A. Res adjudicata vs.

Conclusiveness of Judgment

The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) bar by prior judgment and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment. This Court had occasion to explain the difference between these two aspects of res judicata as
follows:

There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of
the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity
of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is
the concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. Stated differently, any
right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered
on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.[9]

Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been
squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent
jurisdiction.[10] The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and
persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment
or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the
conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the
same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. [11] Thus, only the identities of parties
and issues are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.[12] (Antonio
vs Vda. De Monje , G.R. No. 149624, Sept. 29, 2010)

B. Suarez vs Imboy

Facts:

A parcel of land was partitioned into 5 among the heirs of the Carlos and Asuncion. Lot No. 1907-A-2
was occupied by Felix and Marilou Emboy, who were claiming that they inherited it from their mother
Claudia Emboy, who inherited it from her parents Carlos and Asuncion.

Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins to vacate Lot No. 1907-A-2 and transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-
5. They refused to comply and insisted that Claudia's inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.

In 2004, Felix and Marilou received a demand letter from Carmencita Suarez requiring them to vacate the
lot and informed them that she had already purchased the lot from the former's relatives. Felix and
 Marilou did not heed the demand so Carmencita filed before the MTCC a complaint against unlawful
detainer against them.

Felix and Marilou argued that the complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally inadequate. There
was practically no specific allegation as to when and how possession by tolerance of them began.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint for unlawful detainer was inadequate.

Held:

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following requisites must be alleged:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.

In ejectment cases, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show a statement of facts to
determine the class of case and remedies available to the parties. When the complaint fails to state the
facts constituting a forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected
or how the dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion
reinvidicatoria.

In this case, the first requisite was absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how Emboy
entered the lot and constructed a house upon it. She was also silent about the details on who specifically
permitted Emboy to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about.

Hence, the complaint should not have been for unlawful detainer and the CA did not commit an error in
dismissing Carmencita's complaint.

C. Manila Lodge vs CA

FACTS:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion
of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The act provided that the
reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of
the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later, the City of Manila conveyed a
portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, together with all the
improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC).

ISSUE:
W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

HELD:
The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of
Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of
the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. Such grants have always been
strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resources,
 which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area reclaimed would be filled
at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. Hence, the letter of the
statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of legislation.

D. Abobon vs Abobon

FACTS:
Respondents filed an action for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner claiming that they
were the registered owners of that parcel of un irrigated riceland which they inherited from their father and
covered by transfer certificate of title (TCT). That they had allowed their first cousin, the free use of the
land out of benevolence and that they now immediately needed the parcel of land for their own use and
had accordingly demanded that petitioner should vacate and return it to them but he had refused.

ISSUE:

Who is the true owner of the land in question.

HELD:

A fundamental principle in land registration under the Torrens system is that a certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. The certificate of tile thus becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land;
hence, anyone who deals with property registered under the Torrens system may rely on the title and
need not go beyond the title. This reliance on the certificate of title rests on the doctrine of indefeasibility
of the land title, which has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction. It is only when the acquisition of the
title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine of indefeasibility finds no application. The
respondents had the preferential right to the possession of the land in question. Their having preferential
right conformed to the age- old rule that whoever held a Torrens title in his name is entitled to the
possession of the land covered by the title. He may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

E. German vs CA

In February 1982, the spouses Manuel and Cynthia Jose contracted with German Management and
Services, Inc. for the latter to develop their landholdings into a residential subdivision. The spouses also
executed a special power of attorney to that effect.

German Management started the project in February 1983, however, German Management discovered
that the land was being possessed by Ernest Villeza et al who were the farmers tilling the said land at that
time. German Management spoke with Villeza et al but the farmers refused to vacate the land as the
farmers claimed that they have been occupying the land for twelve years.

Nevertheless, German Management went on to develop the property and demolished the properties of
the farmers without acquiring a court order. In turn, Villeza et al filed a case of forcible entry against
German Management. In its defense, German Management invoked the Doctrine of Self-help which
provides that:

The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or
prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. (Article 429, Civil
Code)

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of self-help is applicable in this case.

What should have been the remedy by German Management?

German Management should have filed either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria to lawfully eject
the farmers.

But the farmers are not the real owners and in fact, the spouses Jose have a lawful title over the land?

Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Further, there is now a presumption of
ownership in favor of the farmers since they are the ones occupying the said property. They can only be
ejected either by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria through which the spouses Jose’s better right
may be proven.

F. Caisip Vs PP

FACTS:
Spouses Gloria Cabalag and Marcelino Guevarra are people who cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot
105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The overseer
of the hacienda is petitioner Felix Casipi and the owner of the same is Roxas y Cia.

The latter acquired a court ruling against the spouses Gloria and Marcelino for forcible entry which orders
them to vacate the premises within 20 days. The order was carried out June 6, 1959 (so they had until
June 26 to vacate it.)

On June 17, Gloria was seen by Felix Caisip harvesting their crops in Lot 105-A. The Latter bade her to
stop what she was doing and to leave the premises. When Gloria refused, Caisip called for Sgt. Rjales
and Cpl. Villadelrey to help him shoo her away. Gloria stuck to her attitude and still refused to stop and
leave so the two police officers, by means of force, stopped her and dragged her away (they also tried to
threaten her by drawing their guns :).

As a result, the clothes of Gloria got torn. One of Gloria’s neighbours caught sight of the event and asked
the officers to release her. Gloria was later turned over to the police on duty for interrogation.

A case filed against the petitioners, Caisip and the officers, for Grave Coercion (Petitioners also filed
grave coercion and unjust vexation against Gloria after 8 days maybe just to get back at her- just in case
sir asks.) One of their defenses was ART. 429 (including the doctrine of self help.) The petitioners were
found guilty by the lower court thus this appeal.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Art. 429 can be used as a defense? [More relevant issue to property:]
2) Whether or not the petitioners liable for Grave Coercion? [Main Issue-this case is really a criminal case]

RULING:
1. NO, Art 429 cannot be used as a defense of the petitioner to justify their action.
The order to vacate was until June 26 (or 20 days from the execution of the decision.) On June 17, the
spouses REMAINED in possession of the said lot. At the very least the owner of the hacienda is just a co-
possessor of the land, thus the spouses still had rights over it.
 Although the spouses were ordered to vacate the land, it doesn’t necessarily mean that they don’t have
rights to the land (they still have right to necessary expenses they used to till the land)
What petitioner did was not ―repel or prevent in actual or threatened x x x physical invasion or
usurpation.‖ They EXPELLED Gloria from a property which they were still in possession of. (more
detailed enumeration of reason in page 23)

2. YES, they are guilty! Caisip is guilty of grave coercion as a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal
by induction
> By trying to stop her the first time showed that he intended to stop her
> By calling the police and not stopping them when they were already dragging Gloria and threatening her
by drawing their guns.

Aggravating circumstances: abuse of superior strength and disregard of sex were appreciated in the case
of Caisip and an additional aggravating: taking advantage of position as a members of the local police
force were appreciated on the two police officers’ case

G. Andama vs Intermediate Appellate Court

H. Epsa vs. Dulay

Facts:
January 1957, president of the Philippines issued proclamation no 1811 reserving a parcel of land in
Lapu-lapu for the establishment of an export processing zone. Not all the reserved land was public. EPZA
then offered to purchase the lands from its registered owners, in the valuation set by PD 464,as
amended. The owners did not agree.

EPZA filed with CFI-Cebu a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
possession against the landowners. Judge Dulay, later issued a writ of possession authorizing EPZA to
take immediate possession of the premises.

After the recommendation of the appointed commissioners as to the just compensation, EPZA filed for a
motion for reconsideration saying that the PD 464, as amended, superseded the rules of court. The trial
court denied the motion. EPZA then filed for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order.

Issue: Whether PD 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed the Revised Rules of Court, such that in
determining just compensation in expropriation shall be based only in its market value as declared by the
owner or by assessor, whichever is lower.

Ruling:
PD 464 on just compensation is unconstitutional and void. The method of just compensation provided by
PD 464 is an encroachment on judicial prerogatives, contradicting the Constitution which reserved the
power to determine just compensation to the Court's final determination. We are convinced and so rule
that the trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or
one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as
to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.

Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities, should be considered. The determination of "just compensation" in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order
can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts
be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.