In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper

attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference."Feb 27, 2013

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154083 February 27, 2013

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SAMSON DE LEON, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A public official is guilty of grave misconduct when he neglects to act upon a complaint about a
violation of the law he is enforcing. He may be suspended or dismissed from office for his first
offense.

The Office of the Ombudsman seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on
January 30, 2002, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reduced to suspension for three months
without pay for simple neglect of duty the penalty of suspension for one yt:!ar without pay the Office
of the Ombudsman had imposed on respondent Samson De Leon (De Leon) upon finding him guilty
of neglect of duty. 1

Antecedents

Acting on a report of illegal quarrying being committed in the Municipality of Baras, Rizal, Graft
Investigation Officer Dante D. Tomilla of the Fact Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of
the Ombudsman conducted an investigation pursuant to a mission order dated April 17, 1998.

On June 8, 1998, Tornilla filed his report to Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, through Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. and Director Agapito B. Rosales,2 confirming the illegal
quarrying, to wit:

From the Municipal Hall, we proceeded to the quarrying area. Along our way, we have noticed a
dump truck loaded with quarrying materials coming from the quarrying site. At this juncture, we
signaled the truck driver to stop and then checked the driver’s license, the truck registration while my
other companions took pictures of the truck.

Verification of the above hauler truck with Plate No. TKU-121 (Isuzu) is owned and operated by
Mayor Lito Tanjuatco of Tanay, Rizal. The truck driver, a certain Alfredo Casamayor Payot informed
this Investigator that he is paying One hundred (₱100.00) Pesos per truckload of quarrying materials
to the quarry operator, a certain Mr. Javier.
 xxxx

Jonathan Llagas, Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator denied knowing Mr. Javier nor
any quarrying activities going on in Baras, Rizal. When we informed him of our findings, he insisted
that the quarrying operations is within the jurisdictional area of Tanay, Rizal. To cut short our
discussion, we requested him to look and see the quarrying operations to determine the territorial
boundaries, whether it is a part of Baras or Tanay and to submit his findings and action taken on our
request. However, up to this writing, Jonathan Llagas failed to comply.

Per report received by the Office of the Assistant Ombudsman, EIO, stated that the quarrying
activities in Baras, Rizal is still going on the following day, Saturday, April 18, 1998, after our visit on
Friday, April 17, 1998, (p. 21, Records). With this information, this investigator proceeded back to the
Baras, Rizal and conducted ocular inspection on May 8, 1998, before proceeding to the Laguna
Lake Development Authority in Calauan, Laguna, in compliance with a Mission Order.

True enough, we were able to see for ourselves the continuing quarry operations and the quarried
stones, soil and materials were dumped to a portion of the Laguna de Bay thereby reclaiming said
portion allegedly to be developed as Resort and restaurant establishments.3

Tornilla recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted against Baras Municipal Mayor
Roberto Ferrera, Baras Municipal Planning and Coordinator Jonathan Llagas, and property owner
Venancio Javier for the probable violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act); and that administrative proceedings for violations of the Civil Service Rules
be also undertaken.

In his report and recommendation dated July 13, 1998,4 DILG Resident Ombudsman Rudiger G.
Falcis II sought the inclusion in the investigation of De Leon as the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) and as concurrently the Chairman of the Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board (PMRB) of Rizal.

After the preliminary investigation, Graft Investigation Officer II Edgardo V. Geraldez of the FFIB,
Office of the Ombudsman, issued a decision dated April 29, 1999,5 dismissing the complaint against
all the respondents for lack of substantial evidence. However, Assistant Ombudsman Aportadera, Jr.
recommended the disapproval of the said decision. Ombudsman Desierto approved the
recommendation of Assistant Ombudsman Aportadera, Jr.

The case was then referred to Atty. Sabino M. Cruz, Resident Ombudsman for the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), who ultimately submitted a memorandum on October
20, 19996, duly approved by the Ombudsman, finding De Leon liable for gross neglect of duty, as
follows:

WHEREFORE , it is respectfully recommended that:

xxxx

3) Respondent SAMSON G. DE LEON, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, be

penalized with one (1) year suspension without pay, for Gross Neglect of Duty.7

xxxx
On December 2, 1999, De Leon moved for Reconsideration,8 praying that the memorandum dated
October 20, 1999 be set aside.

On January 31, 2000, the Ombudsman denied De Leon’s motion for reconsideration.9

On November 17, 1999, the DENR directed the Regional Executive Director of Region IV to effect
De Leon’s suspension. 10

Ruling of the CA

Aggrieved, De Leon appealed to the CA via a petition for review,11 seeking the reversal of the
memorandum dated October 20, 1999 and the order dated January 31, 2000 of the Ombudsman.
He averred as grounds of his appeal the following, namely:

I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED AND COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN
DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS EMBODIED IN THE DECISION
DATED 29 APRIL 1999.

II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED AND COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN
FINDING THE PETITIONER LIABLE FOR GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY.

III. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN EFFECTING THE
IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF THE PENALTY OF SUSPENSION FOR A PERIOD OF ONE
YEAR, ON THE PETITIONER.12

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the Office of the Ombudsman, submitted its
comment on July 14, 2000,13 praying that De Leon’s petition for review be dismissed for its lack of
merit.

On January 30, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Memorandum dated October 20, 1999 issued by the Office
of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-98-0414 is hereby MODIFIED in that petitioner SAMSON DE
LEON is hereby penalized with THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION without pay for SIMPLE
NEGLECT OF DUTY. Furthermore, it appearing that he has already served such penalty, petitioner
is hereby ordered REINSTATED to his former position.

SO ORDERED.14

The Office of the Ombudsman sought reconsideration,15 but the CA denied its motion on June 21,
2002.

Issues

Dissatisfied, the Office of the Ombudsman appeals, contending that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

IT DECREED PRIVATE RESPONDENT LIABLE FOR SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY

NOTWITHSTANDING THE UNDENIABLE FACT THAT HE FAILED TO PERFORM A TASK
WHICH IS CLEARLY REPOSED ON HIM ON A REGULAR BASIS AND WHICH BREACH
OF DUTY APPEARS FLAGRANT AND PALPABLE.

II.

IT SUBSTITUTED ITS FINDING TO THAT OF THE OMBUDSMAN WHEN NO COGENT

REASON EXISTS THEREFOR.

III.

IT HELD THAT THE DECISION OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT IMMEDIATELY

EXECUTORY.16

The pivotal issue is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in modifying the findings and
reducing the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman.

Ruling

The petition for review on certiorari is meritorious.

In its assailed decision, the CA justified its modification of the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in the following manner, to wit:

In the case at bench, petitioner, although guilty of neglect in the performance of his official duties,
may only be held liable for Simple Neglect of Duty. Petitioner’s offense is not of such nature to be
considered brazen, flagrant and palpable as would amount to a Gross Neglect of Duty. As pointed
out by petitioner, as early as May 1997, upon the complaint of one Teresita G. Fabian, he ordered
the inspection of the subject property located in Baras, Rizal. Relying on the report of Forrester
Ferrer and Engineer Aide Velasquez, petitioner indorsed to the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board
the former’s findings that there were "extraction" in the area. The same findings were likewise
forwarded to the Regional Executive Director of the DENR. A reinvestigation of the area was again
conducted in July 1997 upon petitioner’s instruction with the findings that there were no illegal
quarrying activities being undertaken in the premises although a payloader and a back hoe can be
seen in the area. Nonetheless, petitioner should not have merely relied on the reports and instead
confirmed such findings by personally proceeding to the premises and verifying the findings,
specially since the report cited the presence of large machineries, and that there was visible
extraction in the area. While the Court is not inclined to conclude that there were indeed illegal
quarrying activities in the area, nevertheless, prudence dictates that petitioner should have brought it
upon himself to confirm the findings of the investigation. Moreover, in this day and age where
environmental concerns are not to be trifled with, it devolves upon petitioner, as the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resource Officer, to oversee the protection and preservation of the
environment within his province. The Court cannot accept petitioner’s passing the buck, so to speak,
to the Regional Director of the DENR for to do so would be tolerating bureaucracy and inefficiency in
government service.

Be that as it may, as the Court previously stated, petitioner’s negligence does not amount to a gross
neglect of duty. Given that his neglect is not that odious, petitioner should only be liable for Simple
Neglect of Duty and should accordingly be meted out the penalty of three (3) months suspension
without pay.17

We disagree with the CA that De Leon was liable only for simple misconduct. An examination of the
records persuasively shows that the Office of the Ombudsman correctly held De Leon guilty of gross
neglect of duty, a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.18

A PENRO, who is appointed by the Secretary of the DENR, has the responsibility to implement
DENR policies, programs and projects in the province of his assignment. De Leon was appointed as
the PENRO of Rizal and concurrently the Chairman of the PMRB of Rizal. As such, his duties and
responsibilities included the following:

1. Plans, organizes, directs and coordinates the overall office and field activities and
operation of the province concerning environmental and natural resources
programs/projects;

2. Supervises and enforces discipline to personnel pertaining to norm and conduct in the
effective performance of tasks pursuant to manual operation guidelines and establish[ed]
practices;

3. Makes final review and correction of administrative and technical report submitted by
subordinates;

4. Coordinates with local government units, national office officials and other concern (sic)
parties related to the conduct and operation of the office;

5. Execute[s] and implement[s] policy, rules and regulations work programs and plans laid
down by the Regional Office;

6. Approves routine and non-policy determining papers and renders administrative and
technical decision(s) within the limit(s) of delegated authorities;

7. Occasionally conduct[s] field inspection to obtain on the spot information about the needs
and problems of the provincial office; and

8. Perform[s] such other duties as maybe (sic) assigned.19

Based on the Civil Service Position Description Form,20 De Leon as the PENRO of Rizal was the
highest executive officer of the DENR at the provincial level. He had the authority to coordinate all
the DENR agencies within his jurisdiction, including the PMRB. In his concurrent positions as the
PENRO and Chairman of the PMRB, therefore, his paramount function was to ensure that the laws
enforced by the DENR as well as the rules and regulations promulgated by the DENR in
implementation of such laws were complied with and effectively implemented and enforced. Verily,
he was the primary implementor and enforcer within his area of responsibility of all the laws and
administrative orders concerning the environment, and because of such character of his concurrent
offices should have made sure that he efficiently and effectively discharged his functions and
responsibilities.

In the matter that is now before us, De Leon evidently neglected to efficiently and effectively
discharge his functions and responsibilities. Except for issuing the investigation order and for
denying having granted any permit to quarry, he did nothing affirmative to put a stop to the illegal
quarrying complained of, or to do any other action that was entirely within his power to do as the
PENRO that the complaint demanded to be done.

Relevantly, the CA itself also observed in its decision under review that De Leon had not done
enough as the circumstances obtaining in the case properly called for, to wit:

x x x Nonetheless, petitioner should not have merely relied on the reports and instead confirmed
such findings by personally proceeding to the premises and verifying the findings, specially since the
report cited the presence of large machineries, and that there was visible extraction in the area.
While the court is not inclined to conclude that there were indeed illegal quarrying activities in the
area, nevertheless, prudence dictates that petitioner should have brought it upon himself to confirm
the findings of the investigation. Moreover, in this day and age where environmental concerns are
not to be trifled with, it devolves upon petitioner, as the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resource Officer to oversee the protection and preservation of the environment with his province.
The Court cannot accept petitioner’s passing the buck so to speak. x x x.21

Its foregoing observations notwithstanding, the CA still held De Leon guilty only of simple neglect of
duty.

The CA thereby erred.

Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other
persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men
never fail to give to their own property."22 It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness
of a person to perform a duty.23 In cases involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a
breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.24

In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper
attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference."25

Conformably with these concepts, De Leon, given his rank and level of responsibility, was guilty of
gross neglect in not performing the act expected of him as the PENRO under the circumstances
obtaining. He was precisely assigned to perform tasks that imposed on him the obligation to do
everything reasonably necessarily and permissible under the law in order to achieve the objectives
of environmental protection. He could not feign ignorance of the Government’s current efforts to
control or prevent environmental deterioration from all hazards, including uncontrolled mining and
unregulated illegal quarrying, but he chose to be passive despite clear indications of the illegal
quarrying activities that had been first brought to his official attention as early as in 1997 by Teresita
Fabian of the Provincial Tourism Office of Rizal. The most that he did on the complaint was to
dispatch two of his subordinates to verify the report of quarrying. After the subordinates returned with
the information that there were no quarrying activities at the site, he was apparently content with
their report. He was not even spurred into further action by the subordinates’ simultaneous report on
having observed at the site the presence of earthmoving equipment (specifically, a backhoe and a
payloader). Had he been conscientious, the presence of the earthmoving equipment would have
quickly alerted him to the high probability of their being used in quarrying activities at the site. We
presume that he was not too obtuse to sense such high probability. The seriousness of the matter
should have prodded him to take further actions, including personally inspecting the site himself
either to confirm the findings of the subordinates or to satisfy himself that the earthmoving equipment
was not being used for quarrying. By merely denying having granted any permit or unwarranted
benefit to any quarry operator, he seemingly considered the report of his subordinates satisfactory.

Curiously, De Leon contended that the responsibility to monitor any reported mining and quarrying
activities belonged to the Regional Director of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau. His contention
was insincere, if not also ridiculous, however, considering that he was then the concurrent Chairman
of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, the office directly tasked with the implementation of all
environmental laws, rules and regulations.

The flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of De Leon to perform his official duties denoted
gross neglect of duty also because the illegal quarrying had been going for a period of time. The
actions he took were inadequate, and could even be probably seen as a conscious way to mask a
deliberate and intentional refusal to perform the duties that his position required. He had no
justification for accepting the reports of his subordinates at face value despite indications to the
contrary. Making it worse for him was that the place where the quarrying was then taking place was
a mere stone’s throw away from the main road, being only about 400 meters away from the main
road.

In this connection, the Court observes that gross neglect of duty includes want of even slight care.
De Leon’s omission and indifference were definitely more than want of slight care, but were
tantamount to a wilful intent to violate the law or to disregard the established rules, which only
strengthened and confirmed his guilt of gross negligence.

The remaining question is whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman was
immediately executory. The question crops up from the insistence by De Leon that his penalty of
suspension for one year was not immediately executory.

The CA held that the one-year suspension meted on De Leon was not immediately executory, viz:

x x x. Book 5, Title 1, Chapter 6 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cited by the OSG is not
applicable as said rule governs administrative cases decided by the Civil Service Commission. In
this case, petitioner was adjudged liable by the Office of the Ombudsman, hence RA 6670 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 shall govern. In this regard, Section 27 of RA 6670 provides that ‘(A)ny
order, directive, or decision, imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, a suspension of
not more than a month’s salary shall be final and unappealable." Logically, therefore, suspension of
more than one (1) month is not deemed final and executory. (Underscoring in the original)

There is no issue about the disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman over all elective
and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries. The only officials not under its disciplinary authority are those who may be
removed only by impeachment, the Members of Congress, and the Justices and Judges of the
Judiciary. As to this, Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) clearly provides, viz:

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may
be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

De Leon was subject to the disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman because he was
an appointive public official.26 Indeed, the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate
extends to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed
during his tenure of office by any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.27 The
Office of the Ombudsman also has the power to act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts
or omissions that (1) are contrary to law or regulation; (2) are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or
discriminatory; (3) are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in
accordance with law; (4) proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; (5) are
in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or (6) are otherwise irregular,
immoral or devoid of justification.28 At the same time, the Office of the Ombudsman, in the exercise
of its administrative disciplinary authority, can impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The exercise of all
such powers is well founded on the Constitution and on Republic Act No. 6770.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, and related cases,29 the Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Puno, has definitively recognized the full administrative disciplinary authority of the Office of
the Ombudsman, declaring that its authority does not end with a recommendation to punish, but
goes farther as to directly impose the appropriate sanctions on the erring public officials and
employees, like removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or criminal prosecution; and
characterizing such imposition of sanctions to be not merely advisory or recommendatory but
actually mandatory, to wit:

In fine, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full
administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations. Unlike the
Ombudsman-like agencies of the past the powers of which extend to no more than making findings
of fact and recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who
may file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public officials and employees
only in cases of failure of justice, the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is
intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and
other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The Ombudsman is to be an "activist
watchman," not merely a passive one. He is vested with broad powers to enable him to implement
his own actions.30

To resolve whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman was immediately executory,
we hereby hold that the decision is immediately executory, and that an appeal does not stop the
decision from being executory. This was clearly pronounced by the Court in Ombudsman v. Court of
Appeals,31 to wit:

The Court of Appeals held that the order of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of dismissal is not
immediately executory. The Court of Appeals applied the ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, that all
other decisions of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in Section 27 of
RA 6770 are neither final nor immediately executory.

In Lapid v. Court of Appeals, the Court anchored its ruling mainly on Section 27 of RA 6770 , as
supported by Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
pertinent provisions read:

Section 27 of RA 6770
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1) All provisionary orders at the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must
be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:

(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or
decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from
filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest
of justice may require. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (AO 07):

Sec. 7. Finality of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten
(10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or
petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA
6770. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court held in Lapid v. Court of Appeals that the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman "mandate that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman where the penalty imposed is
other than public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary are still
appealable and hence, not final and executory."

Subsequently, on 17 August 2000, the Ombudsman issued Administrative Order No. 14-A (AO 14-
A), amending Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
amendment aims to provide uniformity with other disciplining authorities in the execution or
implementation of judgments and penalties in administrative disciplinary cases involving public
officials and employees. Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by AO 14-A, reads:

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and
in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt of
the written notice of the decision or order denying the motion for reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension
1âw phi1

or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal.(Emphasis supplied)

On 15 September 2003, AO 17 was issued, amending Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman was further amended and now reads:

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and
in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory
and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying
the Motion for Reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension
or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been
under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he
did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a

matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply
with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be
ground for disciplinary action against said officer. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, in the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, the Court noted that Section 7 of AO 17 provides for
execution of the decisions pending appeal, which provision is similar to Section 47 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

More recently, in the 2007 case of Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, the primary issue was whether
the decision of the Ombudsman suspending petitioner therein from office for six months without pay
was immediately executory even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the
pertinent ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals has already been superseded by the case of In the
Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, which
clearly held that decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending
appea1."32 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 30,
2002; HOLDS respondent SAMSON DE LEON guilty of GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, and
IMPOSES on him the penalty of SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE FOR ONE YEAR WITHOUT PAY;
and DIRECTS him to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Rollo, pp. 34-38; penned by Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (later Presiding
Justice of the CA and Member of this Court, now retired), with Associate Justice Hilarion L.
Aquino (retired) and Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (retired) concurring.

2 Id. at 56-60.

3 Id. at 57-58.

4 Id. at 61-65.

5 Id. at 66-74.

6 Id. at 75-79.

7 Id. at 79.

8 Id. at 80-91.

9 Id. at 92-97.

10 Id. at 98.
11 Id. at 99-112.

12 Id. at 104.

13 Id. at 113-122.

14 Id. at 37.

15 Id. at 41-55.

16 Id. at 17-18.

17 Id. at 36-37.

18 Rule IV, Section 52 (A) of the Uniform Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

19 Rollo, p. 123.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 36-37.

22Fernandez v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 193983. March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA
351, 364.

23Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa, G.R. No. 140519, August 21, 2001, 363 SCRA
480, 487.

24 Fernandez v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra note 22.

25 Republic v. Canastillo, G.R. No. 172729, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 546, 555.

26 Republic Act No. 6770 also provides:

Section 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers
or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in
order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.

27 Section 16, Republic Act No. 6770, states:

Section 16. Applicability. — The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any
officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.

28 Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770, says:

 Section 19. Administrative Complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all
complaints relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in
accordance with law;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

29G.R. No. 165416, G.R. No. 165584, and G.R. No. 165731, January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA
253.

30 Id. at 270.

31 GR No. 159395, May 7, 2008, 554 SCRA 75.

32 Id.at 91-95.
FIRST DIVISION

ATTYS. VILMA HILDA D. VILLANUEVA-FABELLA

AND WILMAR T. ARUGAY,
Complainants,
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1518
January 15, 2004

-versus-

JUDGE RALPH S. LEE AND SHERIFF JUSTINIANO

C. DE LA CRUZ JR., BOTH OF THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, QUEZON CITY,
Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar y

Once more, we remind members of the judicial branch – judges and judicial
personnel alike -- to be conscientious, diligent and thorough in the performance of
their functions. At all times they must observe the high standards of public service
required of them. chan robles virtual law library

The Case and the Facts

In an administrative Complaint [1] dated November 12, 2002, Attys. Vilma
Hilda D. Villanueva-Fabella and Wilmar T. Arugay charged Judge Ralph S.
Lee of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City (Branch 38) with
manifest partiality, incompetence and gross ignorance of the law; and
Sheriff Justiniano C. de la Cruz Jr. of the same MeTC, with unjust,
oppressive, irregular and excessive enforcement of a writ of attachment. The
factual antecedents of the matters are summarized by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) as follows:
"The complainants are counsels for the defendants in Civil Case No. [38]-
28457 entitled ‘Star Paper Corporation vs. Society of St. Paul and Fr.
Leonardo Eleazar’ for Sum of Money with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment.
They narrated that on 19 June 2002, their clients were served a copy of the
complaint and a Writ of Attachment by Sheriff Dela Cruz based on the
plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants contracted a debt in bad faith with
no intention of paying the same. cra law

by Counterflix

"On the aforementioned day, a printing machine was levied and delivered to
the plaintiff’s warehouse, although there was an offer by the defendants to
pay right there and then P223,457.75, the amount fixed in the order of
attachment, but the plaintiff denied the defendants’ plea not to attach the
machine, saying that [it] had already set [its] mind on attaching the same. cral aw

by Counterflix

"Atty. Fabella, together with three (3) priests, asked the sheriff to levy on a
less expensive machine but to no avail. She then told the sheriff that he
[would] unnecessarily levy on the machinery because a cash deposit to
discharge the attachment could be filed that same afternoon but he just
dismissed the same, saying that it takes time before the court could approve
the counterbond. chan robles virtual law library
"The complainants claim[ed] that Sheriff Dela Cruz violated x x x Rule 57,
Section 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provide[d] that in the
attachment of personal property capable of manual delivery, [the property
should] be taken and safely kept in the sheriff’s custody. The machinery,
according to complainants, [was] brought to [the] plaintiff’s warehouse in
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The foregoing show[ed] that the
implementation of the writ of attachment was marred by excessiveness,
irregularity and oppressiveness.cralaw

xxx xxx xxx

"On 3 July 2002, Judge Lee granted the defendants’ Urgent Motion to
Discharge Attachment filed 19 June 2002. Thereafter, on 9 July 2002, an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Cash Deposit was filed, without notice
to the defendants and despite failure of the plaintiff to set such litigious
motion for hearing and contrary to existing laws and jurisprudence. Judge
Lee granted the same in his Order of 17 July 2002. Defendants only learned
of the withdrawal when they received a copy of the said Order. cralaw

"A Motion for reconsideration of the 17 July 2002 Order was filed on 30
August 2002. Defendants stressed that the Motion to Withdraw Cash Deposit
has no basis, shows no urgency, lacks notice and hearing, and is already a
prejudgment of the case even before the pre-trial stage which is tantamount
to the taking of property without due process of law. chan robles virtual law library
X

by Counterflix

"For failure of the plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial conference, the court
granted the motion to declare the plaintiff as non-suited as well as the
prayer to allow the ex parte presentation of the defense’s evidence on its
counterclaim. c ralaw

"The plaintiff then filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
declaring it as non-suited[,] which was set for hearing in the morning of 24
October 2002, the same day the aforementioned ex parte presentation of
evidence was supposed to commence. c ralaw

"Judge Lee was not around in the morning so the hearing on the motion did
not materialize with the ex-parte presentation of evidence in the afternoon
because the Clerk of Court refused to proceed for the reason that a motion
for reconsideration had been filed the day before. The Clerk of Court then
conferred with the respondent Judge in his chambers who produced a
handwritten note granting the said motion. She explained to complainant
Atty. Arugay that she did not notice that Judge Lee had already issued the
Order granting such motion[;] thus, the ex parte presentation of evidence
could not proceed. cralaw

"According to complainants, the Clerk of Court could not explain the

irregularity in the granting of the plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and
the fact that the same was swiftly resolved[,] while the defendants’ similar
motion [had] not been resolved for more than two (2) months already." [2]
In his Comment [3] dated January 9, 2003, respondent judge claimed that
the Complaint was fatally defective, because complainants did not have legal
personality to file it; neither did they present affidavits, verified statements
or any authority to represent their clients. Further, the Complaint did not
contain a certification of non-forum shopping, but instead had a handwritten
verification not sworn to or subscribed before an administering officer. chan

robles virtual law library

X

by Counterflix

He likewise assailed complainants’ allegations as hearsay. As to what had

allegedly transpired during the implementation of the subject Writ of
Attachment, he adopted the averments in respondent sheriff’s
Comment [4]alleging the presumption of regularity in the discharge of official
functions. c ralaw

Respondent judge admitted that he had committed a procedural error when

he released the counter-bond [5] to the plaintiff in the said civil case.
However, when the defendants therein, through their Motion for
Reconsideration, called his attention to the mistake, he immediately
ordered [6] the return [7] of the counter-bond to the custody of the Office of
the Clerk of Court. He cited jurisprudence to defend his acts and asserted his
good faith and lack of malice. Moreover, he averred that he had not delayed
the resolution of the Motion. Finally, he urged the Court to dismiss the
instant Complaint outright for being instituted without basis and merely to
harass him. c ralaw

In his Comment, [8] respondent sheriff claimed that after receiving the Writ
of Preliminary Attachment, he sought its implementation through the
assistance of the clerk of court of the MTC-Makati, Sheriff Ernesto Adan, and
the Makati police. He allowed the parties in the civil case to negotiate for a
settlement, but when the negotiations bogged down, he attached a printing
machine that was not in use at the time. cralaw

He denied that there was abuse in the levy, claiming that the machine was
an old 1970 model. Moreover, he said that, contrary to complainants’
allegation that the machine was valuable, no receipt to prove its true value
was ever shown. cralaw

Respondent sheriff added that it was in his own belief and best judgment to
temporarily place the delicate printing machine in the warehouse of the
plaintiff for safekeeping. The machine was eventually returned to the
defendants by virtue of the Order discharging the Writ. In fact, one of the
complainants personally acknowledged receipt of the machine. cralaw

by Counterflix

As to the allegation that he was arrogant, respondent sheriff claimed that he

waited for more than three hours before exercising his ministerial function.
Lastly, he adopted the averments in the Comment of respondent judge on
other events that had transpired during the pendency of the civil case, the
subject of the instant Complaint. chan robles virtual law library
Evaluation and Recommendation of the OCA
The OCA opined that the provisions cited by complainants -- those in
Sections 12 and 18 of Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [9] -- did
not require the adverse party to be first notified and then heard before an
attachment bond may be released. Considering that the bond posted by the
attaching creditor would answer for the damages and costs the court may
award the adverse party by reason of the attachment, the better practice
was for the latter to be notified and heard before the motion to discharge
attachment could be resolved. cralaw

According to the OCA, the error was corrected when respondent judge, on
Motion for Reconsideration, reversed himself before the adverse party
incurred any damage. The OCA emphasized that before the full disciplinary
powers of this Court could befall a judge, the erroneous act should have
been committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or bad faith. It
opined that such fact had not been clearly and convincingly shown in the
instant case. [10]
The OCA found that respondent sheriff had erred when he deposited the
plaintiff’s levied property in the warehouse and thereby lost actual or
constructive possession thereof. The OCA said that this legal violation could
not be justified by the weight and the condition of the machine, which could
have been deposited in a rented private warehouse where it could have been
guarded under his strict supervision. c ralaw

Consequently, the OCA recommended that respondent judge "be REMINDED

to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties and to keep abreast
with the law and jurisprudence"; and that respondent sheriff "be
SUSPENDED for one (1) month without pay for violation of Rule 57, Section
7(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with a WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar act(s) shall be dealt with more severely in the
future." [11]
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the OCA. chan robles virtual
law library
Administrative Liability
With respect to the charges against respondent judge, we find that his grant
of the withdrawal of the cash deposit -- an Order he later reversed by ruling
that the deposit be returned to the clerk of court -- was a mere error of
judgment, not an act revealing gross ignorance of the law or procedure. cralaw

Attachment is a juridical institution intended to secure the outcome of a trial

-- specifically, the satisfaction of a pecuniary obligation. [12] Such order is
enforced through a writ that may be issued at the commencement of an
action, [13] commanding the sheriff to attach property, rights, credits or
effects of a defendant to satisfy the plaintiff’s demand. [14] Hence, the
property of a defendant, when taken, is put in custodia legis. [15]
In order to prevent the sheriff from levying an attachment on property, the
defendant (also called the adverse party) may make a deposit or give a
counter-bond in an amount equal to that fixed in the order of attachment.
Such deposit or counter-bound is intended to secure the payment of any
judgment that the plaintiff (also called the attaching party or the applicant to
the writ) may recover in the action. [16] After a writ has been enforced,
however, the adverse party may still move for the discharge of the
attachment, wholly or in part, by also making a deposit or giving a counter-
bond to secure the payment of any judgment [17] the attaching party may
recover in the action. [18] The property attached shall then be released and
delivered to the adverse party; and the money deposited shall be applied
under the direction of the court to the satisfaction of any judgment that may
be rendered in favor of the prevailing party. [19] chan robles virtual law library
In the instant case, respondent judge had ordered [20] the withdrawal of the
cash deposit of the defendant and released it in favor of the plaintiff, even
before judgment was rendered. This action was clearly in violation of the
Rules mandating that after the discharge of an attachment, the money
deposited shall stand in place of the property released. [21] However, the
inadvertence [22] of respondent judge was not gross enough to merit
sanction.c ralaw

First, he rectified himself within the period given for deciding motions.
Section 15(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution mandates all trial courts to
resolve all matters filed within three months from date of
submission. [23] The Motion for Reconsideration [24] of the July 17, 2002
Order granting the withdrawal of the deposit was filed on August 30, 2002,
and submitted for resolution on September 5, 2002, [25] the date of
hearing. [26] The Order [27] granting this Motion was then issued on
November 4, 2002, well within the three-month period. The money was
returned, and no prejudice was suffered by any of the parties. cra law

Second, respondent judge owned up to his mistake [28] in his Comment.

This is an admirable act. Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges should
be the embodiment of competence [29] and should so behave at all times as
to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. [30] They must
be faithful to the law. [31] That respondent judge admitted his mistake
shows his recognition of his fallibility and his openness to punishment, the
imposition of which restores public confidence in the judicial system. His July
17, 2002 Order was merely an honest mistake of judgment -- an innocent
error in the exercise of discretion -- but not a display of gross incompetence
or unfaithfulness to the law. chan robles virtual law library
We have already ruled that as long as the judgment remains unsatisfied, it
would be erroneous to order the cancellation of a bond filed for the
discharge of a writ of attachment. [32] In like manner, it would be erroneous
to order the withdrawal of a cash deposit before judgment is rendered. Be
that as it may, "a [judge] may not be held administratively accountable for
every erroneous order x x x he renders." [33] Otherwise, a judicial office
would be untenable, [34] for "no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the administration of justice can be infallible." [35] For liability to
attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order of a judge must not only
be erroneous; more important, it must be motivated by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive. [36]Certainly, mere error of
judgment is not a ground for disciplinary proceedings. [37]
Complainants alleged that respondent judge committed another violation of
the Rules of Court when he granted [38]the plaintiff’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Withdraw Cash Deposit. [39] The Rules mandate that, except for motions
that the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant. [40] The notice of hearing shall be addressed to the defendants
therein and shall specify the time and date of the hearing, which must not
be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. [41] The motion
and notice shall be served at least three days before the date of
hearing. [42] Without proof of its service, the court cannot act upon it. [43]
Indeed, the plaintiff’s Motion to withdraw the cash deposit lacked notice of
hearing and proof of service. Respondent judge should not have acted upon
it. However, because he had erroneously thought that the rights of the
defendants would not be prejudiced thereby, he took action. His poor
judgment obviously resulted in his issuance of the erroneous Order that
granted the release of the deposit. chan robles virtual law library
Similarly, the verified Motion for Reconsideration of the Order declaring
plaintiff as non-suited and allowing the ex-parte presentation of evidence by
the defense should have been heard in open court, not granted in chamber.
Respondent judge must have thought that this Motion, which had been filed
by the plaintiff, required immediate action; and so the former granted it by
ordering -- through a handwritten note which we do not approve of -- the
deferment of the scheduled presentation. [44] This Order should not have
been issued, because the Motion had been filed only a day before the
scheduled hearing. [45] The rules on notice of hearing and proof of service
should have been observed by both the plaintiff’s counsel and respondent
judge. Unfortunately, the latter’s poor judgment likewise prevailed, but still
fell short of gross ignorance of the law or procedure. cralaw

Specious is the argument of respondent judge that complainants have no

legal personality to file the instant Administrative Complaint against him. His
contention that the allegations contained therein are hearsay [46] also
deserves scant consideration. Rule 140 allows the institution of disciplinary
proceedings against judges, not only upon a verified complaint -- supported
by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged
therein or by documents substantiating the allegations -- but even upon an
anonymous one. [47] Complainants herein have the requisite personal
knowledge and have, in fact, executed a joint Complaint-Affidavit and
substantiated their allegations with pertinent documents. c ralaw

The verification [48] in their Complaint, albeit handwritten after the jurat, is
sufficient in form and substance. [49]Such verification is a clear affirmation
that they are prepared to establish the truth of the facts pleaded. [50] In
fact, the lack of it is "merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor
fatal." [51] This Court may order the correction of a pleading, "if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be
dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice." [52] The jurat that
preceded the verification simply evidences the fact that the Affidavit was
properly made and sworn to before the officer certifying it. [53] Furthermore,
a certification against forum shopping is not needed in this case; Rule 140
makes no such requirement. chan robles virtual law library
We find that the charges against respondent sheriff have bases. Verily, he
blatantly violated Section 7(b) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court when he
deposited the machine in the warehouse of the plaintiff. In enforcing a writ
of attachment, a sheriff who takes personal property capable of manual
delivery shall safely keep it in custody after issuing the corresponding receipt
therefor. [54] Respondent sheriff failed to do so.cralaw

To constitute a valid levy of attachment, the officer levying it must have

"actual possession of the property attached."[55] "He must put himself in [a]
position to, and must assert and, in fact, enforce a dominion over the
property adverse to and exclusive of the attachment debtor." [56] To this
rule we add that the officer cannot even deliver the property to the
attachment creditor, as the parties must await the judgment in the action.
The levied property must be in the "substantial presence and
possession" [57] of the levying officer, who "cannot act as special deputy
sheriff of any party litigant." [58] The officer may put someone "in
possession of the property for the purpose of guarding it," but the former
cannot be "relieve[d] x x x from liability to the parties interested in said
attachment." [59]
Sheriffs are officers of the court [6] who serve and execute writs addressed
to them by the court, and who prepare and submit returns of their
proceedings. [61] They also keep custody of attached properties. [62] As
officers of the court, they must discharge their duties with "great care and
diligence." [63] They have to "perform faithfully and accurately what is
incumbent upon [them]" [64] and show at all times a "high degree of
professionalism in the performance of [their] duties." [65]
The duty of sheriffs to execute a writ issued by a court is purely
ministerial, [66] not discretionary. [67] Clearly, they must keep the levied
property safely in their custody, not in that of any of the parties. They
exercise no discretion in this regard, for attachment is harsh, extraordinary
and summary in nature -- a "rigorous remedy which exposes the debtor to
humiliation and annoyance." [68] Contrary to the claim of respondent sheriff,
his unusual zeal and precipitate decision to give possession of the machine
to the plaintiff effectively destroys, the presumption of regularity in his
performance of official duties. [69] "Any method of execution falling short of
the requirement of the law deserves reproach and should not be
countenanced." [70] chan robles virtual law library
In implementing the Writ, respondent sheriff cannot afford to err without
adversely affecting the proper dispensation of justice. [71]
"Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice. As agents of
the law, high standards are expected of them. x x x His conduct, at all
times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but must,
and above all else, be above suspicion." [72]
As a public officer who is a repository of public trust, respondent sheriff has
the obligation to perform the duties of his office "honestly, faithfully and to
the best of his ability." [73] He must be "circumspect and proper in his
behavior."[74] Reasonable skill and diligence he must use in the performance
of official duties, especially when the rights of individuals may be
jeopardized by neglect. [75]
Sheriffs must always "hold inviolate and invigorate the tenet that a public
office is a public trust." [76] As court personnel, their conduct must be
beyond reproach and free from any suspicion that may taint the
judiciary. [77] In view of their exalted position as keepers of public faith,
court personnel are indeed saddled with a heavy burden of
responsibility [78] to the public. Hence, they must thoroughly avoid any
impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of
official duties. [79] We have held thus: chan robles virtual law library
"x x x [T]his Court condemns and would never countenance such conduct,
act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of
justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or
even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary." [80]
Once again we emphasize that "[a]t the grassroots of our judicial machinery,
sheriffs x x x are indispensably in close contact with the litigants, hence,
their conduct should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and
integrity of the court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who
work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its
personnel; [81] hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and
everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of
justice." [82] Dismissed for lack of basis, however, is the charge of excessive
enforcement of a writ filed against respondent sheriff.cra law
Applying Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, respondent judge is
found wanting in the exercise of good discretion only. His errors of judgment
fall short of gross ignorance of the law or procedure, yet reflect poorly on his
esteemed position as a public officer in a court of justice. Judges must be
conscientious, studious and thorough, [83]observing utmost diligence in the
performance of their judicial functions. [84] They have to "exhibit more than
just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules." [85] Moreover,
they must require court personnel to observe at all times high standards of
public service and fidelity. [86]
Applying the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, [87] we find respondent sheriff guilty of simple neglect of duty for
violating Section 7(b) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Simple neglect of
duty is the "failure x x x to give proper attention to a task expected" [88] of
an employee, thus signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference." [89] Classified as a less grave offense, it is
punishable by a suspension of one month and one day to six months.
Considering that the failure of respondent sheriff to fulfill his duty seems to
be his first infraction during his stint in the judiciary, the Court considers the
recommended sanction appropriate. chan robles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates its REMINDER [90] to Judge Ralph S. Lee
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 38) to evince due care
in the exercise of his adjudicative functions. On the other hand, Sheriff
Justiniano C. de la Cruz Jr. of the same branch is found GUILTY of simple
neglect of duty and is hereby SUSPENDED for one month and one day
without pay, with a warning that a repetition of the same or of a similar act
in the future shall be dealt with more severely. cralaw

SO ORDERED. cralaw

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and

Azcuna, JJ., concur.

____________________________
Endnotes:

[1] Rollo, pp. 1-7.

[2] OCA Report, pp. 1-4; rollo, pp. 101-104.
[3] Rollo, pp. 49-57. chan robles virtual law library

[4] Dated January 9, 2003; rollo, pp. 96-98.

[5] See OR No. 16169183 dated June 20, 2002; id., p. 20.
[6] See Order dated November 4, 2002; id., p. 91.
[7] See OR No. 17204808 dated December 19, 2002; id., p. 94.
[8] Rollo, pp. 96-98. chan robles virtual law library
[9] The OCA erroneously refers to these as the Rules of Criminal Procedure. See OCA
Report, p. 4; id., p. 104.
[10] Id., pp. 5 & 105. chan robles virtual law library

[11] Id., pp. 5-6 & 105-106.

[12] Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corp. v. Hon. Macaraig Jr., 359 Phil. 831, 855-856,
December 2, 1998.
[13] Also called preliminary attachment, its purpose is to seize the debtor’s property in
advance of the final judgment and hold it to satisfy the said judgment. (Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, Vol. I [5th rev. ed.], p. 399.) Attachment secures a contingent lien on
the property, until the creditor obtains a judgment and applies the property to its
satisfaction. (Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. IV-A [1971], p.
5.) chan robles virtual law library
[14] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. III (1997), pp. 2-3.
[15] Ibid. chan robles virtual law library
[16] §5 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. See Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated,
Vol. 2 (2001 ed.), p. 285.
[17] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, supra, p. 46; citing Philippine British
Assurance Co., Inc. v. IAC, 150 SCRA 520, 527, May 29, 1987.
[18] §12 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated,
supra, p. 302.
[19] §18 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. On the presupposition that a judgment has been
rendered, the applicant who fails to recover by execution can proceed against the deposit.
(Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra, p. 414.) This option presupposes a judgment
rendered.
[20] See Order dated July 17, 2002; rollo, p. 33. chan robles virtual law library
[21] §12 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. See Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court;
supra, p. 47.
The deposit of cash or the filing of a counter-bond does not put the property attached out of
the reach of the attaching party. The cash deposit or counter-bond stands in its place.
Hence, its release does not in any way prejudice his rights. (Dizon v. Valdes, 131 Phil. 728,
731-732, April 25, 1968.)
[22] See Order dated November 4, 2002; rollo, p. 91.
[23] Spouses Morta v. Judge Bagagñan, AM No. MTJ-03-1513, November 12, 2003, p. 8.
[24] Rollo, pp. 34-41. chan robles virtual law library

[25] See Order dated September 5, 2002; rollo, p. 90.

[26] See Notice of Hearing/Request for Submission; id., p. 41.
[27] Rollo, p. 91. chan robles virtual law library

[28] Id., p. 53.

[29] Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[30] Canon 2 of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[31] Canon 3 of Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[32] Anzures v. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., 92 Phil. 742, 743, February 28, 1953.
[33] Daracan v. Natividad, 341 SCRA 161, 175, September 27, 2000, per Ynares-Santiago,
J.; citing Santos v. Judge Orlino, 357 Phil. 102, 109, September 25, 1998; and Rodrigo v.
Quijano, 79 SCRA 10, 12, September 9, 1977. chan robles virtual law library

[34] Santos v. Judge Orlino, supra.

[35] Pilipinas-Bank v. Justice Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834, 846, October 18, 1990, per
Gutierrez Jr., J.; citing Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Capistrano, 159 SCRA
47, 56, March 18, 1998, per curiam. chan robles virtual law library
[36] Guerrero v. Villamor, 357 Phil. 90, 99, September 25, 1998.
[37] Id., p. 100.
[38] See Order dated July 17, 2002; rollo, p. 33.
[39] Rollo, pp. 31-32. This Motion was filed on July 9, 2002.
[40] Paragraph 1 of §4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
[41] §5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. chan robles virtual law library
[42] Unless the court, for good cause, sets the hearing on shorter notice. (Paragraph 2 of
§4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.)
[43] §6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
[44] Rollo, p. 51. chan robles virtual law library
[45] The Motion was filed on October 23, 2002; the hearing was scheduled the following
day. See rollo, p. 51.
[46] §36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
[47] This complaint should be supported by public records of indubitable integrity. (§1 of
AM No. 01-8-10-SC, September 11, 2001.) See also Cruz v. Judge Yaneza 363 Phil. 629,
649, March 9, 1999 and Macalintal v. Judge Teh, 345 Phil. 871, 875-876, October 16,
1997.
[48] Complaint, p. 7; rollo, p. 7.
[49] Paragraph 2 of §4 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
[50] Harp v. State, 26 SW 714, 715, May 5, 1894. See Guevara, Legal Forms Annotated
(15th rev. ed., 1991), p. 46.
[51] Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan, 358 SCRA 240, 247, May 25, 2001, per Davide Jr., CJ.
[52] Ibid. The Rules shall be liberally construed to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. (§6 of Rule 1 of the Rules of Court.)
[53] Young v. Wooden, 265 SW 24, 24-25, October 3, 1924. See also Tañada, Modern
Philippine Legal Forms, Vol. I (6th ed., 1996), p. 31; and Peña, Legal Forms for
Conveyancing and Other Deeds (4th ed., 1994), p. 39. chan robles virtual law library
[54] §7(b) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
[55] Walker v. McMicking, 14 Phil. 668, 673, December 23, 1909, per Johnson, J.
[56] Ibid. chan robles virtual law library

[57] Ibid.
[58] Bilag-Rivera v. Flora, 315 Phil. 668, 680, July 6, 1995, per Padilla, J.
[59] Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, supra, p. 288; citing Walker v. McMicking,
supra.
[60] §D of Chapter VII, The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, Vol. I.
[61] §D of Chapter VI, id. chan robles virtual law library

[62] §F of Chapter VI, id.

[63] Vda. de Velayo v. Ramos, 374 SCRA 1, 6, January 17, 2002, per Ynares-Santiago, J.
[64] Spouses Biglete v. Maputi Jr., 377 SCRA 1, 5, February 15, 2002, per Sandoval-
Gutierrez, J.; citing Remollo v. Atty. Garcia, 357 Phil. 79, 86, September 25, 1998.
[65] Spouses Morta v. Judge Bagagñan, AM No. MTJ-03-1513, November 12, 2003, p. 12,
per Panganiban, J.
[66] "When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his ministerial duty to proceed
with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it in accordance with its mandate."
(Francisco v. Cruz, 340 SCRA 76, 85, September 8, 2000, per Davide Jr., CJ.)
[67] Remollo v. Atty. Garcia, supra. See Portes v. Deputy Prov. Sheriff Tepace, 334 Phil.
839, January 30, 1997.
[68] Lirio v. Ramos, 331 Phil. 378, 389, October 11, 1996, per Davide Jr., J. (now CJ). See
Gruenberg v. CA, 138 SCRA 471, 477-478, September 10, 1985, per Gutierrez Jr.; citing
Salas v. Adil, 90 SCRA 121, 125, May 14, 1979, per Antonio, J. chan robles virtual law library
[69] Cunanan v. Flores, 377 Phil. 5, 11, November 24, 1999. See Bilag-Rivera v. Flora,
supra.
[70] Spouses Biglete v. Maputi Jr., supra. chan robles virtual law library
[71] Magat v. Judge Pimentel, 346 SCRA 153, 159, November 28, 2000. See Ignacio v.
Payumo, 344 SCRA 169, 172, October 24, 2000.
[72] Llamado v. Ravelo, 345 Phil. 842, 853, October 16, 1997, per Hermosisima Jr., J.
[73] Vda. de Velayo v. Ramos, supra; citing Spouses Pecson v. Sicat Jr., 358 Phil. 606,
616, October 19, 1998, per Romero, J.
[74] Tiongco v. Molina, 416 Phil. 676, 683, September 4, 2001, per Quisumbing, J.; citing
Evangelista v. Penserga, 312 Phil. 806, 815, March 27, 1995, per Bidin, J.
[75] Ibid. chan robles virtual law library

[76] Ventura v. Concepcion, 346 SCRA 14, 18, November 27, 2000, per curiam.
[77] Abanil v. Ramos Jr., 346 SCRA 20, 24, November 27, 2000.
[78] Llamado v. Ravelo, supra. chan robles virtual law library

[79] Vda. de Velayo v. Ramos, supra.

[80] Loyao Jr. v. Armecin, 337 SCRA 47, 52, August 1, 2000, per Ynares-Santiago, J.;
citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Sheriff IV Cabe, 389 Phil. 685, 698-699, June 26,
2000, per De Leon Jr., J.; Mendoza v. Judge Mabutas, 223 SCRA 411, 419, June 17, 1993,
per curiam; and Sy v. Academia, 198 SCRA 705, 717, July 3, 1991, per curiam.
[81] Remollo v. Atty. Garcia, supra. chan robles virtual law library
[82] Canlas v. Balasbas, 337 SCRA 41, 46, August 1, 2000, per Panganiban, J.; citing Vda
de. Abellera v. Dalisay, 335 Phil. 527, 530-531, February 12, 1997, per Melo, J.
[83] Judge Paz v. Judge Tiong, 323 Phil. 430, 437, February 9, 1996.
[84] Saylo v. Judge Rojo, 386 Phil. 446, 452, April 12, 2000. chan robles virtual law library

[85] Cortes v. Judge Agcaoili, 355 Phil. 848, 883, August 20, 1998, per Panganiban, J.
[86] Canon 3 of Rule 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. chan robles virtual law library
[87] §52.B.1. of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
CSC Resolution No. 991936, August 31, 1999, amending §23 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and Regulations implementing Book V of EO 292 and other pertinent civil
service laws, CSC Resolution No. 91-1631, December 27, 1991.
[88] Atty. Dajao v. Lluch, 380 SCRA 104, 108, April 3, 2002, per Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J. chan robles virtual law library
[89] Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa, 415 Phil. 713, 721, August 21, 2001, per
Puno, J.
[90] See the Court’s July 7, 2003 Resolution upholding the May 19, 2003 OCA Report
reminding respondent judge to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties and to
keep himself abreast with the law and jurisprudence. The herein reiteration is included in
this Decision to close the matter in this Court’s records.