9 Ilusorio v. CA
9 Ilusorio v. CA
9 Ilusorio v. CA
SYNOPSIS
In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled
that petitioner has no cause of action against Manila Bank. To be entitled to
damages, petitioner has the burden of proving negligence on the part of the bank
for failure to detect the discrepancy in the signatures on the checks. It is incumbent
upon petitioner to establish the fact of forgery, i.e., by submitting his specimen
signatures and comparing them with those on the questioned checks. Petitioner, by
his own inaction, was precluded from setting up forgery.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J : p
This petition for review seeks to reverse the decision 1(1) promulgated on
January 28, 1999 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47942, affirming
the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV (now the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138) dismissing Civil Case No. 43907, for
damages.
Between the dates September 5, 1980 and January 23, 1981, Eugenio was
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able to encash and deposit to her personal account about seventeen (17) checks
drawn against the account of the petitioner at the respondent bank, with an
aggregate amount of P119,634.34. Petitioner did not bother to check his statement
of account until a business partner apprised him that he saw Eugenio use his credit
cards. Petitioner fired Eugenio immediately, and instituted a criminal action
against her for estafa thru falsification before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal. Private respondent, through an affidavit executed by its employee, Mr.
Dante Razon, also lodged a complaint for estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents against Eugenio on the basis of petitioner's statement that his signatures
in the checks were forged. 4(4) Mr. Razon's affidavit states:
Petitioner then requested the respondent bank to credit back and restore to
its account the value of the checks which were wrongfully encashed but
respondent bank refused. Hence, petitioner filed the instant case. 6(6)
At the trial, petitioner testified on his own behalf, attesting to the truth of
the circumstances as narrated above, and how he discovered the alleged forgeries.
Several employees of Manila Bank were also called to the witness stand as hostile
witnesses. They testified that it is the bank's standard operating procedure that
whenever a check is presented for encashment or clearing, the signature on the
check is first verified against the specimen signature cards on file with the bank.
After evaluating the evidence on both sides, the court a quo rendered
judgment on May 12, 1994 with the following dispositive portion:
SO ORDERED. 7(7)
SO ORDERED. 8(8)
Before us, petitioner ascribes the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
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23, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. 10(10)
Essentially the issues in this case are: (1) whether or not petitioner has a
cause of action against private respondent; and (2) whether or not private
respondent, in filing an estafa case against petitioner's secretary, is barred from
raising the defense that the fact of forgery was not established. aDSIHc
Petitioner contends that Manila Bank is liable for damages for its
negligence in failing to detect the discrepant checks. He adds that as a general rule
a bank which has obtained possession of a check upon an unauthorized or forged
endorsement of the payee's signature and which collects the amount of the check
from the drawee is liable for the proceeds thereof to the payee. Petitioner invokes
the doctrine of estoppel, saying that having itself instituted a forgery case against
Eugenio, Manila Bank is now estopped from asserting that the fact of forgery was
never proven.
For its part, Manila Bank contends that respondent appellate court did not
depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, hence there is
no reason for the reversal of its ruling. Manila Bank additionally points out that
Section 23 13(13) of the Negotiable Instruments Law is inapplicable, considering
that the fact of forgery was never proven. Lastly, the bank negates petitioner's
claim of estoppel. 14(14)
On the first issue, we find that petitioner has no cause of action against
Manila Bank. To be entitled to damages, petitioner has the burden of proving
negligence on the part of the bank for failure to detect the discrepancy in the
signatures on the checks. It is incumbent upon petitioner to establish the fact of
forgery, i.e., by submitting his specimen signatures and comparing them with those
on the questioned checks. Curiously though, petitioner failed to submit additional
specimen signatures as requested by the National Bureau of Investigation from
which to draw a conclusive finding regarding forgery. The Court of Appeals found
that petitioner, by his own inaction, was precluded from setting up forgery. Said
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the appellate court:
We cannot fault the court a quo for such declaration, considering that
the plaintiff's evidence on the alleged forgery is not convincing enough. The
burden to prove forgery was upon the plaintiff, which burden he failed to
discharge. Aside from his own testimony, the appellant presented no other
evidence to prove the fact of forgery. He did not even submit his own
specimen signatures, taken on or about the date of the questioned checks, for
examination and comparison with those of the subject checks. On the other
hand, the appellee presented specimen signature cards of the appellant, taken
at various years, namely, in 1976, 1979 and 1981 (Exhibits "1", "2", "3" and
"7"), showing variances in the appellant's unquestioned signatures. The
evidence further shows that the appellee, as soon as it was informed by the
appellant about his questioned signatures, sought to borrow the questioned
checks from the appellant for purposes of analysis and examination (Exhibit
"9"), but the same was denied by the appellant. It was also the former which
sought the assistance of the NBI for an expert analysis of the signatures on
the questioned checks, but the same was unsuccessful for lack of sufficient
specimen signatures. 15 (15)
As borne by the records, it was petitioner, not the bank, who was negligent.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
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those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.
17(17) In the present case, it appears that petitioner accorded his secretary unusual
degree of trust and unrestricted access to his credit cards, passbooks, check books,
bank statements, including custody and possession of cancelled checks and
reconciliation of accounts. Said the Court of Appeals on this matter:
Moreover, the appellant had introduced his secretary to the bank for
purposes of reconciliation of his account, through a letter dated July 14, 1980
(Exhibit "8"). Thus, the said secretary became a familiar figure in the bank.
What is worse, whenever the bank verifiers call the office of the appellant, it
is the same secretary who answers and confirms the checks.
The trouble is, the appellant had put so much trust and confidence in
the said secretary, by entrusting not only his credit cards with her but also his
checkbook with blank checks. He also entrusted to her the verification and
reconciliation of his account. Further adding to his injury was the fact that
while the bank was sending him the monthly Statements of Accounts, he was
not personally checking the same. His testimony did not indicate that he was
out of the country during the period covered by the checks. Thus, he had all
the opportunities to verify his account as well as the cancelled checks issued
thereunder — month after month. But he did not, until his partner asked him
whether he had entrusted his credit card to his secretary because the said
partner had seen her use the same. It was only then that he was minded to
verify the records of his account. 18(18)
The abovecited findings are binding upon the reviewing court. We stress the
rule that the factual findings of a trial court, especially when affirmed by the
appellate court, are binding upon us 19(19) and entitled to utmost respect 20(20)
and even finality. We find no palpable error that would warrant a reversal of the
appellate court's assessment of facts anchored upon the evidence on record. SCHIcT
On the second issue, the fact that Manila Bank had filed a case for estafa
against Eugenio would not estop it from asserting the fact that forgery has not been
clearly established. Petitioner cannot hold private respondent in estoppel for the
latter is not the actual party to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is
the plaintiff, for the commission of a felony is an offense against the State. 25(25)
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court the complaint or
information filed in court is required to be brought in the name of the "People of
the Philippines." 26(26)
All told, we find no reversible error that can be ascribed to the Court of
Appeals. AaIDHS
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 26-30.
2. Also spelled as "Catherine" in some parts of the record.
3. Rollo, p. 26.
4. TSN, October 6, 1983, p. 58.
5. Rollo, pp. 108-109.
6. Id. at 27.
7. Ibid.
8. Id. at 30.
9. Id. at 10.
10. Id. at 14.
11. Id. at 15.
12. Id. at 17.
13. Sec. 23. Forged signature, effect of. When a signature is forged or made without
the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly
inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor,
or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through
or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such
right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.
14. Rollo, p. 49.
15. Id. at 28.
16. Id. at 29.
17. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 641, 657 (2000).
18. Supra, note 16.
19. Lorenzana vs. People, 353 SCRA 396, 403 (2001).
20. Ong vs. CA, 272 SCRA 725, 730 (1997).
21. Supra, note 17 at 659.
22. Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate
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cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. . . .
23. 252 SCRA 620, 633 (1996).
24. 269 SCRA 695, 703-710 (1997).
25. Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65, 100 (1999).
26. SEC. 2. The complaint or information. — The complaint or information shall be in
writing, in the name of the People of the Philippines and against all persons who
appear to be responsible for the offense involved.
27. Rollo, p. 9.
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Endnotes
1 (Popup - Popup)
1. Rollo, pp. 26-30.
2 (Popup - Popup)
2. Also spelled as "Catherine" in some parts of the record.
3 (Popup - Popup)
3. Rollo, p. 26.
4 (Popup - Popup)
4. TSN, October 6, 1983, p. 58.
5 (Popup - Popup)
5. Rollo, pp. 108-109.
6 (Popup - Popup)
6. Id. at 27.
7 (Popup - Popup)
7. Ibid.
8 (Popup - Popup)
8. Id. at 30.
9 (Popup - Popup)
9. Id. at 10.
10 (Popup - Popup)
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10. Id. at 14.
11 (Popup - Popup)
11. Id. at 15.
12 (Popup - Popup)
12. Id. at 17.
13 (Popup - Popup)
13. Sec. 23. Forged signature, effect of. When a signature is forged or made without
the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly
inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor,
or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through
or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such
right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.
14 (Popup - Popup)
14. Rollo, p. 49.
15 (Popup - Popup)
15. Id. at 28.
16 (Popup - Popup)
16. Id. at 29.
17 (Popup - Popup)
17. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 641, 657 (2000).
18 (Popup - Popup)
18. Supra, note 16.
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19 (Popup - Popup)
19. Lorenzana vs. People, 353 SCRA 396, 403 (2001).
20 (Popup - Popup)
20. Ong vs. CA, 272 SCRA 725, 730 (1997).
21 (Popup - Popup)
21. Supra, note 17 at 659.
22 (Popup - Popup)
22. Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. . . .
23 (Popup - Popup)
23. 252 SCRA 620, 633 (1996).
24 (Popup - Popup)
24. 269 SCRA 695, 703-710 (1997).
25 (Popup - Popup)
25. Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65, 100 (1999).
26 (Popup - Popup)
26. SEC. 2. The complaint or information. — The complaint or information shall be in
writing, in the name of the People of the Philippines and against all persons who
appear to be responsible for the offense involved.
27 (Popup - Popup)
27. Rollo, p. 9.
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