, thus, keeping said provision part of the law of the land.
lesser offenses of direct bribery and violation of Section 4(b), R.A. No. 9160, as amended. Upon Major To recall, these cases involve two distinct issues: (a) the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the
General Garcia's motion, and with the express conformity of the OSP, the Sandiganbayan allowed him to Ombudsman Act; and (b) the validity of the administrative action of removal taken against petitioner
post bail in both cases, each at a measly amount of ₱ 30,000.00. Gonzales. While the Court voted unanimously to reverse the decision of the OP removing petitioner
Gonzales from office, it was equally divided in its opinion on the constitutionality of the assailed
statutory provision in its two deliberations held on April 17, 2012 and September 4, 2012. There being no
The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an
majority vote to invalidate the law, the Court, therefore, dismisses the challenge to the constitutionality
administrative finding of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. While the court's determination of the
of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act in accordance with Section 2(d), Rule 12 of the Internal Rules of
propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution evidence on record, the disciplinary
the Court.
authority's determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability is based on whether the plea
bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government's best interest and the
diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes against the Indeed, Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the vote of the majority of the
State. Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part Members of the Court actually taking part in the deliberation to sustain any challenge to the
of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or constitutionality or validity of a statute or any of its provisions.
build a strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the
government finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability, notwithstanding
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460
court approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered into.
isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the
Plea bargaining is a process in criminal cases whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.73 The essence of a plea bargaining petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special
agreement is the allowance of an accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense than that charged against Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the
him. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the procedure therefor, to Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of
wit: 1989.

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. -- At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be
SO ORDERED.
allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of
the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
Facts:
Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and
of the accused of the crime charged.74 However, if the basis for the allowance of a plea bargain in this ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
case is the evidence on record, then it is significant to state that in its earlier Resolution75 promulgated Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i)... found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect
on January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had evaluated the testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him the penalty
witnesses and declared that "the conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution is viewed by of dismissal.
the Court to be of strong character that militates against the grant of bail."
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary proceedings
Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose to plea bargain against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to disciplinary proceedings. The
with the accused Major General Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to secure a Court affirmed the continuation of the proceedings against her... after upholding the constitutionality of
conviction. At this juncture, it is not amiss to emphasize that the "standard of strong evidence of guilt Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.
which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable
 37

In view of the Court's ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the Office of Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
the Solicitor General (OSG). Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but
are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal... autonomy. In general terms, the
In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several others, framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies be insulated from political
before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed an Urgent pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would result in the impairment of their core
Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. The Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for functions.
bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the strength of the prosecution's evidence against Garcia.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the... developments
Issues: in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure.

Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior but is
Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative similar in degree and kind to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the
disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman. Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political... interstices of a republican democracy
that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.
On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from GIPO Garcia on April 27,
2010. On May 6, 2010, he completed his review of the draft, approved it, and transmitted it to the Office c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting... disciplinary authority in the President... over the Deputy
of the Ombudsman for final approval. Since the draft... order on Mendoza's motion for reconsideration Ombudsman violates... the independence of the Office of the
had to undergo different levels of preparation, review and approval, the period it took to resolve the
motion could not be unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft order only within nine (9) calendars Ombudsman and is thus... unconstitutional... we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to
days from his receipt of... the order. discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department
are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the...
Ruling: independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express
constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in
On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales' petition and to carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the... constitutionally-granted independence is
declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman. what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the
a. The Philippine Ombudsman
principle of checks and... balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as
the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function
agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected
essentially as a complaints and action bureau.[36] This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman
to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as... independent as she is, if only
practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills,
because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is
abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and
Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of
corruption is still a major problem... for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
RA No. 6770 provides:
(providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
he statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the Executive power
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons who can remove or suspend its
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
members.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance,
e. Congress' power determines the... manner and causes for the removal... of non-impeachable officers
misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive
is not... a carte blanch authority
officers, during their tenure.
Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,[53] Congress is empowered to determine the modes
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful
of removal from office of all public officers and employees except the President, the Vice-President, the
government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
investigative bodies."[39] It has powers, both constitutional... and statutory, that are commensurate
with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.[40]... Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, who are all impeachable officials.
b. "Independence" of constitutional bodies... vis-a-vis the Ombudsman's independence. The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that "[a]ll other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment" in the second sentence of
 38

Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more... stringent rule of "removal only by Section 13 of RA No. 6770,[79] and by Section 3, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1990, as
impeachment" to favored public officers amended.[80]

While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve the complaint only on the basis of the
consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive unverified affidavit of Kalaw.
due process; the constitutional guarantee of security... of tenure; the principle of separation of powers;
and the principle of checks and balances. we cannot deduce undue interest simply because Gonzales' decision differs from the decision of the
PNP-IAS (which dismissed the complaint against Mendoza).
a. The Office of the President's... finding of gross negligence has... no legal and factual leg to... stand on...
b. No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency Basic strictures of fair play dictate that we can only be held liable for our own misdeeds; we can be made
to account only... for lapses in our responsibilities. It is notable that of all the officers, it was Gonzales
Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of the case were already who took the least time nine days followed by Cecilio, who took 21 days; Garcia the writer of the draft
pending before Ombudsman Gutierrez. took less than four months, and the Ombudsman, less than four months... until the kidnapping incident
rendered Mendoza's motion moot.
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other... persons may be affected.
In the case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and Thus, by constitutional design, the Special
palpable.[71]
Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the
Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in
forwarded to him within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP[72] relied on Section 8, Rule III of the Executive Department.
Administrative Order No. 7 (or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, series of 1990, as
amended) in ruling that Gonzales should have acted on Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration within Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of the
five days: Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office militates against a
differential treatment between the Ombudsman's Deputies, on one... hand, and the Special Prosecutor
Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds Whenever allowable, a motion for himself, on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies
reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the Ombudsman herself in
the decision or order by the party on the basis of any of... the following grounds: the performance of... her duties.

Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the Hearing Officer shall Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be at par
resolve the same within five (5) days from the date of submission for resolution. [emphasis and with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned,
underscore ours] and must also enjoy the same grant of independence under the Constitution.

Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to Gonzales since n the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,[108] the Court resolved to reverse its September
he is a Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not simply a Hearing Officer 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2)
tasked with the initial resolution of the motion. of RA

c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy
Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The facts do not show that Gonzales' subordinates had in any way been grossly negligent in their work.
While GIPO Garcia reviewed the case and drafted the order for more than three months, it is noteworthy However, by another vote of 8-7,[109] the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA
that he had not drafted the initial decision and, therefore, had to... review the case for the first time.[77] No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
Even the Ombudsman herself could not be faulted for acting on a case within four months, given the be constitutionally within the
amount of cases that her office handles.
Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the
The point is that these are not inordinately long periods for the work involved: examination of the Constitution.
records, research on the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and exercise of legal judgment and discretion.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This
d. No undue interest... he fact that Gonzales had Mendoza's case endorsed to his office lies within his ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary,
mandate, even if it were based merely on the request of the alleged victim's father. The Constitution but is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to... conduct an administrative investigation, if
empowers the Ombudsman and her Deputies to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or... warranted, into the possible administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under
manner against any public official or employee of the government.[78] This provision is echoed by pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
 39

CASE 2012-0070: EMILIO A. GONZALES III VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL. WAS THE DISMISSAL OF GONZALES AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
(G.R. No. 196231) WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT VS. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA ET AL. (G.R. NO. 196232) CORRECT?
(04 SEPTEMBER 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) SUBJECT/S: DISMISSAL OF DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (BRIEF TITLES: GONZALES VS. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT; SULIT VS. OCHOA) NO. HIS REMOVAL MUST BE FOR ANY OF THE GROUNDS PROVIDED IN THE REMOVAL OF THE
OMBUDSMAN. THE ALLEGED GROUND OF BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST WAS NOT PRESENT IN HIS CASE.

DISPOSITIVE:
PETITIONER GONZALES MAY NOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE WHERE THE QUESTIONED ACTS, FALLING
SHORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS, DO NOT CONSTITUTE BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST.
“WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately) even as the Office of the Congress laid down two restrictions on the President’s exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds
petitioner. provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process.

In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-1 B-003 against Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the
Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of
1989.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

DOES THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR?

YES. THE OMBUDSMAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER OVER A DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IS NOT EXCLUSIVE. SECTION 8 OF RA 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989)
GRANTS THE PRESIDENT THE POWER TO REMOVE THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR FROM OFFICE AFTER DUE PROCESS.

Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that

Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. —

(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the
grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
 40

SECOND DIVISION On November 11, 1999, the Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein (respondents) to submit their
counter-affidavits. Only Malonzo complied with the order, prompting the Ombudsman to set a
Preliminary Conference on March 13, 2000.
G.R. No. 164679 July 27, 2011

Upon the respondents’ failure to appear at the March 20, 2000 hearing, the Ombudsman deemed the
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
case submitted for resolution.
vs.
ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., Respondent.
On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.11 Having been
separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and
DECISION
other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled agencies
BRION, J.: or corporations.12

Through a petition for review on certiorari,1 the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) After failing to obtain a reconsideration of the decision,13 Andutan filed a petition for review on certiorari
seeks the reversal of the decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 28, 2004, in "Uldarico P. before the CA.
Andutan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman and Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), etc.," docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 68893. The assailed decision annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman
On July 28, 2004,14 the CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter
dated July 30, 2001,3 finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
"should not have considered the administrative complaints" because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770
provides that the Ombudsman "may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS omission complained of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of";15 and second, the administrative case was filed after
Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center Andutan’s forced resignation.16
of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued
a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their THE PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
positions effective July 1, 1998.4 On July 1, 1998, pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from
the DOF.5
In this petition for review on certiorari, the Ombudsman asks the Court to overturn the decision of the
CA. It submits, first, that contrary to the CA’s findings, administrative offenses do not prescribe after one
On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF; year from their commission,17 and second, that in cases of "capital" administrative offenses, resignation
Rowena P. Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Benjamin O. Yao, Chairman and Executive Officer, Steel Asia or optional retirement cannot render administrative proceedings moot and academic, since accessory
Manufacturing Corporation (Steel Asia); Augustus S. Lapid, Vice-President, Steel Asia; Antonio M. penalties such as perpetual disqualification and the forfeiture of retirement benefits may still be
Lorenzana, President and Chief Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and Eulogio L. Reyes, General Manager, imposed.18
Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of
the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e)
The Ombudsman argues that Section 20 of R.A. 6770 is not mandatory. Consistent with existing
and (j) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.6 As
jurisprudence, the use of the word "may" indicates that Section 20 is merely directory or
government employees, Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively charged of Grave
permissive.19 Thus, it is not ministerial upon it to dismiss the administrative complaint, as long as any of
Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
the circumstances under Section 20 is present.20 In any case, the Ombudsman urges the Court to
of the Service.7
examine its mandate under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and hold that an imposition of
a one (1) year prescriptive period on the filing of cases unconstitutionally restricts its mandate.21
The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit
Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others.8
Further, the Ombudsman submits that Andutan’s resignation from office does not render moot the
administrative proceedings lodged against him, even after his resignation. Relying on Section VI(1) of
During the investigation, the FFIB found that Steel Asia fraudulently obtained TCCs worth Two Hundred Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 38,22 the Ombudsman argues that "[a]s long as
Forty-Two Million, Four Hundred Thirty-Three Thousand, Five Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos the breach of conduct was committed while the public official or employee was still in the service x x x a
(₱242,433,534.00).9 The FFIB concluded that Belicena, Malonzo and Andutan – in their respective public servant’s resignation is not a bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution and
capacities – irregularly approved the "issuance of the TCCs to several garment/textile companies and adjudication."23 It is irrelevant that Andutan had already resigned from office when the administrative
allowing their subsequent illegal transfer" to Steel Asia.10 case was filed since he was charged for "acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and
prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public."24 Furthermore, even if Andutan had
already resigned, there is a need to "determine whether or not there remains penalties capable of
 41

imposition, like bar from reentering the (sic) public service and forfeiture of benefits."25 Finally, the III. Assuming that the administrative case is not moot, are the Ombudsman’s findings
Ombudsman reiterates that its findings against Andutan are supported by substantial evidence. supported by substantial evidence?

THE RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS THE COURT’S RULING

Andutan raises three (3) counterarguments to the Ombudsman’s petition. We rule to deny the petition.

First, Andutan submits that the CA did not consider Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 as a prescriptive period; The provisions of Section 20(5) are merely directory; the Ombudsman is not prohibited from conducting
rather, the CA merely held that the Ombudsman should not have considered the administrative an investigation a year after the supposed act was committed.
complaint. According to Andutan, Section 20(5) "does not purport to impose a prescriptive period x x x
but simply prohibits the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting an investigation where the
The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been settled by
complaint [was] filed more than one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained
jurisprudence.34In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun,35 the Court, speaking through Justice
of."26 Andutan believes that the Ombudsman should have referred the complaint to another government
Austria-Martinez, held:
agency.27 Further, Andutan disagrees with the Ombudsman’s interpretation of Section 20(5). Andutan
suggests that the phrase "may not conduct the necessary investigation" means that the Ombudsman is
prohibited to act on cases that fall under those enumerated in Section 20(5).28 [W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe [Concerned Taxpayer v.
Doblada, Jr., A.M. No. P-99-1342, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 218; Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No.
151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476; Heck v. Judge Santos, 467 Phil. 798, 824 (2004); Floria v.
Second, Andutan reiterates that the administrative case against him was moot because he was no longer
Sunga, 420 Phil. 637, 648-649 (2001)]. Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the
in the public service at the time the case was commenced.29 According to Andutan, Atty. Perez v. Judge
character of public officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the object
Abiera30 and similar cases cited by the Ombudsman do not apply since the administrative investigations
sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and
against the respondents in those cases were commenced prior to their resignation. Here, Andutan urges
the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in our government [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No.
the Court to rule otherwise since unlike the cases cited, he had already resigned before the
151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601
administrative case was initiated. He further notes that his resignation from office cannot be
(2001)].
characterized as "preemptive, i.e. made under an atmosphere of fear for the imminence of formal
charges"31 because it was done pursuant to the Memorandum issued by then Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora. Respondents insist that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770, to wit:

Having established the propriety of his resignation, Andutan asks the Court to uphold the mootness of SEC. 20. Exceptions. – The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
the administrative case against him since the cardinal issue in administrative cases is the "officer’s fitness administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
to remain in office, the principal penalty imposable being either suspension or removal."32 The
Ombudsman’s opinion - that accessory penalties may still be imposed - is untenable since it is a (5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
fundamental legal principle that "accessory follows the principal, and the former cannot exist (Emphasis supplied)
independently of the latter."33

proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if the complaint was filed after one
Third, the Ombudsman’s findings were void because procedural and substantive due process were not year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission.
observed. Likewise, Andutan submits that the Ombudsman’s findings lacked legal and factual bases.

In Melchor v. Gironella [G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476], the Court held that the
ISSUES period stated in Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription of the offense but to
the discretion given to the Ombudsman on whether it would investigate a particular administrative
Based on the submissions made, we see the following as the issues for our resolution: offense. The use of the word "may" in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer
discretion [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Jaramilla v.
Comelec, 460 Phil. 507, 514 (2003)]. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from
I. Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation
administrative investigation a year after the act was committed?
[Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; National Federation of
Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, 383 Phil. 910, 918 (2000)].
II. Does Andutan’s resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?
In Filipino v. Macabuhay [G.R. No. 158960, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 50], the Court interpreted
Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 in this manner:
 42

Petitioner argues that based on the abovementioned provision [Section 20(5) of RA 6770)], respondent's An officer or employee under administrative investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of
complaint is barred by prescription considering that it was filed more than one year after the alleged his case but it shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the proceeding against him. It shall also
commission of the acts complained of. be without prejudice to the filing of any administrative, criminal case against him for any act committed
while still in the service. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
The CA refused to give credence to this argument, holding that the provision "refers to cases where the
officers or employees were already charged before they were allowed to resign or were separated from
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not mandatory as petitioner
service."36 In this case, the CA noted that "the administrative cases were filed only after Andutan was
contends. When used in a statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the word
retired, hence the Ombudsman was already divested of jurisdiction and could no longer prosecute the
"shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. Applying Section 20(5),
cases."37
therefore, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation on a
complaint even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
In fine, the complaint is not barred by prescription. (Emphasis supplied) Challenging the CA’s interpretation, the Ombudsman argues that the CA "limited the scope of the cited
Civil Service Memorandum Circular to the first sentence."38 Further, according to the Ombudsman, "the
court a quo ignored the second statement in the said circular that contemplates a situation where
The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a general rule the word "may" is directory,
previous to the institution of the administrative investigation or charge, the public official or employee
the negative phrase "may not" is mandatory in tenor; that a directory word, when qualified by the word
subject of the investigation has resigned."39
"not," becomes prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in character, is not plausible. It is not
supported by jurisprudence on statutory construction. [emphases and underscoring supplied]
To recall, we have held in the past that a public official’s resignation does not render moot an
administrative case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,40 we held
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative
that:
investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed.
Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section
20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative investigation. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July 2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this
Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an
offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case against
However, the crux of the present controversy is not on the issue of prescription, but on the issue of the
him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction.
Ombudsman’s authority to institute an administrative complaint against a government employee who
The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which
had already resigned. On this issue, we rule in Andutan’s favor.
he or she shall still be answerable [Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13,
19-20]. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Andutan’s resignation divests the Ombudsman of its right to institute an administrative complaint
against him.
Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez,41 we held:

Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation [Reyes v. Cristi, A.M. No. P-04-1801, 2 April 2004, 427
investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because
SCRA 8] or retirement [Re: Complaint Filed by Atty. Francis Allan A. Rubio on the Alleged Falsification of
the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.
Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, A.M. No. 2004-17-SC, 27 September 2004; Caja v.
Nanquil, A.M. No. P-04-1885, 13 September 2004] neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative
The Ombudsman argued – in both the present petition and in the petition it filed with the CA – that complaint filed against him while he was still in the service [Tuliao v. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1065, 348
Andutan’s retirement from office does not render moot any administrative case, as long as he is charged Phil. 404, 416 (1998), citing Perez v. Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, 11 June 1975, 64 SCRA 302; Secretary of
with an offense he committed while in office. It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan Justice v. Marcos, A.C. No. 207-J, 22 April 1977, 76 SCRA 301] nor does it render said administrative case
had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since the operative fact that moot and academic [Sy Bang v. Mendez, 350 Phil. 524, 533 (1998)]. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s
determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public service. at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case [Flores v. Sumaljag, 353
The Ombudsman relies on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 38 for Phil. 10, 21 (1998)]. Respondent’s resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability
this proposition, viz.: to which he shall still be answerable [OCA v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511, 20 August 2004].
[emphases and underscoring supplied)

Section VI.
However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the above-cited
cases, the Court found that the public officials – subject of the administrative cases – resigned, either to
1. x x x prevent the continuation of a case already filed42 or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one.43 Here,
neither situation obtains.
 43

The Ombudsman’s general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against him by Reading the quoted passage in a vacuum, one could be led to the conclusion that the mere availability of
resigning, since he "knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of the State would accessory penalties justifies the continuation of an administrative case. This is a misplaced reading of the
eventually reach him"44 is unfounded. First, Andutan’s resignation was neither his choice nor of his own case and its ruling.
doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the
administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one (1) year and two (2) months after his
Esther S. Pagano – who was serving as Cashier IV at the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Benguet –
resignation. The Court struggles to find reason in the Ombudsman’s sweeping assertions in light of these
filed her certificate of candidacy for councilor four days after the Provincial Treasurer directed her to
facts.
explain why no administrative case should be filed against her. The directive arose from allegations that
her accountabilities included a cash shortage of ₱1,424,289.99. She filed her certificate of candidacy
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the under the pretext that since she was deemed ipso facto resigned from office, she was no longer under
Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept the the administrative jurisdiction of her superiors. Thus, according to Pagano, the administrative complaint
Ombudsman’s position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced resignation had become moot.
negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.
We rejected Pagano’s position on the principal ground "that the precipitate resignation of a government
Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to the provisions employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the
of Section VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the Ombudsman’s interpretation administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when
that "[a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed while the public official or employee was still in facing administrative sanction."49Our position that accessory penalties are still imposable – thereby
the service x x x a public servant’s resignation is not a bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution negating the mootness of the administrative complaint – merely flows from the fact that Pagano pre-
and adjudication."45 If we agree with this interpretation, any official – even if he has been separated empted the filing of the administrative case against her. It was neither intended to be a stand-alone
from the service for a long time – may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad argument nor would it have justified the continuation of the administrative complaint if Pagano’s filing of
infinitum. We believe that this interpretation is inconsistent with the principal motivation of the law – candidacy/resignation did not reek of irregularities. Our factual findings in Pagano confirm this, viz.:
which is to improve public service and to preserve the public’s faith and confidence in the government,
and not the punishment of the public official concerned.46 Likewise, if the act committed by the public
At the time petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy, petitioner was already notified by the Provincial
official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress
Treasurer that she needed to explain why no administrative charge should be filed against her, after it
the same.
discovered the cash shortage of ₱1,424,289.99 in her accountabilities. Moreover, she had already filed
her answer. To all intents and purposes, the administrative proceedings had already been commenced at
The possibility of imposing accessory penalties does not negate the Ombudsman’s lack of jurisdiction. the time she was considered separated from service through her precipitate filing of her certificate of
candidacy. Petitioner’s bad faith was manifest when she filed it, fully knowing that administrative
proceedings were being instituted against her as part of the procedural due process in laying the
The Ombudsman suggests that although the issue of Andutan’s removal from the service is moot, there
foundation for an administrative case.50 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvphil
is an "irresistible justification" to "determine whether or not there remains penalties capable of
imposition, like bar from re-entering the public service and forfeiture of benefits."47 Otherwise stated,
since accessory penalties may still be imposed against Andutan, the administrative case itself is not moot Plainly, our justification for the continuation of the administrative case – notwithstanding Pagano’s
and may proceed despite the inapplicability of the principal penalty of removal from office. resignation – was her "bad faith" in filing the certificate of candidacy, and not the availability of
accessory penalties.
We find several reasons that militate against this position.
Second, we agree with the Ombudsman that "fitness to serve in public office x x x is a question of
transcendental [importance]51" and that "preserving the inviolability of public office" compels the state
First, although we have held that the resignation of an official does not render an administrative case
to prevent the "re-entry [to] public service of persons who have x x x demonstrated their absolute lack of
moot and academic because accessory penalties may still be imposed, this holding must be read in its
fitness to hold public office."52However, the State must perform this task within the limits set by law,
proper context. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,48 indeed, we held:
particularly, the limits of jurisdiction. As earlier stated, under the Ombudsman’s theory, the
administrative authorities may exercise administrative jurisdiction over subordinates ad infinitum; thus,
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties a public official who has validly severed his ties with the civil service may still be the subject of an
or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case [Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar, G.R. administrative complaint up to his deathbed. This is contrary to the law and the public policy behind it.
No. 156128, 9 May 2005, 458 SCRA 301, 305]. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the
petitioner’s separation from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions -
Lastly, the State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who committed violations
that of separation from service - may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties
while in office, but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under the "threefold liability rule," the
which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her,
wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative
namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits. [emphasis and
liability.53 Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an administrative case against a public official who
underscoring supplied]
has already resigned or retired, the Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate
Andutan’s alleged transgressions. In fact, here, the Ombudsman – through the FFIB – filed a criminal case
 44

for Estafa and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against 1. Whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative
Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the penalty of imprisonment, but also the investigation a year after the act was committed.
penalties of perpetual disqualification from office, and confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited
interest.54 2. Whether the Ombudsman has authority to institute an administrative complaint against a government
employee who had already resigned.
Conclusion
HELD:
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this statement of what
assumption of public office involves. The stability of our public institutions relies on the ability of our civil 1. No. Well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe. Administrative offenses
servants to serve their constituencies well. by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In disciplining public
officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the
While we commend the Ombudsman’s resolve in pursuing the present case for violations allegedly improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in our
committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and dismiss the petition. Consistent government. Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper subject of an administrative complaint, we find no administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was
reason to delve on the Ombudsman’s factual findings. committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period
stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative
investigation.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the Office of the Ombudsman’s petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68893, promulgated on July 28, 2004, which annulled 2. No. The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the
and set aside the July 30, 2001 decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed. It is irrelevant, according to the
guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since the
operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public service.
No pronouncement as to costs. The SC observed that indeed it has held in the past that a public official’s resignation does not render
moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation. However, the facts of those
cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the past cases, the Court found that the public
SO ORDERED. officials – subject of the administrative cases – resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case
already filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains. First, Andutan’s
FACTS: resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan
resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1,
Pursuant to the Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to 1999, exactly one year and two months after his resignation. What is clear from the records is that
vacate their positions, Andutan resigned from the DOF as the former Deputy Director of the One-Stop Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case
Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF. Subsequently, Andutan, et al. was criminally against him. If the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any official – even if he has
charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through been separated from the service for a long time – may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his
Falsification of Public Documents, and violations RA 3019. As government employees, Andutan et al. superiors, ad infinitum. Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the
were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.
Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The criminal and administrative
charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among
others. The Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been separated
from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other
benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled agencies or
corporations. The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter
“should not have considered the administrative complaints” because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770
provides that the Ombudsman “may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or
omission complained of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of”; and second, the administrative case was filed after
Andutan’s forced resignation

ISSUES:
 45

F. PUBLIC OFFICE AND RESPONSIBILITY The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of "riceland" in Rosario, Pasig which had
been assessed at P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as residential land" in 1978 for P80.00 a square
meter. The land for the floodway was acquired through negotiated purchase,
EN BANC
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 per square meter of land in
G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989 Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for conviction.

AMADO C. ARIAS, petitioner, Herein lies the first error of the trial court.
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in the falsification of public
documents or preparation of spurious supporting papers. The charge is causing undue injury to the
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Government and giving a private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or inexcusable negligence.
The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino which
follows this majority opinion. The dissent substantially reiterates the draft report prepared by Justice The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase of land in Pasig, Rizal for P80.00 a
Griño-Aquino as a working basis for the Court's deliberations when the case was being discussed and for square meter instead of the P5.00 value per square meter appearing in the tax declarations and fixed by
the subsequent votes of concurrence or dissent on the action proposed by the report. the municipal assessor, not by the landowner.

There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The division of the Court is on the conclusions to The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per square
be drawn from those events and the facts insofar as the two petitioners are concerned. The majority is meter value fixed by the assessor in the tax declarations was the correct market value of the Mangahan
of the view that Messrs. Arias and Data should be acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. The Court property and if the Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows that it must
feels that the quantum of evidence needed to convict petitioners Arias and Data beyond reasonable have suffered undue injury.
doubt, as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to cause undue injury to the Government through the
irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds, has not been satisfied.
The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:

In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General 1 who, in 80 pages of his
1. No undue injury was caused to the Government
consolidated manifestation and motion, recommended that Messrs. Arias and Data be acquitted of the
crime charged, with costs de oficio. Earlier, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Eleuterio F. Guerrero had
also recommended the dropping of Arias from the information before it was filed. a. The P80.00 per square rneter acquisition cost is just fair and reasonable.

There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made the It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired through negotiated purchase. It was, therefor,
bidding out and construction of public works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal nothing more than an ordinary contract of sale where the purchase price had to be arrived at by
inefficiency in the public eye. However, the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who may have agreement between the parties and could never be left to the discretion of one of the contracting
ordered the project, who signed a document incident to its construction, or who had a hand somewhere parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For it is the essence of a contract of sale that there must be a
in its implementation. The careless use of the conspiracy theory may sweep into jail even innocent meeting of the minds between the seller and the buyer upon the thing which is the object of the
persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds who engineered the contract and upon the price (Article 1475, New Civil Code). Necessarily, the parties have to negotiate the
defraudation. reasonableness of the price, taking into consideration such other factors as location, potentials,
surroundings and capabilities. After taking the foregoing premises into consideration, the parties have,
thus, arrived at the amount of P80.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable price for the Agleham
Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission
property.
chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from
disbursements which they have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of
conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that the true and fair market
affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and value in 1978 of the Agleham property was indeed P5.00 per square meter only as stated by the assessor
deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy. in the tax declaration (Exhibit W). On the contrary, the prosecution's principal witness Pedro Ocol, the
Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, admitted that the purchase price of P80.00 per square meter paid
for the Agleham property as stated in the Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is reasonable (tsn, August 19,1983, p.
The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of land
20) and fair (Ibid, p. 76); that 'the value of lands within the town of Pasig ranges from P80.00 to P500.00'
purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was intended
(Ibid, p. 21); that the Agleham property is "around 300 meters" from Ortigas Avenue, "adjacent to the
to ease the perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila.
existing Leongson [Liamson] Subdivision ... and near Eastland Garment Building" (Ibid, pp. 12-13); that
 46

said property is surrounded by factories, commercial establishments and residential subdivisions (Ibid, could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking
pp. 73-74); that the P5.00 per square meter assessed valuation of the Agleham property appearing on for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent 'on their subordinates and on
the tax declaration (Exhibit W) was based on actual use only (lbid, pp. 26-27), it being the uniform rate the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department
for all ricefields in Pasig irrespective of their locations (Ibid, pp. 72-74) and did not take into account the secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about
existence of many factories and subdivisions in the area (Ibid., pp. 25-27, 72-74), and that the assessed the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether
value is different from and always lower than the actual market value (Ibid, pp. 22-23). (At pp. 256-259, the correct amount of food was served and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's
Rollo) accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each
voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest
to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document , letters and supporting
A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of
paper that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more
expropriation proceedings.
appalling.

In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (149 SCRA 305, 310 [1987]) we struck down the martial law
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a
decree that pegged just compensation in eminent domain cases to the assessed value stated by a
conspiracy charge and conviction.
landowner in his tax declaration or fixed by the municipal assessor, whichever is lower. Other factors
must be considered. These factors must be determined by a court of justice and not by municipal
employees. Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to
defraud the government?
In the instant case, the assessor's low evaluation, in the fixing of which the landowner had no
participation, was used for a purpose infinitely more weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property started in
the basis for a criminal conviction. 1977. The deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the Republic on June 8,
1978. In other words, the transaction had already been consummated before his arrival. The pre-audit,
incident to payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first week of October, 1978. Arias points out
The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square meter for land in Pasig in 1978 would
that apart from his signature linking him to the signature on the voucher, there is no evidence
be a fair evaluation. The value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a competent
transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused testified they did not know him personally and none
court. We are certain, however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence, the decision, insofar as it
approached him to follow up the payment.
says that the "correct" valuation is P5.00 per square meter and on that basis convicted that petitioners
of causing undue injury, damage, and prejudice to the Government because of gross overpricing, is
grounded on shaky foundations. Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to investigate . gate the smallest detains of the
transaction?
There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during orderly
proceedings has been presented and accepted. Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already worth
P80.00 a square meter at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner alarm. Land
along Ortigas Avenue on the way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 a square meter. The
The Court's decision, however, is based on a more basic reason. Herein lies the principal error of the
falsification of the tax declaration by changing "riceland" to "residential' was done before Arias was
respondent court.
assigned to Pasig besides, there is no such thing as "riceland" in inner Metro Manila. Some lots in
outlying or easily flooded areas may still be planted to rice or kangkong but this is only until the place is
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-dishonest dedicated to its real purpose which is commercial, industrial, or residential. If the Sandiganbayan is going
or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is to send somebody to jail for six years, the decision should be based on firmer foundation.
suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single
detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person
The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982. Arias
involved in a transaction before affixing, his signature as the final approving authority.
explained that the rules of the Commission on Audit require auditors to keep these d documents
and under no circumstance to relinquish custody to other persons. Arias was auditor of the Bureau of
There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were Public Works in Pasig up to September 1, 1981. The seven months delay in the formal turnover of
falsified. A key tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of being machine-numbered. The custody to the new auditor was explained by prosecution witness Julito Pesayco, who succeeded him as
registration stampmark was antedated and the land reclassified as residential instead of ricefield. But auditor and who took over the custody of records in that office.
were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue
in injury and damage to the Government?
The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the finding of undue injury and damage to the
Government is the alleged gross overprice for the land purchased for the floodway project. Assuming
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received that P80.00 is indeed exorbitant, petitioner Arias cites his testimony as follows:
procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office
 47

Q In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness of the price of the property? A As what do you mean of the certification, ma'am?

A In this case, the price has been stated, the transaction had been consummated and the corresponding Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No. 296, A They are not required documents
Transfer Certificate of little had been issued and transferred to the government of the Philippines. The that an auditor must see. (TSN, page 23, April 27,1987).
auditors have no more leeway to return the papers and then question the purchase price.
and continuing:
Q Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by the government to private
individuals there should be a pre-audit of the papers and the corresponding checks issued to the vendor?
A ... The questioning of the purchase price is now beyond the authority of the auditor because it is
inasmuch as the amount involved is beyond his counter-signing authority. (TSN, page 35, April 27, 1987).
A Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there is. (At pp. 15-16, Petition. Underlinings supplied by petitioner)

Q Yes, but in this particular case, the papers were transferred to the government without paying the The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner Data as follows:
price Did you not consider that rather odd or unusual? (TSN, page 17, April 27,1987).
As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on record shows that as the
A No, Your Honor. then District Engineer of the Pasig Engineering District he created a committee, headed by
Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao Cruz, Pedro Hucom
and Carlos Jose, all employees of the district office, as members, specifically to handle the
Q Why not?
Mangahan Floodway Project, gather and verify documents, conduct surveys, negotiate with
the owners for the sale of their lots, process claims and prepare the necessary documents; he
A Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a condition that no payments will be made did not take any direct and active part in the acquisition of land for the Mangahan floodway;
unless the corresponding title in the payment of the Republic is committed is made. it was the committee which determined the authenticity of the documents presented to them
for processing and on the basis thereof prepared the corresponding deed of sale; thereafter,
Q In this case you said that the title is already in the name of the government? the committee submitted the deed of sale together with the supporting documents to
petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of the supporting certified documents which
appeared regular and complete on their face, petitioner Data, as head of the office and the
A Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine whether there is an appropriation set aside to signing authority at that level, merely signed but did not approve the deed of sale (Exhibit G)
cover the said specification. As of the price it is under the sole authority of the proper officer making the as the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works; he thereafter
sale. transmitted the signed deed of sale with its supporting documents to Director Anolin of the
Bureau of Public Works who in turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of
Q My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a piece of property to be bought by the Public Works; the deed of sale was approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a
government; the sale was consummated; the title was issued in favor of the government without the review and re-examination thereof at that level; after the approval of the deed of sale by the
price being paid first to the seller? higher authorities the covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared which petitioner
Data signed; petitioner Data did not know Gutierrez and had never met her during the
processing and payment of her claims (tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14, 16-24, 31-32). (At
A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payments made by the government comes later than the transfer. pp. 267-268, Rollo.)

Q That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way transaction? On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:

A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27,1987). It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive and
convincing evidence of conspiracy between the petitioners and their co-accused. There was
Q And of course as auditor, 'watch-dog' of the government there is also that function you are also called no direct finding of conspiracy. Respondent Court's inference on the alleged existence of
upon by going over the papers . . . (TSN, page 22, April 27,1987). I ... vouchers called upon to determine conspiracy merely upon the purported 'pre-assigned roles (of the accused) in the commission
whether there is any irregularity as at all in this particular transaction, is it not? of the (alleged) illegal acts in question is not supported by any evidence on record. Nowhere
in the seventy- eight (78) page Decision was there any specific allusion to some or even one
instance which would link either petitioner Arias or Data to their co-accused in the planning,
A Yes, Ma'am.
preparation and/or perpetration, if any, of the purported fraud and falsifications alleged in
the information That petitioners Data and Arias happened to be officials of the Pasig District
Q And that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also, not only the tax declaration but also the Engineering Office who signed the deed of sale and passed on pre-audit the general voucher
certification by Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz? covering the subject sale, respectively, does hot raise any presumption or inference, that they
 48

were part of the alleged plan to defraud the Government, as indeed there was none. It should
be remembered that, as aboveshown, there was no undue injury caused to the Government
as the negotiated purchase of the Agleham property was made at the fair and reasonable
price of P80.00 per square meter.

That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words and figures of the purchase price
in the deed of sale from P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00 does not prove conspiracy. It may be
noted that there was a reduction in the affected area from the estimated 19,328 square
meters to 19,004 square meters as approved by the Land Registration Commission, which
resulted in the corresponding reduction in the purchase price from P1,546,240.00 to
Pl,520,320.00. The erasures in the deed of sale were simple corrections that even benefited
the Government.

Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court's suspicion, there was nothing irregular in the
use of the unapproved survey plan/technical description in the deed of sale because the
approval of the survey plan/ technical description was not a prerequisite to the approval of
the deed of sale. What is important is that before any payment is made by the Government
under the deed of sale the title of the seller must have already been cancelled and another
one issued to the Government incorporating therein the technical description as approved by
the Land Registration Commission, as what obtained in the instant case. (At pp. 273-275,
Rollo)

We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the
petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate evidence
on record is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicts and sentences
petitioners Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioners Arias and Data are
acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 49

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION Through Resolution No. 96, the MB required RBSMI to submit within 15 days a written explanation with
respect to the findings of the examiner. It also directed the Department of Rural Banks (DRB), to verify,
monitor and report to the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector (SES) on the
G.R. No. 154499 February 27, 2004
findings/exceptions noted, until the same shall have been corrected.

ALBERTO V. REYES, WILFREDO B. DOMO-ONG and HERMINIO C. PRINCIPIO, petitioners

As directed by the MB, another examination team conducted a special examination on RBSMI. RBSMI
vs.
President Hilario Soriano claimed that he was pressured into issuing a memorandum to the bank
RURAL BANK OF SAN MIGUEL (BULACAN), INC., represented by HILARIO P. SORIANO, President and
employees authorizing the team to review the bank’s accounting and internal control system.
Principal Stockholder, respondent.

Soriano also alleged that sometime in March 1997, Reyes started urging him to consider selling the bank.
RESOLUTION
He specified that on May 28, 1997, Reyes introduced him through telephone to Mr. Exequiel Villacorta,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the TA Bank. They agreed to meet on the following day. In
Tinga, J.: his Affidavit,6 Villacorta confirmed that he and Soriano indeed met but the meeting never got past the
exploratory stage since he (Villacorta) immediately expressed disinterest because Soriano wanted to sell
This deals with the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners Alberto V. Reyes and Wilfredo B. Domo- all his equity shares while he was merely contemplating a possible buy-in.
ong, both Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) officials,1 and the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
respondent Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. Soriano further alleged that when the talks with Villacorta failed, Reyes asked him whether he wanted to
meet another buyer, to which he answered in the affirmative. Thereafter, Reyes introduced him by
In the Decision2 of March 14, 2003, this Court found Deputy Governor Reyes and Director Domo-ong telephone to Benjamin P. Castillo of the Export and Industry Bank (EIB), whom he met on June 26, 1997.
liable for violation of the "standards of professionalism" prescribed by the Code of Conduct and Ethical No negotiation took place because Soriano desired a total sale while EIB merely desired a joint venture
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713) in that they used the distressed arrangement or a buy-in to allow EIB to gain control of RBSMI.
financial condition of respondent Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSMI) as the subject of a
case study in one of the BSP seminars and did the "brokering" of the sale of RBSMI. The Court modified Meanwhile, on June 13, 1997, the MB approved Resolution No. 7247 ordering RBSMI to correct the major
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 601843 by reducing the penalty imposed by the exceptions noted within 30 days from receipt of the advice, and to remit to the BSP the amount of
appellate court from a fine equivalent to six months’ salary to a fine of two months’ salary for Reyes and ₱2,538,483.00 as fines and penalties for incurring deficiencies in reserves against deposit liabilities.
one month salary for Domo-ong.
On July 21, 1997, Soriano submitted RBSMI’s answers to the BSP exceptions/findings mentioned. He
In the Decision, the Court exonerated petitioner Herminio C. Principio4 of the administrative charges. The stated that "the actions taken or to be taken by the bank (RBSMI) were deliberated and ratified by the
exoneration is the subject of RBSMI’s Motion For Partial Reconsideration. Board of Directors in its regular meeting held on July 9, 1997." Among the board approved actions was
the bank’s request addressed to Domo-ong for BSP "to debit the demand deposit of the bank in the
The Motion for Reconsideration of Reyes and Domo-ong is anchored on the following grounds: (1) it was amount of ₱2,538,483.00" representing the payment of fines and penalties.
not under their auspices that the seminar which used training materials containing two case studies on
RBSMI’s financial distress was conducted but under that of another department and other officials of More than a year after, however, the RBSMI asked for a reconsideration of MB Resolution No.
BSP; and, (2) they did not do any act which constituted "brokering" of the sale of RBSMI or deviated from 724 insofar as the imposition of fine amounting to ₱2,538,483.00. On January 21, 1999, the MB
the standards of professionalism. adopted Resolution No. 71,8authorizing the conditional reversal of sixty percent (60%) of the penalty
pending resolution of the dispute on the findings on reserve deficiency. Subsequently, on April 7, 1999,
A brief revisit of the operative milieu is warranted to gain the needed perspective. the MB approved the interim reversal of the entire amount of the penalty "pending the outcome of the
study on the legal and factual basis for the imposition of the penalty."

In a letter dated May 19, 1999, addressed to then BSP Governor Singson, RBSMI charged the petitioners
with violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and The above incidents, particularly the alleged "brokering" by Reyes and the petitioners’ "unsupported"
Employees). The Monetary Board (MB) of the BSP created an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the recommendation to impose a penalty of ₱2,538,483.00 for legal reserve deficiency, prompted the
matter. respondent to file the letter-complaint charging the petitioners with "unprofessionalism."

The ensuing investigation disclosed that sometime in September 1996, RBSMI, which had a history of The Motion for Reconsideration bid of Reyes and Domo-ong is meritorious.
major violations/exceptions dating back to 1995, underwent periodic examination by the BSP. The
examination team headed by Principio noted 20 serious exceptions/violations and deficiencies of In pinning liability on Reyes and Domo-ong for the seminar which used the rural bank as a case study, the
RBSMI.5 court made this ratiocination, viz:
 50

"(W)hile there was indeed no evidence showing that either petitioner Reyes or petitioner Domo-ong The immunity of public officers from liability for the non-feasances, negligence or omissions of duty of
distributed or used the materials, the very fact that the seminar was conducted under their auspices is their official subordinates and even for the latter’s misfeasances or positive wrongs rests, according
enough to make them liable to a certain extent. Petitioner Reyes, as Head of the BSP Supervision and to Mechem, "upon obvious considerations of public policy, the necessities of the public service and the
Examination Sector, and petitioner Domo-ong, as Director of the BSP Department of Rural Banks, should perplexities and embarrassments of a contrary doctrine."15 These official subordinates, he notes further,
have exercised their power of control and supervision so that the incident could have been prevented are themselves public officers though of an inferior grade, and therefore directly liable in the cases in
or at the very least remedied." (Emphasis supplied) which any public officer is liable, for their own misdeeds or defaults.16

Plainly, conclusion on petitioners’ culpability is grounded, not on an established fact but on a mere Significantly, Mechem’s disquisition provides the mooring of the Administrative Code of 1987 which
inference that the seminar was conducted under their auspices. Indeed, the pronouncement on the provides that a head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts,
petitioners’ role is evidently conjectural and evaluation of the extent of their responsibility admittedly omissions of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by
uncertain. written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.17

It is conceded that there was no evidence that the seminar was conducted under petitioners’ patronage. Now, the label of unprofessionalism bestowed by the Court on the petitioners at the instance of RBSMI.
And it was assumed, as indeed there was absolutely paucity of proof, that they exercised supervision and
control over the persons responsible in organizing the seminar. On the contrary, as shown in the Motion
In the assailed Decision, the Court categorized Reyes’ telephone introduction of officials of other banks
For Reconsideration, it was the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Institute (BSPI), an office separate and
to RBSMI’s President in connection with the latter’s expressed desire to sell the bank as "brokering"
independent from the SES which is directly under the control and supervision of another Deputy
which in turn constitutes, according to the Court, violation of the standards of professionalism. The
Governor, that for the Resource Management Sector (RMS)9which is charged with conducting seminars
standards are set forth in Section 4 (A) (b) of Republic Act 6713, as follows:
and lectures for the BSP, including the seminar involved in this case.

Sec. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. — (A) Every public official and employee shall
In its Comment,10 RBSMI argues that since information on the state of its finances found its way as a
observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:
training material of RMS, the event could have transpired only because the SES permitted it. Even if the
subordinates of petitioners were the source of information, RBSMI further claims in ostensible reference
to the principle of command responsibility, petitioners could be held liable for negligence. (b) Professionalism. — Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with
utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their
It is noteworthy again that petitioners’ alleged role in the disclosure of information is not anchored on
roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
any concrete piece of evidence. That explains the RBSMI’s effort to cast liability vicariously on the
petitioners by a superficial resort to the principle of command responsibility which this Court did not
reject. But neither the principle itself which is an accepted notion in military or police structural The Court equates "brokering" with unprofessionalism. According to Webster’s Third New International
dynamics or its counterpart of respondent superior in the law on quasi-delicts11 would be relevant in this Dictionary,"professionalism" means "the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize or mark a
case, involving as it does the actual performance in office of the petitioners and given the fact that profession." Any standard thesaurus defines a "professional" as a person who engages in an activity with
petitioners are high ranking officers of the country’s central monetary authority. Indeed, as such officers, great competence. Indeed, to call a person a professional is to describe him as competent, efficient,
petitioners cannot be expected to monitor the activities of their subalterns. In Arias v. experienced, proficient or polished.
Sandiganbayan,12 this Court held that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on the good
faith of their subordinates. The case specifically involved the liability of the head of office in the The crucial question, therefore, is whether Reyes conducted himself in an unprofessional manner in
preparation of bids, purchase of supplies and contract negotiations done by his subordinates. In the doing the acts imputed to him.
same fashion, petitioners in this case owing to their high ranks cannot be expected to acquaint
themselves with such minutiae as the flow of files and documents which leave their desks. Myriad details
such as those are, by office practice, left to subalterns and minor employees. Delegation of function is The Court rules in the negative.
part of sound management.
In the first place, the acts of Reyes do not constitute "brokering." Case law18 defines a "broker" as "one
From another perspective, the negligence of the subordinate cannot be ascribed to his superior in the who is engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating contracts relative to property with the custody
absence of evidence of the latter’s own negligence. Indeed, the negligence of the subordinate is not of which he has no concern; the negotiator between other parties, never acting in his own name but in
tantamount to negligence of the superior official so the Court ruled in a case13 where the mandated the name of those who employed him. . . . a broker is one whose occupation is to bring the parties
responsibilities of the superior do not include actual monitoring of projects. In another case,14 this Court together, in matters of trade, commerce or navigation." According to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary,
rejected the principle of command responsibility although the case involved a provincial constabulary "brokerage" refers to "the trade or occupation of a broker; the commissions paid to a broker for his
commander, aptly noting that there was neither allegation nor proof that he had been in any way guilty services," while "brokers" are "those who are engaged for others on the negotiation of contracts relative
of fault or negligence in connection with the unlawful raid and arrest effected by his subordinates. to property, with the custody of which they have no concern."19
 51

Thus, the word "brokering" clearly indicates the performance of certain acts for monetary consideration MISCONDUCT COMPLAINED OF
or compensation. To give it another definition such as that imputed by RBSMI to the acts of Reyes is to
distort the accepted jurisprudential meaning of the term. From the evidence, all that Reyes did was to Facts:
introduce RBSMI’s President to the President of TA Bank and EIB. Nothing more. There was not even a
hint that he was motivated by monetary consideration or swayed by any personal interest in doing what In a letter dated May 19,1999, addressed to then BSP Governor Singson, RBSMI charge the petitioner
he did. with violation of RA No. 6713 ( code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). The Monetary Board (MB) of the BSP created an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the
matter.
On his part, Soriano who is RBSMI’s President himself admitted that the talks with Villacorta and Castillo
The ensuing investigation disclosed that sometime in September 1996, RBSMI, which had a history of
never got past the exploratory stage because the two wanted a buy-in while he was for a total sell-out.
major violations/exceptions dating back to 1995, underwent periodic examination by the BSP. The
This is an indelible indication that Reyes was not personally involved in the transaction. If he were, he
examination team headed by Principio noted serious 20 exceptions/violations and deficiencies of RBSMI.
would at least have an inkling of the plans of Villacorta and Castillo; otherwise, he would not have
Through Resolution No. 96, the MB required RBSMI to submit within 15 days a written explanation with
wasted his time introducing them to Soriano.
respect to the findings of the examiner. It also directed the Department of Rural Banks DRB), to verify,
monitor and report to the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector (SES) on the findings
Indeed, RBSMI miserably failed to establish that Reyes had breached the standard of professional noted, until the same shall have been corrected.
conduct required of a public servant. It appears to the Court that in keeping with the standards of Meanwhile on June 13,1997, the MB approved Resolution No. 724 ordering RBSMI to correct the major
professionalism and heeding the mandate of his position, he made the telephone introductions for no exceptions noted within 30 days from receipt of the advice, and to remit to the BSP the amount of
other purpose but to pave the way for a possible consolidation or merger of RBSMI with interested P2,538,483.00 as fines and penalties for incurring deficiencies in reserves against deposit liabilities.
banks. As this Court found in its Decision, it is indeed the policy of the BSP to promote mergers and More than a year after, however, the RBSMI asked for a reconsideration of MB Resolution No. 724
consolidations by providing incentives to banks that would undergo such corporate combinations.20 To insofar as the imposition of fine amounting to P P2,538,483.00.On January 21, 1999, the MB adopted
effectively implement the policy, it was necessary that the banks be advised and assisted by a person Resolution No. 71, authorizing the conditional reversal of sixty of the dispute on the findings on reserve
knowledgeable about the transactions like Reyes. The benefits which may ultimately arise out of any deficiency. Subsequently, on April 7, 1999, the MB approved the interim reversal of the entire amount of
preliminary facilitation step such as what Reyes undertook will not accrue to the facilitator but to the the penalty “pending the outcome of the study on the legal and factual basis for the imposition of the
parties to the transaction themselves and, of course, the institution whose policy initiative is being penalty.”
carried out.
The above incidents, particularly the alleged “brokering” by Reyes and the petitioners’ “unsupported”
All told, there is neither legal nor factual support for holding Reyes and Domo-ong liable. recommendation to impose a penalty of P2,538,483.00 for legal reserve deficiency, prompted the
respondent to file the letter-complaint charging the petitioners with “unprofessionalism.”
In the Decision if March 14,2003, this Court found Deputy Governor Reyes and Director Domo-ong liable
As to the motion for partial reconsideration filed by RBSMI, it is argued that Principio should be for violation of the “standards of professionalism” prescribed by RA 6713in that they used the distressed
administratively penalized for his undue haste in submitting his report to the MB, in making an financial condition of respondent RBSMI as the subject of a case study in one of the BSP seminars and did
unsupported recommendation for imposition of penalties for legal reserve deficiencies, and for taking the “brokering” of the sale of RBSMI. The Court modified the decision of the CA by reducing the penalty
charge of the examinations of RBSMI three consecutive times. RBSMI’s arguments are not new, they imposed from the a fine equivalent to six months’salary to a fine of 2 months salary for Reyes and one
having been previously presented to and squarely ruled upon by the Court. month salary for Domo-ong.
The court exonerated petitioner Proncipio of the Administrative charges. The exoneration is subject to
In closing, it cannot be overemphasized that the BSP is an independent body corporate bestowed under RBSMI’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
its charter21 with fiscal and administrative autonomy. As such, its officials should be granted a certain
degree of flexibility in the performance of their duties and provided insulation from interference and Issue: Whether or not the Superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of
vexatious suits, especially when moves of the kind are resorted to as counterfoil to the exercise of their duty, negligence or misfeasance of his subordinate officer.
regulatory mandate. Elsewise, the institutional independence and autonomy of the BSP as the central
mandatory authority would be rendered illusory. Held:

The immunity of public officers from liability for nonfeasance, negligence or omissions of duty of their
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of the official subordinate and even for the latter’s misfeasance or positive wrong rests, according to MECHEM,
petitioners Deputy Governor Alberto V. Reyes and Director Wilfredo B. Domo-ong. The Decision dated “upon obvious considerations of public policy, the necessities of the public service and the perplexities
March 14, 2003 is SET ASIDE and another entered, DISMISSING the administrative complaint and and embarrassments of a contrary doctrine.” These official subordinates are themselves public officers
EXONERATING all the petitioners. The Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the respondent Rural Bank though of an inferior grade, and therefore directly liable in the cases in which any public officer is liable,
of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. is DENIED. SO ORDERED. for their own misdeeds or defaults.
Under the Admin Code of 1987, which provides that head of a department or a superior officer shall not
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY;HEAD OF A DEPARTMENT OR A SUPERIOR OFFICER SHALL NOT BE CIVILLY be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, misfeasance of his subordinates,
LIABLE FOR THE WRONGFUL ACTS.OMISSION OF DUTY, NEGLIGENCE FOR MISFEASANCE OF HIS unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.
SUBORDINATE.UNLESS HE HAS ACTUALLY AUTHORIZE BY WRITTEN ORDER OF THE SPECIFIC ACT OR
 52

EN BANC the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus,
stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, in her capacity as the Ombudsman, Petitioner,
- versus -
COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) and JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents. In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions,
G.R. Nos. 217126-27 such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional
allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a
Promulgated: particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended
November 10 2015 while the court is hearing the same.

DECISION
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or findings” of the
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770-
attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
FACTS:
concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce,
invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated
The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they “cover the same specific or particular subject
and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.
Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of
Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation the CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it
subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily
rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law. of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly
recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.

The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts
from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite
the usage of the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court,” the Ombudsman
herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?

RULING:

The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing,
took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted
by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through this
provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly
promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of
judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of
 53

G. ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH AND STATE RECOVERY Thereafter, the PCGG conducted an evaluation of the properties offered for settlement by petitioners. In
a Memorandum dated August 18, 1997, Mauro J. Estrada, Director of the PCGG Research and
Development Program, recommended the inclusion of another tract of land5 belonging to petitioners
SECOND DIVISION among the properties which would be subject of the compromise.

G.R. No. 147227 November 19, 2004 On September 18, 1997, respondent, represented by PCGG Commissioners Reynaldo S. Guiao and
Herminio A. Mendoza entered into a Compromise Agreement with petitioners, represented by petitioner
MARIA REMEDIOS ARGANA, DONATA ALMENDRALA VDA. DE ARGANA, LUIS ARGANA, JR., PEREGRINO Maria Felicidad Argana. Petitioners conveyed, ceded and released in favor of respondent a total of
ARGANA, ESTATE OF GELACIO ARGANA, EUFROCINIO NOFUENTE, AMPARO ARGANA NOFUENTE, 361.9203 hectares of agricultural land in Pangil and Famy, Laguna, or 75.12% of the properties subject of
JUANITO ROGELIO, MILAGROS ARGANA ROGELIO, MARIA FELICIDAD ARGANA, MARIA DOROTEA litigation, in consideration of the dismissal or withdrawal of all pending civil, criminal and administrative
ARGANA, REFEDOR SOUTH GOLD PROPERTY MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT cases filed, litigated or investigated by respondent against them. The remainder was distributed as
CORPORATION,petitioners, follows:
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
To be retained by the late Mayor Argana's heirs 9.88% 47.78787 hectares

DECISION Owned by the Mayor's Brothers and Sisters 5.53% 26.6318 hectares

TINGA, J.: Foreclosed by Los Baños Rural Bank 1.24% 5.9856 hectares

Owned by Other Persons 8.23% 39.64865 hectares

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Resolution dated April 11, 2000 and the Order
dated February 22, 2001 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, in Civil Case No. 0026.1
24.88% 120.05392 hectares6

On July 29, 1987, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan a Petition for
Forfeiture of alleged ill-gotten assets and properties of the late Maximino A. Argana, who served as In a letter dated October 7, 1997,7 the PCGG informed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) of the
Mayor of the Municipality of Muntinlupa2 from 1964 to 1967 and from 1972 until his death in 1985. signing of the Compromise Agreement and requested the OSG to file the appropriate motion for
approval thereof with the Sandiganbayan.
On October 28, 1998, the Sandiganbayan remanded the case to the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) for the conduct of an inquiry. In 1990, the case was reactivated in the Subsequently, the OSG requested for clarification from the PCGG if the compromise agreement included
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners Maria Remedios Argana, Donata Almendrala Vda. De Argana, Luis Argana, Jr., all the sequestered assets of petitioners subject of litigation. In response to the request, PCGG informed
Peregrino Argana, Estate of Gelacio Argana, Eufrocinio Nofuente, Amparo Argana Nofuente, Juanito the OSG in a letter dated February 4, 19988 that the properties mentioned in the Compromise
Rogelio, Milagros Argana Rogelio, Maria Felicidad Argana, Maria Dorotea Argana, and Refedor South Agreement comprise all the sequestered assets subject of litigation, and reiterated that it entered into a
Gold Property Management & Development Corporation filed a series of motions, including a Motion to compromise agreement with petitioners because it believed that the evidence might not be sufficient to
Dismiss on the ground of the lack of authority of the PCGG to institute the case on behalf of respondent. warrant continuing the prosecution of Civil Case No. 0026 and that it is to the best interest of the
This issue eventually reached this Court and was decided in favor of respondent on September 29, 1994.3 government to accept the offer of petitioners.9

Petitioners, in their Answer, denied that the properties sought to be forfeited by respondent were On May 27, 1998, then President of the Republic of the Philippines Fidel V. Ramos approved the
unlawfully acquired by the deceased Mayor and/or by petitioners. Still, to avoid a protracted litigation, Compromise Agreement between petitioners and respondent.10
petitioners exerted efforts to settle the case amicably with respondent through the PCGG.
On June 4, 1998,11 the OSG filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement.
After a series of motions were again filed by petitioners, the Sandiganbayan finally set the case for pre- Petitioners expressed their conformity to the motion on June 15, 1998.
trial on November 26, 1997, but the pre-trial was reset several times in view of the manifestation of the
parties that they were in the process of negotiating a compromise.
After conducting hearings on the motion, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision on July 31, 1998
approving the Compromise Agreement and rendering judgment in accordance with the terms thereof.12
On August 7, 1997, petitioners' offer of compromise was accepted by the PCGG in its Resolution No. 97-
180-A.4
However, on October 5, 1998, respondent, through the OSG and the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan
a Motion to Rescind Compromise Agreement and to Set Aside Judgment by Compromise (Motion to
Rescind). Respondent prayed for the rescission of the Compromise Agreement or reformation thereof
 54

after a renegotiation with petitioners. Respondent contended that the partition of the properties in the …
Compromise Agreement was grossly disadvantageous to the government and that there was fraud and
insidious misrepresentation by petitioners in the distribution and partition of properties, to the damage
In the instant case, fraud of an extrinsic character exists because the representatives of
and prejudice of the government. According to respondent, there was fraud and insidious
plaintiff Republic in the PCGG connived with defendants in hiding the assessed or market
misrepresentation because petitioners proposed to divide the properties—with 75% accruing to the
values of the properties involved, so as to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement
government and the remaining 25% going to petitioners and their other creditors—based on the total
adhered to the 75%-25% ratio adopted by the PCGG in entering into compromise of cases
land area of the properties instead of on their value. As a result, the government obtained only Three
involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Through their infidelity, those in the PCGG who
Million Six Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P3,620,000.00) worth of land, while petitioners received
handled or were closely involved with the case during the last days of the previous
almost Four Billion Pesos (P4,000,000,000.00) worth.
administration fraudulently gave the Compromise Agreement a semblance of fairness and
official acceptability. They sold plaintiff Republic down the river by entering into an
Petitioners filed an Answer to the Motion to Rescind and contended that the July 31, 1998 Decision of agreement grossly disadvantageous to the government. For while plaintiff Republic got
the Sandiganbayan could no longer be annulled because it had already become final and executory; that 00.15% (00.15074) of the estimated value of all the properties involved in this case,
respondent's counsel had no authority to file the motion; and that the motion was defective because it defendants almost ran away with 99.85% (99.84526) of their value. This is patently unfair. It is
did not include a Certification against Forum-Shopping. They also argued that there was no agreement to no compromise but a virtual sell-out. It could not have been pulled off without the
divide the properties by a 75% to 25% ratio in favor of the government. What they proposed to cede to connivance or collusion of those responsible for the case in the PCGG. Instead of protecting
the government by way of compromise were their properties in Pangil covered by Transfer Certificate of the interest of the government, they connived at its defeat…almost.16
Title (TCT) Nos. T-4044 and T-4009 and those in Famy, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. T-3813 to T-3817 and
T-4104, 4106 and 4108, not a specific percentage of the properties subject of litigation.13
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 9, 2000 and a Supplement to said motion
dated May 30, 2000. Petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion for Voluntary Inhibition dated May 18, 2000
In its Resolution dated September 22, 1999, the Sandiganbayan treated the Motion to Rescind as a praying that the members of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan voluntarily inhibit themselves from
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and set the motion hearing and resolving the petitioners' pending motions.
for hearing.
On February 22, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued two Orders, one denying petitioners' motion for
On April 11, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting respondent's motion to rescind and reconsideration,17and the other, denying the motion for voluntary inhibition.18
setting aside the Decision dated July 31, 1998. The Sandiganbayan held that the Motion to Rescind was
filed on time on October 5, 1998, the working day immediately following October 4, 1998, which was a
Hence, petitioners filed the present petition on April 27, 2001.
Sunday and the 60th day after respondent received the July 31, 1998 Decision on August 5, 1998. It also
ruled that the presumption that the OSG had authority to file the Motion to Rescind was not overcome
by petitioners. Under Republic Act No. 1379,14the filing and prosecution of cases for forfeiture of Respondent filed its Comment on October 22, 2001.
unlawfully acquired property is a function of the OSG. Petitioners failed to show proof that pleadings or
motions filed by lawyers of the government or the PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc On November 12, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution giving due course to the petition and requiring the
and by the President of the Republic. The Sandiganbayan likewise held that respondent was not required parties to submit their respective memoranda.19
to file a certification against forum-shopping because the motion to rescind was not an initiatory
pleading.15
Respondent filed its Memorandum on January 29, 2002. Petitioners filed theirs on February 26, 2002. In
their respective memoranda, the parties reiterated the arguments in their earlier pleadings.
With respect to the issue of fraud, it held that there was extrinsic fraud in the execution of the
Compromise Agreement. The Sandiganbayan stated:
Specifically, petitioners raise the following arguments:

…The values were deliberately omitted to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement
adheres to the 75%-25% ratio broadly adopted by the PCGG in compromising cases of ill- (A) The Sandiganbayan (Third Division) denied Petitioners their right to substantive and
gotten wealth. It was this 75%-25% mode of compromise, with the greater share of 75% going procedural due process when it refused to voluntarily inhibit itself from further hearing the
to the government that misled the Court to believe, as We did believe, that the Compromise instant case.
Agreement was fair, reasonable and advantageous to the Government….
(B) The PCGG lawyers had no authority to ask for the rescission of the subject Compromise
…What was projected to be a 75%-25% ratio was in reality a 00.15%-99.85% ratio, with Agreement without the consent of the PCGG En Banc and the President of the Republic of the
99.85% going to the Arganas. This is unconscionable and immoral. And since it results in a Philippines.
transaction grossly disadvantageous and immoral to the government, it is against the law as
being violative of Section 3(g) of Republic Act 3019. (C) The Motion to Rescind, which was treated by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) as a
Petition for Relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, is fatally defective because—
 55

1. It was not filed by a party to the case, i.e., it was filed by counsel without the Agreement.25 In support of their petition, petitioners cite Section 3 of Rule 38 which requires that the
client's authority. petition for relief be filed within sixty (60) days after the party seeking the relief learns of the judgment
or final order to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was
entered. They also invoke the case of Samonte v. Samonte26 where the Court held that a judgment upon
2. It was filed out of time.
compromise is deemed to have come to the knowledge of the parties on the very day it is entered.27

3. It was filed sans any supporting Affidavit of Merit.

It is further argued by petitioners that the Sandiganbayan's finding that the settlement between
petitioners and respondent was attended by fraud has no factual or legal basis. Petitioners point out that
4. It lacked the required Certification on Non-Forum Shopping. the property values cited by respondent in its Motion to Rescind were based solely on the estimates of
the PCGG lawyers and no evidence of the valuation of the properties were presented before the
(D) There is no factual or legal basis for the finding of fraud by the Sandiganbayan (Third Sandiganbayan to establish fraud. They also contend that the Sandiganbayan had no legal basis for
Division). taking judicial notice of the fact that agricultural land in rural areas such as Famy and Pangil, Laguna is
much cheaper and is usually sold by the hectare, while land in Metro Manila and in nearby municipalities
such as Muntinlupa is more valuable and sold per square meter. Petitioners insist that knowledge of the
(E) Upon approval of the Compromise Agreement, the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) lost valuation of property is not a condition sine qua non for the validity of a compromise agreement.28
jurisdiction over the case, including the authority to rescind said Compromise Agreement and
to set aside the judgment based thereon.
Petitioners also assert that the Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction to annul the Compromise
Agreement because its July 31, 1998 Decision had already become final and executory. Moreover, as a
(F) The Sandiganbayan (Third Division) lacked authority to alter a contract by construction or contract validly entered into by the parties, the Compromise Agreement had binding effect and authority
to make a new contract for the parties. on the parties thereto even if it were not judicially approved.29

(G) Since the Compromise Agreement had already been implemented, rescission cannot be Petitioners likewise contend that the Sandiganbayan cannot alter the Compromise Agreement which is a
availed of.20 valid and binding contract between themselves and respondent and impose the additional requirement
that "the moneys, properties or assets involved in the compromise must be fully disclosed and described
Petitioners contend that the members of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan should have inhibited not only as to the number or area (in case of real properties) but also as to their exact location,
themselves from resolving petitioners' motion for reconsideration because from the tenor of the April classification, appraised and fair market value, liens and encumbrances, whether titled or not, etc., so as
11, 2000 Order of the court granting respondent's motion to rescind, it was evident that the to leave no room for doubt that all the parties, the Court and the public know exactly what each party is
Sandiganbayan had already prejudged the properties subject of litigation as having been unlawfully giving or taking away, and under what specific terms and conditions."30 According to them, the
acquired.21 imposition of this requirement would be beyond the scope of the Sandiganbayan's authority.31

Petitioners likewise assert that the property value of a property offered for the amicable settlement of a Lastly, petitioners argue that the Compromise Agreement can no longer be rescinded because it had
case is not always material in determining the validity of a compromise agreement. They point out that already been implemented. In support of this argument, petitioners claim that on September 22, 1997,
what impelled the PCGG to enter into a compromise agreement with them was PCGG's perception that or four days after the signing of the agreement, they delivered to the PCGG the original TCTs of the
its evidence against petitioners was weak and might not be sufficient to justify maintaining the case properties ceded to respondent under the agreement.32
against them.22
Respondent, through the OSG, contends that the Sandiganbayan's April 11, 2000 Resolution which
In addition, petitioners insist that the Motion to Rescind which was treated by the Sandiganbayan as a granted the motion to rescind the Compromise Agreement and set aside its July 31, 1998 Decision
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is fatally defective for (i) lack of authority of respondent's cannot be the proper subject of a Petition for Certiorari. According to respondent, petitioners were not
lawyers to file the same; (ii) having been filed out of time; (iii) non-submission of an Affidavit of Merit; without any other remedy from the adverse ruling of the Sandiganbayan, and they should have gone to
and (iv) non-submission of a Certification against Forum-Shopping.23 trial and reiterated their special defenses.33

It is argued by petitioners that the Sandiganbayan should have denied respondent's Motion to Rescind Respondent also maintains that the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying petitioners' motion for
outright for having been filed without authority from the PCGG En Banc and the President of the voluntary inhibition of its members because petitioners' allegations of partiality and bias were not
Republic, both of whom earlier approved and authorized the execution of the Compromise Agreement. supported by clear and convincing evidence.34
According to petitioners, after final judgment has been rendered in a case, an attorney has no implied
authority from his client to seek material or substantial alterations or modifications in such judgment.24 It is also argued by respondent that there is no rule or law requiring that pleadings or motions filed by
lawyers of the government or the PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc and by the
Petitioners claim that the Motion to Rescind was filed only on October 5, 1998, or beyond sixty (60) days President of the Republic.35
from the time the Sandiganbayan promulgated its July 31, 1998 Decision approving the Compromise
 56

Anent the alleged procedural infirmities in the filing of the Motion to Rescind, respondent asserts that it On November 7, 1997, in reply to the letter of PCGG, the OSG with then Solicitor General
complied with the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 Silvestre H. Bello III as signatory, wrote the PCGG requesting it to submit to the OSG
and that it is not an initiatory pleading which is required to be accompanied by a Certification against clarification on the provision in the compromise agreement that the properties mentioned
Forum-Shopping.36 therein comprise all the sequestered assets subject of the litigation considering that in the
petition filed by the Republic, it is alleged that the late mayor Argana acquired no less than
251 OCTs/TCTs in Muntinlupa and the neighboring towns plus some other ill-gotten
Respondent disagrees with the contention of petitioners that the Sandiganbayan already lost jurisdiction
properties. The OSG likewise opined that the Compromise Agreement must first be submitted
over the case when it rendered its Decision on the Compromise Agreement on July 31, 1998 considering
to the President for his approval before submitting it to the Sandiganbayan.
that the decision is immediately executory since there is no appeal from such judgment. According to
respondent, the Rules of Court does recognize the jurisdiction of the court which rendered a decision
over a petition for relief from the same decision, and does not distinguish whether the judgment is based On February 10, 1998, the OSG received a reply from the PCGG, through Commissioner
on the evidence presented or on a compromise agreement. Moreover, as an exception to the general Herminio Mendoza, reiterating that the PCGG has decided to enter into the compromise
rule that the court which rendered judgment on the compromise cannot modify such compromise, the agreement because it believes that the evidence may not be sufficient to warrant continuing
court may order modifications thereon when the parties consent to such modification or when there is a prosecution of Civil Case No. 0026 against the Arganas.
hearing to determine the presence or absence of vitiated consent.37
With respect to OSG's request for clarification, the PCGG furnished the OSG a copy of the
Respondent adds that the Sandiganbayan did not make a new contract for the parties but simply report conducted by the PCGG Research and Development Department whereby it is stated
declared their Compromise Agreement null and void with the net effect of continuing the case from that there are 324 OCTs/TCTs evaluated representing real properties of the late Mayor
where it left off.38 Argana with a total land area of 481.77422 hectares out of which the Republic will get
361.9203 hectares or 75.12% of the total land area under the Compromise Agreement. No
mention, however, was made as to the value of the properties to be ceded to the Republic
Respondent insists that a compromise agreement which is unconscionable, shocking to the mind and
and the properties to be retained by the Arganas.
contrary to law and public policy, such as that entered into by it with petitioners, is null and void. A void
compromise agreement vests no rights and creates no obligations. Considering that the compromise
agreement sought to be declared void in this case is one which is prejudicial to the government, it is the On March 2, 1998, the OSG, through then Solicitor General Romeo C. dela Cruz, again wrote
Court's duty to strike it down as null and void.39 the PCGG reiterating its previous position that before submitting the compromise agreement
to the Sandiganbayan for approval, it must first be submitted to the President of the
Philippines for his approval as required in par. 6 of the Compromise Agreement. The OSG also
It is argued by respondent that while it did not present additional evidence after it filed the Motion to
reiterated its request for clarification regarding the properties covered by the compromise
Rescind, it submitted the motion on the basis of all the verified pleadings and papers on record.
agreement as the Report submitted to it made mention of 361.9203 hectares or 75.12% out
Respondent likewise claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in taking judicial notice of the fact that
of the total land area of 481.71422 hectares to be ceded to the Republic, and 24.88% to be
agricultural lands in the provinces, such as the lands titled in petitioners' names in Famy and Pangil,
retained by the Arganas, no mention whatsoever was made of the kind of land, location and
Laguna, are much cheaper than lands in urban areas such as those in Muntinlupa City. Respondent insists
value of the respective areas.
that such fact is a matter of public knowledge and may be taken judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule
129 of the Revised Rules of Court.40
On June 2, 1998, the OSG received a letter dated May 29,1998 from then Commissioner
Herminio A. Mendoza forwarding it copy of the approval by then President Fidel Ramos of the
Respondent also points out that petitioners expressly admitted in their Answer to the Motion to Rescind
Compromise Agreement. With respect to its query, it was stated therein that the PCGG is
that the value of the properties which they ceded to respondent under the Compromise Agreement is
unable to determine the value of the land to be ceded to the Republic and those to be
less than the value of the properties retained by them.41
retained by the Arganas because of the big number of the parcels of the land located mainly
in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila and Laguna and/or the lack of available records showing their
Respondent claims that there was fraud of an extrinsic character because its representatives in the PCGG respective values for tax purposes. The PCGG reiterated their request that the OSG file with
connived with petitioners in concealing the assessed or market values of the properties subject of the the Sandiganbayan in SB Civil Case No. 0026 a motion for the approval of the compromise
Compromise Agreement to make it appear that the latter adhered to the 75%-25% ratio adopted by the agreement.
PCGG in entering into compromise of cases involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. It is pointed out
by respondent that the OSG was in fact initially reluctant to file the motion for approval of the
Obviously, through such a scheme, those in the PCGG then who handled or were involved
compromise agreement with the Sandiganbayan because the Compromise Agreement only mentioned
with the case fraudulently gave the Compromise Agreement a semblance of fairness and
the areas of the properties but conspicuously failed to mention the property values thereof. Respondent
official acceptability, but in truth, it was grossly disadvantageous to the government. The
explained:
motion to approve compromise agreement was filed by the OSG out of courtesy as the PCGG
was able to get the approval of then Pres. Fidel V. Ramos but not because it (OSG) totally
On October 7, 1997, the PCGG forwarded to the OSG a copy of the Compromise Agreement approved the same after an independent evaluation of the report. 42 (Emphasis in the
between the Republic and the Arganas in SB Civil Case No. 0026, with a request that the OSG original.)
file a motion with the Sandiganbayan for the approval of the said Compromise Agreement.
 57

Finally, respondent argues that the Compromise Agreement had not yet been implemented. Although merely performing its legal duty to recover the wealth purportedly amassed unlawfully by the late Mayor
petitioners delivered the TCTs covering the lots ceded to respondent under the terms of the compromise Argana during his terms as Mayor of Muntinlupa. The Motion to Rescind was filed precisely because the
on September 22, 1997, such delivery could not have the effect of implementation of the Compromise PCGG, as respondent's authorized representative in the compromise, discovered that the execution of
Agreement because the contract was submitted to the Sandiganbayan for approval only on June 15, the Compromise Agreement was attended by fraud and sought the help of the OSG which in turn is the
1998. The Compromise Agreement expressly required that in order for it to be effective, it must be duly authorized government agency to represent respondent in forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379.
approved by the President of the Republic and of the Sandiganbayan.43 Hence, the Sandiganbayan correctly upheld the authority of the OSG, assisted by the PCGG, in filing the
Motion to Rescind.
The issues for the Court's resolution are as follows:
The Court also finds that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in
granting the Motion to Rescind, which it treated as a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of
1) Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy;
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 3 thereof prescribes the periods within which the petition for
relief must be filed:
2) Whether the OSG and the PCGG lawyers have authority to file the Motion to Rescind on
behalf of respondent;
Time for filing petition; contents and verification.– A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
3) Whether the Motion to Rescind, which was treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition for petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not
relief, complied with the requirements of Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding
was taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or
4) Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
Rescind and in setting aside its Decision dated July 31, 1998; and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

5) Whether the members of the Sandiganbayan's Third Division should have inhibited The Court has previously held that as applied to a judgment based on compromise, both the sixty (60)-
themselves from resolving petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. day and six (6)-month reglementary periods within which to file a petition for relief should be reckoned
from the date when the decision approving the compromise agreement was rendered because such
judgment is considered immediately executory and entered on the date that it was approved by the
The Court shall first tackle the first, second, third and fifth issues since these involve court.47
procedural matters.

Applying the foregoing rule to the present case, the sixty (60)-day period should be counted from July 31,
The Court does not agree with respondent's contention that a petition for certiorari is not the proper 1998, the date of the Sandiganbayan Decision granting the Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement.
remedy to assail the February 22, 2001 Order of the Sandiganbayan which affirmed its earlier directive to The sixtieth day from July 31, 1998 is September 29, 1998. The Motion to Rescind was filed by the OSG
set the case against petitioners for pre-trial following the annulment of its judgment by compromise only on October 5, 1998, clearly several days after the sixtieth day from the rendition of the July 31, 1998
agreement. A special civil action for certiorari may be instituted when any tribunal, board or officer Decision.
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.44 The Court has previously held that an order This notwithstanding, the Court finds that no grave abuse can be ascribed to the Sandiganbayan in
setting the case for further proceedings, issued after the original judgment rendered pursuant to a admitting the Motion to Rescind as a petition for relief was timely filed.
compromise agreement is set aside, is an interlocutory order and is therefore not appealable.45 Since no
appeal is available against such an order, the proper remedy to assail it is a special civil action for Although as a general rule, the party filing a petition for relief must strictly comply with the sixty (60)-day
certiorari. The remedy taken by petitioners is therefore proper. and six (6)-month reglementary periods under Section 3, Rule 38,48 it is not without exceptions. The
Court relaxed the rule in several cases49 and held that the filing of a petition for relief beyond the sixty
Petitioners' contention that the Motion to Rescind filed by the lawyers of the PCGG and of the OSG 60-day period is not fatal so long as it is filed within the six (6)-month period from entry of judgment.50
should have been treated by the Sandiganbayan as a mere scrap of paper because the motion was filed
without the authority of the PCGG En Banc and of the President of the Republic has no legal basis. There The Court notes that the filing of the Motion to Rescind on October 5, 1998 was indeed seven days
is no requirement under the law that pleadings and motions filed by lawyers of the government or the beyond the sixty 60-day period but still well within the six (6)-month period from entry of judgment.
PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc and by the President of the Philippines. More Moreover, the case involves an alleged fraud committed against the Republic, and thus justifies the
importantly, R.A. No. 1379 expressly authorizes the OSG to prosecute cases of forfeiture of property liberal interpretation of procedural laws by the Sandiganbayan.
unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee.46 It must be remembered that it was the OSG
which filed Civil Case No. 0026 for the forfeiture of petitioners' allegedly ill-gotten wealth, and that the
Petitioners' claim that respondent failed to attach an affidavit of merit to its Motion to Rescind is belied
Compromise Agreement between petitioners and respondent was an amicable settlement of that case.
by the record of the case. Petitioners in fact attached, as Annex "N" of their Petition for Certiorari, a copy
By filing an action for rescission of the Compromise Agreement based on extrinsic fraud, the OSG was
of the respondent's Motion to Rescind. The Affidavit of Merit signed by Dennis M. Taningco, the counsel
 58

of the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0026, was attached to the Motion to Rescind. In any case, the Court in Noticeable from the documents submitted to the court after the decision approving the
Mago v. Court of Appeals51 held that the absence of an affidavit of merit does not always result in the Compromise Agreement was promulgated is the fact that only the percentage of sharing
denial of the petition for relief, so long as the facts required to be set out in the affidavit appear in the based on area was mentioned and brought to the attention of the PCGG en banc and the
verified petition. The oath which forms part of the petition elevates it to the same category as an Solicitor General. The value of the properties was never, and not even once, mentioned. Thus,
affidavit.52 in the Memorandum of Director Mauro J. Estrada of the PCGG Research and Development
Department to the PCGG Chairman, dated August 18, 1997, the following exposition appears:
Neither was it necessary for respondent to attach a Certification against Forum-Shopping to the Motion
to Rescind. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the Motion to Rescind, which in effect was a petition "12. On July 10, 1996, the Arganas submitted a proposal for Compromise Agreement (copy
for relief, is not an initiatory pleading which requires the inclusion of a Certification against Forum- attached, per Annex "J") that would cede by donation about 231 hectares of agricultural lands
Shopping. Section 2, Rule 38 requires that a petition for relief must be filed with the court which to the government, Xerox copies of nine (9) TCTs attached therewith, enumerated as follows:
rendered the judgment or order sought to be set aside, and in the same case wherein the judgment or
order was rendered. If the court finds that the allegations in the petition for relief are true, it shall set
aside the judgment and try the principal case upon the merits as if a timely motion for new trial had "TCT No. Area in Square Meters Location
been granted.53 Clearly, then, a petition for relief is not an initiatory pleading in a new case which would
require the filing by the petitioner therein of a Certification of Non- Forum Shopping. T-3813 47,908 Famy, Laguna

The Court also finds no abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan in denying petitioners' Urgent Motion T-8314 47,461 -do-
for Voluntary Inhibition. As explained in Gutang v. Court of Appeals,54 the import of the rule on voluntary
inhibition is that the decision of a judge on whether or not to inhibit is left to his or her sound discretion T-8315 30,000 -do-
and conscience, based on his or her rational and logical assessment of the case where the motion for
inhibition is filed. It implies that in addition to pecuniary interest, relationship, or previous participation T-8316 40,000 -do-
in the matter under litigation—which are grounds for mandatory inhibition under the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court—there might be other causes that could diminish the T-8317 30,000 -do-
objectivity of the judge, thus warranting his or her inhibition. Petitioners' claim of bias and partiality on
the part of the Sandiganbayan justices who issued the April 11, 2000 Resolution, evaluated in light of the
T-4104 20,000 -do-
resolution itself, is evidently more imagined than real. To say, as is petitioners' wont, that a judge who
throws out a party's motion in the language employed by the Sandiganbayan in the questioned
Resolution is necessarily prejudiced, is to be indiscriminate and precipitate. T-4106 38,550 -do-

T-4108 31,618 -do-

Petitioners' assertion that the April 11, 2000 Resolution was harshly worded and evinced prejudgment of
the case in respondent's favor is easily disproved by a reading of the Resolution in its entirety. As will be
T-4044 1,137,361 San Isidro & Banilan,
discussed hereafter, the Sandiganbayan's pronouncement that the Compromise Agreement was grossly
883,355 Pangil, Laguna
disadvantageous and prejudicial to the government is supported by the facts on record. In charging the
Sandiganbayan with forejudgment when it said that "all it takes to prove the case is evidence that the
properties are manifestly out of proportion to the late Mayor Maximino A. Argana's salary and to his 2,306,253 Sq. Meters
other lawful income and other legitimately acquired income,"55petitioners have taken the statement out 230,6253 Hectares
of context. The Sandiganbayan made the statement in relation to its bewilderment as to why the PCGG
expressed difficulty in prosecuting the case against the late Mayor Argana in spite of the presumption
regarding unexplained wealth in Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). "Another big tract of land located at Matikiw, Pangil, Laguna, consisting of 131,2950 hectares
The Sandiganbayan therefore had legal and factual grounds to deny petitioners' motion for inhibition. covered by TCT No. T-4009, per Annex "K" may be considered for inclusion in the proposed
compromise settlement. The reason for this is that this land is being eyed by the DAR for
distribution under the CARP. As a whole, the government may be able to acquire about
Anent the propriety of the Sandiganbayan's nullification of the Compromise Agreement on the ground of 361.9203 hectares of land equivalent to 75.12% of the 481.7742 hectares of land of
extrinsic fraud, the Court holds that no error nor grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the sequestered real estate property belonging to the Arganas and other owners.
Sandiganbayan for ruling that the execution of the Compromise Agreement was tainted with fraud on
the part of petitioners and in connivance with some PCGG officials. A circumspect review of the record of
the case reveals that fraud, indeed, was perpetuated upon respondent in the execution of the "However, of the 481.7742 hectares covered by a sequestration order, the late Mayor Argana
Compromise Agreement, the assessed or market values of the properties offered for settlement having owns about 409.50817 hectares and possibly the heirs are willing to cede 361.9203 hectares
been concealed from the reviewing authorities such as the PCGG En Banc and even the President of the which is equivalent to 88.38%, retaining 47.5887 hectares or 11.62% of what they owned.
Republic. The discussion of the Sandiganbayan on the nature and extent of the fraud perpetuated upon
respondent in the execution of the Compromise Agreement is clear and convincing: "E. EVALUATION
 59

"1) As presented in Annex "L", page 13, the total area of real estate property sequestered "However, since the late Mayor Argana owns 409.50817 hectares sequestered and may
aggregated to 481.7742 hectares accounted as follows: possibly cede 361.9203 hectares, the percentage share of the government would be 88.38%
of the 409.50817 hectares actually registered in his name and his children.
Total Area Sequestered 100.00% 481.77422
Accounted as Follows: "G. RECOMMENDATION
a) owned by Mayor Maximino Argana 75.12% 409.50817 has.
b) Owned by his Brothers & Sisters 9.88% 26.6318 has. "The PCGG wanted to recover as much as it could and as fast as possible, while the Arganas
wanted to buy peace without admitting guilt. In order to avoid further lengthy litigation and
c) Foreclosed by Los Baños Rural Bank 1.24% 5.9856 has. to put an end to an almost ten-year unresolved sequestration issue, and to expedite recovery
d) Owned by Other Persons 8.23% 39.64865 has. so that the remaining assets may be used to contribute to the national recovery, the
TOTAL 100.00% 481.77422 has. 230.6253 hectares of land covered by nine (9) TCTs (Nos. T-3813, T-3814, T-3815, T-3816, T-
3817, T-4104, T-4106, T-4108 and T-4044) offered by the Arganas be favorably considered, on
condition that another real estate property covered by TCT No. T-4009, located at Matikiw,
"2) Out of the total area of 481.77422 hectares covered by a sequestration order, about Pangil, Laguna, consisting of 131.2950 hectares, be included and to be ceded to the
409.50817 hectares are owned by the late Mayor Argana. The other lots are owned by his government. All other lots sequestered should be freed from the sequestration order.
brothers and sisters (26.6318 hectares), foreclosed by Los Baños Rural Bank (5.9856
hectares), and registered and/or acquired by other persons (39.64865 hectares). In the event
that the other big area consisting of 131.2950 hectares of land is included in the compromise "As a whole, the government stands to acquire about 361.9203 hectares out of the 409.50817
settlement in favor of the government, a total of 361-50817 (sic) hectares of land would hectares registered in the name of Sps. Maximino A. Argana, REFEDOR, and their children,
comprise about 88.38 % of the 409.50817 hectares registered in the name of the late Mayor equivalent to 88.38%. The remaining 11.62% or 47.58787 hectares will be retained by the
Argana. latter.

3) However, as a whole the 361.9203 hectares to be ceded to the government is equivalent to "For the consideration of the Commission.
75.12% of the 481.77422 hectares sequestered by PCGG as presented above. Since the late
mayor owns 409.50817 hectares to the government, the percentage share of the government
would be 88.38 % and the remaining 11.62 % may be retained by the heirs of the late Mayor Signed
Argana, equivalent to 47.58787 hectares.
MAURO J. ESTRADA"
"F. SUMMARY (Record, v. 6, pp. 776-78)
(Underlining supplied)

"The family of the late Mayor Maximino A. Argana offered to cede to the government a total
of 230.62553 hectares of land covered by nine (9) TCTs. Another property, however, The value of the properties must have been raised or even discussed during the several years
consisting of 131.2950 hectares may be considered for inclusion which would increase to that the properties were held under sequestration. Yet, not even the PCGG bothered to
361.9203 hectares of land that may be ceded to the government. produce any tax declaration, assessment or appraisal to show the assessed or fair market
value of the properties. . . . .
"In the event that the 361.9203 hectares are finally considered and acceptable by both
parties, the PCGG and the Arganas, the 481.77422 hectares of sequestered property would be Again in another Memorandum of Director Mauro J. Estrada to PCGG Counsel Edgardo L.
accounted as follows: Kilayko, dated February 2, 1988, the properties were listed according to the name of the
owner, certificate of title, area in square meters, location and percentages in relation to the
Total Area Sequestered 100.00% 481.77422 has. whole. Obvious from the listing is the absence of a column to indicate the value of the
properties or their classification. . . .
Accounted as follows:
a) To be ceded the Government 75.12% 361.9203 has.
The percentage based solely on area, was clearly emphasized, as shown by the following
b) To be retained by the late Mayor Argana's Heirs 9.88% 47.78787 has.
portions of said Memorandum:
c) Owned by his Brothers & Sisters 5.53% 26.6318 has.
d) Foreclosed by Los Baños Rural Bank 1.24% 5.9856 has.
"Out of the 409.50817 hectares registered in the name of Spouses Maximo A. Argana and
e) Owned by Other Persons 8.23% 39.64865 has. Donata A. Argana as presented above, 361.9203 hectares covering eleven (11) TCTs are to be
Total 100.00% 481.77422 has. ceded to the government under the compromise agreement signed by Argana and the
Commission in the latter part of 1997. The 361.9203 hectares to be ceded to the government
 60

is equivalent to 75.12 % of the total area of 481.77422 hectares, as presented below: x x x" WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated April 11, 2000 of the
(Record, v. 6, p. 1739) (underlining supplied) Sandiganbayan granting the Motion to Rescind Compromise Agreement and to Set Aside Judgment by
Compromise and setting the case for pre-trial, as well as the Order dated February 22, 2001 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, are hereby AFFIRMED.
"As a whole, there are 324 TCTs/OCTs covering a total area of 481.77422 hectares, out of
which the heirs of the late Mayor agreed to cede 361.9203 hectares equivalent to 75.12 % of
the total area. Sometime. In August 1997, the Commission agreed to accept the offer by Costs against petitioners.
concluding a compromise agreement with the heirs of the late Mayor." (Record, v. 6, p. 1739)
(underlining supplied)
SO ORDERED.

. . . The values were deliberately omitted to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement
adheres to the 75%-25% ratio broadly adopted by the PCGG in compromising cases of ill-
gotten wealth. It was this 75%-25% mode of compromise, with the greater share of 75% going
to the government that misled the Court to believe, as We did believe, that the Compromise
Agreement was fair, reasonable and advantageous to the Government. . . .

. . . What was projected to be a 75%-25% ratio was in reality a 00.15%-99.85% ratio, with
99.85% going to the Arganas. This is unconscionable and immoral. And since it results in a
transaction grossly disadvantageous and immoral to the government, it is against the law as
being violative of Section 3(g) of Republic Act 3019.

In the instant case, fraud of an extrinsic character exists because the representatives of
plaintiff Republic in the PCGG connived with defendants in hiding the assessed or market
values of the properties involved, so as to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement
adhered to the 75%-25% ratio adopted by the PCGG in entering into compromise of cases
involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Through their infidelity, those in the PCGG who
handled or were closely involved with the case during the last days of the previous
administration fraudulently gave the Compromise Agreement a semblance of fairness and
official acceptability. They sold plaintiff Republic down the river by entering into an
agreement grossly disadvantageous to the government. For while plaintiff Republic got
00.15% (00.15074) of the estimated value of all the properties involved in this case,
defendants almost ran away with 99.85% (99.84526) of their value. This is patently unfair. It is
no compromise but a virtual sell-out. It could not have been pulled off without the
connivance or collusion of those responsible for the case in the PCGG. Instead of protecting
the interest of the government, they connived at its defeat…almost.56 (Emphasis in the
original.)

It is evident from the foregoing that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan is grounded on facts and on the law.
The Court sees no reason to depart from the conclusions drawn by the Sandiganbayan on the basis of its
findings, especially considering that the three justices comprising the Sandiganbayan's Third Division
conducted a thorough examination of the documents submitted by the parties to this case, heard the
testimonies of the parties' witnesses and observed their deportment during the hearing on the Motion
to Rescind.

Moreover, it is an established rule that the State cannot be estopped by the mistakes of its
agents.57 Respondent cannot be bound by a manifestly unjust compromise agreement reviewed on its
behalf and entered into by its representatives from the PCGG who apparently were not looking after
respondent's best interests.
 61

H. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS Transmittal14 dated August 23, 2000 which contained an explicit directive from the Court for the SB to
submit proof of execution within fifteen (15) days from receipt. As such, the SB immediately set the case
for this purpose.
EN BANC
On February 26, 2001, Labrador’s counsel de oficio, Atty. Vicente Espina, manifested in open court that
G.R. No. 199114 July 16, 2013 Labrador desires to apply for probation in accordance with Presidential Decree No. (PD) 968,15 as
amended by PD 199016(Probation Law). Thus, in an Order17 of even date, the SB resolved to accord
Labrador a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file such application, and, in the meantime,
ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ, IN HER CAPACITY AS THEN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE suspended the execution proceedings.
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), PETITIONER,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND COMMISSIONER Eventually, upon favorable recommendation of the Parole and Probation Office, the SB, in a
JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., RESPONDENT. Resolution18 dated September 28, 2001, granted Labrador’s application for probation and likewise
cancelled the bail bond he posted for his provisional liberty.19
DECISION
Thereafter, at the end of Labrador’s probation period, a Probation Officer’s Final Report20 dated
November 4, 2003 was issued, recommending that his probation be terminated and that he be
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: discharged from its legal effects. The SB, however, withheld its approval and, instead, issued a
Resolution21 dated March 2, 2004 (March 2, 2004 Resolution), stating that Labrador’s application for
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 is respondent Commission on Audit’s (COA) Decision No. 2009- probation was, in fact, erroneously granted due to his previous appeal from his judgment of conviction,
1212 dated October 29, 2009 which affirmed Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-0023 dated January 18, in violation of Section 4 of the Probation Law.22 Further, owing to the probation officer’s finding that
2006, directing petitioner Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz (Dimapilis-Baldoz), in her capacity as then Labrador continued to hold the position of POEA ESRD Chief despite him having been sentenced to suffer
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), to refund the government the penalty of temporary special disqualification from office, the SB directed that copies of the March 2,
the amount of ₱1,740,124.08 which represents the salaries and benefits unduly received by Leonel P. 2004 Resolution be furnished to Dimapilis-Baldoz, as POEA Administrator, as well as to the CSC Chairman
Labrador (Labrador) despite his adjudged dismissal from service. for their information.23

The Facts On March 9, 2004, Dimapilis-Baldoz received a copy of the said resolution and thereupon issued a
Notice/Order of Separation24 dated March 11, 2004 (Separation Order), relieving Labrador of his duties,
viz:
Labrador was the former Chief of the POEA’s Employment Services Regulation Division (ESRD). On May 2,
1997, then Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Quisumbing) ordered his dismissal from service as
he was found to have bribed a certain Madoline Villapando, an overseas Filipino worker, in the amount NOTICE/ORDER OF SEPARATION
of ₱6,200.00 in order to expedite the issuance of her overseas employment certificate.4 Labrador’s
dismissal was affirmed on appeal by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) through CSC Resolution No. 03- TO : MR. LEONEL P. LABRADOR
0339 dated March 12, 2003,5 and his subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied through CSC
No. 8 Luciano Street
Resolution No. 040547 dated May 17, 2004.6 Phase 5, Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision
Molino, Bacoor
Aside from the foregoing administrative proceedings, a criminal case for direct bribery was instituted 4102 Cavite
against Labrador in view of the same infraction. Consequently, on August 31, 1999, the Sandiganbayan
(SB) promulgated a Decision,7 convicting him of the aforementioned crime and thereby sentenced him Anent Notice of Resolution dated 02 March 2004 Re: Criminal Case No. 19863 issued by the
to: (a) suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, Quezon City, resolving the finality and execution of the Court’s August
of prision correccional, as maximum; (b) pay a fine of ₱3,000.00; (c) suffer the penalty of temporary
31, 1999 decision carrying among other penalties temporary special disqualification from office, please
special disqualification from public office; and (d) pay costs.8 Labrador’s motion for reconsideration was be informed that effective today, you are hereby considered dropped from the rolls and separated from
denied in a Resolution dated November 17, 1999,9 prompting him to elevate the matter to the Court.10 the service.

In a Resolution dated January 26, 200011 (January 26, 2000 Resolution), the Court affirmed Labrador’s As such, you are further instructed to turn over your duties and responsibilities and clear yourself of all
conviction and subsequently denied his motion for reconsideration with finality on March 15, property and money accountabilities with this Office.
2000.12 Likewise, in a Resolution dated June 28, 2000,13 the Court denied Labrador’s motion for leave to
file a second motion for reconsideration with motion for new trial and prayer for referral to the Court En
Banc, resulting in the January 26, 2000 Resolution’s entry of judgment. On October 26, 2000, the SB For strict compliance.
received copies of the same resolution and its corresponding entry of judgment through a Letter of
 62

Mandaluyong City, 11 March 2004. he was under probation since his probation did not obliterate the crime for which he was convicted,
more so his penalty of dismissal from the service.31
Sgd. ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ
Administrator On January 26, 2010, the POEA moved for the reconsideration32 (POEA’s Motion for Reconsideration) of
the COA Decision. On even date, POEA Administrator Jennifer Jardin-Manalili (Jardin-Manalili), who took
over the post of Dimapilis-Baldoz, wrote a letter to Audit Team Leader Evelyn V. Menciano, requesting
Incidents Before the COA
that the execution of the COA Decision be held in abeyance pending resolution of the POEA’s Motion for
Reconsideration.33 In a letter34 dated May 31, 2000, the COA, however, no longer entertained the said
Almost a year later, or on February 7, 2005, COA State Auditor IV, Crescencia L. Escurel, issued Audit motion in view of the issuance by the COA Secretary of a Notice of Finality of Decision35 dated January 7,
Observation Memorandum No. 2005-01125 dated February 7, 2005 (COA Audit Memo) which contained 2010, stating that the COA Decision had already become final and executory since no motion for
her audit observations on the various expenditures of the POEA pertaining to the payment of salaries reconsideration or appeal was filed within the reglementary period.36
and benefits to Labrador for the period covering August 31, 1999 to March 15, 2004. The pertinent
portions of the COA Audit Memo read as follows:26
Undaunted, Jardin-Manalili, through a letter37 dated June 21, 2010, again implored the COA to resolve
POEA’s Motion for Reconsideration on its merits and not to deny it outright on a technicality. Yet, the
The accounts Government Equity and Salaries and Wages-Regular, Additional Compensation, COA no longer responded to the said plea, prompting Dimapilis-Baldoz to file this petition for certiorari.
Representation and Transportation Allowances and Other Personnel Benefits are overstated by
₱1,626,956.05, ₱57,143.03, ₱3,000.00, ₱16,050.00 and ₱11,800.00, respectively due to payment of
The Issue Before the Court
salaries and wages, additional compensation, allowances and other benefits to an official from August
31, 1999 to March 15, 2004, contrary to the Sandiganbayan Decision dated August 31, 1999.
The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the
COA’s disallowance in this case.
In view thereof, justification is desired why Mr. Leonel Labrador, formerly Chief General Services Division
and Employment Services Regulation Division was allowed to continue in the service and receive his
salaries, additional compensation, RATA and other personnel benefits from August 31, 1999 to the time The Court’s Ruling
he was terminated from office effective March 9, 2004 (Note: The last salary received was even up to
March 15, 2004) in the total amount of ₱1,714,949.08, including other emoluments such as allowances,
The petition is partly meritorious
13th month pay and other personnel benefits granted him such as medical and rice allowances, incentive
allowances, etc. in the amount of ₱565,795.05. Pursuant to the August 31, 1999 judgment of conviction,
which had long become final and executory, Mr. Labrador is considered terminated from the service and A. Grave abuse of discretion; reckoning
is no longer entitled to continue to draw his salaries thereafter up to March 15, 2004. x x x point of period of disallowance.

Corollary to this, Book V Title I Subtitle B Chapter 9, Sec. 52, EO 292 and Sec. 103 PD 1445 provides that It is fundamental that the COA has the authority to rule on the legality of the disbursement of
expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall government funds. This finds force in Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefore. (Constitution) which explicitly provides that:
(Underscoring and italics in the original)
D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Based on these observations, the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance27 (Notice of Disallowance) on
January 18, 2006, finding Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA employees,28 personally liable for the Section 2.
salaries and other benefits unduly received by Labrador in the amount of ₱1,740,124.08, paid through
various checks issued from August 1999 to March 15, 2004.
The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property,
Through a letter29dated March 3, 2006, Dimapilis-Baldoz sought the reconsideration of the Notice of owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
Disallowance, asserting that the POEA should not be held liable for the refund of the foregoing amount instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on
since Labrador's employment was fully and promptly terminated upon receipt of the SB’s March 2, 2004 a post- audit basis:
Resolution.

a. constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy
However, on October 29, 2009, the COA issued Decision No. 2009-12130 (COA Decision) which affirmed under this Constitution;
the Notice of Disallowance and reiterated that the amount covering the salaries and benefits of Labrador
should not have been paid to him from August 1999 to March 31, 2004 pending final resolution of the
criminal case against him. The COA pointed out that Labrador should not have reported for work while b. autonomous state colleges and universities;
 63

c. other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and penalties imposed against him, more significantly, his temporary special disqualification from public
office.
d. such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or
through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to The Court holds that neither of these positions adopts a proper perspective toward the attendant facts
such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. x x x of the case.

The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the Significant to the determination of the appropriate period of the disallowance is the undisputed fact
scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and that, pursuant to an order issued by then Labor Secretary Quisumbing, Labrador had already been made
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and to suffer the administrative penalty of dismissal from service on May 2, 1997, which was long before the
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses SB convicted him of direct bribery on August 31, 1999. As a matter of law, a department secretary’s
of government funds and properties. decision confirming the removal of an officer under his authority is immediately executory, even pending
further remedy by the dismissed public officer.40 On this score, Section 47(2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title
I, Book V of the Administrative Code, as amended,41 expressly provides:
Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987" (Administrative Code), echoes this constitutional mandate, to wit:
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
SEC. 11. General Jurisdiction. – (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case
uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations
initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall
with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that
be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after
have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and
confirmation by the Secretary concerned. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such
non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition In Bangalisan v. CA,42 the Court upheld the immediate execution of the Education Secretary’s decision
of subsidy or equity. x x x dismissing or suspending a band of striking public school teachers pursuant to the above-cited provision
(Section 472):
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the
scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and As to the immediate execution of the decision of the Secretary against petitioners, the same is
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and authorized by Section 47, paragraph (2), of Executive Oder No. 292, thus: "The Secretaries and heads of
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate
of government funds and properties. and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction.
Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or
fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office
In view of the foregoing, it has been pronounced that the COA’s exercise of its general audit power is
head is appealable to the Commission, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal,
among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our
in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned."43
form of government. Furthermore, it has also been declared that the COA is endowed with enough
latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds.38 Likewise, in the subsequent cases of De la Cruz v. CA44 and Hon. Gloria v. CA,45 the Court similarly
affirmed the import of Section 47(2) on the immediate effect of administrative sanctions upon final
order by the department secretary or head of agency.
Pursuant to its mandate, the COA disallowed the disbursements pertaining to the personnel benefits
paid to Labrador, reasoning that the latter should have stopped reporting for work as early as June 28,
2000 when the denial of his appeal from the SB’s August 31, 1999 Decision rendered his conviction for Hence, based on these authorities, then Labor Secretary Quisumbing’s order of dismissal in this case
the crime of direct bribery final and executory, notwithstanding the grant of his application for should have also been executed immediately upon its issuance on May 2, 1997. In this accord, Labrador
probation. In this regard, it opines that the period of disallowance should be reckoned from May 3, 2000 should not have been allowed to report for work from such date, much less receive any salary or benefit
which is the date the SB’s August 31, 1999 Decision had become final and executory.39 accruing from his previous post.

While Dimapilis-Baldoz takes no exception to the COA’s authority to disallow any illegal disbursements, At this juncture, it is well to note that neither the grant nor subsequent revocation of Labrador’s
she argues that its disallowance of the subject amounts pertaining to Labrador’s salaries and benefits probation should hold any relevance to his disqualification from office.
should have been reckoned only from March 2, 2004, which is the time the SB set aside its initial
resolution granting Labrador’s application for probation and directing the latter to finally serve the
 64

As correctly argued by the COA, the grant of probation does not justify a public employee’s retention in An equally compelling incident relevant to the finding of grave abuse of discretion in this case is the
the government service. This was settled in the case of the Office of the Court Administrator v. adjudged personal liability of Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA personnel.
Librado46 wherein the Court declared:
Essentially, Dimapilis-Baldoz tries to exculpate herself from the foregoing by arguing that she and her
x x x While indeed the purpose of the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as amended) is to save valuable office were not officially notified of the orders, resolutions, and decisions of the SB or that of the Court,
human material, it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon probation does not obliterate the crime affirming Labrador’s conviction of the crime of direct bribery, and even the notices on the subsequent
[for] which the person under probation has been convicted. The reform and rehabilitation of the actions and proceedings undertaken by the SB.51 In fact, In her letter for reconsideration addressed to
probationer cannot justify his retention in the government service. He may seek to re-enter government the COA’s Legal and Adjudication Office,52 Dimapilis-Baldoz alleged that Labrador’s 201 file is bereft of
service, but only after he has shown that he is fit to serve once again. It cannot be repeated too often any records regarding the SB case. While admitting that Labrador did indeed continue to report for work
that a public office is a public trust, which demands of those in its service the highest degree of morality. despite the SB’s August 31, 1999 Decision convicting him of direct bribery, these antecedents show that
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) she merely acted in good faith and lawfully exercised her duties when she approved the payment of
Labrador’s salaries, wages, and other personnel benefits for the period beginning August 31, 1999 to
March 2, 2004.53
Thus, irrespective of the incidents concerning Labrador’s probation, the concomitant effects of his
conviction, more significantly, his disqualification to hold public office, were already left for him to suffer
at the time the SB’s August 31, 1999 Decision became final and executory on May 3, 2000 which is the The Court finds the defense to be well-taken.
same date the COA posits as the reckoning point of its period of disallowance. However, as earlier
discussed, the proper reckoning point for the said disallowance should be pegged at May 2, 1997, since
It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge
Labrador had already been dismissed from the service at such time and hence, had already been
of official duties,54 such that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with malice or
disqualified from receiving any salary or benefit attendant to his post. In this light, the Court finds no
bad faith, he should not be charged with personal liability for damages that may result from the
reason to engage in a discussion on the date the SB’s August 31, 1999 Decision had actually become final
performance of an official duty.55 Good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the contrary bears
and executory. It is key, however, to ascertain how the fact of Labrador’s May 2, 1997 dismissal figures
the burden56 to convincingly show that malice or bad faith attended the public officer’s performance of
into the finding of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
his duties.57

Jurisprudence instructs that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or
Keeping with these principles, the Court observes that Dimapilis-Baldoz’s actuations were only
fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.47 The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so
impressed with good faith which perforce, negates her personal liability in this case.
patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to
act at all in contemplation of law.48
To elucidate, while the COA correctly affirmed the disallowance of the salaries and benefits which
Labrador unduly received when he continued to hold office despite his conviction, the liability for refund
Applying these principles to the case at bar, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COA in
cannot be imposed upon Dimapilis-Baldoz because she had no knowledge or any reasonable indication
fixing the reckoning point of the period of disallowance at May 3, 2000, since records are bereft of any
that the payment of salaries to Labrador was actually improper. Two important incidents impel this
showing that it had any knowledge of Labrador’s prior dismissal on May 2, 1997. To hold otherwise
conclusion: first, Labrador’s 201 File with the POEA was without any record of the SB case; and second,
would be simply antithetical to the concept of grave abuse of discretion, much less countenance a
Dimapilis-Baldoz was only apprised of his conviction when her office was furnished a copy of the SB’s
speculative endeavor.
March 2, 2004 Resolution which ordered the revocation of Labrador’s probation. In addition, Dimapilis-
Baldoz’s good faith is further strengthened by the fact that she lost no time in issuing the Separation
Be that as it may, the Court cannot, nevertheless, sanction the erroneous finding that the disallowance Order as soon as she was apprised of Labrador’s situation. Thus, absent any proof to the contrary, it
of the POEA’s illegal disbursements to Labrador should only be reckoned from May 3, 2000 when he was, cannot be gainsaid that Dimapilis-Baldoz’s approval was spurred only by the honest belief that the
in fact, already dismissed as early as May 2, 1997. The salaries of government employees clearly payment of salaries disbursed to Labrador was due and owing to him.1âwphi1
constitute public funds49 which should, at all times, be properly accounted for. In this relation, the
Constitution vests the COA with the primary responsibility to ensure that any irregularity in the
It is well to stress that neither will it do justice to hold Dimapilis-Baldoz personally liable simply because
disbursement of the same is cleared, or any attendant illegality be proscribed. Yet, when a significant
she possessed the final authority for the disbursements and had direct supervision over her
fact which would impact this process is missed – as in this case, the May 2, 1997 dismissal of Labrador –
subordinates. Case law exhorts that although a public officer is the final approving authority and the
the public nature of the above-mentioned interests impels the Court to judiciously mind the COA of such
employees who processed the transaction were directly under his supervision, personal liability does not
fact if only to aid the latter to fulfill its constitutional mandate as well as to avert any loss on the part of
automatically attach to him but only upon those directly responsible for the unlawful expenditures.58 As
the government. Verily, public funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at all
Dimapilis-Baldoz’s direct responsibility therefor had not been demonstrated, in addition to her good
times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste.50 As such, the COA must correct its previous
faith as above-discussed, there is no cogent factual or legal basis to hold her personally liable. In this
issuances in this case in order to reflect the actual date of Labrador’s dismissal which would also be the
respect, the Court finds that the COA gravely abused its discretion.
proper reckoning point of the period of disallowance.

As to how the matter of Labrador’s administrative penalty of dismissal from the service escaped notice –
B. Grave abuse of discretion; personal liability of Dimapilis-Baldoz.
not to mention, implementation – is not revealed in the records before the Court; but it can be easily
 65

surmised that the POEA’s incapability to deal with a twice-dismissed employee was largely attributable
to bureaucratic incompetence. It bears emphasizing that it is the policy of the State to maintain honesty
and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.59 It should, therefore, be the responsibility of each government agency, such as the POEA, to
know matters pertaining to the conduct of its own employees in the performance of their duties and to
readily take action against those undeserving of the public’s trust. To be an effective agent at exacting
accountability from those under its direct authority, government agencies would do well to devise a
coordinative system to ensure that records of personnel actions concerning its individual employees are
properly updated and secured on file, especially all administrative and criminal cases decided against
them.

In view of the foregoing pronouncements, the Court finds it unnecessary to delve on the other ancillary
issues raised in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-002 dated
January 18, 2006 and Decision No. 2009-121 dated October 29, 2009 issued by respondent Commission
on Audit is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, (a) deleting the portions pertaining to petitioner Rosalinda
Dimapilis-Baldoz’s personal liability; and (b) adjusting the proper period of disallowance from the date of
Leonel P. Labrador’s dismissal on May 2, 1997. The foregoing is without prejudice to any subsequent
action or proceeding to recover any undue amount/s received by Labrador.

SO ORDERED.
 66

EN BANC wage benefit in the form of education scholarship to one (1) child of all Justices and Judges to free
tuition fee in a state university or college: x x x .
A.M. No. 14061-Ret June 19, 2012
Judge Macarambon asserts that Section 1 allows the payment of retirement benefits to a judge of the
RTC who resigns by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of his office. Citing the case of Re:
Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910,
Application for Retirement under R.A. No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the
Present: as amended by Republic Act No. 9946.
Intermediate Appellate Court, he posits that his appointment as COMELEC Commissioner incapacitated
him to discharge his duties as an RTC judge on account of his "submission to the will of the political
RESOLUTION authority and appointing power."

BRION, J.: As an alternative, he appeals that he be allowed to retire under the second sentence of Section 1
considering that he has rendered a total of 18 years, 1 month and 16 days of judicial service and a total
For consideration are: (1) the letter dated September 15, 2011 of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon of 35 years of government service. Judge Macarabon claims that while he was short of the minimum age
(Judge Macarambon); and (2) the Memorandum of Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez (Court requirement of 60, he believes that the Court’s ruling in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda1 is applicable to his case
Administrator), both addressed to former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona regarding the request of Judge where the Court brushed aside such requirement and considered the retiree’s career which was marked
Macarambon to retire under Republic Act (RA) No. 910, as amended by RA No. 9946. with competence, integrity, and dedication to public service.

Judge Macarambon was a judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for a period of 18 years, 1 month and In his Memorandum, the Court Administrator disagreed with Judge Macarambon’s position. The Court
16 days. Before reaching the optional retirement age of 60, Judge Macarambon transferred to the Administrator averred:
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) having been appointed as Commissioner by then President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). He served as COMELEC Commissioner for less than a year and was We humbly submit that Judge Macarambon’s case is different from that of Justice Britanico’s. Justice
no longer re-appointed after having been bypassed thrice by the Commission on Appointments. Judge Britanico, together with the other Members of the Judiciary at that time, was ordered by then President
Macarambon was subsequently appointed by President Arroyo as President/CEO of the National Corazon C. Aquino, through Proclamation No. 1, to tender their courtesy resignations. The decision as to
Transmission Corporation but he resigned from the position less than a year after when he failed to whether or not they would stay in their office was the prerogative of then President Aquino. On the
receive a reappointment from President Benigno C. Aquino III. contrary, the prerogative to accept the appointment as a COMELEC Commissioner depended entirely on
Judge Macarambon. He had the choice of whether or not to accept the appointment of being a
In his letter, Judge Macarambon requests that he be allowed to retire under Section 1 of RA No. 910, as Commissioner or to stay as a RTC Judge. Therefore, his appointment as a COMELEC Commissioner did
amended, the pertinent portions of which read: not render him incapacitated to discharge the duties of his office as a RTC Judge.

SECTION 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or of the Nonetheless, based on the documents submitted, Judge Macarambon may retire under R.A. No. 1616, as
Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, he meets all the requirements for retirement under the said law, i.e., has been in the government service
municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter as of 01 June 1977 and has rendered at least twenty (20) years government service, the last three (3)
established who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Judiciary or in any other branch of years of which have been continuous.
the Government, or in both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy years, or (b) resigns by
reason of his/her incapacity to discharge the duties of his/her office as certified by the Supreme Court, The sole issue is whether we can allow a judge who voluntarily resigned from his judicial office before
he/she shall receive during the residue of his/her natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the reaching the optional retirement age to receive retirement benefits under RA No. 910, as amended.
salary which plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances
such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which he/she
Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts carrying different meanings and legal
was receiving at the time of his/her retirement, or resignation, and non-wage benefit in the form of
consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee can resign at any time, retirement entails the
education scholarship to one (1) child of all Justices and Judges to free tuition fee in a state university or
compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence. Resignation
college: Provided,That such grant will cover only one (1) bachelor's degree. When a Justice of the
stems from the employee’s own intent and volition to resign and relinquish his/her post.2 Retirement
Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial
takes effect by operation of law. In terms of severance to one’s employment, resignation absolutely cuts-
court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any
off the employment relationship in general; in retirement, the employment relationship endures for the
other court hereafter established has attained the age of sixty (60) years and has rendered at least
purpose of the grant of retirement benefits.
fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the last three (3) of which shall have been continuously
rendered in the Judiciary, he/she shall likewise be entitled to retire and receive during the residue of
his/her natural life also in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary plus the highest monthly RA No. 910, as amended allows the grant of retirement benefits to a justice or judge who has either
aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief retired from judicial service or resigned from judicial office.
allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which he/she was then receiving and the non-
 67

In case of retirement, a justice or judge must show compliance with the age and service requirements as More important, there must be present an essential factor before an application under the Plana or
provided in RA No. 910, as amended. The second sentence of Section 1 imposes the following minimum Britanico rulings may be granted.1âwphi1 The Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of
requirements for optional retirement: required age or service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence,
integrity, and dedication to the public service; it was only a bowing to policy considerations and an
acceptance of the realities of political will which brought him or her to premature retirement.5
(a) must have attained the age of sixty (60) years old; and

In this case, Judge Macarambon failed to present similar circumstances, i.e., the presence of available
(b) must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the last three (3)
and sufficient accumulated leave credits which we may tack in to comply with the age requirement. A
of which shall have been continuously rendered in the Judiciary.
verification from the Leave Division, OCA shows that at the time he left the Court on November 5, 2007,
Judge Macarambon only had 514 vacation leaves and 79 sick leaves which are insufficient to cover the
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of gap in the age of retirement. Moreover, these accumulated leave credits were all forwarded to the
exception remains to be on a case to case basis.3 We have ruled that the Court allows seeming COMELEC upon his transfer. Further, we already stated that unlike in Britanico, the nature of his
exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample separation from his judicial office was voluntary.
reasons to grant such exception.4
All told, we are not unmindful of Judge Macarambon’s long and dedicated service in the government for
On the other hand, resignation under RA No. 910, as amended must be "by reason of incapacity to which he is undeniably entitled to be rewarded. We agree with the Court Administrator that although
discharge the duties of the office." In Britanico, we held that the resignation contemplated under RA No. Judge Macarambon is not qualified to retire under RA No. 910, as amended, he may retire under RA No.
910, as amended must have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More 1616 based on the documents he had presented before the Court which meets the age and service
than physical or mental disability to discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring from requirements under the said law.
the intent of the justice or judge who would not have parted with his/her judicial employment were it
not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors beyond his/her control.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to:

In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge Macarambon’s case does not render him eligible
(1) NOTE the Memorandum dated April 3, 2012 of Court Administrator Jose Midas P.
to retire under RA No. 910, as amended.
Marquez; and

First, Judge Macarambon failed to satisfy the age requirement as shown by the records and by his own
(2) DENY the letter-request dated September 15, 2011 of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon to
admission that he was less than 60 years of age when he resigned from his judicial office before
retire under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946 for lack of legal
transferring to the COMELEC. Likewise, he failed to satisfy the service requirement not having been in
basis.
continuous service with the Judiciary for three (3) years prior to his retirement.

Judge Macarambon is hereby ADVISED to file an application for optional retirement under Republic Act
Second, Judge Macarambon’s resignation was not by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the
No. 1616 with the Government Service Insurance System, subject to the submission of the requirements
office. His separation from judicial employment was of his own accord and volition. Thus, our ruling in
for retirement, and to the deduction of the retirement gratuity he received from his previous retirement,
Britanico cannot be properly applied to his case since his resignation was voluntary.
if there be any, and subject finally to the availability of funds and the usual clearance requirements.

Third, we find no exceptional reasons to justify Judge Macarambon’s request. In Re: Gregorio Pineda, the
SO ORDERED.
case cited by Judge Macarambon, the Court fully explained how a liberal approach in the application of
retirement laws should be construed, thus:

The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee. However, when
in the interest of liberal construction the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain
retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The crediting of
accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately.
It is always on a case to case basis.

In some instances, the lacking element-such as the time to reach an age limit or comply with length of
service is de minimis. It could be that the amount of accumulated leave credits is tremendous in
comparison to the lacking period of time.
 68

EN BANC aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief
allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which he/she was then receiving and the non-
A.M. No. 14061-Ret June 19, 2012 wage benefit in the form of education scholarship to one (1) child of all Justices and Judges to free
tuition fee in a state university or college: x x x .
Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910,
Present: as amended by Republic Act No. 9946. Judge Macarambon asserts that Section 1 allows the payment of retirement benefits to a judge of the
RTC who resigns by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of his office. Citing the case of Re:
RESOLUTION Application for Retirement under R.A. No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, he posits that his appointment as COMELEC Commissioner incapacitated
BRION, J.: him to discharge his duties as an RTC judge on account of his "submission to the will of the political
authority and appointing power."
For consideration are: (1) the letter dated September 15, 2011 of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon
(Judge Macarambon); and (2) the Memorandum of Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez (Court As an alternative, he appeals that he be allowed to retire under the second sentence of Section 1
Administrator), both addressed to former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona regarding the request of Judge considering that he has rendered a total of 18 years, 1 month and 16 days of judicial service and a total
Macarambon to retire under Republic Act (RA) No. 910, as amended by RA No. 9946. of 35 years of government service. Judge Macarabon claims that while he was short of the minimum age
requirement of 60, he believes that the Court’s ruling in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda1 is applicable to his case
Judge Macarambon was a judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for a period of 18 years, 1 month and
where the Court brushed aside such requirement and considered the retiree’s career which was marked
16 days. Before reaching the optional retirement age of 60, Judge Macarambon transferred to the
with competence, integrity, and dedication to public service.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) having been appointed as Commissioner by then President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). He served as COMELEC Commissioner for less than a year and was In his Memorandum, the Court Administrator disagreed with Judge Macarambon’s position. The Court
no longer re-appointed after having been bypassed thrice by the Commission on Appointments. Judge Administrator averred:
Macarambon was subsequently appointed by President Arroyo as President/CEO of the National
Transmission Corporation but he resigned from the position less than a year after when he failed to We humbly submit that Judge Macarambon’s case is different from that of Justice Britanico’s. Justice
receive a reappointment from President Benigno C. Aquino III. Britanico, together with the other Members of the Judiciary at that time, was ordered by then President
Corazon C. Aquino, through Proclamation No. 1, to tender their courtesy resignations. The decision as to
In his letter, Judge Macarambon requests that he be allowed to retire under Section 1 of RA No. 910, as whether or not they would stay in their office was the prerogative of then President Aquino. On the
amended, the pertinent portions of which read: contrary, the prerogative to accept the appointment as a COMELEC Commissioner depended entirely on
Judge Macarambon. He had the choice of whether or not to accept the appointment of being a
SECTION 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or of the
Commissioner or to stay as a RTC Judge. Therefore, his appointment as a COMELEC Commissioner did
Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
not render him incapacitated to discharge the duties of his office as a RTC Judge.
municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter
established who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Judiciary or in any other branch of Nonetheless, based on the documents submitted, Judge Macarambon may retire under R.A. No. 1616, as
the Government, or in both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy years, or (b) resigns by he meets all the requirements for retirement under the said law, i.e., has been in the government service
reason of his/her incapacity to discharge the duties of his/her office as certified by the Supreme Court, as of 01 June 1977 and has rendered at least twenty (20) years government service, the last three (3)
he/she shall receive during the residue of his/her natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the years of which have been continuous.
salary which plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances
such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which he/she The sole issue is whether we can allow a judge who voluntarily resigned from his judicial office before
was receiving at the time of his/her retirement, or resignation, and non-wage benefit in the form of reaching the optional retirement age to receive retirement benefits under RA No. 910, as amended.
education scholarship to one (1) child of all Justices and Judges to free tuition fee in a state university or
college: Provided, That such grant will cover only one (1) bachelor's degree. When a Justice of the Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts carrying different meanings and legal
Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee can resign at any time, retirement entails the
court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence. Resignation
other court hereafter established has attained the age of sixty (60) years and has rendered at least stems from the employee’s own intent and volition to resign and relinquish his/her post.2 Retirement
fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the last three (3) of which shall have been continuously takes effect by operation of law. In terms of severance to one’s employment, resignation absolutely cuts-
rendered in the Judiciary, he/she shall likewise be entitled to retire and receive during the residue of off the employment relationship in general; in retirement, the employment relationship endures for the
his/her natural life also in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary plus the highest monthly purpose of the grant of retirement benefits.
 69

RA No. 910, as amended allows the grant of retirement benefits to a justice or judge who has either In some instances, the lacking element-such as the time to reach an age limit or comply with length of
retired from judicial service or resigned from judicial office. service is de minimis. It could be that the amount of accumulated leave credits is tremendous in
comparison to the lacking period of time.
In case of retirement, a justice or judge must show compliance with the age and service requirements as
provided in RA No. 910, as amended. The second sentence of Section 1 imposes the following minimum More important, there must be present an essential factor before an application under the Plana or
requirements for optional retirement: Britanico rulings may be granted.1âwphi1 The Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of
required age or service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence,
(a) must have attained the age of sixty (60) years old; and integrity, and dedication to the public service; it was only a bowing to policy considerations and an
acceptance of the realities of political will which brought him or her to premature retirement.5
(b) must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the last three (3) of which
shall have been continuously rendered in the Judiciary. In this case, Judge Macarambon failed to present similar circumstances, i.e., the presence of available
and sufficient accumulated leave credits which we may tack in to comply with the age requirement. A
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of verification from the Leave Division, OCA shows that at the time he left the Court on November 5, 2007,
exception remains to be on a case to case basis.3 We have ruled that the Court allows seeming Judge Macarambon only had 514 vacation leaves and 79 sick leaves which are insufficient to cover the
exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample gap in the age of retirement. Moreover, these accumulated leave credits were all forwarded to the
reasons to grant such exception.4 COMELEC upon his transfer. Further, we already stated that unlike in Britanico, the nature of his
separation from his judicial office was voluntary.
On the other hand, resignation under RA No. 910, as amended must be "by reason of incapacity to
discharge the duties of the office." In Britanico, we held that the resignation contemplated under RA No. All told, we are not unmindful of Judge Macarambon’s long and dedicated service in the government for
910, as amended must have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More which he is undeniably entitled to be rewarded. We agree with the Court Administrator that although
than physical or mental disability to discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring from Judge Macarambon is not qualified to retire under RA No. 910, as amended, he may retire under RA No.
the intent of the justice or judge who would not have parted with his/her judicial employment were it 1616 based on the documents he had presented before the Court which meets the age and service
not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors beyond his/her control. requirements under the said law.

In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge Macarambon’s case does not render him eligible WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to:
to retire under RA No. 910, as amended.
(1) NOTE the Memorandum dated April 3, 2012 of Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez; and
First, Judge Macarambon failed to satisfy the age requirement as shown by the records and by his own
admission that he was less than 60 years of age when he resigned from his judicial office before (2) DENY the letter-request dated September 15, 2011 of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon to retire
transferring to the COMELEC. Likewise, he failed to satisfy the service requirement not having been in under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946 for lack of legal basis.
continuous service with the Judiciary for three (3) years prior to his retirement.
Judge Macarambon is hereby ADVISED to file an application for optional retirement under Republic Act
Second, Judge Macarambon’s resignation was not by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the No. 1616 with the Government Service Insurance System, subject to the submission of the requirements
office. His separation from judicial employment was of his own accord and volition. Thus, our ruling in for retirement, and to the deduction of the retirement gratuity he received from his previous retirement,
Britanico cannot be properly applied to his case since his resignation was voluntary. if there be any, and subject finally to the availability of funds and the usual clearance requirements.

Third, we find no exceptional reasons to justify Judge Macarambon’s request. In Re: Gregorio Pineda, the SO ORDERED.
case cited by Judge Macarambon, the Court fully explained how a liberal approach in the application of
retirement laws should be construed, thus:

The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee. However, when
in the interest of liberal construction the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain
retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The crediting of
accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately.
It is always on a case to case basis.
 70

EN BANC computation of retirement pay. In response, the Comelec issued a resolution referring the matter to its
Finance Services Department for comment and recommendation.14 On July 14, 2009, the Comelec issued
another resolution referring the same matter to its Law Department for study and recommendation.15
G.R. No. 191890 December 04, 2012

In the presently assailed Resolution No. 880816 dated March 30, 2010, the Comelec, on the basis of the
EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON, Petitioners,
Law Department’s study, completely disapproved the petitioners’ claim for a lump sum benefit under
MANUEL A. BARCELONA, JR., Petitioner-Intervenor,
R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec reasoned out that:
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Of these four (4) modes by which the Chairman or a Commissioner shall be entitled to lump sum benefit,
only the first instance (completion of term) is pertinent to the issue we have formulated above. It is clear
DECISION
that the non-confirmation and non-renewal of appointment is not a case of resignation or incapacity or
death. The question rather is: Can it be considered as retirement from service for
BRION, J.: having completed one’s term of office?

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary The full term of the Chairman and the Commissioners is seven (7) years. When there has been a partial
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, 1 seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of service, what remains is called the "unexpired term." The partial service is usually called tenure. There is
Commission on Elections (Co melee) Resolution No. 8808 issued on March 30, 2010.2 Republic no doubt in the distinction between a term and tenure. Tenure is necessarily variable while term is
Act (R.A.) No. 1568, as amended,3 extends a five-year lump sum gratuity to the chairman or any member always fixed. When the law, in this case, RA 1568 refers to completion of term of office, it can only mean
of the Comelec upon retirement, after completion of the term of office; incapacity; death; finishing up to the end of the seven year term. By completion of term, the law could not have meant
and resignation after reaching 60 years of age but before expiration of the term of office. The partial service or a variable tenure that does not reach the end. It could not have meant, the "expiration
Comelec en banc determined that former Comelec Commissioners Evalyn I. Fetalino4 and Amado M. of term" of the Commissioner whose appointment lapses by reason of non-confirmation of appointment
Calderon5 (petitioners) - whose ad interim appointments were not acted upon by the Commission on by the Commission on Appointments and non-renewal thereof by the President. It is rightly called
Appointments (CA) and, who were subsequently, not reappointed — are not entitled to the five-year expiration of term but note: it is not completion of term. RA 1568 requires ‘having completed his term of
lump sum gratuity because they did not complete in full the seven year term of office. office’ for the Commissioner to be entitled to the benefits.

The Antecedent Facts Therefore, one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said to have completed his term of
office so as to fall under the provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568 that would entitle him to a lump sum
On February 10, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to the petitioners as benefit of five (5) years salary.17 (emphasis, italics and underscores ours)
Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to Section 2, Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution.6Eleven days later (or on February 21, 1998), Pres. Ramos renewed the petitioners’ ad On this basis, the Comelec ruled on the matter, as follows:
interim appointments for the same position. Congress, however, adjourned in May 1998 before the CA
could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to APPROVE and ADOPT
and the petitioners were no longer re-appointed as Comelec Commissioners.7 Thus, the
the study of the Law Department on the payment of retirement benefits to members of the Commission.
petitioners merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four months, or from February 16,
1998 to June 30, 1998.8
Consequently, the following former Chairman and Commissioners of this Commission whose
appointments expired by reason of nonapproval by Commission on Appointments and non-renewal by
Subsequently, on March 15, 2005, the petitioners applied for their retirement benefits and monthly
the President are not entitled to a lump sum benefit under Republic Act 1528 (sic):
pension with the Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568.9 The Comelec initially approved the petitioners’
claims pursuant to its Resolution No. 06-136910 dated December 11, 2006 whose dispositive portion
reads:
Name Position Date of Service

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the recommendation of Director Alioden 1. Alfredo Benipayo, Jr. Chairman Feb. 16, 2001 to June 5, 2002
D. Dalaig, Law Department, to grant the request of former Comelec Commissioners Evalyn Fetalino and
Amado Calderon for the payment of their retirement benefits, subject to release of funds for the
2. Evalyn Fetalino Commissioner Feb. 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998
purpose by the Department of Budget and Management.11
3. Amado Calderon Commissioner Feb. 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998
On February 6, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 07-0202 granting the petitioners a pro-rated
gratuity and pension.12 Subsequently, on October 5, 2007, the petitioners asked for a re-computation of 4. Virgilio Garciliano Commissioner Feb. 12, 2004 to June 10, 2005
their retirement pay on the principal ground that R.A. No. 1568,13 does not cover a pro-rated
 71

First, it submits that the petitioners’ reliance on Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
5. Manuel Barcelona, Jr. Commissioner Feb. 12, 2004 to June 10, 2005
Procedure to show that Resolution No. 06-1369 has attained finality is misplaced as this
resolution is not the final decision contemplated by the Rules. It also argues that estoppel
6. Moslemen Macarambon Commissioner Nov[.] 05, 2007 to Oct. 10, 2008 does not lie against the Comelec since the erroneous application and enforcement of the law
by public officers do not estop the Government from making a subsequent correction of its
7. Leonardo Leonida Commissioner July 03, 2008 to June 26, 2009 errors.23

Second, the Comelec reiterates that the petitioners are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity,
This resolution shall also apply to all requests of former COMELEC Chairmen and Commissioners similarly
considering that they cannot be considered as officials who retired after completing their
situated. All previous resolutions which are inconsistent herewith are hereby AMENDED or REVOKED
term of office. It emphasizes that R.A. No. 1568 refers to the completion of the term of office,
accordingly.
not to partial service or to a variable tenure that does not reach its end, as in the case of the
petitioners. The Comelec also draws the Court’s attention to the case of Matibag v.
Let the Finance Services and Personnel Departments implement this resolution.18 (emphasis ours) Benipayo24 where the Court categorically ruled that an ad interim appointment that lapsed by
inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office.25
The Petitions
Third, it argues that the petitioners do not have any vested right on their retirement benefits
The petitioners sought the nullification of Comelec Resolution No. 8808 via a petition for certiorari under considering that the retirements benefits afforded by R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. later joined the petitioners nature; they are not similar to pension plans where employee participation is mandatory so
in questioning the assailed resolution. Like the petitioners, Barcelona did not complete the full seven- that they acquire vested rights in the pension as part of their compensation. Without such
year term as Comelec Commissioner since he served only from February 12, 2004 to July 10, 2005. The vested rights, the Comelec concludes that the petitioners were not deprived of their property
petitioners and Barcelona commonly argue that: without due process of law.26

(1) the non-renewal of their ad interim appointments by the CA until Congress already The Court’s Ruling
adjourned qualifies as retirement under the law and entitles them to the full five-year lump
sum gratuity; We DISMISS the petition and DENY Barcelona’s petition for intervention.

(2) Resolution No. 06-1369 that initially granted the five-year lump sum gratuity is already Preliminary Considerations
final and executory and cannot be modified by the Comelec; and
R.A. No. 1568 provides two types of retirement benefits for a Comelec Chairperson or Member:
(3) they now have a vested right over the full retirement benefits provided by RA No. 1568 in a gratuity or five-year lump sum, and an annuity or a lifetime monthly pension.27 Our review of the
view of the finality of Resolution No. 06- 1369.19 petitions, in particular, Barcelona’s petition for intervention, indicates that he merely questions the
discontinuance of his monthly pension on the basis of Comelec Resolution No. 8808.28 As the assailed
In the main, both the petitioners and Barcelona pray for a liberal interpretation of Section 1 of R.A. No. resolution, by its plain terms (cited above), only pertains to the lump sum benefit afforded by R.A. No.
1568. They submit that the involuntary termination of their ad interim appointments as Comelec 1568, it appears that Barcelona’s petition for intervention is misdirected. We note, too, that Barcelona
Commissioners should be deemed by this Court as a retirement from the service. Barcelona, in support has not substantiated his bare claim that the Comelec discontinued the payment of his monthly pension
of his plea for liberal construction, specifically cites the case of Ortiz v. COMELEC.20 The Court ruled in this on the basis of the assailed Resolution.
cited case that equity and justice demand that the involuntary curtailment of Mario D. Ortiz’s term be
deemed a completion of his term of office so that he should be considered retired from the service. To put the case in its proper perspective, the task now before us is to determine whether the petitioners
are entitled to the full five-year lump sum gratuity provided for by R.A. No. 1568. We conclude under our
In addition, the petitioners also bewail the lack of notice and hearing in the issuance of Comelec discussion below that they are not so entitled as they did not comply with the conditions required by
Resolution No. 8808. Barcelona also assails the discontinuance of his monthly pension on the basis of the law.
assailed Comelec issuance.21
The petitioners are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended
The Case for the Respondents
That the petitioners failed to meet conditions of the applicable retirement law — Section 1 of R.A. No.
On July 22, 2010, the Comelec filed its Comment22 through the Office of the Solicitor General. The 156829 — is beyond dispute. The law provides:
Comelec prays for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds outlined below:
 72

Sec. 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of the
retires from the service for having completed his term of office or by reason of his incapacity to Comelec who has retired from the service after having completed his term of office. The petitioners
discharge the duties of his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the full seven-
age of sixty years but before the expiration of his term of office, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump sum year term of office prescribed by Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution; they served as Comelec
his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the last annual Commissioners for barely four months, i.e., from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998. In the recent case
salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may of Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, as
be: Provided, That in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service in the amended by Republic Act No. 9946,33 where the Court did not allow Judge Macarambon to retire under
government; And, provided, further, That he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue R.A. No. 910 because he did not comply with the age and service requirements of the law, the Court
of his natural life equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, emphasized:
incapacity or resignation. [italics supplied]
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of
To be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, any of the following exception remains to be on a case to case basis. We have ruled that the Court allows seeming
events must transpire: exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample
reasons to grant such exception. (emphasis ours; citations omitted)
(1) Retirement from the service for having completed the term of office;
More importantly, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioners’ service, if any, could only
amount to tenure in office and not to the term of office contemplated by Section 1 of R.A. No.
(2) Incapacity to discharge the duties of their office;
1568. Tenure and term of office have well-defined meanings in law and jurisprudence. As early as 1946,
the Court, in Topacio Nueno v. Angeles,34provided clear distinctions between these concepts in this wise:
(3) Death while in the service; and
The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the
(4) Resignation after reaching the age of sixty (60) years but before the expiration of the term interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term
of office. In addition, the officer should have rendered not less than twenty years of service in during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-
the government at the time of retirement. over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent. There is no principle, law or doctrine by which the term of an office may be extended by
Death during the service obviously does not need to be considered in the present case, thus reason of war. [emphasis ours]
leaving retirement, incapacity and resignation as the event that must transpire in order to be entitled to
the lump sum gratuity. This is the ruling that has been followed since then and is the settled jurisprudence on these concepts.35

We note that the termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments could hardly be considered as While we characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo36 "as a permanent
incapacity since it was not the result of any disability that rendered them incapable of performing the appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
duties of a Commissioner. Thus, incapacity is likewise effectively removed from active consideration. appointee has qualified into office," we have also positively ruled in that case that "an ad
interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not
"Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and constitute a term of office."37 We consequently ruled:
renounces the further right to it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or
employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments
relinquishment."30 In this sense, resignation likewise does not appear applicable as a ground because the does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to
petitioners did not voluntarily relinquish their position as Commissioners; their termination was merely a the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the
consequence of the adjournment of Congress without action by the CA on their ad President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the
interim appointments. COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile
the confirming power of the Commission on Appointments.38 (emphasis ours; italics supplied)
This eliminative process only leaves the question of whether the termination of the petitioners’ ad
interim appointments amounted to retirement from the service after completion of the term of office. Based on these considerations, we conclude that the petitioners can never be considered to have retired
We emphasize at this point that the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are from the service not only because they did not complete the full term, but, more importantly, because
met: first, when the conditions imposed by the applicable law – in this case, R.A. No. 1568 — are fulfilled; they did not serve a "term of office" as required by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended.
and second, when an actual retirement takes place.31 This Court has repeatedly emphasized that
retirement entails compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and
Ortiz v. COMELEC cannot be applied to the present case
jurisprudence, and takes effect by operation of law.32
 73

We are not unmindful of the Court’s ruling in Ortiz v. COMELEC39 which Barcelona cites as basis for his The application of the clear letter of the retirement law in this case is supported by jurisprudence. As
claim of retirement benefits despite the fact that — like the petitioners — he did not complete the full early as 1981, in the case of In Re: Claim of CAR Judge Noel,42 the Court strictly adhered to the provisions
term of his office. of R.A. No. 910 and did not allow the judge’s claim of monthly pension and annuity under the
aforementioned law, considering that his length of government service fell short of the minimum
requirements.
In that case, the petitioner was appointed as Comelec Commissioner, for a term expiring on May 17,
1992, by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and took his oath of office on July 30, 1985. When
President Corazon Aquino assumed the Presidency and following the lead of the Justices of the Supreme Similarly, in Re: Judge Alex Z. Reyes,43 the Court dismissed CTA Judge Reyes’ invocation of the doctrine of
Court, Ortiz — together with the other Comelec Commissioners — tendered his courtesy resignation on liberal construction of retirement laws to justify his request that the last step increment of his salary
March 5, 1986. On July 21, 1986, President Aquino accepted their resignations effective immediately. grade be used in the computation of his retirement pay and terminal leave benefits, and held:
Thereafter, Ortiz applied for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568, which application the Comelec
denied. The Court, however, reversed the Comelec and held that "[t]he curtailment of [Ortiz’s] term not
In Borromeo, the court had occasion to say: "It is axiomatic that retirement laws are liberally construed
being attributable to any voluntary act on the part of the petitioner, equity and justice demand that he
and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited. All doubts as to the intent of the law
should be deemed to have completed his term xxx. [That he] should be placed in the same category as
should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes." Such interpretation in
that of an official holding a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends upon his superior’s loss of
favor of the retiree is unfortunately not called for nor warranted, where the clear intent of the
confidence in him." Thus, as "he is deemed to have completed his term of office, [Ortiz] should be
applicable law and rules are demonstrably against the petitioner's claim. (Paredes v. City of Manila,
considered retired from the service."40
G.R. No. 88879, March 21, 1991). Section 4 is explicit and categorical in its prohibition and, unfortunately
for Judge Reyes, applies squarely to the instant case.44 (emphasis ours; italics supplied)
A close reading of Ortiz reveals that it does not have the same fact situation as the present case and is
thus not decisive of the present controversy. We note that the impact of the principle of stare
Finally, in Gov’t Service Insurance System v. Civil Service Commission,45 the Court was asked to resolve
decisis that Barcelona cited as basis is limited; specific judicial decisions are binding only on the parties
whether government service rendered on a per diem basis is creditable for computing the length of
to the case and on future parties with similar or identical factual situations.41 Significantly, the factual
service for retirement purposes. In disregarding the petitioners’ plea for liberal construction, the Court
situation in Ortiz is totally different so that its ruling cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied arbitrarily
held:
to the present case.

The law is very clear in its intent to exclude per diem in the definition of "compensation." Originally, per
First, in Ortiz, Ortiz’s appointment was a regular appointment made by then President Marcos, while the
diem was not among those excluded in the definition of compensation (See Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186),
petitioners were appointed by President Ramos ad interim or during the recess of Congress.
not until the passage of the amending laws which redefined it to exclude per diem.

Second, Ortiz’s appointment was made under the 1973 Constitution which did not require the
The law not only defines the word "compensation," but it also distinguishes it from other forms of
concurrence of the CA. Notably, the 1973 Constitution abolished the CA and did not provide for an
remunerations. Such distinction is significant not only for purposes of computing the contribution of the
executive limit on the appointing authority of the President. In the present case, the petitioners’ ad
employers and employees to the GSIS but also for computing the employees' service record and
interim appointment was made under the 1987 Constitution which mandated that an appointment shall
benefits.
be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress.

Private respondents both claim that retirement laws must be liberally interpreted in favor of the
Third, in Ortiz, the Court addressed the issue of whether a constitutional official, whose "courtesy
retirees. However, the doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied in the instant petitions,
resignation" had been accepted by the President of the Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom
where the law invoked is clear, unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or
Constitution, may be entitled to retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568. In the present case, the issue is
construction. Moreover, to accommodate private respondents' plea will contravene the purpose for
whether the termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments entitles them to the full five-year
which the law was enacted, and will defeat the ends which it sought to attain (cf. Re: Judge Alex Z. Reyes,
lump sum gratuity provided for by R.A. No. 1568.
216 SCRA 720 [1992]).46 [italics supplied; emphasis ours]

No occasion for liberal construction since Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended, is clear and
No compelling reasons exist to warrant the liberal application of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as
unambiguous
amended, to the present case

The petitioners’ appeal to liberal construction of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 is misplaced since the law is
We find no compelling legal or factual reasons for the application of the Court’s liberality in the
clear and unambiguous. We emphasize that the primary modality of addressing the present case is to
interpretation of retirement laws to the present case. The discretionary power of the Court to exercise
look into the provisions of the retirement law itself. Guided by the rules of statutory construction in this
the liberal application of retirement laws is not limitless; its exercise of liberality is on a case-to-case
consideration, we find that the language of the retirement law is clear and unequivocal; no room for
basis and only after a consideration of the factual circumstances that justify the grant of an exception.
construction or interpretation exists, only the application of the letter of the law.
The recent case of Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act
No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 994647 fully explained how a liberal approach in the application
of retirement laws should be construed, viz:
 74

The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee. However, when however, between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something
in the interest of liberal construction the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal
retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The crediting of construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by
accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately. the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive, the
It is always on a case to case basis. legislative, and the judicial.51

In some instances, the lacking element—such as the time to reach an age limit or comply with length of In the present case, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, by its plain terms, is clear that retirement entails the
service is de minimis. It could be that the amount of accumulated leave credits is tremendous in completion of the term of office. To construe the term "retirement" in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 to
comparison to the lacking period of time. include termination of an ad interim appointment is to read into the clear words of the law exemptions
that its literal wording does not support; to depart from the meaning expressed by the words of R.A. No.
1568 is to alter the law and to legislate, and not to interpret. We would thereby violate the timehonored
More important, there must be present an essential factor before an application under
rule on the constitutional separation of powers. The words of Justice E. Finley Johnson in the early case
the Plana or Britanico rulings may be granted. The Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of
of Nicolas v. Alberto52 still ring true today, viz.:
required age or service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence,
integrity, and dedication to the public service; it was only a bowing to policy considerations and an
acceptance of the realities of political will which brought him or her to premature retirement. (emphases The courts have no legislative powers. In the interpretation and construction of statutes their sole
and italics ours; citation omitted) function is to determine, and, within the constitutional limits of the legislative power, to give effect to
the intention of the legislature. The courts cannot read into a statute something which is not within the
manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself. To depart from the meaning
In the present case, as previously mentioned, Ortiz cannot be used as authority to justify a liberal
expressed by the words of a statute, is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to interpret. The
application of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended not only because it is not on all fours with the
responsibility for the justice or wisdom of legislation rests with the legislature, and it is the province of
present case; more importantly, the Court in Ortiz had ample reasons, based on the unique factual
the courts to construe, not to make the laws.
circumstances of the case, to grant an exception to the service requirements of the law. In Ortiz, the
Court took note of the involuntariness of Ortiz’s "courtesy resignation," as well as the peculiar
circumstances obtaining at that time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 calling for the courtesy To reiterate, in light of the express and clear terms of the law, the basic rule of statutory construction
resignation of all appointive officials, viz: should therefore apply: "legislative intent is to be determined from the language employed, and where
there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction."53
From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's "resignation" lacks the element of clear intention to
surrender his position. We cannot presume such intention from his statement in his letter of March 5, The Comelec did not violate the rule on finality of judgments
1986 that he was placing his position at the disposal of the President. He did not categorically state
therein that he was unconditionally giving up his position. It should be remembered that said letter was
Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 06-1369, which initially granted them a five-year lump sum
actually a response to Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino issued on February 25, 1986 when she
gratuity, attained finality thirty (30) days after its promulgation, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 18 of the
called on all appointive public officials to tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first step to restore
Comelec Rules of Procedure, and, thus, can no longer be modified by the Comelec.
confidence in public administration."48

We cannot agree with this position. Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads:
In stark contrast, no such peculiar circumstances obtain in the present case.

Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. –

Finally, in the absence of any basis for liberal interpretation, the Court would be engaged in judicial
legislation if we grant the petitioners’ plea. We cannot overemphasize that the policy of liberal
construction cannot and should not be to the point of engaging in judicial legislation — an act that the a. In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs a decision or
Constitution absolutely forbids this Court to do. In the oft-cited case of Tanada v. Yulo,49 Justice George resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its
A. Malcolm cautioned against judicial legislation and warned against liberal construction being used as a promulgation.
license to legislate and not to simply interpret,50 thus:
A simple reading of this provision shows that it only applies to ordinary actions, special proceedings,
Counsel in effect urges us to adopt a liberal construction of the statute. That in this instance, as in the provisional remedies and special reliefs. Under Section 5, Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of
past, we aim to do. But counsel in his memorandum concedes "that the language of the proviso in Procedures, ordinary actions refer to election protests, quo warranto, and appeals from decisions of
question is somewhat defective and does not clearly convey the legislative intent", and at the hearing in courts in election protest cases; special proceedings refer to annulment of permanent list of voters,
response to questions was finally forced to admit that what the Government desired was for the court to registration of political parties and accreditation of citizens’ arms of the Commission; provisional
insert words and phrases in the law in order to supply an intention for the legislature. That we cannot remedies refer to injunction and/or restraining order; and special reliefs refer to certiorari, prohibition,
do. By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language used, the subject matter, and the mandamus and contempt. Thus, it is clear that the proceedings that precipitated the issuance of
purposes of those framing them are able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction, Resolution No. 06-1369 do not fall within the coverage of the actions and proceedings under Section 13,
 75

Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus, the Comelec did not violate its own rule on finality of G.R. No. 191890: December 4, 2012
judgments.1âwphi1

EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON, Petitioners, MANUEL A. BARCELONA, JR., Petitioner-
No denial of due process
Intervenor, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

We also find no merit in the petitioners’ contention that that they were denied due process of law when
the Comelec issued Resolution No. 8808 without affording them the benefit of a notice and hearing. We FACTS:
have held in the past that "[t]he essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [Thus, a] formal or trial-type hearing is not at all President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to petitioners Evalyn Fetalino (Fetalino) and
times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are given fair and Amado Calderon (Calderon) as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years. Congress,
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is
absolute lack of notice and hearing." 54 In Bautista v. Commission on Elections,55 we emphasized: however, adjourned before the Commission on Appointments (CA) could act on their appointments. The
constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect and Fetalino and Calderon were no
In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan (166 SCRA 316 [1988]), we held that the right to be heard does not only longer re-appointed. Thus, Fetalino and Calderon merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more
refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court. A party may also be heard through his pleadings.
than four months.
Where opportunity to be heard is accorded either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no
denial of procedural due process. As reiterated in National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. vs.
NLRC (G.R. No. 123520, June 26, 1998), the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, Subsequently, Fetalino and Calderon applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the
or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. Hence, in Navarro III vs.
Damaso (246 SCRA 260 1995), we held that a formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and not in all Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec initially approved the claims pursuant to its resolution.
instances essential.56 (italics supplied) However, in its subsequent resolution, the Comelec, on the basis of its Law Departments study,
completely disapproved the Fetalino and Calderons claim, stating that one whose ad interim
Thus, "a party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was accorded the opportunity
appointment expires cannot be said to have completed his term of office so as to fall under the
of a hearing, through either oral arguments or pleadings. There is no denial of due process when a party
is given an opportunity through his pleadings."57 In the present case, the petitioners cannot claim provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568 that would entitle him to a lump sum benefit of five years salary.
deprivation of due process because they actively participated in the Comelec proceedings that sought for Petitioner-intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. (Barcelona) later joined the petitioners in questioning the
payment of their retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568. The records clearly show that the issuance of
the assailed Comelec resolution was precipitated by the petitioners’ application for retirement benefits assailed subsequent resolution.
with the Comelec. Significantly, the petitioners were given ample opportunity to present and explain
their respective positions when they sought a re-computation of the initial pro-rated retirement benefits
ISSUES:
that were granted to them by the Comelec. Under these facts, no violation of the right to due process of
law took place.
A. Whether or not an ad interim appointment qualifies as retirement under the law and entitles them to
No vested rights over retirement benefits the full five-year lump sum gratuity;

As a last point, we agree with the Solicitor General that the retirement benefits granted to the
B. Whether or not the resolution that initially granted the five-year lump sum gratuity is already final and
petitioners under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature; thus, they have no vested
right over these benefits. 58Retirement benefits as provided under R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished executory;
from a pension which is a form of deferred compensation for services performed; in a pension, employee
participation is mandatory, thus, employees acquire contractual or vested rights over the pension as part
of their compensation. 59 In the absence of any vested right to the R.A. No. 1568 retirement benefits, the C. Whether or not Fetalino and Calderon acquired a vested right over the full retirement benefits provided
petitioners' due process argument must perforce fail. by RA No. 1568.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
Evalyn I. Fetalino and Amado M. Calderon for lack of merit. We likewise DENY Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr.'s
petition for intervention for lack of merit. No costs.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Term of Office
SO ORDERED.
 76

First Issue: Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 employees acquire contractual or vested rights over the pension as part of their compensation.
of R.A. No. 1568, as amended. DENIED

The Court emphasized that the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are met:
first, when the conditions imposed by the applicable law in this case, R.A. No. 1568 are fulfilled; and
second, when an actual retirement takes place. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that retirement
entails compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence, and
takes effect by operation of law.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of the
Comelec who has retired from the service after having completed his term of office. Fetalino, Calderon
and Barcelona obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the
full seven-year term of office. While the Court characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v.
Benipayo as a permanent appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by
the President once the appointee has qualified into office, the Court have also positively ruled in that
case that an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments
does not constitute a term of office.

Second Issue: The Comelec did not violate the rule on finality of judgments.

Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads: In ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become
final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.

A simple reading of this provision shows that it only applies to ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs. Thus, it is clear that the proceedings that precipitated the
issuance of the assailed resolution do not fall within the coverage of the actions and proceedings under
Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus, the Comelec did not violate its own rule on
finality of judgments.

Third Issue: No vested rights over retirement benefits.

Retirement benefits granted to Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are
purely gratuitous in nature; thus, they have no vested right over these benefits. Retirement benefits as
provided under R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished from a pension which is a form of deferred
compensation for services performed; in a pension, employee participation is mandatory, thus,
 77

EN BANC 1. The application for retirement and or claims for retirement benefits of former Chairman
Melinda L. Ocampo [were] endorsed to DBM for its proper disposition together with the
pertinent information or circumstances attendant thereto. Please see the attached letter of
G.R. NO. 188716, June 10, 2013
endorsement dated April 2, 2002 and the matrix of information on Chairman Ocampo's
appointment and tenure in office. This was received by DBM on April 5, 2002.
MELINDA L. OCAMPO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
2. In its letter dated April 24, 2002, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
DECISION the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) and the corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation
(NCA) to cover the payment of Chairman Ocampo's second gratuity benefits.
PEREZ, J.:
3. Under the above-mentioned circumstances there was no more cogent reason nor basis for
this Office to defer the release to Chairman Ocampo of the amount corresponding to the
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, of the Rules of Court assailing DBM approved gratuity benefits, especially considering the follow-up efforts by the
Decision No. 2008-0171 dated 15 February 2008 and Decision No. 2009-0382 dated 1 June 2009 of the beneficiaries. To do otherwise could expose the undersigned to charges of unreasonable
Commission on Audit (COA) sustaining Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2003-021 dated 3 September delayed action.8
2003 disallowing the payment of retirement gratuity to petitioner Melinda L. Ocampo (Ocampo) as
Board Member and Chairperson, respectively, of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), amounting to
P1,449,450.48.
On 28 October 2002, Ocampo likewise wrote Auditor Monterde asking for the lifting of NS No. 2002-002-
On 1 March 1996, Ocampo retired from the National Electrification Administration under 101 dated 10 July 2002 and asseverating her entitlement to the second retirement gratuity:
Commonwealth Act No. 1863 as amended, by Republic Act No. 1616,4 after more than seventeen (17)
years of service. Ocampo availed of the lump sum payment with a net gratuity of P358,917.01. 1. That the basic law (E.O. 172, as amended) provides no prohibition to receive second
retirement gratuity;
Three days thereafter, on 4 March 1996, under Letter of Appointment dated 16 February 1996, Ocampo
assumed office as Board Member of the ERB. On 30 June 1998, upon expiration of her term, Ocampo 2. That I retired under different positions, first as Board Member and second as Chairman of the
retired under Executive Order No. 172, "Creating the Energy Regulatory Board" in relation to Republic Energy Regulatory Board;
Act No. 1568, "An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor General and the Chairman or any Member
of the Commission on Elections." Ocampo availed of the five year lump sum benefit and the
corresponding monthly pension to be paid out for the remainder of her life. This first gratuity lump sum 3. Retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the employee because the level of
payment based on sixty (60) months or five (5) years advance salary was immediately received by retirement compensation is below the cost of living requirements of a retiree. A grateful
Ocampo after her retirement. Likewise, Ocampo began to receive her monthly nation owes the retiree at the very least a liberal interpretation.9
pension.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On 25 August 1998, Ocampo was again appointed, this time as Chairman of ERB with a term of four (4) Acting on Chairperson Barin's request for the lifting of NS No. 2002-001-101 dated 10 July 2002, the
years. On 15 August 2001, the ERB was abolished and replaced by the Energy Regulatory Commission Legal and Adjudication Office-National (LAO-N) of the COA issued LAO-N-2003-132 dated 12 June 2003
(ERC) as a consequence of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9136, the Electric Reform Act of 2001. For denying the request:
the second time, Ocampo sought retirement under Executive Order No. 172. Ocampo's claim was
endorsed by the then Chairperson of the ERC, Fe C. Barin (Chairperson Barin), to the Department of Of pertinence is the last paragraph of Section 1 of EO 172, quoted hereunder, thus:
Budget and Management (DBM). Upon release by the DBM of the Special Allotment Release Order The Chairman and the Members of the Board, upon completion of their terms or upon becoming
(SARO) and the corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA), Chairperson Barin approved the payment eligible for retirement under existing lawsshall be entitled to the same retirement benefits and
thereof to Ocampo. privileges provided for the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections.

However, on post-audit of the transaction with Ocampo as payee, State Auditor IV, Nelda R. Monterde The retirement benefits of the Members of the Commission on Elections is found in RA 3595, amending
(Auditor Monterde), issued Notice of Suspension (NS) No. 2002-002-101 dated 10 July 2002: (1) RA 1568. Section 1 thereof states:
suspending payment of the amount of P1,452,613.71 covering Ocampo's second retirement gratuity Section 1. When the Auditor General or the [Chairman] or any Member of the Commission on Elections
computed on a pro-rata basis equivalent to only two years, eleven months, and twenty days;6 and (2) retires from the service for having completed his term [of office] x x x, he or his heirs shall be paid in
requiring submission by the ERC of "legal basis for [the payment of] retirement gratuity twice under the lump sum his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the
same law (EO 172)."7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary last annual salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement, x x x; And, provided, further, That he
shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the
In a letter dated 23 July 2002, Chairperson Barin responded: amount of monthly salary that he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or resignation.
(Emphasis theirs).
 78

The above provision of law is integral to the matter on hand since RA 1568 merely extends to the Auditor that they are exempt from this general rule.
General and the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections the retirement benefits
granted under RA 910. EO 172, on the other hand, explicitly provides that the Chairman and Members of The provision of second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution which states "Pensions
the Board shall be entitled to the same retirement benefits given to the Chairman and Members of the or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation[,]" may not be
COMELEC. Having claimed retirement benefits under EO 172 twice, x x x Ms. Ocampo, therefore, would invoked. This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive
in all certainty be receiving double pension for the remainder of [her life]. such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which compensation is
attached x x x.
The above-situation is predictable considering that under Paragraph 2 of Section 1 of EO 172, a person
may be appointed to the Board for a minimum of two terms, to wit: "No person may be appointed to WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein request for lifting of NS. No. 2002-001-101 (2002) is
serve more than two (2) successive terms in the Board." It follows then that upon meeting the condition hereby DENIED.10
of completion of terms or eligibility for retirement each time, the concerned official would apply for
retirement benefits, as a matter of course. While this could have been the scenario, it bears emphasizing On motion for reconsideration of Ocampo, the COA LAO-N issued ND No. 2003-021 dated 3 September
that EO 172, however, does not have a parallel provision that would allow a Board Member to claim the 2003 affirming NS No. 2002-001-101 disallowing Ocampo's receipt of a second retirement gratuity under
full benefits of the law for as long as the number of term [of] office of such official would allow. The most Executive Order No. 172.
practical solution that would not run counter to the prohibition against double pension is to deduct the
amount of lump sum and monthly pensions already received on the first retirement under EO 172 from On appeal, COA, in Decision No. 2008-017 dated 15 February 2008, partially affirmed ND No. 2003-021
the gratuity claimed on the second retirement under the same law. While there is no hard and fast rule and allowed Ocampo's receipt of a pro- rated retirement gratuity based on her salary as Chairperson of
requiring such deduction, for reasons of equity however, it would be proper and logical that said benefits the ERB:
should nevertheless be deducted from the retirement pay to be received by the employee concerned.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission affirms in part the disallowance, under ND No.
EO 172 sets forth the condition when the Chairman and the Members of the Board of the ERB shall be 2003-021 dated September 03, 2003, and rules that [Ocampo] is entitled to a pro-rata retirement
entitled to retirement benefits provided under RA 3595. For clarity, the condition is "upon completion of gratuity, conformably to her years in service as Chairman of ERB which is, two years, eleven months and
their terms or upon becoming eligible for retirement under existing laws." A quick review of the twenty days. In accordance with the computation prepared by the Office of the Supervising Auditor,
circumstances herein obtaining would show that x x x Ms. Ocampo had met such condition when [her] Energy Regulatory Board hereto attached as Annex A and made an integral part hereof, of the total
term [was] completed upon the abolition of ERB. As then ERB Chairman, [she was] originally appointed amount of P4,138,086.71, inclusive of gratuities and pensions, received by Ms. Ocampo only
to a term of four years which was however shortened to less than three years. x x x Of equal importance P2,688,636.23 is allowable. In fine, this Commission affirms the disallowance up to the amount of
is the fact that [she was] also eligible for retirement under existing laws. Records bear that x x x Ms. P1,449,450.48.
Ocampo had previously retired on March 3, 1996.
Accordingly, the monthly pension that [Ocampo] should receive shall only correspond to one monthly
Section 1 of RA 3595 is clear as to the extent of the gratuity: lump sum of salary for one year, not pension based on the computation of her last retirement benefit.
exceeding five years, for every year of service plus the life pension. In the attached pertinent documents,
it is shown that [Ocampo was] granted retirement gratuity in the amount of x x x P1,472,155.43, x x x The Auditor concerned is hereby ordered to require the adjustment in the books of accounts of the
computed as follows: agency as regards the payment of the first lump sum gratuity.11

Highest Monthly Salary (Per NOSA) x No. of Gratuity Months = Gratuity Pay In its Decision No. 2009-038 dated 1 June 2009, COA denied Ocampo's motion for reconsideration and
affirmed the disallowance of the amount of P1,449,450.48 and of the double monthly for Ocampo.
P41,275.00 x 35.667 = [P]1,472,155.43
Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by the COA.
As already mentioned, [she is] also entitled to an annuity payable monthly during the residue of [her]
natural [life]. The payment of pension starts after the expiration of the five year period as provided for The singular issue for our resolution is framed by Ocampo:
under Section 3 of RA 910, the retirement law of the Members of the Judiciary, thus:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COA ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE ONLY
Section 3. Upon retirement a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals shall be THE BENEFITS CORRESPONDING TO HER RETIREMENT AS ERB CHAIR, AND THE PERIOD DURING WHICH
automatically entitled to a lump sum payment of the monthly salary that said Justice was receiving at the SHE SERVED AS MEMBER OF THE SAID BOARD SHOULD BE MERELY TACKED IN TO THE PERIOD DURING
time of his retirement for five years, and thereafter upon survival after the expiration of this period of WHICH SHE SERVED AS SUCH CHAIR.12
five years, to a further annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the
amount of the monthly salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. (Emphasis theirs). In sum, Ocampo posits that she should be separately paid retirement benefits for her respective terms as
Board Member and Chairperson of the ERB. In other words, Ocampo claims two (2) lump sum payments,
In our jurisdiction, the legal precept is against double pension. The rule in construing or applying pension and payment thereafter of two (2) monthly pensions.
and gratuity laws is that, in the absence of express provision to the contrary, they will be so interpreted
as to prevent any person from receiving double compensation x x x. There must be a provision, clear and While Ocampo accedes that the "rule is against a retiree's receiving double pension," she claims
unequivocal, to justify a double pension. x x x It is therefore, incumbent upon x x x Ms. Ocampo to show exemption to the application thereof because of the absence of a prohibition, whether express or
 79

implied, in Executive Order No. 172 or Republic Act No. 3595 "for a covered official to retire twice our resolution relate only to Ocampo's retirement benefits in the two instances of her retirement from
thereunder and receive the corresponding benefits each time." Ocampo stresses that the applicable the ERB.
laws, Executive Order No. 172 and Republic Act No. 3595, were intended specifically to accord special
privileges to covered government officials who are considered, for retirement purposes, on the same For easy reference, a recital of the applicable laws:
level as Members of Constitutional Commissions; and the "very enactment [of these laws] are
unequivocal expressions of the intention to remove the covered officials from the operation of the 1. Section 1, paragraphs 2 and 6 of Executive Order No. 172.
general rule." Thus, a liberal interpretation thereof must follow. [2] The term of office of the Chairman and the Board Members shall be four (4) years, but the first
Chairman to be appointed shall hold office for four (4) years, and of the first four (4) Members, two (2)
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, ostensibly defending COA's stance, concluded that: shall hold office for a term of two (2) years, and two (2) shall hold office for a term of three (3) years. No
person may be appointed to serve more than two (2) successive terms in the Board.
Hence, [Ocampo] is entitled only to a pro-rata amount on her retirement gratuity to be computed based [6] The Chairman and the Members of the Board, upon completion of their terms or upon becoming
on her two (2) years, eleven (11) months and twenty (20) days actual creditable service as Chairman of eligible for retirement under existing laws shall be entitled to the same retirement benefits and
ERB considering that she cannot anymore tack her previous stint as member of the Board of the ERB privileges provided for the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections.
since her retirement benefits were already awarded to her.13 2. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3595.
Section 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections
In her Reply, Ocampo counters that: retires from the service for having completed his term [of] office or by reason of his incapacity to
discharge the duties of his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the
1. With due respect, the Comment of the OSG in behalf of COA did not fully support the COA Decision age of sixty years but before the expiration of [his] term of office, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump
dated February 15, 2008 and Resolution dated June 1, 2009. sum his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the last annual
salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may
1.1 x x x [T]he OSG Comment argued that "[Ocampo] is entitled only to a pro-rata amount of her be; Provided, That in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service in the
retirement gratuity to be computed based on her two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and twenty (20) government: And, provided, further,
days actual creditable service as Chairman of ERB x x x." This is contrary to the COA Decision dated
February 15, 2008 being questioned which ruled that "[Ocampo] should have received only pro-rata That he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the
amount on her retirement gratuity to be computed based on two years and four months actual amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or resignation.
creditable service as Board Member of the ERB. Likewise [Ocampo] is entitled to a pro-rata retirement 3. Item No. 4, Administrative Order No. 444.
gratuity as ERB chairman, based on two years, eleven months, and twenty days of service as ERB 4. Upon retirement, the lump sum of five years' gratuity as provided under R.A. 3595 for the
Chairman." Chairman/Commissioner of a Constitutional Commission shall be computed on the basis of the highest
monthly salary plus the duly authorized transportation, living and representation allowances in the last
1.2 x x x [T]he OSG x x x, posits that [Ocampo], after legally receiving the first gratuity pay equivalent to a month prior to retirement or expiration of term.15
lump sum of five years as Board member III of ERB in the total amount of Php1,784,040.00, is also
entitled to a pro-rata computation of her retirement gratuity as ERB Chairman equivalent to two years, Textually, the rules on the retirement benefits under Executive Order No. 172, in relation to Republic Act
eleven months, and twenty days in the amount of Php1,452,613.71. However, the COA's Decision No. 3595, are:
subject of this case ruled that [Ocampo] is entitled to the pro-rata computation of her
retirement BOTH as ERB Board Member III and as ERB Chairman for a total of five (5) years, three (3) 1. The employee must have completed his term of office, or become incapacitated to discharge the
months, and 20 days in the total amount of Php 2,688,636.23 only. duties of his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age of sixty years
but before the expiration of his term of office;
1.3 x x x This is significant because in the COA Decision, [Ocampo] is being required to refund the amount
of Php1,449,450.48 while in the OSG position before this Honorable Court, [Ocampo] will not refund any 2. The lump sum is to be paid out according to the employee's number of years of service with the ERB;
amount. x x x.14 (Emphasis theirs).
3. The lump sum gratuity to be paid is the employee's salary for one year, not to exceed five
Considering the foregoing asseverations, we list the following issues for our resolution: years;16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Whether Ocampo is entitled to a second lump sum retirement gratuity as ERB Chairperson under 4. The lump sum is based on the employee's last annual salary that he was receiving at the time of
Executive Order No. 172, given that she had already received in full, as admitted by Ocampo herself, a retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may be;
five year lump sum retirement gratuity as ERB Board Member;
5. In case of resignation, the employee should have rendered not less than twenty years of service in the
2. Corollary thereto, whether Ocampo is entitled to double monthly pensions as part of her two government; and,
retirement gratuities for having held the positions of ERB Board Member and Chairperson, respectively.
6. The employee shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life
To obviate confusion, we state at the outset that the parties make no issue of Ocampo's second equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or
retirement as a consequence of the abolition of the ERB and its replacement by the ERC. The issues for resignation.
 80

In affirming ND No. 2003-021 dated 3 September 2003, the COA ruled that: (1) the phrase "for every b. After her first retirement, Ocampo was re-appointed to the ERB, this time, as its chairman on
year of service" limits the payment of the lump sum to the employee's length of service and does not 25 August 1998.
automatically entitle an employee to a lump sum gratuity of five years; (2) Ocampo is not entitled to two
(2) lump sum benefit of five years for each term as it would run counter to the "common-sense c. Ocampo retired once again from the ERB on 15 August 2001, after serving a total of two (2)
principle" laid down in jurisprudence; (3) payment to Ocampo of two retirement benefits under years, eleven (11) months and twenty (20) days as chairman thereof (second retirement).
Executive Order No. 172 for both her retirements, albeit under different positions and offices, is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision against additional or double compensation; and (4)
ultimately, Ocampo should have received only a pro- rated amount on her retirement gratuity based on Owing to her two retirements from the ERB, Ocampo now claims that she is likewise entitled to two (2)
her two years and four months as ERB Board Member, and two years, eleven months and twenty days as sets of retirement benefits under Executive Order No. 172 in relation to Republic Act No. 1568 as
ERB Chairperson. amended by Republic Act No. 3595.

We note that, while COA's decisions did not state whether Ocampo, for her first retirement gratuity, We disagree.
received the maximum lump sum benefit of five years which an employee may receive, Ocampo
asseverated in her Reply, and the records of this case categorically show that for her retirement as ERB Claim of Ocampo for Two Sets of Retirement Benefits Not a Claim of Double Compensation
Board Member, she received the maximum lump sum benefit of five years although her actual creditable
service for that position and period is less than five (5) years, i.e., two years and four months. This has At the outset, it must be clarified that the claim of Ocampo for two (2) sets of retirement benefits under
already been paid to, and received by Ocampo, and has never been the subject of any audit or Republic Act No. 1568 is not, strictly speaking, a claim for double compensation prohibited under the
disallowance by the COA prior to Ocampo's claim for a second retirement benefit as ERB Chairperson. first paragraph of Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution. Claims for double retirement benefits fall
under the prohibition against the receipt of double compensation when they are based on exactly the
Ocampo is surprised, therefore, that her first retirement gratuity, which she had long received, was same services and on the same creditable period.19 This is not, however, the case herein.
audited by the COA. In short, Ocampo argues that the foregoing expenditure is not the proper subject of
COA's jurisdiction, as COA should confine itself to its disallowance of Ocampo's second retirement In this case, Ocampo is not claiming two (2) sets of retirement benefits for one and the same creditable
gratuity in the amount of P1,452,613.71 computed on a pro-rated basis equivalent to Ocampo's length of period. Rather, Ocampo is claiming a set of retirement benefits for each of her two (2) retirements from
service as ERB Chairperson for two years, eleven months and twenty days. the ERB. In other words, each set of retirement benefits claimed by Ocampo is based on distinct
creditable periods i.e., one for her term as member of the ERB and another for her term as chairman of
In fact, in the dispositive portion of COA's Decision 2008-017, COA's pro-rated computation of Ocampo's the same agency.
first and second retirement benefits as ERB Board Member and Chairperson, respectively, exceeded the
five-year limit set forth in the law. The pro-rated computation of COA of Ocampo's retirement benefits What Ocampo is merely claiming, therefore, is that she is entitled to two (2) sets of retirement benefits
corresponded to Ocampo's total period of employment as both ERB Board Member and Chairperson for for her two (2) retirements from the ERB under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. Hence, in order to
five (5) years, three (3) months, and twenty (20) days, in the total amount of P2,688,636.23. Thus, in the resolve her claim, what is only required is an interpretation of Republic Act No. 1568, as amended.
Decisions 2008-017 and 2009-038, COA affirmed the disallowance of ?1,449,450.48. COA noted that
Ocampo had already received the total amount of ?4,138,086.71 as retirement benefits, and ordered the Republic Act No. 1568 as Amended Does Not Justify Payment of More than One Gratuity and Annuity
Auditor concerned to adjust the books of accounts of the agency respecting the payment of the first as a Consequence of Several Retirements from the Same Agency
lump sum gratuity.
As can be seen from our discussion above, the success of Ocampo's claim actually depends on the
First. We disagree with Ocampo that COA should not have audited the first retirement benefit paid to existence of a provision in Republic Act No. 1568 that allows her to recover two (2) set of retirement
Ocampo as ERB Board Member. COA's plenary authority, consisting of pre and post audit, is enshrined in benefits as a consequence of her two (2) retirements from the ERB. Ocampo hinges her claim for two (2)
the Constitution,17 and as oft observed in jurisprudence.18 COA validly looked into the government sets of retirement benefits solely on the provisions of Republic Act No. 1568 as amended by Republic
expenditure relating to the first retirement benefit paid to Ocampo because she now claims payment of Act No. 3595.
a second retirement benefit under the same law. Part of the scope of the COA's power, authority and
duty is to "promulgate accounting and auditing rules, and regulations including those for the prevention We rule against her.
and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or
uses of government funds and properties." There is nothing in Republic Act No. 1568 as amended by Republic Act No. 3595 that allows a qualified
retiree to therein recover two (2) sets of retirement benefits as a consequence of two (2) retirements
Second. Before examining the correctness of the COA audit, however, it is imperative to ascertain first, in from the same covered agency. As worded, Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, only allows payment of
view of the circumstances herein obtaining, as to how much Ocampo is entitled to receive as retirement only a single gratuity and a single annuity out of a single compensable retirement from any one of the
benefits under Executive Order No. 172 in relation to Republic Act No. 1568 as amended by Republic Act covered agencies.
No. 3595. We can recall that Ocampo retired twice from the ERB under the following circumstances:
In fact, the contingency of multiple retirements from the same covered agency could not have been
contemplated by the law. We can confirm this if we take into consideration that Republic Act No. 1568 is
a. Ocampo first retired from the ERB on 30 June 1998, after serving a total of two (2) years and a law that, first and foremost, was intended to cover the retirement benefits of the chairmen and
four (4) months as a member thereof (first retirement). members of the COA (formerly the Office of the Auditor General) and of the Commission on Elections
 81

(COMELEC)20 and that it has been the consistent policy of the State, indeed since the 1935 Constitution, for purposes of computing her annuity, Ocampo's last monthly salary shall be that which she was
to prohibit any appointment of more than one term in the said constitutional bodies. Hence, Republic receiving monthly as of the date of her second retirement.
Act No. 1568, as it was passed and in its present form, cannot be said to have sanctioned the payment of
more than one set of retirement benefits to a retiree as a consequence of multiple retirements in one Third. We now come to COA's findings. As can be seen from the factual narration, the disallowance made
agency. by the COA with respect to some of the retirement benefits already received by Ocampo rests on a
different premise than that We have settled in the previous discussions. Hence, for the sake of accuracy,
The mere circumstance that members and chairmen of the ERB may be appointed to serve therein for We require a remand of this case to the COA with the following directives:
more than one term (but not for two consecutive terms)21 does not mean that they would be entitled a
set of retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568 for each of their completed term. Section 1 of
1. To recompute the gratuity and annuity of Ocampo in accordance with the principles
Executive Order No. 172 merely extends to members and chairmen of the ERB similar retirement
enunciated in this Decision;
benefits that retiring members and chairmen of the COA and COMELEC are entitled to under the
law. Similar does not mean greater.
2. To require the adjustment of Ocampo's account to reflect such recomputed gratuity and
Since Republic Act No. 1568, as amended by Republic Act No. 3595 clearly does not justify the payment annuity;
of more than one gratuity and one annuity to a qualified retiree, Ocampo cannot claim two (2) sets of
retirement benefits under the same law. 3. To compare such recomputed gratuity and annuity with the gratuity and annuity already
received by Ocampo so far; and,
How Much Ocampo is Entitled to Recover As Retirement Benefits
a. In the event that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is greater than the gratuity or
Having settled that Ocampo is only entitled to receive only one set of retirement benefits under annuity already received by Ocampo, to allow the payment to Ocampo of only the
Republic Act No. 1568 as amended, We now proceed to the determination of how much Ocampo is excess,
entitled to receive as retirement benefits under the same law.
b. In the event that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is lesser than the gratuity or
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1568 grants two (2) types of retirement benefits to a qualified retiree, i.e., annuity already received by Ocampo, to disallow the excess payments to Ocampo
a gratuity or a lump sum payment and an annuity or monthly pension, viz: and require the refund thereof.

Section 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on It is in this light that We are constrained to grant this petition.
Elections retires from the service for having completed his term or office or by reason of his incapacity
to discharge the duties of his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. This case is remanded to the Commission
age of sixty years but before the expiration of this term of office, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump on Audit with the following directives:
sum his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the last
annual salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the
case may be: Provided, That in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service 1. To recompute the gratuity and annuity of Ocampo in accordance with the principles
in the government; And, provided, further, That he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the enunciated in this Decision;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of 2. To require the adjustment of Ocampo's account to reflect such recomputed gratuity and
retirement, incapacity or resignation. (Emphasis supplied). annuity;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
3. To compare such recomputed gratuity and annuity with the gratuity and annuity already
Applying the above provision, We discern that Ocampo may recover one gratuity in an amount received by Ocampo so far; and,
equivalent to her last annual salary multiplied by her actual years of service in the ERB but not to exceed
five (5) years. In addition, Ocampo is entitled to receive only one annuity equivalent to the amount of a. In the event that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is greater than the gratuity or
her last monthly salary. annuity already received by Ocampo, to allow the payment to Ocampo of only the
excess,
While Ocampo is entitled to receive only one set of retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as
amended, despite her two (2) retirements, We believe that her subsequent stint as Chairman of the b. In the event that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is lesser than the gratuity or
ERB and her consequent second retirement necessitated an adjustment of the retirement benefits she annuity already received by Ocampo, to disallow the excess payments to Ocampo
is entitled to under the law. This is because Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, reckons the amount of and require the refund thereof.
gratuity on the retiree's last annual salary and actual years of service not exceeding five (5) years, and it
bases the amount of annuity on the retiree's last monthly salary.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, for purposes of computing her gratuity, Ocampo's last annual salary shall be that which she was
receiving at the time of her second retirement and her actual years of service shall be the sum of her
years of service both as ERB member and chairman, but not to exceed five (5) years. On the other hand,
 82

EN BANC Associate Justice of the Supreme Court." Accordingly, Justice Salazar-Fernando requested that her
longevity pay be adjusted "from the current 10% to 20% of [her] basic salary effective May 25, 1999."
A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA June 16, 2015
We referred this letter-request to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Chief of the Office of Administrative Services
( OAS ), for study and recommendation.
Re: Letter· of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for His
Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission
In her February 18, 2013 Memorandum,6 Atty. Candelaria recommended that Justice Salazar-Fernando’s
services as MTC Judge be credited as judicial service that can be added to her present longevity pay.
RESOLUTION
Atty. Candelaria, however, recommended the denial of Justice Salazar-Fernando’srequest that her
services at the COMELEC be also credited for her present longevity pay. Nonetheless, she recommended
BRION, J.: that Justice Salazar-Fernando’s services in the COMELEC be included in the computation of her longevity
pay upon retirement "as in the case of Justice Pardo."
Prefatory Statement
B. Letter-Request of Justice Gacutan
The Consolidated Cases
and the Affected Parties In her letter7 dated September 11, 2012, Justice Gacutan requested that: (a) her services as
Commissioner IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) , from March 3, 1998 to
For the Court’s consideration are the following: (1) letter-request dated August 22, 2012, of Court of November5, 2009, be credited as judicial service for purposes of retirement; (b) she be given a longevity
Appeals ( CA) Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando;1 (2) letter-request dated September 11, pay equivalent to 10% of her basic salary; and (c) an adjustment of her salary, allowances and benefits be
2012, of CA Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan;2 and (3) motion for reconsideration3 dated November made from the time she assumed as CA Justice on November 6, 2009. In the Court’s Resolution8 of
7, 2012, of CA Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso.4 November 13, 2012, we required the Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO ) to comment
onJustice Gacutan’s letter. In her Comment of January 4, 2013, Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores, Deputy
Clerk of Court and Chief of Office of the FMBO, recommended that: (1) Justice Gacutan’s request for the
The petitioners are all Justices of the Court of Appeals. Justices Veloso and Fernando claim longevity pay crediting of her services as Commissioner IV of the NLRC as judicial service be granted, but only for
for services rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of their compensation package . Justice purposes of her retirement benefits, to take effect on her compulsory retirement on December 3,
Gacutan, who has recently retired, claims deficiency payment of her longevity pay for the services she 2013;and (2) Justice Gacutan’s request that her salary and allowances be adjusted retroactive from her
had rendered before she joined the Judiciary, as well as a re-computation of her retirement pay to assumption of office in the CA on November 6, 2009, be denied.9
include the claimed longevity pay.

C. Motion for Reconsideration of Justice Veloso

Interest in the outcome of these consolidated cases goes beyond that of the petitioners; some
incumbent justices and judges, before joining the Judiciary, also served in the Executive Department and
would like to see these previous services credited in the computation of their longevity pay. Others who In his November 7, 2012 motion for reconsideration,10 Justice Veloso assailed the Court’s October 23,
had also previously served with the Executive Department currently enjoy longevity pay credit for their 2012 Resolution11 that denied his request for the crediting of his services as NLRC Commissioner as
executive service; they would like to see their mistakenly granted longevity pay credits maintained. judicial service for purposes of adjusting his salary and benefits, specifically his longevity pay.

Thus, the Court’s decision on these consolidated cases, whether to find for or against the petitioners, will Justice Veloso claimed that Republic Act No. (RA) 9347 which amended Article 216 of the Labor Code
likewise affect the interests of other judges and justices in similar circumstance, including several should be applied retroactively since it is a curative statute. He maintained under this view that he
members of this honorable court participating in these matters. already had the rank of a CA Justice as NLRC Commissioner before he was appointed to the appellate
court on February 4, 2004.

Antecedents
We referred Justice Veloso’s motion for reconsideration to the FMBO for report and recommendation in
our Resolution of November 27, 2012.12
A. Letter-Request of Justice Salazar-Fernando

In her Report and Recommendation dated February 15, 2013,13 Atty. Ferrer-Flores recommended that
In her letter dated August 22, 2012,5 Justice Salazar-Fernando requested that her services as Judge of the Justice Veloso’s motion for reconsideration be denied since the points he raised were a rehash of his
Municipal Trial Court ( MTC) of Sta. Rita, Pampanga, from February 15, 1983 to July 31, 1987, and as arguments in his July 30, 2012 letter-request.14
Commissioner of the Commission on Elections ( COMELEC ), from February 14, 1992 to February 14,
1998, be considered as part of her judicial services "as in the case of Hon. Bernar do P. Pardo, Retired
 83

Our Rulings Notably, the Court in In Re: Justice Pardo liberally interpreted the phrase "the Court" in Section 3 of BP
129 to mean the entire judiciary, not just the Court of Appeals. The provision reads:
I. Letter of Justice Salazar-Fernando in A.M. No. 13-02-07-SC
Any member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other position in the
government shall retain precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his
a. Services as MTC Judge
service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes , be considered as continuous and uninterrupted.
(emphases supplied)
We grant the request of Justice Salazar-Fernando to credit as judicial service her previous services as
MTC Judge of Sta. Rita, Pampanga, as judicial service in the computation of her longevity pay.
This provision was an amendment to Section 3 of BP 129 which, as originally worded, referred only to
the organization of the CA, the appointment process of its justices, and the means by which seniority of
Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Bilang ( B.P. Blg.) 129 provides: rank is determined among the CA justices. Executive Order No. 33 added this phrase, and hence Section
3 now reads as:
Section 42. Longevity pay. – A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay shall be
paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, Sec. 3. Organization. There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding Justice
and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary; Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each and fifty Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Presiding
Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge Justice shall be so designated in hi s appointment, and the Associate Justice shall have precedence
next in rank. [Italics supplied; emphasis and underscoring ours] according to the dates of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two or more of
them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were issued by the
We find it undisputed that Justice Salazar-Fernando served as MTC Judge from February 15, 1983 to July President. Any member w ho is reappointed to the Court after rendering in any other position in the
31, 1987. This service constitutes continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his
and, hence, should be included in the computation of her longevity pay. service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes, be considered as continuous and uninterrupted.

b. Service as COMELEC Commissioner Thus, had the Court given a more literal interpretation of the phrase added by EO No. 33,then it would
have interpreted its application to refer to an incumbent CA justice only. The phrase, after all, had been
added to Section 3 of BP 129, which referred to the organization of the CA. Following this interpretation,
We deny, however, the inclusion of Justice Salazar-Fernando’s request to credit her services as COMELEC Justice Pardo’s service in the COMELEC would not have been appreciated in determining his longevity
Commissioner, from February 14, 1992 to February 14, 1998, as judicial service for longevity pay pay, as he was reappointed not to the CA, but to the Supreme Court.
purposes.

Instead, the Court, taking a more liberal approach, interpreted the phrase "the Court" to mean the entire
The only service recognized for purposes of longevity pay under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is service in judiciary. It noted that the additional phrase in Section 3 used the generic word "Court" instead of Court
the Judiciary, not service in any other branch of government. The CO MELEC is an agency independent of of Appeals, and that to apply the stricter application of interpreting "Court" to mean "Court of Appeals"
the Judiciary; hence, service in this agency cannot be considered as service rendered in the Judiciary. would "lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers."

We find Justice Salazar-Fernando’s invocation of the case of Justice Pardo, to support her claim to Thus, following this more liberal approach, Justice Pardo’s one-time service outside of the judiciary was
longevity pay, misplaced. considered part of his service in the judiciary for purposes of determining hi s longevity pay. The same
may be applied, for instance, to a trial court judge who rendered service outside the judiciary and then
b.1. Our Pardo Ruling returned to being a member of the bench.

In In Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for Adjustment of His Longevity Pay,15 we held that the Thus, the Court’s ruling in In Re: Justice Pardo is authority for expanding EO No. 33’s amendment to
inclusion of Justice Pardo’s service in the COMELEC in the computation of his longevity pay upon his Section 3 of BP 129 to all members of the judiciary.
retirement was predicated on the factual circumstances peculiar to him: he was an incumbent CA Justice
when he was appointed COMELEC Chairman, and was appointed to the Supreme Court after his service b.2. The liberal Pardo ruling cannot and should not be extended to allow members of the judiciary to
with the COMELEC, without any interruption in his service . leave and return more than once, without interrupting the continuity of their service.

The Court ― based on its reading of Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 12916 ― did not consider his intervening The next question to be asked, then, refers to the frequency by which members of the judiciary may be
service in the COMELEC, an office outside the Judiciary, as a disruption of his service in the Judiciary. able to serve in other branches of government without breaking their ‘continuo us and uninterrupted’
service. Did the ruling in Justice Pardo’s case allow members of the judiciary to leave for other branches
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of government numerous times, and still maintain continuous and uninterrupted service in the judiciary? Additionally, it must not be lost on us that we have already given Section 3 a liberal interpretation in In
The answer to this question is a resounding no. Re: Justice Pardo. To top this exercise of liberality with another liberal interpretation of the same
provision, when the law is clear regarding its application, would amount to judicial legislation that
furthers the interests within our ranks.
A critical aspect of Justice Pardo’s case was the absence of any gap in his service from the time he was
appointed as Caloocan City Judge in 1974, until he retired as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in
2002. He occupied the positions of District Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 34, Caloocan To recapitulate, Section 3 applies to any judge or justice, who left the judiciary, served in a single non-
City, from May 3, 1974 to January 17, 1983; Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Manila, from January judicial governmental post, and returned to the judiciary. This was what happened in the case of Justice
18, 1983 to March 29, 1993; Associate Justice of the CA, from March 30, 1993 to February 16, Pardo, when after a long and continuous service in the judiciary, he left to serve in the COMELEC and
from there was subsequently appointed to the Supreme Court.
1995; Chairman, COMELEC, from February 17, 1995 to October 6, 1998; and Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, from October 7, 1998 to February 10, 2002. b.3. Justice Fernando is not entitled to her request even under the liberal Pardo ruling.

In these lights, Justice Pardo’s case has nothing to offer by way of jurisprudential precedent in terms of Justice Salazar-Fernando effectively asks us in her present case to give her the benefit of our Pardo ruling
determining whether Section 3 of BP 129 allows judges and justices to leave the judiciary several times although the attendant facts of her case differ from those of Justice Pardo’s and do not approximate the
without breaking their continuous service. There was no occasion to rule on this issue, as Justice Pardo factual situation that Section 3 requires.
left the judiciary only once, to serve in the COMELEC.
In the first place, her record shows that her services in between her judicial services were not continuous
Proceeding from this conclusion, the next level of inquiry leads us to examine whether Section 3 of BP and uninterrupted.
129 allows multiple breaks in judicial office and considers these breaks as part of a continuous and
uninterrupted judicial service.
We find that after Justice Salazar-Fernando’s stint as MTC Judge in July 1987, she was named Chairman
of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) where she served from August
The amendment to Section 3, as worded and interpreted in In Re: Justice Pardo , refers to the 1987 to February 13, 1992. During this period, she concurrently held directorship posts at the Light Rail
reappointment of a member of the judiciary after serving in another branch of government. The judge Transit Authority (LRTA) and at the Office of Transport Cooperatives (OTC). In the later part of
shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his judicial 1991,Justice Salazar-Fernando held the position of Officer-in-Charge/Assistant Secretary of the Land
service shall be considered uninterrupted. Transportation Office.

This service outside the judiciary, however, should only occur once, as in Justice Pardo’s case. Section 3 It was only after Justice Salazar-Fernando’s stints at the LTFRB, LRTA, and OTC all non-judicial offices that
refers to an original appointment , which is the first appointment by which a lawyer becomes a member she was appointed as Commissioner of the COMELEC on February 14, 1992, and served in this capacity
of the judiciary. As he progresses in the judiciary ― whether by staying in his original post or by being until February 15, 1998. Three (3) days later, or on February 18, 1998, she started to serve as a
appointed in other posts ― he acquires seniority, which is especially applicable in determining his consultant in the COMELEC until October 6, 1998.
retirement and longevity pay. Once he leaves the judiciary, however, his original appointment is cut off;
hence, Section 3 can only refer to the judge’s return to the judiciary as a "reappointment." He needs to
Parenthetically, her service as consultant is not a "position in government" that should be considered a
get re-appointed back to the judiciary, as he is no longer part of it.
part of her government service as she did not occupy any specific position in government. Moreover, it
was only five (5) months after her COMELEC consultancy, or on March 25, 1999, that Justice Salazar-
Section 3 works to bridge the gap between the time the judge left his original appointment and his Fernando was appointed as Associate Justice of the CA. Thus, significant gaps in her judicial service
reappointment to the judiciary, provided the gap in service was rendered in another branch of intervened so that her situation did not comply with the requirement in Section 3 that only a single non-
government. Once reappointed to the judiciary, however, he can no longer avail of Section 3, as Section judicial position should intervene in her judicial service record.
3 speaks of an original appointment. A second reappointment, after another service in a different
government agency, would be succeeding the first reappointment, and not the original appointment.
Reduced to the bare essentials, the issue for us is whether we should apply with liberality a ruling that
Section 3 operates to bridge an original appointment with a reappointment, and not to connect a
had already been very liberally interpreted by this Court, under facts that do not entitle Justice Fernando
reappointment with a second appointment. Had the latter interpretation been the intent behind the law,
to recognition of continuous service under the requirements of Section 3.
then it should and would have made this situation clearer.

Our brief and direct answer is that we cannot and must not allow the crediting of Justice Salazar
Further, the application of Section 3 appears to be limited to service in a single position in government
Fernando’ s COMELEC service for longevity pay purposes. Acceding to her request will constitute an
outside of the judiciary. Section 3 speaks of "any other position in the government," and thus uses a
outright judicial legislation that the Court cannot undertake under the Constitution. As earlier noted,
singular noun. After this single service, the judge or justice invoking the application of Section 3 must
Justice Salazar-Fernando’s de tails do not at all approximate the factual circumstances Section 3 of BP
have returned to the judiciary in order for his service to be deemed uninterrupted.
129 that speaks of, nor the factual situation in In Re: Justice Pardo.
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If we had been liberal in the past and this liberal ruling is now cited, we should, at the very least, not go Considering the express wordings of RA 910, which include service "in all other branches of the
beyond the facts under which our past liberality had been extended. If we further read liberally a Court Government" as creditable service in the computation of the retirement benefits of a justice or judge,
ruling that only came to being because of past liberality, we stand to hear a re-echo of the charge that Justice Gacutan’s service as NL RC Commissioner should be credited as part of her government service
this Court selectively applies its liberality in favor of its own . (In fact, a favorable ruling in these for retirement purposes under RA 910, as amended.
consolidated cases may already raise eyebrows and questions as the Court will be ruling on matters that
will directly affect some of its participating Members .)
III. Motion for Reconsideration of Justice Veloso in A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA

To sum up, Justice Salazar-Fernando’s services as COMELEC Commissioner cannot be included in the
a. Background.
computation of her longevity pay, now or upon her retirement .

The chairman and members of the NLRC were entitled to receive an annual salary at least equivalent to
II. Letter-Request of Justice Gacutan in A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC
the allowances and benefits of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the CA, respectively, prior
to the amendment of Article 216 of the Labor Code by RA 9347 .
a. Longevity Pay for Services as NLRC Commissioner
Under RA 9347 (which took effect on August 26, 2006),17 NLRC commissioners were given the equivalent
We deny Justice Gacutan’s request that her past services in the NLRC be recognized for purposes of her rank of a CA Justice. The Labor Code, as now amended by Section 4 of RA 9347, reads:
longevity pay. She served as a Commissioner IV of the NLRC from March 3, 1998 to November 5, 2009, or
for a period of eleven years and eight months.
Article 216. Salaries, Benefits and Emoluments. The Chairman and members of the Commission shall
have the same rank , receive an annual salary equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances,
Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is clear and explicit: a judge or justice should have rendered five years of retirement and benefits as those of the Presiding and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,
continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary in order to qualify for a monthly longevity respectively. [italics supplied, emphasis ours]
pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay.
In his present motion, Justice Veloso claims that RA 9347 should be given a retroactive application. With
We point out that the NLRC is an agency attached to the Department of Labor and Employment – an the equivalent rank of a CA Justice from the time RA 9347 was amended, his service as NLRC
adjunct of the Executive Department – albeit for policy and program coordination only. Under the Commissioner should be considered as judicial service for purposes of his longevity pay.
circumstances, Justice Gacutan’s past service as NLRC Commissioner cannot be credited as judicial
service for longevity pay purposes since she did not render such service while with the Judiciary.
b. Our ruling and the reasons therefore

b. NLRC Services Considered in Retirement Pay

b.1. RA 9347 does not provide for retroactivity.

Nonetheless, Justice Gacutan’s service as NLRC Commissioner is creditable as part of overall government
We disagree with Justice Veloso’s position and thus deny his motion.
service for retirement purposes under RA 910, as amended. Section 1 of this law provides:

First, nothing in the language of RA 9347 expressly indicates the intention to give it retroactive effect.
Section 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals who has rendered at least
We emphasize that statutes, as a rule, apply prospectively, unless the legislative intention to give them
twenty years' service either in the judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, (a)
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.18 In "case of
retires for having attained the age of seventy y ears, or (b) resigns by reason of his incapacity to
doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retroactive effect."19
discharge the duties of his office, he shall receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner
hereinafter provided, the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. And
when a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals has attained the age of fifty-seven years Nor is retroactivity discernible, even by implication, from the provisions of RA 9347. It is not implied from
and has rendered at least twenty years' service in the Government, ten or more of which have been the law’s legislative intent, nor from the deliberations in Senate Bill No. 2035 (which became RA 9347).20
continuously rendered as such Justice or as judge of a court of record, he shall be likewise entitled to
retire and receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner also hereinafter prescribed, the In Re: Request of Retired Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada for Automatic Adjustment
salary which he was then receiving. It is a condition of the pension provided for herein that no retiring of His Retirement Benefits to Include Special Allowance Under R.A. 9227,21 the Court refused to extend
Justice during the time that he is receiving said pension shall appear as counsel before any court in any the benefits provided by RA 9227 to official s of the Judiciary who retired prior to the passage of this law.
civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or RA 9227 granted a special allowance to justices, judges, and all other positions in the Judiciary with the
in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense equivalent rank of justices of the CA or judges of the RTC. Since the position of Deputy Court
committed in relation to his office, or collect any fee for his appearance in any administrative Administrator (DCA) carries the same rank as an Associate Justice of the CA,22 retired DCA Ponferrada
proceedings to maintain an interest adverse to the Government, insular, provincial or municipal, or to asked for the inclusion of the RA 9227 special allowance in his retirement pay.
any of its legally constituted officers.
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The Court denied the request, noting that RA 9227 did not expressly provide for retroactivity so that With each of the consolidated petitions directly ruled upon, the following discussions are submitted to
those who had retired at the time of its enactment would be covered. Although the grant was extended expound on the conclusions reached and to generally comment on the issues the Dissents raised.
to retired SC and CA justices, this was justified under Section 3-A of RA 910, as amended, which states:
At the core of the issues raised is the question: should the past service of incumbent justices and judges,
SEC. 3-A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court Appeals is increased or rendered at the Executive Department, be recognized under Section 42 of BP 129 ( the longevity pay
decreased, salary shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the salary or the retirement pension provision ) on the ground that their previous executive positions now carry the rank, salary, and benefits
which a Justice x x x who retired was receiving at the time of his cessation in the office: Provided, That of their counterparts in the Judiciary?
any benefits that have already accrued prior to such increase or decrease shall not be affected
thereby.23 [underscore ours]
The law governing this issue is of course the longevity pay provision, heretofore quoted,26 whose salient
points are summarized below:
According to the Court, parity in rank and salary does not automatically mean parity in retirement
benefits under Section 3-A of RA 910. Notably, the automatic adjustment of retirement benefits was
1. The longevity pay is a monthly pay equivalent to 5% of monthly basic pay;
expressly extended by RA 910, as amended, but only to Justices of the SC and the CA, not to judicial
officials with the equivalent rank. Additionally, since he retired prior to the passage of RA 9227, DCA
Ponferrada could not even invoke the automatic adjustment of his retirement pay under Section 3-A of 2. Recipients are the Justices and Judges of courts;
RA No. 910, as amended, to support his request.24
3. For each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service;
In the same way, RA 9347 was en acted into law only on July 27, 2006. Justice Veloso had, by then (on
February 4, 2004) left his post as NLRC Commissioner to assume the position of Associate Justice of the 4. The service is to be rendered in the Judiciary;
Court of Appeals. In the absence of any clear intent to give RA 9347 any retroactive effect, Justice Veloso
cannot validly claim that he held the rank of a CA justice during his stint as NLRC Commissioner from
1989 to 2004. 5. In no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge, after his longevity pay is added,
exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank.

b.2. RA 9347 is not a curative statute.

What would otherwise be a simple stand-alone provision is complicated by subsequent laws that grant
the same ranks, salaries and benefits.
"A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments
or acts of public authorities[,] which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain
existing legal requirements."25Simply put, curative laws are enacted to validate acts done that otherwise - "as those of" their counterpart judge or justice (for the National Prosecution Service), or
would be invalid under existing laws.
- "as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals (for the
RA 9347 is not a curative statute since it was not intended to supply deficiencies, abridge superfluities in National Labor Relations Commission), and
existing laws, or curb evils; the insertion of the word "rank" in Article 216 was merely to emphasize the
increase in salaries and benefits of the NLRC Commissioners and labor arbiters. - the [ "rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges"] as their counterpart
Justice or Judge (for the Office of the Solicitor General).
b.3. Grant of Equivalent Rank is not Service in the Judiciary
These new levels of rank and salary are essentially what the present petitioners and the incumbent
At any rate, even if we recognize retroactivity as requested, the conferment of the rank of a CA Justice to justices and judges cite as basis for the grant or increase of their longevity pay.
Justice Veloso during his tenure as NLRC Commissioner would not entitle him to longevity pay.
Another complicating factor involves the past rulings of this Court where past executive service had been
Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is clear: a judge or justice shall be paid a monthly longevity pay equivalent to recognized, not only for retirement pay purposes, but for longevity pay purposes upon retirement.
5% of the monthly basic pay for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service Interestingly, no in-depth look appears to have been made in these past rulings, although their results
rendered in the Judiciary. Service in the NLRC, even with the rank of a CA Justice, is not service with the cannot be in doubt ― the Court recognized past executive services for longevity pay purposes.
Judiciary for purposes of longevity pay. Justice Veloso’s service in the NLRC, however, m ay be credited
as part of his government service for retirement purposes under RA 910, as in the case of Justice Interestingly, the Dissents, led by Justice De Castro, take a multi-pronged critique of the ponencia
Gacutan . generally chastising it for being overly strict in its reading of Section 42.

IV. General Discussions Among others, she posits that the ponencia disregards long established rulings of the Court on longevity
pay without a clear finding of the legal error made, and disregards as well the liberal interpretation the
 87

Court has applied in these rulings; that the ponencia disregards too the intent of the relevant laws Section 42 of this law has heretofore been quoted, but for convenience is again quoted below –
(referring to the subsequent laws that grants ranks, salaries and benefits similar to those of their
counterparts in the Judiciary), the legal presumption of legislative awareness, and consideration of prior
Section 42. Longevity pay . – A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay shall be
laws and jurisprudence in enacting a statute; and claims that the contemporaneous construction given
paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient,
by the Department of Justice and other Executive branch officers, which disc loses a similar treatment of
and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary ; Provided , That in no case shall the total salary of each
the longevity pay provision of Section 42, de serves the court’s respect. Last but not the least, Justice De
Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge
Castro analyzes Section 42 and concludes that longevity pay is not a mere benefit but is a component of
next in rank. [italics supplied; emphasis and underscore ours ]
the salary that should not be withheld from executive officers with the same rank, salary and benefits as
their counterparts in the Judiciary.
As written, the language and terms of this provision are very clear and unequivocal: longevity pay is
granted to a judge or justice (and to none other) who has rendered five years of continuous, efficient
For his part, Justice Velasco essentially joins the Dissent of Justice De Castro and questions the
and meritorious service in the Judiciary. The granted monthly longevity pay is equivalent to 5% of the
ponencia’s proposal to "freeze" the longevity pay grants for justices and judges who have been credited
monthly basic pay.
with their past service in the Executive Department. He posits too that "what matters is their receiving,
for purposes of computing longevity pay, the salary of a Justice of the CA at the time they served as NLRC
Commissioners." If this is the case, Justice Veloso claims they should be credited with their service with The plain reading of Section 42 shows that longevity pay is not available even to a judicial officer who is
the NLRC for purposes of their longevity pay. not a judge or justice. It is likewise not available, for greater reason, to an officer in the Executive simply
because he or she is not serving as a judge or justice. It cannot also be available t o a judge or justice for
past services he or she did not render within the Judiciary as services rendered outside the Judiciary for
Faced with these complications and dissents, the Court should not forget that our duty, first and
purposes of longevity pay is not contemplated by law.
foremost, is to correctly interpret the law as written, not to stick to our past rulings at all costs nor to
consider our personal interests. In doing this, we must also be reminded that at the center of the dispute
is Section 42 of BP 129 – the provision on longevity pay that we must consider with a fresh eye. Significantly, the Court has had occasion to speak about the purpose of longevity pay. In In Re: Request
of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for Adjustment of His Longevity Pay,28 the Court categorically declared that
the purpose of the law in granting longevity pay to judges and justices is to recompense them for each
The consolidated cases, too, do not embody claims by executive officers against their own Department
five y ears of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary; it is the long service
for the enforcement of what the law involving their Department provides. These cases involve claims by
in the Judiciary - from the lowest to the highest court of the land – and not in any other branch of
CA justices – members of the Judiciary – who look up to laws involving the Executive Department to
government, that is rewarded,29
secure, maintain or increase the longevity pay that provides benefit for judges and justices. Our primary
focus, however, must be the interpretation of our own law ― BP 129 and its Section 42.
In the case of the judge or justice now asking for the tacking of his/her past executive service, the reason
for the denial is simple and needs no intricate or complicated exercise in interpretation: these past
A. Statutory Construction & Interpretation Perspectives
services were undertaken outside the Judiciary and are not the services the law contemplates. The
tacking, to put it bluntly, violates the clear purpose and wording of Section 42 of BP 129.
a. First rule of statutory construction: the plain meaning rule.
To look at Section 42 from another perspective, if indeed (as some would argue) the intent is to grant
The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a law (in executive officers longevity pay pursuant to their respective grants of benefits similar to that provided
this case, the provision granting longevity pay) is to examine the law itself to see what it plainly says. This under Section 42 of BP 129, this presumed grant should be understood to be limited to the executive
is the plain meaning rule of statutory construction.27 officer’s continued, efficient and meritorious service in the Executive Department, to be given while the
executive officer is still with that department.
The first aspect that offers itself in the examination of the law is its title, which gives us a direct indicator
of the exact subject matter of the law. In the present cases, the law under which the disputed longevity When the public officer with equivalent rank, salary and benefits transfers to the Judiciary , the longevity
provision can be found is B.P. Blg. 129, An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore pay to which he may have been entitled under the law applicable to his previous Executive Department
and For Other Purposes (simplified as BP 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). position, and which he may have been receiving because of his continued service in that department,
will simply have to be disregarded and discontinued.
This title alone already suggests that its provisions specifically relate to members of the judiciary, unless
an express contrary intent is made by the legislature. No such exception clause is evident under the At the point of transfer, Section 42 of BP 129 will now apply and operate, and will require five (5) years
terms of BP 129 or in any of the other related laws (specifically, in R. A. 9347, 9417, and 10071) discussed of continued and efficient service in the Judiciary before it can start to be earned. This application may
in this ponencia . sound hard and illiberal, but this is the logical consequence of the combined effect of the Judiciary’s BP
129 longevity provision and the laws granting parity to benefits applicable to the Judiciary.
As discussed more extensively below, these other general laws do not specifically mention at all the
longevity provision under BP 129, a specific grant made only to the judges and justices in the Judiciary.
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To reiterate for emphasis, for a transferring public official, now a new justice or judge, to be entitled to In the present case, where the law is clear, we should likewise be clear and decisive in its application lest
longevity pay under the terms of Section 42, he must first render continued, efficient and meritorious we be accused of favoritism or accommodating former colleagues, or indirectly, ourselves, who will all
service in the Judiciary for at least five years; his prior continued service in his previous department will inevitably retire from our judicial posts.
not and should not be counted.
d. Administrative construction is merely advisory and is not binding upon the courts.
b. The general laws that the Dissents cite cannot prevail over a specific law.
We take exception to the Dissent’s invocation of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction to
General laws (such as Republic Act Nos. [RA] 9347, 9417, and 10071) that generally grant the same ranks, support its expansive reading of RA 9347 in relation with Section 42 of BP 129.
salaries and benefits to public officers in the Executive Department as those of their specified
counterparts in the Judiciary, cannot prevail over a special law such as BP 129 that specifically grants
The Dissent conveniently fails to mention that contemporaneous constructions of administrative or
longevity pay solely to justices and judges who have rendered five (5) years of continuous, efficient, and
executive agencies are merely at best advisory and not binding on the courts, for by the Constitution and
meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary.
the law, the courts are given the task of finally determining what the law means.33

A basic principle of statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law.30 A later
We do so under our authority to state what the law is34 and deference to an agency’s statutory
enactment like RA 9347 and RA 10071 cannot override BP 129 because the latter, as a special law, must
interpretation should be withheld whenever it conflicts with the language of the statute, as in the
prevail regardless of the dates of the enactment of these other laws.31
present case.

As we held in Hon. Bagatsing v. Judge Ramirez,32 a general provision must give way to a particular
In Peralta v. Civil Service Commission,35 the Court had occasion to state and held:
provision. As a special provision on the grant of longevity pay, Section 42 of BP 129 governs and is
controlling; to hold otherwise, as the dissent suggests, is to violate its clear mandate.
Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law,
Following the rule on general and special laws, the general laws granting the same salaries and benefits
or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the
cannot apply to the longevity pay provision that, by its specific and express terms, is solely for the
letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
benefit of judges and justices who have shown loyal service to the Judiciary; it is not for those who have
been granted similar ranks, salaries and benefits as those of their counterpart judges and justices. That
they cannot be beneficiaries of longevity pay is clinched by its purpose – the reward is intended for those Thus, while the Executive possesses discretion in the implementation of laws, we should not forget the
with loyal service to the Judiciary. reason for the Judiciary’s existence. We are the interpreters of the law and the Constitution, not the
Executive, and when a legal error exists, we must step in and intervene, however long and hard the
Executive’s previous implementation of the law had been.
c. Is there room for liberality in reading and interpreting Section 42?

e. The question of Judicial Legislation

As a general rule and contrary to the Dissent’s view, no room or occasion exists for any liberal
construction or interpretation; only the application of the letter of the law is required by basic statutory
construction principles. Judicial legislation, in simplest terms, happens when the Court adds to what the law provides and does
so in the guise of interpretation, as the present dissents now want to do by seeking to tack and to credit,
for longevity pay purposes, the past services that justices and judges rendered in the Executive
We should not forget that liberality is not a magic wand that can ward off the clear terms and import of
Department.
express legal provisions; it has a place only when, between two positions that the law can both
accommodate, the Court chooses the more expansive or more generous option. It has no place where no
choice is available at all because the terms of the law are clear and do not at all leave room for In fact, in their discussions, the Dissents take the view that the ponencia has engaged in judicial
discretion. legislation because it restricts the concept of salary merely to the "basic pay."

In terms of the longevity pay’s purpose, liberality has no place where service is not to the Judiciary, as This Resolution does, in fact, reflect the views imputed to it and it has not been shy or hesitant from the
the element of loyalty – the virtue that longevity pay rewards – is not at all present. very start in taking this position. But rather than being narrow and illiberal in doing this, we believe that
our position hews to the letter of the law so that our stance cannot be the basis for the charge of judicial
legislation.
We cannot overemphasize too that the policy of liberal construction cannot and should not be to the
point of engaging in judicial legislation – an act that the Constitution absolutely forbids this Court to do.
We may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute or include, under its terms, Judicial legislation in fact transpires when the Court reads into the law an interpretation that the four
situations that were not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. We cannot rewrite the law to conform corners of that law cannot b ear. This expansive interpretation – i.e., that the term "salary" under Section
to what we think should be the law. 42 includes longevity pay so that equivalency of "salary" translates to the mandatory recognition of
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longevity pay – is unfortunately what the dissents espouse, driven perhaps by thoughts of what the law The Judiciary recognizes the ranks that the law accords to judges and justices. These judicial ranks wholly
ought to be. pertain to the Judiciary as an independent, separate and co-equal branch of government. Under our
current constitutional set-up, no legislative or executive grant, fiat or recognition of rank can make the
grantee, who is not a judge or justice, a judicial officer, without violating the constitutional principles of
What "ought to be" as a matter of policy is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to decide upon. The
separation of powers and independence of the Judiciary.
Court eloquently spoke in Canet v. Mayor Decena about this judicial limit, albeit in the context of
discussing the maxim expression unius est exclusio alterius (literally, what is expressed puts an end to
what is implied). The Court said:36 As a consequence, the grant of rank at the same level as the grantees’ counterpart judges or justices is
not and cannot be a conferment of "judicial rank" and does not thereby accord the grantees recognition
as members of the Judiciary. For incumbent judges and justices who had previous government service
In other words, it is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
outside the Judiciary , it follows that the grant of rank to them under their old executive positions does
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius
not render their service in these previous positions equivalent to and creditable as judicial service, unless
est exlusio alterius. Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to
Congress by law says otherwise and only for purposes of entitlement to salaries and benefits.
what is implied. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislative body would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms
to those expressly mentioned. To be sure, Congress can create and recognize ranks outside of the Judiciary that are equivalent to the
ranks it has created for the Judiciary, but again, this recognition doe s not thereby create "judicial ranks"
outside of the Judiciary, nor constitute the grantees of these ranks as judges and justices. Technically,
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither could
what Congress creates or grants are executive ranks that are equivalent to judicial ranks.
the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled
by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and
include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the Notably, even for those within the Judiciary itself, the recognition of "judicial rank" in favor of those who
enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom are not justices or judges does not thereby make the grantee a justice or a judge who is entitled to this
may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should formal title; the grantee may be entitled to the benefits of the rank but he/she remains an administrative
be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention has been called to official in the Judiciary, separate and distinct from the justices and judges who directly exercise judicial
the omission. power, singly or collegially.

Courts should not, by construction, revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature, b. Commonalities and Divergence of Terms and Conditions of Government Service.
nor rewrite the law to conform with what they think should be the law. Nor may they interpret into the
law a requirement which the law does not prescribe. Where a statute contains no limitations in its
The principle of separation of powers between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of
operation or scope, courts should not engraft any. And where a provision of law expressly limits its
government ordains that each of these three (3) great branches of government has exclusive cognizance
application to certain transactions, it cannot be extended to other transactions by interpretation. To do
of, and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.38
any of such things would be to do violence to the language of the law and to invade the legislative
sphere. [emphases ours]
Each branch cannot invade the domain of the others.39 This principle presupposes mutual respect by and
between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial departments and entitles them to be left alone to
Applied to the present consolidated cases, we cannot go beyond the terms of Section 42 by expanding its
discharge their assigned duties as they see fit.40
terms to what it does not include: when the law speaks of service "in the Judiciary," it means what it says
and cannot include service outside the Judiciary. To relate this to the statutory construction rule
discussed above give n the express and clear terms of the law, the basic rule to apply is: "legislative We generally draw attention to this constitutional principle to emphasize that while all officials in the
intent is to be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, three branches of government are government officials, vast differences may exist in the terms and
there is no room for construction."37 conditions of their government service; these are ultimately traceable to the separation of power
principle.
B. The Grant of Rank, Benefits and their Implications
Government officials perform specifically assigned functions peculiar to their respective departments
and these functions justify their differing terms and conditions of government service. In the context of
a. Judicial Rank and Executive Rank.
the present consolidated cases, distinctions must necessarily exist between one who is appointed to the
position of a judge or justice, (which position carries law-defined salaries, benefits, and conditions
The grant of a "rank" equivalent to (or even "the same as" ) "those of the" grantee’s counterpart judge specific to judges and justices), and one who is appointed to an executive position with the equivalent
or justice is a matter that has not been the subject of extensive jurisprudential c overage. Hence, the rank, salary or benefits of a justice or judge in the Judiciary.
subject of this Resolution proceeds on a path that so far remains untrodden. The novelty of the issue
posed need not deter us as the matters before us call for resolution and should be written about if only
The extent to which those with equivalent executive and judicial ranks have commonalities or diverge in
to serve as guides for the future.
their salaries and benefits is a matter that the Constitution leaves, within limits, to the discretion of the
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Legislature as a matter of policy. What is important to recognize is the legal reality that the divergence of in this situation would be legality, but this situation, to our mind, is one that is both illegal and unfair.
salaries and benefits across government, even among those with equivalent ranks, is not at all unusual Unfairness comes in because of the grant of what is not legally due.
because these positions belong to different branches of government and undertake functions peculiar to
their departments.
D. The Salary and Longevity Pay

A convenient example to cite is the allowance benefit that members of the Office of the Solicitor General
a. The Applicable Law on Salary
are given as peculiarly their own – honoraria and allowances from client departments, agencies and
instrumentalities.41Members of the Judiciary do not enjoy these same benefits.
An examination of BP 129 shows that its Section 41 treats of "salaries" of judges, while Section 42
provides for longevity pay.
On the part of the Judiciary, the disputed longevity pay also serves as a good example. By its terms,
longevity pay is peculiar to the Judiciary as discussed above. Significantly, in all the cited laws that grant
similarity of ranks, salaries, and benefits between executive officials and their counterparts in the Under Section 41, the "salaries" or compensation (and allowances) that judges shall receive shall be the
Judiciary, no mention at all is made of longevity pay and its enjoyment outside the Judiciary. Longevity amount that the President may authorize following the guidelines set fort h in Letter of Implementation
pay, of course, is not unique as a feature of judicial life that is wholly the Judiciary’s own; there are other (LOI) No. 93, pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 985, as amended by PD 1597.
benefits that the Judiciary enjoys – by law, by rule or by practice – that are not replicated in the
executive agencies, in the same manner that there are benefits in executive agencies that the Judiciary PD 985, as amended by PD 1597, implemented a position classification and compensation
does not share. standardization scheme (Scheme) :

In this sense, it approximates the absurd to claim that the grant of the "same" benefits to executive (1) under which positions are classified by occupational groups, series and classes according
officials with the "same" rank should encompass all the benefits that the comparator judge or justice to the similarities or differences in duties, responsibilities, and qualification requirements;
enjoys. and

b.1. The Question of Fairness. (2) by which the rates of pay for each of the positions and employee groups/classes are
determined according to the salary and wage schedules fixed by the Decree to be uniformly
A tempting question to raise when comparisons are made across branches of government and when app lied to all belonging to a particular position.
equivalency of salaries and benefits comes into focus, is the essential fairness, or lack of it, that results or
should result. Under Section 4 of PD 985, this position classification and compensation standardization scheme shall
apply to all positions in the national government, that under PD 1597’s amendment now includes the
The Judiciary, for example, may raise the point – if we are the comparators and all our benefits should be justices and judges in the Judiciary.
enjoyed by the Solicitors, is there no resulting unfairness because no la w grants the Judiciary the same
privilege of enjoying the benefits that the Office of the Solicitor General enjoys? Section 11 of PD 985 provides for the "Salary Schedule " under the compensation system for positions pa
id on annual or monthly basis. The Schedule consists of twenty-eight grades with each grade having eight
To be sure, unfairness may factually result, but this is not a matter for the Judiciary to examine in the prescribed steps. Each grade represents a level of work difficulty and responsibility that distinguishes it
absence of a case where this factual issue is raised and is relevant. Nor is there any indefensible from the other grades in the Schedule. Each class of position in the Position Classification System is
inequality as a matter of law viewed from the prism of the legal measuring standard ― the equal assigned a "salary grade" and determines the position’s salary rate.42
protection clause. Notably, the Judiciary and the Executive Department belong to different branches of
government whose roles and functions in government differ as pointed out above. Thus, ground/s for Under the Scheme, every covered position receives a "salary" or compensation corresponding to the
distinctions may exist that render any seeming unfairness not legally objectionable. position’s "salary grade" under the "Salary Schedule." Otherwise stated, all covered positions or
employees belonging to a particular "salary grade," regardless of the department, bureau, office, etc., to
If the issue of unfairness will surface at all, this would transpire when the terms of the longevity which they belong, shall receive the same "salary rate," expressed as annual, in pesos, as fixed under the
provision under BP 129 would be disregarded, i.e., if longevity pay would be recognized in favor of the "Salary Schedule" (subject to certain salary rate increments for each step within each salary grade). In
NLRC, the prosecutors and the solicitors under the terms of their respective laws, when longevity pay – short, a particular "salary grade" equates to a specific, fixed "salary rate."
by the express terms fashioned out by Congress – should be granted only to those who have served
continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the judiciary. Prior to its amendment by PD 1597, Section 4 of PD 985 exempted from the position classification and
compensation standardization scheme the following positions or group of government officials and
Similarly unfair would be the tacking of previous services outside of the Judiciary rendered by judges and employees: (1) elected officers and those whose compensation is fixed by the Constitution; (2) heads of
justices, incumbent or retired, for purposes of longevity pay under Section 42. Of course, the main issue executive departments and officials of equivalent rank: (3) chiefs of diplomatic missions, ministers, and
Foreign Service officers; (4) Justices and Judges of the Judicial Department; (5) members of the armed
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forces; (6) heads and assistant heads of GOCCs, including the senior management and technical In contrast with longevity pay, the "salary" under Section 41 entitles the official or employee to its
positions; (7) heads of state universities and colleges; (8) positions in the career executive service; and receipt from day one (or the first day of the first month) of his service. Its basis or reason for payment is
(9) provincial, city, municipal and other local government officials and employees. The salaries or the actual performance of service or assigned duties, without regard to the months or years the recipient
compensation and allowances of these exempted positions are those to be authorized by the President. has been rendering the service.

Pursuant to PD 985’s mandate, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Implementation (L OI Note, too, that the service contemplated under Section 42 for entitlement to longevity pay is service in
93) adopting an integrated compensation scheme for positions in the Judiciary. In almost the same the judiciary. This intent is clear not only from Section 42’s explicit use of the word "judiciary" to qualify
fashion as PD 985, Para graph 3.0 of LOI 93 enumerated the various positions in the Judicial Component "service," but also from the title of the statute to which this specific provision belongs, i.e., "The Judiciary
of the Judiciary, i.e., Justices and Judges of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court Reorganization Act of 1980." In these lights, the "same salary" that Article 216 of the Labor Code speaks
of Tax Appeals, Court of Agrarian Relations, the First and Second Level Courts, the Clerks of Court of the of and to which the NLRC Commissioners shall be entitled, should be read and understood as the salary
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and the corresponding "salary rates" for each position, expressed under Section 41 or the "salary rate," as provided under the "Salary Schedule" that corresponds to the
as annual, in pesos. "salary grade" of their counterpart justice or judge. Other laws that grant other public officers in the
executive department with the "same salary" as their counterpart justice or judge (i.e., RA Nos. 9417 and
10071) should likewise be read and understood in this way.
With PD 1597’s amendment, those previously exempted positions, i.e., Justices and Judges of the Judicial
Department, are now included in the coverage of Section 4 of PD 985. PD 985, as amended by PD 1597,
now limits the exemptions to elected officers; to those whose compensation is fixed by the Constitution; b.2. Nature of Longevity Pay.
and to local government officials and employees.
Based on these considerations, longevity pay should be treated as a benefit or an "add-on" and not a
Note that Section 11 of PD 985, as amended by PD 1597, and even Paragraph 3.0 of LOI 93, provided for part, let alone an integral component of "salary," contrary to the Dissents’ position.
fixed "salary rates" for each "salary grade" expressed as annual, in pesos. As matters now stand, the
"salary" or compensation that an employee or a position in the government will receive is the prevailing
This consequence necessarily results as "salary" and longevity pay: (1) are treated under different
"salary rate," fixed under the "Salary Schedule," that corresponds to the employee or position’s "salary
sections of BP 129; (2) have different bases for determination or computation; and (3) have different
grade."
reasons for the payment or grant.

The "salary rate" as expressed in annual fixed rates, based on the "salary grade" referred to under LOI 93
In addition, Section 42 of BP 129 does not categorically state that the monthly longevity pay shall form
pursuant to PD 985, as amended by PD 1597 is the "salary" referred to in Section 41 of BP 129, i.e., an
part of the "salary" or is an integral or inseparable component of “salary.” Even the most liberal
amount or salary rate fixed as annual, in pesos, that is based on the recipient’s salary grading.
interpretation of Section 42 does not reveal any intention to treat longevity pay in this manner ― as
part, or as an integral component, of “salary.”
b. Longevity Pay under Section 42.
On the contrary, Section 42 makes it clear that the "salary," which the Dissents submit serve as basis of
Section 42 of BP 129 provides for the payment and the manner of computing longevity pay, i.e., to be the "salary" of executive officers with the same rank of a justice or judge, is that referred to or
paid monthly, based on the recipient’s monthly basic pay at the rate of 5% for each five years of contemplated in Section 41.
continuous, efficient and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary. Note that the amount of
longevity pay to which a recipient shall be entitled is not a fixed amount, in contrast with the "salary"
b.3. Section 42 Analyzed.
under Section 41; it is a percentage of the recipient’s monthly basic pay which, at the least, is equivalent
to 5%.
Note in this regard that the last clause of Section 42 which states that: "in no case shall the total salary of
each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added , exceed the salary of the Justice or
Also, the payment of longevity pay is premised on a continued, efficient, and meritorious service: (1) in
Judge next in rank."
the Judiciary; and (2) of at least five years. Long and continued service in the Judiciary is the basis and
reason for the payment of longevity pay; it rewards the loyal and efficient service of the recipient in the
Judiciary. The use of the term "total salary" under the first portion of Section 42’s last clause, presupposes an
addition of components, and should be understood to refer to the total compensation received . This
"total salary" is the "salary" (or the salary rate fixed under the "Salary Schedule" as the recipient’s
From these perspectives, longevity pay is both a branch specific (i.e., to the judges and justices of the
monthly compensation corresponding to his "salary grade") plus the "add-on" longevity pay (or that
Judiciary) and conditional (i.e., due only upon the fulfillment of certain conditions) grant. In negative
portion or percentage of the "salary" as fixed under the Salary Schedule) equivalent to at least 5% of the
terms, it is not an absolute grant that is easily transferrable to other departments of government.
monthly salary.

b.1. Salary and Longevity Pay compared.

In formula form, this should read –
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Section 41 Salary + Section 42 Longevity Pay = Total Salary E. The complete parity that the dissent advocates is a policy matter that Congress has not so far
expressed.
Where:
The legislative history and record of the laws (that grant the same ranks, salaries, and benefits to officers
in the Executive department equivalent to their specified counterparts in the Judiciary) do not support
Salary = monthly salary rate of position per the Salary Schedule
the Dissent’s view that these laws grant full parity in rank, salaries, and benefits or equal treatment
between the executive officers/grantees and the comparator judges and justices whose longevity pay
Longevity Pay = monthly salary rate x 5%. arises from BP 129.

That the word "total" was added to "salary" under the first portion of Section 42’s last clause, in no way In fact, the legislative history and record of these statutes positively show that Congress has not yet gone
signifies that longevity pay is an integral part of the "salary" which a Justice or Judge will receive each as far as the Dissents would want them to go―to recognize full parity that includes the grant of longevity
month by virtue of his position/rank/salary grade. pay under BP 129 to executive officers in the Executive Department.

The word "total" was added simply to qualify "salary" (the recipient’s "salary" fixed under the "Salary As the discussions below will show, the Dissent, without delving deep into legislative history and record
Schedule") plus any longevity pay to which he may be entitled. This treatment, to be sure, does not make of the statutes it cited as bases, took the easy route of resorting to hasty generalizations to support its
the longevity pay a part of the "salary." tenuous theory that these laws operate under the principle of " equal in qualifications and equal in rank,
equal in salaries and benefits received."
In short, "total" simply modified "s alary," and in effect denotes that amount received or to be received
as total compensation, and distinguishes this resulting amount from the "salary" received each month by This interpretative route may be easy but is a very dangerous one in its implications, as Congress has not
virtue of the position/salary grade. in any way shown that it has intended officers with the same rank and qualifications across government
to receive equal pay and equal benefits.
Note, too, the word "salary" under the last portion of Section 42’s last clause which is not qualified or
modified by the word "total," in contrast with the "total salary" under the first portion. For this kind of "equalization" to prevail, the government must be ready to embark on a comparison, not
only of rank and qualifications, but on the quantification of job content and valuation of jobs of equal
The last portion states: the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank: this "salary" of the Justice or Judge value, involving similar or allied activities undertaken across government.
next in rank should not be exceeded by the "total salary" (or total compensation) of the recipient. The
"salary" under the last phrase, when read together with the "total salary" under the first phrase, shows This is the requirement that the "equal pay for equal work" principle established in jurisdictions with
that "salary" is distinct, and to be pa id separately from longevity pay, so that the latter cannot be an more advanced social legislation than the Philippines.43 To be sure, this is a serious policy matter that,
integral part of "salary." under the terms of the Constitution, is not for this Court but for Congress to establish .

To sum up, the "same salary" to be received by the public officials in the Executive Department, with the To fully support these contentions, we embark on a brief look into the laws that the Dissent itself cited.
same rank of justice or judge, is the "salary" of the justice or judge under Section 41. The "salary"
referred to in Section 41, in turn, and as explained above, is the "salary rate" fixed under the "Salary
a. RA 934744 affecting the NLRC.
Schedule" corresponding to the position’s "salary grade."

RA 9347 lapsed into law on July 27, 2006. This law was passed to address the then urgent need to
Notably, Justice De Castro’s proposition that the term "salary" constitutes the basic monthly salary plus
improve the administrative and operational efficiency of the National Labor Relations Commission
the longevity pay when the Congress enacted RA Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071 is not reflected in any of
(NLRC), particularly its rate of disposition of pending cases and the reduction of its ballooning backlog of
the congressional deliberations. What the deliberations clearly reveal is simply the intention to increase
labor cases.45 In dealing with these issues, Congress then focused on measures that would encourage
the "salaries" of the covered public officers in the Executive Department to the level of the "salaries"
productivity and efficiency and boost the morale of NLRC officials.
received by or granted to their counterpart in the Judiciary.

The congressional measures Congress passed included the increase in the number of commissioner-
This "salary" cannot but refer to the fixed sum that the system of "salary rate," "Salary Schedule," and
members of the NLRC, the creation of positions for commission attorneys who would assist the NLRC
"salary grade" speaks of. It cannot refer to the variable amount of "total salary" that the dissent refers
commissioners in deciding the labor cases, and a provision for retirement benefits to NLRC
to, as the basis or comparator cannot be a variable amount that reflects the seniority that a judge or
commissioners and labor arbiters equivalent to the retirement benefits of justices of the CA and judges
justice has attained after years in the service.
of the RTCs, respectively.

Ironically, Justice De Castro’s cited case – Re Longevity pay of Justices of the Sandiganbayan, appearing
at page 42 of this ponencia – best illustrates how the "salary" and "total salary" concepts operate.
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In appreciating RA 9347, note that as early as Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, the commissioners of the the old Article 216 of the Labor Code did not include all the benefits then being enjoyed by judges and
NLRC were already given the same salary and benefits as justices of the CA . As the old Article 216 of the justices of the Judiciary.
Labor Code provided, before the amendment:
In providing for retirement benefits, Congress significantly did not simply state that the NLRC shall enjoy
Article 216. Salaries, benefits and other emoluments. The Chairman and members of the Commission the terms and benefits of judges and justices under their retirement law, RA 910, where longevity pay is
shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances and benefits a special and specific provision. Congress contented itself with the plain insertion of "retirement pay"
as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, respectively. The and stopped there.
Executive Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to that of an Assistant Regional
Director of the Department of Labor and Employment and shall be entitled to the same allowances and
Thus, as matters now stand, NLRC officials retire under the retirement law applicable to executive
benefits as that of a Regional Director of said Department. The Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual
officials, with parity of the terms of this retirement law with those of their counterparts in the Judiciary.
salary at least equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as that of an Assistant
Retirement benefits specific to the Judiciary, however, were not and should not be interpreted to be
Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment. In no case, however, shall the provision
wholly included.
of this Article result in the diminution of existing salaries, allowances and benefits of the aforementioned
officials. (As amended by Section 8, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)46
b. RA 941749 affecting the OSG.
This old provision did not include retirement benefits in its wording. Thus, as enumerated, entitlement to
equivalence was limited to salaries, allowances and benefits. To address the perceived legislative gap, RA 9417 passed into law on March 30, 2007. As in the case of RA 9347, this law was passed to address
the amendatory RA 9347 expressly included the word retirement in the enumeration. This grant applied the plight of the members of the Office of the Solicitor General ( OSG ) by upgrading their salaries and
to both commissioners and labor arbiters of the NLRC. benefits to improve their efficiency as the Republic’s counsel.

Aside from this observation, note too that the old Article 216 of the Labor Code did not give labor In the sponsorship speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile regarding Senate Bill No. 2249, the predecessor
arbiters the salary, allowances and benefits equivalent to those of the Regional Trial Court (RTC ) judges. Senate Bill of RA 9417, Senator Enrile pointed out that the Senate’s Committee on Justice and Human
Apart from addressing the issue on retirement benefits, RA 9347 also sought to deal with the then Rights, in crafting Senate Bill 2249, aimed to address the following issues regarding the OSG:
situation of labor arbiters in terms of their salaries and emoluments.
1. Increase the number of staff of the OSG and upgrade their positions;
Thus, the congressional intent in RA 9347 was to deal with two gaps in PD 442 with respect to the
salaries, benefits, and emoluments of the members of the NLRC. 2. Increase the existing 15 legal divisions of the OSG to 30;

The first was the grant of salaries and benefits to labor arbiters equivalent to those of RTC judges, and 3. Provide health care services, insurance coverage and scholarship and other benefits to all
the second was the express inclusion of the retirement benefits of the labor arbiters and NLRC OSG employees subject to the availability of funds;
commissioners at the levels equivalent to those of RTC judges and CA justices, respectively.

4. Grant franking privileges to the OSG;

In the discussions and exchanges among the members of Congress – among them, the explanatory note
of Senator Ramon Revilla Jr. in Senate Bill No. 120447 and the sponsorship speech of Senator Jinggoy
Ejercito Estrada of Senate Bill No. 2035 (the senate bill that led to RA 9347)48 – nowhere did they deal 5. Establish a provident fund within the OSG; and
with the issue of longevity pay as a benefit that should be accorded to labor arbiters and commissioners
of the NLRC. 6. Grant retirement benefits to qualified employees.50

In this light, we believe that to make the hasty generalization that the word benefit as enumerated in As in the case of the NLRC, it must again be noted that this enumeration is specific with respect to the
Article 216 of the Labor Code should include longevity pay would run counter to the intention of the law. benefits granted to members of the OSG: it particularly referred to the benefits to be granted. Although
Note that had it been the intent of Congress to give the labor arbiters and commissioners of the NLRC all Section 3 of RA 941751 provides that the Solicitor General shall have the same qualifications for
the benefits enjoyed by the members of the Judiciary as provided in BP 129 and in other laws specifically appointment, rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges as the Presiding Justice of
applicable to members of the Judiciary, then it should not have amended Article 216 of the Labor Code the CA (and an Assistant Solicitor General as that of a CA Associate Justice), RA 9417 still allocated
by including "retirement benefits" in the enumeration. Congress should have left the provision as it is express provisions for the other benefits to be enjoyed by the members of the OSG. These provisions are
since it already provides for the general term benefit. the following:

Parenthetically, retirement pay is a specific form of allowance under the general term benefits. Congress Section 4- Compensation52
had to include this item as an express benefit precisely because the use of the general word benefit in
 94

Section 5- Benefits and Privileges53 On the other hand, a look at the structure of the laws affecting the Judiciary, the prosecutors, the OSG,
and the NLRC shows that there could be no equal treatment among them. Notably, under Section 16,
par. 6 of RA 10071,59only the prosecutors would have an automatic increase in salaries and benefits in
Section 6- Seminar and Other Professional Fees54
case the salaries and benefits in the Judiciary increase. This provision, by itself, shows that Congress did
not intend full parity, because increases in the salaries and benefits of prosecutors would not lead to an
Section 7- Transportation Benefits55 automatic increase in the salaries and benefits of members of the Judiciary.

Section 8- Other Benefits56 Extending our judicial lens even further, the laws increasing the salaries and benefits of executive officers
in the OSG and the NLRC do not also provide for an automatic increase should there be increases in the
Section 10- Grant of Special Allowances57 salaries and benefits of the Judiciary; neither do these laws increase the salaries and benefits of the
members of the Judiciary should the salaries and benefits of these public officers increase.

Had Congress really intended to grant the benefit of longevity pay to the members of the OSG, then it
should have also included in the list of benefits granted under RA 9417 a provision pertaining to Had Congress really intended full parity between the Judiciary and other public officers in the executive
longevity pay. This provision is glaringly missing and thus cannot be included via this Court’s decision department, it would have provided for reciprocity in the automatic increase of salaries, benefits and
without running afoul of the rule that prohibits judicial legislation. Nor can this Court recognize the past allowances, and the upgrading of the grades or levels of the emoluments of these public officers.
service rendered by a current judge or justice in the OSG for purposes of longevity pay.
Instead, the laws, as currently worded, allow for a situation where an increase in the salaries and
A closer examination of this law shows that what Congress did was to grant benefits that were applicable benefits of prosecutors would not result in the increase in the salaries of members of the Judiciary, the
to the type of service that the OSG provides. OSG and NLRC. Thus, instead of equalization, the prosecutors (who were merely granted a rank at par
with their named counterparts in the Judiciary) would be in a better position than the actual judges and
justices themselves, in the absence of a similar provision of law giving the same benefits to justices and
For example, OSG lawyers are entitle d to honoraria and allowances from client departments, agencies judges in the event additional emoluments would be given to these prosecutors.
and instrumentalities of the Government.58

The inevitable conclusion from all these is that Congress, in increasing the salaries and benefits of these
This benefit is only proper as the main function of the OSG is to act as the counsel of the Government officers, merely used the salary levels and benefits in the Judiciary as a yardstick to make their salaries
and its officers acting in their official capacity. On the other hand, this benefit is not applicable to and benefits comparable to fellow government employees engaged in the administration of justice.
member s of the Judiciary as they do not act as advocates but rather as impartial judges of the cases
before them, for which they are not entitled to honoraria and allowances on a per case basis.
At the risk of endlessly belaboring a point, we cannot, without engaging in the prohibited act of judicial
legislation, construe that the Dissent’s cited laws fully intend and recognize full parity in rank, salaries,
Another indicator that should be considered from the congressional handling of RA 9417 is that Congress benefits, and other emoluments among the public officers mentioned.
did not intend to introduce a strict one-to-one correspondence between the grant of the same salaries
and benefits to members of the executive department and of the Judiciary. The congressional approach
apparently was for laws granting benefits to be of specific application that pertains to the different G. The Dissent’s cited cases of Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente and Guevara-Salonga are not controlling
departments according to their personnel’s needs and activities. No equalization or standardization of in the present case, as they are a strained and erroneous application of Section 42 of BP 129 that should
benefits was ever intended on a generalized or across-the-board basis. be abandoned.

F. The structure of the laws providing for the salaries and benefits of members of the Judiciary, The dissent’s invocation of the cases of Judge Santiago and Justices Gancayco, Dela Fuente, and Guevara-
prosecutors, and public officers in the OSG and the NLRC further negate the Dissent’s view that these Salonga cannot be applied to the present case as they are erroneous applications of Section 42 of BP 129
laws intended equal treatment among them. in relation with RA 910 or the Judiciary’s retirement law.

We cannot also agree with the Dissent’s position that the laws providing for the salaries and benefits of Nor can these cases be cited to support the position that these past rulings already established that the
members of the Judiciary, the prosecution service, the OSG solicitors , and the members of the NLRC aim past services in the Executive Department of incumbent and retired justices and judges, should be given
to provide equality among these public officers in their salaries and benefits. credit for purposes of longevity pa y under Section 42 of BP 129.

In terms of salaries, their rationalization has been addressed through Position Classification and a. The Guevarra-Salonga & Dela Fuente Cases
Compensation System of the government under PD 985, PD 1597 and LOI 93, heretofore discussed. It is
through the amendments of these legislative enactments that parity and equity can both be achieved in The grants of longevity pay to Justice Guevara-Salonga and Justice Dela Fuente, in particular, were based
government. on a misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the Judiciary’s retirement law ― RA 910, read in relation
 95

to Section 42 of BP 129 ― and its interaction with RA 10071, which granted prosecutors the same rank Significantly, this case did not treat the longevity pay under Section 42 as an integral component of the
and benefits (including retirement benefits) of their counterparts in the Judiciary. salary of the recipient, to be given to and applied in equal degree and force, and under absolute
circumstances to public officials in the Executive Department granted the "same salary" as their
counterpart in the Judiciary.
Although RA 910 recognized, for purposes of retirement pay, past services in the Judiciary or in any other
branch of the Government, the longevity pay provision under Section 42 of BP 129 recognizes only
services in the Judiciary in determining the longevity pay of 5% of the basic salary (given for each five The Sandiganbayan ruling, in fact, does not apply to the factual situation of the present case; it solely
years of service) that is carried over into retirement from the service. involves Justices of the Sandiganbayan ― members of the Judiciary. Note the following pronouncement
in that case:
In considering the longevity pay in the cases of Justices Guevarra-Salonga and Dela Fuente, the Court
mistakenly recognized their services as prosecutors to be services in the Judiciary, because RA x x x longevity pay once earned and enjoyed becomes a vested right and forms part of the salary of the
1007160 granted prosecutors the same rank and benefits (including retirement benefits) as their recipient thereof which may not be reduced despite the subsequent appointment of a justice or judge
counterparts in the Judiciary. next higher in rank who is not entitled to longevity pay for being new and not having acquired any
longevity in the government service. Furthermore, diminution or decrease of the salary of an incumbent
justice or judge is prohibited by Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution; hence, such recipient continue
The Court failed to fully appreciate that the longevity pay provision under RA 910, in relation with
to earn and receive addition l longevity pay as may be warranted by subsequent services in the judiciary,
Section 42 of BP 129, is unique to the Judiciary and can be enjoyed only for services actually rendered,
because the purpose of the Longevity Pay Law is to reward justices and judges for their long and
and by those who retired, in this branch of government. Thus, services at the Department of Justice, i.e.,
dedicated service as such. The provision of the law that the total salary of each justice or judge
outside of the Judiciary, should not have been recognized as additional judicial service for purposes of
concerned, after adding his longevity pay, should not exceed the salary plus longevity pay of the justice
longevity pay on retirement.
or judge next higher in rank, refers only to the initial implementation of the law and does not proscribe a
justice or judge who is already entitled to longevity pay, from continuing to earn and receive longevity
Notably, the Court did not comprehensively discuss in these cited rulings the nature of service required pay for services rendered in the judiciary subsequent to such implementation, by the mere accident of a
for the longevity provision to apply, nor the purpose, reason and history of the longevity pay provision newcomer being appointed to the position next higher in rank.
under BP 129, for the Dissents to conclude that the Court already treated the past service in the
Executive Department to be equivalent to service in the Judiciary.
These pronouncements reveal the Court’s recognition of a situation where a Justice or Judge who has
rendered service in the Judiciary for a considerable length of time and who will receive a total
As we earlier discussed, under our system of Government, the Judiciary is separate from, serves a compensation that far exceeds the "salary" that a newly appointed Justice or Judge, who has not
purpose and functions, and has powers, duties and prerogatives distinct from those of the Executive rendered any prior service in the Judiciary, will earn or receive based simply on his "salary grade." The
Department. Hence, the Court, in these Resolutions, could not have regarded service in the Executive as former, the "long-serving" Justice or Judge, will earn far more than the latter, the "newly-serving" Justice
unqualifiedly equivalent to service in the Judiciary. or Judge, because of the "add-on" longevity pay that he (the long-serving Justice or Judge) will receive
for his continued long service in the Judiciary, aside from the "salary" to which the latter (the newly-
It should be considered, too, that an acceptance of past service in the Executive as service in the serving Justice or Judge) shall only be entitled.
Judiciary may have no basis. The qualification for the grant by the Judiciary should be its determination
that there had been continuous, efficient, and meritorious service. No such determination can be done The Court realized this scenario as problematic and the obvious inequity it may bring if it were to cons
by the Judiciary if it will simply recognize longevity pay based solely on service in a position under the true strictly the words of Section 42. It is iniquitous for the "long-serving" Justice or Judge if the "add-on"
Executive Department with rank, salaries, and benefits equivalent to specified positions in the Judiciary. pay (longevity pay) that he earned under the law for his long and dedicated service in the Judiciary would
be reduced or eliminated altogether simply because of a new Justice or Judge w ho will not be entitle d
To reiterate, for clarity and emphasis, if the Judiciary would recognize past service in the Executive to any "add-on" pay for lack of the required long and dedicated service in the Judiciary, and who will thus
simply because of the equivalency of rank, salaries and benefits, the situation would be legally receive lesser total compensation.
problematic as it would have no way of knowing for itself if the grantee would qualify (based on efficient
and meritorious service) since the past service would be with the Executive, not with the Judiciary. Of The Court met the case head on and declared that the limitation refers only to the "initial
course, for this Court to simply recognize that past executive service w ill be credited under Section 42 of implementation of the law and does not proscribe a justice or judge, who is already entitled to longevity
BP 129 constitutes prohibited judicial legislation for going beyond the requirement that service should pay, from continuing to earn and receive longevity pay for services rendered in the judiciary subsequent
be in the Judiciary. to such implementation, by the mere accident of a newcomer being appointed to the position next
higher in rank." This case assumes importance in the present consolidated cases as it stresses the
b. The cited Sandiganbayan case. purpose of longevity pay as discussed and interpreted in these pronouncements: " to reward justices and
judges for their long and dedicated service as such, " i.e., as justices or judges.

Re: Longevity Pay of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan (Sandiganbayan case)61 is a very
interesting case that Justice De Castro uses as part of her argument on the liberal stance the Court has
taken on longevity pay.
 96

It highlights, too, that " salary" and the "longevity pay" are separate components of a judge’s or justice’s (3) DENY the request of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Femando that her services as
total compensation , and that such total compensation can be variable because seniority or years in the COMELEC Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity pay;
service is a factor taken into account.
(4) DENY the request of Associate Justice Angelita Gacutan that her services as NLRC
Most importantly, this case is an example of the Court’s prompt decisive action to act with liberality Commissioner be included in the computation. of her longevity pay from the time she started
when such action is called for. her judicial service;

c. Moving On (5) DENY with finality the motion for reconsideration of Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso
for lack of merit; and
Construing Section 42 as we do in this Resolution does not and will not negate the applicable laws,
contrary to Justice De Castro’s Dissent. Rather, the interpretation that the term "salary" does not include (6) DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to proceed with the handling of granted longevity pay
longevity pay will rectify the error that the Court’s past rulings have created on this subject. benefits under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, pursuant to the guidelines and
declarations outlined in the Moving On portion of this Resolution.
To recapitulate, the Court’s prior rulings treated longevity pay as part of the "salary" – a ruling that, as
explained, runs counter to the express and implied intent of BP 129. They are erroneous because they SO ORDERED.
introduced and included in the definition and composition of "salary" under Section 41 an element that
the law did not intend to include, either expressly or impliedly.
DISPOSITIVE:

Hence, the most compelling reason now exists to abandon the above-cited cases: they were clear and “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of CA
grossly erroneous application of the law. In jurisdictional terms, they involved an interpretation not Justice Gacutan and MODIFY the Resolution dated June 16, 2015 in A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA, 12-9-5-SC, and
within the contemplation of words expressed by the statute; hence, they were gravely abusive
13w02·07-SC, insofar as to GRANT CA Justice Gacutan’s request that her services as NLRC Commissioner
interpretation62 that did not and cannot confer any vested right protected by the due process clause. The
worst approach the Court can take now is to compound the problem by perpetuating our past mistakes be included in the computation of her longevity pay, but reckoned only from August 26, 2006, when
and simply burying our heads in the sand of past-established rulings. Republic Act No. 9347 took effect.

SO ORDERED.”
The first decisive move for the Court is to declare, as it hereby declares, the abandonment of our rulings
on longevity pay in the cases of Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente, and Guevara-Salonga and to strike
them out of our ruling case law, without, however, withdrawing the grants to those who have benefitted SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
from the Court’s misplaced final rulings.
WHAT IS MEANT BY CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION?
Along these lines, the Court also hereby expressly declares that it does not disavow the longevity pay
previously granted to the retired justices and judicial officials for services rendered outside the Judiciary. IT IS THE INTERPRETATION OR CONSTRUCTION PLACED UPON THE STATUTE BY AN EXECUTIVE OR
They may continue enjoying their granted benefits as their withdrawal now will be inequitable. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER CALLED UPON TO EXECUTE OR ADMINISTER THE STATUTE.

IT INCLUDES THE CONSTRUCTION BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF LEGAL
With the same objective, those still in the service who are now enjoying past longevity pay grants due to
past services outside the Judiciary, shall likewise continue with the grants already made, but their grants ADVISER OF THE GOVERNMENT.
will have to be frozen at their current levels until their services outside the Judiciary are compensated for
by their present and future judicial service. CERTAIN LAWS GRANT TO CERTAIN OFFICIALS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT THE RANK AND SALARY
OF A MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY. MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY ENJOY LONGEVITY PAY. DO THOSE
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to: CERTAIN OFFICIALS ALSO ENJOY LONGEVITY PAY?

YES.
(1) NOT the Memorandum dated February 18, 2013 of Atty. Eden T. Candelaria and the
Report and Recommendation dated February 15, 2013 of Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores;
THIS WAS THE INTERPRETATION OF THE JUSTICE SECRETARY.

(2) GRANT the request of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando that her services as THE RULE IS THAT COURTS SHOULD RESPECT THE CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION PLACED UPON
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Rita, Pampanga be included in the computation of
A STATUTE BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS WHOSE DUTY IS TO ENFORCE IT, AND UNLESS SUCH
her longevity pay;
INTERPRETATION IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS WILL ORDINARILY BE CONTROLLED THEREBY.
 97

IN THE CASE OF JUDGES, WHAT LAW DEFINES LONGEVITY AS PART OF SALARY?

SECTION 42 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129 CLEARLY STATES THAT THE LONGEVITY PAY IS “ADDED” TO
THE BASIC MONTHLY SALARY AND FORMS PART OF THE “TOTAL SALARY” OF A JUDGE OR JUSTICE.

THUS, THE SALARY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY REFERS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE BASIC PAY PLUS
THE. LONGEVITY PAY TO WHICH THEY MAY BE ENTITLED BY VIRTUE OF THEIR CONTINUOUS, EFFICIENT,
AND MERITORIOUS SERVICE IN THE JUDICIARY.

WHY WOULD LONGEVITY PAY BE ALSO PART OF SALARY IN THE CASE OF THOSE IN THE EXECUTIVE
WHICH BY LAW ARE GIVEN THE EQUIVALENT RANK AND SALARY OF THOSE IN THE JUDICIARY?

BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT CONGRESS INTENDED IT. THE PERTINENT LAWS GRANTING THESE OFFICERS IN
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT THE SAME RANKS AS THOSE IN THE JUDICIARY DO NOT DISTINGUISH
SALARY WITH LONGEVITY PAY AND SALARY WITHOUT LONGEVITY PAY.
 98

EN BANC In the past, the Court had allowed the tacking of earned leave credits to government service in order to
enable retiring members of the judiciary to complete the age/service requirement under R.A. No. 910 or
to increase their longevity pay for purposes of computing their retirement benefits.
March 6, 2018

Invoking past judicial precedents, may I request that my earned leave credits be tacked to my judicial
A.M. No. 15-11-01-SC
service to increase my longevity pay.

RE: APPLICATION FOR OPTIONAL RETIREMENT UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910, AS AMENDED BY
Tacking my earned leave credits to my judicial service I would have served, upon my retirement, for
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5095 AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946, OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
thirty-seven (37) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days, that would entitle me to additional longevity
JR.
pay in accordance with B.P. Blg.129.

RESOLUTION
While Sec. 42 provides for entitlement to longevity pay for every five (5)-year period of judicial service,
fairness and justice dictate a liberal construction of the provision if the member of the judiciary
MARTIRES, J.: concerned is retiring compulsorily and therefore is left with no option, unlike one who retires optionally,
to complete the five (5)-year period requirement in order to be entitled to the whole five percent (5%)
The present matter concerns the computation of the longevity pay of Associate Justice Martin S. additional longevity pay.
Villarama, Jr. (Justice Villarama), a former member of this Court.
In other words, even if he opts to extend his stay to complete at least another five (5)-year period, he
Previously, Justice Villarama, in a letter1 dated 2 November 2015, applied for optional retirement under cannot do so because of the constitutional limitation to his term of office.3 (emphasis omitted)
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and R.A. No. 9946, to be effective on 15
January 2016. In a Resolution2 dated 10 November 2015, the Court granted Justice Villarama's request In its resolution in A.M. No. 03-9-20-SC, the Court granted the request of Justice Bellosillo. The approved
for optional retirement and approved the payment of Justice Villarama's retirement gratuity and resolution became the basis of Administrative Circular (A. C.) No. 58-2003 which this Court approved on
terminal leave benefits, exclusive of the longevity pay component, pending the resolution of his requests 11 November 2003. Entitled "ALLOWING THE TACKING OF EARNED LEAVE CREDITS IN THE
for adjustments to his longevity. COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY UPON COMPULSORY RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES," the
circular reads:
We are tasked to determine the amount of longevity pay due to Justice Villarama.
WHEREAS, The Court has studied proposals to allow the tacking of earned leave credits to the length of
THE FACTS judicial service for computation of the-longevity pay.

Antecedents WHEREAS, Section 42 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 129 provides for a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5%
of the monthly basic pay for every five years of service rendered in the judiciary;

On 14 August 1981, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (B.P. Blg. 129), known as "The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980," became effective and, by virtue thereof, created or established the Court of Appeals, WHEREAS, it is true that vacation and sick leave credits earned during the period of employment are, by
Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial their nature and purpose, generally enjoyed during employment; however, the law does not preclude
Courts. Section 42 of the law granted to justices and judges of the said courts a monthly longevity pay the accumulation of these leave credits, not to be paid while one is working, but to be reserved for
equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for each five-year period of continuous, efficient, and senior age;
meritorious service in the judiciary.
WHEREAS, retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because their intention is to
Since the Supreme Court, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax Appeals were not covered by B.P. Blg. provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue
129, the justices and judges of these courts were not entitled to the monthly longevity pay provided in earning his livelihood and the liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in
Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129. Presidential Decree No. 1927, approved on 2 May 1985, corrected the gap. order that the efficiency, security, and well-being of government personnel may be enhanced;

On 25 September 2003, Justice Josue N. Bellosillo (Justice Bellosillo), a former member of this Court who WHEREAS, laws pertaining to retiring government personnel should be liberally construed to benefit
was then due to retire compulsorily, requested that his earned leave credits be tacked to his judicial retiring personnel, following an interpretation that rightly expresses the nation’s gratitude towards the
service in order to increase his longevity pay. Justice Bellosillo’s letter-request was docketed as A.M. No. women and men who have tirelessly and faithfully served the government;
03-9-20-SC. He wrote:
 99

WHEREAS, earned leave credits, computed in accordance with Section 40, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules The recommendation of the committee
on Leave, should accordingly be allowed to increase the longevity pay of Justices and Judges reaching the
age of compulsory retirement;
Based on its 12 January 2017 memorandum, the committee recommended the denial of the requests of
Justice Villarama.
NOW, THEREFORE, the COURT RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that earned leave credits shall be
allowed to be tacked to the length of judicial service for the purpose of increasing the longevity pay of
The committee's recommendation is based on the consideration that A.C. No. 58-2003 was intended to
Justices and Judges who reach the age of compulsory retirement. The computation should also include
apply only to those who retire compulsorily. Further, the committee believes that the pro hac vice ruling
the additional percentage of longevity pay that corresponds to any fraction of a five-year period in the
in the case of Justice Austria-Martinez cannot be considered a precedent to be applied in subsequent
total number of years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service rendered, considering that the
cases as in the case of Justice Villarama. The committee also adds that neither tacking of leave credits
retiree would no longer be able to complete the period because of his compulsoryretirement.4(emphasis
nor fractional longevity pay finds support in Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129; thus, it recommends that A.C.
supplied)
No. 58-2003 be abandoned.

Gleaned from the text of A.C. No. 58-2003, the benefits provided therein seemed to apply only to
Anent Justice Villarama's service as bar examiner, the committee opines that it cannot also be tacked to
justices and judges who retire compulsorily.
his judicial service because at the time Justice Villarama served as such, he was an incumbent member of
the Judiciary. A.M. No. 08-12-7-SC6 adverted to by Justice Villarama, as the committee puts it, explicitly
Perhaps cognizant of the limitation, Justice Ma. Alicia AustriaMartinez (Justice Austria-Martinez), also a covers only service prior to appointment to the Judiciary.
former member of this Court who was to retire optionally, requested that the tacking of leave credits
under A.C. No. 58-2003 be applied in her favor. The Court, in a resolution dated 24 February 2009,
THE ISSUES
approved the request of Justice Austria-Martinez but with a qualification that the ruling be only pro hac
vice.
At the outset, we note the letter-request of Justice Villarama seeking a pro hac vice ruling. However, in
order to put to rest this lingering issue, our disposition of the present matter should not bind Justice
The letter-request of Justice Villarama
Villarama only but include other members of the judiciary who may be similarly situated in the present
or will be so in the future.
Like Justice Austria-Martinez, Justice Villarama also applied for optional retirement. In his 2 November
2015 letter, Justice Villarama requests that the benefits of A.C. No. 58-2003 be applied in computing his
Thus, the issues may be couched in broad terms to cast a general interpretative effect for the guidance
longevity pay in view of the following considerations:
of the Bar and the bench in future cases, viz:

1. He would have completed 28 years, 2 months and 8 days of judicial service by 6 January 2016, lacking
I. Whether the benefits under A.C. No. 58-2003 may be applied to optional retirees, particularly that: (a)
only 2 months and 29 days to reach the mandatory age of 70 for compulsory retirement from the
earned leave credits are tacked to judicial service, thereby increasing longevity pay, and (b) the fraction
judiciary on 14 April 2016;
of a five-year period is included in computing longevity pay; and

2. In its resolution adopted on 24 February 2009, the Court considered Administrative Circular No. 58-
II. Whether the service rendered by a member of the judiciary as bar examiner is credited as part of
2003 applicable, pro hac vice, to Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez who optionally retired on 30 April
judicial service, thereby increasing longevity pay.
2009 and whose compulsory retirement date was on December 19, 2010 or 1 year and 8 months short of
the mandatory date of compulsory retirement;
OUR RULING
3. In its Resolution adopted on 3 February 2009, the Court allowed the service as bar examiner be
credited as part of government service and be tacked in the computation of the longevity pay upon After careful deliberation, the Court rules to grant Justice Villarama’s request to tack his earned leave
compulsory or optional retirement.5 credits, but not his services as Bar Examiner in 2004, to his years in judicial service for purposes of
computing his longevity pay. The fraction of the five-year period immediately prior to Justice Villarama’s
optional retirement shall also be included in the computation.
Justice Villarama prays that, in the light of his attendant circumstances, A.C. No. 58-2003 should be
applied to him, pro hac vice. He also prays that his earned leave credits and services as Bar Examiner in
2004 be tacked to the length of his judicial service for purposes of computing his longevity pay. On the application of A.C. No. 58-2003

We referred the matter to the Special Committee on Retirement and Civil Service Benefits (the The committee insists that A.C. No. 58-2003 should not be construed liberally to extend its benefits to
committee) for its recommendation. those who retire optionally.1âwphi1 It explains that the circular was issued, through A.M. No. 03-9-20-
SC,7 in response to the request of Justice Bellosillo to adjust his longevity pay by tacking his earned leave
credits to government service. Such issuance was already a liberal interpretation of Section 42 of B.P.
 100

Blg. 129 and must, accordingly, no longer be given further liberal interpretation without undermining the year period of his service immediately prior to his compulsory retirement. In circularizing the tacking of
proscription against judicial legislation. The committee lengthily quotes this Court's discussion in Re: earned leave credits and recognition of fractional longevity pay, however, the Court styled A.C. No. 58-
Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for his Services as 2003 as "ALLOWING THE TACKING OF EARNED LEAVE CREDITS IN THE COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY
Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission8 (Veloso case). UPON COMPULSORY RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES. " Under the circular, all those who may be
similarly situated with Justice Bellosillo can then be entitled to its benefits.
We are not persuaded. It is unnecessary even to treat whatever beclouds the committee's mind in
suggesting that the Court is crossing the realm of judicial legislation when it (the Court) topped the The seeming express limitation of the benefits of A.C. No. 58-2003 only to justices and judges who retire
exercise of liberal interpretation in Sec. 42 of B.P. Big. 129 with another liberal interpretation, as was this compulsorily apparently developed the view that the circular's benevolent provisions are beyond the
Court’s fear in Veloso. Incidentally, we would be amiss not to mention that whatever result was reached reach of those who retire optionally. This is the same view advanced by the committee when it
by this Court in Veloso was later reversed in our 26 July 2016 resolution on the motion for mentioned in its memorandum that on the face and articulated rationale of A.C. No. 58-2003, it applies
reconsideration in A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA.9 to and is intended only for those who retire compulsorily.

A.C. No. 58-2003 is an implementation of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129, or the basic provision on longevity Upon deeper reflection, no discernible reason exists to deny optional retirees the tacking of leave credits
pay granted by law to justices and judges in the judiciary. for purposes of computing their longevity pay. If the rationale of such longevity pay is to reward loyalty
to the government, then it makes no sense to limit the tacking of earned leave credits to the service of
compulsory retirees only. The question therefore arises:
Section 42 of B.P. Big. 129 is intended to recompense justices and judges for each five-year period of
continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary.10 The purpose of the law is to
reward long service, from the lowest to the highest court in the land.11 Are members of the judiciary who optionally retire necessarily considered less loyal, and therefore less
deserving, than those who compulsorily retire?
A plain reading of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 readily reveals that the longevity pay is given the justice or
judge on a monthly basis together with his or her basic pay, provided that the justice or judge has An affirmative answer can hardly be justified. Otherwise, an absurd situation ensues when a justice or
completed at least five (5) years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary. The judge who had rendered, say, only 7 years of judicial service but is compulsorily retired because he
amount is equivalent to five percent (5%) of the monthly basic pay, and it increases by an increment of entered the judiciary at a late stage in his professional career, is allowed to tack earned but relatively few
5o/o for every additional cycle of five (5) years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service. It is leave credits to his judicial service thus gaining from an increase in his longevity pay; as compared to
given while the justice or judge is still in active service andbecomes part of the monthly pension benefit another justice or judge, who had rendered 30 long years of service in the judiciary and had opted to
upon his or her retirement, or survivorship benefit upon his or her death after retirement. retire before reaching the compulsory retirement age, yet is precluded from tacking a possibly
substantial amount of earned leave credits, and is thus denied the reward intended for long and loyal
service to the public.
In granting the longevity pay to the justice or judge still in active service, taking into consideration its
salutary purpose, the law did not qualify whether the recipient is to subsequently retire compulsorily or
optionally. Upon his or her retirement, whether compulsory or optional, the justice or judge continues to When juxtaposed with Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129, the very same law sought to be implemented by A.C.
enjoy the longevity pay by receiving the same together with the monthly pension benefit. Thus, if a No. 58-2003, it becomes evident that limiting its scope only to justices and judges who retire
justice or judge has rendered long service in the judiciary, he or she must be rewarded even if the compulsorily cannot stand. As previously discussed, the longevity pay is paid to justices or judges who
retirement is optional; and the purpose of the law is served no more than it would be in the case of one had proven their loyalty to the judiciary, regardless of the manner by which they retire.
who is retired compulsorily. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the benevolent objective of the law
should be limited to justices or judges who retire compulsorily.
Thus, for purposes of computing longevity pay, the tacking of leave credits to the length of judicial
service rendered by qualified justices and judges should be applied to optional retirees as well.
On the other hand, A.C. No. 58-2003 was issued by this Court pursuant to its constitutional power to
interpret laws and, as such, has the force and effect of law. In crafting the circular, the Court duly
What comes to the fore in our discussion is that allowing the tacking of leave credits only to compulsory
considered the long-standing policy of according liberal construction to retirement laws covering
retirees is simply wrong. To avoid this error, A.C. No. 58-2003, regardless of its title and the contents of
government personnel. The liberal approach in construing retirement laws, which are enacted as social
its dispositive portion, should be read to likewise cover justices and judges who retire optionally.
legislations, is necessary in order to achieve the humanitarian considerations of promoting the physical
and mental well-being of public servants.12 Given this legal milieu, the Court allowed the tacking of
earned leave credits to the length of judicial service in order to increase the longevity pay of justices and We believe it a better policy to consider A.C. No. 58-2003 as complete in its scope, effectively covering
judges. Thus, the wisdom behind the issuance of A.C. No. 58-2003 is to ensure the comfort and security both compulsory and optional retirees. Not only is it consistent with the moral fiber of B.P. Blg. 129, it
of retired justices and judges who had tirelessly and faithfully served the government.13 makes unnecessary the issuance of a separate circular to cover optional retirees only.

As noted above, A.C. No. 58-2003 was issued as the Court's response to the letter-request of Justice On the pro hac vice ruling in Austria-Martinez
Bellosillo who sought the adjustment of his longevity pay by tacking his earned leave credits to the
length of his judicial service andat the same time recognizing the fractional portion of the unexpired 5-
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It is unfortunate that the ruling of this Court in the case of Justice Austria-Martinez was qualified as pro squarely raised. The incident stemmed from the refusal by the Department of Budget and
hac vice. As discussed herein, this qualification could have been avoided and the result could have been Management (DBM) to release Justice Bellosillo’s longevity pay, computed in accordance with A.C. No.
just as persuasive. 58-2003. It appeared that the DBM’s negative response to the application of the subject circular was
rooted in its view that Section 42 of B.P. Big. 129 covers actual service only. Then Secretary Emilia T.
Boncodin (Secretary Boncodin) of the DBM expressed her observations on the tacking of leave credits in
To recall, Justice Villarama cites the ruling in Austria-Martinez wherein the Court, taking cognizance of
a letter, dated 6 May 2004, that was conveyed to the Court. To Secretary Boncodin, unused leave credit
the special circumstances of Justice Austria-Martinez, granted the magistrate's request to tack her
is not actual service and, thus, cannot be tacked to the length of service in computing longevity pay.
earned leave credits to her judicial service even though she had not reached the compulsory retirement
age. Justice Villarama, an optional retiree, also points to special circumstances that, according to him,
justify a pro hac vice application of A.C. No. 58-2003. In no uncertain terms, the Court rejected the view of Secretary Boncodin. The Court emphasized that it
had already sufficiently settled its position on the matter in the resolution of Justice Bellosillo’s request.
Accordingly, A.C. No. 58-2003 explicitly dictates the tacking of earned leave credits.
The committee asserts that Justice Villarama may not benefit from the pro hac vice ruling in Austria-
Martinez. As the committee has pointed out, the said ruling does not in any way detract from the
prevailing ruling that A.C. No. 58-2003 applies only to those who retire compulsorily, nor should it be On the payment of fractional longevity pay
considered as an exception to nor a departure from it.
We uphold the computation of the longevity pay to include the fractional percentage of the unexpired
Concededly, the Court had, in not a few occasions, disposed of a matter before it on a pro hac vice basis. five-year period.

From a survey of these cases, we have invariably imputed to the term pro hac vice the meaning of "for The position taken by the Committee against the payment of fractional longevity pay in favor of retired
this one particular occasion." 14 We have also said that a ruling expressly qualified as such cannot be justices and judges was also taken up in Re: Computation of Longevity Pay Upon Compulsory
relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases.15 Retirement. Secretary Boncodin also held the view that the payment of longevity pay is conditioned on
the full expiration of the five-year period; it cannot be granted before the expiration of the five-year
period.
Yet, a pro hac vice ruling in favor of Justice Villarama in this case is decidedly pointless. As has already
been presented, justices and judges who retire optionally are also entitled to the benefit of tacking their
earned leave credits to their judicial service in order to increase the longevity pay due them. Such reasoning failed to convince us then; it fails to persuade us now.

To reiterate, the idea that the tacking of leave credits, as authorized by A.C. No: 58-2003, is for We reiterate our reason for including any fraction of the five-year period in computing the longevity pay
compulsory retirees only is erroneous. By consequence, the inference that A.C. No. 58-2003 may be of retiring Justices and Judges. When the Court approved A.C. No. 58-2003, it was with due consideration
applied to optional retirees pro hac vice, proceeding as it does from a wrong premise, must be rejected. of Justice Bellosillo’s observation that despite the predilection to extend one's service in the judiciary in
The application of A.C. No. 58-2003 to justices and judges who optionally retire need not be on pro hac order to complete the five-year period, a retiring justice or judge is precluded from doing so because of
vice basis but on due consideration of the manifest intent of the law to make the longevity pay available the constitutional limitation to his term of office. In line with the liberal approach, we adopted Justice
to all types of retirees. Bellosillo's viewpoint which has since been the norm.

Thus, Justice Villarama’s earned leave credits should be included in the computation of his longevity pay We hasten to add that the fractional portion of the five-year period is actual service rendered, a fact that
upon his optional retirement. cannot be reversed. It would be a mockery of the liberal approach in the treatment of retirement laws
for government personnel if such fractional portion is disregarded to the detriment of the retiring justice
or judge. Going back to the rationale behind the grant of longevity pay, it cannot be gainsaid that service
On the submission that the tacking of leave credits to judicial service has no legal basis
during such fractional portion of the five-year period is an eloquent manifestation as well of the justice's
or judge’s loyalty to the judiciary as the service rendered during the previously completed five-year
In essence, the committee proposes that when Section 42 of B.P. Big. 129 states that the grant of periods.
longevity pay is based on continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary, the law
means actual service. Unused but earned leave credits, according to the committee, refer to
Rounding off the fractional period
commutable terminal leave. Following the prevailing treatment of terminal leave as excluded from
"service," unused leave credits cannot therefore be tacked to lengthen one's actual years of service.
We are fully aware that the fractional portion of the unexpired fiveyear period immediately preceding
retirement is the direct consequence of the tacking of leave credits to the judicial service of every retired
Such view is not novel.
justice or judge. However, we also recognize that Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 was crafted in such a way as
to grant a full 5% adjustment of the longevity pay for every cycle of five years of judicial service. All
In Re: Computation of Longevity Pay Upon Compulsory Retirement, 16 the question on whether the attempts must be made in order to realize the granting of a full 5% as adjustment in the computation of
continuous, efficient, and meritorious service contemplated by A.C. No. 58-2003 is "actual" or not was the longevity pay. Thus, in order to align the tacking of leave credits under A.C. No. 58-2003 with the full
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5% adjustment for every five-year expired period specified in Section 42 of B.P. Big. 129, and in Thus, for purposes of computing longevity pay, we find no justifiable reason in tacking the service as bar
pursuance of our rule-making power under Section 10 of Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing examiner to the judicial service of one who is already a member of the judiciary. Accordingly, Justice
Book V of Executive Order No. 292,17 we deem it appropriate to consider a fraction of at least two (2) Villarama’s service as bar examiner could not be credited in the computation of his longevity pay.
years and six (6) months as one whole 5-year cycle. In this instance, the additional percentage of
monthly basic pay which is added to the monthly pension pay of a retired justice or judge as longevity
In sum, a justice or judge who retires optionally, just like Justice Villarama, is entitled to the tacking of
pay is always divisible by five (5).
leave credits provided in A.C. No. 58- 2003 for .the purpose of computing the longevity pay as granted in
Section 42 of B.P. 129; likewise, a fraction of the unexpired five-year period immediately prior to
For those whose service (inclusive of the tacked-in leave credits) during the unexpired 5-year period retirement is with sufficient basis. In the case of Justice Villarama, there remains a fraction of the 5-year
immediately preceding retirement is below the threshold above, the adjustment of the computation of period prior to his optional retirement on 6 January 2016 which must correspondingly be counted in
additional longevity pay shall be an additional one percent (1% ) for every year of service in the judiciary. computing his longevity pay. Lastly, service as bar examiner by a member of the judiciary is not to be
factored in computing longevity pay.
Thus, in the case of Justice Villarama whose total judicial service is 28 years, 2 months, and 8 days, and
whose total leave credits (1,3 86 days) is equivalent to 5 years and 3 months, his judicial service for It bears repeating that despite Justice Villarama’s plea for a pro hac vice ruling, what we have forged
purposes of the longevity pay is 33 years, 5 months and 8 days. The fraction of 3 years, 5 months and 8 today henceforth lays a precedent. Members of the judiciary who are similarly situated can find doctrinal
days in the unexpired 5-year period immediately preceding Justice Villarama's optional retirement is well value in this decision.
above the aforestated threshold. Thus, consistent with the foregoing formula, the longevity pay of
Justice Villarama shall be thirty-five percent (35%) of his basic monthly pay.
WHEREFORE, the request of Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Court DIRECTS that Justice Martin S. Villarama be paid his longevity pay in accordance with
On Justice Villarama’s service as bar examiner Administrative Circular No. 58-2003, that is, to include his unused and earned leave credits, subject to
adjustment in accordance with the "Rounding off the Fractional Period" portion of this resolution, but to
exclude his service as Bar Examiner in 2004.
The committee likewise recommended the denial of Justice Villarama’s request to count his service as
bar examiner part of his judicial service. It explains that A.M. No. 08-12-7-SC, the basis of Justice
Villarama’s claim, is inapplicable because while the subject resolution of the Court coyers service (as bar The 12 January 2017 Memorandum of the Special Committee on Retirement and Civil Service Benefits
examiner) prior to one's appointment to the judiciary, Justice Villarama was already a member of the is NOTED.
judiciary when he served as such.
SO ORDERED.
We agree.

Indeed, by the express terms of A.M. No. 08-12-7-SC relied upon by Justice Villarama, we quote:

Henceforth, services rendered by all Justices of the Supreme Court as Bar Examiners prior to their
appointment to the Judiciary shall be credited as part of their government service and be tacked in the
computation of their longevity pay upon compulsory or optional retirement.18

Clearly, this does not apply to Justice Villarama since he was already a member of the judiciary when he
was tasked to serve as bar examiner.

The reason for denying an incumbent member of the judiciary the inclusion of his or her service as bar
examiner in the computation of the longevity pay is simple. At the time of his or her appointment as bar
examiner, an incumbent justice or judge is already concurrently serving in the judiciary. The regular
functions of the justice or judge and the service performed as bar examiner cannot appropriately be
considered as two separable and finite judicial services if they supposedly coincide at the same time or
period. It would be defying logic and sensible reasoning if one is to be tacked to the other, in effect
extending the length of judicial service, even if no additional time was really spent in the performance
of the service as bar examiner outside of the time or period actually served as justice or judge. Not
even the liberal approach in the treatment of retirement laws could save the argument for tacking such
service as bar examiner in favor of an incumbent justice or judge.