Regional Trial Court: Plaintiff-Appellee'S Memorandum
Regional Trial Court: Plaintiff-Appellee'S Memorandum
Regional Trial Court: Plaintiff-Appellee'S Memorandum
ENGRACITA S. ZABALA,
Plaintiff-Appelee,
DIVINA SUNGA,
Defendant-Appellant.
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PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S
MEMORANDUM
PREFATORY STATEMENT
SO ORDERED.”
Second: The Honorable Court a quo erred in not finding that the
defendant-appellant has been continuously in
possession of the subject property despite the fact that it
was illegally rented out by plaintiff-appellee to Fe Tiu.
Page Three (3)
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“ The argument of the defendant that plaintiff’s
act of leasing a property not owned by her is illegal and
the court should therefore leave her where it found
her is unavailing. If defendant considers plaintiff’s
act of leasing the disputed property illegal, she should
have instituted appropriate legal actions to recover
same like what plaintiff is doing right now, and not
forcibly take the property away when the latter’s tenant
stopped renting the property. In forcible entry cases, it is
immaterial how defendant came into such possession
or by what right she did so. Even usurpers of land
owned by another are entitled to remain on it until they
are lawfully ejected therefrom. A party who can prove
prior possession can recover such possession even against
the owner himself. Whatever may the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in
time he has the security that entitled him to remain on
the property until a person with a better right
lawfully ejects him.”
13. As regards the second assignment of error, the lower court has
ruled that contrary to the claim of the defendant-appellee, the evidences
presented by the parties, both documentary and testimonial, tilted heavily in
favor favor of the plaintiff-appellee. In fact, the lower court has been emphatic
in its ruling when it said:
14. The findings of the lower court has even made more clear when it
said:
But for fourteen (14) long years since plaintiff exercised acts of
possession over the property, defendant never lifted a finger to
question the same. Instead, what she did was to take the law into her
own hands and justifies the padlocking to her claim of ownership. She
asserts that the remaining portion of the 94.20 sq.m. (particularly
that located along Navarro Street) was never sold or relinquished by
her or any of her predecessors-in-interest to the plaintiff. This
defense, assuming it is true, is misplaced in a forcible entry case
where possession flowing from ownership is not an issue. Possession
in forcible entry cases means nothing more than physicial possession
or possession de facto, not legal possession in the sense contemplated
in civil law. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue.”
Anyone of them who can prove prior physical possession de facto, may
recover such possession even from the owner himself. (Gachon vs. Devera,
Jr. 274 SCRA).