Central Mindanao University Vs Republic Full Text

Central Mindanao University vs.
Republic
GR No. 195026 February 22, 2016
(Full Text)
For this Court's resolution is a petition for review on certiorari dated January 14, 2011 filed by
petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1
dated December 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which annulled the Decision2 dated
December 22, 1971, the Amended Decision3 dated October 7, 1972 and the Second Amended
Decision4 dated September 12, 1974 rendered by the then Court of First Instance (CFI), 15th
Judicial District, Branch II of Bukidnon and annulled the Decrees No. N-154065, N-154066 and N154067 issued in favor of petitioner and the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-160, OCT No.
0-161 and OCT No. 0-162 registered in petitioner's name on January 29, 1975.
The facts follow:
Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is an agricultural educational institution owned and
run by the State established by virtue of Republic Act No. 4498.5 It is represented by its
President, Dr. Maria Luisa R. Soliven in accordance with CMU Board of Regents Resolution No. 02,
s. 2011.6
The subjects of the controversy are two parcels of land situated at Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon
identified as "Sheet 1, Lot 1 of Ir-1031-D" consisting of 20,619,175 square meters, and "Sheet 2,
Lot 2 of Ir-1031-D" consisting of 13,391,795 square meters, more or less.7
In 1946, CMU took possession of the subject parcels of land and started construction for the
school site upon the confirmation of the Secretary of Public Instruction.8 However, during the
final survey in 1952, CMU discovered that there were several adverse claimants, holders,
possessors and occupants of the portions of lots identified as school sites.9
On January 16, 1958, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and pursuant to the provisions of Section 8310 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141,
otherwise known as Public Land Act, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 47611
which reserved certain portions of the public domain in Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon for
petitioner CMU's (formerly Mindanao Agricultural College) site purposes.12 The said parcels of
land were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for CMU's school site purposes,
"subject to private rights, if any there be."
In a letter dated October 27, 1960, the Director of Lands Zoilo Castrillo formally requested the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that he be authorized under Section 87 of C.A.
No. 141, to file in the CFI of Bukidnon an application for the compulsory registration of the
parcels of land reserved by President Garcia under Proclamation No. 476 as CMU's school site
purposes.13
In the first indorsement dated November 9, 1960, the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, through its Undersecretary Salvador F. Cunanan, forwarded to the Executive
Secretary a recommendation that the Director of Lands be authorized to file the said
application.14
Thereafter, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C.
Quema, in the second indorsement dated December 12, 1960, authorized and directed the
Director of Lands to file the necessary petition in the CFI of Bukidnon for the compulsory
registration of the parcels of land reserved for CMU.15
Department Legal Counsel Alejandro V. Recto, in the indorsement dated December 28, 1960,
communicated the said directive and authority granted to the Director of Lands to file the
application for compulsory registration.16
On January 31, 1961, the Director of Lands filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance of
Bukidnon for the settlement and adjudication of the title of the parcels of land reserved in favor
of CMU, and for the determination of the rights of adverse claimants in relation to the reservation
of the land.17
The cadastral court, in its Decision dated December 22, 1971 in Land Registration Case Cadastral
Rec. No. 414, declared that the subject parcels of land as public land included in the reservation
for CMU, and be registered in its name, except for specified portions adjudicated to other
persons.18 The court also gave the other 18 claimants an opportunity to acquire full ownership
in the subject parcels of land.19 Hence, the court reduced the claim of CMU to 3,041 hectares of
total land area.20 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
In view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Lot No. 1
containing an approximate area of 20,619,175 square meters and Lot No. 2 containing an area of
13,391,795 square meters, both situated in the barrio of Musuan, municipality of Maramag,
Bukidnon, as described in the survey plans and technical descriptions approved by the Director
of Lands as IR-1031-D, marked as Exhibits "D" and "D-l" of the Central Mindanao University, as
public land included in the reservation in favor of said University by virtue of Proclamation No.
476, series of 1958, of the President of the Philippines, which may be registered in its name,
except such portions hereinbelow specified which are adjudicated in favor of the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Venancio Olohoy, married, and Esmeralda Lauga, married to Julio Sagde, both of legal ages
and residents of Valencia, Bukidnon- 17.75 hectares of Lot No.l as shown in the survey plan (Exh.
"D");
2. Martina Songkit, of legal age, married to Martin Binanos and resident of Maramag, Bukidnon 3 hectares of Lot No. 2 as shown in the plan Exh. "D-l";
3. Pablo Saldivar, widower, of legal age and resident of Dologon, Maramag, Bukidnon- 12
hectares of Lot No. 2 as indicated in the survey plan Exh. "D-l" above- mentioned;
4. Fernando Bungcas, married to Feliciana Gayonan and resident of Dologon, Maramag- 6
hectares of Lot No. 2;
5. Cerilo Salicubay, married to Valentina Bento, and Virginia Salicubay, married to Ricardo
Tunasan, both of legal ages and residents of Panalsalan, Maramag, Bukidnon, share and share
alike, - 4 hectares of Lot No. 2
6. Rosita Lupiahan, of legal age, married to Simplicio Alba and resident of Maramag, Bukidnon - 4
hectares of Lot No. 2.
The areas herein adjudicated to the above-named private individuals should be surveyed and
each lot given a separate number with their corresponding technical descriptions.
Considering, however, that the Court rejected most of the claim due to the dubious nature of the
occupation of the claimants prior to the take-over by the College, now University, in 1946 but
most of them remained on the land up to the present time, in order to avoid possible injustice
and in line with the national objective of providing land for the landless, it is hereby
recommended that the claimants enumerated hereunder who filed answers and presented
evidence which, nevertheless, was found short of the requirements for a decree of registration,
be given the opportunity to acquire full ownership thereof through a homestead, or free patent
application if they are landless persons, otherwise by means of a sales application if they are
already owners of other pieces of real estate, after a corresponding amendment of the Executive
Proclamation through the avenues allowed by law. The following claimants may be considered for
that purpose, namely:
Geronimo Aniceto and his sister Francisca Aniceto- 12 hectares of Lot No. 2;
Bonifacio Aniceto- 6 hectares of Lot No. 2;
Julita Aniceto- 12 hectares of Lot No. 2;
Maximo Nulo- 5 hectares of Lot No. 2;
Magno Sepada- 3 hectares of Lot No. 1;
Eulogio Guimba- 12 hectares of Lot No. 2;
Mario Baguhin and his wife, Treponia Dagoplo 18 hectares of Lot No. 2;
Aniceto Nayawan- 12 hectares of Lot No. 2;
Eduardo Saloay-ay- 13 hectares of Lot No. 2;
Arcadio Belmis and his wife Beatriz Lauga- 24 hectares of Lot No. 1;
Vitaliano Lauga- 24 hectares of Lot No. 1;
Procopio Abellar- 12 hectares of Lot No. 1;
Rufino Dador- 12 hectares of Lot No. 1;
Roque Larayan- 12 hectares of Lot No. 1;
Benito Lutad- 12 hectares of Lot No. 1;
Juliana Pasamonte- 11 hectares of Lot No. 1;
Tirso Pimentel- 19 hectares of Lot No. 1; and
Dativa P. Velez- 18 hectares of Lot No. 1.

Should the above recommendation be given due course, it is further suggested that those
claimants included in the said recommendation who are now occupying portions of Lot No. 2
situated above the university grounds on the hillside which they have already denuded, should
be transferred to the lower portions of the land near or along the Pulangi river in order to enable
the University to reforest the hillside to protect the watershed of its irrigation system and water
supply.
After this decision become final and the portions adjudicated to private persons have been
segregated and their corresponding technical descriptions provided, the order of the issuance of
the corresponding decree and the certificates of title shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Upon the submission of the parties of the compromise agreement through a Joint Manifestation,
the cadastral court rendered its Amended Decision dated October 7, 1972 adjudicating in full
ownership of some portions of the subject lots to the 29 groups of claimants.22 A portion of the
fallo of the amended decision reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the evidence presented and the compromise agreement submitted by
the parties, the decision rendered by this Court on December 22, 1971 is hereby AMENDED and
another one entered ADJUDICATING in full ownership to the claimants hereinbelow specified the
following portions of the lots in questions, to wit:
xxxx
The remaining portions of Lots 1 and 2 not otherwise adjudicated to any of the above-named
private claimants are hereby ADJUDICATED in full ownership to the Central Mindanao State
University. It is hereby directed that the different portions of Lots 1 and 2 hereinabove granted to
private claimants must [be segregated] by a competent surveyor and given their technical
descriptions and corresponding lot numbers for purposes of the issuance of certificates of title in
their favor.
It is, however, ordered that the area adjacent and around or near the watersheds or sources of
Lot No. 2 adjudicated to any of the private claimants specified in the foregoing paragraph may be
replaced or substituted to the Central Mindanao State University with other areas of equal extent
in either Lot 1 or 2, should said University desire to do so in order to protect and conserve the
watersheds.
The findings and resolutions made by the Court in its original decision not affected by the
amendments incorporated elsewhere herein shall stand.
The petition from relief from judgment presented by Lucio Butad which the Court finds without
merit is hereby denied.
Once the decision becomes final and the subdivision directed in the preceding paragraph has
been accomplished, the order for the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration and
the certificates of title in favor of each and every adjudicatee shall likewise issue.
Based on the Order made by the court that those portions of the private claimants in the area
adjacent and around, or near the watersheds of Lot No. 2 may be replaced or substituted by CMU
with areas of equal extent, the 16 grantees entered into an agreement with CMU for the
replacement of the areas adjudicated to them with those outside the watershed vicinity or
beyond the area necessary for the proper development, administration, supervision and
utilization of the portion adjudicated to CMU.24
Thereafter, the cadastral court, in its second amendment of the Decision dated September 12,
1974, ordered that the specific portions of the subject lots be adjudicated to the 33 claimants as
indicated in their agreement.25 It also awarded to CMU Lot 1-S (18,531,671 square meters), Lot
2-A (10,001 square meters), and Lot 2-Q (12,266,524 square meters).26 On January 25, 1975,
the court issued Decrees No. N-154065, N-154066, and N-154067 in favor of CMU.27
Consequently, OCT Nos. 0-160, 0-161 and 0-162 were registered in the name of CMU on January
29, 1975.28 The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding said manifestation and agreement of the parties in order, the dispositive
portions of the amended decision rendered by this Court on October 7, 1972 aforementioned is
further amended such that the lots specified hereunder and more particularly indicated in the
revised plans and technical descriptions above-mentioned are hereby adjudicated as follows:
To Roque Larayan, Lot 1-A with an area of 120.001 square meters;
To Fernanda Bungcas, Lot 1-B with an area of 60.00 square meters;
To Tirso Pimentel, Lot 1-C with an area of 190.000 square meters;
To Juliana Pasamonte, Lot 1-D with an area of 109.999 square meters;
To Dativa Velez, Lot 1-E with an area of 180.00 square meters;
To Mario Bagubin, Lot 1-F with an area of 60.00 square meters;
To Triponia Dagoplo, Lot 1-G with an area of 60.001 square meters;
To Mario Baguhin, Lot 1-H with an area of 60.001 square meters;
To Celerina Guimba, Lot 1-1 with an area of 30.001 square meters;
To Constantino Baston, Lot 1-J with an area of 30.001 square meters;
To Maximo Nulo, Lot 1-K with an area of 49.999 square meters;
To Beatriz Lauga, Lot 1-L with an area of 100.00 square meters;
To Evorcio Olohoy, Lot 1-M with an area of 177.500 square meters;
To Arcadio Belmis, Lot 1-N with an area of 140.000 square meters;
To Luciano Namuag, Lot 1-0 with an area of 240.000 square meters;
To Vitaliano Lauga, Lot 1-P with an area of 240.000 square meters;
To Rufino Dador, Lot 1-Q with an area of 120.00 square meters;
To Procopio Abellar, Lot 1-B with an area of 120.001 square meters;
To Eduardo Saloay-ay, Lot 2-B with an area of 130.000 square meters;
To Francisco Anecito, Lot 2-C with an area of 120.000 square meters;
To Julita Anecito, Lot 2-D with an area of 60.000 square meters;
To Vicente Buntan, Lot 2-E with an area of 30.000 square meters;
To Victoriano Lacorda, Lot 2-F with an area of 130.000 square meters;
To Cerilo Salicubay, Lot 2-G with an area of 40.000 square meters;
To Julita Anecito, Lot 2-H with an area of 60.000 square meters;
To Benito Butad, Lot 2-1 with an area of 120.000 square meters;
To Pablo Zaldivar, Lot 2-J with an area of 120.000 square meters;
To Magno Sepada, Lot 2-K with an area of 30.000 square meters;
To Anecito Nayawan, Lot 2-L with an area of 120.000 square meters;
To Bonifacio Anecito, Lot 2-M with an area of 60.001 square meters;
To Eulogio Guimba, Lot 2-N with an area of 120.001 square meters;
To Martina Songkit, Lot 2-0 with an area of 30.000 square meters;
To Rosita Lapianan, Lot 2-P with an area of 40.000 square meters;
To Central Mindanao State University; Lot 1-S with an area of 18,531.671 square meters;
To Central Mindanao State University; Lot 2-A with an area of 10.001 square meters;
To Central Mindanao State University, Lot 2-Q with an area of 12,266,524 square meters;
The findings and resolutions made by this Court in its original decision not affected by the
amendments incorporated herein shall remain in force.
Once this decision becomes final, the order for the issuance of the corresponding decrees of
registration and the certification of title in favor of each and every adjudicates shall likewise
issue.
On December 15, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed before
the CA a petition for annulment of the Decision dated September 12, 1974 by the cadastral court
granting in favor of CMU the title to the subject parcels of land.
The Republic argued that the cadastral court should have summarily dismissed the registration
proceedings since the Solicitor General did not sign or file the petition for compulsory registration
of the parcels of land, as provided in Sections 5330 and 8731 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.32 It
also alleged that the subject parcels of land are inalienable lands of public domain.33 It
maintained that the cadastral court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res; hence, the entire
proceedings of the case should be null and void.
Accordingly, the CA ruled in favor of the respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 1) Decision dated December 22, 1971, 2)
Amended Decision dated October 7, 1972 and 3) Second Amended Decision dated September
12, 1974, all rendered by the Court of First Instance, 15th Judicial District, Branch II, Bukidnon
Province, in "L.R.C. Cad. Rec. No. 414, Sec. 87 of Commonwealth Act 141, Ir-1031-D (Lots 1 & 2),
Maramag, Bukidnon, insofar as they adjudicated a portion of the land covered by Proclamation
No. 476 to the Central Mindanao University, are declared NULL and VOID.
Consequently, 1) Decrees No. N-154065, N-154066 and N-l 54067 issued in favor of the
University on January 24, 1975; and 2) Original Certificates of Title (OCT) No. 0-160 (covering Lot
1-S), No. 0-161 (for Lot 2-A) and No. 0-162 (for Lot 2-Q) registered in the University's name on
January 29, 1975, are likewise declared NULL AND VOID.
The CA ruled that there was no sufficient proof of a positive act by the government, such as
presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau
of Lands investigators, or a legislative act or statute, which declared the land of the public
domain alienable and disposable.35 The documents adduced by CMU did not expressly declare
that the covered land is already alienable and disposable and that one of such documents was
merely signed by the Assistant Executive Secretary.36
According to the CA, CMU was unable to prove that the subject land ceased to have the status of
a reservation.37 However, the CA clarified that despite nullification of the titles in its favor, CMU
is still the rightful possessor of the subject property by virtue of Proclamation No. 476.38
Hence, the petitioner CMU filed the present petition before this Court raising the sole issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals:
committed a serious and grave error and gravely abused its discretion on a question of law, and
ruled and decided a question of substance in a way and manner not in accord with law and
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court
in granting the petition for annulment of judgment filed by respondent on the ground that the
cadastral court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the specific res of the subject
matter of the petition below for the reason that the subject lands are inalienable and nondisposable lands of the public domain.39
CMU maintains that the CA has completely misconstrued the facts of the cadastral proceedings
since the documents it presented showed that the subject property has already been declared,
classified, and certified by the Office of the President as alienable and disposable
lands.40cralawred
Particularly, CMU alleges that the specific and express authorization and the directive, as
embodied in the Second Indorsement41 dated December 12, 1960, from the President, through
the then Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema, authorizing the Director of Lands to
file the necessary petition in the CFI of Bukidnon for compulsory registration of the parcels of
land reserved for CMU's site purposes is equivalent to a declaration and certification by the
Office of the President that the subject parcels of land are alienable and disposable.42
CMU has cited the case of Republic v. Judge De la Rosa43 wherein the then President Quirino
issued on June 22, 1951 a directive authorizing the Director of Lands to file the necessary
petition in the CFI of Isabela for the settlement and adjudication of the titles to the tract of land
involved in the Gamu Public Lands Subdivision, Pls-62, Case 5. This Court held that the said
presidential directive was equivalent to a declaration and certification that the subject land area
is alienable and disposable.44
This Court finds the instant petition without merit.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony.45 Also, the doctrine states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.46 Consequently, the person
applying for registration has the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of ownership of
lands of the public domain.47
To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable
and disposable must be established.48 Hence, a public land remains part of the inalienable
public domain unless it is shown to have been reclassified and alienated by the State to a private
person.49
As noted, Proclamation No. 476 issued by then President Garcia, decreeing certain portions of the
public domain in Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon for CMU's site purposes, was issued pursuant to
Section 83 of C.A. No. 141. Being reserved as CMU's school site, the said parcels of land were
withdrawn from sale and settlement, and reserved for CMU. Under Section 88 of the same Act,
the reserved parcels of land would ordinarily be inalienable and not subject to occupation, entry,
sale, lease or other disposition, subject to an exception, viz.:
Section 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall
be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition
until again declared alienable under the provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the
President. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of Navy Officers' Village Association, Inc. v. Republic,50 it was held that parcels of
land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses: (1) are non-alienable and nondisposable in view of Section 88 (in relation with Section 8) of C.A. No. 141, specifically declaring
them as non-alienable and not subject to disposition; and (2) they remain public domain lands
until they are actually disposed of in favor of private persons.51 In other words, lands of the
public domain classified as reservations remain to be property of the public dominion until
withdrawn from the public or quasi-public use for which they have been reserved, by act of
Congress or by proclamation of the President, or otherwise positively declared to have been
converted to patrimonial property.52
In the case at bar, CMU relies on the Court's ruling in the De la Rosa53 case that the directive
from the President authorizing the Director of Lands to file the necessary petition for the
compulsory registration of the parcels of land so reserved is the equivalent of the declaration and
certification that the subject land is alienable and disposable. As such, CMU avows that the
subject lots, as declared alienable and disposable, are properly registered in its name.
This Court finds that the De la Rosa case does not apply in the instant petition because of the
varying factual settings, to wit:
In De la Rosa, the Mallig Plains Reservation was reserved by the President for settlement
purposes under the administration of National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA), later
replaced by Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO), while the subject lots in
the present case was reserved for educational purposes, e.g. as CMU's school site, under the
administration of the Board of Trustees of CMU.
The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration, when it replaced LASEDECO,
excluded the Mallig Plains Reservation among the properties it needed in carrying out the
purposes and objectives of Republic Act No. 1160,54 thus, the Reservation eventually reverted to
and became public agricultural land. There was no evidence that CMU ceased to use and occupy
the reserved lots in Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon as its school site or that its public purpose is
abandoned, for the lots to revert to and become public agricultural land.
At the time that President Quirino issued the directive, the Gamu Public Land Subdivision in the
Mallig Plains Reservation was not reserved for public or quasi-public purpose or has ceased to be
so. On the other hand, the subject lots in Bukidnon are reserved for public purpose when the
President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, issued the said directive.
In the De la Rosa case, the private respondent was a qualified private claimant with the requisite
period of possession of the subject residential lot in his favor. Meanwhile, CMU is not a private
claimant of the land so reserved.
It was explicated in De la Rosa55 that the authority of the President to issue such a directive,
held as equivalent to a declaration and certification that the subject land area is alienable and
disposable, finds support in Section 7 of C.A. No. 141, to wit:
Sec. 7. For purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands,
the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from
time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act. (Emphasis
supplied).
However, the said directive by the President is limited to those enumerated in Section 8 of C.A.
No. 141, which provides that:
Section 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been
reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner
become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this
Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have
ceased to be so. However, the President may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the
public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or
been surveyed, or may, for the same reason, suspend their concession or disposition until they
are again declared open to concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of
the National Assembly. (Emphases supplied)
As can be gleaned from the above provision, the lands which can be declared open to disposition
or concession are those which have been officially delimited and classified, or when practicable
surveyed; those not reserved for public or quasi-public purpose; those not appropriated by the
Government; those which have not become private property in any manner; those which have no
private right authorized and recognized by C.A. No. 141 or any other valid law may be claimed;
or those which have ceased to be reserved or appropriated.
For the said President's directive to file the necessary petition for compulsory registration of
parcels of land be considered as an equivalent of a declaration that the land is alienable and
disposable, the subject land, among others, should not have been reserved for public or quasipublic purposes.
Therefore, the said directive on December 12, 1960 cannot be considered as a declaration that
said land is alienable and disposable. Unlike in De la Rosa, the lands, having been reserved for
public purpose by virtue of Proclamation No. 476, have not ceased to be so at the time the said
directive was made. Hence, the lots did not revert to and become public agricultural land for
them to be the subject of a declaration by the President that the same are alienable and
disposable.
We have ruled in the case of CMU v. DARAB56 that the CMU land reservation is not alienable and
disposable land of public domain, viz.:
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the [Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program] CARP because:
(1) It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
(2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress;
(3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU;
(4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site and campus, including
experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling
research and pilot production centers.
The inalienable character of the lands as part of the long term functions of autonomous
agricultural educational institution is reiterated in CMU v. Executive Secretary:57
It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by proclamation to
appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. As already
stated, the lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia
dedicated them for CMU's use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture.
They have ceased to be alienable public lands.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This Court is not unmindful of its earlier pronouncement in CMU v. DARAB that the land
reservation is a private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU. This
pronouncement, which is now being argued by CMU as one of its bases in convincing this Court
that the subject property is owned by it and already alienable, is specious. The 1992 CMU case
merely enumerated the reasons why the said portion of the property is beyond the coverage of
CARP. Moreover, the fact that the Court had already settled the inalienable character of the
subject property as part of the long term functions of the autonomous agricultural educational
institution in the case of CMU v. DARAB and reiterated in CMU v. Executive Secretary, belies
CMU's contention that this Court has recognized that the said land is a private property or that
the land is alienable and disposable.
As to what constitutes alienable and disposable land of the public domain, this Court expounds in
its pronouncements in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v.
Yap:59
xxxx
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim)
is alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure
a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been nossessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.60ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the case at bar, CMU failed to establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land
reservations registered in its name are alienable and disposable lands of public domain. Aside
from the series of indorsements regarding the filing of the application for the compulsory
registration of the parcels of land and the said directive from the President, CMU did not present
any proof of a positive act of the government declaring the said lands alienable and disposable.
For lack of proof that the said land reservations have been reclassified as alienable and
disposable, the said lands remain part of inalienable public domain, hence; they are not
registrable under Torrens system.
This Court will not discuss the other issue raised by CMU, e.g., the filing of the petition for
cadastral proceeding was pursuant to the written consent, authorization and directive of the
OSG, as the same was not discussed in the assailed Decision of the CA. This Court also dismisses
the other issue raised that the titles in CMU's name were singled out by respondent- for lack of
evidence.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari dated January 14, 2011 filed by petitioner
Central Mindanao University is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated December 30, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81301 is hereby AFFIRMED. The proceedings in the Court of
First Instance, 15th Judicial District, Branch II of Bukidnon is NULL and VOID. Accordingly, Original
Certificate of Title Nos. 0-160, OCT No. 0-161 and OCT No. 0-162 issued in the name of petitioner,
are CANCELLED. Sheet 1, Lot 1 of Ir-1031-D and Sheet 2, Lot 2 of Ir-1031 -D are ORDERED
REVERTED to the public domain.
Republic vs. Zuburban Realty and Development Corp.

GR No. 164408 March 24, 2014
Facts:
Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed with RTC an application for original
registration of land. Director of Lands opposed it arguing that applicant and its predecessor in
interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of
land since June 12, 1945.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Zurbaran.
On appeal to SC, the Republic appealed arguing that Zurbaran failed to establish the time when
the land became alienable and disposable, which is crucial in determining whether Zuburan
acquired the land by prescription.
ISSUE: What are the substantive elements in filing an application for original registration of land?
RULING:
The requirements depend on what basis the application was filed..
The following are the bases for application:
1. On the basis of possession, wherein you need to show the following:
a. The land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain (Example of non-alienable
lands are forests, lakeshores, etc)
b. the applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and
c. the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the land since June
12, 1945, or earlier
Note: Land need not be declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is
sufficient that property is alienable and disposable at the time of application (Malaban vs.
Republic)
2. On the basis of prescription, wherein you need to prove the following:
a. Land is alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property
b. continuous possession of land for at least 10 years in good faith and with just title OR 30 years
regardless of good faith or bad faith.
c. Land is converted or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of 10-year
or 30-year period of possession.
Only patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription (Article 1113 of Civil
Code). Property of public dominion, if not longer intended for public use or service, shall form
part of patrimonial property of State. (Article 422 of Civil Code)
Here, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public use, service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
In the case at bar, the application did not state when their possession and occupation
commenced (no allegation that they have been in possession since June 12, 1945) and the
duration. So the application is based on prescription. Here, there is no evidence showing that the
land in question was within an area expressly declared by law either to be the patrimonial
property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth.
Republic vs. Andrea Tan
GR No. 199537 February 10, 2016
(Full Text)
Antecedents
On October 2, 2002, Tan applied for the original registration of title of Lot No. 4080, Cad. 545-D
(new) situated in Casili, Consolacion, Cebu (the subject lot). She alleged that she is the absolute
owner in fee simple of the said 7,807 square-meter parcel of residential land she purchased from
a certain Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992. Her application was docketed as LRC Case No.
N-144.
After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the land registration court issued an order
of general default, excepting the State which was duly represented by the Solicitor General.
During the trial, Tan proved the following facts:
The subject lot is within Block 1, Project No. 28, per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu;
The subject lot was declared alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965, pursuant to
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063;
Luciano Gonzaga who was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 01465 in 1965 and 02983 in 1972 initially
possessed the subject lot.
After Luciano's death, Julian Gonzaga inherited the subject lot;
Andrea Tan purchased the subject lot from Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992;
She, through her predecessors, had been in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years.
On 28 April 2004, the land registration court granted Tan's application. The court confirmed her
title over the subject lot and ordered its registration.
The Republic appealed the case to the CA, arguing that Tan failed to prove that she is a Filipino
citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject lot, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of her application. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702.
On May 29, 2009, the CA denied the appeal. The CA observed that under the Public Land Act,
there are two kinds of applicants for original registration: (1) those who had possessed the land
since June 12, 1945; and (2) those who already acquired the property through prescription. The
respondent's application fell under the second category.
The CA noted that before land of the public domain can be acquired by prescription, it must have
been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land. The CA pointed to the certification
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) as evidence that
the subject was classified as alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965, pursuant to Land
Classification Project No. 28. The CA concluded that Tan had already acquired the subject lot by
prescription.
On July 2, 2009, the Republic moved for reconsideration. Citing Republic v. Herbieto,4 it argued
that an applicant for judicial confirmation of title must have been in possession and occupation of
the subject land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and that the subject land has been likewise
already declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, or earlier.5
On October 18, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration citing the then recent case of
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Rep. of the Philippines6 which abandoned the ruling in Herbieto.
Malabanan declared that our law does not require that the property should have been declared
alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, as long as the declaration was made before the
application for registration is filed.7
On January 5, 2012, the Republic filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
The Petition
The Republic argues: (1) that the CA misapplied the doctrine in Malabanan; and (2) that the
CENRO certification and tax declarations presented were insufficient to prove that the subject lot
was no longer intended for public use.
Meanwhile, the respondent insists that she has already proven her title over the subject lot. She
maintains that the classification of the subject lot as alienable and disposable public land by the
DENR on September 1, 1965, per Land Classification Project No. 28, converted it into patrimonial
property of the State.
From the submissions, the lone issue is whether a declaration that Government-owned land has
become alienable and disposable sufficiently converts it into patrimonial property of the State,
making it susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
Our Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State. It is the fountain from which springs any
asserted right of ownership over land. Accordingly, the State owns all lands that are not clearly
within private ownership. This is the Regalian Doctrine which has been incorporated in all of our
Constitutions and repeatedly embraced in jurisprudence.8 Under the present Constitution, lands
of the public domain are not alienable except for agricultural lands.9
The Public Land Act10 (PLA) governs the classification, grant, and disposition of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. It is the primary substantive law on this matter. Section 11
thereof recognizes judicial confirmation of imperfect titles as a mode of disposition of alienable
public lands.11 Relative thereto, Section 48(b) of the PLA identifies who are entitled to judicial
confirmation of their title:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter. (As amended by PD 1073.)
The Property Registration Decree12 (PRD) complements the PLA by prescribing how registrable
lands, including alienable public lands, are brought within the coverage of the Torrens system.
Section 14 of the PRD enumerates the qualified applicants for original registration of title:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,1945, or earlier;
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws;
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws;
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by
law.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The PRD also recognizes prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.14
Nevertheless, prescription under Section 14(2) must not be confused with judicial confirmation of
title under Section 14(1). Judicial confirmation of title requires:
That the applicant is a Filipino citizen;15
That the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property since June 12,
1945;16
That the property had been declared alienable and disposable as of the filing of the
application.17
Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is outside the
commerce of man.18 It cannot be the object of prescription19 because prescription does not run
against the State in its sovereign capacity.20 However, when property of public dominion is no
longer intended for public use or for public service, it becomes part of the patrimonial property of
the State.21 When this happens, the property is withdrawn from public dominion and becomes
property of private ownership, albeit still owned by the State.22 The property is now brought
within the commerce of man and becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and
prescription.
In the present case, respondent Tan's application is not anchored on judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title because she does not claim to have possessed the subject lot since June 12, 1945.
Her application is based on acquisitive prescription on the claim that: (1) the property was
declared alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965; and (2) she had been in open
continuous, public, and notorious possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner for
over thirty (30) years.
In our 2009 decision and 2013 resolution23 in Malabanan, we already held en banc that a
declaration that property of the public dominion is alienable and disposable does not ipso facto
convert it into patrimonial property. We said:
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.24ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable and disposable is sufficient in
an application for judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not suffice
for the purpose of prescription under the Civil Code.25 Before prescription can even begin to run
against the State, the following conditions must concur to convert the subject into patrimonial
property:
The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compliance with Sections 2 and
3 of Article XII of the Constitution;
The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable;26
There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject lot is no longer
intended for public use, thereby converting it to patrimonial property.
Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public and peaceful possession of
the subject lot in the concept of an owner.
In the present case, the third condition is absent. Even though it has been declared alienable and
disposable, the property has not been withdrawn from public use or public service. Without this,
prescription cannot begin to run because the property has not yet been converted into
patrimonial property of the State. It remains outside the commerce of man and the respondent's
physical possession and occupation thereof do not produce any legal effect. In the eyes of the
law, the respondent has never acquired legal possession of the property and her physical
possession thereof, no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The May 29, 2009 decision and October 18, 2011
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The respondent's application for Land Registration is DENIED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Cruz vs. Sec. of Environment and Natural Resources

GR No. 135385 December 4, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority

GR No. 133250 July 9, 2002
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR
(Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be
reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private
corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have
290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari
as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture agreement) to
AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since
the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.
Republic vs. Naguiat

GR No. 134209 January 24, 2006
FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land
having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest
who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her
knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any
person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not
established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to
alienable and disposable property.
ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain?
HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the
parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The
classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Republic vs. CA and Dela Rosa

GR No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
Doctrine: The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. The rights over the land are
indivisible and the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must
be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
Facts: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February
11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria,
Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9
lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de
la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the
subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father
shortly after the Liberation.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it
on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet
had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as
evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological
mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma
and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and
recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were
purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual
assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes
thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought
to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No.
217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation
under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim
of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered.
The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and recognized
the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining
claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over
the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of
their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior
right of ownership.
Issue: Whether respondent courts decision, i.e. the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the
land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of
their mining claim, is correct.
Held: No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question
by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of
1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject
to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be
shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at
that time. Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution
against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this
was made subject to existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act,
the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need
of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the
land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as
they did, to Benguet and Atok. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is no conflict
of interest between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights.
This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights
not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a
reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and
agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand,
especially in its practical application.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and
completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were
being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural,
even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who
were unlawfully occupying the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the
benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals
that may be found in public and even private land devoted to agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining. Thus, if a person is the owner of
agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him
the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such
minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land
could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct
interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is
being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the
minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof,
for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the
loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining
Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds

GR No. L-630 November 15, 1947
FACTS:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was
interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the
register of deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction.
Krivenko appealed to the Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of
private ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?
RULING:
1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber,
and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. This means to say that,
under the provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of
urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in
contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and void
per se and ab initio.
2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121
which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed
that the pharase "no land" used in this section refers to all private lands, whether strictly
agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been
acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained
in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except
"upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the
same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens
were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity.
Collado vs. CA
GR No. 107764 October 4, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel
of land with an approximate area of 120.0766 hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is situated in
Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the
application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, "[t]his
survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." Then petitioner Collado filed an Amended
Application to include additional co-applicants. Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively
referred to as "petitioners" for brevity).
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo,
through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners
application.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has
been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of
Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902.
ISSUES:
Whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
HELD:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources
belong to the State. Watersheds are considered natural resources which are not susceptible of
occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. The statute of limitations with regard to public
land does not operate against the State.
Pajomayo vs. Manipon

GR No. L-33676 June 30, 1971
(Full Text)
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IX) in its Civil Case
No. U-655. The decision was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals on November 3, 1964. In
the resolution of the second special division of the Court of Appeals, promulgate on April 27,
1971, this case was certified to this Court as one that is within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court only errors on question of law being involved in the appeal. 1
On June 5, 1963 the plaintiffs filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IX, at
Urdaneta, Pangasinan) a complaint alleging that they are owners pro-indiviso of the parcel of
land described in the complaint which is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 in the
name of Diego Pajomayo, issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan; that they
had acquired the land as an inheritance from their late father Diego Pajomayo; that they and
their predecessor-in-interest had been in actual, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of said
property in the concept of owners for a period of more than 70 years until the early part of the
year 1956 when the defendants dispossessed them of said property, resulting in their having
suffered annual damages amounting to around P1,100.00 representing the value of the crops of
rice; mongo, corn and vegetables that they failed to harvest; and that because they have to file
the present suit they must spend P800.00 for incidental expenses of litigation and attorney's
fees. The plaintiffs prayed that they be declared the lawful owners pro-indiviso of the land in
question, and that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay them the damages they
have suffered.
In their answer the defendants, after denying some of the allegations of the complaint, alleged
that they are the exclusive owners of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
14043 issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, the said land having been
adjudicated to them in the cadastral proceedings of the Malasique cadastre and that apparently
the plaintiffs are claiming the same parcel of land. The defendants claim they had acquired the
land mentioned in their answer by inheritance from their deceased father Pioquinto Manipon, and
that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, peaceful, and adverse
possession of said land for more than 70 years, to the reclusion of plaintiffs; and that as
possessors in good faith they have introduced on the land improvements worth P1,000.00. As
affirmative defenses, the defendants allege that plaintiffs' action is barred by res-judicata and/or
prescription and that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The
defendants set up a counterclaim for damages in the sum of P500.00 representing attorney's
fees that they paid their counsel. The defendants prayed that they be declared the owners of the
parcel of land mentioned in their answer; that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay them damages in
the sum of P500.00; and, in the alternative should judgment be rendered against them, that the
plaintiffs ordered jointly and severally to pay them the sum of P1,000.00 representing the value
of the improvements they have introduced on the land.
When the case, was called for trial on July 6, 1964, the counsels for the parties submitted to the
court a stipulation of facts, as follows:
1.
That plaintiffs are the children and compulsory heirs of the late Diego Pajomayo;
2.
That parties agree that the land in question is covered by two Certificates of Title, one in
the name of Diego Pajomayo under Original Cert. of Title No. 1089 issued under Free Patent,
owner's copy attached hereto as Annex A; and Original Cert. of Title No. 14034, in the name of
the Defendant Rodrigo Manipon, issued in Cadastral Case No. 91 of Malasique Cadastre, certified
true copy of which is attached hereto as Annex B;
3.
That parties agree to submit this case on the above stipulations without further
presentation of evidence.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed this Honorable Court that decision be rendered upon the
foregoing stipulation after the parties have submitted simultaneous memoranda within a period
of twenty (20) days from today.
Urdaneta, Pangasinan this 6th day of July, 1964.
On the basis of the foregoing stipulation of facts, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
(Branch IX) made a finding that Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 held by the plaintiffs was
issued earlier than Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 held by the defendants, and on
September 10, 1964 it rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court, rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants,
hereby orders the latter to vacate the land in question and deliver possession thereof to the
former who are entitled thereto as the heirs of Diego Pajomayo who is hereby declared the legal
and lawful owner of the said property.
The Register of Deeds for Pangasinan is hereby ordered to cancel de oficio Original Certificate of
Title No. 14034.
With costs of this suit against the defendant.
From the above-mentioned decision of the lower court, the defendants brought up the present
appeal. In their appeal the defendants made the following assignment of errors:
1.
The lower court erred in declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 of herein
appellants null and void notwithstanding the fact that this is not one of the reliefs prayed for by
the appellees.
2.
The lower erred in ordering the herein appellants to vacate the land in question and to
deliver the possession thereof to the herein appellees although the latter failed to prove their
cause of action against the herein appellants.
3.
The lower court erred in not applying the doctrine of res judicata in favor of herein
appellants.
The appeal has no merit. There is no question regarding the identity of the land involved. The
only question to be resolved in the present appeal is: which of the two original certificates of title
should prevail the No. 1089 held by the plaintiffs-appellees which was issued in virtue of the
homestead patent, or the No. 14034 held by the defendants-appellants which was issued in
connection with the cadastral proceedings? Necessarily when one of the two titles is held to be
superior over the other, one should be declared null and void and should be ordered cancelled.
And if a party is declared to be the owner of a parcel of land pursuant to a valid certificate of title
said party is entitled to the possession of the land covered by said valid title. The decree of
registration issued in the cadastral proceedings does not have the effect of annulling the title
that had previously been issued in accordance with the provisions of the land Registration Law
(Act 496).
The lower court, therefore, had correctly ordered the cancellation of Certificate of Title No 14034
held by the defendants when it declared that Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 held by the
plaintiffs should prevail. Likewise, the lower court had correctly ordered the defendants to vacate
the land in question and deliver possession thereof to plaintiffs after declaring plaintiffs entitled
thereto as the heirs of Diego Pajomayo, the lawful owner of the land.
Contrary to the claim of defendants, the doctrine of res judicata can not be applied in their favor
in the present case.
The undisputed fact is that the plaintiffs base their claim of title to the land in question on
Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 issued to their father, Diego Pajomayo, on November 27,
1931 in virtue of a free patent that was granted to him. The law requires that the homestead
patent must be registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province where the land
covered by the patent lies. Section 122 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) provides as
follows:
SEC. 122.
Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging (to the Government of the
United States or) to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed
to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It shall be the duty of the official issuing
the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to came suck
instrument before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the
province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyance,
whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land and an owner's
duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance from
the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority
to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey and effect the land, and in all cases under this Act registration shall be
made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. The fees for
registration shall be paid by the grantee. After due registration and issue of the certificate and
owner's duplicate, such land shall be registered land for all purposes under this Act. (Emphasis
supplied).
Thus, it has been ruled by this Court that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with
the Public Land Act registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496 (Land Registration Act), the
certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under
the Land Registration Act. In the cage of Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850, this Court
held:
The procedure under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the
Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of
judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final. (Act
No. 496, secs. 35, 38, and 45, as amended; Act 926. secs. 59 and 63, as amended; Escueta vs.
Director of Lands, 16 Phil. 482; Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil.
31; Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 591) ... 2
In the case of Manalo vs. Lukban and Liwanag, 48 Phil. 973, 979, this Court said:
The record shows that the land covered by said judgment had already been granted by the
government to Monico Corpus Manuel as homesteader under the provisions of Act 926, the
corresponding certificate of title having been registered and issued to said grantee. By virtue of
said registration and issuance of the certificate of title, that land is considered registered within
the meaning of the Land Registration Act, No. 496 (sec. 122 of said Act).
So that when the trial was held in the cadastral proceeding which covered said land, and when
the judgment of June 29, 1922 concerning said land was rendered in said proceeding, the title to
that land could no longer be the subject of any inquiry, determination or judgment, for it had
already been adjudicated to Monico Corpus Manuel more than ten years before, with all the legal
formalities and with all the force of a title under Act 496.
The doctrine laid down in the two cases above-cited has been affirmed and applied by this Court
in a long line of decisions. 3 The ruling regarding the validity and force of a certificate of title
issued in virtue of the registration of a homestead patent is applicable to certificates of title
issued in virtue of the registration of other land patents under the Public land Law. In the case of
Lahora, et al. vs. Dayanghirang, et al., G.R. No. L-28565, January 30, 1971, 4 thus Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held:
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of
title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a
private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is
issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the
Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards
provided in Section 38 of said Act. In other words, upon the expiration of one year from its
issuance, the certificate of title becomes irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a
registration proceeding.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between
the original parties, and in case of successive registration where, more than one certificate is
issued over the land the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as
against the person who relies on the second certificate. 5
In the case now before Us, it appearing that Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 upon which the
defendant appellants base their claim of ownership over the land in question was issued on April
1, 1957, while Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 upon which plaintiffs-appellees base a similar
claim was issued on November 27, 1931, under the law and the authorities. We have herein
cited, the latter certificate of title should prevail, and the former should be cancelled.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with costs against
the defendants-appellants. It is so ordered.
Republic vs. CA and Lapia

GR No. 108998 August 24, 1994
(Full Text)
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by
purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the
appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of
respondent spouses for registration over the lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence
with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo,
p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2)
parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however,
they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through
naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective
evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in
question, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said application and
confirms the title and possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in
the names of spouses Mario B. Lapia and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth
but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City
and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued. In the
certificate of title to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road rightof-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following
ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they
bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the
acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful
owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money.
Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as
has been passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed
out that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not
established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm
and register the title which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular reference to the main issue at bar, the High
Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of
the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the
applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were not
disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442,
November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present
recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it
not been for the constitutional issue presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights
over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to
justify the registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered
lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification
belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of
title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to
the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same
proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessorsin-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bonafide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively
presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title over the two adjacent
parcels of land are sought to be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to
the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable
zone established by the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted
by the Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had
been occupied by the applicants "whose house of strong materials stands thereon"; that it had
been declared for taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they
acquired the same by means of a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly
executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that
applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30
years prior to the filing of the application for registration. But what is of great significance in the
instant case is the circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in
1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they filed their application for
registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to them. (Rollo, p.,
27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues:
17.
The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name
of respondent spouses only since 1979. However, tax declarations or reality tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing cases)
18.
Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the
filing of the application for registration." This is not, however, the same as saying that
respondents have been in possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b],
CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents' possession. They
fall short of the required possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they
needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession prior to the filing of their application (on
February 5, 1987), they would still be short of the required possession if the starting point is
1979 when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation purposes in
their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus
foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the
transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession
thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
Sec. 48.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4.
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land
Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been
in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal
requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the
said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only
since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that
respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to be registered only
in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of
land were acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn,
have been in open and continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped
into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights
necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves
scant consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the
occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in
the 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated
in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public
land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion
of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by
his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the
land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act
as by free patent . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant,
a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public
land which is of the character and duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an
express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the
possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissible
to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more
than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the
required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land
from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of
law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in
Cario, ". . .(There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and
exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to
private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602
[1990]). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and
his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public
land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial
or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78
[1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land
ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to
private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does
not confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were
able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered
to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced
improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by
Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels
of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of
her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented
in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the
questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no
forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the
ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra)
supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino
citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity
ends. The applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The
land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court
on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee
simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of
the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their
predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or
royal grant (b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado"
title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion
posesoria" or possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous
title (Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is
possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time
immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v.
Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain
or that if had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest (Cario v. Insular
Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant does not come
under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest
began in 1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the
Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable
public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time
immemorial, as ruled in both Cario and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]),
adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R.
Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must
secure a certification from the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as
owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the
applicant to prove its positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property
subject of the application is an alienable and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire
property . . . was pasture land (and therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the
property in question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently
baseless. . . . When referring to possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means
possession of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he has
learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession was never present in the case of
private respondents. . . .
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and
their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest) had
possessed the property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of
both his last will and testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs in
such manner as to remove the same from the public domain under the Cario and Susi doctrines.
Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right
whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession
cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes
without saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the
property before they lost their Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were
American citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove
possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a
manner that the property has been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their
application, as American citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the
time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon,
tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time
held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents
have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by
respondent Lapias mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution
itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections
7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7.
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain.
Sec. 8.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of
the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as
his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which
provides:
Sec. 2.
Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and
who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or
one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married
couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail
of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be
entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which,
when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein
authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by
the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor
of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for
registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already
private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by
respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered
no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in character since private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law
provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may
be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1)
hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens
of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it
is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they
purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private
respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a
private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8,
Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the
requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject
lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied
with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides:
Sec. 6.
In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the registration of
titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred under this Act, unless the transferee shall
submit to the register of deeds of the province or city where the property is located a sworn
statement showing the date and place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of
his spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of acquisition of his
landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the
date he lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such
other information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant
case since said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom
compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied,
that the requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the
approval of an application for registration of title. An application for registration of title before a
land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the
register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the
application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is
the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be
complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the
office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior
to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the
approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Malabanan vs. Republic

GR No. 179987 April 29, 2009
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of
Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square
meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and
peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his greatgrandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe
fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and
divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the
death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was
this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under
Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December
2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner
and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February
2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for
registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or
because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that
the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed
by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the
Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that
the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax
Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail
themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is
no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the
public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Malabanan vs. Republic
(Motion for Reconsideration September 3, 2013)
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both
assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of
Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by
sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of
71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased
the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the
property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the
judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as
surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of
249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No.
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application
for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration
Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of
Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its
technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with
residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect
title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the
CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential
and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the
CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable
only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for
purposes of computing Malabanans period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5
(Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In
this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as
alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect
title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration
Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land
subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to
June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the
notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their
argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an
alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was
essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription
at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the
part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land
as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of
the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or
disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit
title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of
the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their
favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he
had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time
when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to
the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication,
the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation.
It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different
classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the
Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of
private ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public
use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not
of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for
public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part
of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country
from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the
public domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State
is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands
of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19
Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven,
specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The
1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest
or timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified
by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands
according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the
Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the
public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands
of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by
the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently,
lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however,
public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or
when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of
such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until
the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until
Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public
service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and
not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of
the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise
classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the
coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public
Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to
come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify
lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order
for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that
the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because
any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal
effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over
by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full
legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which
should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of
possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of
the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal
meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as
agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title
is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that
the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title
over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-ininterest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted
to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this
doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were
already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite
period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property
subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to
dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which
prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants
possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.
Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through
actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only
a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of
title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles
to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and
cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we
should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative
development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order
to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to
qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting
such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning
disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in
conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can
now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands
of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also
presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of
the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of
the application, provided the applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of
the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already
ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that
may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the
land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive
prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without
satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land
has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation
declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's
Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Amunategui vs. Dir. Of Forestry

GR No. L-27873 November 29. 1983
(Full Text)
The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of the Court of Appeals
which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private
persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its
registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be
registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of
645,703 square meters.cralawnad
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for
registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an
opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that
the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be
confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the
application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still
classified as forest land and part of the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885
containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be
confirmed and registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and
interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition,
claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio
Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the
proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective appeals with
the Court of Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34190-R.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have been shown
to have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to the northeastern portion of a little less than
117,956 square meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square meters, it
was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question that must have to be considered is
whether after all, the title that these two (2) private litigants have shown did not amount to a
registerable one in view of the opposition and evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . .
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was filed which
would place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted that during that period, the land was a
classified forest land so much so that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensee before
1926 and after that; that even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to
cut timber within the area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood and
maintained its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to
above persuasively indicates, and the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond
was sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the application; but only
after there had been a previous warning by the District Forester that that could not be done
because it was classified as a public forest; so that having these in mind and remembering that
even under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after this case had
already been filed in the lower Court, in order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a
registerable title he must have shown.
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30)
years, preceding the filing of the application;
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants or
oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic
Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30)
years before filing of the application, he had been in
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain,
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that period of
thirty (30) years and even before and applicants and their predecessors had made implicit
recognition of that; the result must be to deny all these applications; this Court stating that it had
felt impelled notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private
litigants among themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a better right to possess
because this Court foresees that this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is
always better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass
final judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed; the application as well
as all the oppositions with the exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby
sustained are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the
disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in
accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and
confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the
Land Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for review on certiorari was filed by
Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre
complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in
favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of
Appeals decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the
disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain
classified as forest land.chanrobles law library : red
The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin in their
petition depends on the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot
No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land
because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a
"mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section
1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in
Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land
registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons
for many years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be
kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that
possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in
Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the area covered
by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any
patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found
in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of
the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin
forest as stated by Emeterio Berebers witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it
must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the
Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate courts finding that timber licenses had to
be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a
license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was
converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the
same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he
meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act
No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public
domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because
of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years
preceding the filing of his application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions implicit in
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The records show that Lot No. 88S never ceased to be
classified as forest land of the public domain.
In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in-interests since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The evidence is clear
that Lot No. 885 had always been public land classified as forest.
Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never
confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public
land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute
a grant from the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)."cralaw virtua1aw library
We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of the public
domain, classified as public forest land. There is no need for us to pass upon the other issues
raised by petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, as such issues are rendered moot by
this finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic vs. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc.

GR No. 156951 September 22, 2016
FACTS:
The subject matter of these proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are parcels of land with
a total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio
where, military officers, both in the active and retired services, and their respective families,
have been occupying housing units and facilities originally constructed by the AFP.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military
officers. Records show that SHAI was able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal a title Transfer Certificate of Title in its name to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area.
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991on the basis of a notarized Deed of
Sale purportedly executed on the same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. of the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI.The total purchase price as written in the conveying
deed was P11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the Department of Justice on
reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of the aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced
and eventually referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results
of the examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino reveals that the
puported signatures in the document are forgeries.
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V.Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173 directing
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to institute action towards the cancellation of TCT No.
15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger
parcel within the reservation. A month later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed
with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and cancellation of title suit against the
private respondent SHAI, purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no
records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment of the
purchase price; and c) the property in question is inalienable, being part of a military reservation
established under Proclamation No. 423.
On pre-trial the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in evidence)the Deed of
Sale dated October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A,"and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B."Respondent,
then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and B as its Exhibits "1" and 2, respectively.
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro
Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and asserted that the signature of Palad in
Exhibit A is a forgery. For his part, Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the
same document and denied ever signing the same, let alone in front of a notary public holding
office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad stated that he could not have had
signed the conveying deed involving as it did a reservation area which, apart from its being
outside of the LMBs jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place.
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in the person of Police
Inspector Redencion Caimbon who testified that Palads signature in Exhibit A is genuine. Mrs.
Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, likewise testified, saying that applications to purchase were
signed and then filed with the LMB by one Engr. Eugenia Balis, followed by the payment in full of
the contract price.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
Republics complaint as it considered the parcels covered by the deed in question as no longer
part of the FBMR. Therefrom, the Republic went on appeal to the CA which affirmed in toto that of
the trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic.
ISSUE: Was the JUSMAG area, during the period material, alienable or inalienable, as the case
may be, and, therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?
RULING:
Petitioner Republic, correctly asserts the inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same
having not effectively been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable
and disposable.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as
reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or
purposes. Such tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be
subject to sale or other disposition until again declared alienable. Consistent with the foregoing
postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is
not open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable, unless it is in the
meantime reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public land. And until a given
parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and
reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part
of a military reservation remains,even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a
military camp or for defense. The same is true in this case.
There is no doubt that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned October 30, 1991sale formed
part of the FBMR as originally established under Proclamation No. 423. And while private
respondent SHAI would categorically say that the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence
that subject land is within military reservation,and even dared to state that the JUSMAG area is
the private property of the government and therefore removed from the concept of public
domain per se its own evidence themselves belie its posture as their evidence both the TCT and
the Deed of Sale technically described the property as situated in Jusmag area located at Fort
Bonifacio which is now renamed Fort Mckinley a declared a military reservation.
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423. In
the process, it has invariably invited attention to the proclamations specific area coverage to
prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered
inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce of man.
The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming its authenticity,
could not plausibly be the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a
disposable parcel. And private respondent SHAIs unyielding stance that would have the Republic
in estoppel to question the transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It
should have realized that the Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part
of its officials or agents.
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least at
the time of the supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is
necessarily void ab initio.
Moreover, Article XII, Section 3[of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, except through lease for a limited
period.
The interplay of compelling circumstances and inferences deducible from the case, also cast
doubt on the authenticity of such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious.
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a forgery. The NBI signature
expert corroborated Palads allegation on forgery.Respondent SHAIs expert witness from the
PNP, however, disputes the NBIs findings. In net effect, both experts from the NBI and the PNP
cancel each other out.
2.Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB office at Plaza
Cervantes, Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity, Palad nonetheless proceeded on the
same day to Pasig City to appear before the notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the
Rizal Registry and there stamped Received by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14
p.m. of October 30, 1991to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In other words, the whole
conveyance and registration process was done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is
quite surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head, while in the exercise of his functions as the
bureaus authorized contracting officer, has to repair to another city just to have a deed
notarized.
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to purchase required
under Section 89 of the Public Land Act. There is also no record of the deed of sale and of
documents usually accompanying an application to purchase, inclusive of the investigation
report and the property valuation. The Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date
November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records Management Division of
the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court attest to this fact of absence of records.
Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition Division, LMB, testified having
personally looked at the bureau record book, but found no entry pertaining to SHAI.
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the deed of sale specifically
meritorious Official Receipt No. 6030203 as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase
price An official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to prove payment. While it kept
referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the required payment, it failed to present and
offer the receipt in evidence. We can thus validly presume that no such OR exists or, if it does,
that its presentation would be adverse to SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document as paid has, in fact,
never been paid.
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier
of the LMB the corresponding amount apparently coming in a mix of P500 and P100
denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAIs witnesses account taxes credulity to the limit.
TCT No. 15084 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis of such Deed are declared
void and cancelled.
Republic vs. CA and Republic Real Estate Corp.

GR No. 103882 November 25, 1998
(Full Text)
At bar are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Here, the Court is confronted with a case commenced before the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal in Pasay City, in 1961, more than 3 decades back,
that has spanned six administrations of the Republic and outlasted the tenure of ten (10) Chief
Justices of the Supreme Court.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines, as petitioner, assails the Decision, dated
January 29, 1992 and Amended Decision, dated April 28, 1992, of the Court of Appeals 1 which
affirmed with modification the Decision of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch 7,
Pasay City) in Civil Case No. 2229-P, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Pasay City and
Republic Real Estate Corporation".
The facts that matter are, as follows:
Republic Act No. 1899 ("RA 1899"), which was approved on June 22, 1957, authorized the
reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. Section I of said law, reads:
Sec. 1.
Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake
and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any
foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper
and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
On May 6, 1958, invoking the a forecited provision of RA 1899, the Pasay City Council passed
Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in
Pasay City, empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation contracts, and
prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959 by
Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation ("RREC") to reclaim
foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions.
On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement 2 for the reclamation of the
foreshore lands in Pasay City.
On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines ("Republic") filed a Complaint 3 for
Recovery of Possession and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Preventive injunction and
Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 2229-P before the former Court of First Instance
of Rizal, (Branch 7, Pasay City).
On March 5, 1962, the Republic of the Philippines filed an Amended Complaint 4 questioning
subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC (Exhibit "P") on the grounds that the subjectmatter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and conditions are
violative of RA 1899, and that the said Agreement was executed without any public bidding.
The Answers 5 of RREC and Pasay City, dated March 10 and March 14, 1962, respectively,
averred that the subject-matter of said Agreement is within the commerce of man, that the
phrase "foreshore lands" within the contemplation of RA 1899 has a broader meaning than the
cited definition of the term in the Words and Phrases and in the Webster's Third New
International Dictionary and the plans and specifications of the reclamation involved were
approved by the authorities concerned.
On April 26,1962, Judge Angel H. Mojica, (now deceased) of the former Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City) issued an Order 6 the dispositive portion of which was to the
following effect:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby orders the defendants, their agents, and all persons claiming
under them, to refrain from "further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession or
dispoilation over any area within the Manila Bay or the Manila Bay Beach Resort", until further
orders of the court.
On the following day, the same trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction 7 which enjoined
the defendants, RREC and Pasay City, their agents, and all persons claiming under them "from
further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession."
Thereafter, a Motion to Intervene 8, dated June 27, 1962, was filed by Jose L. Bautista, Emiliano
Custodio, Renato Custodio, Roger de la Rosa, Belen Gonzales, Norma Martiner, Emilia E. Paez,
Ambrosio R. Parreno, Antolin M. Oreta, Sixto L. Orosa, Pablo S. Sarmiento, Jesus Yujuico, Zamora
Enterprises, Inc., Industrial and Commercial Factors, Inc., Metropolitan Distributors of the
Philippines, and Bayview Hotel, Inc. stating inter alia that they were buyers of lots in the Manila
Bay area being reclaimed by RREC, whose rights would be affected by whatever decision to be
rendered in the case. The Motion was granted by the trial court and the Answer attached thereto
admitted. 9
The defendants and the intervenors then moved to dismiss 10 the Complaint of the Republic,
placing reliance on Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5187, which reads:
Sec. 3.
Miscellaneous Projects
xxx
xxx
xxx
m.
For the construction of seawall and limited access highway from the south boundary of the
City of Manila to Cavite City, to the south, and from the north boundary of the City of Manila to
the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the north, including the reclamation of the
foreshore and submerged areas: Provided, That priority in the construction of such seawalls,
highway and attendant reclamation works shall be given to any corporation and/or corporations
that may offer to undertake at its own expense such projects, in which case the President of the
Philippines may, after competitive didding, award contracts for the construction of such project,
with the winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to be paid in terms of percentage
fee of the contractor which shall not exceed fifty percent of the area reclaimed by the contractor
and shall represent full compensation for the purpose, the provisions of the Public Land Law
concerning disposition of reclaimed and foreshore lands to the contrary notwithstanding:
Provided, finally, that the foregoing provisions and those of other laws, executive orders, rules
and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, existing rights, projects and/or contracts of city
or municipal governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands shall be
respected. . . . . (emphasis ours).
Since the aforecited law provides that existing contracts shall be respected, movants contended
that the issues raised by the pleadings have become "moot, academic and of no further validity
or effect."
Meanwhile, the Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. ("PLCU") moved to intervene 11, alleging
as legal interest in the matter in litigation the avowed purpose of the organization for the
promotion of good government in Pasay City. In its Order of June 10, 1969, the lower court of
origin allowed the said intervention 12.
On March 24, 1972, the trial court of origin came out with a Decision, disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, after carefully considering (1) the original complaint, (2) the first Amended
Complaint, (3) the Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation to the first Amended
Complaint, (4) the Answer of Defendant Pasay City to the first Amended Complaint, (5) the
Second Amended Complaint, (6) the Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation to
the Second Amended Complaint, (7) the Answer of Defendant Pasay City to the Second Amended
Complaint, (8) the Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction of Plaintiff, (9) the
Memorandum In Support of the Opposition to the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction of Defendant
Pasay City and Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (10) the Answer in Intervention of
Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (11) Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Intervene, (12) the Reply to
Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (13) the Stipulation of Facts by
all the parties, (14) the Motion for Leave to Intervene of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience
Union, Inc., (15) the Opposition to Motion For Leave to Intervene of Intervenors Bautista, et. al.,
(16) the Reply of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (17) the Supplement to
Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Defendant Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation
(18) the Complain in Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (19) the
Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (20) the Answer of Intervenor Jose L.
Bautista, et. al., to Complaint in Intervention, (21) the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Republic
Real Estate Corporation, and Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (22) the Opposition of Plaintiff to said
Motion to Dismiss, (23) the Opposition of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (24)
the Memorandum of the Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (25) the Memorandum for
the Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (26) the Manifestation of Plaintiff filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General, and all the documentary evidence by the parties to wit: (a)
Plaintiff's Exhibits "A" to "YYY- 4", (b) Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation's Exhibits "1RREC" to "40-a" and (c) Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc's., Exhibits "A-PLACU" to
"C-PLACU", the Court hereby:
(1)
Denies the "Motion to Dismiss" filed on January 10, 1968, by Defendant Republic Real
Estate Corporation and Intervenors Bautista, et. al., as it is the finding of this Court that Republic
Act No. 5187 was not passed by Congress to cure any defect in the ordinance and agreement in
question and that the passage of said Republic Act No. 5187 did not make the legal issues raised
in the pleadings "moot, academic and of no further validity or effect;" and
(2)
Renders judgment:
(a)
dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint;
(b)
Inc.,
Dismissing the Complaint in Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union,
(c)
Enjoining Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City to have
all the plans and specifications in the reclamation approved by the Director of Public Works and
to have all the contracts and sub-contracts for said reclamation awarded by means of, and only
after, public bidding; and
(d)
Lifting the preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on April 26, 1962, as soon as
Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City shall have submitted the
corresponding plans and specifications to the Director of Public Works, and shall have obtained
approval thereof, and as soon as the corresponding public bidding for the award to the contractor
and sub-contractor that will undertake the reclamation project shall have been effected.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (See Court of Appeals' Decision dated January 28, 1992; pp. 6-8)
Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Republic appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals.
However, on January 11, 1973, before the appeal could be resolved, Presidential Decree No. 3-A
issued, amending Presidential Decree No. 3, thus:
Sec. 1.
Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 3, dated September 26, 1972, is hereby
amended by the addition of the following paragraphs:
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water,
whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person
authorized by it under a proper contract.
All reclamations made in violation of this provision shall be forfeited to the State without need of
judicial action.
Contracts for reclamation still legally existing or whose validity has been accepted by the
National Government shall be taken over by the National Government on the basis of quantum
meruit, for proper prosecution of the project involved by administration.
On November 20, 1973, the Republic and the Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines ("CDCP") signed a Contract 13 for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project (Phases I
and II) which contract included the reclamation and development of areas covered by the
Agreement between Pasay City and RREC. Then, there was issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
which transferred to the Public Estate Authority ("PEA") the rights and obligations of the Republic
of the Philippines under the contract between the Republic and CDCP.
Attempts to settle amicably the dispute between representatives of the Republic, on the one
hand, and those of Pasay City and RREC, on the other, did not work out. The parties involved
failed to hammer out a compromise.
On January 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals came out with a Decision 14 dismissing the appeal of
the Republic and holding, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1.
The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and submission of RREC's plans
specification to the Department Public Works and Highways in order that RREC may continue the
implementation of the reclamation work is deleted for being moot and academic;
2.
Ordering the plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and possession
over all vacant spaces in the twenty-one hectare area already reclaimed by Pasay City and RREC
at the time it took over the same. Areas thereat over which permanent structures has (sic) been
introduced shall, including the structures, remain in the possession of the present possessor,
subject to any negotiation between Pasay City and the said present possessor, as regards the
continued possession and ownership of the latter area.
3.
Sustaining RREC's irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the Twenty-One
(21) hectares of land already reclaimed by it, to be exercised within one (1) year from the finality
of this decision, at the same terms and condition embodied in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation
contract, and enjoining appellee Pasay City to respect RREC's option.
SO ORDERED.
On February 14, 1992, Pasay City and RREC presented a Motion for Reconsideration of such
Decision of the Court of Appeals, contending, among others, that RREC had actually reclaimed
Fifty-Five (55) hectares, and not only Twenty-one (21) hectares, and the respondent Court of
Appeals erred in not awarding damages to them, movants.
On April 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals acted favorably on the said Motion for Reconsideration,
by amending the dispositive portion of its judgment of January 28, 1992, to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of our Decision dated January 28, 1992 is hereby AMENDED
to read as follows:
1.
The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission of the RREC's
plans and specification to the Department of Public Works and Highways in order that RREC may
continue the implementation of the reclamation work is deleted for being moot and academic.
2.
Ordering plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and possession of the
above enumerated lots (1 to 9).
3.
Sustaining RREC's irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the land referred
to in No. 2 of this dispositive portion, to be exercised within one (1) year from the finality of this
Decision, at the same terms and condition embodied in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation
contract, and enjoining Pasay City to respect RREC's irrevocable option.
SO ORDERED.
From the Decision and Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals aforementioned, the Republic
of the Philippines, as well as Pasay City and RREC, have come to this Court to seek relief, albeit
with different prayers.
On September 10, 1997, the Court commissioned the former thirteenth Division of Court of
Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy. The corresponding Commissioner's
Report, dated November 25, 1997, was submitted and now forms part of the records.
On October 11, 1997, the Cultural Center of the Philippines ("CCP") filed a Petition in
Intervention, theorizing that it has a direct interest in the case being the owner of subject nine
(9) lots titled in its (CCP) name, which the respondent Court of Appeals ordered to be turned over
to Pasay City. The CCP, as such intervenor, was allowed to present its evidence, as it did, before
the Court of Appeals, which evidence has been considered in the formulation of this disposition.
In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines theorizes, by way of assignment of errors,
that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF PASAY CITY ORDINANCE NO. 158
DATED APRIL 21, 1959 AND THE RECLAMATION CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PASAY CITY
AND RREC;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RREC HAD RECLAIMED 55 HECTARES AND IN
ORDERING THE TURN-OVER TO PASAY CITY OF THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF NINE (9)
LOTS TITLED IN THE NAME OF CCP.
In G.R. No. 105276, the petitioners, Pasay City and RREC, contend, that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 3-A
UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PASAY CITY AND
RREC.
Let us first tackle the issues posed in G.R. No. 103882.
On the first question regarding the validity of Pasay City Ordinance No. 158 dated April 21, 1959
and the Agreement dated April 24, 1959 between Pasay City and RREC, we rule in the negative.
Sec. 1 of RA 1899, reads:
Sec. 1.
Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake
and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any
foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper
and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
It is the submission of the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, that there are no foreshore
lands along the seaside of Pasay City 15; that what Pasay City has are submerged or offshore
areas outside the commerce of man which could not be a proper subject matter of the
Agreement between Pasay City and RREC in question as the area affected is within the National
Park, known as Manila Bay Beach Resort, established under Proclamation No. 41, dated July 5,
1954, pursuant to Act No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has been in open, continuous and
peaceful possession since time immemorial.
Petitioner faults the respondent court for unduly expanding what may be considered "foreshore
land" through the following disquisition:
The former Secretary of Justice Alejo Mabanag, in response to a request for an opinion from the
then Secretary of Public Works and Communications as to whether the term, "foreshore areas" as
used in Section I of the immediately aforequoted law is that defined in Webster's Dictionary and
the Law of Waters so as to make any dredging or filling beyond its prescribed limit illegal, opined:
According to the basic letter of the Director of Public Works, the law of Waters speaks of "shore"
and defines it thus: "that space movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit in the line
reached by highest equinoctial tides."
Webster's definition of foreshore reads as follows:
That part of the shore between high water and low-water marks usually fixed at the line to which
the ordinary means tide flows: also, by extension, the beach, the shore near the water's edge.
If we were to be strictly literal the term foreshore or foreshore lands should be confined to but a
portion of the shore, in itself a very limited area. (p. 6, Intervenors-appellees' brief).
Bearing in mind the (Webster's and Law of Waters) definitions of "shore" and of foreshore lands,
one is struck with the apparent inconsistency between the areas thus described and the purpose
to which that area, when reclaimed under the provision of Republic Act No. 1899, shall be
devoted. Section I (of said Law) authorizes the construction thereat of "adequate docking and
harbor facilities". This purpose is repeated in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.
And yet, it is well known fact that foreshore lands normally extend only from 10 to 20 meters
along the coast. Not very much more if at all. In fact certain parts in Manila bordering on Manila
Bay, has no foreshore to speak of since the sea washes the sea wall.
It does not seem logical, then, that Congress had in mind. Webster's limited concept of foreshore
when it enacted Republic Act No. 1899, unless it intends that the wharves, piers, docks, etc.
should be constructed parallel to the shore, which is impractical.
Since it is to be presumed that Congress could not have intended to enact an ineffectual
measure not one that would lead to absurd consequences, it would seem that it used "foreshore"
in a sense wider in scope that defined by Webster. . . .
To said opinion on the interpretation of the R.A. 1899, plaintiff-appellant could not offer any
refutation or contrary opinion. Neither can we. In fact, the above construction is consistent with
the "rule on context" in statutory construction which provides that in construing a statute, the
same must be construed as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole
(see Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709). There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the force and
significance of particular expressions will largely depend upon the connection in which they are
found and their relation to the general subject-matter of the law. The legislature must be
understood to have expressed its whole mind on the special object to which the legislative act is
directed but the vehicle for the expressions of that meaning is the statute, considered as one
entire and continuous act, and not as an agglomeration of unrelated clauses. Each clause or
provision will be illuminated by those which are cognate to it and by the general tenor of the
whole statute and thus obscurities end ambiguities may often be cleared up by the most direct
and natural means. Secondly effect must be given, if it is possible, to every word and clause of
the statute, so that nothing shall be left devoid of meaning or destitute of force. To this end, each
provision of the statute should be read in the light of the whole. For the general meaning of the
legislature, as gathered from the entire act, may often prevail over the construction which would
appear to be the most natural and obvious on the face of a particular clause. If is by this means
that contradiction and repugnance between the different parts of the statute may be avoided.
(See Black, Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., pp. 317-319).
Resorting to extrinsic aids, the "Explanatory Note" to House Bill No. 3830, which was
subsequently enacted as Republic Act No. 1899, reads:
In order to develop and expand the Maritime Commerce of the Philippines, it is necessary that
harbor facilities be correspondingly improved and, where necessary, expanded and developed.
The national government is not in a financial position to handle all this work. On the other hand,
with a greater autonomy many chartered cities and provinces are financially able to have credit
position which will allow them to undertake these projects. Some cities, such as the City of
Bacolod under R.A. 161, has been authorized to reclaim foreshore lands bordering it.
Other cities end provinces have continuously been requesting for authority to reclaim foreshore
lands on the basis of the Bacolod City pattern, and to undertake work to establish, construct on
the reclaimed area and maintain such port facilities as may be necessary. In order not to unduly
delay the undertaking of these projects, and inorder to obviate the passage of individual pieces
of legislation for every chartered city and province, it is hereby recommended that the
accompanying bill be approved. It covers Authority for All chartered cities and provinces to
undertake this work. . . . (emphasis supplied)
Utilizing the above explanatory note in interpreting and construing the provisions of R.A. 1899,
then Secretary of Justice Mabanag opined:
It is clear that the "Bacolod City pattern" was the basis of the enactment of the aforementioned
bill of general application. This so-called "Bacolod City pattern" appears to be composed of 3
parts, namely: Republic Ad No. 161, which grants authority to Bacolod City to undertake or carry
out . . . the reclamation . . . of any [sic] carry out the reclamation project conformably with
Republic Act No. 161; and Republic Act No. 1132 authorizing Bacolod City to contract
indebtedness or to issue bonds in the amount not exceeding six million pesos to finance the
reclamation of land in said city.
Republic Act No. 161 did not in itself specify the precise space therein referred to as "foreshore"
lands, but it provided that docking and harbor facilities should be erected on the reclaimed
portions thereof, while not conclusive would indicate that Congress used the word "foreshore" in
its broadest sense. Significantly, the plan of reclamation of foreshore drawn up by the Bureau of
Public Works maps out an area of approximately 1,600,000 square meters, the boundaries of
which clearly extend way beyond Webster's limited concept of the term "foreshore". As a
contemporaneous construction by that branch of the Government empowered to oversee at
least, the conduct of the work, such an interpretation deserves great weight. Finally, Congress in
enacting Republic Act No. 1132 (supplement to RA 161), tacitly confirmed and approved the
Bureau's interpretation of the term 'foreshore' when instead of taking the occasion to correct the
Bureau of over extending its plan, it authorized the city of Bacolod to raise the full estimated cost
of reclaiming the total area covered by the plan. The explanatory note to House Bill No. 1249
which became Republic Act No. 1132 states among the things:
The Bureau of Public Works already prepared a plan for the reclamation of about 1,600,000
square meters of land at an estimated costs of about P6,000,000.00. The project is selfsupporting because the proceeds from the sales or leases of lands so reclaimed will be more than
sufficient to cover the cost of the project.
Consequently, when Congress passed Republic Act No. 1899 in order to facilitate the reclamation
by local governments of foreshore lands on the basis of the Bacolod City pattern and in order to
obviate the passage of individual pieces of legislation for every chartered city and provinces
requesting authority to undertake such projects, the lawmaking body could not have had in mind
the limited area described by Webster as "foreshore" lands. . . . .
If it was really the intention of Congress to limit the area to the strict literal meaning of
"foreshore" lands which may be reclaimed by chartered cities and municipalities, Congress would
have excluded the cities of Manila, Iloilo, Cebu, Zamboanga and Davao from the operation of RA
1899 as suggested by Senator Cuenco during the deliberation of the bill considering that these
cities do not have 'foreshore' lands in the strict meaning of the term. Yet, Congress did not
approve the proposed amendment of Senator Cuenco, implying therefore, that Congress
intended not to limit the area that may be reclaimed to the strict definition of "foreshore" lands.
The opinion of the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag, who was at that time the chief law officer
and legal adviser of the government and whose office is required by law to issue opinions for the
guidance of the various departments of the government, there being then no judicial
interpretation to the contrary, is entitled to respect (see Bengzon vs. Secretary of Justice and
Insular Auditor, 68 Phil. 912).
We are not unmindful of the Supreme Court Resolution dated February 3, 1965 in Ponce vs.
Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce vs. City of Cebu (L-2266), by a unanimous vote of six (6) justices
(the other five (5) members deemed it unnecessary to express their view because in their
opinion the questions raised were not properly brought before the court), which in essence
applied the strict dictionary meaning of "foreshore lands" as used in RA 1899 in the case of the
city of Cebu. But this was promulgated long after the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag rendered
the above opinion on November 16, 1959 and long after RREC has started the subject
reclamation project.
Furthermore, as held by the lower court, Congress, after the Supreme Court issued the
aforementioned Resolution, enacted RA 5187. In Sec. 3 (m) of said law, Congress appropriated
money "for the construction of the seawall and limited access highway from the South boundary
of the city of Manila to Cavite City, to the South, and from the North boundary of the city of
Manila to the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the North (including the
reclamation of foreshore and submerged areas . . . provided . . . that . . . existing projects and/or
contracts of city or municipal governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands
shall be respected . . ." This is a clear manifestation that Congress in enacting RA 1899, did not
intend to limit the interpretation of the term "foreshore land" to its dictionary meaning.
It is presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had in mind the judicial construction
given to a former statute on the subject, and that the statute on the subject, and that the statute
was enacted having in mind the judicial construction that the prior enactment had received, or in
the light of such existing judicial decisions as have direct bearing upon it (see 50 Am. Jur., Sec.
321, pp. 312-313). But notwithstanding said interpretation by the Supreme Court of RA 1899 in
the Ponce cases, Congress enacted a law covering the same areas previously embraced in a RA
1899 (as mentioned earlier, cities without foreshore lands which were sought to be excluded
from the operation of RA 1899 were not excluded), providing that respect be given the
reclamation of not only foreshore lands but also of submerged lands signifying its non-conformity
to the judicial construction given to RA 1899. If Congress was in accord with the interpretation
and construction made by the Supreme Court on RA 1899, it would have mentioned reclamation
of "foreshore lands" only in RA 5187, but Congress included "submerged lands" in order to clarify
the intention on the grant of authority to cities and municipalities in the reclamation of lands
bordering them as provided in RA 1899. It is, therefore, our opinion that it is actually the
intention of Congress in RA 1899 not to limit the authority granted to cities and municipalities to
reclaim foreshore lands in its strict dictionary meaning but rather in its wider scope as to include
submerged lands.
The Petition is impressed with merit.
To begin with, erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of respondent court that under RA
1899, the term "foreshore lands" includes submerged areas. As can be gleaned from its
disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the respondent court unduly stretched and
broadened the meaning of "foreshore lands", beyond the intentment of the law, and against the
recognized legal connotation of "foreshore lands". Well entrenched, to the point of being
elementary, is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. 16 So also, resort to extrinsic
aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, is unwarranted, the language of the law
being plain and unambiguous. 17 Then, too, opinions of the Secretary of Justice are unavailing to
supplant or rectify any mistake or omission in the law. 18 To repeat, the term "foreshore lands"
refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and
dry according to the flow of the tide. (Words and Phrases, "Foreshore")
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between
the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of
wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its
meaning, much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include
submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only
signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term "foreshore lands".
Neither is there any valid ground to disregard the Resolution of this Court dated February 3, 1965
in Ponce v. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-22669) despite the enactment of
Republic Act No. 5187 ("RA 5187"), the relevant portion of which, reads:
Sec. 3.
Miscellaneous Projects
xxx
xxx
xxx
m.
For the construction of seawall and limited access highway from the south boundary of the
City of Manila to Cavite City, to the south, and from the north boundary of the City of Manila to
the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the north, including the reclamation of the
foreshore and submerged areas: Provided, That priority in the construction of such seawalls,
highway and attendant reclamation works shell be given to any corporation and/or corporations
that may offer to undertake at its own expense such projects, in which case the President of the
Philippines may, after competitive bidding, award contracts for the construction of such projects,
with the winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to be paid in terms of percentage
fee of the contractor which shall not exceed fifty percent of the area reclaimed by the contractor
and shall represent full compensation for the purpose, the provisions of the Public Land Law
concerning disposition of reclaimed and foreshore lands to the contrary notwithstanding:
Provided, finally, that the foregoing provisions and those of other laws, executive orders, rules
and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, existing rights, projects and/or contracts of city
or municipal governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands shall be
respected. . . . .
There is nothing in the foregoing provision of RA 5187 which can be interpreted to broaden the
scope of "foreshore lands." The said law is not amendatory to RA 1899. It is an Appropriations
Act, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR PUBLIC WORKS, SYNCHRONIZING THE SAME
WITH PREVIOUS PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATIONS."
All things viewed in proper perspective, we reiterate what was said in Ponce v. Gomez (L-21870)
and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-22669) that the term "foreshore" refers to "that part of the land
adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides." As
opined by this Court in said cases:
WHEREAS, six (6) members of the Court (Justices Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera,
Dizon and Jose P. Bengzon) opine that said city ordinance and contracts are ultra vires and
hence, null and void, insofar as the remaining 60% of the area aforementioned, because the term
"foreshore lands" as used in Republic Act No. 1899 should be understood in the sense attached
thereto by common parlance; (emphasis ours)
The aforesaid ruling was applied by then Secretary of Justice Claudio Teehankee, in his opinion
dated December 22, 1966, in a case with analogous facts as the present one, to wit:
December 22, 1966
The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:
xxx
xxx
xxx
I.
Facts
1.
On January 19, 1961, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1899, the Municipality
of Navotas enacted Ordinance No. 1 authorizing the Municipal Mayor to enter into a reclamation
contract with Mr. Chuanico.
2.
On March 15, 1961, a reclamation contract was concluded between the Municipality of
Navotas, represented by the Municipal Mayor, and Mr. Chuanico in accordance with the above
ordinance. Thereunder, Mr. Chuanico shall be the attorney-in-fact of the Municipality in
prosecuting the reclamation project and shall advance the money needed therefor; that the
actual expenses incurred shall be deemed a loan to the Municipality; that Mr. Chuanico shall
have the irrevocable option to buy 70% of the reclaimed area at P7.00 per square meter; that he
shall have the full and irrevocable powers to do any and all things necessary and proper in and
about the premises," including the power to hire necessary personnel for the prosecution of the
work, purchase materials and supplies, and purchase or lease construction machineries and
equipment, but any and all contracts to be concluded by him in behalf of the Municipality shall
be submitted to public bidding.
xxx
xxx
xxx
3.
On March 16, 1961, the Municipal Council of Navotas passed Resolution No. 22 approving
and ratifying the contract.
xxx
xxx
xxx
III.
Comments
1.
The above reclamation contract was concluded on the basis of Navotas Ordinance No. 1
which, in turn, had been enacted avowedly pursuant to Republic Act No. 1899. This being so, the
contract, in order to be valid, must conform to the provisions of the said law.
By authorizing local governments "to execute by administration any reclamation work," (Republic
Act No. 1899 impliedly forbids the execution of said project by contract. Thus, in the case or
Ponce et al. vs. Gomez (February 3, 1966), five justices of the Supreme Court voted to annul the
contract between Cebu Development Corporation and Cebu City for the reclamation of foreshore
lands because "the provisions of said . . . contract are not . . . in accordance with the provisions
of Republic Act No. 1899," as against one Justice who opined that the contract substantially
complied with the provisions of the said law. (Five Justices expressed no opinion on this point.)
Inasmuch as the Navotas reclamation contract is substantially similar to the Cebu reclamation
contract, it is believed that the former is likewise fatally defective.
2.
The Navotas reclamation project envisages the construction of a channel along the Manila
Bay periphery of that town and the reclamation of approximately 650 hectares of land from said
channel to a seaward distance of one kilometer. In the basic letter it is stated that "practically, all
the 650 hectares of lands proposed to be reclaimed under the agreement" do not constitute
foreshore lands and that "the greater portion of the area . . . is in fact navigable and presently
being used as a fishing harbor by deep-sea fishing operators as well as a fishing ground of
sustenance fisherman. Assuming the correctness of these averments, the Navotas reclamation
contract evidently transcends the authority granted under Republic Act No. 1899, which
empowers the local governments to reclaim nothing more than "foreshore lands, i.e., "that part
of the land adjacent to the see which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of
the tides." (26 C.J. 890.) It was for this reason that in the cited case Ponce case, the Supreme
Court, by a vote of 6-0 with five Justices abstaining, declared ultra vires and void the contractual
stipulation for the reclamation of submerged lands off Cebu City, and permanently enjoined its
execution under Republic Act No. 1899.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In accordance with the foregoing, I have the honor to submit the view that the Navotas
reclamation contract is not binding and should be disregarded for non-compliance with law.
Very truly yours,
(SGD) CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE

Secretary of Justice
The said opinion of Justice Secretary Teehankee who became Associate Justice, and later Chief
Justice, of this Court, did, in our considered view, supersede the earlier opinion of former justice
Secretary Alejo Mabanag, aforestated, as the cases, in connection with which subject opinions
were sought, were with similar facts. The said Teehankee opinion accords with RA 1899.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by
Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
What is worse, the same Agreement was vitiated by the glaring absence of a public bidding.
Obviously, there is a complete dearth of evidence to prove that RREC had really reclaimed 55
hectares. The letter of Minister Baltazar Aquino relied upon by RREC is no proof at all that RREC
had reclaimed 55 hectares. Said letter was just referring to a tentative schedule of work to be
done by RREC, even as it required RREC to submit the pertinent papers to show its supposed
accomplishment, to secure approval by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways to the
reclamation plan, and to submit to a public bidding all contracts and sub-contracts for subject
reclamation project but RREC never complied with such requirements and conditions sine qua
non.
No contracts or sub-contracts or agreements, plans, designs, and/or specifications of the
reclamation project were presented to reflect any accomplishment. Not even any statement or
itemization of works accomplished by contractors or subcontractors or vouchers and other
relevant papers were introduced to describe the extent of RREC's accomplishment. Neither was
the requisite certification from the City Engineer concerned that "portions of the reclamation
project not less than 50 hectares in area shall have been accomplished or completed" obtained
and presented by RREC.
As a matter of fact, no witness ever testified on any reclamation work done by RREC, and extent
thereof, as of April 26, 1962. Not a single contractor, sub-contractor, engineer, surveyor, or any
other witness involved in the alleged reclamation work of RREC testified on the 55 hectares
supposedly reclaimed by RREC. What work was done, who did the work, where was it
commenced, and when was it completed, was never brought to light by any witness before the
court. Certainly, onus probandi was on RREC and Pasay City to show and point out the as yet
unidentified 55 hectares they allegedly reclaimed. But this burden of proof RREC and Pasay City
miserably failed to discharge.
So also, in the decision of the Pasay Court of First Instance dismissing the complaint of plaintiffappellant, now petitioner Republic of the Philippines, the lifting of the writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued on April 26, 1962 would become effective only "as soon as Defendant Republic
Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City shall have submitted the corresponding plans
and specifications to the Director of Public Work, and shall have obtained approval thereof, and
as soon as corresponding public bidding for the award to the contractor and sub-contractor that
will undertake the reclamation project shall have been effected." (Rollo, pp. 127-129, G.R. No.
103882)
From the records on hand, it is abundantly clear that RREC and Pasay City never complied with
such prerequisites for the lifting of the writ of Preliminary Injunction. Consequently, RREC had no
authority to resume its reclamation work which was stopped by said writ of preliminary injunction
issued on April 26, 1962.
From the Contract for Dredging Work, dated November 26, 1960, marked Exhibit "21-A" for RREC
before the lower court, and Exhibit "EE" for CCP before the Court of Appeals, it can be deduced
that only on November 26, 1960 did RREC contract out the dredging work to C and A
Construction Company, Inc., for the reclamation of the 55 hectares initially programmed to be
reclaimed by it. But, as stated by RREC itself in the position paper filed with this Court on July 15,
1997, with reference to CDCP's reclamation work, mobilization of the reclamation team would
take one year before a reclamation work could actually begin. Therefore, the reclamation work
undertaker by RREC could not have started before November 26, 1961.
Considering that on April 26, 1962 RREC was enjoined from proceeding any further with its
reclamation work, it had barely five (5) months, from November, 1961 to April, 1962, to work on
subject reclamation project. It was thus physically impossible for RREC to reclaim 55 hectares,
with the stipulated specifications and elevation, in such a brief span of time. In the report of
RREC (Exhibit "DD" for CCP), it was conceded that due to the writ of preliminary injunction issued
on April 26, 1962, C and A Construction Co., Inc. had suspended its dredging operation since
May, 1962.
The "graphical report" on the Pasay Reclamation project, as of April 30, 1962, attached to the
Progress Report marked Exhibit "DD", is a schematic representation of the work accomplishment
referred to in such Progress Report, indicating the various elevations of the land surface it
embraced, ranging from 0.00 meters to the highest elevation of 2.5 meters above MLLW. Such
portrayal of work accomplished is crucial in our determination of whether or not RREC had
actually "reclaimed" any land as under its Contract for Dredging Work with C and A Construction
Company (Exhibit "EE", the required final elevation for a completely reclaimed land was 3.5
meters above MLLW, as explicitly provided in said Contract for Dredging Work. So, the irresistible
conclusion is when the work on subject RREC-Pasay City reclamation project stopped in April,
1962 in compliance with the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court of origin, no
portion of the reclamation project worked on by RREC had reached the stipulated elevation of 3.5
meters above MLLW. The entire area it worked on was only at sea level or 0.00 meter above
MLLW. In short, RREC had not yet reclaimed any area when the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in April 1962.
On this point, the testimonies of Architect Ruben M. Protacio, Architect and Managing partner of
Leandro V. Locsin and partners, Architect and City Planner Manuel T. Maoza, Jr. of Planning
Resources and Operation System, Inc., Rose D. Cruz, Executive Assistant, Office of the President,
from 1966 to 1970, and Dr. Lucrecia Kasilag, National Artist and member of CCP Advisory
Committee, come to the fore. These credible, impartial and knowledgeable witnesses recounted
on the witness stand that when the construction of the Main Building of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines (CCP) began in 1966, the only surface land available was the site for the said building
(TSN, Sept. 29, 1997, pages 8, 14 and 50), what could be seen in front of and behind it was all
water (TSN, Sept. 29, 1997 pages 127-128). When the CCP Main Building was being constructed,
from 1968 to 1969, the land above sea level thereat was only where the CCP Main Building was
erected and the rest of the surroundings were all under water, particularly the back portion
fronting the bay. (TSN, Sept. 13, 1997, pp. 181, 182, 185, 186, 188). Dr. Lucrecia R. Kasilag
stressed that on April 16, 1966, during the ground breaking for the CCP Main Building, it was
water all around (TSN, Sept. 30, 1997, pp. 320, 324, 325).
There was indeed no legal and factual basis for the Court of Appeals to order and declare that
"the requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission of RREC's plans and
specification to the Department of Public Works and Highways in order that RREC may continue
the implementation of the reclamation work is deleted for being moot and academic." Said
requirement has never become moot and academic. It has remained indispensable, as ever, and
non-compliance therewith restrained RREC from lawfully resuming the reclamation work under
controversy, notwithstanding the rendition below of the decision in its favor.
Verily, contrary to what the Court of Appeals found, RREC had not reclaimed any area with the
prescribed elevation of 3.5 meters above MLLW, so much so that in 1978, it (RREC) opted to file
with the former Ministry of Public Highways, a claim for compensation of P30,396,878.20, for
reclamation work allegedly done before the CDCP started working on the reclamation of the CCP
grounds. On September 7, 1979, RREC asked the Solicitor General to settle its subject claim for
compensation at the same amount of P30,396,878.20. But on June 10, 1981, guided by the cost
data, work volume accomplished and other relevant information gathered by the former Ministry
of Public Highways, the Solicitor General informed RREC that the value of what it had
accomplished, based on 1962 price levels, was only P8,344,741.29, and the expenses for
mobilization of equipment amounted to P2,581,330.00. The aforesaid evaluation made by the
government, through the then Minister of Public Highways, is factual and realistic, so much so
that on June 25, 1981, RREC, in its reply letter to the Solicitor General, stated:
We regret that we are not agreeable to the amount of P10,926,071.29, based on 1962 cost data,
etc., as compensation based on quantum meruit. The least we would consider is the amount of
P10,926,071.29 plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 1962 to the time of payment. We
feel that 6% is very much less than the accepted rate of inflation that has supervened since 1962
to the present, and even less than the present legal rate of 12% per annum. 19
Undoubtedly, what RREC claimed for was compensation for what it had done, and for the dredge
fill of 1,558,395 cubic meters it used, on subject reclamation project.
Respondent Court likewise erred in ordering the turn-over to Pasay City of the following titled
lots, to wit:
LOT NO.
42
AREA OCT/TCT
Gloria Maris 9,516 sq.m. OCT 159 in the
Restaurant
3
BUILDING
name of GSIS
Asean Garden
76,299 sq.m.
OCT 10251 in the
name of CCP
12
Folk Arts Theater
and PICC parking
1.7503 hec. TCT 18627 in the
name of CCP
space
22
landscaped with
132,924 sq.m.
TCT 75676 in the
sculpture of Asean name of CCP

Artists-site of
Boom na Boom
23
open space, back
of Philcite
24
34,346 sq.m.
TCT 75677 in the
10,352 sq.m.
TCT 75678 in the
name of CCP
Parking space for
Star City, CCP,
name of CCP
Philcite
25
open space 11,323 sq.m.
occupied by Star
TCT 75679 in the
name of CCP
City
28
open space, 27,689 sq.m.
TCT 75684 in the
beside PICC name of CCP

29
open space, 106,067 sq.m.
leased by El name of CCP

Shaddai
TCT 75681 in the
We discern no factual basis nor any legal justification therefor. In the first place, in their answer
to the Complaint and Amended Complaint below, RREC and Pasay City never prayed for the
transfer to Pasay City of subject lots, title to which had long become indefeasible in favor of the
rightful title holders, CCP and GSIS, respectively.
The annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the said lots is of no
moment. It did not vest in Pasay City and RREC any real right superior to the absolute ownership
thereover of CCP and GSIS. Besides, the nature of the action did not really warrant the issuance
of a notice of lis pendens.
Sec. 14 of Rule 13, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, reads:
Sec. 14.
Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of
real properly, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer,
may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated
a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the
object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected
thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of
the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the
action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens herein above mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court,
after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it
is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Under the aforecited provision of law in point, a notice of lis pendens is necessary when the
action is for recovery of possession or ownership of a parcel of land. In the present litigation,
RREC and Pasay City, as defendants in the main case, did not counterclaim for the turnover to
Pasay City of the titled lots aforementioned.
What is more, a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens
title, whether fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or
annul it. (Halili vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 257 SCRA 174, Cimafranca vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 611.) Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the
germane provision of Section 48 of P.D. 1529, that a certificate of title can never be the subject
of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
instituted in accordance with law.
Although Pasay City and RREC did not succeed in their undertaking to reclaim any area within
subject reclamation project, it appearing that something compensable was accomplished by
them, following the applicable provision of law and hearkening to the dictates of equity, that no
one, not even the government, shall unjustly enrich oneself/itself at the expense of another 20,
we believe; and so hold, that Pasay City and RREC should be paid for the said actual work done
and dredge-fill poured in, worth P10,926,071.29, as verified by the former Ministry of Public
Highways, and as claimed by RREC itself in its aforequoted letter dated June 25, 1981.
It is fervently hoped that long after the end of our sojourn in this valley of tears, the court, for its
herein historic disposition, will be exalted by the future generations of Filipinos, for the
preservation of the national patrimony and promotion of our cultural heritage. As writer Channing
rightly puts it: "Whatever expands the affections, or enlarges the sphere of our sympathies
Whatever makes us feel our relation to the universe and all that it inherits in time and in eternity,
and to the great and beneficent cause of all, must unquestionably refine our nature, and elevate
us in the scale of being."
WHEREFORE:
In G.R. No. 103882, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision, dated January 28, 1992, and Amended
Decision, dated April 28, 1992, of the Court of Appeals, are both SET ASIDE; and Pasay City
Ordinance No. 121, dated May 6, 1958, and Ordinance No. 158, dated April 21, 1959, as well as
the Reclamation Agreements entered into by Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation
(RREC) as authorized by said city ordinances, are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires,
and contrary to Rep. Act 1899.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962 by the trial court a quo in Civil Case
No. 2229-P is made permanent and the notice of lis pendens issued by the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CV No. 51349 ordered CANCELLED. The Register of Deeds of Pasay City is directed to take
note of and annotate on the certificates of title involved, the cancellation of subject notice of lis
pendens.
The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, is hereby ordered to pay Pasay City and Republic Real
Estate Corporation the sum of TEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND SEVENTYONE AND TWENTY-NINE CENTAVOS (P10,926,071.29) PESOS, plus interest thereon of six (6%)
percent per annum from May 1, 1962 until full payment, which amount shall be divided by Pasay
City and RREC, share and share alike.
In G.R. No. 105276, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic vs. CA and Del Rio

GR No. L-43105 August 31, 1984
FACTS: The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the shores of Laguna de
Bay. Said land was owned by Benedicto del Rio. After the death of Benedicto, the land was
acquired by his son Santos Del Rio. The private oppositors in this case sought and obtained
permission from Santos Del Rio to construct duck houses on said land. The private oppositors,
however, violated their agreement and instead constructed residential houses thereon. Santos
then filed an ejectment suit against the private oppositors and later on sought to register the
land. Meanwhile, private oppositors simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with
Bureau of Lands, and they opposed Santos del Rios application for registration.
The CFI of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a
favourable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors
filed their respective petitions for review on said decision to the Supreme Court.
The Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land is covered with water four to five
months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the
subject of registration.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and
2.
Whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.
HELD: The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides." It cannot be
considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as
private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. The purpose
of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the
registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. Applicant by himself and through his father before him, has been in open, continuous,
public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30)
years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts.
Applicant has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the
registration in his favor of said land.
Republic vs.Regulto
GR No. 202051 April 18, 2016
(Full Text)
For resolution of this Court is the petition for review on certiorari dated July 10, 2012 filed by
petitioners, the Republic of the Philippines as represented by the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH); Engineer Simplicio D. Gonzales, District Engineer, Second Engineering District
of Camarines Sur; and Engineer Victorino M. Del Socorro, Jr., Project Engineer, DPWH, Baras,
Canaman, Camarines Sur assailing the Order1 dated May 24, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ofNaga City, Branch 62, which ordered herein petitioners to pay respondents spouses
Ildefonso B. Regulto and Francia R. Regulto (Spouses Regulto) the amount of Two Hundred FortyThree Thousand Pesos (P243,000.00) as just compensation for the part of their property
traversed by the Naga CityMilaor Bypass Project of the DPWH.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Respondents spouses Ildefonso B. Regulto and Francia R. Regulto are the registered owners of
the property in controversy located at Mabel, Naga City, Camarines Sur consisting of 300 square
meters covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 086-2010000231.2 The Spouses Regulto acquired the said property
by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed by Julian R. Cortes, attorney-in-fact of the spouses
Bienvenido and Beatriz
Santos, in February 1994.3 The subject property originated from a Free Patent property
consisting of 7,759 square meters registered and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 235 dated April 14, 1956.4
Sometime in April 2011, the DPWH Second Engineering District of Camarines Sur apprised the
Spouses Regulto of the construction of its road project, the Naga City-Milaor Bypass Road, which
will traverse their property and other adjoining properties. 5 The DPWH initially offered the
spouses the sum of P243,000.00 or Pl ,500.00 per square meter for the 162 square-meter
affected area as just compensation.6
However, in a letter dated May 11, 2006, the DPWH, through District Engr. Rolando P. Valdez,
withdrew the offer, and informed the Spouses Regulto that they were not entitled to just
compensation since the title of their land originated from a Free Patent title acquired under
Commonwealth Act (CA.) No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, which contained a reservation in
favor of the government of an easement of right-of-way of twenty (20) meters, which was
subsequently increased to sixty (60) meters by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 635, for public
highways and similar works that the government or any public or quasi-public service enterprise
may reasonably require for carrying on their business, with payment of damages for the
improvements only. 7
The Spouses Regulto, in their letter dated May 30, 2011, protested the findings of the DPWH and
ordered them to cease from proceeding with the construction. 8 They alleged that since their
property is already covered by TCT No. 086-2010000231, it ceased to be a public land.9 They
communicated that the market value of the property is P450,000.00 plus the Zonal Value of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), which is more or less the acceptable just compensation of their
property. 10 Furthermore, they requested that they be furnished, within five (5) days from the
receipt of their letter, with a Program of Works and Sketch Plan showing the cost of the project
and the extent or area covered by the road that will traverse their property. 11
The DPWH furnished the Spouses Regulto with the sketch plan showing the extent of the road
right-of-way that will cut across their property. 12 It also reiterated its earlier position that the
title to the land was acquired under C.A. No. 141. 13
On October 8, 2011, the Spouses Regulto filed a complaint for payment of just compensation,
damages with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Naga City, Branch 62, against herein petitioners Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the DPWH; District Engr. Valdez of the Second Engineering District of
Camarines Sur; and Project Engr. Del Socorro, Jr. of the DPWH, Baras, Canaman, Camarines Sur.
14
The Spouses Regulto averred that the DPWH acted with deceit, misrepresentation and evident
bad faith in convincing them to sign on a paper after relying on the assurance that they would be
paid with just compensation. 15 They also alleged that their property is outside the coverage of
Section 112, C.A. No. 141 because their land is a private property, and that the same is situated
beyond the 60-meter radius or width from the public highways, railroads, irrigation ditches,
aqueducts, telegraph and telephone lines, airport runways, an d oth er government structures.
16
On August 5, 2011, the petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Spouses Regulto do not have a cause of action, and
that their complaint failed to state the same. 17 Petitioners asseverated that Section 112 of C.A.
No. 141 is explicit on the encumbrance imposed upon lands originally covered by a free patent or
any other public land patent. 18 Petitioners also alleged that the respondents failed to exhaust
administrative remedies for not appealing the findings of the Regional Infrastructure Right-of-Way
(IROW) Committee with the DPWH Regional Director or to the Secretary of Public Works and
Highways. 19
In an Order dated October 17, 2011, the RTC denied the motion filed by the petitioners citing that
the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint to sustain a
dismissal based on lack of cause of action. 20 In this case, the complaint stated allegations of
nonpayment of just compensation.[[ 21]] Furthermore, the court mentioned that one of the
exceptions of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is when the issue is one of
law and when circumstances warrant urgency of judicial intervention, as in the case of the
Spouses Regulto whose portion of their property has already been occupied by the petitioners
without just compensation. 22
In the Answer23 dated November 16, 2011, the petitioners reiterated their defense that no legal
right has been violated since C.A. No. 141, as amended by P.D. No. 1361,24 imposes a 60-meter
wide lien on the property originally covered by a Free Patent.25 Petitioners also avowed that
Section 5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulation (IRR) of the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 897426
provides that if the private property or land is acquired
under the provisions of C.A. No. 141, the government officials charged with the prosecution of
the projects or their representative is authorized to take immediate possession of the property
subject to the lien as soon as the need
arises, and the government may obtain a quitclaim from the owners concerned without the need
for payment for the land acquired under the said quit claim mode except for the damages to
improvements only. 27 Hence, petitioners maintained that the Spouses Regulto are not entitled
to a just compensation for the portion of their property affected by the construction of the Naga
City-Milaor Bypass Road.28
The petitioners, in a Motion dated December 19, 2011, prayed for the issuance of the writ of
possession of the subject property in their favor for the construction of the project to finally
proceed and be completed without
further delay.29
On January 2, 2012, the RTC ordered the respondents spouses to remove the obstructions that
they erected on the subject property within three days, or the petitioners may dismantle the
same to proceed with the construction of the bypass road project.30 Likewise, the petitioners
were ordered to deliver the check already prepared in the amount of Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00) for payment of the trees/improvements on the property. 31 The petitioners were also
ordered to deposit with any authorized government depository bank the amount of Thirty-Six
Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Pesos (P36,450.00) equivalent to the assessed value of the 162
square meters of the subject property, which was assessed at P67,500.00 by the 2010 tax
declaration, that the road project will traverse.32
In an Order dated January 27, 2012, the RTC dismissed the motion for reconsideration filed by the
Spouses Regulto, and sustained its earlier order that the petitioners deposit the amount of
P36,450.00.33 The RTC also acknowledged the receipt of the Spouses Regulto of the check for
the payment of the improvements on the property affected by the project.34
Consequently, the RTC, in its Order dated May 24, 2012, ordered the petitioners to pay the
Spouses Regulto the amount of P243,000.00 as just compensation for the affected portion of
their property.[[ 35]] The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants Engr.
Rolando F. Valdez and Engr. Victorino M. del Socorro, Jr., Republic of the Philippines and the Dept.
of Public Works and Highways to pay plaintiffs-spouses Ildefonso and Francia Regulto the amount
of P243,000.00 as just compensation for their property traversed by the Naga-Milaor Bypass
Project.
SO ORDERED.36
The RTC concluded that the government waived the encumbrance provided for in C.A. No. 141
when it did not oppose the further subdivision of the original property covered by the free patent
or made an express intent on making its encumbrance before the residential lots, which are part
of the said subdivision, were sold to other innocent purchasers for value, especially after the 25year period has lapsed since the free patent. 37
Hence, the petitioners, through the OSG, filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
THE RTC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO AND IN ORDERING
PETITIONERS TO PAY JUST COMPENSATION DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE LAND WAS
ORIGINALLY PUBLIC LAND AW ARD ED TO RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST BY FREE
PATENT, AND THUS A LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT-OF-WAY EXISTS IN FAVOR OF THE
GOVERNMENT.
THE TRIAL COURT'S RATIOCINATION - THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY HAS IPSO FACTO CEASED TO
BE "PUBLIC LAND" AND THUS NO LONGER SUBJECT TO THE LIEN IMPOSED BY SAID PROVISION OF
C.A. NO. 141, BY VIRTUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BEING ALREADY COVERED BY A TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IN THEIR NAME CONTRAVENES SECTION 44 OF P.D. NO. 1529 AND
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS.
THE RTC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 8 ("EXPROPRIATION"), NOT SECTION 5 ("QUIT
CLAIM"), OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF R.A. N6. 8974 IS THE APPLICABLE
PROVISION REGARDING THE MODE OF ACQUISITION OF RESPONDENTS' PROPERTY.38
This Court finds the instant petition partially meritorious.
At the outset, it is noted that petitioners filed the instant petition before this Court without
appealing the said case before the Court of Appeals (CA). A strict application of the policy of
strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts is unnecessary when cases brought before
the appellate courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions.39 Section 2 (c), 40 Rule
41, of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a decision or order of the RTC may, as done in the
instant petition, be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45, provided that such petition raises only questions of law.41
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact are explained in the case of Navy
Officers' Village Association, Inc. (NOVA!) v. Republic of the Philippines 42 as follows:
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence on a certain state of facts. The issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. In
contrast, a question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood
of facts or when the query invites the calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses; the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances,
as well as their relation to each other and to the whole; and the probability of the situation.
In the case at bar, the petitioners raise questions of law in disputing the denial by the RTC in the
application of C.A. No. 141 to impose the legal easement of right-of-way to the subject property,
and the application of Section 8 (Expropriation) of the IRR of R.A. No. 8974 instead of Section 5
(Quit Claim) in the acquisition of the said property.
Essentially, the issue for resolution of this Court is whether the petitioners are liable for just
compensation iri enforcing the Government's legal easement of right-of-way on the subject
property which originated from the 7,759 square-meter of public land awarded by free patent to
the predecessor-in-interest of the Spouses Regulto.
Petitioners allege that a legal easement of right-of-way exists in favor of the Government since
the land in controversy was originally public land awarded by free patent to the Spouses
Regulto's predecessors-in-interest.
The RTC, however, ruled that the provision of C.A. No. 141 regarding the easement of right-ofway in favor of the government is not applicable to the subject property since the law is clearly
meant for lands granted gratuitously by the government in favor of individuals tasked to make it
agriculturally productive.43 It ruled that the subject property is already a private property since
the Spouses Regulto acquired the same through a deed of absolute sale from the spouses
Bienvenido and Beatriz Santos in February 1994, and that the same originated from the property
covered by TCT No. 24027.44
This Court finds that the RTC erroneously ruled that the provisions of C.A. No. 141 are not
applicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, this Court held that "a legal easement of right-ofway exists in favor of the Government over land that was originally a public land awarded by free
patent even if the land is subsequently sold to another."45 This Court has expounded that the
"ruling would be otherwise if the land was originally a private property, to which just
compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of
right-of-way."46
It is undisputed that the subject property originated from and was a part of a 7,759-square-meter
property covered by free patent registered under OCT No. 235.47 ..Furthermore, the Spouses
Regulto's transfer certificate of title, which the RTC relied, contained the reservation: "subject to
the provisions of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act, as well as to those of
the Mining Law, if the land is mineral, and subject, further, to such conditions contained in the
original title as may be subsisting."48
Jurisprudence settles that one of the reservations and conditions under the Original Certificate of
Title of land granted by free patent is that the said land is subject "to all conditions and public
easements and servitudes
recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112,
113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. "49
Section 112 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, provides that lands granted by patent shall be
subjected to a right-of-way in favor of the Government, to wit:
Sec. 112. Said land shall further be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding sixty (60) meters on
width for public highways, railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraph and telephone lines,
airport runways, including sites necessary for terminal buildings and other government
structures needed for full operation of the airport, as well as
areas and sites for government buildings for Resident and/or Project Engineers needed in the
prosecution of government-infrastructure projects, and similar works as the Government or any
public or quasi-public service or enterprise, including mining or forest concessionaires, may
reasonably require for carrying on their business, with damages for the improvements only.
Government officials charged with the prosecution of these projects or their representatives are
authorized to take immediate possession of the portion of the property subject to the lien as
soon as the need arises and after due notice to the owners. It is however, understood that
ownership over said properties shall immediately revert to the title holders should the airport be
abandoned or when the infrastructure projects are completed and buildings used by project
engineers are abandoned or dismantled, but subject to the same lien for future
improvements.50
In other words, lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 60
meters in width for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works of the
government or any public enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of the
improvements existing thereon that may be affected.51
We are not persuaded with the ruling of the RTC that the government waived the encumbrance
imposed by C.A. No. 141 (Public Land Act) when it did not oppose the subdivision of the original
property covered by the free patent. The reservation and condition contained in the OCT of lands
granted by free patent, like the origins of the subject property, is not limited by any time period,
"thus, the same is subsisting. 52 . This subsisting reservation contained in the transfer certificate
of title of the Spouses Regulto belies such supposition that the Government waived the
enforcement of its legal easement of right-of-way on the subject property when it did not oppose
to the subdivision of the property in 1995.
Petitioners allege that since the property in controversy was originally acquired under the
provisions of special laws, particularly C.A. No. 141, then Section 5 of the IRR of R.A. No. 8974
should be applied in the present case. Petitioners insist that the acquisition of the portion of the
subject property is through execution of quitclaims.
Section 5 of the IRR of R.A. No. 8974 provides:
SECTION 5. Quit Claim - If the private property or land is acquired under the provisions of Special
Laws, particularly Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, which provides a
20-meter strip of land easement by the government for public use with damages to
improvements only, P.D. No. 635 which increased the reserved area to a 60-meter strip, and P.D.
No. 1361 which authorizes government officials charged with the prosecution of projects or their
representative to take immediate possession of portion of the property subject to the lien as
soon as the need arises and after due notice to the owners, then a quit claim from the owners
concerned shall be obtained by the Implementing Agency. No payment by the government shall
be made for land acquired under the quit claim mode. 53
With the existence of the said easement of right-of-way in favor of the Government, the
petitioners may appropriate the portion of the land necessary for the construction of the bypass
road without paying for it, except for damages to the improvements. Consequently, the
petitioners are ordered to obtain the necessary quitclaim deed from the Spouses Regulto for the
162-square-meter strip of land to be utilized in the bypass road project.
It is noted that the 162 square meters of the subject property traversed by the bypass road
project is well within the limit provided by the law While this Court concurs that the petitioners
are not obliged to pay just compensation in the enforcement of its easement of right-of-way to
lands which originated from public lands granted by free patent, we, however, rule that
petitioners are not free from any liability as to the consequence of enforcing the said right-of-way
granted over the original 7,759-square-meter property to the 300-square-meter property
belonging to the Spouses Regulto.
There is "taking," in the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, when the
owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction
or material impairment of the
value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof.54 Using one of these
standards, it is apparent that there is taking of the remaining area of the property of the Spouses
Regulto. It is true that no burden was imposed thereon, and that the spouses still retained title
and possession of the property. The fact that more than half of the property shall be devoted to
the bypass road will undoubtedly result in material impairment of the value of the property. It
reduced the subject property to an area of 138 square meters.1wphi1
Thus, the petitioners are liable to pay just compensation over the remaining area of the subject
property, with interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of writ of
possession or the actual taking until full payment is made.
The case of Republic v. Hon. Jesus M Mupas55 elucidated just compensation in this language:
Just compensation is defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator." The word "just" is used to qualify the meaning of the word "compensation"
and to convey the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample. On the other hand, the word "compensation" means "a full indemnity
or remuneration for the loss or damage sustained by the owner of property taken or injured for
public use."
Simply stated, just compensation means that the former owner must be returned to the
monetary equivalent of the position that the owner had when the taking occurred. To achieve this
monetary equivalent, we use the standard value of "fair market value" of the property at the
time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation or at the time of the taking of property,
whichever is earlier.56
Consequently, the case is remanded to the court of origin for the purpose of determining the
final just compensation for the remaining area of the subject property. The RTC is thereby
ordered to make the determination of just compensation payable to the respondents Spouses
Regulto with deliberate dispatch. The R TC is cautioned to make a determination based on the
parameters set forth by law and jurisprudence regarding just compensation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari dated July 10, 2012 filed by the Republic of the
Philippines as represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways; Engineer Simplicio
D. Gonzales, District Engineer, Second Engineering District of Camarines Sur; and Engineer
Victorino M. Del Socorro, Jr., Project Engineer, DPWH, Baras, Canaman, Camarines Sur, is hereby
PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 62 for the
determination of the final just compensation of the compensable area consisting of 13 8 square
meters, with interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of writ of
possession or the actual taking until full payment is made.
SO ORDERED.

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Central Mindanao University vs.

Dativa P. Velez- 18 hectares of Lot No. 1.

This Court finds the instant petition without merit.

Republic vs. Zuburban Realty and Development Corp.

Cruz vs. Sec. of Environment and Natural Resources

Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority

Republic vs. Naguiat

Republic vs. CA and Dela Rosa

Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds

Pajomayo vs. Manipon

Republic vs. CA and Lapia

Malabanan vs. Republic

Amunategui vs. Dir. Of Forestry

In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Republic vs. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc.

Republic vs. CA and Republic Real Estate Corp.

dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint;

(SGD) CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE

Gloria Maris 9,516 sq.m. OCT 159 in the

OCT 10251 in the

Folk Arts Theater

and PICC parking

1.7503 hec. TCT 18627 in the

TCT 75676 in the

sculpture of Asean name of CCP

open space, back

TCT 75677 in the

TCT 75678 in the

Parking space for

Star City, CCP,

open space 11,323 sq.m.

TCT 75679 in the

open space, 27,689 sq.m.

TCT 75684 in the

beside PICC name of CCP

open space, 106,067 sq.m.

leased by El name of CCP

TCT 75681 in the

Republic vs. CA and Del Rio

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