MAGIC AREAS in POLITICAL LAW

2017 Bar Examination

Dean ED VINCENT S. ALBANO
Bar Review Director

Ways of amending the Constitution.

There are several ways of proposing amendments to the Constitution. One is by way of a constitutional
convention and the other is proposal of ¾ of Congress as a constituent body.
There is a third way of proposing amendments to the Constitution; however, the people through initiative
upon petition of at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per cent of the registered voters in it, may directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. This right is not operative without an implementing law. (Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution).

IMMUNITY OF STATE FROM SUIT

Reason behind the principle of State immunity.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodies in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates this Constitution. It is as well a universally
recognized principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another state.
The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy –
that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to
law suits at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means
required for the proper administration of the government. (Professional Video Inc. v. TESDA, G.R. No. 155504, June
26, 2009).

Immunity of State from suit, not instrument to perpetuate injustice.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation
arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first
resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. Thus, in De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the trial court’s dismissal
based on the doctrine of non-suability of the State of two cases (one of which was for damages) filed by owners of
property where a road had been constructed by the provincial engineer of Rizal and a private contractor without the
owners’ knowledge and consent was reversed and the cases remanded for trial on the merits. The Supreme Court
ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In
exercising the right of eminent domain, the Court explained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished from
its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area, where private property had been taken in expropriation
without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an
action for payment by the owners (Air Transportation Office v. Sps. Ramos, G.R. No. 159402 February 23, 2011,
Bersamin, J).

Immunity of State from suit; a generally accepted principle of international law.

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice
Holmes that “there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.”[
Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the
case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in
the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, “unduly vex the peace of
nations.” [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable
to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act
to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the
suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff,
16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed
without its consent.

ARTICLE II – Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Constitution mandates self-reliant economy, but does not impose policy of monopoly.
The 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does
not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange
on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as in all
economies in the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign
investments and services.
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain
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areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact
laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In
this case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of
reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy. (Rep. Espina, et al. v. Hon.
Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010).

Right to balanced and healthful ecology.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed,
like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an
issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical
legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them
cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear
as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

Right to information.
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information about themselves.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in
question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most instructive:
A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy
rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook
friends, STC did not violate the minors’ right to privacy, as it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the
pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means
of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said
posts. (RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES, et al. v. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, et al., G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014,
Velasco, Jr., J.).

Disclosure of SALN.
Right to information goes hand in hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty
in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in government decision-making as well
as in checking abuse in government. The importance of the said right was pragmatically explicated that the
incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation’s problems nor a
meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is
needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. However, restrictions on access to
certain records may be imposed by law (Valmonte v. Berlmonte, Jr.).

Duty of people in government to disclose SALN.

While “public concern” like “public interest” eludes exact definition and has been said to embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because such matters naturally arouse the interest
of an ordinary citizen, the Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article IX, has classified the information disclosed in
the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a “duty to disclose” sprang from the “right to
know.” Both of constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence, there is a duty
on the part of members of the government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner provided by law.
Valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some individuals in their
requests for access to such personal information and their publication. However, custodians of public documents
must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking to access to the records.
The moral or material injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestor’s responsibility and lookout.
While public manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested parties, such discretion
does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After all,
public office is a public trust. (Re: Request for copy of 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) and
Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the
Judiciary (A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012, En Banc [Mendoza]).

ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS

Investigator cannot be the prosecutor at the same time.

The PCGG cannot gather evidence against a respondent, file a criminal complaint, and then conduct a
preliminary investigation of the case without contravening the basic tenets of due process. The due process violation
was compounded by the fact that the PCGG had filed a civil complaint against the same respondent alleging
substantially the same illegal or criminal acts.
In our criminal justice system, the law enforcer who conducted the criminal
investigation, gathered the evidence and thereafter file the complaint for the purpose of
preliminary investigation cannot be allowed to conduct the preliminary investigation of his
own complaint. It is to say the least arbitrary and unjust. It is in such instances that We say one
cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the

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 complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the
preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor (People v.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., G.R. Nos. 160864 & 160897, November 16, 2016, Sereno, J).

Ex-parte application and inquiry of AMLC of bank deposit not violative of substantive due process.
The contention that there is violation of the right to due process is not correct. Section 11 of the AMLA
providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does not
violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage. It is the
preliminary and actual seizure of the bank deposits or investments in question which brings these within reach of
the judicial process, specifically a determination that the seizure violated due process (Republic of the Phils. v.
Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc., et al., 566 Phil. 94, 106-107 [2008]). In fact, in Eugenio it was said that:
“A bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical seizure of
property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the
particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The
monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not
seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder's
record of deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to be
inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder.
Said records are in the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of
the account holder alone as that would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the
bank.”

At the stage in which the petition was filed, the inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments by the
AMLC still does not contemplate any form of physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property (Subido, Pagente,
Certeza, Mendoza & Binay Law Offices v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 216914, December 6, 2016, Perez, J).

Concept of probable cause under the AMLA.

The probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order differs from the probable cause required for
the institution of a criminal action.
The probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order refers to "such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity and/or money
laundering offence is about to be, is being or has been committed and that the account or any monetary instrument
or property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to
said unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense."
In resolving the issue of whether probable cause exits, the CA's statutorily-guided determination's focus is
not on the probable commissions of an unlawful activity (or money laundering) that the office of the Ombudsman
has already determined to exist, but on whether the bank accounts, assets, or other monetary instruments sought to
be frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal activities enumerated under R.A. 9160, as amended. Otherwise
stated, probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the relation between an unlawful activity and the property or
monetary instrument which is the focal point of Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended. xxx (Lt. Gen. Ligot, et al., v.
Republic, 705 Phil. 477, 501-502 [2013]; Subido, etc. v. CA, G.R. No. 216914, December 6, 2016, Perez, J.).

Due process and police power.

An Ordinance enacted by the City of Davao prohibiting aerial spraying in all agricultural entities in that City
and requiring affected parties to shift to other modes of pesticide application within a three-month period under
pain of penalty was declared unconstitutional as it violates due process for being oppressive. The reason is because
of the impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application within three months considering
the vast area of the affected plantations and the corresponding resources required therefor.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the plantations. As
such, the completion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the
respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month
period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be
oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc (Bersamin)).”

Ordinance No. 1664 authorizes the immobilization of illegally parked motor vehicles by clamping the tires;
valid.
As to substantive due process, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality
by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of
fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy. Considering that traffic congestions were already
retarding the growth and progress in the population and economic centers of the country, the plain objective of
Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption
was, therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government purpose. With regard to procedural process the
clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles was within the exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. The
immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors were not
around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous. (Valentino
L. Legaspi V. City Of Cebu, Et Al./Bienvenido P. Jaban, Sr., Et Al. V. Court Of Appeals, Et Al., G.R. No. 159110/G.R. No.
159692. December 10, 2013).

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Reason for the rule that a temporary protection order under RA 9262 can be issued ex parte.
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children,
their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended
parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to
regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded
all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim; to accord the victim and any designated
family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that
jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor
children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their
financial support. (Tua v. Hon. Mangrobang, et al., G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014, Peralta, J).

Ex-parte issuance of TPO not violative of due process.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like
a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing
will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim
of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if
notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests,
among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
(Tua v. Hon. Mangrobang, et al., G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014, Peralta, J).

Equal protection clause does not require universal application of laws.

The fact that a Municipal Judge applying for promotion to the RTC was not considered because he has not
yet complied with the 5-year requirement of incumbency in the first level court cannot rightfully contend that there
is violation of the equal protection and due process clause.
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to screen applicants who cannot be
all accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best qualified among the
applicants, and not to discriminate against any particular individual or class.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands
as long as it bears a rationale relationship to some legitimate government end. (Villanueva v. JBC, G.R. No. 211833,
April 7, 2015).

The Three (3) Levels of Scrutiny to Determine the Propriety of the Classification under the Equal Protection
Clause
The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given by the Government for its conduct
is gauged by using the means-end test. This test requires analysis of: (1) the interests of the public that generally
requires its exercise, as distinguished from those of a particular class; and (2) the means employed that are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive upon individuals. To
determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three levels of scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.
The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis test) demands that the
classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies in cases involving
economics or social welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class.
When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be treated under intermediate or
heightened review. Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny. To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be substantially related
to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad
generalizations.
The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The Government carries the
burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association,
Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin])

Application of Rational basis test; violative of equal protection clause.

Applying the rational basis test, the ordinance of Davao City prohibiting aerial spraying in all agricultural
entities therein as the practice produces pesticide drift causing inconvenience and harm to the residents and
degrades the environment, violates the equal protection clause, hence, should be declared unconstitutional.
REASON: The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of
any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift
that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to
the environment. A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to
achieve. In the process, the ordinance suffers from being “underinclusive” because the classification does
not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. A classification
that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the
legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., (G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin]).

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Effect of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness.
Aside from its being underinclusive, the ordinance also tends to be “overinclusive” because its impending
implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose. Its
implementation will unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider range of individuals than those included in the
intended class based on the purpose of the law.
The imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the substance to be
aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. The respondents admit that they
aerially treat their plantations not only with pesticides but also vitamins and other substances. The imposition of
the ban against aerial spraying of substances other than fungicides and regardless of the agricultural activity being
performed becomes unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no relation to the purported inconvenience,
discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the ordinance seeks to address. The burden now will
become more onerous to various entities, including the respondents and even others with no connection whatsoever
to the intended purpose of the ordinance.”
Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that are the only ideal venues for the
investment of machineries and equipment capable of aerial spraying. It effectively denies the affected individuals
the technology aimed at efficient and cost-effective operations and cultivation not only of banana but of other crops
as well. The prohibition against aerial spraying will seriously hamper the operations of the banana plantations that
depend on aerial technology to arrest the spread of the Black Sigatoka disease and other menaces that threaten their
production and harvest. X x x the effect of the ban will not be limited to Davao City in view of the significant
contribution of banana export trading to the country’s economy.
The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and unreasonable in light of the
existence and availability of more permissible and practical alternatives that will not overburden the respondents
and those dependent on their operations as well as those who stand to be affected by the ordinance (Mosqueda, et al.
v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., (G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc
[Bersamin]).

Mandatory drug testing of students constitutional.

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c) and (d), for secondary and tertiary level students and public and
private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicion less arrangement. The primary legislative intent is
not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not
necessarily treated as criminals, hence, constitutional.
Schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and
may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and schools have the right to
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school
rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements. (SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY(SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD(DDB) and PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY(PDEA), G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.).

Mandatory drug testing of persons charged with crimes is unconstitutional.

There is no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicion less." In the case of persons charged with a
crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicion less. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicion less are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They
are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are
charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of
being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do
not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on
the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art.
III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. (SOCIAL
JUSTICE SOCIETY(SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD(DDB) and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY(PDEA),
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.). In fact, drug testing becomes a fishing expedition prior to the
prosecution of a person that would make it unconstitutional.

Requisites of valid classification.

Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the LGC-amending RA
9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP100 million income
criterion. .
The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual differences
between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify, necessarily
implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.
Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. All these
requisites have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause.
The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills long
before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for cityhood.
To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be
indeed unfair. (LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. Nos.

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176951, 177499, 178056 December 21, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.)

Routine baggage inspection at the port by port authorities valid even without warrant.
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are not
unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so
as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.
Searches pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray
scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.
The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into airports
or ports of travel.
Search conducted by the port authorities are reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions,
accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course of
such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against the accused (Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016).

Nature of stop & frisk search.

“Stop and frisk” searches are necessary for law enforcement.  That is, law enforcers should be given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of
“suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds him or herself in.  This may be undoubtedly
based on the experience of the police officer. The case of the accused was different. He was simply a passenger
carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal about riding a
jeepney and carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney
driver. It was the driver who signaled to the police that the accused was “suspicious”. It is the police officer who
should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not
adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as “a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.” (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No.
200334, July 30, 2014).

Plain View Doctrine.

The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and premises under his immediate
control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence." "The doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
with a search directed against the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure." The Plain View Doctrine thus
finds no applicability in a situation where the police officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police
officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in his possession; they deliberately opened it, as
part of the search incident to his lawful arrest. (People v. Calantiao, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014)

Overbreadth doctrine.
Sec. 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law penalizes the intentional or reckless alteration, damaging,
deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right,
including the introduction or transmission of viruses does not suffer from overbreadth.
While it seeks to discourage data interference, it does not intrude into the area of protected speech and
expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of
protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what
essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this
case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to
guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents.
(Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Sec. of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335 & other cases, February 11, 2014).

Aggregate-based airtime is unreasonable and arbitrary; reasons.

The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts
and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here,
the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not
constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government.
And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. In this
particular instance, what the COMELEC has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped its wings.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast
time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of
languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really

6
reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message
through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To
add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself –
a form of suppression of his political speech. (GMA Network Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205357. September 2, 2014).

Monitoring requirement is valid; reasonable.

The Reporting Requirement for the Comelec’s monitoring is reasonable. It is a basic postulate of due
process, specifically in relation to its substantive component, that any governmental rule or regulation must be
reasonable in its operations and its impositions. Any restrictions, as well as sanctions, must be reasonably related to
the purpose or objective of the government in a manner that would not work unnecessary and unjustifiable burdens
on the citizenry. (GMA Network Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205357. September 2, 2014).

Freedom of expression, etc.

The removal of the tarpaulin at a church was in violation of their fundamental right to freedom of
expression. The contention that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda which is subject to regulation, especially so
that it was oversized is not correct.
Article III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances. The right to freedom of expression was upheld in ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780 [2000], when the
SC overruled the COMELEC when it prevented ABS-CBN from conducting exit surveys. In Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil.
75 [1948], the SC likewise recognized the constitutional right to freedom of speech; to peaceful assembly and to
petition for redress of grievances, although not absolute when it issued a writ of mandamus to compel the Mayor of
Manila to issue a permit to use the street. (The Diocese of Bacolod, etc. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 191728, January
21, 2015, Leonen, J).

Removal of tarpaulin, content-based restriction.

Assuming arguendo that the size restriction sought to be applied . . . is a mere time, place, and manner
regulation, it’s still unconstitutional for lack of a clear and reasonable nexus with a constitutionally sanctioned
objective.”
The regulation may reasonably be considered as either content-neutral or content-based. (See: Wilson R.
Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging
Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L. J. 801 (2004).228 Chavez v. Gonzales, 569 Phil. 155, 207–208 (2008)). Regardless,
the disposition of this case will be the same. Generally, compared with other forms of speech, the proposed speech is
content-based. (The Diocese of Bacolod, etc. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 191728, January 21, 2015, Leonen, J).

‘On-its-face’ invalidation of penal statutes not allowed.

The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial
challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may
be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of
penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an
existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a
penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties
who are not before it. The allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the State’s
ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the State’s
power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him. (Romualdez vs. Comelec, supra.; Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al., G.R. No. 178552, October 10, 2010).

Clear and present danger is not the only test to restrain forms of speech.
The clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been applied by the courts. Generally,
said doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow of the government and even other evils which do not clearly
undermine national security. Since not all evils can be measured in terms of “proximity and degree” the Court,
however, in several cases – Ayer Productions vs. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 (1988) and Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 28
SCRA 835 (1969) applied the balancing of interests test. In Gonzales vs. COMELEC, it was said that “where the
legislation under constitutional attack interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly in a more generalized
way and where the effect of the speech and assembly in terms of the probability of realization of a specific danger is
not susceptible even of impressionistic calculation,” then the “balancing interests” test can be applied. (Soriano v.
Laguardia, et al., supra.).

Freedom of Religion; effect of insulting words.

There is nothing in petitioner's statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious
belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a
televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain
and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners
attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any
religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting
amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious
speech. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language
discourse. Hence, his speech cannot be protected by the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. (ELISEO F.

7
SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, et al., G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010, Velasco).

When custodial investigation commences.

Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in
the commission of the crime under investigation. (People v. Pavillare, 386 Phil. 126, 136 [2000]). As a rule, a police
line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and
cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police lineup. (People v. Pepino, et al., G.R. No. 174471,
January 12, 2016).
In People v. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 332, it was held that the guarantees of Sec.
12(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is
under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is
not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
invoked at this stage.

Police power and freedom of speech; press guarantee of equal opportunity to public service.
The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must
be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power
and effects the constitutional policy of "guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service." Section
5.2(a)'s requirement of disclosing subscribers neither curtails petitioners' free speech rights nor violates the
constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts. (SWS, Inc., et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 208062, April
7, 2015, 755 SCRA 124, Leonen, J). This is so because if there is a clash between police power and non-impairment of
contract, the former shall prevail, it being the most irresistible power of government. (Kabiling v. NHA).

Threat to arrest and cancel licenses, content-based restriction.

The press statements of Sec. Gonzales threatening those who would play the Garci tapes and the NTC
threatening cancellation of the franchises of media establishments who would play the Garci tapes from a content-
based prior restraint that transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the press statements made by
respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press
statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent
Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of
media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered
by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or
official circular. Otherwise, the non-formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition of prior restraint. The press statements constitute impermissible forms of prior
restraints on the right to free speech and press, hence, they were struck down.
There was enough chilling effect of the complained acts. The warnings came from the NTC, a regulatory
agency that can cancel the certificate of authority of radio and broadcast media. They also came from the Sec. of
Justice, an alter ego of the President who weilds the power to prosecute those violating the laws (Chavez v. Raul
Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, CJ Puno).

Dichotomy of treatment between broadcast media and print media.

The broadcast media is subject to a regulatory regime absent in print media. The stricter system of controls
seems to have been adopted in answer to the view that owing to their particular impact on audiences, films, videos,
and broadcasting require a system of prior restraint, whereas it is not accepted that books and other printed media
do not. These media are viewed as beneficial to the public in a number of respects, but are also seen as possible
sources of harm (Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, 297 93rd ed. 2002).
In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) v. Daus, G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 628, it was said that
all forms of media whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and
expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger
rule.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause.
Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom
accorded to newspaper and print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted
with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other
forms of communications, receives the most limited protection from the free expression clause. First, broadcast
media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens, Material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material
available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is
constantly tuning in and out (Chavez v. Raul Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, CJ Puno).

Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.

The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos.
Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities
accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books,
newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high

8
priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal.
Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the
indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast
over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of
different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be
difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the
printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently
overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread
uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for
existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the
most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special
protection (Chavez v. Raul Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, CJ Puno).

Tests on the restraint of freedom of speech.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three
tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has
been established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated;(Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 151
[1957]; Gonzales v. Comelec, 137 Phil. 417 [1969]; People v. Perez, 4 Phil. 599 [1905]; People v. Nabong, 57 Phil. 455
[1933]; People v. Faleo, 57 Phil. 451 [1933]) (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts
need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation; (Sec. Gonzales v.
Comelec) and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained
because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent.
This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high (Cabansag v. Fernandez, supra; Chavez v. Raul Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. 168338,
February 15, 2008, CJ Puno).

Four (4) aspects of the freedom of the press.

Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four
aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment
subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of circulation (Chavez v. Raul
Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, CJ Puno).

Distinction on restraint of freedom of speech.

A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-
defined standards; (JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing, 210 Phil. 457 [1983]; Navarro v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-31687, February 18,
1970, 31 SCRA 730; Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 [1956]; Primictas v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 [1948]) or (2) a content-
based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. The cast
of the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with.
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental
interest is required for its validity (Osmena v. Comelec, 351 Phil. 692 [1998]; Adiong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 103456,
March 31, 1992). Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any particular message, they are not
subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach somewhere between the mere
rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-based
restrictions. The test is called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but
also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant governmental interest
that is unrelated to the suppression of expression. The intermediate approach has been formulated in this manner:
A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest (Osmena v. Comelec; Adiong v. Comelec; US v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367
[1968]).

On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content
is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, (INC v. CA, 328 Phil. 893
[1996]) with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down
(INC v. CA; ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Comelec, 380 Phil. 780 [2000]; SWS v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147571, May 5,
2001, 357 SCRA 496).
With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech
sought to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm
otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears, but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on
ground. As formulated, the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are

9
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree (Cabansag v. Fernandez; ABS-CBN v. Comelec).
The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or substantial government
interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression (Adiong v. Comelec; Chavez v. Raul Gonzales, et al.,
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, CJ Puno).

Freedom of speech, etc. and franchises; content-neutral restriction.

Res. No. 9615 of the COMELEC which prohibits the posting of election campaign materials during the
election period in PUVs and transport terminals is not valid as it unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the
people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and
private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their
property, and convince others to agree with them.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs and
transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and
effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the
revocation of their franchise or permit to operate. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015, 755 SCRA
411).

Content-neutral regulation.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that
merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if
it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is
within the constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth, the
incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
(United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377).
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely
control the place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to
the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
While Resolution No. 9615, including the herein assailed provisions, furthers an important and substantial
governmental interest, i.e., ensuring equal opportunity, time and space among candidates aimed at the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. It is further conceded that the governmental interest in
imposing the said prohibition is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. However, Section 7(g) items (5) and
(6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the
COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right
to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015,
755 SCRA 411).

COMELEC’s prohibition against the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile places” is unconstitutional.
The freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or
the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by
displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once
the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out
restrictions on reporting by newspaper or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as
these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the
prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person
who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015, 755
SCRA 411 citing Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712).

State may regulate the posting of commercial ads on vehicles; reasons.

A prohibition on the posting of commercial advertisements on a PUV is considered a regulation on the
ownership of the vehicle per se; the restriction on the enjoyment of the ownership of the vehicle does not have any
relation to its operation as a PUV.
On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of commercial advertisements on windows of buses, because
it hinders police authorities from seeing whether the passengers inside are safe, is a regulation on the franchise or
permit to operate. It has a direct relation to the operation of the vehicle as a PUV, i.e., the safety of the passengers. (1-
UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015, 755 SCRA 411).

Extrajudicial confession while at a detention cell; effect.

The fact that the extrajudicial confession was made while inside a detention cell does not by itself render
such confession inadmissible. In People v. Domantay, 366 Phil. 459 [1999], where the accused was also interviewed
while inside a jail cell, the Court held that such circumstance alone does not taint the extrajudicial confession of the
accused, especially since the same was given freely and spontaneously.
While there were indeed some police officers around because about two to three meters from the jail were
the police station and the radio room there is no evidence that the presence of the police officers exerted any undue
pressure or influence on accused-appellant and coerced him into giving his confession.
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted
under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant confessed to the killing out of fear (People v.
Dacanay, G.R. No. 216064, November 7, 2016; citing People v. Jerez, 349 Phil. 319, 327 [1998]).

10
Roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop cannot be considered a formal
arrest.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner Rodel Luz could not be
said to have been “under arrest.” There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his
liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which Luz was at the police
station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact xx x PO3 Altea himself testified that the only reason they
went to the police sub-station was the Luz had been flagged down “almost in front” of that place. Hence, it was only
for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take Luz into custody. (Luz v.
People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012, 2nd Div., Sereno).

Spontaneous statements to the police, not part of questioning; admissible in evidence.

The constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is no applicable if the accused went to the police
and voluntarily told the police that the victim jumped out of his jeep, as he was never held for questioning. Custodial
investigation refers to “any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” This presupposes that he is suspected
of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him. (People
v. Canton, 442 Phil. 743 (2002)). The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into
custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating
statements. The assailed statements were spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all elicited through
questioning. It was established that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police
station and voluntarily made the statement that the victim jumped out of his vehicle. Thus, the constitutional
procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable. (Jesalva v. People, G.R. No. 187725, January 19, 2011,
Nachura, J).

A letter admitting shortage of dollars in the collection in a bank is not an uncounselled confession.
The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being executed with the
assistance of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party admission under Section 26, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court that is admissible against her. Such rule provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for
the reason that it is fair to presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitter’s fault if the
admission does not. (US v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578). By virtue of its being made by the party himself, an admission is
competent primary evidence against the admitter.
The letter was not a confession due to its not expressly acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified
theft. Under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging
guilt for the offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein. (People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 159450,
March 30, 2011, Bersamin, J).

Not necessary that a person be assisted by a counsel when he writes the letter.
There was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when she wrote the letter because she
spontaneously made it while not under custodial investigation. Her insistence on the assistance of a counsel might
be valid and better appreciated had she made the letter while under arrest, or during custodial investigation, or
under coercion by the investigating authorities of the Government. The distinction of her situation from that of a
person arrested or detained and under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense derived from the
clear intent of insulating the latter from police coercion or intimidation underlying Section 12 of Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. (People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011, Bersamin, J).

Right to counsel commences.

The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion that would lead
the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused
(People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 691, 718; People v. Pepino, et al., G.R. No. 174471,
January 12, 2016).
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in
the commission of the crime under investigation (People v. Pavillare, 386 Phil. 126, 136 [2000]). As a rule, a police
line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and
cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police lineup (People v. Pepino, et al., G.R. No. 174471,
January 12, 2016; People v. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 332).

Effect if accused is invited by police to shed light on a particular case.

R.A. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to “include the practice of issuing an ‘invitation’
to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice
to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any violation of law.” This means that even those who voluntarily
surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a
custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station.
As an additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the
police station. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARK JASON CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014).

11
Effect if the holding of religious rituals within the halls of justice would be prohibited.
To disallow the holding of religious rituals within halls of justice would set a dangerous precedent and
commence a domino effect. Strict separation, rather than benevolent neutrality/accommodation, would be the norm.
Thus, the establishment of Shari'a courts, the National Commission for Muslim Filipinos, and the exception of
Muslims from the provisions of the RPC relative to the crime of bigamy would all be rendered nugatory because of
strict separation. The exception of members of Iglesia ni Cristo from joining a union or the non-compulsion
recognized in favor of members of the Jehovah's Witnesses from doing certain gestures during the flag ceremony,
will all go down the drain simply because we insist on strict separation (In Re: Letter of Tony Valenciano, Holding of
Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017, Mendoza, J).

Requisites before right to information may be compelled.

Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of mandamus. Firstly,
the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public interest. And, secondly, it must not
be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
The Philippine petrochemical industry centers on the manufacture of plastic and other related materials,
and provides essential input requirements for the agricultural and industrial sectors of the country. Thus, the
position of the petrochemical industry as an essential contributor to the overall growth of our country's economy
easily makes the information sought a matter of public concern or interest.
The constitutional guarantee of the people's right to information does not cover national security matters
and intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters. Equally excluded from
coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting and executive
sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. In Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, the Court has ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters acknowledged as
"privileged information under the separation of powers," which include "Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings." Likewise exempted from the right to
information are "information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and
information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused (Sereno,
et al. v. Committee on Trade & Related Matters (CTRM) of the NEDA, G.R. No. 175210, February 1, 2016)."

Limitation on the right to travel

The right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not absolute.
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that such
restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This,
however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over
lower courts.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by
judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To “restrict” is to restrain or prohibit a
person from doing something; to “regulate” is to govern or direct according to rule. To ensure management of court
docket and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who
wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application for leave of absence duly recommended for approval
by his Executive Judge, a certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the OCA. The said
certification shall state the condition of his docket based on his Certificate of Service for the month immediately
preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3)
months from date of submission, pursuant to Section 15[1] and [2], Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, for travelling abroad without having been officially allowed by the Court, Judge Macarine is guilty of
violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. (Office of Administrative Services – Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Ignacio B. Macarine, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, 18 July 2012, 2nd Div. [Brion]).

Vexations delay results in dismissal of a case.

The speedy disposition of cases covers not only the period within which the preliminary investigation was
conducted, but also all stages to which the accused is subjected, even including fact-finding investigations conducted
prior to the preliminary investigation proper. In Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr., G.R. No. 126814, March 2, 2000, it was said:
Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid
constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice. It
guarantees the right of all persons to “a speedy disposition of their case”; includes within its
contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords broader protection than
Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the
protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after the submission of the
case. The present constitutional provision applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases
(Commodore Lamberto Torres v. SB, et al., G.R. No. 221562-69, October 5, 2016, Velasco, J).

Purpose of rule on speedy disposition of cases.

The right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in
the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that
an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever
legitimate defense he may interpose.
The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem
the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial

12
tribunals. The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the
established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay
in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations
inutile.
All told, the criminal complaints were correctly dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay of fifteen (15)
years amounting to a transgression of the right to a speedy disposition of cases and therefore, the Sandiganbayan did
not gravely abuse its discretion (Commodore Lamberto Torres v. SB, et al., G.R. No. 221562-69, October 5, 2016,
Velasco, J).

Cost-recovery mechanics imposed by ERC does not violate the non-impairment clause; exercise of police power.
The regulation of rates imposed to public utilities such as electricity distributors is an exercise of the State’s
police power, like the order to refund over-recoveries charged to their customers.
When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected by public interest, it ceases to be juris
privati only and becomes subject to regulation. As the state agency charged with the regulation of electric
cooperatives, ERC is mandated to protect public interest by directing NEECO to refund over-charges it made to its
consumers. Moreover, the computation made by the ERC to determine the cap was a mechanism purely for cost-
recovery and should not be income-generating.
Nor can the cost-recovery mechanism imposed be deemed an impairment of the contracts entered into by
NEECO prior to the enactment of RA 7832 since all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate
measures taken by the State to promote public welfare (Nueva Ecija Electric Coop., Inc (NEECOI) v. ERC, G.R. No.
180642, February 3, 2016).

There is double jeopardy if a person is charged with the same offense.

An accused would be put in double jeopardy if he is charged with imprudence resulting in homicide after
pleading guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
The accused’s negative constitutional right not be “twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense” protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. The law penalizes the negligent or careless
act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is merely taken into consideration in the imposition of the
penalty. As the careless act is single, the offense of criminal negligence remains one and the same and cannot be split
into different crimes and prosecutions. (Jason Ivler v. Hon. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172176, November 17, 2010).

Oral order of dismissal of a criminal case; no double jeopardy; void.

An oral order of dismissal of an information issued by a Justice of the Sandiganbayan due to delay is a void
order. In Corpuz vs. SB, G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 294, it was said that the dismissal made in
open court by the Chairman, which was not reduced in writing, is not a valid dismissal or termination of the
cases. This is because the Chairman cannot unilaterally dismiss the same without the approval or consent of the
other members of the Division. The Sandiganbayan is a collegiate court and under its internal rules Section 1(b) of
the 1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan, which is now Section 1(b), Rule VIII of the 2002 Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan, an order, resolution or judgment, in order to be valid or considered as an official action
of the Court itself - must bear the unanimous approval of the members of the division, or in case of lack thereof, by
the majority vote of the members of a special division of five. (Monico Jacob, et al. vs. SB, et.al., G.R. No. 162206,
November 17, 2010).
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandates that a judgment must be written
in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly
and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based. The rule applies to a final order dismissing
a criminal case grounded on the violation of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial. A verbal judgment or order of
dismissal is a violation of the provision; hence, such order is, in contemplation of law, not in esse, therefore,
ineffective. (Monico Jacob, et.al. vs. SB, et.al., G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010).

Citizenship

Naturalization laws are strictly construed, burden lies in the petitioner to prove qualifications.
Naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of law.
Under the law, one of the qualifications for a person to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization is that he
must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have
some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation. (Sec. 2, Revised Naturalization Law (RA 473)).
The qualification of “some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation” means “not only that the
person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be
able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid
one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge.” (Chua Kian Lai v. Republic, 158 Phil. 44 (1974); In the
Matter of the Petition of Tiong v. Republic, supra; In the Matter of the Petition of Ban Uan, supra; Chiao v. Republic,
154 Phil. 8 (1974); Watt v. Republic, 150-B Phil. 610 (1972)).  His income should permit “him and the members of
his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with
the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.” (In the Matter of the Petition of Ban Uan, 154 Phil.
552 (1974); In the Matter of the Petition of Tiong v. Republic, 157 Phil. 107 (1974); Tan v. Republic, 121 Phil. 643

13
(1965); Rep. v. Kerry Lao Ong, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012).

Effect of use of American passport after renunciation of foreign citizenship.

A dual citizen who renounced his American citizenship is not qualified to run for public office if he
subsequently uses his American passport. The declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of this Act." This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2) requires
those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce any and all
foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d)
of the Local Government Code which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local
position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino
citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport – which
indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national – even after the Filipino has renounced his
foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy. (Maquiling v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 195649, July
2, 2013; Agustin v. COMELEC; Arnado v. COMELEC).

Sen. Grace Poe admittedly foundling, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings
either. During the deliberations in the 1935 Constitutional convention, there was an attempt to amend the proposed
provisions on citizenship to include foundlings in the concept of natural-born citizens but it was not carried out not
because there was any objection to the notion that persons of unknown parentage are not citizens but only because
their number was not enough to merit specific mention. In fact some delegates were able to convince their
colleagues that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings a Filipinos because they are already impliedly
so recognized. In the words of Chief Justice Fernando, “the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. In fact,
there is nothing in the 1935, 1973, 1987 Constitution for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of
Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to deny the use of the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to
show that the Constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board
marginalization. (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March
8, 2016, Perez, J).
No provisions of the Constitution that discriminate against foundlings.
There was no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All
exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article
II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate
against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status. (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et
al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016, Perez, J).

The COMELEC’s ruling in Sen. Poe’s repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result
in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship is not correct.
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregarded consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes
in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 409 Phil. 633, 649 [2001], repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as an "abbreviated repatriation process that
restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." (Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, 692 Phil. 407, 420 [2012]). Also included is
Parreno v. Commission on Audit, 551 Phil. 368, 381 [2007], which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, 531 Phil. 407, 417
[2006], where it was said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship
(under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship." (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016).

Concept of the phrase "from birth."

R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship
may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had
been once lost.
In Bengson III v. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person
who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is
"repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, it was pointed out that there are
only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no

14
third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who,
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of
their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. (G.R. No. 217126-
27, 10 November 2015; Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos.
221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016).

Circumstantial evidence allowed to prove citizenship.

Our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for Sen. Poe to establish her parentage.
In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through circumstantial evidence. In Suerte-Felipe v. People,
571 Phil. 170 [2008]:
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any interference
or presumption; while circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or facts from which, taken either
singly or collectively, the existence of a particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or
probable consequence.

Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal
proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings (374 Phil.
810 [1999]). There is no rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal
proceedings and for not considering circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative
proceedings.
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result in
deprivation of life, liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal system would
require, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too may
it suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as those
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence (Rizalito David v. SET, et al.).

DELEGATION OF POWERS

Tests to determine valid delegation of powers.

Sec. 26(a) provides that the Cybercrime Coordinating Center (CICC) shall have the powers to formulate a
national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime offenses
through a computer emergency response team (CERT). Such delegation of powers is valid.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two
tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have
to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. (Gerochi v. Department of
Energy, 554 Phil. 563 [2007]).
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a
national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the
CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity. (Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Sec. of Justice, et al., G.R. No.
203335 & other cases, February 11, 2014).

Reason for delegation of powers.

It is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to the enforcement and administration of
a law may be delegated to various specialized administrative agencies like the Secretary of Finance in this case.
The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of modern life and many technical fields of
governmental functions as in matters pertaining to tax exemptions. This is coupled by the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its
activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon
present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

Limitations on power to fill in details.

Thus, rules and regulations implementing the law are designed to fill in the details or to make explicit what
is general, which otherwise cannot all be incorporated in the provision of the law. Such rules and regulations, when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, "deserve
to be given weight and respect by the courts in view of the rule-making authority given to those who formulate them
and their specific expertise in their respective fields." To be valid, a revenue regulation must be within the scope of

15
statutory authority or standard granted by the legislature. Specifically, the regulation must (1) be germane to the
object and purpose of the law; (2) not contradict, but conform to, the standards the law prescribes; and (3) be issued
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect the general provisions of our tax laws. (LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE
FACTORY v. CA, G.R. No. 125346, November 11, 2014).

SEPARATION OF POWERS

Separation of powers; political question.

Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution the Supreme Court may inquire whether or not the
decision to expel a Senator is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In
Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924), the Supreme Court held that it could not compel the Senate to reinstate a
Senator who assaulted another Senator and was suspended for disorderly behavior, because it could not compel a
separate and co-equal department to take any particular action. In Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960), it was
held that the Supreme Court could not interfere with the suspension of a Congressman for disorderly behavior,
because the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior. The assault of a fellow
Senator constitutes disorderly behavior.

President’s power to enter into executive agreements; political question.

Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, as expressed in Art II of the 1987 Constitution, the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. An exchange of notes falls into
the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an internationally accepted form of international
agreement. Hence, the Non-Surrender Bilateral Agreement in the exchange note is a recognized mode of concluding
a legally binding international written contract among nations.
An act of the executive branch with a foreign government must be afforded great respect. This authority of
the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of legislators is provided by the inviolable
doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government. Thus,
absent any clear contravention of the law, the courts should exercise utmost caution in declaring any executive
agreement invalid. (BAYAN MUNA, et al. v. ALBERTO ROMULO, et al., G.R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011, J. Velasco,
Jr.).

The “Pork Barrel” System Declared Unconstitutional: Reasons; violation of separation of powers.
The Court declared the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules
within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-
oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it
has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of
presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the
effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of
governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely
local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy;
and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-
related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification
of “priority infrastructure development projects,” it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
(Belgica, et al. v. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, et al., G.R. No. 208566, 710 SCRA 1, 50-51, November 19, 2013, En
Banc [Perlas-Bernabe].

ARTICLE VI – Legislative Department

HRET as sole judge.

Article VI, Section 17 provides that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The authority
conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity
of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals, (Co v. HRET, G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692), which is
conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate
who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of
Representatives. (Co v. HRET).
A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of
the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate. (Rep. Danilo
Ramon Fernandez v. HRET, et al., G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009).

Effect if a winning Congressional candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office.
The COMELEC would lose jurisdiction, instead, the HRET would now have jurisdiction, once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives.
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s  own jurisdiction begins. (Guerrero v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 458 (2000); Perez v. Commission on Elections,

16
375 Phil. 1106 (1999)).
Under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. As the Court explained in
Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391 [1988], the use of the word “sole” emphasizes the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred x x x. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as “intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature” x x x. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm “as full, clear and
complete”

Mandatory drug testing as additional qualification of an elected public officer before assumption of office.
It is unconstitutional for the COMELEC to impose mandatory drug testing before an elected official may
assume office because it is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution.
The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should
not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution.
(SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY(SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD(DDB), et al., G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008,
VELASCO, JR., J.).

Party List.
In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that has met the 2% threshold,
"proportional representation" is the touchstone to ascertain entitlement to extra seats.
The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to additional seats of the first party and other qualified
party-list groups was clearly explicated in Veterans: The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least
2% of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number
of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter’s number of seats and so on.
The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to,
based on proportional representation. In simplified form, it is written as follows:
“Additional seats for concerned party = (No. of votes of concerned party/No. of votes of the first party) x No.
of additional seats allocated to first party.” The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of
the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole
number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not
rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats
in excess of that provided by the law.
Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner’s case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an
additional seat. Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one, then it did not obtain
or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from our ruling in Veterans that in order to be
entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an additional
seat. (CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC) v. COMELEC represented by CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN
ABALOS, SR., G.R. No. 172103, 13 April 2007, J. Velasco, Jr.).

Defining factor of the PDAF or Pork Barrel of members of Congress.

The defining factor of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is the authority of legislators to participate in
the post-enactment phases of project implementation. At its core, legislators, may it be through project lists, prior
consultations or program menus, have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects
they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. They are also granted the statutory
authority to participate in the area of fund release as well as fund realignment.
Legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into
the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the executive department be deprived of
what the Constitution has vested as its own. (Belgica, et al. v. Hon. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R.
No. 208566 & companion cases, November 19, 2013).

Post-enactment measures like project identification, etc. not part of the oversight power of Congress.
These post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators
have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – “the various operational
aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the
―regulation and release of funds” in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as
categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court abandoned
its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same faltered altogether. (Belgica, et al. v. Hon. Exec. Sec.
Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013).

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Power of Augmentation of Public Funds; Purposes of RA 8439.
R. A. No. 8439 was enacted as a manifestation of the State’s recognition of science and technology as an
essential component for the attainment of national development and progress. The law offers a program of human
resources development in science and technology to help realize and maintain a sufficient pool of talent and
manpower that will sustain the initiative for total science and technology mastery. In furtherance of this objective,
the law not only ensures scholarship programs and improved science and engineering education, but also affords
incentives for those pursuing careers in science and technology. Moreover, the salary scale of science and technology
personnel is differentiated by R. A. No. 8439 from the salary scales of government employees under the existing law.
Section 7 of R. A. No. 8439 confers the Magna Carta benefits consisting of additional allowances and benefits
to DOST officers and employees, such as honorarium, share in royalties, hazard, subsistence, laundry, and housing
and quarter allowances, longevity pay, and medical examination. But the Magna Carta benefits will remain merely
paper benefits without the corresponding allocation of funds in the GAA. (Nazareth v. The Hon. Reynaldo A. Villar, et
al., G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013).

Limitations to the authority to transfer funds.

The authority granted to the President is subject to two essential requisites in order that a transfer of
appropriation from the agency’s savings would be validly effected. The first requires that there must be savings from
the authorized appropriation of the agency. The second demands that there must be an existing item, project,
activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which the savings would be transferred for
augmentation purposes only. (Nazareth v. Villar, et al., supra.).

ARTICLE VII – Executive Department

Concept or nature of the faithful execution clause.

The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate
grant of power. It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not
above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them. This is precisely why the law provides that "administrative
or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution." (NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, et al. v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al.,
G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013).

Effect/s if the heads of offices are allowed to transfer funds within their respective offices..
By allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds within their respective offices, the
Constitution itself ensures the fiscal autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains the separation of
powers among the three main branches of the Government. In Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992,
208 SCRA 133, 150, it was said that the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have
the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions
and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for
their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric
of our constitutional system is based.
In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds from one item to another within the Executive has
not been the mere offshoot of established usage, but has emanated from law itself. It has existed since the time of
the American Governors-General. Act No. 1902 (An Act authorizing the Governor-General to direct any unexpended
balances of appropriations be returned to the general fund of the Insular Treasury and to transfer from the general
fund moneys which have been returned thereto), passed on May 18, 1909 by the First Philippine Legislature, was the
first enabling law that granted statutory authority to the President to transfer funds. The authority was without any
limitation, for the Act explicitly empowered the Governor-General to transfer any unexpended balance of
appropriations for any bureau or office to another, and to spend such balance as if it had originally been
appropriated for that bureau or office. (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209135 & companion cases, July 11,
2014).

Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Art. VI, Section 25(5) of the Constitution must be made
upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to
transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices. (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209135 & companion cases, July 11, 2014).

Concept of “savings.”
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in the GAA free from any obligation
or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the
work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii)from appropriations balances arising from
unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii)
from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and

18
efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services
approved at a lesser cost.
The three instances are a sure indication that savings could be generated only upon the purpose of the
appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the appropriation being no longer existent. (Araullo, et al. v.
Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209135 & companion cases, July 11, 2014, Bersamin, J).

President or other officers not authorized to, cross-broader transfer funds.

Although the Executive was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws
(which included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to
substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs,
given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to
spend the public wealth resides in Congress, not in the Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending power of the
Executive unrestricted would threaten to undo the principle of separation of powers. (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et
al., G.R. No. 209135 & companion cases, July 11, 2014, Bersamin, J).

Requirement that should be met if there is augmentation of funds.

Should there be augmentation of savings, it is required that there should be an item in the project to which
the savings may be transferred. In Nazareth v. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 385, it was ruled
that there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to
which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the
GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for
augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with
the degree of flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable
contingencies. (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et al., supra).

The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA.
Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, G.R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 385, it was clarified that there
must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings
may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which
Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation
purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of
flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies.
Nonetheless, this modified interpretation did not take away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the
appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et
al., G.R. No. 209287, & companion cases, February 3, 2015, Bersamin, J).

The Operative Fact Doctrine

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination
of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the
general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny
and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to
only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only
when the extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application. (Maria
Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No., 209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En
Banc [Bersamin])

Operative Fact Doctrine Applied in the DAP (Disbursement Acceleration Program) Case
The doctrine of operative fact is applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its application to
the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances
could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.
The implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs
that were not covered in the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to augment items
pertaining to other departments of the Government in clear violation of the Constitution. To declare the
implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an
operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is
to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under
it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith
under the DAP. That scenario would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
The other side of the coin is that it has been adequately shown as to be beyond debate that the
implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the country.
To count the positive results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like public infrastructure, could easily include
roads, bridges, homes for the homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to apply the doctrine of operative fact
to the DAP could literally cause the physical undoing of such worthy results by destruction, and would result in most
undesirable wastefulness. (Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No.,
209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En Banc [Bersamin])

The Doctrine of Operative Fact Extends as well to a Void or Unconstitutional Executive Act
The term executive act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.

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 In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation (G.R. No. 187485, October 8, 2013), the
Court likewise declared that “for the operative act doctrine to apply, there must be a ‘legislative or executive
measure,’ meaning a law or executive issuance.” Thus, the Court opined there that the operative fact doctrine did
not apply to a mere administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related issuances
were executive acts. The DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a merely administrative practice especially after the
Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by issuing various memoranda and circulars. (Maria Carolina P.
Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No., 209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En Banc
[Bersamin])

Power of appointment of Justices at SB; clustering of nominees is not constitutional.

The power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as
the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary
is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is
valid. President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the six
shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists encroached on
President Aquino's power to appoint members of the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered to be
qualified for the same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six clusters, one for every vacancy, could influence the
appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate of recommending qualified nominees to the President.
Clustering impinges upon the President's power of appointment, as well as restricts the chances for appointment of
the qualified nominees, because (1) the President's option for every vacancy is limited to
the five to seven nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the President has appointed from one cluster, then he is
proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. The said limitations are
utterly without legal basis and in contravention of the President's appointing power (Hon. Philip Aguinaldo, et al. v.
Aquino, et al., G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016, Leonardo-De Castro, J).

Nature of the power to deport; Act of State; subject to judicial review.

It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an
alleged alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings. Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as
established by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to
execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President, (Tatad vs. Secretary of the
Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330, 347; Ledesma vs. CA, G.R. No. 113216,
September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 656, 681; Tañada vs. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18, 48-49), the
Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of
discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
(Republic vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 167741, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 495, 502; Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 141, 148; Domingo vs. Scheer,
466 Phil. 235 (2004); House of Sara Lee vs. Rey, 500 SCRA 419 (2006); Secretary of Justice, et al. vs. Christopher
Roruga, G.R. No. 166199, April 24, 2009).

Solicitor General may not be designated as Acting Secretary of Justice.

The designation is void, hence, unconstitutional. Sec. 13, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. Likewise, Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides
that unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General,
therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other
office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise
so provided. (Funa v. Acting Sec. of Justice Alberto N. Agra, et al., G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013).

Exceptions to the prohibition against holding multiple positions.

According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 53, the only two
exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section
3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive
officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of the officials’ offices. (Funa v. Acting Sec. of Justice Alberto N. Agra, et
al., G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013).

Former President Joseph Estrada granted absolute pardon.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is
that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. (Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC,

20
et al., G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015, Leonardo de Castro, J).

Pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to
wit:
The only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases;
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be
argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34, 38 [1940] and Pelobello v. Palatino,72 Phil. 441, 442 [1941] the SC
declared that “subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action.” In Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. it was also said that a pardon, being a presidential
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action. The exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary
in the President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits
provided for by the Constitution. (Atty. Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, et l., supra.).

Duty of the State to protect its citizens, represented by the President; Constitutional provision on such duty.
The 1987 Constitution has “vested the executive power in the President of the Republic of the Philippines”
(Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1). While the vastness of the executive power that has been consolidated in the person of
the President cannot be expressed fully in one provision, the Constitution has stated the prime duty of the
government, of which the President is the head:
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may
call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required,
under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service. (Sec. 4, Article II,
Constitution; Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 212426 and companion
cases, January 12, 2016, Sereno, J)

The duty to protect the State and its people must be carried out earnestly and effectively throughout the
whole territory of the Philippines in accordance with the Constitutional provision on national territory. Hence, the
President of the Philippines, as the sole repository of executive power, is the guardian of the Philippine archipelago,
including all the islands and waters embraced therein and all other territories over which it has sovereignty or
jurisdiction. These territories consist of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains; including its territorial sea, the
seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas; and the waters around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions.

How the President carries out such important duty.

To carry out this important duty, the President is equipped with authority over the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), which is the protector of the people and the state. The AFP's role is to secure the sovereignty of
the State and the integrity of the national territory. In addition, the Executive is Constitutionally empowered to
maintain peace and order; protect life, liberty, and property; and promote the general welfare (Constitution, Art. II,
Sec. 3). In recognition of these powers, Congress has specified that the President must oversee, ensure, and reinforce
our defensive capabilities against external and internal threats (see Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 18 in relation to Art. II,
Secs. 3, 4 & 7; Executive Order No. 292 [Administrative Code of 1987], Book IV [Executive Branch], Title VIII
[National Defense], Secs. l, 15, 26 & 33 [hereinafter Administrative Code of 1987]) and, in the same vein, ensure that
the country is adequately prepared for all national and local emergencies arising from natural and man-made
disasters. (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV [Executive Branch], Title XII [Local Government], Sec. 3[5];
Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.,G.R. No. 212426 and companion cases, January 12, 2016, Sereno, J)

Power absolute not absolute.

This power is limited by the Constitution itself, because the President may call out the AFP to prevent or
suppress instances of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, (Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 18) but not suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for a period exceeding 60 days, or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law exceeding that same span. In the exercise of these powers, the President is also duty-bound to
submit a report to Congress, in person or in writing, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and Congress may in turn revoke the proclamation or
suspension. The same provision provides for the Supreme Court's review of the factual basis for the proclamation or
suspension, as well as the promulgation of the decision within 30 days from filing. (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive
Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 212426 and companion cases, January 12, 2016, Sereno, J)

Martial law power; meaning of appropriate proceedings covered by Sec. 18[3], Article VII of the Constitution.
Section 18[3], Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days
from its filing.

The phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" does not refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or
Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed
any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions.

21
Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. Under
Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of
emergency powers. Put differently, if the Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the
same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII (Rep. Ecel Lagman, et al. v. Hon.
Medialdea, et al., G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, Del Castillo, J).

Unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII make it sui generis.
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated
as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said
provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief
Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not
applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court
has to promulgate its decision.
The phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers
to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of
the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a
matter to be resolved by the Court (Rep. Ecel Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Medialdea, et al., G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017,
Del Castillo, J).

Extent of the powers of Congress and Court on declaration of martial law.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen
on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only
the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to
"undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." On the other hand, Congress may take into
consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court
which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis, Congress could probe deeper and further; it
can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it (Rep. Ecel Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Medialdea, et al., G.R. No.
231658, July 4, 2017, Del Castillo, J).

The judicial power to review versus the congressional power to revoke.

The Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate
proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it, may be
activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different
but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the
nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised
independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest the Court and Congress with veto powers independently
from each other (Rep. Ecel Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Medialdea, et al., G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, Del Castillo, J).

Extraordinary powers; exercised if there is actual rebellion.

The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial
law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987
Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of these powers:"(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review
and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court” (Rep. Edcel
Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Medialdea, et al., G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, Del Castillo, J).

Police power exercised during martial law by the President.

A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power, which is
normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police power, with themilitary
assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government agencies which for the time being are unable to cope
with the condition in a locality, which remains under the control of the State.
In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, it was said that under a valid declaration of martial law, the
President as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on
public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and ( d) issuance of Presidential
Decrees x x x".

Court’s review confined to sufficiency not accuracy of factual basis.

The Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the
declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. In
any event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution are in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the
martial law period is good only for 60 days; Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after the
proclamation is made; and, this Court may investigate the factual background of the declaration (II RECORD,
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 470-471(July30, 1986)).
The Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in declaring martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be
limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the

22
facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (Rep. Edcel Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Medialdea, et al.,
G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, Del Castillo, J).

Probable cause is the allowable standard of proof for thePresident.

In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there is probable
cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed. To require
him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. Along this line, Justice
Carpio, in his Dissent in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to satisfy
probable cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of
declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard
by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of
martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof, which, in order to be met,
would require much from the President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise of emergency powers, the
requirement of probable cause is much simpler. It merely necessitates an "average man to weigh the facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibration of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.
He merely relies on common sense and x x x needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed x x x by the accused" (Rep. Edcel Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Medialdea, et al., G.R. No. 231658,
July 4, 2017, Del Castillo, J).

Burden of proof to show sufficiency of the bases by the President falls in the petitioners.
The burden of proof to show insufficiency in the bases of the President in declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus lies on the shoulders of the citizen initiating the proceedings.
Such laying of the burden of proof is constitutional, natural and practical – constitutional, because the President is
entitled to the strong presumption of the constitutionality of his or her acts as the Chief Executive and head of one of
the great branches of Government; natural, because the dutiful performance of an official duty by the President is
always presumed; (Dimapilis-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 199914, July 16, 2013, 701 SCRA 318); and
practical, because the alleging party is expected to have the proof to substantiate the allegation.

Appropriate proceedings; concept.

To equate the appropriate proceeding mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 18 with the certiorari
action under Section 5(1) in relation to the second paragraph of Section 1 is to "emasculate the Court's task under
Section 18, Article VII."
The third paragraph of Section 18 suffices to confer on the Court the exclusive and original jurisdiction to
determine the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial law. To equate the appropriate
proceeding to the certiorari action authorized under Section 5(1), in relation to the second paragraph of Section 1, is
erroneous. The third paragraph of Section 18 defines the legal duty to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for
the proclamation of martial law upon the filing of the petition for the purpose by any citizen. The Court has then to
discharge the duty (Rep. Ecel Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Medialdea, et al., G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, Del Castillo, J).
The appropriate proceeding, once commenced, should not focus on whether the President gravely abused his or her
discretion or not in determining the necessity for proclaiming martial law. Instead, the 1987 Constitution mandates
the Court to examine and sift through the factual basis relied upon by the President to justify his proclamation of
martial law and to determine whether the factual basis is sufficient or not. To rule that a finding of grave abuse of
discretion is essential is to confine the discharge of the duty by the Court within limits not considered at the time of
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Doing so may also produce impractical results.

When Congress will vote jointly in relation to proclamation of Martial Law.

The Constitution grants the Congress the power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress may exercise such power,
i.e., by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special session. The use of the
word "may" in the provision - such that "[t]he Congress x x x may revoke such proclamation or suspension x x x" - is
to be construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke, but in
order to revoke, the same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of the Members of the Congress,
voting jointly, favor revocation.
The provision does not actually refer to a "joint session." While it may be conceded, that the phrase "voting
jointly" shall already be understood to mean that the joint voting will be done "in joint session," notwithstanding the
absence of clear language in the Constitution, still, the requirement that "[t]he Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of
at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, x x x" explicitly applies only to the situation when
the Congress revokes the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. Simply put, the provision only requires Congress to vote jointly on the revocation of the President's
proclamation and/or suspension (Padilla, et al. v. Congress of the Phils., et al. & companion cases, G.R. No. 231671,
231694, July 25, 2017, Leonardo-De Castro, J).

When Congress required to vote jointly when martial law is declared; when it revokes proclamation.
The Congress is only required to vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation of martial
law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The deliberations on Article VII, Section 18 of the
1986 ConCom do not reveal a manifest intent of the framers to make it mandatory for the Congress to convene in
joint session following the President's proclamation and/or suspension, so it could deliberate as a single body,
regardless of whether its Members will concur in or revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension (Padilla,
et al. v. Congress of the Phils., et al. & companion cases, G.R. No. 231671, 231694, July 25, 2017, Leonardo-De Castro,

23
J).
The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a
joint session is specifically for the purpose of revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the petitions at bar, the Senate and House of
Representatives already separately adopted resolutions expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No.
216. Given the express support of both Houses of the Congress for Proclamation No. 216, and their already evident
lack of intent to revoke the same, the provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on revocation did
not even come into operation and, therefore, there is no obligation on the part of the Congress to convene in joint
session (Padilla, et al. v. Congress of the Phils., et al. & companion cases, G.R. No. 231671, 231694, July 25, 2017,
Leonardo-De Castro, J).

Foreign relations.
There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be regularly decided by the Executive
Department without either challenge or interference by the Judiciary. One such area involves the delicate arena of
foreign relations. It would be strange indeed if the courts and the executive spoke with different voices in the realm
of foreign policy. Precisely because of the nature of the questions presented, and the lapse of more than 60 years
since the conduct complained of, we make no attempt to lay down general guidelines covering other situations not
involved here, and confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary to reach a decision on this matter.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our
country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications
for stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment
of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed. (Vinuya, et al. v. The Honorable Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, et al., G.R. No.
162230, April 28, 2010, En Banc [Del Castillo]).

The power and duty to conduct foreign relations; its nature; reason for the rule.
The President carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations (See
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1 in relation to Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV [Executive Branch], Title I Foreign
Affairs), Secs. 3[1] and 20; Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino, 580 Phil. 422 [2008]; Pimentel v. Office of the
Executive Secretary, 501 Phil. 303 (2005); People's Movement for Press Freedom v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 84642, 13
September 1988 (unreported) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 [1936]); Joaquin
Bernas, Foreign Relations in Constitutional Law, 101 (1995); Irene R. Cortes, The Philippine Presidency: A Study of
Executive Power 187 [1966]; Vicente G. Sinco, Philippine Political Law: Principles and Concepts 297 [10th ed.,
1954]). Since every state has the capacity to interact with and engage in relations with other sovereign states (See
1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Art. 1, 165 LNTS 19; James Crawford, The Creation
of States in International Law 61 [2"d ed. 2007]), it is but logical that every state must vest in an agent the authority
to represent its interests to those other sovereign states (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra).

Role of the Senate in relation to the power of the President as the sole organ in international relations.
The power to defend the State and to act as its representative in the international sphere inheres in the
person of the President. This power, however, does not crystallize into absolute discretion to craft whatever
instrument the Chief Executive so desires. The Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international agreements
the President enters into, as contemplated in Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution, obtain the approval of two-
thirds of its members (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra).

Nature Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement [EDCA].

EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain "Agreed
Locations" in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so was no
longer necessary. Accordingly, in June 2014, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the U.S. Embassy
exchanged diplomatic notes confirming the completion of all necessary internal requirements for the agreement to
enter into force in the two countries. (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra)

Contention that VFA is unconstitutional, violation of equal protection clause.

The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a
member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused.
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from
local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units
around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their
bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the
sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of the Court to adopt rules of procedure is
curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules
of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply — except to the extent agreed upon — to subjects of another State
due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some
aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State,
diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another State’s territory.
On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2; Laude, et al. v. Hon. Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde, et al., G.R. No. 217456,
November 24, 2015, Leonen, J).

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Attitude of the SC on the expansive power of the President on foreign affairs.
The Court has long treated this power as something the Courts must not unduly restrict. As stated recently
in Vinuya v. Romulo:
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of
such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said
determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari. (Saguisag, et al. v.
Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 212426 and companion cases, January 12, 2016, Sereno, J)

Basis why EDCA is an executive agreement.

EDCA can be in the form of an executive agreement, since it merely involves "adjustments in detail" in the
implementation of the MDT and the VFA. There are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have
already been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under
Section 25. Because of the status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate. (Saguisag,
et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 212426 and companion cases, January 12, 2016, Sereno, J)

Distinguishing feature of executive agreements.

One of the distinguishing features of executive agreements is that their validity and effectivity are not
affected by a lack of Senate concurrence. (Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, supra). This distinctive
feature was recognized as early as in Eastern Sea Trading ( 1961 ), where the Supreme Court ruled that treaties are
formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements
become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate. (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive
Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 212426 and companion cases, January 12, 2016, Sereno, J)

The President is granted a vast power to enter into executive agreements; role of the Supreme Court.
In the field of external affairs, the President must be given a larger measure of authority and wider
discretion, subject only to the least amount of checks and restrictions under the Constitution. The rationale behind
this power and discretion was recognized by the Court in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, or the Guidelines in the Negotiation of International Agreements and
its Ratification, thus, correctly reflected the inherent powers of the President when it stated that the DF A "shall
determine whether an agreement is an executive agreement or a treaty."
Accordingly, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court does not look into whether an
international agreement should be in the form of a treaty or an executive agreement, save in cases in which the
Constitution or a statute requires otherwise. Rather, in view of the vast constitutional powers and prerogatives
granted to the President in the field of foreign affairs, the task of the Court is to determine whether the international
agreement is consistent with the applicable limitations (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 212426
and companion cases, January 12, 2016, Sereno, J). This is so because of the principle of separation of powers that
the SC cannot intrude into the wisdom of the Executive Department.

ARTICLE VIII – Judiciary Department

Requisites of the power of judicial review.

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case. (Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R.
No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373, 382; Funa v. The Chaiman, CSC Francisco Duque III, et al., G.R. No.
191672, November 25, 2014, Bersamin, J; Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 212426 and
companion cases, January 12, 2016, Sereno, J).

Concept of the power of judicial review.

The power of judicial review specially refers to both the authority and the duty of this Court to determine
whether a branch or an instrumentality of government has acted beyond the scope of the latter's constitutional
powers (See: Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, 17 July 2012, 676 SCRA 579; Tagolino v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 202202, 19 March 2013, 693 SCRA 574; Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, 658 Phil. 322 (2011); Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra; Demetria
v. Alba, 232 Phil. 222 [1987]). As articulated in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the power of judicial review
involves the power to resolve cases in which the questions concern the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court exhaustively discussed this "moderating power" as part of
the system of checks and balances under the Constitution. In our fundamental law, the role of the Court is to
determine whether a branch of government has adhered to the specific restrictions and limitations of the latter's

25
power (Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra).

How 1987 Constitution strengthened the power of judicial review.

The power of judicial review has since been strengthened in the 1987 Constitution. The scope of that power
has been extended to the determination of whether in matters traditionally considered to be within the sphere of
appreciation of another branch of government, an exercise of discretion has been attended with grave abuse
(Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, supra note 94; Francisco v. House of Representatives,
supra note 94; Tanada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 [1997]; Oposa v. Factoran,G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA
792, 809-810 (citing Llamas v. Orbos, 279 Phil. 920 [1991]; Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No.
89914, 20 November 1991, 203 SCRA 767; Gonzales v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636, 19 November 1990, 191 SCRA 452;
Coseteng v. Mitra, G.R. No. 86649, 12 July 1990, 187 SCRA 377; Daza v. Singson, 259 Phil. 980 [1989]). The expansion
of this power has made the political question doctrine "no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or
review." (Oposa v. Factoran, supra)

How the moderating power exercised.

This moderating power, however, must be exercised carefully and only if it cannot be completely avoided.
The Constitution is so incisively designed that it identifies the spheres of expertise within which the different
branches of government shall function and the questions of policy that they shall resolve (Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil.
415, 442 [1968]). Since the power of judicial review involves the delicate exercise of examining the validity or
constitutionality of an act of a coequal branch of government, this Court must continually exercise restraint to avoid
the risk of supplanting the wisdom of the constitutionally appointed actor with that of its own. (See: Francisco v.
House of Representatives, supra note 93; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); and Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra; Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 212426 and companion cases, January 12,
2016, Sereno, J)

Senate investigation of a case already pending in court does not violate the sub-judice rule.
The sub-judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. Suffice it to state that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any
prosecution or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose. (See
Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704, October 17, 2006)
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand,
courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid
of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus,
legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or
remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do
not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
When the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with
its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a
Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. (REGHIS M. ROMERO II, et al. v. SENATOR
JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, et al., G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.)

Judicial power may not be exercised in vacuum; meaning of principle.

Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court’s exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a
particular case conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court. In
other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-
General, 20 Phil. 523 [1911], the Court elucidated that “[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject matter
existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or
authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if
that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to
exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter.” (
Conchita Carpio-Morales v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).

Concept of political question does not preclude judicial review.

The concept of a political question, however, never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional
organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right.
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is
being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official
concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. (Marcos v. Manglapus,
258 Phil. 479 [1989])
How the court has chosen to address the political question doctrine has undergone an evolution since the
time that it had been first invoked in Marcos v. Manglapus. Increasingly, the Court has taken the historical and social
context of the case and the relevance of pronouncements of carefully and narrowly tailored constitutional doctrines.
This trend was followed in cases such as Daza v. Singson, 259 Phil. 980 [1989] and Coseteng v. Mitra Jr., G.R. No.
86649, July 12, 1990, 1987 SCRA 377.

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The rule-making power of the Supreme Court (Section 5[5], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment
of Legal Fees, The Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291,
which exempts it from “all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to exempt it from
the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987
Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.
In said case, the Court ruled that:
“The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if
they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption
from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees
without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence
– fiscal autonomy, Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess
and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components,
the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The
laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to
“guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.”
legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also
comprise an essential element of the Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment
of legal fees granted by Congress to governments-owned or controlled corporations and local
government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is
constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its
independence. (GSIS v. Heirs of Fernando F. Caballero, G.R. No. 158090, 623 SCRA 5, 14-15, Oct. 4,
2010, 2nd Div. [Peralta])

Impeachment

Meaning of “initiate” in impeachment.

The term “initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.  The initiation starts with the
filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing
of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint.  The initial action taken
by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. (Francisco v. House of
Representatives, et al., 460 Phil. 830 (2003). What ends the initiation is the referral to the Committee on Justice.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period. (Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R.
No. 193459, February 15, 2011).

Power of suspension by the Ombudsman.

Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act vests the Office of the Ombudsman with disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the government, except officials who may be removed only by impeachment,
Members of the Congress, and the Judiciary. While CTD has the rank of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, he does not
belong to the Judiciary but to the Executive Department. This simply means that he has the same compensation and
privileges as a Justice of the Court of Appeals. If the Supreme Court were to investigate CTD, it would be performing a
non-judicial function. This will violate the principle of separation of powers. (Noblejas v. Teehankee, 23 SCRA 405
(1968).

Preventive suspension by Ombudsman.

When Ombudsman may impose preventive suspension upon a public officer.
If a public officer fails the lifestyle check conducted by the office because his assets were grossly
disproportionate to his salary and allowances and charged with graft and corrupt practices and pending the
completion of investigations, he was suspended from office for six months, the suspension is valid.
The suspension meted out to him is preventive and not punitive. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 grants
the Ombudsman the power to impose preventive suspension up to six months. Preventive suspension may be
imposed without any notice or hearing. It is merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation and is not
the final determination of the guilt of the officer concerned. (Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207 (1999).

Requisites for issuance of preventive suspension by the Ombudsman.

The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:
The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under
his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a)
the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.

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 The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of
the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period
of suspension herein provided. (The Ombudsman v. Valeroso, 548 Phil. 688, 695 [2007]; Conchita
Carpio-Morales v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).

ARTICLE IX – Constitutional Commissions/Elections

Jurisdiction of COMELEC; decisions to be brought to SC via Rule 64.

The COMELEC’s declaration that Smartmatic JV is eligible to participate in the bidding process for the
COMELEC’s procurement of 23,000 units of optical mark readers may not be brought to the SC via Rule 64. Article IX-
A, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The phrase “decision, order, or ruling” of constitutional commissions, the COMELEC included, that may be
brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that it only relates to those
rendered in the commissions’ exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Garces v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 114795, July 17, 1996, 259 SCRA 99, 107). In the case of the COMELEC, this would limit the provision’s coverage
to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued pursuant to its authority to be the sole judge of generally all controversies
and contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of elective offices. (Bedol v. Comelec, G.R. No.
179830, December 3, 2009, 606 SCRA 554; Querubin, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015,
Velasco, J).

Designation of CSC Chairman to the Board of GSIS, ECC, etc. violates the independence of the Commission.
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various powers and
functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated with
appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and
welfare of government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform
other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether
personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC
Chairman, such as imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation
of health care providers, or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. Duque’s
designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per
diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its
clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes
against the principle behind an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s designation as member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An
office that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch. (Dennis Funa v. The
Chairman, CSC, Francisco Duque III, et al., G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014, Bersamin, J).

Promotional appointment of COA Chairman; condition.

Villar’s appointment as Chairman of COA is not prohibited under the Constitution after his resignation as
Commissioner. The Constitutional provision provides: The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five
years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. The provision, on its face, does not prohibit a
promotional appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term
of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment to
the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission
membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he
will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system
in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). There is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly
precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated
circumstances or conditions. (Dennis A. Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit, Reynaldo A. Villar, G.R. No.
192791 April 24, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.).

ARTICLE XII – General Provisions / National Patrimony

Meaning and purpose of the Filipinization of public utilities.

The Filipinization provision in the 1987 Constitution is one of the products of the spirit of nationalism
which gripped the 1935 Constitutional Convention. (Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Anti-Dummy Board, 46 SCRA 474
(1972). The 1987 Constitution “provides for the Filipinization of public utilities by requiring that any form of
authorization for the operation of public utilities should be granted only to ‘citizens of the Philippines or to

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corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens.’ The provision is an express recognition of the sensitive and vital position of public utilities
both in the national economy and for national security.” The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to
prevent aliens from assuming control of public utilities, which may be inimical to the national interest. This specific
provision explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens control of public utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal of
the 1987 Constitution: to “conserve and develop our patrimony” and ensure “a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must therefore meet the minimum
nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be
granted authority to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its “capital” must be owned by Filipino citizens.
(Gamboa v. Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011).

Meaning of the term “capital” of a public utility company in the Constitution.

The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote
in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding
capital stock comprising both common and nonvoting preferred shares.
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred
shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only
to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the
term "capital" shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of
the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors
(Heirs of Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Sec. Teves; Jose Roy III v. Chairperson Teresita Herbosa, et al., G.R. No. 207246,
November 22, 2016, Caguioa, J).

Reason for the foregoing definition of “capital.”

The Court adopted the foregoing definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution in furtherance of "the intent and letter of the Constitution that the 'State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos' [because a] broad definition unjustifiably
disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the public utility." The
provision is an express recognition of the sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy
and for national security. The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from assuming
control of public utilities, which may be inimical to the national interest. The foregoing interpretation is consistent
with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and
management of public utilities; and, as revealed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, "capital"
refers to the voting stock or controlling interest of a corporation (Gamboa v. Teves, 668 Phil. 1 [2011]; Jose Roy III v.
Chairperson Teresita Herbosa, et al., G.R. Nos. 207246, November 22, 2016, Caguioa, J).

The term ―franchise includes not only authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the form of statute, but
also those granted by administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchise has been delegated by
Congress.
The TRB was granted sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to operate the toll
facility/system. By explicit provisions of the PDs, the TRB was given power to grant administrative franchise for toll
facility projects. The limiting thrust of Article 12, Section 11 of the Constitution on the grant of franchise or other
forms of authorization to operate public utilities may, in context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant shall be made
only in favor of qualified Filipino citizens or corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises, as
contracts; and (c) no such authorization shall be exclusive or exceed fifty years. Under the 1987 Constitution,
Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may validly delegate its legislative
authority, under the power of subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to some
administrative agencies. (Ernesto Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, GR Number 166910, October 19, 2010,
VELASCO, JR., J.).

Aliens cannot acquire land in the Philippines.

A foreigner who married a Filipino is not entitled to a share of a parcel of land they acquired during
marriage even if the money used to purchase it came from him. Under the Constitution, save in cases of hereditary
succession no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. He was well aware of the constitutional prohibition and
openly admitted the same. His actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition, hence,
he cannot be entitled to a share of the real properties. Contracts that violate the Constitution and the law are null and
void, vest not rights, create no obligations and produce no legal effect at all. The denial of his claim does not amount
to injustice. It is the Constitution itself that demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine
land. The purpose of the prohibition is to conserve and develop the national patrimony. (Beumer vs. Amores, G.R. No.
195670, December 3, 2012).

Requisites before one may acquire property of public dominion.

In Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 605 Phil. 244 [2009], Bersamin, J, it was said that possession and
occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code will not convert
it to patrimonial or private property. There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of national wealth. In the absence thereof, the property remains to be alienable
and disposable and may not be acquired by prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.

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 There must be an official declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public use, public service, or for the development of national wealth before it can be acquired by prescription;
that a mere declaration by government officials that a land of the public domain is already alienable and disposable
would not suffice for purposes of registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The period of acquisitive
prescription would only begin to run from the time that the State officially declares that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the development of national wealth (Rep. v.
Cortez, G.R. No. 186639, February 5, 2015, 715 SCRA 417; Rep. v. Rizalvo, Jr.,659 Phil. 578 [2011]; Rep. v. Heirs of
Estacio, G.R. No. 208350, November 14, 2016, Peralta, J) .

Alien cannot own land in the Phils.; purpose is conservation of national patrimony.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.

Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, it has been held that "[a]liens, whether individuals or corporations,
are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private
lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony"
(Muller v. Muller, 531 Phil. 460, 466 [2006]).
Taina herself admitted that it was really Mike who paid with his own funds the subject lot; hence, Mike was
its real purchaser or buyer. More than that if the deed of sale at all proclaimed that she (Taina) was the purchaser or
buyer of the subject property and this subject property was placed under her name, it was simply because she and
Mike wanted to skirt or circumvent the constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens from
acquiring or purchasing lands in the Philippines. Indeed, the lower courts exposed and laid bare her posturing and
pretense for what these really are: that in the transaction in question, she was a mere dummy, a spurious stand-in,
for her erstwhile common-law husband, who was not a Filipino then, and never attempted to become a natural
Filipino citizen thereafter. They cannot do directly what is prohibited by law (Taina Manigque-Stone v. Cattleya Land,
Inc., et al., G.R. No. 195975, September 5, 2016, Del Castillo, J).

Academic Freedom
Even if the education department had not issued such prohibition, private schools still have the authority to
promulgate and enforce a similar prohibition pursuant to their right to establish disciplinary rules and
regulations. This right has been recognized in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which has the character
of law. Section 78 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations of Regulations for Private Schools. (Espiritu Santo Parochial
School v. NLRC, 258 Phil. 600 (1989)).
The right to establish disciplinary rules is consistent with the mandate in the Constitution (Art. XIV, Sec.
3(2), Constitution) for schools to teach discipline; (Jenosa v. Dalariate, G.R. No. 172138, September 8, 2010) in fact,
schools have the duty to develop discipline in students. (Marian College, Inc. v. CA, 401 Phil. 431 (2000) Corollarily,
the Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions on students who violate
disciplinary rules. The penalty for violations includes dismissal or exclusion from re-enrollment.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Condonation doctrine without basis in the Constitution and law.

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the other legal provisions now leads to the conclusion that the
doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with
the idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be
wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a
mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative
liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative
offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was
interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos, 279 Phil. 920, 937 [1991], to apply to administrative offenses (Conchita Carpio-
Morales v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J).

3-term limit, its rationale; coverage.

Coverage of the 3-term limit and the reason for the same.
As stressed in Socrates v. COMELEC(G.R. No. 154512, 2002), the principle behind the three-term limit rule
covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. An elective local
official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth term, albeit he is allowed
to seek a fresh term for the same position after the election where he could have sought his fourth term but
prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition. There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive
terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a
fourth term, immediately following the third. (MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ERNESTO R. VEGA, G.R. No. 20171, January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.).

Effect of voluntary renunciation of the office of an elected official on the 3-term limit.
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary

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renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall not, in determining
service for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected. This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local
official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a
voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events
or causes. (MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, G.R. No. 20171,
January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.).

Involuntarily interrupted terms, not considered a full term.

The almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be
considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot,
in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term
threshold. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was
relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was
occupying the mayoralty seat. In other words, during which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office,
Abundo was a private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared
later as having the right to serve the elective position such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the
finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to said
position. (MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, G.R. No. 20171,
January 8, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.)

Objective of the 3-term limit.

The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was “to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.” The Court
underscored this objective in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, stating:
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom
to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same
office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when
they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it (Talaga v. Comelec, G.R. No.
196804; 197015, October 9, 2012, Bersamin, J).

3-term limit; effect of disqualification.

It is true that he occupied the position of mayor in the following periods: 1995-1998; 1998-2001; 2001-
2004; 2004-2007 but because of his disqualification he was not duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither
did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the
full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’
occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for
purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap
for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’
first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. (Dizon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009).

Exceptional situation in the 3-term limit.

Preventively suspended elective public officer may not run for a fourth term.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close our
eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to
discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be
sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary – some of them personal and some of them by operation of law –
that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that
preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a
suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the
functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different because it
disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the
standard to determine effective interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of
confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted in
the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a
case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is. (Simon Aldovino, Jr., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, Brion, J).

Plebiscite; the phrase “by the qualified voters therein” includes all voters in the LGU affected; issue, a novel one
of first impression.
The COMELEC’s ruling that only the voters of Cabanatuan City shall participate in the plebiscite to convert
Cabanatuan City into a highly urbanized city is not correct.
The phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 means the qualified voters not only in the city
proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in
order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. This means that the entire province of Nueva

31
Ecija shall participate in the plebiscite (Umali v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 203974, & companion cases, April 22,
2014).

LGUs have the power to classify and reclassify their properties; police power measure.
Ordinance No. 8187, otherwise known as “An Ordinance Amending Ord. No. 8119, Otherwise Known as
“The Manila Comprehensive Land Use and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 By Creating a Medium Industrial Zone (1-2)
and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3). The creation of the industrial zones lifted the prohibition against owners and
operators of businesses including Chevron and the other oil companies from operating in designated commercial
zones, an industrial zone prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is valid. The petition is a sequel to the case of
SJS v. Mayor Atienza, J. where the SC found that said ordinance (No. 8027) was enacted to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila, hence it ordered the operators of the Pandacan depots to
immediately relocate and transfer their oil terminals. But despite the finality of said judgment, the City of Manila
enacted an ordinance, (Ordinance No. 8171) repealing Ordinance No. 8027 on the theory that a local government
unit can classify and reclassify its own properties. Pursuant to the Local Government Code, the LGU is in the best
position to determine the needs of its constituents that the removal of the oil depots in the Pandacan area is
necessary to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. The oil companies’ contention that the Pandacan terminals have never been the subject of
terrorist attacks, hence, the petitions are based on unfounded fears and mere conjectures is not correct. (SJS, et al. v.
Lim, G.R. No. 187836 & companion cases, November 25, 2014, Perez, J).

LGU has the power to impose fees for purposes of regulation in the exercise of police power.
Ordinance No. 18, series of 2003, entitled “An Ordinance Regulating the Establishment of Special Projects” is
a valid ordinance. The primary purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate the “placing, stringing, attaching,
installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and
other apparatus” listed therein, which included Smart’s telecommunications tower. Clearly, the purpose of the
assailed Ordinance is to regulate the enumerated activities particularly related to the construction and maintenance
of various structures. The fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not impositions on the building or structure itself; rather, they
are impositions on the activity subject of government regulation, such as the installation and construction of the
structures. (Angeles University Foundation v. City of Angeles, G.R. No. 189999, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 539, 373).
Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate certain construction activities of the identified
special projects, which included “cell sites” or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are
primarily regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. While the fees may contribute to the revenues of
the Municipality, this effect is merely incidental. Thus, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes. (Smart
Communications, Inc. v. Mun. of Malvar, Batangas, G.R. No. 204429, February 18, 2014).

Creation of a province is population not an indispensable requirement.

A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of
not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office.

The requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to
the indispensable income requirement. (Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 2, 2010).

When second placer can assume.

The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when
two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b)
the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such awareness within
the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate (Grego
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481, 501). Under this sole exception, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest number of votes
may be deemed elected (Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, supra note 51, at p. 312). But the exception did not
apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the
least aware of the fact of Barbara Ruby’s illegibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the
Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the elections (Talaga v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 196804; 197015, October 9, 2012, Bersamin, J).

Criterion in creating a local government unit.

When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land
area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government
unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but
not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater

32
likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most
cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in
Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in
Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the
inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
(Navarro, et al. V. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011).

Prohibition against midnight appointments; applies only to Presidential appointees; not to LGUs.
A midnight appointment “refers to those appointments made within two months immediately prior to the
next presidential election.” Midnight appointments are prohibited under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make the appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service
or endanger public safety.

Midnight appointments are prohibited because an outgoing President is “duty-bound to prepare for the
orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he or she should not do acts which he or she ought to
know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his or her successor.” (Aytona v. Castillo, No. L-193313, January
19, 1962, 4 SCRA 1, 9-10). An outgoing President should not “deprive the new administration of an opportunity to
make the corresponding appointments.
However, the constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential
appointments. It does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives. There is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. (The Provincial Government of
Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015, 757 SCRA 222, Leonen, J, citing De Rama v. CA, 405 Phil. 531, 353
SCRA 94).

Cityhood cases; exemption from coverage of P100M requirement.

Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least P20,000,000.00 for the last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant
prices. As amended, there is a P100M income requirement (League of Cities of the Phils., etc. v. Comelec, G.R. No.
176951, & companion cases, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 149).

Enactment of the laws, an exercise of legislative power.

Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to
alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised
when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable
indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units—income, population, and land area.
Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into
component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-
generated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly
imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very
intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these
municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended
R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the
concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments
to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on
their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the
LGC (League of Cities of the Phils., etc. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 176951, & companion cases, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA
149).

Requisites of a Valid Ordinance

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law. In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also
comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.
(Wilfredo Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, et al., G.R. No. 189185, August
16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin])

Body with jurisdiction over boundary disputes between barangays.

The RTC has no jurisdiction to settle a boundary dispute involving barangays in the same city or
municipality. Said dispute shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panglungsod or sangguniang bayan
concerned. If there is failure of amicable settlement, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned
and shall decide the same within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to. Further, the decision of
the sanggunian may be appealed to the RTC having jurisdiction over the area in dispute, within the time and manner
prescribed by the Rules of Court (Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo City v. Antipolo City, SB, et al., G.R. No. 187349,
August 17, 2016).

33
Vice-Governor counted in computing the quorum and not counted in the determination of the required votes to
uphold a matter in the SP; role is merely to break a tie.
In La Carlota City, Negros Occidental, et al. v. Atty. Rojo, G.R. No. 181367, April 24, 2012, the Court interpreted
a provision pertaining to the composition of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, viz.:
Section 457. Composition (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, the legislative body of the city,
shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the
president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the panlungsod na
pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as members.
R.A. 7160 clearly states the composition of that the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Black's Law
Dictionary defines "composed of”' as "formed of' or "consisting of." As the presiding officer, the
vice-mayor can vote only to break a tie. In effect, the presiding officer votes when it matters the
most, that is, to break a deadlock in the votes. Clearly, the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a
"member" of the Sangguniang Panlungsod considering that he is mandated under Section 49 of RA
7160 to vote to break a tie. To construe otherwise would create an anomalous and absurd situation
where the presiding officer who votes to break a tie during a Sanggunian session is not considered a
"member" of the Sanggunian.

It can, thus, be concluded that the Vice Governor forms part of the composition of the SP as its Presiding
Officer, and should be counted in the determination of the existence of a quorum. However, the nature of the position
of the Presiding Officer as a component of the SP is distinct from the other members comprising the said body (J.
Tobias M. Javier, et al. v. Rhodora Cadiao, et al., G.R. No. 185369, August 3, 2016).

Police Power

Ordinance prevails over restrictions on use of property.

An ordinance re-classifying the area as institutional, hence, the owner expanded the school shall prevail
over the restriction in the title.
The ordinance as it is an exercise of police power. As early as Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Feati Bank &
Trust Co., 183 Phil. 176 (1979), the SC upheld the validity of an ordinance declaring the residential area in
Mandaluyong as industrial and commercial zone as it was passed in the exercise of police power. Since the motives
behind the passage of the questioned resolution is reasonable, and it being a legitime response to a felt public need,
not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the
municipality’s exercise of police power. (Learning Child, Inc., et al. v. Ayala Alabang Village Asso., et al., G.R. No.
134269, and other companion cases, July 7, 2010).

20% senior citizen discount considered as an exercise of police power.

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be
gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic
commodities. The discount serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent the productive years of their lives
on contributing to the development and progress of the nation. This distinct cultural Filipino practice of honoring
the elderly is an integral part of this law. (Manila Memorial Park, Inc., et al. v. Sec. of the DSWD, et al., G.R. No.
175356, December 3, 2013).

R.A. Nos. 9257 & 9442 do not violate the equal protection clause
"The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within
a specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from another." For a classification to be valid, (1) it must be based upon
substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction as to income, is a valid classification. The
Constitution itself considered the elderly as a class of their own and deemed it a priority to address their needs.
When the Constitution declared its intention to prioritize the predicament of the underprivileged sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children, it did not make any reservation as to income, race, religion or any. other personal
circumstances. It was a blanket privilege afforded the group of citizens in the enumeration in view of the
vulnerability of their class.
R.A. No. 9257 is an implementation of the avowed policy of the Constitution to enact measures that protect
and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities.
Specifically, it caters to the welfare of all senior citizens. The classification is based on age and therefore qualifies all
who have attained the age of 60. Senior citizens are a class of their own, who are in need and should be entitled to
government support, and the fact that they may still be earning for their own sustenance should not disqualify them
from the privilege.

Reason why senior citizens are granted the benefits.

It is well to consider that our senior citizens have already reached the age when work opportunities have
dwindled concurrently as their physical health. They are no longer expected to work, but there are still those who
continue to work and contribute what they can to the country. Thus, to single them out and take them out of the
privileges of the law for continuing to strive and earn income to fend for themselves is inimical to a welfare state that
the Constitution envisions. It is tantamount to penalizing them for their persistence. It is commending indolence
rather than rewarding diligence. It encourages them to become wards of the State rather than productive partners.
Our senior citizens were the laborers, professionals and overseas contract workers of the past. While some

34
may be well to do or may have the capacity to support their sustenance, the discretion to avail of the privileges of the
law is up to them. But to instantly tag them as undeserving of the privilege would be the height of ingratitude; it is an
outright discrimination.

Discount to PWDs is an exercise of police power.

RA 7277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Disabled
Persons and their Integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the
"Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," is constitutional.
The law is valid as an exercise of police power. The case is similar to Carlos Superdrug Corp., et al. v. DSWD, et
al., 553 Phil. 120 [2007] upholding the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of RA 9527 which grants 20% discount on the
purchase of medicines of senior citizens as a legitimate exercise of police power.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled
in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits (Sangalang v.
intermediate Appellate Court, 257 Phil. 930 [1989]). Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs (Ermita-Ma/ate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association, inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849, citing Noble State
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 412 (1911)). It is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and of the subjects of the same (U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910), citing Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush., 53 (Mass.
1851); U.S. v. Pompeya, 3 I Phi I. 245, 253-254 ( 1915); Drugstores Assn of the Phils. Inc., et al. v. National Council on
Disability Affairs, et al., G.R. No. 194561, September 14, 2016, Peralta, J).

Eminent Domain

Nature of power of eminent domain.

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is
necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the law. Consequently,
when the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the
agency asserting the power. The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against
the condemnor. When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or
clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9 that “private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.” The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the
Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The constitutional
provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part
too, it is about loss spreading. If the government takes away a person’s property to benefit society, the society should
pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is “to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” (City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005; cited in Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association,
Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin])

The Two (2) Types of “Taking” under the Power of Eminent Domain
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the government’s
regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property. (City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No.
118127, April 12, 2005)
In Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al. (G.R. No. 189185,
August 16, 2016), it was argued that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone in all agricultural entities under
Section 6 of an ordinance of Davao City prohibiting aerial spraying unduly deprives all agricultural landowners in
that City of the beneficial use of their property amounting to taking without just compensation. The Supreme Court
did not agree. Citing City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. (G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005), it clarified that taking only becomes
confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property. According to the Court:
The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the effects of aerial
spraying within and near the plantations. Although Section 3(e) of the ordinance requires the planting of
diversified trees within the identified buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as
confiscatoy requiring payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to compensation if
the taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or productive uses of the land. The
respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely deprived of their landholdings because they
can still cultivate or make other productive uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer zones.

Agency that determines just compensation.

The RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has been conferred with the original and exclusive power to
determine just compensation for parcels of land acquired by the State pursuant to the agrarian reform program. To
guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the factors which must be taken into consideration
to accurately determine the amount of just compensation to be awarded in a particular case. They are: (a) the
acquisition cost of the land; (b) the current value of like properties; (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and
the income therefrom; (d) the owner’s sworn valuation; (e) the tax declarations; (f) the assessment made by

35
government assessors; (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by
the government to the property; and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any. It, however, bears stressing that courts are not constrained to adopt the said
formula in every case since the determination of the amount of just compensation essentially partakes the nature of
a judicial function. In this accord, courts may either adopt the DAR formula or proceed with its own application for as
long as the factors listed in Section 17 of RA 6657 have been duly considered. (LBP v. Hababag, Sr., et al., G.R. No.
172352, September 16, 2015, reiterating the the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777 [1989]).

Point to determine just compensation.

Compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the
use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties before the trial court for the valuation of the subject portion must
be based on the values prevalent at such time of taking for like agricultural lands. (DAR v. Berina, et al., G.R. No.
183901; LBP v. Berina, et al., G.R. No. 183931, July 9, 2014).

Concept of public use.

Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the public.” However, the concept has expanded to include
utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of the public. In Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of
Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 169914, April 18, 2008, 552 SCRA 59, 175, Justice Corona, in his
dissenting opinion said that:
To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The meaning of the term “public use” has
evolved over time in response to changing public needs and exigencies. Public use which was
traditionally understood as strictly limited to actual “use by the public” has already been
abandoned. “Public use” has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public
benefit,” and “public convenience.” (Rep. v. Heirs of Saturnino Borbon, et al., G.R. No. 165354,
January 12, 2015).

Effect if the expropriator abandons the public use.

It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the proceedings for
expropriation. The effects of abandoning the public purpose were explained in Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Lozada, Sr., to wit:
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed,
failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon
the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire
the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the
particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property
owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owner's
right to justice, fairness and equity. (G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010, 613 SCRA 618; Rep. v.
Heirs of Saturnino Borbon, et al., G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015).

Compensation to be paid; basis; instance of an inverse condemnation proceedings.

State took a private property for public use; cannot it invoke the prescriptive period in recovering the
compensation.
The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in no less than our Bill of Rights, which states in clear
and categorical language that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” (Art.
III, Sec. 9, Constitution). This constitutional mandate cannot be defeated by statutory prescription. (Napocor v. Heirs
of Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011). Thus, it has been ruled that the prescriptive period under Section 3 (i)
of R.A. No. 6395 does not extend to an action to recover just compensation. (Napocor v. Sangkay). It would be a
confiscatory act on the part of the government to take the property of respondent spouses for a public purpose and
deprive them of their right to just compensation, solely because they failed to institute inverse condemnation
proceedings within five years from the time the transmission lines were constructed. To begin with, it was not the
duty of respondent spouses to demand for just compensation. Rather, it was the duty of NAPOCOR to institute
eminent domain proceedings before occupying their property. In the normal course of events, before the
expropriating power enters a private property, it must first file an action for eminent domain (Rule 67, Sec. 1, Rules
of Court) and deposit with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property. (Sec. 2, Rule 67). Due to its omission, however, respondents were constrained to file inverse condemnation
proceedings to demand the payment of just compensation before the trial court. NAPOCOR cannot invoke the
statutory prescriptive period to defeat respondent spouses’ constitutional right to just compensation. (National
Power Corporation v. Sps. Saludares, G.R. No. 189127, April 25, 2012).
No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential damages are
awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or decrease
in value. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI), G.R. No. 203039, September 11, 2013).

RA No. 8974 otherwise known as An Act to Facilitate Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure
Project and for Other Purposes provides for guidelines for expropriation proceedings.
The requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real property are:

36
(1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the defendant; (3)
payment of an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation
of the BIR including payment of the value of the improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation is
available and in cases of utmost urgency, the payment of the proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4)
presentation to the court of a certificate of availability of funds from the proper officials.
Upon compliance with the requirements, a complainant in an expropriation case is entitled to a writ of
possession as a matter of right, and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of
possession. No hearing is required, and the court exercises neither its discretion nor its judgment in determining the
amount of the provisional value of the properties to be expropriated, as the legislature has fixed the amount under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974. (Rep. v. Far East Ent. Inc., et al., G.R. No. 176487, August 25, 2009 citing Capitol
Steel Corp. v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, G.R. No. 169453, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 590).

PUBLIC OFFICERS

Reorganization must be done in good faith.

It is a well-established rule that a reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general
rule, the test of good faith lies in whether the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the
bureaucracy more efficient. Removal from office as a result of reorganization must, thus, pass the test of good
faith. A demotion in office, i.e., the movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment
with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve a reduction in salary, is
tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it. (Gayatano v. CSC, G.R. No. 93064, June 27, 1992, 210 SCRA 183).
Consequently, before a demotion may be effected pursuant to a reorganization, the observance of the rules on bona
fide abolition of public office is essential. (Bautista v. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010).

Nature of the power of Ombudsman to impose administrative liability.

It is already well-settled that “the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative
liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory.” (Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero, Jr., G.R. No.
172635, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 135). In Atty. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 396 (2005), the fact “that
the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with the order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring
officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action under Section 15(3) of RA 6670, is a strong indication that the
Ombudsman’s ‘recommendation’ is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of
law.” (Fajardo v. Officer of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012, Del Castillo, J). Under the
“threefold liability rule,” any act or omission of any public official or employee can result in criminal, civil, or
administrative liability, each of which is independent of the other. (Regidor, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 166086-92,
February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 244; Fajardo v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012).

ELECTION LAWS

Requirement to be met to justify the cancellation of a COC on the ground of material/false representation.
In order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation
pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a
candidate - the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. (Salcedo II v.
COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377, 386 [1999]). The material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to
qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification
necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code. (Villafuerte v. Commission
on Election, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014, 717 SCRA 312, 323, citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,
supra, at 389, citing RA 7160, Section 39 on qualifications). Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality,
the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. (Arnado v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015, Del Castillo, J).
So, when he stated in his COC that he was qualified to run despite using his foreign passport after renouncing his
other citizenship, he committed material misrepresentation.

Two (2) remedies to prevent candidate from running.

There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral
race. One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due course to or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy. In Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No. 182369, December 18, 2008, 574
SCRA 782, the Court has differentiated the two remedies thuswise:
[A] petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of
the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is
false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68
is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied
due course under Section 68 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Agustin v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 207105,
November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J).

37
Sections 78 and 68 of the OEC should not be confused.
A Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or confused with a Section 68 petition. The remedies
under the two sections are different, for they are based on different grounds, and can result in different eventualities.
A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC is
cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a
person who has not filed a CoC. Miranda v. Abaya has clarified that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68
can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person
whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not
considered a candidate (Talaga v. Comelec, G.R. No. 196804; 197015, October 9, 2012, Bersamin, J).

Nature of petition under Sec. 78.

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a
finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required
of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for
the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate. Indeed, a proceeding under Section 78 is likened to a quo warranto proceeding under Section
253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in
the fact that a “Section 78” petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after
proclamation of the winning candidate. (Agustin v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin,
J; see also Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No. 1823689, December 19, 2008, 574 SCRA
782).

False representation attempts to mislead, misinform electorates.

Requisite of material misrepresentation as a ground to cancel COC or to disqualify a candidate.
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
involves a finding not only that a person lacked a qualification for the office he is vying for but also that such he made
a material representation in the CoC that was false. It was stressed in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744, 769, that in addition to materiality there must be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render the candidate ineligible, viz.:
The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a “deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” Given the
purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the
would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78
addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where
the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The
deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the
consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs
and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
(See also Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra note 29, at 792; Salcedo II v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447, 455; (Agustin v. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J).).

Dual citizen cannot run for public office.

A dual citizen who renounced his other citizenship but used his foreign passport thereafter is not eligible to
run and be voted for as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte because after having renounced his USA
citizenship and having already filed his CoC, he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing
himself as a citizen of the USA. He continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels abroad despite having
been already issued his Philippine passport on August 23, 2012. He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of
renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time he used his USA passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on
October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from
October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012.
His continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA through using his USA passport after the
renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen. (Maquiling v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420). Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to
public office in the Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code for being a dual citizen.
A candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the
qualifications for elective office. (Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections). Even if it made no finding that the petitioner
had deliberately attempted to mislead or to misinform as to warrant the cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC could
still declare him disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility under the Local Government Code. (Agustin v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J; Arnado v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 210164, August
18, 2015, Del Castillo, J).

Effect if candidate was declared disqualified by final judgment before election day, effect on votes cast for him.
The effect of his disqualification depends upon when the disqualification attained finality. The distinction
exists because of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), which states that any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be

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disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Cayat v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163776, and G.R. No. 165736, April 24,
2007, 522 SCRA 23; Agustin v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015, Bersamin, J).

Conviction for libel; candidate is disqualified.

Someone who was convicted of the crime of libel run for public office is disqualified to run for public office,
because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code) which shall be
removed after the expiration of five years from his service of sentence.
In Teves v. Comelec, 604 Phil. 717 [2009], the five-year period of disqualification would end only on 25 May
2010 or five years from 24 May 2005, the day petitioner paid the fine he was sentenced to pay in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan. In this case, since he served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year
period shall end only on 16 February 2016. Thus, he is disqualified to become a Member of the House of
Representatives until then. (Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado v. HRET, et al., G.R. No. 219603, January 26, 2016, Carpio, J).

Election protest to be filed within 10 days is mandatory and jurisdictional requirement.

Jurisprudence teaches that the rule prescribing the 10-day reglementary period is mandatory and
jurisdictional, and that the filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives the court of jurisdiction over the
protest. Violation of this rule should neither be taken lightly nor brushed aside as a mere procedural lapse that can
be overlooked. The rule is not a mere technicality but an essential requirement, the non-compliance of which would
oust the court of jurisdiction over the case.
The rationale behind the non-extendible 10-day prescriptive period is not difficult to deduce – every
candidate interested in the outcome of the election is expected to be vigilant enough in protecting his or her votes
and would, therefore, enlist the aid of volunteer poll watchers in every clustered precinct to guard against or
document possible irregularities, or that the candidate would personally be present at or, at the very least, would
send representatives to the canvassing areas to ensure the proper tallying of votes and to monitor the real-time
results of the elections as they are electronically transmitted. Consequently, they are expected to know of the exact
moment the winning candidate is proclaimed by the board of canvassers concerned. (Maria Angela Garcia v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 216691, July 21, 2015, Velasco, J).

Concept of nuisance candidates.

Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy “to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention
to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of
the true will of the electorate.” (Timbol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015, Leonen, J).

Wreath of victory cannot be transferred to an ineligible candidate.

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal
mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any
other intervening circumstances his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date.
Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly
qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains
unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to
hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the
substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office. (Casan Macode Maquiling v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])

Substitution of candidate.
Substitution to be valid, the existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua not for a valid substitution.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the
candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a
valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much
the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate (Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July
28, 1999).
Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election
Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute
candidate submits prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code (Luna v.
Comelex, G.R. No. 165983, April 25, 2007; Talaga v. Comelec, G.R. No. 196804; 197015, October 9, 2012, Bersamin, J).

Substitution of under age candidate.

A minor who filed his certificate of candidacy as an official candidate of a party who subsequently withdrew
his certificate after the deadline of filing of certificates of candidacy may be substituted because she was an official
candidate/nominee of the party, hence, she can be validly substituted. Under Sec. 77 of BP 881, not just any person,
but only an official candidate of a registered political party may be substituted. In Luna v. COMELEC, 550 Phil. 284
[2007], the SC held that a candidate who was also under age, withdrew his COC before election day and was
substituted by a qualified candidate and it was held that substitution was proper.
If candidate made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy,
his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of

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candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code.
Moreover, the candidate has already withdrawn his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC declared
that he was not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless his certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in
accordance with Section 78 of the Election Code, his certificate of candidacy was valid and he may be validly
substituted by Luna. (Cerafica v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014, Perez, J).

Administrative Law

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

A resolution was issued by Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II) Board of Directors removing a
certain Setudo, Jr. as a member of the Board of Directors is not within the jurisdiction of the court to decide. The
National Electrification Administration has jurisdiction, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The NEA has the
power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives under Secs. 5 & 7. PD No. 1645, hence, the resolution
removing the Director within the power of NEA to review. The RTC has no jurisdiction (Samar II Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. Setudo, Jr., G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012, Peralta,J).
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes
into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has
been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al., G.R. No.
18487, August 15, 2011). In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the
judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be
unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. (Baguna v. Sps. Aggabao, et al., supra.).

Basis of the doctrine.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. (Public
Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 170599,
September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 73, 79; Montanez v. Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), G.R. No.
183142, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 217). The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and
complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose
of the case.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies; exceptions.

It is true that whenever a decision of an administrative agency may be questioned and the law provides for a
remedy of appeal within the administrative structure of government, there must be compliance with the same,
otherwise recourse to the courts directly would be improper for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The rule
regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not applicable (1) where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as
an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him,
or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, - Gonzales vs. Hechanova, L-
21897, October 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230; Abaya vs. Villegas, L-25641, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA; Mitra vs. Subido, L-
21691, September 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 127.
Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
(Cipriano vs. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291), when there is no due process observed (Villanos vs. Subido, 45 SCRA 299), or
where the protestant has no other recourse (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 637).

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Doctrine of Incorporation; The Doctrine of Transformation.

The doctrine of incorporation means that the rules of international law for part of the law of the land and no
legislative action is required to make them applicable to a country. The Philippines follows his doctrine, because
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution states that the Philippines adopt the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of transformation on the other hand requires that an international law principle be
transformed into domestic law through a constitutional mechanism, such as local legislation. (Pharmaceutical and
Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007). The transformation theory is
applied in the Philippines through treaty-making power of the President. Through this power, rules and principles
embodied in a treaty in force would be transformed into Philippine Law and shall become valid and effective upon
the concurrence of 2/3 of all members of the Senate.

Jurisdictional rules under the International Criminal Court.

The Roman Statute provides for the following jurisdiction:
1. ICC shall have the power to exercise jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern, covering the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the
crime of aggression as defined in the Statute. (Article 5, Rome Statute; Pimentel, Jr. V. Office of the
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005)
2. The Court shall have jurisdiction over the person of an accused only if the crime was committed in the
territory of a State a party to the Rome Statute or if the accused is a national of a State that is party to
the Rome Statute. (Article 12, Rome Statute)

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 3. A person shall not be criminally liable under the Rome Statute unless the conduct in question
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court and after the entry into
force of the Rome Statute. (Article 11 and 22, Rome Statute)

The Philippine Baseline Law (RA 9522) can constitutionally “convert” internal waters into archipelagic waters,
hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including over
flight.
Whether referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of the Constitution or as “archipelagic
waters” under UNCLOS III (Article 49(1)), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. The fact of
sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus,
domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional
powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passage. (Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011).

UNCLOS; balance State sovereignty.

Under Sec. 31 of the UNCLOS, a flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the
Coastal State resulting from non-compliance with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding
passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
Although the US has not yet ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long standing policy the US considers itself
bound by customary international rules on the traditional uses of the ocean as codified in the UNCLOS.
The international law of the sea is a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the sea,
the exploration of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public
international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans. The UNCLOS is a
multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by
the Philippines in 1984 and became into force on November 16, 1994.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the
principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum) (Bertrand Theodor L. Santos, “Untangling a Tangled Net of
Confusion: Reconciling the Philippine Fishery Poaching Law and the UNCLOS” World Bulletin, Vol. 18: 83-116 (July-
December 2002), p. 96). The freedom to use the world’s marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of
international law (Anne Bardin, “Coastal State’s Jurisdiction Over Foreign Vessels” 14 Pace Int’l. Rev. 27, 28 (2002)).
The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which
are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also
gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located.
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty,
subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the
territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil (Fr. Arigo, et al. v. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014).

Good Luck to All 2017 Bar Examinees

We Are Praying for Your Success

God Bless

From: ABRC Family

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