Plant Siting & Layout PDF

10 Plant Siting and
Layout
Contents
10.1 Plant Siting 10/2

10.2 Plant Layout 10/2
10.3 Layout Generation 10/4
10.4 Layout Techniques and Aids 10/5
10.5 Layout Planning and Development 10/6
10.6 Site Layout Features 10/8
10.7 Plot Layout Considerations 10/11
10.8 Equipment Layout 10/13
10.9 Pipework Layout 10/15
10.10 Storage Layout 10/16
10.11 Separation Distances 10/17
10.12 Hazardous Area Classification 10/22
10.13 Hazard Assessment 10/23
10.14 Hazard Models 10/25
10.15 Fire Protection 10/26
10.16 Effluents 10/29
10.17 Drain Systems 10/30
10.18 Shock-Resistant Structures 10/31
10.19 Control Buildings 10/33
10.20 Ventilation 10/38
10.21 Toxics Protection 10/43
10.22 Winterization 10/44
10.23 Modular Plants 10/45
10.24 Notation 10/48
07:20 7/11/00 Ref: 3723 LEES Loss Prevention in the Process Industries Chapter 10 Page No. 1
10/2 PLANT SITING AND LAYOUT
10.1 Plant Siting Table 10.1 Selected references on plant siting

Safety is a prime consideration in plant siting. Other NRC (Appendix 28: Siting); Cremer (1945); Mohlman
important factors include: access to raw materials and to (1950); Bierwert and Krone (1955); Greenhut (1956); von
markets; availability of land, labour and cooling water; Allmen (1960); J.A. Gray (1960); Anon. (1964b); Risinger
means of effluent disposal; interlinking with other plants; (1964i); Liston (1965); Fryer (1966); Farmer (1967a,b,
and government policies, including planning permission 1969a,b); R. Reed (1967); Fowler and Spiegelman (1968);
and investment incentives. It is only safety aspects which Kaltenecker (1968); G.D. Bell (1970); Otway and
are considered here. Erdmann (1970); Speir (1970); Tucker and Cline (1970);
As far as safety of the public is concerned, the most Yocom, Collins and Bowne (1971); Gronow and Gausden
important feature of siting is the distance between the (1973); Balemans et al. (1974); Cross and Simons (1975);
site and built-up areas. Sites range from rural to urban, Roskill (1976); Weismantel (1977); Cremer and Warner
with population densities varying from virtually zero to (1978); Slater (1979); Dalal (1980); Kletz (1980h);
high. Separation between a hazard and the public is Granger (1981); Considine, Grint and Holden (1982);
beneficial in mitigating the effects of a major accident. Lovett, Swiggett and Cobb (1982); Ramsay, Sylvester-
An area of low population density around the site will Evans and English (1982); Landphair and Motloch (1985)
help to reduce casualties. In the ideal case the works is
surrounded by fields or waste land forming a complete
cordon sanitaire. In many situations, however, it is
unattractive to `sterilize' a large amount of land in this
A discussion of siting for high toxic hazard materials
way, particularly in an urban area, where land is
(HTHMs) is given in the CCPS HTHM Storage
generally at a premium.
Guidelines (1988/2). Siting policy for major hazard plants
The physical effects of a major accident tend to decay
in the UK was discussed in Chapter 4. Selected
quite rapidly with distance. Models for fire give an
references on plant siting are given in Table 10.1.
inverse square law decay, as do many of the simpler
models for explosion and toxic release, though other
explosion and toxic release models give different decay
relations, some with less rapid decay. Decay laws were 10.2 Plant Layout
discussed in Chapter 9 and further treatments are given Plant layout is a crucial factor in the economics and
in Chapters 1517. safety of process plant. Some of the ways in which plant
Information on the potential effects of a major accident layout contributes to safety and loss prevention are:
on the surrounding area is one of the main results
obtained from a hazard assessment and such an (1) segregation of different risks;
assessment is of assistance in making decisions on (2) minimization of vulnerable pipework;
plant siting. (3) containment of accidents;
Siting is not a substitute for high standards of design (4) limitation of exposure;
and operation of the plant. It should never be forgotten (5) efficient and safe construction;
that the people most at risk are the people on site, and (6) efficient and safe operation
standards should be such as to safeguard this workforce. (7) efficient and safe maintenance;
It is sometimes argued in fact that standards should be (8) safe control room design;
sufficiently high that separation between site and public (9) emergency control facilities;
is not necessary. Such standards, however, are essen- (10) fire fighting facilities;
tially a form of active protection, which depends crucially (11) access for emergency services;
on the quality of management. In most countries, (12) security.
including the UK, the view is taken that it is prudent
Plant layout can have a large impact on plant
nevertheless to have a degree of separation. The
economics. Additional space tends to increase safety,
provision of a separation distance is a form of passive
but is expensive in terms of land and also in additional
protection which provides a further mitigating factor and
pipework and operating costs. Space needs to be
which is relatively robust in the event of deterioration in
provided where it is necessary for safety, but not wasted.
the plant management.
The topics considered under the heading of `plant
In terms of hazard warning, separation tends to create
layout' are traditionally rather wide ranging. Many of
a hazard, which will give more warnings and which is
these subjects are treated here in separate chapters and
therefore less unforgiving.
only a brief treatment is given in this one. This applies
Topography is another relevant feature. It is
in particular to such topics as hazard assessment,
desirable to avoid terrain where hazardous fluids,
emission and dispersion, fire and fire protection, explo-
whether liquids or dense gases, can flow down into
sion and explosion protection, storage, and emergency
populated areas. Another consideration to be taken into
planning.
account is contamination of water courses by liquid
A general guide to the subject is given in Process Plant
spills.
Layout (Mecklenburgh, 1985). This is based on the work
In selecting a site, allowance should be made for site
of an Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE) work-
emergencies. One factor is the availability of emergency
ing party and expands an earlier guide Plant Layout
utilities such as electrical power and water. Another is
(Mecklenburgh, 1973). The treatment of hazard assess-
the availability and experience of outside emergency
ment in particular is much expanded in this later volume.
services, particularly the fire service. A third is access for
The loss prevention aspects of plant layout have also
these services.
been considered specifically by Mecklenburgh (1976).
PLANT SITING AND LAYOUT 10/3
Table 10.2 Selected references on plant layout Robins and Page (1974); Butragueno and Costello (1978);
IP (1980 Eur. MCSP Pt 2, 1981 MCSP Pt 3, 1987 MCSP
Cremer (1945); Mallick and Gaudreau (1951); Shubin Pt 9); API (1981 Refinery Inspection Guide Chapter 13,
and Madeheim (1951); Muther (1955, 1961, 1973); 1990 Std 620, 1993 Std 650); Nolan and Bradley (1987);
McGarry (1958); Armistead (1959); R. Reed (1961, 1967); D.J. Lewis (1989b); Martinsen, Johnsen and Millsap
EEUA (1962 Document 12, 1973 Hndbook 7); J.M. (1989); NFPA (1989 NFPA 50A, 50B, 1992 NFPA 58, 59);
Moore (1962); ABCM (1964/3); Dow Chemical Co. IRI (1991, 1992); LPGITA (1991 LPG Code)
(1964, 1966a,b, 1976, 1980, 1987, 1994); Duggan (1964a);
Jenett (1964c); Landy (1964ac); Risinger (1964i); R.
Wilson (1964b); Liston (1965, 1982); IP (1980 Eur. MCSP Pipework
Pt 2, 1981 MCSP Pt 3, 1987 MCSP Pt 9, 1990 MCSP Pt R. Kern (1966); Mecklenburgh (1973, 1976, 1985); Clarke
15); R. Kern (1966, 1977 series, 1978b): M.W. Kellogg (1966 BRE/1)
Co. (1967); BCISC (1968/7); Fowler and Spiegelman
(1968); Kaltenecker (1968); House (1969); Proctor Corrosion
(1969); British Cryogenics Council (1970); J.R. Hughes Mears (1960); ABCM (1964/3)
(1970); ICI/RoSPA (1970 IS/74); Kaess (1970); Sachs
(1970); Tucker and Cline (1970); Bush and Wells (1971, Buildings
1972); Simpson (1971); Guill (1973); Mecklenburgh BRE (Appendix 28, 1983 CP2/83, IP8/83); Beigler
(1973, 1976, 1982, 1985); Pemberton (1974); R.B. (1983); Crossthwaite and Crowther (1992)
Robertson (1974a,b, 1976a,b); Unwin, Robins and Page BS (Appendix 27 Buildings, CoP Buildings), BS
(1974); Falconer and Drury (1975); Beddows (1976); Handbook 20:1985
Harvey (1976, 1979b); Spitzgo (1976); Rigby (1977);
Kaura (1980b); Kletz (1980h, 1987c); F.V. Anderson Structures and access
(1982); O'Shea (1982); Goodfellow and Berry (1986); EEUA (1962 Document 12, 1973 Handbook 7);
Brandt et al. (1992); Meissner and Shelton (1992); Mecklenburgh (1973, 1976, 1985)
Bausbacher and Hunt (1993); Madden (1993); Briggs
(1994) ANSI A, A10, A37 and D series, BS 5930: 1981 Floors, walkways
ABCM (1964/3); Steinberg (1964); Pierce (1968);
Layout techniques Friedrich (1974); ASTM (1978 649); EEMUA (1983
Mecklenburgh (1973, 1976, 1985); Sproesser (1981); Publication 105)
Nolan and Bradley (1987); Madden, Pulford and Shadbolt
(1990); Madden (1993). Escape and rescue
Virtual reality: IEE (1992 College Digest 92/93) FPA (CFSD FPDG 4); HSE (HSW Booklet 40); EEUA
(1962 Document 12); Webber and Hallman (1988)
Civil engineering, including foundations
ASCE (Appendix 27, 28); Urquhart (1959); Biggs (1964); Lighting
ASTM (1967); MacNeish (1968); Benjamin and Cornell Illuminating Engineering Society (n.d.); Electricity
(1970); Tomlinson (1980); Carmichael (1982); M. Council and British Lighting Council (1967); Mixon
Schwartz (1982ac, 1983ae, 1984); Pathak and Rattan (1967); Rowe (1973); HSE (1987 HS(G) 38); BS 5266:
(1985); Blenkinsop (1992); BS (Appendix 27 Civil 1981; UL 8441990, UL 9241990, UL 7811992
Engineering, Construction), BS 6031: 1981, BS 8004: 1986, Emergency lighting: UL (1990 924)
BS COP 2010: 1970, BS COP 2012: 1974.
Equipment weights: El-Rifai (1979) Ventilation (see Table 25.1)
Wind resistance
Hazardous area classification (see Table 16.2) BRE (1972 BR 9, 1975 CP 16/75, SO 8, 1978 CP 25/78,
1986 EP1); Simiu and Scanlan (1978); ASCE (1980/10,
Materials handling 1986/12, 1987/34, 35)
Woodley (1964); Smego (1966); R. Reed (1969);
Department of Employment and Productivity (1970); Resistance to flood, hurricane
Brook (1971); DTI (1974); Pemberton (1974); Sussams Fulton (1960); Labine (1961); Neill and Bethel (1962);
(1977); Chemical Engineering (1978b) Weismantel (1969a); Marlar (1971)
In-works transport, roads Blast resistance (see Table 17.38)

HSE (1973 TDN 44); Mecklenburgh (1973, 1985); HSE
(1985 IND(G) 22(L); 1992 GS 9) Earthquake resistance (see Table A15.1)
Separation distances Compressor houses

C.W.J. Bradley (n.d., 1985); Armistead (1959); Dow D.H.A. Morris (1974); Prentice, Smith and Virtue (1974)
Chemical Co. (1964, 1966a, 1976, 1980, 1987, 1994);
Scharle (1965); Home Office (1968/1, 1971/2, 1973/4); Control rooms
Masso and Rudd (1968); Goller (1970); J.R. Hughes Bradford and Culbertson (1967); Burns (1967); Prescott
(1970); ICI/RoSPA (1970 IS/74); Laska (1970); Simpson (1967); Schmidt (1971); E. Edwards and Lees (1973);
(1971); OIA (1972 Publication 631); HSE (1973 HSW Mecklenburgh (1973, 1976, 1985); V.C. Marshall (1974,
Booklet 30); Mecklenburgh (1973, 1976, 1985); Unwin, 1976a,c,d); Kletz (1975e); Anon. (1976 LPB 11, p. 16);
Gugan (1976); Harvey (1976, 1979b); Langeveld (1976); Plant identification

Anon. (1977 LPB 16, p. 24); Balemans and van de Putte NFPA (1990 NFPA 901); API (1993 RP 1109);
(1977); CIA (1979); Cannalire et al. (1993) BS (Appendix 27 Identification of Equipment), BS 1710:
1984, BS 5378: 1980
Emergency shelters
Johnston (1968); Lynskey (1985) Hazard assessment
Mecklenburgh (1982, 1985)
Indoor plants
R. Kern (1978a); Munson (1980)
Other work on plant layout, and in particular safety
and loss prevention (SLP), includes that of: Armistead
Storage
(1959), R. Kern (1977af; 1978af), and Brausbacher and
FPA (1964/1); IP (1980 Eur. MCSP Pt 2, 1981 MCSP Pt
Hunt (1993) on general aspects and spacing recommen-
3, 1987 MCSP Pt 9); Home Office (1968/1, 1971/2, 1973/
dations; Simpson (1971) and R.B. Robertson (1974a,
4); J.R. Hughes (1970); ICI/RoSPA (1970 IS/74); HSE
1976b), on fire protection; Fowler and Spiegelman
(1973 HSW Booklet 30); Wirth (1975); Hrycek (1978);
(1968), the Manufacturing Chemists Association (MCA,
D.W. Johnson and Welker (1978); Aarts and Morrison
1970/18), Balemans et al. (1974) and Drewitt (1975), on
(1981); NFPA (1986 NFPA 43C, 1989 NFPA 50A, 50B,
checklists; and Madden (1993), on synthesis techniques.
1990 NFPA 43A, 50, 59A, 1992 NFPA 58, 59, 1993 NFPA
Plant layout is one of the principal aspects treated in
43B); LPGITA (1991 LPG Code 1 Pt 1)
various versions of the Dow Guide by the Dow Chemical
Company (1994b). It is also dealt with in the Engineering
Fire prevention and protection Design Guidelines of the Center for Chemical Process
FPA (CFSD FPDG 2); IRI (1964/5); BCISC (1968/7); IP Safety (CCPS, 1993/13). There are also a large number
(1980 Eur. MCSP Pt 2, 1981 MCSP Pt 3, 1987 MCSP Pt of codes relevant to plant layout, and particularly
9, 1993 MCSP Pt 19); Home Office (1974 Manual of separation distances and area classification. These are
Firemanship); J.R. Hughes (1970); ICI/RoSPA (1970 IS/ described below.
74); Simpson (1971); Mecklenburgh (1973, 1976, 1985); The treatment given here for the most part follows that
R.B. Robertson (1974a,b, 1976a,b); Klootwijk (1976); of Mecklenburgh, except where otherwise indicated. It is
Kaura (1980a) appropriate to repeat here his caution that the practice
described should be regarded only as typical and that it
Chimneys may need to be modified in the light of local conditions,
BS 4076: 1989 legislation and established safe practices. In particular,
the account given generally assumes a `green-field' site,
Drains and some compromise is normally necessary for an
J.D. Brown and Shannon (1963a,b); Seppa (1964); ICE existing site. Selected references on plant layout are
(1969); Mecklenburgh (1973, 1976, 1985); Klootwijk given in Table 10.2.
(1976); Anon. (1978 LPB 19, p. 10); Elton (1980);
Gallagher (1980); D. Stephenson (1981b); Easterbrook
and Gagliardi (1984); Mason and Arnold (1984); Chieu 10.3 Layout Generation
and Foster (1993); Crawley (1993 LPB 111); BS 8005:
1987
10.3.1 Factory layout
Earthing, grounding For factories generally there are a number of different
IEEE (1982 IEEE 142); UL (1984 UL 467); BS 7430: 1991 principles on which plant layout may be based (Muther,
1961). Thus in light engineering use is made of layouts
Winterisation in which the material fabricated remains in a fixed
J.C. Davis (1979); Facer and Rich (1984); Fisch (1984) position and others in which a particular process or
function is performed at a fixed point.
Modular plants 10.3.2 Flow principle
Armstrong (1972); Glaser, Kramer and Causey (1979); For process plants, however, the most appropriate
IMechE (1980); Saltz (1980); Bolt and Arzymanow method is generally to lay the plant out so that the
(1982); H.R. James (1982); Marcin and Schulte (1982); material flow follows the process flow diagram. This is
Parkinson, Short and Ushio (1982); Zambon and Hull the process flow principle. This arrangement minimizes
(1982); Glaser and Kramer (1983); Hulme and La Trobe the transfer of materials, which is desirable both for
Bateman (1983); Kliewer (1983); Tan, Kumar and economics and safety. It is difficult to overemphasize the
Kuilanoff (1984); Whitaker (1984); Tarakad, Durr and importance of efficient materials handling. It has been
Hunt (1987); Clement (1989); Hesler (1990); Shelley estimated by the Department of Trade and Industry
(1990); Duty, Fisher and Lewis (1993) (DTI, 1974) that about a quarter of the production costs
of manufacturing industry generally are for materials
Barge mounted and ocean-borne plants handling, an activity which in itself is totally unproduc-
Birkeland et al. (1979); Charpentier (1979); Glaser, tive.
Kramer and Causey (1979); J.L. Howard and Andersen Likewise, long runs of pipework with vulnerable
(1979); Jackson (1979); Jansson et al. (1979); Shimpo features are an undesirable addition to the hazards of
(1979); Ricci (1981); H.R. James (1982); de Vilder (1982) the plant. There are features which can lead to the
layout sequence diverging from the process sequence. Process relationships are exemplified by: direct flow
They relate particularly to: requirements for gravity flow; diagram connectivity between items; gravity flow; hydrau-
equipment needing specially strong foundations; access lics and net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements;
for construction, commissioning, operation and mainte- and heat interchange and conservation. Operations
nance; future extension; operator protection; escape and relationships include multiple items with similar fea-
fire fighting; containment of accidents; and environmental tures, e.g. batch reactors and centrifuges. Examples of
impact. mechanical relationships are the space needed between
items for piping and transmission or isolation of
10.3.3 Correlation and compatibility vibrations. Electrical relationships may be associated
There are certain other layout approaches which are with electrical area classification and with high voltage
used for factory layouts generally and which merit or power features. Structural features include the group-
mention. Correlation and compatibility techniques are ing together of heavy items and the location of heavy
used for the elimination of layout arrangements which items on good ground. Some safety features are
are incompatible or impossible, and also for the separation between potential leak sources and ignition
preliminary formulation of compatible arrangements. sources and the provision of a sterile area such as that
In the correlation chart method, for example, the around a flare.
procedure is as follows. The constraints and objectives
are listed. The floor space is subdivided into a grid and 10.3.8 Groups
for each item the grid divisions which violate the From the relationships identified it is then necessary to
constraints are deleted. The permissible layouts are select those which are to be given priority. It is then
then determined. There is a corresponding algebraic possible to arrange the items into groups. It is found by
method. experience that a group size of about seven items is the
Proximity and sequencing techniques are available for largest which a layout designer can readily handle; above
the determination of the costs of material transfer with this number the arrangement of items within the group
different layouts. becomes excessively complex. A typical group is a
These general factory layout techniques are described distillation column group consisting of the column itself
in more detail by Mecklenburgh (1973), but he states and its associated heat exchangers, etc.
that they appear to have found little application in
process plant layout. 10.3.9 Segregation
A relationship of particular importance in plant layout is
10.3.4 Process plant layout that between a hazard and a potential target of that
As with design generally, the design of a process plant hazard. The minimization of the risk to the target is
layout involves first synthesis and then analysis. Despite effected by segregating the hazard from the target. The
its importance, there is relatively little written on the requirement for segregation therefore places constraints
generation of the layout. An indication of some of the on the layout.
principles which guide the designer has been given by
Madden (1993). He describes a structured approach to
the generation of the layout which has four stages: (1) 10.4 Layout Techniques and Aids
three-dimensional model, (2) flow, (3) relationships and
(4) groups. There are a number of methods available for layout
design. These are generally more applicable to the
analysis rather than the synthesis of layouts, but some
10.3.5 Three-dimensional model have elements of both. They include:
The first step is to produce a three dimensional (3D)
model of the space occupied by each item of equipment. (1) classification, rating and ranking;
This 3D envelope should include space for (1) operations (2) critical examination;
access, (2) maintenance access, and (3) piping connec- (3) hazard assessment;
tions. The effect of allowing for these aspects is generally (4) economic optimization.
to increase several-fold the volume of the envelope.
There are also various aids, including:
10.3.6 Flow (5) visualization aids;
The concept of `flow' as used by Madden has two (6) computer aids.
meanings: (1) progression of materials towards a higher
degree of completion, and (2) mass flows of process or 10.4.1 Classification, rating and ranking
utility materials. Often the two coincide, but where there There are several methods of classification, rating and
is a feature such as a recycle the relationship is less ranking which are used in layout design. The main
straightforward. techniques are those used for the classification of (1)
hazardous areas, (2) storage, (3) fire fighting facilities
10.3.7 Relationships and (4) access zones, together with methods based on
A relationship exists between two items when they share hazard indices.
some common factor. Relationships may be identified by Hazardous area classification is aimed at the exclusion
considering the plant from the viewpoint of each of ignition sources from the vicinity of potential leak
discipline in turn. Broad classes of relationship are (1) sources and involves the definition of zones in which
process, (2) operations, (3) mechanical, (4) electrical, (5) control of ignition sources is exercised to differing
structural and (6) safety. degrees. It is described in Section 10.12 and Chapter 16.
Storage classification is based on the classification of can constitute up to 0.5% of the total installed plant cost.
the liquids stored. Accounts are given in Section 10.10 They are useful as an aid to: doing layout drawings;
and Chapter 22. determining piping layout and avoiding pipe fouls;
Closely related is classification based on fire fighting positioning valves, instruments, etc.; checking access
requirements, since this is applicable particularly to for operation and maintenance; planning construction
storage. and executing it; and operator training.
Restriction of access may be required near major
hazard plants or commercially sensitive processes. Areas 10.4.6 Computer aids
are therefore classified by the need to control access. Plant layout is one of the areas in which computer aided
Ranking methods such as those of the Dow Index and design (CAD) methods are now widely used. One type of
Mond Index may also be used as a means of grouping code gives visualization of the layout. This may take a
similar hazards together. number of forms. One is a 2D layout visualization
equivalent to cutouts. Another is a 3D visualization
10.4.2 Critical examination equivalent to either a block model or a piping model,
Critical examination, which is part of the technique of but much more powerful. The visualization packages
method study (Currie, 1960), may be applied to plant available have become very sophisticated and it is
layout. This application has been described by Elliott and possible in effect for the user to sit at the display and
Owen (1968). In critical examination of plant layout, take a `walk' through the plant. A recent development is
typical questions asked are: Where is the plant equip- enhancement by the use of the techniques of virtual
ment placed? Why is it placed there? Where else could it reality. Typically such CAD packages not only give 3D
go? display but hold a large amount of information about the
The technique therefore starts with and involves plant such as the co-ordinates of the main items and
analysis of a proposed layout, but insofar as other branches, the piping routes, the materials list, etc.
possible solutions are suggested it may be regarded A particular application of 3D visualization codes is as
also as a method for the generation of alternatives which input to other computer programs such as computational
can then be evaluated. fluid dynamics codes for explosion simulation. The 3D
As already mentioned in Chapter 8, the working layout required for the latter is provided by the 3D
document in an early hazard study is a plant layout visualization code, which then forms the front end of the
diagram, and to this extent such a hazard study may be total package.
regarded as a form of critical examination of layout. Another type of code tackles the synthesis of layouts.
The general approach is to define a priority sequence for
10.4.3 Hazard assessment locating items of equipment inside a block and then for
Hazard assessment of plant layout is practised both in the location of the block. The pipework is then added
respect of major hazards which affect the whole site, and and costed. Such a method has been described by
of lesser hazards, notably leaks, and their escalation. The Shocair (1978).
traditional method of dealing with the latter has been the A third type of code deals with the analysis of layouts
use of minimum safe separation distances, but there has to obtain an economic optimum. Typical factors taken
been an increasing trend to supplement the latter with into account in such programs include the costs of
hazard assessment. An account of hazard assessment is piping, space and buildings. A program of this type has
given in Chapter 9 and its role in plant layout is been described by Gunn (1970).
discussed in Sections 10.5 and 10.13. The extent to which computer aids are used in the
design of plant layout is not great, but some visualization
10.4.4 Economic optimization packages are very powerful and are likely to find
The process of layout development generates alternative increasing application. Computer techniques for plant
candidate layouts and economic optimization is a layout are described in more detail in Chapter 29.
principal method of selection from among these. The
points at which such economic optimization is performed
are described in Section 10.5. Some factors which are of 10.5 Layout Planning and Development
importance for the cost of a plant layout include
foundations, structures, piping and pipetracks, and 10.5.1 Layout activities and stages
pumps and power consumption. Plant layout is usually divided into the following
activities:
10.4.5 Visualization aids
There are various methods of representing the plant to (1) site layout;
assist in layout design. These include drawings, cutouts, (2) plot layout;
block models and piping models. Cutouts are a two- (3) equipment layout.
dimensional (2D) layout aid consisting of sheets of paper,
cardboard or plastic which represent items in plan, The layout developed typically goes through three
whether whole plots or items of equipment, and are stages:
overlaid on the site or plot plan, as the case may be. The (1) Stage One layout;
other main physical aids are 3D. Block models are very (2) Stage Two layout;
simple models made from wood blocks or the like which (3) Final layout.
show the main items of equipment and are used to
develop plot and floor plans and elevations. Piping The sequence of layout development described by
models include the pipework, are more elaborate, and Mecklenburgh is:
Table 10.3 Typical stages in the development of a to a review such as critical examination which generates
plant layout (after Mecklenburgh, 1985) (Courtesy of the alternatives, and these alternatives are costed. Similarly,
Institution of Chemical Engineers) alternative plan layouts are generated accommodating the
main items of equipment, pipework, buildings and cable
A Stage One plot layout runs, and are reviewed to ensure that they meet the
1 Initial plot data principal constraints. These include construction, opera-
2 First plot layout tion, maintenance, safety, environment and effluents. The
3 Elevation plan layouts are then costed. The justification for the use
4 Plot plan of buildings is examined. The civil engineering aspects
are then considered, including foundations and support
5 Plot buildings
6 Second plot plan and access structures.
7 Hazard assessment of plot layout The outcome of this process for each plot is a set of
8 Layout of piping and other connections candidate layouts. These are then presented for view as
9 Critical examination of plot layout layout models in block model or computer graphics form.
The different disciplines can then be invited to comment.
B Stage One site layout These plot layouts are then costed again and a short list
is selected, preferably of one.
10 Initial site data The plot layouts are then subjected to hazard assess-
11 First site layout ment. This assessment is concerned largely with the
12 Hazard assessment of site layout smaller, more frequent leaks which may occur and with
13 Site layout optimization sources of ignition for such leaks. The process of
14 Critical examination of site layout hazardous area classification is also performed. Hazard
15 Site selection assessment and hazardous area classification are
described in Sections 10.12 and 10.13.
C Stage Two site layout
Studies are carried out to firm up on piping and piping
16 Stage Two site data routes and on electrical mains routes. Finally, each plot
17 Stage Two site layout layout is subjected to a critical examination, typically
using a model and following a checklist.
D Stage Two plot layout
18 Stage Two plot layout data 10.5.3 Stage One site layout
19 Stage Two plot layout The Stage One plot layouts provide the information
necessary for the Stage One site layout. These include
the size and shape of each plot, the desirable separation
distances, the access requirements and traffic character-
istics. The flow of materials and utilities on the site are
(1) Stage One plot layout; represented in the form of site flowsheets.
(2) Stage One site layout; The site layout is now developed to accommodate not
(3) Stage Two site layout; only the process plots but also storage and terminals,
(4) Stage Two plot layout. utilities, process and control buildings, non-process
Typical stages in the development of a plant layout are buildings and car parks, and the road and rail systems.
given in Table 10.3. The Stage Two and Final Stage The flow principle is again followed in laying out the
design network is shown in simplified form in Figure plots, but may need to be modified to meet constraints.
10.1. The process of layout development makes consider- Guidance is available on separation distances for this
able use of guidelines for separation distances. These are preliminary site layout.
described in Section 10.11. Hazard assessment is then performed on the site
Stage One is the preliminary layout, also known as the layout with particular reference to escalation of incidents
conceptual, definition, proposal or front end layout. In and to vulnerable features such as service buildings and
this stage consideration is given to the various factors buildings just over the site boundary.
which are important in the layout, which may threaten If alternative site layouts have been generated, they
the viability of the project if they are not satisfactorily are then costed and the most economic identified. The
resolved and which are relevant to site selection. site layout is then subjected to a critical examination. If
there is a choice of site, the selection is made at this
point.
10.5.2 Stage One plot layout
In the Stage One plot layout, the information available
should include preliminary flow sheets showing the 10.5.4 Stage Two site layout
major items of equipment and major pipework, with an Stage Two layout is the secondary, intermediate or
indication of equipment elevations, and process engineer- sanction layout. As the latter term implies, it is carried
ing designs for the equipment. The plot layouts are then out to provide a layout which is sufficiently detailed for
developed following the process flow principle and using sanction purposes. It starts with the site layout and then
guidance on preliminary separation distances. The plot proceeds to the plot layout.
size generally recommended is 100 m 6 200 m with plots At this stage information on the specific characteristics
separated from each other by roads 15 m wide. of the site is brought to bear, such as the legal
For each plot layout the elevation and plan are further requirements, the soil and drainage, the meteorological
developed. The proposed elevation layouts are subjected conditions, the environs, the environmental aspects and
Figure 10.1 Simplified Stage Two and Final Stage design network (Mecklenburgh, 1985). ELD, engineering line
diagram (Courtesy of the Institution of Chemical Engineers)
the services. Site standards are set for building lines and layout. The standards include international and national
finishes, service corridors, pipetracks and roads. standards and codes of practice, company standards and
Stage Two layout involves reworking the Stage One contractor standards. The process engineering design
site layout in more detail and for the specific site, and data include the flowsheets, flow diagrams, equipment
repeating the hazard assessment, economic optimization lists and drawings, process design data sheets and
and critical examination. pipework line lists.
Features of the specific site which may well influence The Stage Two plot layout involves reworking in more
this stage are: planning matters; environmental aspects; detail and subject to the site constraints the plot plans
neighbouring plants, which may constitute hazards and/ and layouts and repeating the hazard assessment, piping
or targets; other targets such as public buildings; and layout and critical examination. The reworking of the plot
road, rail and service access points. layout, which occurs at node 7 in Figure 10.1, is a
At this stage there should be full consultation with the critical phase, requiring good co-ordination between the
various regulatory authorities, insurers and emergency various disciplines.
services, including the police and fire services. By the end of Stage 2 an assessment should have
A final site plan is drawn up in the form of drawings been carried out of hazard and environmental problems.
and models, both physical and computer-based ones, This assessment is used to obtain detailed planning
showing in particular the layout of the plots within the permission.
site, the main buildings and roads, railways, service
corridors, pipetracks and drainage.
10.6 Site Layout Features
10.5.5 Stage Two plot layout
There then follows the Stage Two plot layout. The 10.6.1 Site constraints and standards
information available for this phase includes (1) stan- Once a site has been selected the next step is to
dards, (2) site data, (3) Stage Two site layout, (4) establish the site constraints and standards. The con-
process engineering design and (5) Stage One plot straints include:
(1) topography and geology; of the use of buildings are the housing of batch reactors,
(2) weather; centrifuges and analysis instruments.
(3) environment; Since ventilation in a building is generally less than
(4) transport; that outdoors, a leak of flammable or toxic material tends
(5) services; to disperse more slowly and a hazardous concentration is
(6) legal constraints. more likely to build up. Moreover, if an explosion of a
flammable gas or dust occurs the overpressure generated
Topographical and geological features are those such tends to be much higher. These are major disadvantages
as the lie of the land and its load-bearing capabilities. of the use of a building.
Weather includes temperatures, wind conditions, solar
radiation, and thunderstorms. Environment covers people,
activities and buildings in the vicinity. Services are 10.6.4 Location of buildings
power, water and effluents. Legal constraints include Buildings which are the work base for a number of
planning and building, effluent and pollution, traffic, fire people should be located so as to limit their exposure to
and other safety laws, bylaws and regulations. hazards.
Site standards should also be established covering Analytical laboratories should be in a safe area, but
such matters as: otherwise as close as possible to the plants served. So
(1) separation distances; should workshops and general stores. The latter also
(2) building lines; require ready access for stores materials.
(3) building construction, finish; Administration buildings should be situated in a safe
(4) road dimensions; area on the public side of the security point. The main
(5) service corridors; office block should always be near the main entrance and
(6) pipebridges. other administration buildings should be near this
entrance if possible. Other buildings such as medical
Road dimensions include width, radius and gradient. centres, canteens, etc., should also be in a safe area and
the latter should have ready access for food supplies.
All buildings should be upwind of plants which may
10.6.2 Site services give rise to objectionable features.
The site central services such as the boiler house, power Water drift from cooling towers can restrict visibility
station, switch station, pumping stations, etc., should be and cause corrosion or ice formation on plants or
placed in suitable locations. This means that they should transport routes, and towers should be sited to minimize
not be put out of action by such events as fire or flood this. Another problem is recycling of air from the
and, if possible, not by other accidents such as discharge of one tower to the suction of another,
explosion, and that they should not constitute sources which is countered by placing towers cross-wise to the
of ignition for flammables. prevailing wind. The entrainment of effluents from stacks
Electrical substations, pumping stations, etc., should be and of corrosive vapours from plants into the cooling
located in areas where non-flameproof equipment can be towers should be avoided, as should the siting of
used, except where they are an integral part of the plant. buildings near the tower intakes. The positioning of
Factors in siting the boiler house are that it should not natural draught cooling towers should also take into
constitute a source of ignition, that emissions from the account resonance caused by wind between the towers.
stack should not give rise to nuisance and that there The problem of air recirculation should also be borne in
should be ready access for fuel supplies. mind in siting air-cooled heat exchangers.
10.6.3 Use of buildings 10.6.5 Limitation of exposure

Some plant may need to be located inside a building, but An aspect of segregation which is of particular impor-
the use of a building is always expensive and it can tance is the limitation of exposure of people to the
create hazards and needs to be justified. Typically a hazards. The measures required to effect such limitation
building is used where the process, the plant, the are location of the workbase outside, and control of entry
materials processed and/or the associated activities are to, the high hazard zone. The contribution of plant layout
sensitive to exposure. Thus the process may need a to limitation of exposure therefore lies largely in work-
stable environment not subject to extremes of heat or base location. Limitation of exposure is considered more
cold or it may need to be sterile. The plant may contain fully in Chapter 20.
vulnerable items such as high speed or precision
machinery. The process material may need to be
protected against contamination or damage, including 10.6.6 Segregation
rain. The activities which the operators have to under- Although a layout which is economical in respect of land,
take may be delicate or skilled, or simply very frequent. piping and transport is in general desirable, in process
Thus a building may be used to encourage more plants it is usually necessary to provide some additional
frequent inspection of the plant. Similarly, there may be space and to practise a degree of segregation. The site
maintenance activities which are delicate or skilled or layout should aim to contain an accident at source, to
simply frequent. In some cases where there are high prevent escalation and avoid hazarding vulnerable
elevations an indoor structure may be, or may feel, safer. targets. A block layout is appropriate with each plot
The need to satisfy customers of the product and to keep containing similar and compatible types of hazard and
unsightly plant out of view are other reasons. Examples with different types segregated in separate plots.
Figure 10.2 Compact block layout system in the process area of a petrochemical plant with 4.5 m roads (Simpson,
1971) (Courtesy of the Institution of Chemical Engineers)
10.6.7 Fire containment consisting of a major process with several stages and a
The site layout should contribute to the containment of number of subsidiary processes. There are two main
any fire which may occur and to combating the fire. process areas and at right angles to these is an area with
Features of the site layout relevant to fire hazard are a row of fired heaters, and associated reactors, steam
illustrated in Figures 10.2 and 10.3 (Simpson, 1971). boilers and a stack.
Figure 10.2 shows a compact layout, which minimizes This layout has several weaknesses. The lack of
land usage and pipework, for a petrochemical plant firebreaks in the main process blocks would allow a
Figure 10.3 Block layout system in the process area of a petrochemical plant with 6 m roads (Simpson, 1971)
(Courtesy of the Institution of Chemical Engineers)
fire to propagate right along these, particularly if the Pedestrian pathways should be provided alongside
wind is blowing along them, which, on the site roads where there are many people and much traffic.
considered it does for 13% of the year. There is entry Bridges may need to be provided at busy intersections.
to the plant area from the 6 m roads from opposite Car and bus parks and access roads to these should be
corners, which allows for all wind directions. But the situated in a safe area and outside security points. The
only access for vehicles to the process plots is the 4.5 m park for nightshift workers should be observable by the
roads. In the case of a major fire, appliances might well gatekeeper. There should be gates sited so that the
get trapped by an escalation of the fire. The 4.5 m roads effect of shift change on outside traffic is minimized.
give a total clearance of about 10 m after allowance for
equipment being set back from the road, but this is
barely adequate as a firebreak. The layout is also likely 10.6.10 Emergencies
to cause difficulties in maintenance work. There should be an emergency plan for the site. This is
The alternative layout shown in Figure 10.3 avoids discussed in detail in Chapter 24. Here consideration is
these problems. The process areas are divided by limited to aspects of layout relevant to emergencies.
firebreaks. There are more entry points on the site and The first step in emergency planning is to study the
dead ends are eliminated. The roads are 6 m wide with scenarios of the potential hazards and of their develop-
an effective clearance of 15 m. The crane access areas ment. Plant layout diagrams are essential for such
provide additional clearances for the fired heaters. studies. Emergency arrangements should include an
Other aspects of fire protection are described in emergency control centre. This should be a specially
Section 10.15 and Chapter 16. designated and signed room in a safe area, accessible
from the public roads and with space around it for
emergency service vehicles.
10.6.8 Effluents Assembly points should also be designated and signed
The site layout must accommodate the systems for in safe areas at least 100 m from the plants. In some
handling the effluents gaseous, liquid and solid and cases it may be appropriate to build refuge rooms as
storm water and fire water. The effluent systems are assembly points. A control room should not be used
considered in Section 10.16 and the drain system in either as the emergency control centre or as a refuge
Section 10.17. room.
The maintenance of road access to all points in the
10.6.9 Transport site is important in an emergency. The site should have
It is a prime aim of plant layout to minimize the a road round the periphery with access to the public
distances travelled by materials. This is generally roads at two points at least. The vulnerability of the
achieved by following the flow principle, modified as works road system to blockage should be as low as
necessary to minimize hazards. possible. Data on typical fire services appliance dimen-
Access is required to plots for transport of materials sions and weights are given by Mecklenburgh (1985).
and equipment, maintenance operations and emergencies. For several of these the turning circle exceeds 15 m.
Works roads should be laid out to provide this to plant Arrangements should be made to safeguard supplies of
plots, ideally on all four sides. Roads should be suitable services such as electricity, water and steam to plants in
for the largest vehicles which may have to use them in an emergency. Electricity cables are particularly vulner-
respect of width, radius, gradient, bridges and pipe- able to fire and, if possible, important equipment should
bridges. Recommended dimensions for works roads are be provided with alternative supplies run through the
given by Mecklenburgh (1973). Road widths of 10 m and plant by separate routes.
7.5 m are suggested for works' main and side roads,
respectively. Standard road signs should be used. A road 10.6.11 Security
width of 7.5 m with the addition of free space and/or a The site should be provided with a boundary fence and
pipe trench on the verges may be used to give a all entrances should have a gatehouse. The number of
separation distance of 15 m between units. entrances should be kept to a minimum. If construction
There are various types of traffic in a works, including work is going on in part of the works, this building site
materials, fuel, wastes, stores, food and personnel. These should have its own boundary fence and a separate
traffic flows should be estimated and their routes entrance and gatehouse. If the works boundary fence is
planned. Incompatible types of traffic should be segre- used as part of this enclosure, movement between the
gated as far as possible. building site and the works should be through an
Road and rail traffic should not go through process entrance with its own gatehouse.
areas except to its destination and even then should not
violate hazardous area classifications. In this connection,
it should be borne in mind that some countries still use
open firebox engines. Railway lines should not cross the 10.7 Plot Layout Considerations
main entrance and should not box plants in. There Some considerations which bear upon plot layout are:
should be as few railway crossings, crossroads, right
angle bends, dead ends, etc., as possible. (1) process considerations;
There should be adequate road tanker parking and rail (2) economic considerations;
tanker sidings at the unloading and loading terminals, so (3) construction;
that vehicles can wait their turn at the loading gantry or (4) operations;
weighbridge without causing congestion at entrances, or (5) maintenance;
on works or public roads. (6) hazards;
(7) fire fighting; Ladders should be positioned so that the person using
(8) escape. it faces the structure and does not look into space. A
ladder should not be attached to supports for hot pipes,
10.7.1 Process considerations since forces can be transmitted which can distort the
Process considerations include some of the relationships ladder. Recommended dimensions for ladders are given
already mentioned, such as gravity flow and availability by Mecklenburgh (1973).
of head for pump suctions, control valves and reflux If plant items require operation or maintenance at
returns. Under this heading come also limitations of elevated levels, platforms should be provided. The levels
pressure drop in pipes and heat exchangers and across are defined as 3.5 m above grade for vessels, 2 m above
control valves and of temperature drop in pipes, the grade for instruments or 2 m above another platform.
provision of straight runs for orifice meters, the length of Platform floors are normally not less than 3 m apart.
instrument transmission lines and arrangements for Headroom under vessels, pipes, cable racks, etc., should
manual operations such as dosing with additives, be 2.25 m minimum, reducing to 2.1 m vertically over
sampling, etc. stairways.
Good lighting on the plant is important, particularly on
access routes, near hazards and for instrument reading.
10.7.2 Economic considerations
Operations involving manipulation of an equipment
As already mentioned, some features which have a
while observing an indicator should be considered so
particularly strong influence on costs are foundations,
that the layout permits this. Similarly, it is helpful when
structures, piping and electrical cabling. This creates the
operating controls to start or stop equipment to be able
incentive to locate items on the ground, to group items
to see or hear that the equipment has obeyed the signal.
so that they can share a foundation or a structure, and to
Hand valves need good access, particularly large valves
keep pipe and cable runs to a minimum.
which may require considerable physical effort to turn.
Valves which have to be operated in an emergency
10.7.3 Construction should be situated so that access is not prevented by the
Additional requirements are imposed by the needs of accident through fire or other occurrences. For emer-
construction and maintenance. The installation of large gency isolation, however, it may be preferable to install
and heavy plant items requires space and perhaps access remotely operated isolation valves, as described in
for cranes. Such items tend to have long delivery times Chapter 12.
and may arrive late; the layout may need to take this into Batch equipment such as batch reactors, centrifuges,
account. filters and driers, tends to require more manual opera-
Construction work may require an area in which the tion, so that particular attention should be paid to layout
construction materials and items can be laid out. On for such items.
large, single-stream plants major items can often be Insulation is sometimes required on pipework to
fabricated only on site. There needs to be access to protect operating and maintenance personnel rather
move large items into place on the plant. If the plot is than for process reasons.
close to the site boundary, it should be checked that
there will be space available for cranes and other lifting 10.7.5 Maintenance
gear. Plant items from which the internals need to be removed
for maintenance should have the necessary space and
10.7.4 Operation lifting arrangements. Examples are tube bundles from
Access and operability are important to plant operation. heat exchangers, agitators from stirred vessels and spent
Mention has already been made of the development of catalyst from reactors.
the 3D envelope of the main items of equipment to allow
for operation. Hazop studies, described in Chapter 8, may 10.7.6 Hazards
be used to highlight operating difficulties in the layout. The hazards on the plant should be identified and
The routine activities performed by the operator allowed for in the plot layout. This is discussed in
should be studied with a view to providing the shortest other sections, but some general comments may be
and most direct routes from the control room to items made at this stage.
requiring most frequent attention. Clear routes should be Plot layout can make a large contribution to safety. It
allowed for the operator, avoiding kerbs and other should be designed and checked with a view to reducing
awkward level changes. the magnitude and frequency of the hazards and
General access ways should be 0.7 m and 1.2 m wide assisting preventive measures. The principle of segrega-
for one and two persons, respectively. Routes should be tion of hazards applies also to plot layout.
able to carry the maximum load, which often occurs Hazardous areas should be defined. They should not
during maintenance. extend beyond the plot boundaries or to railway lines. It
Stairways rather than ladders should be provided for is economic to minimize the extent of hazardous areas
main access, the latter being reserved for escape routes and to group together in them items which give the
on outside structures and access to isolated points which same hazard classification.
are only visited infrequently. Recommended dimensions Plants which may leak flammables should generally be
for stairways are an angle of 35408 and overall width of built in the open or, if necessary, in a structure with a
1 m with railings 0.85 m high and clearances 2.1 m. The roof but no walls. If a closed building cannot be avoided,
height of single flights without a landing should not it should have explosion relief panels in the walls or roof
exceed 4.5 m. No workplace should be more than 45 m with relief venting to a safe area. Open air construction
from an exit. ventilates plants and disperses flammables but, as already
indicated, scenarios of leakage and dispersion should be risk should be equipped with wet riser mains. The inlets
investigated for the plant concerned. on the ground floor to dry riser mains and the outlets on
Fire spread in buildings should be limited by design, all floors to both types of main should be accessible.
as should fire spread on open structures. Sprinklers and Pipes for fire water supply should be protected against
other protective systems should be provided as appro- explosion damage. Isolation valves should be provided to
priate. A more detailed consideration of fire hazards and prevent loss of fire water from damaged lines and, if
precautions is given in Chapter 16. these valves are above ground level, they should be
Plants which may leak toxics should also generally be protected by concrete blast barriers.
built in the open air. The hazardous concentrations for Fire extinguishers of the appropriate type and fire
toxics are much lower than those for flammables, blankets should be placed at strategic points. There
however, and it cannot be assumed that an open should be at least two extinguishers at each point. Some
structure is always sufficiently ventilated. A wind of at extinguishers should be located on escape or access
least 8 km/h is needed to disperse most toxic vapours routes, so that a person who decides to fight the fire
safely before they reach the next plant. Some toxic using the extinguisher has a route behind him for
plants, however, require a building and in some cases escape. The location of other fire fighting equipment
there has to be isolation of the toxic area through the such as sprinklers and foam sprays is a matter for
use of connecting rooms in which clothing is changed. experts.
Ventilation is necessary for buildings housing plants Fire equipment should be located so that it is not
processing flammables or toxics. Air inlets should be likely to be disabled by the accident itself. It should be
sited so that they do not draw in contaminated air. The accessible and should be conspicuously marked. The
relative position of air inlets and outlets should be such main switchgear and emergency controls should have
that short circuiting does not occur. Exhaust air may good access, preferably on an escape route, so that the
need to be treated before discharge by washing or operator does not have to risk his life to effect shut-
filtering. down.
Plants which are liable to leak liquids should stand on There are numerous legal requirements concerning
impervious ground with suitable slopes to drain spillages fire, fire construction and fire fighting. There should be
away. The equipment should be on raised areas which full consultation on this at an early stage with the works
slope down to valleys and to an appropriate collecting safety officer and with other parties such as the local
point. Suitable slopes are about 1 in 40 to 1 in 60. authority services, the Factory Inspectorate and the
Valleys should not coincide with walkways, and kerbs insurers.
may be needed to keep liquid off these. The collecting
points should be away from equipment so that this is 10.7.8 Escape
less exposed to any fire in the liquid collected. The A minimum of two escape routes should be provided for
amount of liquid which may collect should be estimated any workspace, except where the fire risk is very small,
and the collecting point should be designed to take away and the two routes should be genuine alternatives. No
this amount. The heat generated if the liquid catches fire workplace should be more than 1245 m, depending on
should be determined and vulnerable items relocated if the degree of risk, from an exit, and a dead end should
necessary. not exceed 8 m.
The use of pervious ground, such as pebbles, to Escape routes across open mesh areas should have
absorb leaks of flammable liquids should be avoided. solid flooring. Escape stairways should be in straight
Such liquid may remain on the water table and may be flights. They should preferably be put on the outside of
brought up again by water from fire fighting. Other buildings. Fixed ladders may be used for escape from
hazards which are prevalent mainly outside the UK structures if the number of people does not exceed 10.
include earthquakes and severe thunderstorms. These Doors on escape routes should be limited to hinged or
require special measures. sliding types and hinged doors should open in the
Personal safety should not be overlooked in the plot direction of escape. Handrails should be provided on
layout. Measures should be taken to minimize injury due escape routes across flat roofs. Escape routes should be
to trips and falls, bumping of the head, exposure to drips signposted, if there is any danger of confusion, as in
of noxious substances and contact with very hot or cold large buildings. They should be at least 0.7 m and
surfaces. Where such hazards exist they generally preferably 1.2 m wide to allow the passage of 40 persons
present a threat not just on occasion but for the whole per minute on the flat and 20 persons per minute down
time. stairways. Good lighting should be provided on escape
routes and arrangements made to ensure a power supply
10.7.7 Fire fighting in an emergency. The escape times of personnel should
Access is essential for fire fighting. This is provided by be estimated, paying particular attention to people on tall
the suggested plot size of 100 m 6 200 m with approaches items such as distillation columns or cranes. Bridges
preferably on all four sides and by spacing between plots between columns may be used.
and buildings of 15 m.
Fire water should be available from hydrants on a
10.8 Equipment Layout
main between the road and the plant. Hydrant points
should be positioned so that any fire on the plot can be
reached by the hoses. Hydrant spacings of 48, 65 and 10.8.1 General considerations
95 m are suitable for high, medium and low risk plots, Furnaces and fired heaters are very important. Furnace
respectively. Plants over 18 m high should be provided location is governed by a number of factors, including
with dry riser mains and those over 60 m high or of high the location of other furnaces, the use of common
facilities such as stacks, the minimization of the length of Corrosive materials are responsible for an appreciable
transfer lines, the disposal of the gaseous and liquid proportion of accidents on chemical plants and of
effluents, the potential of the furnace as an ignition damage done to the plant. The presence of corrosive
source and the fire fighting arrangements. Furnaces materials creates two particular hazards: (1) corrosion of
should be sited at least 15 m away from plant which materials of construction, and (2) contact of persons with
could leak flammables. corrosive materials. On a plant handling corrosive
No trenches or pits which might hold flammables chemicals the materials of construction should be
should extend under a furnace, and connections with chosen with particular care, should be protected by
underground drains should be sealed over an area 12 m regular painting and should be checked by regular
from the furnace wall. The working area of the furnace inspection.
should be provided with ventilation, particularly where Some features of plant layout which are particularly
high temperatures and high sulphur fuels are involved. important in relation to corrosive chemicals are:
On wall-fired furnaces there should be an escape route
at least 1 m wide at each end and on top-fired furnaces
(1) foundations;
there should also be an escape route at each end, one of
(2) floors;
which should be a stairway. The provision of peepholes
(3) walkways;
and observation doors should be kept to a minimum.
(4) staging;
Access to these may be by fixed ladder for heights less
(5) stairs;
than 4 m above ground, but platforms should be provided
(6) handrails;
for greater heights.
(7) drains;
Incinerators and burning areas for waste disposal
(8) ventilation.
should be treated as fired equipment. Waste in burning
areas should be lit by remote ignition and, if it is an
explosion hazard, blast walls should be provided. Foundations of both buildings and machines, especially
Chemical reactors in which a violent reaction can those constructed in concrete, may be attacked by
occur may need to be segregated by firebreaks or even leakage of corrosive materials, including leakage from
enclosed behind blast walls. drains. If the corrosion is expected to be mild, it may be
Heat exchangers should have connecting pipework allowed for by the use of additional thickness of
kept to a minimum, consistent with provision of pipe concrete, but if it may be more severe, other measures
lengths and bends to allow for pipe stresses and with are necessary. These include the use of corrosion
access for maintenance. resistant asphalt, bricks and plastics.
Equipments which have to be opened for cleaning, Floors should be sloped so that spillages are drained
emptying, charging, etc., may need ventilation. away from vulnerable equipment and from walkways and
Driers in which volatile materials are driven off solids traffic lanes. The latter should generally be laid across
will generally need ventilation of the drying area and the direction of fall and should as far as possible be at
probably of the drier itself. If the materials are noxious, the high points of the slopes.
detraying booths may be necessary. Severe corrosion of steel stanchions can occur between
Dust-handling equipment such as driers, cyclones and a concrete subfloor and a brick floor surface, and this
ducts may constitute an explosion hazard, but tends to possibility should be considered.
be rather weak. It should be separated from other plant Pipe flanges which may drip corrosive substances
by a wall and vented. Vents should be short and should should not be located over walkways. There should be
go through the roof. Some equipment such as cyclones guardrails around vessels or pits containing corrosive
is often placed outside the building and this is preferable liquids. The floors and walkways should be of the `non-
to ducting a vent to the outside. Vents should pass to a skid' type.
safe area. Mills are relatively strong and are not usually Staging should not be located over an open vessel
provided with explosion relief. Dust should be trans- which may emit corrosive vapours.
ferred through chokes to prevent the transmission of fire Staircases and handrails should be designed to
or explosion. Surfaces which might collect dust should minimize corrosion. Stairheads should be located at the
be kept to a minimum. Dust hazards are considered high points of sloping floors. Handrails tend to corrode
further in Chapter 17. internally and may collapse suddenly. They should be
Pumps handling liquids which are hot (4608C) should made of a suitable material. Aluminium is suitable, if it is
be separated from those handling liquids which are not corroded by the atmosphere of the plant. Metal
flammable and volatile (boiling point 5408C) or from protectors of the vapour type are also available. These
compressors handling flammable gases. In the open, are put inside the pipe and the ends sealed. Alternatively,
separation may be effected by a spacing of at least 7.5 m solid rails can be used. The rails should be protected
and in a pump room by a vapour-tight wall. against external corrosion by regular painting or other
Hazards associated with particular plant equipment are means. Regular inspection and maintenance is particu-
also considered in Chapter 11. larly important for staging, staircases and handrails on
plants containing corrosive materials.
10.8.2 Corrosive materials Drains should be designed to handle the corrosive
If the process materials are corrosive, this aspect should materials, and mixtures of materials, which may be
be taken into account in the plant layout. The layout of discharged into them.
plants for corrosive materials is discussed in Safety and Ventilation should be provided and maintained as
Management by the Association of British Chemical appropriate. This requires as a minimum the circulation
Manufacturers (ABCM, 1964/3). of fresh air. It may also involve local exhaust ventilation.
10.9 Pipework Layout Overhead clearances below the underside of the pipe,
flange, lagging or support should have the following
In general, it is desirable both for economic and safety
minimum values:
reasons to keep the pipe runs to a minimum. Additional
pipework costs more both in capital and operation, the
latter through factors such as heat loss/gain and
pumping costs. It is also an extra hazard not only from Above roads and areas with access for crane 7m
the pipe itself but more particularly from the joints and Plant areas where truck access required 4m
fittings. Plant areas in general 3m
The application of the flow principle is effective in Above access floors and walkways within
minimizing pipe runs, but it is also necessary to practise buildings 2.25 m
segregation and this will sometimes lead to an unavoid- Above railway lines (from top of rail) 4.6 m
able increase in the length of pipe runs. The design
therefore involves a compromise between these two
factors.
Pipe flanges should be positioned so as to minimize
Piping for fluids servicing a number of points may be
the hazards from small leaks and drips. Flanges on
in the form of a ring main, which permits supply to most
pipework crossing roads on pipebridges should be
points, even if part of the main is disabled. Ring mains
avoided. Pipebridges over roads should be as few as
are used for steam, cooling water, process water, fire
possible. Every precaution should be taken to prevent
water, process air, instrument air, nitrogen and even
damage from vehicles, particularly cranes and forklift
chlorine.
trucks.
Services such as steam and water mains and electricity
Attention should be paid to the compatibility of
and telephone cables should generally be run alongside
adjacent pipework, the cardinal principle being to avoid
the road and should not pass through plant or service
loss of containment of hazardous materials. Thus it is
areas.
undesirable, for example, to put a pipe carrying corrosive
Pipes may be buried, run at ground level, run on
material above one carrying flammables or toxics at high
supports or laid in an open pipe trench. Open pipe
pressure.
trenches may be used where there is no risk of
Emergency isolation valves should be used to allow
accumulation of flammable vapours, of the material
flows of flammable materials to be shut off. Valves may
freezing or of flooding.
be manually or power operated and controls for the latter
Water mains should be buried below the frost line or
may be sited locally or remotely. The use of such valves
to a minimum depth of 0.75 m to avoid freezing. If they
is described in more detail in Chapter 12.
run under roads or concreted areas, they should be laid
If a manual valve is used for isolation, it should be
in ducts or solidly encased in concrete.
mounted in an accessible position. Emergency operation
Steam mains may be laid on the surface on sleepers.
of valves from ladders should be avoided. If the valve is
They should be run on the outside edge of the pipeway
horizontally mounted and its spindle is more than 2.1 m
to allow the expansion loops to have the greatest width
above the operating level, a chain wheel should be
and to facilitate nesting of the loops. Steam mains may
provided. A valve should not be mounted in the inverted
also be run in open pipe trenches.
position, since solids may deposit in the gland and cause
Electrical power and telephone cables should be run in
seizure.
sand-filled trenches covered by concrete tiles or a
Discharges from pressure relief valves and bursting
coloured concrete mix. If possible, the cables should
discs are normally piped away in a closed system. In
be run at the high point of paving leaving room for draw
particular, a closed system is necessary for hydrocarbon
boxes. If use is made of underground piping and cabling,
vapours with a molecular weight greater than 60,
it should be put in position at the same time as the
flammable liquids and toxic vapours and liquids.
foundation work is being done. Alternatively, cables can
Pressure relief and flare systems are considered more
be run overhead. Overhead cables are less affected by
fully in Chapter 12.
spillages and are easier to extend, but may require fire
Liquid drains from drainage should also be taken to a
protection.
safe point. Liquids which are not flammable or toxic may
Electrical lines can give rise to fields of sufficient
be discharged to grade.
intensity to cause local overheating of adjacent metalwork
Sample points should be 1 m above the floor and not at
or to induce static electricity in plant nearby, and this
eye level.
should be taken into account in positioning them. Pipes
Flexible piping should be kept to a minimum. Where
which are hot or carry solvents should be laid as far as
such piping is used on vehicles, use may be made of
possible from electrical cables.
devices which shut off flow if the vehicle moves away.
Piping may be run as a double layer, but triple layers
Instruments incorporating glass tubing, such as sight
should be avoided. Double layer piping should be run
glasses and rotameters, are a source of weakness. In
with service lines on the upper and process lines on the
some cases the policy is adopted of avoiding the use of
lower deck.
such devices altogether. If this type of instrument is
Piping may require a continuous slope to permit
used, however, it should be enclosed in a transparent
complete drainage for process, corrosion or safety
protective case.
reasons; other pipes should not be sloped. Sloped lines
The layout for piping and cabling should allow for
should be supported on extensions of the steel structure.
future plant expansion. An allowance for 30% additional
The slope arrangement should not create a low point
pipework is typical. Full documentation should be kept
from which liquid cannot be drained.
on all piping and cabling.
10.10 Storage Layout Class III Liquids with flashpoint at or above 608C
(1408F)
Treatments of plant layout frequently cover all aspects of
Class IIIA Liquids with flashpoint at or above 608C
storage, including bunding, venting, etc. In this book
(1408F) and below 93.48C (2008F)
storage is dealt with separately in Chapter 22, and only
Class IIIB Liquids with flashpoint at or above 93.48C
those features which are directly relevant to the layout of
(2008F)
the plant as a whole are dealt with at this point.
The principal kinds of storage are bulk storage of
fluids, bulk storage of solids and warehouse storage. The
storage of main interest in the present context is storage
NFPA 321 distinguishes between flammable and
of fluids, particularly flammable fluids. The types of
combustible liquids. It defines a flammable liquid as
storage include:
one having a flashpoint below 37.88C (1008F) and having
(1) liquid at atmospheric pressure and temperature; a vapour pressure not exceeding 40 psia at 37.88C
(2) liquefied gas under pressure and at atmospheric tem- (1008F), and a combustible liquid as one having a
perature (pressure storage); flashpoint at or above 37.88C (1008F).
(3) liquefied gas at atmospheric pressure and at low tem- Quantities in storage are almost invariably much
perature (refrigerated storage); greater than those in process. Typical orders of
(4) gas under pressure. magnitude for a large plant are several hundred tonnes
in process and ten thousand tonnes in storage.
There are also intermediate types such as semi- Storage is usually built in the open, since this is
refrigerated storage. cheaper and allows dispersion of leaks. The site chosen
For liquid storage it is common to segregate the should have good load-bearing characteristics, since
liquids stored according to their class. The current tanks or vessels full of liquid represent a very heavy
classification, given in the Refining Safety Code of the load. The design of foundations for storage tanks is a
Institute of Petroleum (IP, 1981 MCSP Part 3) and used specialist matter.
in BS 5908: 1990, is The storage site should be such that the contour of
the ground does not allow flammable liquid or heavy
Class I Liquids with flashpoint below 218C vapour to collect in a depression or to flow down to an
Class II (1) Liquids with flashpoint from 218C up to area where it may find an ignition source. The prevailing
and including 558C, handled below flash- wind should be considered in relation to the spread of
point flammables to ignition sources or of toxics to the site
Class II (2) Liquids with flashpoint from 218C up to boundary.
and including 558C, handled at or above Storage should be segregated from process. A fire or
flashpoint explosion in the latter may put at risk the very large
Class III (1) Liquids with flashpoint above 558C up to inventory in storage. And a small fire in storage which is
and including 1008C, handled below otherwise easily dealt with may jeopardize the process.
flashpoint The storage area should be placed on one or at most on
Class III (2) Liquids with flashpoint above 558C up to two sides of the process and well away from it. This
and including 1008C, handled at or above gives segregation and allows room for expansion of the
flashpoint process and/or the storage. The separation distance
between process and storage has been discussed
An earlier classification, given in the former BS CP above. It should not be less than 15 m.
3013: 1974, was as follows: It is also necessary to keep terminals away from the
Class A Liquids with flashpoint below 22.88C process, since they are sources of accidents. A suitable
(738F) layout is therefore to interpose the storage between the
Class B Liquids with flashpoint between 22.8 and process and the terminals. The separation distance
668C (73 and 1508F) between storage and terminals should be not less than
Class C Liquid with flashpoint above 668C (1508F) 15 m.
The storage tanks should be arranged in groups. The
The classification given in the National Fire Protection grouping should be such as to allow common bunding, if
Association's (NFPA 321: 1987) Basic Classification of bunds are appropriate, and common fire fighting equip-
Flammable and Combustible Liquids is: ment for each group. There should be access on all four
sides of each bund area and roads should be linked to
Class I Liquids with flashpoint below 37.88C minimize the effect if one road is cut off during a fire.
(1008F) It is not essential that there be only one storage area,
Class IA Liquids with flashpoint below 22.88C one unloading terminal or one loading terminal. There
(738F) and boiling point below 37.88C may well be several, depending on the materials and
(1008F) process, and the principle of segregation. The raw
Class IB Liquids with flashpoint below 22.88C material unloading and the product loading terminals
(738F) and boiling point at or above should be separate. Normally both should be at the site
37.88C (1008F) boundary near the entrance. If the materials are
Class IC Liquids with flashpoint at or above 22.88C hazardous or noxious, however, the terminal should not
(738F) and below 37.88C (1008F) be near the entrance, although it may be near the site
Class II Liquids with flashpoint at or above 37.88C boundary, provided it does not affect a neighbour's
(1008F) and below 608C (1408F) installation.
10.11 Separation Distances and Allied Industries. Separation distances are also given
in many of the NFPA codes.
Plant layout is largely constrained by the need to
Further guidance on separation distances and clear-
observe minimum separation distances. For hazards,
ances is given by Armistead (1959), House (1969), the
there are basically three approaches to determining a
Oil Insurance Association (OIA) (1972/6), Backhurst and
suitable separation distance. The first and most tradi-
Harker (1973), Mecklenburgh (1973, 1985), Kaura
tional one is to use standard distances developed by the
(1980b), F.V. Anderson (1982) and Industrial Risk
industry. The second is to apply a ranking method to
Insurers (IRI) (1991, 1992).
decide the separation required. The third is to estimate a
Separation distances are specified in the Fire and
suitable separation based on an engineering calculation
Explosion Index. Hazard Classification Guide (the Dow
for the particular case. Not all separation distances relate
Guide) (Dow Chemical Company, 1976) as a function of
to hazards. Construction, access and maintenance are
the Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) and the maximum
other relevant factors. The first two methods of determin-
probable property damage (MPPD). These do not appear
ing separation distances are considered in this section,
as such in the current edition of the Guide (Dow
and the third is considered in Section 10.14.
Chemical Company, 1994b), which is described in
Chapter 8. Some tables of separation distances for
storage of flammable liquids, for LPG and for LFG are
10.11.1 Types of separation reproduced in Chapter 22.
The types of separation which need to be taken into Separation distances for process units are usually given
consideration are illustrated by the set of tables of as the distances between two units or as the distance
separation distances given by Mecklenburgh (1985) and between a single unit and an ignition source. It is normal
include: to quote distances between the edges of units and not
(1) site areas and sizes; centre to centre. There is generally little explanation
(2) preliminary spacing for equipment: given of the basis of the separation distances recom-
(a) spacing between equipment, mended.
(b) access requirements at equipment, The separation distances for liquids which have a
(c) minimum clearances at equipment; lower vapour pressure, including the bulk of petroleum
(3) preliminary spacings for storage layout: products and flammable liquids, tend to be less than
(a) tank farms, those for liquids which have a high vapour pressure and
(b) petroleum products, so flash off readily, such as LPG and LFG. It is
(c) liquefied flammable gas, frequently stated that for LPG a smaller separation
(d) liquid oxygen; distance may be allowed if there is provision of adequate
(4) preliminary distances for electrical area classification; radiation walls and/or water drench systems.
(5) size of storage piles. There is naturally some tendency for separation
distances to be reproduced from one publication to
Further types of separation used by D.J. Lewis (1980b) another. In general, however, there are differences
are given in Section 10.11.4. between the various codes and guidelines, so that the
overall situation is rather confused. This problem has
been discussed by Simpson (1971).
10.11.2 Standard distances Typical separation distances for preliminary site layouts
There are a large number of standards, codes of practice are given by Mecklenburgh (1985). The table of spacings
and other publications which give minimum safe separa- which he gives is shown in Table 10.4. Some interunit
tion distances. The guidance available relates mainly to and interequipment separation distances given by IRI
separation distances for storage, either of petroleum (1991, 1992) are shown in Table 10.5.
products, of flammable liquids, of liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG) or of liquefied flammable gas (LFG).
10.11.3 Rating and ranking methods
Recommendations for separation distances are given
An alternative to the use of standard separation distances
in: for petroleum products, The Storage of Flammable
is the utilization of some form of rating or ranking
Liquids in Fixed Tanks Exceeding 10 000 m3 Total Capacity
method. The most widely applied method of this kind is
(HSE, 1991 HS(G) 52), the Refining Safety Code (IP, 1981
that used in hazardous area classification. This method
MCSP Pt 3), the American Petroleum Institute (API)
ranks items by their leak potential. An outline of the
standards API Std 620: 1990 and API Std 650: 1988 and
method is given in Section 10.12. Another such method
NFPA 30: 1990 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code;
is the Mond Index, which is now described.
for LPG, in The Storage of LPG at Fixed Installations by
the HSE (1987 HS(G) 34), Liquefied Petroleum Gas by
the IP (1987 MCSP Pt 9), the Code of Practice, Part 1, 10.11.4 Mond Index
Installation and Maintenance of Fixed Bulk LPG Storage The Mond Index is one of the hazard indices described
at Consumers' Premises by the Liquefied Petroleum Gas in Chapter 8. A particular application of this index is the
Industry Technical Association (LPGITA) (1991 LPG determination of separation distances as described by
Code 1 Pt 1), API Std 2510: 1989 and 2510A: 1989 and D.J. Lewis (1980b, 1989b). In the Mond Index method
NFPA 58: 1989 Storage and Handling of Liquefied two values are calculated for the overall risk rating
Petroleum Gases; and for LFG, the ICI Liquefied (ORR), those before and after allowance is made for off-
Flammable Gases, Storage and Handling Code (the ICI setting factors. It is the latter rating R2 which is used in
LFG Code) (ICI/RoSPA 1970 IS/74). Another relevant applying the technique to plant layout. The ORR assigns
code is BS 5908: 1990 Fire precautions in the Chemical categories ranging from mild to very extreme.
Table 10.4 Preliminary areas and spacings for site layout (Mecklenburgh, 1985) (Courtesy of the Institution of
Chemical Engineers)
Administration 10 m2 per administration employee
Workshop 20 m2 per workshop employee
Laboratory 20 m2 per laboratory employee
Canteen 1 m2 per dining space
3.5 m2 per place including kitchen and store
Medical centre: 0.10.15 m2 per employee depending on complexity of service
Minimum 10 m2
Fire-station (housing 1 fire, 1 crash, 500 m2 per site
1 foam, 1 generator and 1 security
vehicle)
Garage (including maintenance) 100 m2 per vehicle
Main perimeter roads 10 m wide
Primary access roads 6m wide
Secondary access roads 3.5 m wide
Pump access roads 3.0 m wide
Pathways 1.2 m wide up to 10 people/min
2.0 m wide over 10 people/min (e.g. near offices, canteens,
bus stops)
Stairways 1.0 m wide including stringers

Landings (in direction of stairway) 1.0 m wide including stringers
Platforms 1.0 m wide including stringers
Road turning circles (908 turn and radius equal to width of road
T-junctions)
Minimum railway curve 56 m inside curve radius
Cooling towers per tower 0.04 m2/kW mechanical draught
to 0.08 m2/kW natural draught
Boiler (excluding house) 0.002 m3/kW (Height = 4 6 Side)
(non-pressurized)
boundary
Control room
Property
Control room
(pressurized)
Administration
Shippings, buildings,
Main substation
building
NA
Loading facilities,
30 NA
road, rail, water
warehouses
Fire pumphouse
8 NA NA
Cooling towers
8 8 8 NA
Gas compressors
8 30 15 8 NA
Process fired
High pressure storage
8 15 NM 30 15 NA
Atmospheric flammable
30 60 30 60 60 60 NA
heaters
spheres or tanks 51 bar g

liquid storage tanks
spheres, bullets
8 8 8 8 30 30 45 NA
Reactors
Low pressure storage
30 30 30 30 60 30 45 30 7.5
30 30 30 75 60 75 60 60 30 7.5
30 30 30 60 60 60 60 60 30 15 2
Aircoolers
60 30 30 60 60 60 60 60 30 15 10 2
Process control
Plot limits
CP 60 30 75 75 75 CP 75 30 CP 75 60 CP
Process equipment
Process equipment
(low flashpoint)
(high flashpoint)
CP 60 30 60 60 60 CP 60 30 CP 60 60 CP CP
Process unit
substation
station
Cryogenic O2*
60 30 30 60 60 60 60 60 30 15 7.5 5 60 60 NM
CP 60 30 75 60 60 CP 60 30 CP 60 60 CP CP 60 CP
60 60 60 60 60 60 45 60 30 NA NA NA CP CP NA CP 15
plant
30 NA NA NA 30 NA 60 NA 15 15 15 15 60 60 15 60 NA NA
NM NM NA NA NM NA 45 NM 15 15 15 15 NM NM 15 NM NM NM NA
15 30 NM 60 60 60 60 60 30 30 7.5 5 CP CP 5 CP NA 15 15 2
15 30 NM 60 60 60 60 60 30 15 7.5 5 CP CP 5 CP NA 15 15 2 2
CP 30 NM 30 60 60 CP 45 30 CP 45 60 CP CP 30 CP CP 60 50 CP CP 30
NA, not applicable since no measureable distance can be determined; NM, no minimum spacing established use engineering
judgement; CP, reference must be made to relevant Codes of Practice but see section C.6 of the original reference.
a
See also section C.6 for minimum clearances.
Notes:
(1) Flare spacing should be based on heat intensity with a minimum space of 60 m from equipment containing hydrocarbons.
(2) The minimum spacings can be down to one-quarter these typical spacings when properly assessed.
Table 10.5 Some separation distances for oil and chemical plants. The spacings given are applicable for items with
potential for fire and vessel explosion. Spacings for items with potential for vapour cloud explosion should be
obtained by other means
A Interunit spacings (Industrial Risk Insurers, 1991)
s
tion
es
s
bsta
trica l centr
ding
l su
buil
o
and r contr
i ce
s
area
Serv
elec
rs
ings
o
towe
Mot
ities
uild
s
room
ses
/
Util
ling
or b
hou
/ /
Coo
trol
ress
rd
zard
ump
s
50 50 /
tank
Con
za
ts
p
Com
e ha
mod ess uni
e ha
50 50 100 50
ge p
age
diat s
t
s
inte ess uni
erat
/ / 100 100 /
tank
Lar
tank
haza ts
stor
Proc
high s uni
rd
100 100 100 100 100 30
s
rme
rack
rage
eric
age
Proc
100 100 100 100 100 30 30
es
stor
osph
Proc
ing
t
100 100 100 100 100 30 30 50
s
ated
load
sure
Atm
200 100 100 100 200 50 50 100 100
of
iger
Pres
e ro
d
400 200 200 200 300 100 100 200 200 200
g an
s
ump
Refr
dom
250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 300 350 *
es
in
er p
Flar
oad
350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 * *
ions
wat
Unl
350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 * * *
stat
Fire
300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 400 400 /
Fire
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 300 250 350 350 300 50
50 50 50 50 50 200 200 200 300 300 350 350 350 300 200 /
50 50 50 50 50 200 200 200 300 300 350 350 350 300 200 / /
1 ft = 0.305 m; /, No spacing requirements; * Spacing given in Table 3 of the original reference.
B Interequipment spacings (Industrial Risk Insurers, 1992)

ps
sors
pum
s
e
ump
haza mediat
pres
rd
zard
rd p
Com
za
s,
d
e ha
r
ator
reac hazar
h ha
Inte
rd
30
reac mediat
mul
aza
tors
Hig
30 5
reac erate h
Hig
ccu
tors
r
50 5 5
s
drum mns, a
Inte
tank
tors
50 10 15 25
Mod
own
ters
s
Colu
50 10 15 25 15
ger
hea
s
d
50 10 15 25 15 15
er
Run
han
hea ooled
ang
d
rols
50 10 15 50 25 25 15
Fire
t exc
ch
c
cont
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

t ex
Air
es
rack
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 25
Hea
lv
ncy
k va
erge
30 15 15 25 15 15 15 100 50 /
Pipe
s
room
c
t blo
30 10 15 25 15 10 10 100 50 15 5
Em
lyser
30 10 15 25 15 10 10 100 50 / 10 /
Uni
Ana
50 50 50 100 50 50 50 100 50 50 50 50 /
50 50 50 100 50 50 50 100 50 50 50 50 / /
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 50 50 50 50 / / /
1 ft = 0.305 m; /, No spacing requirements.
The objectives of layout are: to minimize risk to other occupied buildings should be adjacent to low or
personnel; to minimize escalation, both within the plant medium risk units, the latter being acceptable only if a
and to adjacent plants; to ensure adequate access for fire low risk unit is not available and if the R2 value is just
fighting and rescue; and to allow flexibility in combining inside the medium risk band. Units with the highest
together units of similar hazard potential. value of the aerial explosion index A2 should not be
Lewis enumerates the basic concepts underlying the located near to the plant boundary but should be
initial layout. In addition to general layout principles, he separated by areas occupied by low risk activities and
includes several applications of the ORR. Control and with low population densities (up to 25 persons/acre).
Major pipebridges with medium to high R2 should be (c) a plant boundary,

located to reduce their vulnerability to incidents from tall (d) the works boundary.
process units and from transport accidents arising from
normal vehicle traffic.
Units separately assessed can be combined into a For units, the relevant distance for the determination
single unit, providing that the hazards are compatible of separation is taken as that between the nearest wall,
and the risks similar, the potential direct and consequen- structural frame or free-standing equipment of the two
tial losses do not become excessive and the reassessed units.
R2 value is acceptable. Separation distances for pipebridges receive particular
The initial layout is based on a nominal interunit attention. For a pipebridge between two units, the
spacing of 10 m. It includes pipebridges and vehicle separation distance is between one side of the pipe-
routes. The nominal interunit distances are then replaced bridge and the adjacent unit. The distance should not
by those established by engineering considerations, include the plan area occupied by the pipebridge itself,
including the use of guidance on minimum separation but it is not normally necessary to provide two separation
distances and of the ORR. distances, one on each side of the pipebridge. A
Lewis states that the minimum separation distances pipebridge which itself has significant potential for a
given in the relevant codes are absolute minimum hazardous release should not be located alongside a unit
distances and are not necessarily good practice for new without a separation distance unless assessment shows
installations. Some situations for which separation dis- that the hazard level of the combination of unit and
tances are required are given by Lewis as follows: pipebridge is acceptable. If it is not, there should be a
separation between the pipebridge and all units, using
(1) distances between a unit of a particular degree of the pipebridge separation distances given.
hazard and The spacings for storage units given in the initial
(a) another unit of the same degree, treatment (D.J. Lewis, 1980b) were subsequently revised
(b) another unit of lower or higher degree; (D.J. Lewis, 1989b). The principal changes are consider-
(2) distances between a process unit and able increases in separation distances for the extreme
(a) a storage unit, and very extreme values of R2 , exclusion of units which
(b) the bund of a storage unit; have potential for `frothover' or for `boilover' in a fire, and
(3) distances between adjacent storage units containing restriction to units which are on level ground.
materials of different flammability; The recommendations for separation distances for
(4) distances between a unit and process units are shown in Table 10.6 and those for
(a) occupied buildings, storage units in Tables 10.7 and 10.8. D.J. Lewis (1989b)
(b) potential ignition sources, gives further recommendations for dealing with storage
Table 10.6 Separation distances for process units: spacings between process units and other features obtained
using the Mond Index (D.J. Lewis, 1980b) (Courtesy of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers)
A Minimum spacings between one process unit A and another process unit B (m)
Overall risk Overall risk rating R2 of process unit B
rating R2 of
process unit A Mild Low Medium High Very high Extreme Very extreme
Mild 0 6 9 12 17 20 30
Low 6 8 10 15 20 25 40
Medium 9 10 15 18 25 30 50
High 12 15 18 20 30 40 60
Very high 17 20 25 30 40 50 80
Extreme 20 25 30 40 50 65 100
Very extreme 30 40 50 60 80 100 150
B Minimum spacings between a process unit and another feature (m)

Feature
Overall risk Works Plant boundary Control Offices, amenity, Electrical Electrical power Process furnaces Forced draught
rating R2 boundary works main road, room buildings, switchgear, lines and and similar cooling towers
of storage works main workshops, instrument transformers ignition sources
unit railway laboratories, etc. houses
Mild 20 15 9 12 5 0 7 10
Low 27 20 10 15 10 5 12 17
Medium 35 27 15 20 15 10 17 25
High 50 35 18 27 20 15 25 30
Very high 70 50 25 40 25 20 30 35
Extreme 120 75 30 60 30 25 40 40
Very extreme 200 100 50 75 40 30 60 50
Table 10.7 Separation distances for process units: spacings between storage units and process units or other
storage units obtained using the Mond Index (D.J. Lewis, 1989b) (Courtesy of the Norwegian Society of Chartered
Engineers)
A Minimum spacings between a storage unit and a process unit: spacing to tank wall (m)
Overall risk Overall risk rating R2 of process unit
rating R2 of
storage unit Mild Low Medium High Very high Extreme Very extreme
Mild 3 7 10 13 18 23 38
Low 6 9 12 17 23 30 50
Moderate 9 12 17 21 31 44 66
High 12 17 21 28 43 56 84
Very high 17 23 31 43 56 72 110
Extreme 23 30 44 56 72 97 145
Very extreme 38 50 66 84 110 145 197
B Minimum spacings between a storage unit and a process unit: spacing to bund wall (m)
Overall risk Overall risk rating R2 of process unit
rating R2 of
storage unit Mild Low Medium High Very high Extreme Very extreme
Mild 2 4 5 7 9 10 15
Low 3 5 6 8 10 13 20
Moderate 4 6 8 9 13 16 26
High 6 8 9 12 16 22 33
Very high 8 10 13 16 22 28 45
Extreme 10 13 16 22 28 36 58
Very extreme 15 20 26 33 45 58 90
C Spacings between two storage units: spacing between one tank wall and the other tank wall (m)
Overall risk Overall risk rating R2 of storage unit B
rating R2 of
storage unit A Mild Low Medium High Very high Extreme Very extreme
Mild 5 7 10 13 18 25 43
Low 7 10 13 19 26 36 55
Moderate 10 13 19 26 36 56 80
High 13 19 26 36 56 72 110
Very high 18 26 36 56 72 97 145
Extreme 25 36 56 72 97 130 185
Very extreme 43 60 80 110 145 185 225
units with frothover or boilover potential and with units is suggested as the limit for workers out on the plant
located on sloping ground. who must continue doing essential tasks; and the third is
the level of minor discomfort and is suggested as the
10.11.5 Hazard models limit for people in adjoining areas. A more detailed
Another approach to the determination of separation discussion of thermal radiation criteria is given in
distances is to use hazard models to determine the Chapter 16.
separation distance at which the concentration from a Simpson also considers separation distances based on
vapour escape or the thermal radiation from a fire fall to the dilution of a vapour leak to a concentration below the
an acceptable level. This is the other side of the coin to lower flammability limit. The estimates are based on
hazard assessment of a proposed layout. Early accounts calculations of leak emission flows, pool vaporization rate
of the use of hazard models to determine separation and vapour cloud dispersion, as described in Chapter 15.
distances include those of Hearfield (1970) and Simpson One problem which he discusses is the separation
(1971). between storage and an ignition source for petroleum
Two principal factors considered as determining spirit and other flammable liquids of similar volatility. For
separation are (1) heat from burning liquid and (2) this case he concludes that in most instances a
ignition of a vapour escape. separation distance of 15 m is adequate.
Permissible heat fluxes are discussed by Simpson, who Another problem is the separation distance between a
distinguishes three levels of heat flux: 12.5 kW/m2 (4000 petrochemical unit and an ignition source. The typical
BHU/ft2 h), 4.7 kW/m2 (1500 BTU/ft2 h) and 1.6 kW/m2 scenarios which he discusses give separation distances
(500 BTU/ft2 h). The first value is the limit given in the as high as 88 m, this being for a necked-off branch on a
Building Regulations 1965 and is suggested as a suitable C2 fractionator. A further discussion of the basis for
limit for buildings such as control rooms or workshops; separation distances has been given by R.B. Robertson
the second is the threshold of pain after a short time and (1976b).
Table 10.8 Separation distances for process units: spacings between storage units and other features obtained
using the Mond Index (D.J. Lewis, 1989b) (Courtesy of the Norwegian Society of Chartered Engineers)
A Spacings between a storage unit and another feature: spacing to tank wall (m)
Overall risk Featurea
rating R2 of
storage unit Works Plant boundary, Control Offices, amenity, Process furnaces, Flare stacks,
boundary works main road, room buildings, other ground of tip height H m
works main workshops, level ignition above groundb
railway laboratories, etc. sources, electrical
switchgear, instrument
houses
Mild 20 15 7 12 10 1.25H + 6
Low 27 20 12 16 15 1.25H + 10
Moderate 35 25 20 24 22 1.25H + 15
High 55 41 28 36 33 1.25H + 22
Very high 81 70 41 58 52 1.25H + 35
Extreme 125 95 53 72 66 1.25H + 45
Very extreme 175 130 75 100 90 1.25H + 60
B Spacings between a storage unit and another feature: spacing to bund wall (m)
Overall risk Featurea
rating R2 of
storage unit Works Plant boundary, Control Offices, amenity, Process furnaces, Flare stacks,
boundary works main road, room buildings, other ground of tip height H m
works main workshops, level ignition above groundb
railway laboratories, etc. sources, electrical
switchgear, instrument
houses
Mild 15 10 5 8 7 H+6
Low 20 12 6 11 10 H+8
Moderate 25 15 7 13 12 H + 10
High 38 22 9 20 18 H + 16
Very high 46 29 12 25 23 H + 20
Extreme 54 36 15 30 26 H + 23
Very extreme 65 45 20 40 32 H + 28
a
In the case of a buried tank, the tank wall distance is measured to the position on the plan of the tank wall or other items not more
than 10 m below ground level.
b
In the case of a flare stack, the distances is a function of the flare stack tip height H, as shown in the last column.
The principle of the use of hazard models to set flammable liquid with a flashpoint below 328C the radius
separation distances is now recognized in codes. of Zone 2 depends on the liquid temperature as follows:
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (IP, 1987 MCSP Part 9) gives
separation distances for liquid storage units based on Liquid temperature Radius of Zone 2
hazard models, as described in Section 10.14. (8C) (m)
4 100 6
10.11.6 Liquefied flammable gas 100200 20
A separation distance of 15 m frequently occurs in codes 4 200 30
for the storage of petroleum products, excluding LPG.
For LPG and LFG, the separation distances are generally
greater. Thus in the ICI LFG Code the separation
10.12 Hazardous Area Classification
distances recommended between a storage and an
ignition source are, for ethylene, 60 m for pressure Plant layout has a major role to play in preventing the
storage and 90 m for refrigerated storage, and for C3 ignition of any flammable release which may occur. This
compounds, 45 m for both types of storage. The general aspect of layout is known as àrea classification'. One
approach there taken is that there is significant risk of principal type of ignition source is electric motors, and
failure for a refrigerated storage but negligible risk for a area classification has its origins in the need to specify
pressure storage vessel. motors with different degrees of safeguard against
Separation distances are also implied in the ICI ignition. As such, the practice was known as èlectrical
Electrical Installations in Flammable Atmospheres Code area classification' and was usually performed by
(the ICI Electrical Installations Code) (ICI/RoSPA 1972 electrical engineers. The extension of this practice to
IS/91) in that the code gives guidance on the radius of cover the exclusion of all sources of ignitions is known
the electrical area classification zone from potential leak as `hazardous area classification' and is generally
points. For a pump with a mechanical seal containing a performed by chemical engineers.
Hazardous area classification is dealt with in BS 5345: based on these strategies is broadly as follows. First the
1977 Code of Practice for the Selection, Installation and potential leak sources are identified. The characteristics
Maintenance of Electrical Apparatus for Use in Potentially of the leak are defined, for start-up, shut-down and
Explosive Atmospheres (Other than Mining Applications or emergency conditions as well as normal operation, and
Explosive Processing and Manufacture), and in a number the grade of leak assigned. For each leak point
of industry codes, including the Area Classification Code consideration is given to reducing or eliminating any
for Petroleum Installations (IP, 1990 MCSP Pt 15). leak. Guidance on separation distances is then used to
The process of hazardous area classification involves determine the area around the leak source from which
assigning areas of the site to one of four categories. The ignition sources should be excluded. Next the ignition
international definition of these by the International sources near the leak point are identified. For each
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), given in BS 5345: ignition source in turn, consideration is given to the
1977, is: possibility that it can be eliminated or moved. Where this
is not applicable, the zone is specified and appropriate
Zone 0 A zone in which a flammable atmosphere protection of the ignition source is determined. For
is continuously present or present for electrical equipment this means specifying the type of
long periods. safeguarding appropriate to the zone.
Zone 1 A zone in which a flammable atmosphere A check may be made on the separation distances
is likely to occur for short period in used and on the degree of protection required by
normal operation. modelling the dispersion of the leak. Consideration
Zone 2 A zone in which a flammable atmosphere should also be given to the effect of any pool fire
is not likely to occur in normal operation arising from flammable liquid released at the leak point.
and if it occurs only exist for a short In some instances this may require an increase in the
time. separation distance or the use of protection measures
such as insulation or water sprays.
A non-hazardous area is an area not classified as Zone 0,
The control of ignition sources reduces the risk of
1 or 2. In the UK, this classification system replaces an
injury to personnel and the risk of property damage. The
earlier system based on three divisions: 0, 1 and 2.
extent to which the plant design is modified for reasons
In the USA, hazardous area classification is covered in
of hazardous area classification is governed for personal
Article 500 of NPFA 70: 1993 National Electrical Code
injury by the usual risk criteria and considerations of
and in API RP 500: 1991 Recommended Practice for
what is reasonably practicable, and for property damage
Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at
by economic considerations. In cases where it is property
Petroleum Facilities.
damage which is the issue, it may be preferable to
The purpose of hazardous area classification is to
accept a certain risk rather than to undertake unduly
minimize the probability of ignition of small leaks. It is
expensive countermeasures.
not concerned with massive releases, which are very
The outcome of this exercise for all the ignition
rare. This distinction is a necessary one, but the
sources identified is the definition of the zones in three
difference can sometimes be blurred. Mecklenburgh
dimensions for the whole plant. Drawings are produced
instances a pump seal which, if it leaks, will generally
showing these zones in plan and elevation, both for
give a rather small release, but which may on occasion
individual items of equipment and for the plant as a
give a leak greater than that from the rupture of a small
whole. A typical plan drawing is illustrated in Figure
pipe. Because the leaks considered are small and
10.4.
because small flammable releases burn rather than
Hazardous area classification provides the basis for the
explode, it is fire rather than explosion with which
control of ignition sources both in design and in
hazardous area classification is concerned.
operation. A further discussion of hazardous area
Since it is difficult to specify leaks fully in terms of
classification is given in Chapter 16.
size, frequency and duration, the following grades of leak
are defined:
10.13 Hazard Assessment
(1) Continuous grade: release is continuous or nearly so.
(2) Primary grade: release is likely to happen regularly or In the methodology for plant layout described by
at random times during normal operation. Mecklenburgh (1985) hazard assessment is used at
(3) Secondary grade: release is unlikely to happen in nor- several points in the development of the layout. In
mal operation and in any event will be of limited dura- each case the procedure is essentially an iterative one
tion. in which hazards are identified and assessed, modifica-
tions are made to the design and the hazards are
Broadly speaking, continuous, primary and secondary reassessed. The nature of the hazard assessment will
grade releases equate to Zones 0, 1 and 2, respectively. vary depending on whether it is done in support of site
Hazardous area classification proceeds by identifying location, site layout, Stage One plot layout or Stage Two
the sources of hazard, or potential leak points, and the plot layout.
sources of ignition. Typical leak points include flanges, Hazard assessment in support of site location is
seals, sample points and temporary connections; typical essentially some form of quantitative risk assessment.
ignition sources include electric motors, burners and Hazard assessment for site layout concentrates on
furnaces, engines and vehicles. major events. It provides guidance on the separation
There are three main strategies available for the distances required to minimize fire, explosion and toxic
control of ignition sources: prevention, separation and effects and on the location of features such as utilities
protection. The approach to hazardous area classification and office buildings.
Figure 10.4 Hazardous area classification drawing (Reproduced with permission from Foster and Wheeler Energy Ltd)
Hazard assessment for plot layout deals with lesser Table 10.9 Hazard assessment in support of plant
events and with avoidance of the escalation of such layout: Mecklenburgh hazard model system
events. It is used as part of the hazardous area
classification process and it provides guidance on Table
separation distances to prevent fire spread and for No.a
control building location. B1 Source term: instantaneous release from storage
At the plot layout level hazard assessment is con- of flashing liquid (catastrophic failure of vessel)
cerned mainly with flammable releases. It is not usually Flash fraction
possible at this level to do much about explosions and Mass in, and volume of, vapour cloud
toxic releases. B2 Dispersion of flammable vapour from
instantaneous release
10.14 Hazard Models Distance to lower flammability limit (LFL)
10.14.1 Early models B3 Explosion of flammable vapour cloud from
An account has already been given of the early work of instantaneous release
Simpson (1971) on the use of models for plant layout Explosion overpressure
purposes. The hazard models described by him include Damage (as function of overpressure)
models for two-phase flow and for vapour dispersion and B4 Fireball of flammable vapour cloud from
criteria for thermal radiation, as described in Section instantaneous release
10.11. Fireball diameter, duration, thermal radiation
B5 Dispersion of toxic vapour from instantaneous
10.14.2 Mecklenburgh system release
A set of hazard models specifically for use in plant layout Peak concentration, time of passage
has been given by Mecklenburgh (1985). A summary of Distance to safe concentration, outdoors and
the models in this hazard model system is given in Table indoors
10.9. Some of the individual models are described in B6 Source term: continuous release of fluid
Chapters 15, 16 and 17. Although the modelling of some (a) Gas (subsonic)
of the phenomena has undergone further development, (b) Gas (sonic)
this hazard model system remains one of the most (c) Flashing liquid (not choked)
comprehensive available for its purpose. (d) Flashing liquid (choked)
B7 Dispersion of flammable vapour jet
10.14.3 IP system Jet length, diameter (to LFL)
Another, more limited, set of hazard models for plant B8 Jet flame from flammable vapour jet
layout is that given in Liquefied Petroleum Gas (IP, 1987 Flame length, diameter
MCSP Pt 9). The models cover: Flame temperature, surface heat flux, distance
(1) emission; to given heat flux
(a) pressurized liquid; B9 Dispersion of toxic vapour plume
(b) refrigerated liquid; Distance to given concentration
(2) pool fire; Distance to safe concentration, outdoors and
(3) jet flame. indoors
The models include view factors for thermal radiation B10 Growth of, and evaporation from, a pool
from cylinders at a range of angles to the vertical and of Pool diameter
positions of the target. The requirements for separation Evaporation rate
distances between storage units are based on thermal B11 Pool or tank fire
radiation flux criteria. These are given in Chapter 22. Flame height
The code gives worked examples. Regression rate, surface heat flux
View factor
10.14.4 Injury and damage criteria B12 Effect of heat flux on targets
Criteria for injury and damage, principally the latter, are Tolerable heat fluxes
given by Mecklenburgh as part of his hazard model B13 Risk criteria
system. Individual risk to employees (as a range)
For the heat flux from a flame or fire the tolerable Individual risk to public (as a range)
intensities are given as follows: Multiple fatality accident
B14 Explosion overpressure
Heat flux Damage (as function of overpressure) (see also
(kW/m2) B3)
B15 Dispersion of flammable vapour from small
Drenched storage tanks 38 continuous release
Special buildings 25 Jet dispersion: distance to given concentration,
Normal buildings 14 to LFL (see B7)
Vegetation 12 Passive dispersion: distance to given
Escape routes 6 concentration (see B9)
Personnel in emergencies 3 Jet flame: distance to given heat flux (see B8)
Plastic cables 2 B16 Evaporation and dispersion from small liquid pool
Stationary personnel 1.5 Distance to given concentration
B17 Dispersion of flammable vapour from small (5) Continuous release of pressurized liquid from 10 cm
continuous release in a building hole
Jet dispersion: distance to given concentration (a) Flammable fluid giving rise to passively disper-
Passive dispersion: distance to given sing unignited vapour cloud, or jet fire
concentration (b) Toxic fluid giving rise to passively dispersing
Jet flame: distance to given heat flux (see B8) toxic gas cloud.
B18 Evaporation and dispersion from small liquid pool
in a building The overall results are summarized in Table 10.10. These
Evaporation rate results are discussed by Mecklenburgh in relation to
Mean space concentration both on-site and off-site effects and to the counter-
Other parameters for (a) horizontal air flow and measures which might be taken.
(b) vertical air flow
a
In Mecklenburgh (1985). 10.15 Fire Protection
Plant layout can make a major contribution to the fire
For a fireball the safe dose is given as ItB2/3 5 47, where protection of the plant. This has a number of aspects.
I is the heat flux (kW/m2) and tB is the duration of the Plant layout for fire protection is covered in BS 5908:
fireball (s). 1990 Fire Precautions in the Chemical and Allied
For the peak incident overpressure from an explosion Industries. Also relevant are BS 5306:1976 Fire
the limits which should not be exceeded are given as Extinguishing Installations and Equipment on Premises,
follows: particularly Part 1 on fire hydrants, and BS 5041: 1987
Fire Hydrant Systems Equipment. An important earlier
code, BS CP 3013: 1974 Fire Precautions in Chemical
Peak incident
Plant, is now withdrawn. The coverage of BS 5908: 1990
overpressure
is indicated by the list of contents given in Table 10.11.
(bar)
Accounts of the fire protection aspects of plant layout
Schools 0.02 include those by Simpson (1971), Hearfield (1970) and
Housing 0.04 Kaura (1980a).
Public roads 0.05 Some aspects of plant layout for fire protection may be
Offices 0.07 classed as passive and others as active measures. The
Shatter-resistant windows 0.10 former include (1) separation of hazards and targets, (2)
Site roads, utilities 0.20 measures to prevent fire spread and (3) provision of
Hazardous plants 0.300.40 access for fire fighting; the latter include provision of (4)
Protected control room 0.7 fire water and (5) fire protection systems. The segrega-
tion of hazards and targets and the containment of fire
are important aspects of site layout and are considered in
10.14.5 Illustrative example Section 10.6. The provision and location of fire water
Mecklenburgh illustrates the application of his hazard hydrants and fire protection equipment are prominent
models by giving for each a scenario and worked features of plot layout and are discussed in Section 10.7.
example, and for some of the outdoor cases he This section deals primarily with access, fire water and
combines these into an assessment of the effects on fire protection equipment. Fire protection is discussed
site and off site. For this latter assessment he considers further in Chapter 16.
a set of scenarios which may be summarized as follows: There are numerous legal requirements concerning
fire, fire construction and fire fighting. There should be
(1) Instantaneous release of flashing liquid from storage full consultation at an early stage with the works safety
tank officer and with other parties such as the local authority
(a) Flammable liquid giving rise to unignited vapour services, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the
cloud, or fireball, or vapour cloud explosion insurers.
(b) Toxic liquid giving rise to toxic gas cloud, in open
and around building 10.15.1 Fire fighting access
(2) Residual liquid in tank Access is essential for fire fighting. Some basic principles
(a) Flammable liquid giving rise to unignited vapour are that it should be possible to get fire fighting
cloud, pool fire equipment sufficiently close to the site of the fire and
(b) Toxic liquid giving rise to toxic gas cloud that there should be access from more than one side.
(3) Liquid pool from 10 cm leak in tank base following Access should be provided within 18 to 45 m of a hazard
instantaneous release and there should be water supplies and hard standing at
(a) Flammable liquid giving rise to unignited vapour these access points.
cloud, or pool fire The site should have a peripheral road connected at
(b) Toxic liquid giving rise to toxic gas cloud not less than two points with the public road system. It
(4) Continuous release of pressurized liquid from 2.5 cm may be necessary to provide a waiting area for fire
hole fighting vehicles near each main gate. Site roads should
(a) Flammable fluid giving rise to passively disper- be arranged to allow approach to a major fire from two
sing unignited vapour cloud, or jet fire directions. Major process or storage units should be
(b) Toxic fluid giving rise to passively dispersing accessible from at least two sides. Access is assisted by
toxic gas cloud a plot size of 100 m 6 200 m with approaches preferably
Table 10.10 Hazard assessment in support of plant layout: illustrative example (after Mecklenburgh, 1985)
(Courtesy of the Institution of Chemical Engineers)
A Off-site effects summary of distances (m)
All built-up area 100 m built-up, All country
then country
1(a) Instantaneous release
LFL 341 363 377
Fireball, safe dose 463 463 463
Blast, schools 500 500 500
housing 290 290 290
roads 240 240 240
Safe toxic, open 941 1034 1048
Safe toxic, building 35 54
1(b) Open tank after instantaneous release

LFL At tank At tank
Fire, 1.5 kW/m2 17 17 17
Safe toxic Near tank Near tank
1(c) Unconfined pool from 10 cm leak after instantaneous release

Fire, 1.5 kW/m2 83 83
Pool radius (fire) 9 9
LFL 37 41
Safe toxic 67 96
Pool radius (evap.) 33 33 (concrete)
2 2.5 cm steady release under pressure

LFL (no jet) 16 (28) 16 (38)
Fire, 1.5 kW/m2 43 43
Safe toxic (no jet) 60 (72) 68 (92)
3 10 cm steady release under pressure

LFL (no jet) 62 (159) 62 (172) 62 (200)
Fire, 1.5 kW/m2 172 172 172
Safe toxic in open (no jet) 290 (403) 324 (461) 324 (489)
Safe toxic in building (no jet) 87 (126) 87 (131) 87 (159)
LFL, lower flammability limit.
B On-site effects summary of distances (m)

1(a) Instantaneous release
LFL 341
Fireball, safe dose 463
Fireball radius 73
Blast-resistant control rooms 50
Hazardous plants 6075
Shatter-resistant windows 150
Offices 180
Safe toxic in buildings 35
Safe toxic in open 941
1(b,c) After instantaneous release

Open tank (m) Unconfined pool from 10 cm leak (m)
LFL Close 37
Pool radius (fire) 9
Fire, drenched tanks 8 30
Special buildings 9 33
Normal buildings 10 39
Vegetation 10 41
Escape routes 12 50
Personnel in emergencies 14 62
Table 10.11 Continued

1(b,c) After instantaneous release
Open tank (m) Unconfined pool from 10 cm leak (m)
Plastic cables 15 73
Stationary personnel (1.5 kW/m2) 17 83
Safe toxic limit 3 67
Pool radius (evaporation) 33
2 and 3 Steady releases under pressure

2.5 cm 10 cm
LFL (no jet) 16 (28) 63 (159)

Fire, drenched tanks 29 116
Special buildings 30 120
Normal buildings 32 128
Vegetation 32 128
Escape routes 35 140
Personnel in emergencies 39 156
Plastic cables 41 164
Stationary personnel 43 172
Safe toxic limit in open (no jet) 60 (72) 290 (403)
Safe toxic limit in building (no jet) 60 (72) 87 (126)
LFL, lower flammability limit.
Note Values in brackets are for the case where the release does not take the form of a jet
on all four sides and by spacing between plots and the time taken to control fires points to a duration of 3
buildings of 15 m. hours.
Access for fire fighting vehicles should be over firm The fire water requirement may be based on the
ground, should have sufficient road and gate widths, specification of a design basis fire. Kaura (1980a)
should give adequate clearance heights and should allow suggests that this might be two simultaneous fires, one
for the necessary turning and manoeuvring. The vehicles on a major process unit and the other at the storage
requiring access may include heavy bulk foam or carbon tanks. The IP Refining Safety Code states, on the other
dioxide carriers. hand, that it is usual to assume that there will be only
one major fire at a time. The practical difference between
10.15.2 Fire water these approaches depends on how generous an allow-
In a fire, water is required for extinguishing the fire, for ance is made for the single fire.
cooling tanks and vessels and for foam blanketing The fire water main may be fed from the public water
systems. The quantities of water required can be large, supply, but for large works the public supply may well
both in terms of the instantaneous values involved and of
the duration for which they may be needed. In some
fires water sprinkler systems have been required to
operate for several days. Table 10.11 Principal contents of BS 5908: 1990
The design of a fire water system requires the 1. General
determination of the maximum fire water flow which 2. Legal background
the system should deliver. Some order of magnitude 3. Principles of initiation, spread and extinction of fire
figures are given in the Refining Safety Code (IP, 1981 4. Site selection and layout
MCSP Pt 3). This states that for a major process fire the 5. Buildings and structures
fire water flows required might be of the order of 750 6. Storage and movement of materials
1500 m3/h. The code also quotes for a major fire on a 7. Design of process plant
50 m diameter storage tank a fire water flow of 830 m3/h 8. Operation of process plant
for the application of foam to the burning tank and for 9. Maintenance of process plant
the cooling of the adjacent tanks. R.B. Robertson (1974a) 10. Fire prevention
refers to investigation of the fire water actually used in 11. Fire defence
major process plant fires and quotes water flows in the 12. Works fire brigades
range of 9002700 m3/h. 13. Classification of fires and selection of extinguishing
It is also necessary to specify the length of time for media
which such fire water flows should be sustained. This 14. Fixed fire extinguishing systems
specification also may be obtained using the design basis 15. Portable and transportable appliances
fire approach. Typically this length of time is recom- 16. Organization of emergency procedures
mended to be 23 hours. Robertson states that study of
not be adequate to provide the quantities of water water at the most remote location at a pressure suitable
required. Additional water supplies may be drawn by for the fire fighting equipment, which is usually 10 bar.
the fire brigades from rivers, canals, reservoirs or static At this pressure the reaction forces on hoses and nozzles
tanks, but such sources should be near enough to allow are high and make special care necessary.
suction to be obtained directly, since reliance on relays is The quantities of water used in a fire can easily
likely to involve undue delay. Cooling water should not overload the drainage system unless adequate provision
be used, because loss of cooling on other plants is itself is made. This is discussed in Section 10.17.
a hazard. Where the public supply is to be used, this
should be done in accordance with BS 6700: 1987. The 10.15.3 Fire protection equipment
water and fire authorities should be consulted about fire The other aspects of fire protection of plant, including
water supplies. fire containment by layout, gas, smoke and fire detection,
Water supplies for water sprays and sprinklers may be passive fire protection such as fire insulation, and active
provided in the form of elevated static water tanks. A fire protection such as the use of fixed, mobile and
typical capacity might be such as to supply water for 1 portable fire fighting equipment, are considered in
hour. Pumps should be provided to replenish the Chapter 16.
supplies. It is appropriate to mention here, however, the
Fire water should be available from hydrants adjacent provision of certain minimal equipment which is gener-
to the fire hazards on a ring main running alongside the ally treated as an aspect of plant layout. Fire extinguish-
road and located between the road and the plant. The ers of the appropriate type and fire blankets should be
main should preferably be buried under ground. The placed at strategic points on the plant. There should be
installation should be generally in accordance with BS at least two extinguishers at each point. Some extinguish-
5306: 1976 and fire water hydrants with BS 750: 1984 ers should be located on escape or access routes, so that
and BS 5306: Part 1: 1976. The main should take the a person who decides to fight the fire using the
form of a ring main encircling the plant, with cross- extinguisher has a route behind him for escape.
connections and with isolation valves to allow shut-off if a Fire equipment should be located so that it is not
section of the main is damaged. likely to be disabled by the accident itself, should be
Hydrant intervals should be 45 m for high risk areas accessible and should be conspicuously marked. The
but may be up to 100 m for low risk ones. The distance main switchgear and emergency controls should have
between the hydrant the plant structure or storage area good access, preferably on an escape route, so that the
should be not less than 18 m and may be up to 45 m. operator does not have to risk his life to effect shut-
The hydrants should be provided with a hard standing down.
and with signs in accordance with BS 5499: Part 1: 1990.
The signs should indicate the quantity of water available.
10.16 Effluents
Rising mains should be installed in a building or
structure on any floor exceeding 18 m above ground General arrangements for dealing with effluents are
level. Dry rising mains are suitable for heights up to discussed by Mecklenburgh (1973, 1985). Pollution of
60 m, but above this height a wet main may be any kind is a sensitive issue and attracts a growing
preferable. The inlets on the ground floor to dry riser degree of public control. There should be the fullest
mains and the outlets on all floors to both types of main consultation with the local and water authorities and the
should be accessible. Inspectorate of Pollution in all matters concerned with
Fire water for sprinkler and water spray systems effluents.
should be in accordance with BS 5908. Hazard identification methods should be used to
Pipes for fire water supply should be protected against identify situations which may give rise to acute pollution
explosion damage. Isolation valves should be provided to incidents and measures similar to those used to control
prevent loss of fire water from damaged lines and, if other hazards should be used to ensure that this type of
these valves are above ground level, they should be hazard also is under control.
protected by concrete blast barriers. The fire water is
normally pumped through the main by fixed fire pumps. 10.16.1 Liquid effluents
There should be at least two full capacity pumps with Liquid effluents include soil, domestic and process
separate power supplies. Cabling for electric pumps effluents, and cooling, storm and fire water. Harmless
should not run through high risk areas or, if this is aqueous effluents and clean stormwater may be run away
unavoidable, it should be protected. The location of the in open sewers, but obnoxious effluents require a closed
pumps is usually determined by that of the source of sewer. One arrangement is to have three separate
supply, but they should not be in a high risk area. The systems: an open sewer system for clean stormwater
fire pumps should be housed to protect them from the and two closed sewer systems, one for domestic sewage
weather. In a fire, mobile pumps may sometimes be used and one for aqueous effluent from the plant and for
to boost the fire main pressure, though their principal contaminated stormwater.
use is to supply fire hoses from the main or other There are a number of hazards associated with liquid
sources. effluent disposal systems such as drains and sewers. One
The fire main should be kept pressurized by jockey is the generation of a noxious gas by the mixing of
pumps. A fall in mains pressure should result in incompatible chemicals. Another hazard is that a flam-
automatic start-up of the main fire pump(s) with an mable gas may flow through the drains, become
indication of this at a manned control point. With regard distributed around the plant and then find a source of
to the fire water pressure, the IP Refining Safety Code ignition. This can give rise to a quite violent explosion,
states that the system should be able to deliver fire or even detonation. A flammable liquid which is immiscible
with water flowing through the drains constitutes another Flare stacks are a particular problem, because they
hazard. Again it may become distributed around the plant radiate intense heat and can be very noisy. Quite a large
and find an ignition source. If the liquid is already on fire, area of ground beneath a flare stack is unusable and is
its entry into the drains may cause the fire to be effectively `sterilized'. A flare stack may have to be
distributed around the plant. relegated to a distant site. A further discussion of flare
Other problems with sewers include overloading, stacks is given in Chapter 12.
blockage and back flow, each of which can be The behaviour of airborne emissions of all types
hazardous. Overloading or blockage can result in a should be carefully considered. Although the prevailing
liquid fire being floated across to other parts of the wind is the main factor, other possible troublesome wind
site. Some case histories of problems in sewers are given conditions should be taken into account. The effect of
by Anon. (1978 LPB 19, p.10). There are also environ- other weather conditions such as inversions should also
mental factors to consider. It is necessary to avoid the be considered.
discharge of untreated contaminated liquid.
As stated above, process effluents, essentially aqueous, 10.16.3 Solid wastes
and contaminated stormwater are collected in a common Solid waste should preferably be transferred directly from
sewer. The liquids discharged to this sewer should be the process to transport. If intermediate storage is
closely controlled. If different effluents are to be mixed unavoidable, care should be taken that it does not
together, it should be checked that this can be done constitute a hazard or a nuisance. If combustible solid
safely. Chemical works effluents are quite prone, for and solvent wastes are burnt, the incinerator should be
example, to generate obnoxious gases. convenient to the process.
Water-immiscible flammable liquids should not be
allowed to enter the sewers, where they create the
10.17 Drain Systems
hazard of fire or explosion. In particular, open sewers
with solvent floating on the water may transmit fires over The main plant sewers are of particular importance and
long distances. There should be arrangements to prevent merit further description. As already stated, it is common
the entry of such liquids into the sewers. Runoff from to have an open clean stormwater sewer and a closed
the plant area should be routed to interceptors located at contaminated stormwater sewer. These sewers also carry
the edge of the fire risk area. In order to avoid firewater runoff during fire fighting.
overloading, use is made of primary interceptors to Accounts of sewer systems include those by J.D.
effect a preliminary separation. Measures may need to Brown and Shannon (1963a,b), Seppa (1964),
be taken to prevent sedimentation in, and freezing of, the D'Alessandro and Cobb (1976a) and Anon. (1978 LPB
interceptors. 19, p.10). These systems are also considered by
It may be necessary to take measures to avoid flooding Mecklenburgh (1973, 1985). Stormwater systems are
on process and storage plots. There is need for care to discussed by Elton (1980), W.E. Gallagher (1980) and
avoid the flooding by effluents of vulnerable points such G.S. Mason and Arnold (1984).
as pump pits. Flooding of bunds can cause the tanks
inside to float. Effluents should not be permitted to run 10.17.1 Clean stormwater system
off plant areas onto adjacent sites, or vice versa. If the Clean stormwater is usually collected in an open sewer.
site slopes or contains a natural water course, additional The discharge may be to water courses or the sea, or to
precautions are needed. a holding pond. On large sites it is generally not
The traditional sewer is the gravity flow type. This practical to discharge it to the public system, due to
should have a gradient and be self-cleaning. Sewer boxes overload of the latter.
should be used as interconnections with a liquid seal to
prevent the transmission of gases and vapours and 10.17.2 Contaminated stormwater system
reduce the hazard of fire/explosion. Where noxious The contaminated stormwater system consists of the
vapours might collect, the sewer box lids should be contaminated stormwater sewers together with an
closed, sealed and vented to a safe place. A suitable impounding basin to hold the contaminated water prior
point is above grade 3 m, horizontally 4.5 m from to treatment and discharge. The design of the impound-
platforms and 12 m from furnaces walls. The routing of ing basin is discussed by Elton (1980) and W.E.
sewers should be parallel to the road system. They can Gallagher (1980) and that of the contaminated storm-
go under the road, but for preference should be water sewers themselves by G.S. Mason and Arnold
alongside it. (1984).
Sewers are considered in more detail in Section 10.17. First it is necessary to determine the catchment area,
The sewer system should be settled at an early stage. It or watershed, from which the stormwater will flow onto
is usually not practical to increase the capacity once the the plant site. The next step is to characterize the
plant is built. rainfall. A suitable starting point is a rainfall atlas such as
the Rainfall Frequency Atlas in the USA. The available
10.16.2 Gaseous effluents data may be used to make an estimate of the maximum
Gaseous effluents should be burned or discharged from 24 hour rainfall. For some locations information is
a tall stack so that the fumes are not obnoxious to the available from which the recurrence interval of particular
site or the public. The local Industrial Pollution Inspector levels of 24 hour rainfall may be determined. Recurrence
is able to advise on suitable stack heights and should be intervals for rainfall at Houston have been described by
consulted. It is also necessary to check whether a high Elton (1980) and W.E. Gallagaher (1980).
stack constitutes an aerial hazard and needs to be fitted In principle only a proportion of this rainfall becomes
with warning lights. runoff, this proportion being termed the `runoff coefficient'.
Elton quotes typical values of the runoff coefficient A gravity flow stormwater system allows nearly
of 1.0 for impervious, 0.7 for semi-pervious and 0.4 for immiscible liquids such as chlorinated hydrocarbons to
pervious surfaces, respectively. The first group includes accumulate and to contaminate water passing through
process pads, paved areas and impervious clays; the until they are gradually dissolved. It may also allow a
second group includes enclosed, sloping, quickly drained light, nearly immiscible flammable liquid to float on the
shell and gravel paving; and the third group includes top of the water and pass through unless liquid seals are
sand or gravel beds, flat open fields. installed to prevent this.
Correlations may be developed, as described by Elton, The alternative type of system is the fully flooded
for the cumulative volumetric flow per unit area as a system. The system is flooded by a dam at the entrance
function of the recurrence interval and the concentration to the collection sump. As water enters, the sewer
time. The latter is the time from the start of rainfall until becomes fully flooded. The catchbasins and manholes
the entire area under consideration is contributing. used in this case are of the dry-box type. A fully flooded
Relations are available for the concentration time. Elton system prevents the passage of flammable vapours and of
quotes: burning liquids. There is no accumulation of nearly
immiscible liquids and thus no contamination of the
Tc = 5 6 1075 D stormwater by such liquids.
[10.17.1]
A flooded stormwater system may not be justified if
where D is the distance between the point where the the liquids handled on the plant are not flammable. Such
rain falls and the location in question (ft) and Tc the time a system may be impractical in a location sufficiently
the water takes to reach the latter (days). He recom- dusty to cause clogging.
mends that for steeply sloped areas the constant be The selection of the materials of construction for a
reduced by a factor of at least 2. fully flooded system is important and is considered by
Contaminated stormwater is usually collected in an the authors. These need to withstand both corrosion and
impoundment basin and then treated before it is thermal shock. They also discuss the conversion of a
discharged. One of the principal problems in the design gravity flow system to fully flooded system and give cost
of the stormwater system is the sizing of this basin. As comparisons.
already indicated, not all the stormwater will necessarily
be contaminated. Investigations may be carried out to 10.17.3 Firewater disposal
determine the degree of contamination of stormwater There should be arrangements for the disposal of fire
from various parts of the site. These may show that it is water, but it is expensive to provide sewers for the very
sufficient to collect into the impounding basin only the large quantities of water involved, and different views
initial fraction of the runoff. If in a particular area have been expressed on the necessity for this (e.g.
contamination does not fall after the first few inches of Simpson, 1971; Mecklenburgh, 1976). A practical com-
runoff, this may be an indication that there is a promise is to design the sewers to take at any rate the
continuous leak. Mason and Arnold suggest that the initial `first aid' fire fighting water (R.B. Robertson,
amount of rainfall which will typically need treatment is 1974a).
the first 0.5 1 inches. There are also different estimates given of the
For a given recurrence interval, a curve may be quantities of fire water likely to be involved.
constructed for the cumulative runoff over a period of Mecklenburgh (1985) states that the allowance for fire
days. The impoundment basin may then be sized as a water is about five times the volume allowed for the
function of the capacity of the treatment plant. This stormwater. Presumably this refers to UK conditions. A
exercise may be repeated for other recurrence intervals. different ratio may well apply in other parts of the world.
This then gives the size of the basin required to prevent Consideration should be given to the fire water flow in
discharge of untreated stormwater for different recur- all sections of the sewer system. The main trunk sewer
rence intervals or, alternatively, the frequency of such usually receives water from a relatively large watershed,
discharge for a given basin size. The procedure is but branch sewers may well be prone to overloading
described by Elton and by Gallagher. from large fire water usage on particular parts of the site.
The design of the contaminated stormwater sewers is In view of the large quantities of fire water which can
described by Mason and Arnold. There are two main be generated, it may well not be practical to design the
systems, the gravity flow and the fully flooded systems. sewers for these flows, and other methods of disposal
In a gravity flow system there is a network of lines may be needed. These include measures to pump it
running to a collection sump. The lines are sized to run away or to run it off onto other land.
about three-quarters full at the design flow. The process
areas have curbs which direct the water to a catchbasin
with a sand trap and liquid seal. Liquid flows from the
10.18 Shock-Resistant Structures
catchbasins to the collection sump. Sand-trap-type man-
holes are provided for inspection, cleaning and main- It is sometimes necessary in the design of structures
tenance. such as plant and buildings to allow for the effect of
The water flows under gravity and a minimum slope is shocks from explosions and/or earthquakes. In both
required. The authors quote a slope of 0.60.8% for a 6 these cases there is a strong probabilistic element in the
inch line. Given the need for a minimum soil cover, this design in that it is not possible to define the precise load
may involve excavation to some depth, which can reach to which the plant structure may be subjected. The
2 m at the collection sump. This can cause problems, starting point is therefore the definition of the design
particularly if the water table is high. In some cases it is load in terms of the relation between the magnitude of
necessary to resort to lift pumps at intermediate points. the load and the frequency of occurrence.
The full design of shock-resistant structures is beyond For regions of high seismicity, such as the USA and
the scope of this book, but some limited comments are Japan, the importance of earthquake-resistant design is
made here. Further accounts of explosion-resistant clear. The earthquake hazard should not, however, be
structures are given in Chapter 17 and of earthquake- neglected in other regions. Although earthquakes are
resistant structures in Appendix 15. often associated with fault lines, they are not confined to
The simpler methods of shock-resistant design are such zones. Within a given region of relatively low
those which assume a static load. This approach builds overall seismicity, there will generally be zones of higher
on the expertise in civil engineering on the design of and lower seismicity, but quite severe earthquakes may
structures for wind loads. Accounts of such design are still occur even in the latter, albeit with lower frequency.
given in Wind Forces in Engineering (Sachs, 1978) and Earthquake-resistant design involves consideration of
Wind Engineering (Cerkmak, 1980). the whole system of soil and structure, and not simply
the latter. Bad ground can reduce markedly the
10.18.1 Explosion-resistant structures resistance to earthquakes. Some principal problems
The methods for the design of a structure to withstand related to soil are soilstructure interaction, soil amplifi-
explosion, or blast, shocks start from this point in that cation of the earthquake and soil liquefaction.
one of these methods is to design for the equivalent For structures such as buildings there are two
static pressure exerted by the blast wave. This is a principal approaches to earthquake-resistant design. The
rather simplified approach, however, and the alternative traditional approach is the use of a suitable building
method of dynamic analysis may be preferred. code. Perhaps the best known of these is the Uniform
The type of structure which has received most Building Code (UBC) of the International Conference of
attention in explosion-resistant design is a rectangular Building Officials (ICBO, 1991) in the USA. This code
building. Accounts of methods of analysing such a gives an equation for the total lateral shear at the base
structure have been given in Explosion Hazards and of, or base shear on, the structure. The equation contains
Evaluation (W.E. Baker et al., 1983), and by Forbes coefficients for the various influencing factors. It gives
(1982). Guidance on the design of a explosion-resistant the horizontal acceleration of the structure, and hence
control building has been given by the Chemical the force to which it is subjected.
Industries Association (CIA, 1979). This is described in The other, more fundamental, approach is to use some
Section 10.19. form of dynamic analysis. Design of an earthquake-
The analysis of tall structures such as distillation resistant structure by dynamic analysis starts with the
columns has not been as fully treated. Work in support definition of a design basis earthquake. This in turn
of a method for this type of structure has been described involves deciding on the severity, and hence recurrence
by A.F. Roberts and Pritchard (1982) and D.M. Brown interval, of the earthquake. The ground motion charac-
and Nolan (1985). teristics of the earthquake are then defined, utilizing
Accounts of explosion-resistant design frequently either profiles from real earthquakes of similar severity
assume that the blast profile to be considered is that or standard reference profiles.
from an explosion of a condensed phase explosive such as Earthquake-resistant design requirements relevant to
trinitrotoluene (TNT). In many process plant applications plant are most advanced in the nuclear industry. In the
the event of interest is a vapour cloud explosion, which USA the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires earth-
has a different blast profile. In the dynamic analysis of a quake-resistant design. It has issued standard earthquake
structure the blast profile is in effect the forcing function profiles for seismic design and it has had an extensive
exciting the dynamic system. The shape of this function, programme for the seismic qualification of plant.
therefore, influences the response of the structure. Design requirements for the UK nuclear industry have
An important question is the degree of explosion been given by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
resistance possessed by plant which is designed to (HSE, 1979d). It is required that there be determined
normal codes but which is not designed specifically for for each site two levels of ground motion, that for the
blast resistance. Experimentally, such plant has withstood operating basis earthquake (OBE) and that for the safe
an overpressure of some 0.3 bar (5 psi), except where shut-down earthquake (SSE). The OBE is the most
pipework lacked flexibility. The explosion resistance of severe earthquake which would be expected to occur
plant is considered further in Chapter 17. at least once in the life of the plant and the SSE the
most severe which might be expected to occur based on
10.18.2 Earthquake-resistant structures seismological data. The design is required to ensure that
As stated in Chapter 9, where the earthquake hazard is the plant is not impaired by the repeated occurrence of
briefly treated as one of the natural but rare events ground motions of the OBE level and that it can shut
which may threaten a plant, this phenomenon is not down safely in the face of those at the SSE level.
readily handled either at that point or in this section and The earthquake-resistant design of major hazard plants
is therefore relegated to Appendix 15. The account given in the UK has been investigated by Alderson (1982 SRD
here is confined to a limited treatment of earthquake- R 246). Essentially, he proposes that the approach
resistant structures. adopted should follow broadly that adopted in the UK
Accounts of earthquake-resistant design are given in nuclear industry. Some US codes for process plant
Fundamentals of Earthquake Engineering (Newmark and contain seismic design requirements. An example is
Rosenblueth, 1971) and Earthquake Resistant Design NFPA 59A: 1990 for liquefied natural gas.
(Dowrick, 1977, 1987) and by Alderson (1982 SRD As for explosions, so for earthquakes an important
R246). UK conditions are treated in Earthquake question is the degree of resistance possessed by plant
Engineering in Britain by the Institution of Civil which is designed to normal codes. Evidence from
Engineers (ICE, 1985) and by Alderson. earthquake incidents is that failures which do occur are
mainly due to overturning moments, causing yielding of a disaster. A third is to protect plant records, including
anchor bolts and buckling of storage tank shells and to those of the period immediately before an accident.
lack of flexibility in pipework, and that fracture of mains It is sometimes suggested that another aim should be
may occur. Failure of storage spheres at the Paloma to equalize the risks to those inside and outside. Since
Cycling Plant in the earthquake at Kern County, those outside tend to be less at risk in an explosion, this
California, in 1952 led to a major vapour cloud explosion means in effect reducing the risk to those inside. This
and fire (Case History A20). Generic studies of the objective is not self-evident, however. The philosophy of
seismic resistance of storage tanks and spheres have risk described earlier is that no one should be subjected
shown certain vulnerabilities in larger earthquakes. The to more than a specified risk, not that the risk should be
earthquake resistance of plant is considered further in equal for all. In any event, before designing a control
Appendix 15. room, it is necessary to be clear as to what the
objectives are.
10.19.3 ACMH recommendations

10.19 Control Buildings
Control building location and design is one of the topics
Until the mid-1970s there were few generally accepted raised by the Court of Inquiry on the Flixborough
principles, and many variations in practice, in the design disaster and considered in the First and Second Reports
of control buildings. Frequently the control buildings of the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH)
constructed were rather vulnerable, being in or close to (Harvey 1976, 1979b). The recommendations of the
the plant and built of brick with large picture windows. committee are that control rooms which may be subject
to explosion should not be built in brick with large
10.19.1 Flixborough picture windows, but in reinforced concrete with small,
The Flixborough disaster, in which 18 of the 28 deaths protected windows.
occurred in the control building, caused the Court of
Inquiry to call for a fundamental reassessment of practice 10.19.4 Control facilities
in this area. There is a tendency for control rooms to become part of
The control building at Flixborough has been a complex of facilities, as the buildings at Flixborough
described by V.C. Marshall (1976a). It was constructed illustrate. As a result, more people are exposed to hazard
with a reinforced concrete frame, brick panels and than is necessary and/or the buildings must be of more
considerable window area. It was 212 storeys high in its elaborate and expensive construction. Some of the
middle section, the 112 storeys over the control room additional rooms often associated with the control room
consisting of a half-storey cable duct and a full-storey include computer room, locker room, mess room, toilets,
electrical switchgear room. The control room was part of supervisors' offices, analytical laboratories, test rooms,
a complex of buildings some 160 m long, which also instrument workshops, electrical relay and switchgear
housed managers' offices, a model room, the control rooms.
laboratory, an amenities building and a production block. The proper policy is to build a secure control room in
This building complex was 100 m from the assumed which the functions performed are limited to those
epicentre of the explosion and was subjected to an essential for the control of the plant and to remove all
estimated overpressure of 0.7 bar. The complex lay with other functions to a distance where a less elaborate
its long axis at right angles to the direction of the blast. construction is permissible. The essential functions which
It was completely demolished by the blast and at the are required in the control room are those of process
control room the roof fell in. The occupants of control. There are other types of control which are
the control room were presumably killed mainly by the required for the operation of the plant, such as analytical
collapse of the roof, but some had been severely injured control and management control, but they need not be
by window glass or wired glass from the internal doors. exercised from the control room. Thus other facilities
It took mine rescue teams 19 days to complete the such as analytical laboratories, amenities rooms, etc.,
recovery of the bodies. should be located separately from the control room.
The main office block, which was a 3-storey building, The control room should not be used as a centre to
again constructed with a reinforced concrete frame, brick control emergencies. There should be a separate
panels and windows, was only 40 m from the assumed emergency control centre, as described in Chapter 24.
epicentre and was also totally demolished. The control room should also not be used as an
The implications of the Flixborough disaster for control emergency assembly point or refuge room.
building location and design have been discussed by
V.C. Marshall (1974, 1976a,c,d) and by Kletz (1975e). 10.19.5 Location
The ability of a control building to give protection against
10.19.2 Building function a hazard such as an explosion depends not only on its
The control building should protect its occupants against design but also on its location. The siting of a control
the hazards of fire, explosion and toxic release. Much building can therefore be as important as its construc-
the most common hazard is fire, and this should receive tion.
particular attention. There are several reasons for It is good practice to lay plant out in blocks with a
seeking to make control buildings safer. One is to standard separation distance. The control building should
reduce to a minimum level the risk to which operators be situated on the edge of the plant to allow an escape
and other personnel are exposed. Another is to allow route. Recommended minimum distances between the
control to be maintained in the early stages of an plant and the control building tend to lie in the range
incident and so reduce the probability of escalation into 2030 m. If hazard studies indicate, however, that the
standard separation distance may not be adequate, the 10.19.7 Bradford and Culbertson method
distance between the control building and the plant Bradford and Culbertson (1967), of Esso, in an early
should, of course, be increased. paper recommended that the control building be located
The control building should not be so near the plant 100 ft (30 m) from sources of hazard and that it should
that its occupants are at once put at risk by a serious be in reinforced concrete and should be designed for a 3
leak of flammable, toxic or corrosive materials. On the psi (0.2 bar) static overpressure. This was based on a
other hand, increasing the distance from the process 1 te TNT equivalent explosion which would give a peak
may make the operators less willing to get out on the overpressure of 15 psi (1 bar) at 30 m, combined with an
plant. Managers are generally opposed to control rooms analysis showing that a building designed for 3 psi static
which are too remote. This is important, because active pressure would resist a diffraction overpressure of 15 psi
patrolling by the operator is one of the main safeguards and a reflected overpressure of up to 45 psi with only
against plant failures. light to moderate structural damage.
A control building should not be sited in a hazardous
area as defined in BS 5345: 1977. Further guidance on 10.19.8 Langeveld method
location of the control building is given below. Langeveld (1976) has described the evolution of control
building design at Shell, which has been influenced not
only by the disaster at Flixborough, but also by the
earlier one at Pernis. The explosion at Pernis was
10.19.6 Basic principles estimated to have been equivalent to 20 ton of TNT.
Arising from the experience of Flixborough, V.C. He emphasizes that the explosion pressure which the
Marshall (1976a) has suggested certain principles for control building must withstand cannot be defined with
control building design which may be summarized as any precision in the current state of knowledge and that
follows: the important thing is to have a good and practical
design. In the design described the control building is a
(1) The control room should contain only the essential reinforced concrete structure capable of withstanding an
process control functions. equivalent static pressure of 10 ton/m2 (1 bar) on the
(2) There should be only one storey above ground. walls and 2.55.0 ton/m2 (0.250.5 bar) on the roof slabs.
(3) There should be only the roof above the operator's The purpose of quoting the static pressures is to give the
head. The roof should not carry machinery or cabling. engineer a basis on which to design a building of
(4) The building should have cellars built to withstand reasonable dimensions rather than to withstand any
earthshock and to exclude process leaks and should particular expected overpressure. The front elevation of
have ventilation from an uncontaminated intake. a typical Shell control centre is shown in Figure 10.5.
(5) The building should be oriented to present minimum There is perhaps rather less agreement on control
area to probable centres of explosion. room windows. One view is that there should be no
(6) There should be no structures which can fall on the windows at all. There were in fact a number of
building. windowless control rooms before Flixborough. But the
(7) Windows should be minimal or non-existent and glass more common view among plant managers is that it is
in internal doors should be avoided. highly desirable to see the plant from the control room.
(8) Construction should be strong enough to avoid spal- Langeveld states that this view has been supported by
ling of the concrete, but it is acceptable that, if neces- ergonomists.
sary, the building be written off after a major In the design described by Langeveld, the total
explosion. window area does not exceed 7% of the front wall and
the individual frame sizes are not larger than 0.25 m2
The control building should be constructed in ductile (e.g. 0.3 m 6 0.8 m). A special laminated glass is used
rather than brittle materials. Ductile materials include consisting of two layers of normal glass, each at least
steel and reinforced concrete. Brick and masonry are 3 mm thick and a polyvinyl butyral intermediate layer of
brittle materials. 1.9 mm. The glass pane is held in a strong flexible way
The standards of construction of control rooms subject in a window frame with rebates at least 30 mm high, and
to the hazard of an explosion, and particularly that of a a catch bar is installed inside the building in the centre
vapour cloud explosion, have been discussed by a of the window behind the glass pane to minimize the
number of workers, including W.J. Bradford and effects if the glass is blown inside.
Culbertson (1967), Kletz (1975e, 1980h), Langeveld
(1976), Balemans and van de Putte (1977), the CIA 10.19.9 Baalemans and van de Putte method
(1979), Forbes (1982), Beigler (1983) and Crossthwaite A guideline for control building design has been
and Crowther (1992). The various approaches proposed described by Balemans and van de Putte (1977) of the
are now described. Ministry of Social Affairs in the Netherlands. The
Figure 10.5 A typical Shell control centre (Langeveld, 1976) (Courtesy of the Institution of Chemical Engineers)
requirement is that the external walls of the building be These values may be varied for materials of high or
capable of withstanding an external static load of 0.3 bar low reactivities.
and the roof one of 0.2 bar. For Category I situations the control building should
be located as far as practical, but in any case not less
than 30 m, from the nearest source of hazard with a
10.19.10 CIA method release potential of 15 te, preferably at the edge of the
An Approach to the Categorisation of Process Plant Hazard plot and positioned to avoid funnel effects which could
and Control Building Design by the CIA (1979) (the CIA give rise to rapid flame acceleration. The number of
Control Building Guide) gives a method for the assess- personnel using it as their workbase should be kept to a
ment of the explosion hazard from, and for the minimum, consistent with operational requirements.
categorization of, a plant, and guidance on the location Heavy equipment should not be located on or over the
of the control building and on the design of the building main roof. The building should be designed to withstand
to resist blast and also to provide protection against toxic one explosion at or near ground level. This means that
release. the building should be in working condition after the
Protection of the control building is necessary for the explosion, although the structure may need to be rebuilt.
safety of the personnel, the maintenance of control of the It should have appropriate fire protection.
plant and the preservation of plant records. The Guide The Guide states that analysis of incidents indicates
starts from the premise that neither the modelling of that the approximate parameters of a typical vapour cloud
vapour cloud explosions nor the technique of hazard explosion are a peak overpressure of 0.7 bar and a
assessment are mature enough to utilize. It emphasizes duration of 20 ms, but that some theoretical studies point
that there is no justification for assuming that all plants to a peak overpressure of 0.2 bar and duration of 100 ms.
are subject to a vapour cloud explosion hazard. For partially confined explosions these parameters may
The approach suggested is to examine the plant and to be 1.0 bar and 30 ms, but the evidence is conflicting and
identify the points where a major leak may occur. Such a the mechanisms poorly understood.
leak is improbable from pressure vessels or large The design criteria for a control building in the Guide
diameter pipes; smaller pipes are more likely sources. are intended to give a building which will withstand peak
The Guide enumerates the design techniques which can overpressure and duration combinations of either 0.7 bar
be used to reduce the size of any leak, such as limitation and 20 ms or 0.2 bar and 100 ms. The design for these
of inventory, reduction of pressure and temperature, use conditions is conservative and the building should in fact
of high standards of design and construction for flanges, withstand an explosion where the combination is 1.0 bar
bellows and fittings and of appropriate materials of and 30 ms. This statement is qualified where the material
construction, and devices for leak detection and isolation. used is other than reinforced concrete, there are long
The Guide proposes that the duration of the leak be spans or elements with very short natural period.
taken as 5 minutes, based on the assumption that this is The outline guidance for the detailed design of the
the time required for detection, diagnosis, decision and control building is as follows. The building should
action. It recommends that measures be taken to ensure normally have a single storey. The materials used
that the leak does not last longer than this, including should be ductile, and brick, masonry or unreinforced
cessation of heat input, depressurization and isolation. concrete should not be used. The building should
Installation of means for remotely operated isolation conform to the normal building codes.
allows the release duration to be reduced to 3 minutes. For normal loadings the Guide states that the building
In some cases, exhaustion of the inventory may should conform to BS CP 3 Chapter V: Parts 1 and 2 for
determine the duration. dead and imposed loads and wind loads, respectively. It
The categorization is based on the likely sources of should be noted that, since the Guide was written, Part 1
emission, the mass of the release and the probability of a of this standard has been replaced by BS 6399: Part 1:
vapour cloud explosion. Three categories of plant are 1984. The loading combinations to be considered are (1)
defined. Category I plants are high hazard plants. dead + imposed + wind load and (2) dead + imposed +
Category II plants are other plants handling flam- blast load.
mables. Most medium-sided, moderate pressure plants The building should be designed for blast loadings 1
containing flammables fall in this category. Category III (0.7 bar, 20 ms) and 2 (0.2. bar and 100 ms) and
plants are those handling materials which cannot produce checked that it will withstand blast loading 3 (1.0 bar
a flammable vapour cloud. and 30 ms). The walls should be designed with allowance
Allocation to category is effected by dividing the plant for the reflected pressure and the roof for the incident
into sections, making a qualitative assessment of the pressure. Thus for blast load 1 the roof should be
hazard, estimating the mass of the flammable vapour in designed for 0.7 bar and the walls for 1.75 bar
the cloud from a potential release and then applying the overpressure, both with 20 ms duration, and for blast
following categorization: load 2 the corresponding figures are 0.2 bar, 0.3 bar and
100 ms. The suction phase may be ignored, provided
structural rebound is taken into account.
Mass of flammable The Guide describes a design method based on
vapour (te) dynamic analysis. It gives the following relation for the
dynamic resistance of a structural element:
Category I 415
Category II 215 R = P/
[10.19.1]
Category III 52
with
1
2 ÿ 12 2 ÿ 1t0 source of hazard and the building as shown in Figure
10:19:2 10.6. This figure is itself based on a correlation of peak
t0 2t0 0:77
overpressure as a function of distance and mass of
Xm =Xy 10:19:3 hydrocarbon released. The upper boundaries of zones B,
C, D and E correspond to peak overpressures of 0.35,
where P is the peak value of the applied blast load, R is 0.2, 0.1 and 0.03 bar, respectively.
the dynamic resistance, t0 is the duration of the blast Kletz recommends that no building should be nearer
load, Xm is the maximum allowable dynamic displace- the plant than 20 m, but also that a control building be
ment, Xy is the effective yield displacement, t is the no further than 35 m from the plant. His recommenda-
fundamental period of vibration, and d is a parameter. Xy tions for building strength relate to occupied buildings,
is based on the equivalent elasticplastic load deforma- which he equates to those occupied by at least one
tion relationship and is the effective displacement at person for 20 h/week or more.
which plastic deformation begins. The Guide gives the Within zone B a building should be designed for a
limits on the ratio d to be used for steel and reinforced peak incident overpressure of 0.7 bar and a duration of
concrete. It also gives guidance on the standards and 20 ms. This design allows for the building being within
strengths to be used for steel and reinforced concrete, the cloud, since the peak incident overpressure is
on foundations, on additional structural requirements and unlikely to exceed 0.7 bar even in the cloud. No other
on external doors and openings. hazardous plant should be located within this zone and
For Category II situations the design philosophy given there should be no site roads, though there may be plant
in the Guide is to follow normal building standards but to roads.
minimize sensitivity to blast and to arrange structural Within zone C a building should be designed for the
details so that large plastic deformations occur before peak incident overpressure which might occur at the
collapse. The building should generally be single storey. point where it is located. The overpressure range given
The materials used should be ductile. Guidance is given is between 0.70 and 0.20 bar. There should be no low
on structural, external and internal details. pressure storage tank in this zone unless it is specially
designed or the contents are harmless.
10.19.11 Kletz method Within zone D a building should be designed for the
Kletz (1975e, 1980g), of ICI, has given guidance on peak incident overpressure which might occur at the
control building design. The later guidance (Kletz, point where it is located, which means for overpressures
1980g) applies to buildings in general as well as control between 0.20 and 0.10 bar. There should be no public
buildings and is based on the distance between the roads in this zone.
Figure 10.6 Guidelines for location of buildings where a vapour cloud explosion hazard exists (Kletz, 1980h). The
clause numbering refers to the appendix of the original paper. (Courtesy of the American Institute of Chemical
Engineers)
Housing should be excluded from zone E. which the authors obtain by assuming a constant
duration of 50100 ms. Three levels of construction are
10.19.12 Forbes method considered. A conventional brick building is unlikely to
Forbes (1982) describes an approach to the design of a withstand a peak overpressure in excess of 0.15 bar. A
blast resistant control building based on dynamic fully blast resistant building to the CIA Category I
analysis. He takes as his design explosion one equiva- standard should withstand 0.7 bar. Between these levels
lent to 1 ton of TNT exploding at a distance of 100 ft of overpressure they suggest a building strengthened to
(30 m) and designs for slight to moderate damage. He resist between 0.3 and 0.5 bar, which is somewhat
gives a table showing the degree of damage to be stronger than the CIA Category II building.
expected both with the blast-resistant design and with The method involves making certain assumptions,
conventional design as a function of mass of TNT and which are not described, about the relation between
distance from the explosion. building strength and probability of fatality. The location
The design peak pressures on the building are then and construction of the control building are based on
taken as 10 psi (0.7 bar) on the roof and 25 psi (1.7 bar) criteria for risk of fatality to employees, both individual
on the walls, both with a duration of 20 ms. The author risk and risk to groups. The risk criteria which the
also tabulates values for other structural elements. The authors suggest are a limit of 1074/year for individual
dynamic design approach described by Forbes is broadly risk and of 1075/year for the risk of 10 deaths.
similar to that given in the CIA Guide. The authors give an illustrative example in which for a
given location the individual risks are tabulated for
10.19.13 Beigler method control buildings of different strengths.
Beigler (1983) has described a method developed in
Sweden for the location and construction of buildings
based on the energy conversion in the explosion, as 10.19.15 Detail design
shown in Table 10.12. Only essential buildings should be Several of the methods just described cover also the
located in Zone B; this is likely to include the control detailed design of features of the control building such
building. In Zone A buildings are to be designed to the as the foundation, the additional structural requirements,
normal building code, but with additional static load the external doors and openings and the internal parts.
strength. In Zone Z conventional design applies. Some other aspects of control room construction have
For a control building the requirement is that it be been described by Mecklenburgh (1973, 1976). Windows
designed to withstand a static load of 0.8 bar or an and doors should be positioned so as to minimize the
impulse load of 20 mbar-s, and also that it meet a probability of debris from them striking people. The
pressure impulse curve criterion as described by the incidence of direct sunlight on the instrumentation
author. should be avoided if possible, as this can make it
difficult to read the instruments; in this connection it is
10.19.14 Crossthwaite and Crowther method an advantage if the windows face north.
Crossthwaite and Crowther (1992) argue that with the A control room should have forced ventilation with an
improved understanding of material reactivity and of the air intake from a clean area. There should also be
effects of confinement of the cloud and with the vapour emergency air supplies to deal with situations such as
cloud explosion models now available, an approach to entry of foul gases through broken windows.
control building design based simply on the mass There are different views on the provision of rooms
released has become questionable, and propose instead underground in the control centre. An underground
one based on hazard assessment. They describe an room offers protection against explosion, but has some
essentially conventional hazard assessment method with serious drawbacks. Process leaks of liquid or heavy
identification of release sources and estimation of the vapour may get in. It discourages an active patrolling
frequency and consequences of releases. For the latter, policy and it is less pleasant to work in.
the relevant part of the vapour cloud is taken as that part The switch room is often located under the control
which is confined within plant structures. The procedure room to save cabling, but if there is a danger of heavy
yields a set of site plans with frequency contours for vapours collecting in it, it may be preferable to put the
different levels of peak overpressure. room at ground level. The integrity of cables is
The construction of the control building is governed in important. These should survive about the same level
a vapour cloud explosion by the impulse of the blast, of accident as the control room itself.
Table 10.12 Zone distances for building location and construction (after Beigler, 1983)
Distance
Energy conversion
in explosion Zone B Zone C Zone Z
(GJ) (m) (m) (m)
2 15 125 325
5 20 150 400
10 30 200 500
20 40 250 650
50 60 300 800
100 90 400 1000
10.19.16 Control room layout 10.20.3 Ventilation systems

The instruments in the control panel are normally laid Ventilation may be provided either by natural or
out in groups by process units and areas. Other grouping mechanical means. In deciding between the two means,
criteria include instruments for related variables and the main factors to be considered are the quantity and
instruments used in sequential operations. Control panel the quality of the air and the control of the air flow.
displays are discussed in more detail in Chapter 14. Natural ventilation can, in theory, supply any required
It is recommended (Mecklenburgh, 1973) that the quantity of air, but there are practical limitations. It can
section of the panel carrying recorders and controllers supply air of good quality provided it can draw from a
should be no lower than 1.2 m and no higher than 2.1 m source of clean air, but if the air has to be filtered it is
with the space up to 2.4 m reserved for indicators, alarms necessary to resort to mechanical ventilation. Natural
and similar instruments, and that there be a space of 1 m ventilation systems give air flow rates which vary with
behind the panel and 3 m in front of it. the weather conditions and can be designed only on a
probabilistic basis. Thus where large quantities of air are
required, where it is necessary to filter the inlet air and/
10.20 Ventilation
or where control of the air flow is needed, it is necessary
Where process plant is located inside a building, to use mechanical ventilation.
ventilation is required to provide a suitable atmosphere Natural ventilation has the limitations that: neither the
for personnel. The plant may generate heat which has to air flow for ventilation nor the conditions within the
be removed. Any leaks of flammable or toxic materials space ventilated can be controlled at all closely; that
need to be diluted. users may close off air inlets; and that in some cases
Ventilation is the subject of BS 5925:1990 Design of building layout inhibits good ventilation.
Buildings: Ventilation Principles and Designing for Natural BS 5925: 1990 lists various situations where mechan-
Ventilation. The previous version, BS 5925: 1980, is that ical ventilation is an absolute necessity and others where
referred to in much of the ventilation literature; the it is desirable. Included in the former are factories where
differences are not great. it is essential to remove dust, toxic or other noxious
The problem of leaks of gases which are lighter or contaminants near their source and in the latter factories
heavier than air is considered by Leach and Bloomfield where it is necessary to remove hot air, moisture and
(1973) and M.R. Marshall (1983). contaminants generally.
The main driving forces for natural ventilation are the
10.20.1 Legal requirements pressure differences caused by wind against the side of
Legal requirements for ventilation include those of the the building and the temperature difference between the
Building Regulations, the Factories Act 1961 and the ambient air and the air in the building. Use may also be
Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963. made of the pressure difference of a column of gas in a
chimney.
10.20.2 Ventilation functions Locations of the air inlets and outlets are illustrated in
The main function of ventilation is foremost to maintain a BS 5925: 1990 for the two types of ventilation and are as
suitable atmosphere for personnel. This has a number of follows. For natural ventilation by wind or temperature
aspects, including control of the ambient air in respect of difference, the air inlet is set low in a wall on one side of
(1) respiration, (2) humidity, (3) thermal comfort and (4) the ventilated space and the outlet high in an opposite
contaminants. wall, but for temperature difference there is also shown a
For respiration it is necessary to maintain a minimum combined inlet/outlet system in one wall with the inlet
oxygen content in the expired air and a maximum just below the outlet. For mechanical ventilation the air
carbon dioxide content in the room. The threshold inlet is low in one wall and the outlet high in the
limit value for the latter is 0.5% and this is the governing opposite one, but there is also a combined inlet/outlet
factor, since the air flows required to maintain this system shown set in the roof.
concentration greatly exceed those needed for the
oxygen criterion, which is an oxygen concentration of
16.3% in the expired air. The air flows required for an 10.20.4 Ventilation rates
adult male to maintain the carbon dioxide concentration Ventilation rates may be expressed in several ways. They
are 0.8 l/s when seated quietly and 2.63.9 l/s when include volumetric flow per person, volumetric flow per
performing moderate work; the corresponding air flows unit floor area and number of air changes per unit time.
to maintain the oxygen concentration are 0.1 l/s and 0.3 BS 5925: 1990 gives recommended ventilation rates for
0.35 l/s. various occupancies. For factories the recommended rate
Low relative humidity can cause respiratory discomfort, is 0.8 l/s per m2 of floor area. Where the ventilation rate
and high relative humidity can cause condensation and is set by the need to remove a contaminant, the number
mould growth. of air changes per unit time is an appropriate measure.
There are various types of contaminant, such as The control of contaminants is considered below
odours, which may be present and which need to be In setting the ventilation rate the effect of air move-
removed by ventilation. There may also be smoke ment on comfort should be considered. Criteria are given
resulting from smoking where this is permitted. There in BS 5925: 1990. An air velocity of 0.1 m/s is about the
may be fugitive emissions from the plant of flammable or lower limit of perceptibility and one of 0.3 m/s about the
toxic chemicals. In accident conditions, there may be a upper limit of acceptability, except perhaps in summer.
leak of a flammable or toxic material or smoke from a Allowance for air movement may be made be increasing
fire. Where there are fuel burning appliances, ventilation the temperature in the ventilated space using the
is required to supply air for these. correlation given in the standard.
10.20.5 Natural ventilation wind speed and direction relative to the building and the
Natural ventilation is based mainly on wind or tempera- presence of other structures which affect the flow. The
ture difference. The openings through which the air flow pressure p at a particular point is:
takes place are classified in BS 5925: 1990 as (1) cracks
or small openings with a typical dimension less than p p0 Cp 0:5u2r 10:20:2
10 mm and (2) larger openings. For the latter the air flow
is given by: and the mean pressure
1 0:5u2
p p0 C 10:20:3
Q Cd A2p= 2 10:20:1 p r
where A is the area of opening, Cd is the coefficient of where Cp is the surface pressure coefficient, p is the
discharge, Q is the volumetric air flow, Dp is the pressure at a particular point (Pa), p0 is the static
pressure difference and r is the density of air. The pressure in the free wind (Pa), ur is the reference
value of Cd conventionally used is 0.61, which is that for wind speed (m/s), r is the density of the air (kg/m3)
a sharp-edged orifice at high Reynolds numbers. and the overbar indicates the mean value. The reference
BS 5925: 1990 gives a method for determining the wind speed is conventionally taken as the speed of the
wind pressure on the surface of the building. This undisturbed wind at a height equal to that of the
pressure is a function of the shape of the building, the building.
Figure 10.7 Some modes of natural ventilation of a simple building (BS 5925: 1990): (a) ventilated space in a
building; (b) wind only; (c) temperature difference only; and (d) wind and temperature difference only (Courtesy of the
British Standards Institution)
Values of the surface pressure coefficient Cp are given The relations for ventilation are:
in BS 5925: 1990, Table 13, based on those in BS CP3 1
Chapter V, Part 2: 1972. BS 5925: 1990 gives illustrative Qw Cd Aw ur Cp 2 wind only 10:20:7
values of the pressure difference (p 7 p0) for values of Cp 12
in the range 0.11.0. 2gH1
For the wind speed at a particular height the relation Qb Cd Ab temperature difference only

given is:
10:20:8
u wind and temperature difference

Kz a 10:20:4 Q Qb < 0:26
um combined
10:20:9
where u is the wind speed at height z, um is the mean Q Qw > 0:26
wind speed at 10 m height in open terrain, K is a
with
constant, and a is an index. The values given for the two 1
latter are: ur =2
1 1 10:20:10
Ab =Aw 2 H1 =Cp 2
where DCp is the differential pressure coefficient, Q is
K a the volumetric air flow (m3/s), y is the absolute
temperature (K), is the mean absolute temperature of
Open flat country 0.68 0.17 the inside and outside air, Dy is the temperature
Country with scattered wind breaks 0.52 0.20 difference between the inside and outside air (K), is
Urban 0.35 0.25 a discrimination parameter, and subscripts b and w refer
City 0.21 0.33 to temperature difference and wind, respectively.
BS 5925: 1990 also treats the case where the air
openings exist in one wall only.
The wind speed u50 which is exceeded 50% of the time 10.20.6 Contaminant control
at the site in question is obtained from a wind speed Models for the concentration of a contaminant in a
map of the country. This wind speed u50 is used as the ventilated space are given in BS 5925: 1990 and by
value of um in Equation 10.20.4 to calculate u at the Leach and Bloomfield (1973). The model described in
height of the building, this latter speed then being the former is for the situation where there is an air flow
termed the reference wind speed ur . into and out of the space and a leak of contaminant into
The method given in BS 5925: 1990 for the tempera- it. The unsteady-state mass balance is:
ture difference is to use for the air temperature the mean
monthly values, and the mean monthly diurnal tempera- dc
V Qce q ÿ Qc 10:20:11
ture variation values, given by meteorological stations. dt
The standard gives in Appendix E a map of the air where c is the concentration of contaminant in the
temperature for the British Isles. ventilated space (v/v), ce is the concentration of
The general approach to the design of a natural contaminant in the inlet air, (v/v), q is the volumetric
ventilation system given in BS 5925: 1990 may be flow of the leak (m3/s), Q is the volumetric flow of
illustrated by reference to Figure 10.7. Figure 10.7(a) ventilation air (m3/s), t is time (s) and V is the volume
shows a simple space with two air inlets set low and two of ventilated space (m3). Integrating Equation 10.20.11
outlets set high in opposite walls. Figures 10.7(b)10.7(d) yields:
show the air flows occurring, respectively, with natural
Qc q Qq
ventilation in Case 1 by wind only, Case 2 by c e 1 ÿ exp ÿ t 10:20:12
temperature difference only and Case 3 by wind and Qq V
temperature difference in combination. If the inlet air is pure:
The equivalent areas for the wind and buoyancy
mechanisms are: q Qq
c 1 ÿ exp ÿ t 10:20:13
Qq V
1 1 1 At steady state
10:20:5
A2w A1 A2 2 A3 A4 2 Qce q
cE 10:20:14
Qq
or for pure inlet air
1 1 1 q
10:20:6 cE 10:20:15a
A2b A1 A3 2 A2 A4 2 Qq
q
where Ab is the equivalent area for ventilation by cE q << Q 10:20:15b
temperature difference only (m2), Aw is the equivalent Q
area for ventilation by wind only (m2) and areas A1A4 where cE is the steady-state concentration of contaminant
(m2) are as shown in Figure 10.7. in the ventilated space (v/v).
The ventilation air requirement assuming pure air is conditions c = 0; y = y0 , where y0 is the vertical distance
then from Equation 10.20.15a from the ceiling of the interface between the two layers
(m), Equation 10.20.22 integrates to give
1 ÿ cE
Qq 10:20:16 c h q i
cE 1 ÿ exp ÿ y ÿ y 10:20:23
c0 AD 0
If there is no leak, but an initial concentration of
contaminant The authors describe experiments which were actually
done inverted, using a dense gas, nitrous oxide,
Q
c c0 exp ÿ t 10:20:17 introduced through the floor, with the air inlet in the
V roof and the outlet close to the floor. At low air flows the
where c0 is the initial concentration of contaminant (v/v). concentration profile was close to the theoretical one, but
Leach and Bloomfield treat this case and also two at higher flows the concentrations in the `gas' layer fell
others. One is the case where there is a leak flow into and some contaminant appeared in the àir' layer.
the space and a corresponding flow out of it, but no Leach and Bloomfield also present a theoretical
ventilation air flow. The unsteady-state mass balance is: investigation of the concentrations associated with a
leak of buoyant gas from a source low down in the
dc room. They use the buoyant plume model of B.R.
V q ÿ qc 10:20:18
dt Morton, Taylor and Turner (1956). They point out that
which on integration gives the pure plume would exist only for a short time and
q that the situation soon becomes more complex, with the
c 1 ÿ exp ÿ t 10:20:19 plume then entraining not pure air, but a mixture of air
V
and gas. This will lead to an increase in the concentra-
At steady state cE = 1. tion of the buoyant gas in the plume and hence in its
The other case is where there is a leak into a sealed concentration below the ceiling and throughout the
space. The unsteady-state mass balance is: room. This situation has been studied by Baines and
dc Turner (1969), but the treatment is complex.
V q 10:20:20 Further work on this problem has been described by
dt
M.R. Marshall (1983), who performed a series of
which integrates to give experiments in a 20 m3 cubical space and also in an
q 8 m3 rectangular space and in buildings, with and without
c t 10:20:21
V ventilation. In the unventilated situation the dominant
factor is the density of the gas released. With the leak
source of buoyant gas part way up one wall, a gas-rich
10.20.7 Buoyant or dense gas mixture is formed in the volume above the source and
The model just described is based on the assumption of this volume is well mixed. If the leak source is near the
perfect mixing. This assumption is not valid for the case ceiling, a shallow layer of high concentration is formed,
where the leak is that of a gas which is buoyant or whilst if the source is near the floor a deep layer of
dense. lower concentration is formed. In both cases the
The buoyant gas case has been treated by Leach and concentration increases with time. This behaviour is
Bloomfield (1973). The situation which they consider is a shown for natural gas, a buoyant gas, in Figure 10.8.
leak of such gas into a room with the leak point in the Figures 10.8(a) and (b) show instantaneous concentration
ceiling and with ventilation air coming in through a low profiles with the leak source near the ceiling and near
inlet and leaving through a high outlet in the opposite the floor, respectively, and Figure 10.8(c) shows the
wall. Under these conditions the authors postulate the development of the concentration profile with time for a
formation of a stratified layer of buoyant gas between the leak source that is relatively high up. Likewise, with a
ceiling and the air outlet. leak of dense gas, a well mixed gas-rich mixture is
They argue that mixing between two such layers can formed in the volume below the source.
be almost totally suppressed, even though there is Where there is ventilation, on the other hand, this may
turbulent mixing in both the gas and air layers. The well be the dominant effect. In this case, however, the
mixing is governed by the Richardson number which is situation is more complex, because there are various
the ratio of work done against gravity to work done by combinations of ventilation pattern and leak source
turbulent stresses. If the Richardson number is large, location. In this case the results are presented in terms
only a small fraction of the energy is available for of the steady-state concentration profiles. Marshall gives
turbulent mixing. results for work with a buoyant gas, natural gas, with
The authors give the following model for diffusion at upward, downward and cross-flow ventilation patterns.
steady state over the cross-sectional area of the room: For upward ventilation flow the momentum and buoy-
ancy forces reinforce each other. Figure 10.9 shows the
dc
qc0 qc DA ÿ 10:20:22 steady-state concentration profiles for upward ventilation
dy
flow with a leak source of buoyant gas located at three
where A is the cross-sectional area of the room (m2), c is different heights. The profiles are similar in shape to the
the concentration of contaminant in the gas layer (v/v), transient profiles for the unventilated case. A gas-rich
c0 is the concentration of contaminant in the leak gas (v/ mixture is formed in the volume above the source and
v), D is the molecular diffusion coefficient (m2/s), q is this volume is well mixed. At steady state the concentra-
the volumetric flow of leak gas (m3/s) and y is the tion in this volume is close to that calculated from
vertical distance from the ceiling (m). With the boundary Equation 10.20.15b.
Figure 10.8 Effect of gas density on mixing in an unventilated space (M.R. Marshall, 1983): (a) instantaneous
concentration profile for leak of a buoyant gas located in a side wall near the ceiling; (b) instantaneous concentration
profile for leak of a buoyant gas located in a side wall near the floor; (c) development of the concentration profile for
leak of a buoyant gas located in the upper part of a side wall (Courtesy of the Institution of Chemical Engineers)
For a buoyant gas with downward ventilation flow, the With the appropriate inversion, these results are applic-
momentum and buoyancy forces are opposed. The able also to a dense gas.
overall effect is to increase mixing, which results in the The practical implication of this work is that for the
formation of a high concentration in the volume above usual case of upward flow ventilation there is at steady
the leak source and a lower concentration in the volume state a volume within which there is a well mixed gas/
below it. At steady state the concentration in the volume air mixture, that for a buoyant gas this volume is the
below the source is close to that calculated from volume above the leak source and that for a dense gas it
Equation 10.20.15b, whilst that in the volume above it is the whole volume of the ventilated space.
is slightly higher. For a buoyant gas with cross-flow
ventilation with two pairs of inlets and outlets, one pair at 10.20.8 Fire ventilation
low level and one at high level, the low level pair were Ventilation may also be required to remove smoke
found to have little effect, and the concentration profiles generated in fire conditions. This aspect is considered
were broadly similar to those for the unventilated case. in Chapter 16.
Figure 10.9 Effect of gas density on mixing in a space with natural ventilation (M.R. Marshall, 1983): steady-state
concentration profiles for leaks of a buoyant gas located at different heights in a side wall (Courtesy of the Institution
of Chemical Engineers)
10.21 Toxics Protection which protection is required. Generally, it will be

necessary to shut off the normal ventilation and the
Another hazard against which protection may be required
control building will then lose any overpressure and may
is that posed by a release of toxic gas. In general,
become contaminated. Self-contained breathing apparatus
ordinary buildings off site and even on site can afford an
should be provided for each occupant.
appreciable degree of protection against a transient toxic
In some cases it may be possible to supply air from a
gas release, but for certain functions enhanced protection
source sufficiently far from the control building that the
is required. It is also necessary to ensure that the
air from it is clean. The air supply should maintain
protection potentially available is not defeated. Buildings
within the building a positive pressure of 0.51.0 in.
of particular interest here are (1) the control building,
water gauge, which requires 2 to 15 air changes per
(2) the emergency control centre and (3) any temporary
hour, depending on building size, construction and gas-
refuges.
tightness.
There are various ways in which toxic gas may enter
10.21.1 Control room such a building. One is via service trenches and cellars.
The design of a control room for protection against toxic These should be avoided, but if used should incorporate
release is discussed in the CIA Control Building Guide sealed barriers and should be subject to a permit-to-work
(CIA, 1979). The design should start by identifying the system. Another mode of entry is via instrument air lines
release scenarios against which protection is required and appropriate precautions should be taken. Instrument
and by making some quantitative assessment of the sample lines should not bring toxic process fluids into
dispersion of the gas. If persons outside exposed to the the control building.
gas release would be incapacitated or unable to escape, Where available, gas detectors should be used to give
protection is needed. The time for which protection is warning of a toxic gas escape by activating an alarm in
needed should also be defined. This will normally be the control room, where there should be means of
governed by the time required to shut the plant down or activating the toxic gas alarm. There should be in the
the time needed to control the emergency. control room an indication of wind direction.
The control building should be located at the edge of It may be possible to provide protection to the control
the plant, and its siting should take into account both building using a water spray system. The gas detector
fire/explosion and toxic gas hazards. There should be at signal may be used to activate such a water spray and to
least two escape routes, which should be chosen bearing shut off the normal ventilation air.
in mind that they may need to be used by partially The control building should have a priority commu-
incapacitated people and by rescue teams wearing heavy nication link, other than the normal telephone system, to
breathing apparatus. They should be free from obstruc- the emergency control centre.
tions and well lit. Appropriate breathing apparatus or respirators should
The construction of the building should be gas-tight. be provided in the control building to assist the escape
This means, among other things, that windows should be of any persons who have to be evacuated in the
non-opening and that door and window frames should be emergency.
designed and maintained to minimize entry of gas. There
should be no more than two doors, each with an air lock 10.21.2 Emergency control centre
and each gas-tight. The wedging open of these doors Protection of the emergency control centre from a toxic
should not be tolerated. release will normally be in large part by location. It is
The occupants of the control building should be necessary for the emergency controllers to gain access to
provided with a supply of air sufficient for the time for the centre at the start of the emergency and it is
undesirable that they should have to pass through a location of plant inside buildings, and use of insulation,
toxic gas cloud. Nevertheless, it may need to be heat tracing and internal heating coils. Steam tracing is
designed to afford protection against toxic gas, in widely used and has become fairly standardized, but
which case the points just made in relation to the both steam consumption and labour requirements are
control building are pertinent. relatively high, and the rising costs of both mean that
other methods merit consideration.
10.21.3 Refuges Design measures include: the use of bypass lines
A temporary refuge, or haven, has the quite different around equipment to maintain circulation when the
function of providing temporary shelter for personnel. equipment is closed off for maintenance; recirculation
The design of such havens is described in the Vapor lines to maintain flow through non-operating pumps;
Release Mitigation Guidelines (CCPS, 1988/3). The location of block valves to eliminate dead legs and
Guidelines distinguish between temporary and permanent permit lines to be self-draining; use of common insula-
havens, or more effective temporary havens. Virtually any tion around two lines, steam and condensate being a
weather-tight building should suffice as a temporary common pair; use of steam traps to remove condensate;
haven. Personnel in such a haven should be notified to and exploitation of thermosyphon circulation.
leave the building when the toxic gas cloud has passed. The use of heated buildings is generally confined to
There should be arrangements for them to be rescued, if certain specific applications such as the use of centrifuge
necessary, by well-equipped teams. It would also seem rooms and analyser rooms. It is normal to bury fire
necessary that there be means whereby the emergency water lines, but not process lines, because of the hazards
controllers know the location of personnel needing of corrosion and of leakage. Where local conditions are
rescue. suitable, insulation is an economical way of preventing
For permanent havens the CCPS Guidelines refer to freezing. Tables of times to freezing in a stagnant line
the arrangements for control buildings as described in have been given by House (1967). For some plant an
the CIA Control Building Guide. They also give a method internal heating coil may be used, but this creates the
of estimating the capacity of a haven. The conditions in risk of a leak from the coil which may not be readily
the haven should not exceed the following limits: detected. Finally, some method of heat tracing may be
minimum oxygen concentration 18%; maximum carbon used to give protection. Methods include steam tracing,
dioxide concentration 3%; maximum temperature 338C; circulating medium tracing and electrical tracing.
and maximum 100% relative humidity (RH). The winterization protection should be designed as a
Relations are given for all four of the features and it is system in its own right. The weather conditions against
shown that humidity is the limiting factor. Thus, starting which protection is to be provided should be defined and
with an initial temperature of 208C and 50% RH a review conducted of the protection requirements. For
(8.7 mm Hg) and rising to a temperature of 338C and each part of the system a method of heat tracing should
100% RH (37.7 mm Hg), and allowing for a production of be selected and the tracing requirements defined,
water vapour of 2.3 l/min person, the minimum volume including heat inputs and maximum allowable tempera-
of space required per person is calculated as: tures. The alternatives to heat tracing should be
0:011V 2:3t 0:049V 10:21:1a considered.
The design weather conditions should be combinations
or of minimum temperature and wind velocity. The con-
V =t 60:8 10:21:1b sequences of a freeze-up may be sufficiently severe that
it is appropriate to design using a formal recurrence
where t is the shelter period (min) and V is the volume interval approach.
of space required per person (l). This factor has the There are several factors which may determine the
highest value of V/t of the four factors considered, and maximum temperature limit for the tracing. One is the
is therefore the limiting one. maximum tracing temperature which the process fluid
The volume of the human body is 2.65 ft3 and can withstand. Another is the maximum process fluid
converting from 60.8 l to 2.1 ft3 gives, for the required temperature which the tracing can tolerate, allowing for
capacity of the haven: operations such as hot water flushing or steaming out on
Vtot 2:1t 2:65N 10:21:2 the process side.
Flow diagrams should be produced for the heat tracing
where N is the number of people to be sheltered and system which show the lines requiring heat make-up in
Vtot is the total volume of the haven (ft3). The normal operation, those needing freeze protection during
corresponding floor area may be obtained assuming a shut-down and those normally stagnant. The diagrams
ceiling height of 8 ft. should also show where alternatives to heat tracing are
to be used, such as self-draining lines, minimum flow
bypasses and recirculation arrangements.
10.22 Winterization
The first choice of tracing is usually steam tracing.
It is convenient to deal here with the protection of plant The minimum practical steam pressure is 25 psig. Steam
against severe winter conditions, or winterization. The tracing has been successfully used at temperatures down
winterization of process plants has been described by to 7358C, though in this case the recommended
J.C. Davis (1979) and Fisch (1984), and the shut-down minimum steam pressure is 50 psig. Steam tracing
winterization of an ammonia plant has been described by systems are reliable in providing protection, but their
Facer and Rich (1984). installation requires skill and their maintenance require-
There are five basic techniques for winterization: ments are high. Although, in theory, steam tracing can
design and operating methods which avoid freezing, be turned on and off with the weather, this is not always
practical and it may be possible to do no more than shut Accounts of modular plants have been given by Glaser,
it off between spring and autumn. Kramer and Causey (1979), Zambon and Hull (1982),
Circulating medium tracing systems utilize hot oil or Glaser and Kramer (1983), Hulme and La Trobe-Bateman
antifreeze and are used mainly where steam tracing is (1983), Kliewer (1983), Clement (1989), Hesler (1990)
not practical. They are more expensive and are vulner- and Shelley (1990), and accounts of barge-mounted
able to failure of the circulating pump. plants have been given by Birkeland et al. (1979),
Electrical tracing comes in the form of tapes, cable, Charpentier (1979), J.L. Howard and Andersen (1979),
blankets and custom-built shapes. It can be used over a R.G. Jackson (1979), Jansson et al. (1979), Shimpo
wide range of temperatures, from below those at which (1979), Ricci (1981), Bolt and Arzymanow (1982), de
steam is suitable to above those at which hot oil can be Vilder (1982) and Glaser and Kramer (1983). Both types
utilized. Its main advantage is that it can be thermo- of plant are treated by Mecklenburgh (1985).
statically controlled, either by ambient thermostats or
thermostats in contact with pipe surfaces. An electrical
tracing system should be provided with alarms to signal 10.23.1 Skid-mounted plants
failure. The early skid-mounted plants were typically natural gas
An electrical tracing system may be based on series processing plants and pipeline compressor stations
resistance or parallel resistance cable. The latter is rather mounted on skids. The plants had a quite small number
more flexible in the range of heat inputs which it can of modules of limited dimensions. They were transported
provide and is useful particularly for protecting valves by truck from the fabrication works to the operating site.
and instruments. Both types are subject to burnout. A The plants were simple and were equipped to shut down
third type is temperature-self-limiting tape, which can be if an operating problem arose. The plant operator
provided with a range of cut-off temperatures and is typically lived in a house close by. These plants were
virtually immune to burnout. designed for a relatively short life and had low capital
Tracing systems can be used in areas subject to and running costs. A description of such skid-mounted
hazardous area classification. Electrical tracing systems plants is given by Kliewer (1983).
are available for such areas. But for all types of system
consideration should be given to the surface temperature.
There have been cases where heat tracing has caused 10.23.2 Modular plants
the allowable hot surface temperature to be exceeded. The late 1970s saw a significant extension of the scale
Hazards may also arise when electrical tracing is and complexity of modular plants. Such plants were seen
disconnected for maintenance. as offering benefits where site construction was un-
There are also various other devices available. These usually difficult, particularly on remote sites. Factors
include preformed and preinsulated accessories such as favouring modular plants include problems associated
instrument enclosures and pretraced tubing as well as with (1) access difficulties, (2) severe weather and (3)
preapplied heat transfer cement placed over tracer the labour force.
tubing. Further details of winterization system design Advantages of modular construction are those asso-
are given by House and by Fisch. ciated with (1) access for equipment suppliers, (2) work
The winterization measures taken at an Alaskan in sheltered conditions and (3) availability of a skilled
refinery have been described by J.C. Davis (1979). He workforce. Arising from these are (4) easier construction
highlights in particular the avoidance of water in process and testing, (5) improved quality assurance and (6)
streams and the reduction of steam lines to an absolute shorter project time-scale. Construction of the plant at a
minimum. The water vapour generated is dispatched dedicated fabrication site minimizes access difficulties for
quickly to a tall stack. Use is made of air cooling. Heat equipment suppliers, and allows the work to be done
tracing is by hot oil. under cover and by a skilled workforce. Main items of
Facer and Rich (1984) describe the shut-down winter- equipment, pipework, supports, instrumentation and
ization of an ammonia plant. Their account deals with: cabling can be installed and tested under essentially
the aims of the winterization; the measures taken to factory conditions. The project timetable can be shorter,
protect catalyst, furnaces and burners, and rotating both because work on foundations and on plant
equipment such as gas turbines, compressor and construction can proceed in parallel and because
pumps; the steam and cooling water systems; and the construction can be done in more favourable conditions.
restart. Disadvantages of modular construction include those
associated with (1) engineering design, (2) modifications,
(3) steelwork and (4) transport. Modular construction
necessitates high quality and more expensive engineer-
ing design. It is relatively unforgiving of modifications,
10.23 Modular Plants
which can therefore be disruptive and expensive. There
During the late 1950s and early 1960s there was are additional costs for steelwork but, because steel is
introduced a type of plant consisting of a number of relatively cheap, these may be modest. There are
modules and mounted on skids which could be additional transport costs which vary depending on the
transported by road from the fabrication to the operating site and the plant, and which can be considerable.
site. The processes were straightforward and the plants Modular construction requires its own design
were simple and cheap. From these early skid-mounted approach. It is not effective to design a plant by
plants there has developed a whole range of modular and conventional methods and then divide it into modules.
barge-mounted plants, some of which are large and It is necessary to design for a modular layout from the
complex. start. It is also necessary to accept that the main features
affecting layout have to be frozen earlier than is often the ton, 17 compressor units weighing 90 ton each, and 37
case is normal design. pipe rack units weighing 35350 ton.
Plants have been constructed with some 200 modules
and with modules stacked as high as 50 m. With regard 10.23.3 Barge-mounted plants
to module dimensions and weight, in one project A particular type of modular plant is that mounted on a
described by Kliewer (1983) the maximum module barge or other vessel. The development of such plants
dimensions were set at 6.7 m wide 6 4.0 m high 6 has received impetus from the need for shipyards to
30.5 m long. The weight limit was 125 ton, though most diversify. Features of the operating site which favour the
modules did not exceed 50 ton. Shelley (1990) describes use of a barge-mounted plant include: a seaboard
rubber-track crawlers and trailers with up to 360 wheels inaccessible from the hinterland; a navigable, if shallow,
capable of transporting 30004000 ton and cranes with river; or a delta unsuitable for land traffic.
lifting capacity of 5000 ton. A plant transported by sea may in fact be truly barge
Advocates of modular design typically claim savings on mounted or it may be self-floating. In the latter case it is
project cost and time. Accounts of cost benefits include effectively a sea-going object in its own right, must be
those of Kliewer (1983) and Shelley (1990). Broadly, fully seaworthy and must meet the requirements of the
capital costs are less, but design, steelwork and classification societies. The direct costs of transport of a
transportation cost more. Shelley quotes construction barge-mounted plant may well be modest, but those of
times shortened by up to 50% and capital cost savings providing the stiff framing for, and the measures to
of up to 20%. counter stresses developed in, a sea voyage can be
Progress in modular construction has been reviewed appreciable. A barge-mounted plant is a sea-going object
by Shelley (1990). The image of modular plants has so that it must be seaworthy and must meet the
tended to be that of skid-mounted plants and plants classification society specifications, which can be expen-
shipped to remote locations. Modularization has generally sive.
been considered only for remote locations where the One solution is to use a vessel designed specifically
weather is hostile or skilled labour unavailable. The for the transport of modular plants. The Wijsmuller semi-
author discerns a trend towards increasing use of submersible heavy lift vessel Super Servant, described by
modular construction for regular projects, arising from de Vilder (1982), is of this type. This is a development
its advantages of cutting capital costs and shortening from the semi-submersible barges which have been in
construction times. Another stereotype which is some- use for some decades, either unpowered or with auxiliary
what outdated is that modular plants necessarily involve propulsion only.
a cramped layout. The options for installation at the operating site have
An account of five projects involving modular plants been discussed by Charpentier (1979), who lists four.
has been given by Zambon and Hull (1982). These are a One is a barge floating at sea or anchored. This means,
petrochemical complex in the Middle East, a large in effect, a factory ship with its own propulsion and
synthetic crude oil project in Alberta, a plant to convert mooring systems. Another is a barge which floats but is
natural gas to gasoline in New Zealand, and two projects moored along a quay, accessible from the sea on one
in Alaska, one a gas separation plant and one a seawater side and from the land on the other. A third is a barge
treatment facility for oil well water injection. The authors grounded on a dredged bed in a shelter site, possessing
give details of project profiles, listing key factors such as: connections similar to those in the previous case but not
access, weather and labour availability; schedule and cost subject to water movement. The fourth option is a barge
data; execution strategies; modules contracts; and module grounded on a foundation sill and protected by some
timetables. Labour considerations were important in all form of dike or dam.
five projects and the weather was important in four. Four The use of prestressed concrete hulls for barge-
of the projects were barge mounted. mounted plants has been described by Birkeland et al.
The modular construction of a large gas processing (1979). They outline three options for installation at the
plant in Wyoming is described by Kliewer (1983). The operating site: a self-floating plant may be permanently
plant consisted of some 175 modules, some assembled floating or permanently grounded; a plant delivered by a
by the vendors and some by a construction company. barge is off-loaded and floated into position and then
There were some 390 items of equipment, of which 250 permanently grounded.
were preassembled in some way, leaving the residue of Reviews of projects on barge-mounted plants include
some 140 units to be site installed. those by Charpentier (1979) and Ricci (1981). Birkeland
Glaser and Kramer (1983) describe four modular plant et al. (1979) describe several barge-mounted projects.
projects: a refinery at Calgary, a crude oil processing They include a self-floating LPG refrigeration and storage
facility in Saudi Arabia, a visbreaking unit at Killingholme barge, the Ardjuna Sakti, sited near Jakarta and
and a methane recovery unit in New York City. They permanently floating. Charpentier (1979) describes a
present a detailed account of the Calgary project showing number of projects involving barge-mounted plants.
the items which could and could not be modularized and They include a refinery, a natural gas liquefaction plant,
giving dimensions and weights of modules. Typical an ammonia plant and a methanol plant.
reasons for not modularizing are that the item was too The design of a barge-mounted liquefied natural gas
tall or was delivered too late. (LNG) liquefaction and storage plant, the marine LNG
These authors also described the modular construction system (MLS), has been described by J.L. Howard and
of the large crude oil stabilization unit at Sullom Voe in Andersen (1979); the project was intended for the Pars
the Shetland Islands, as do Bolt and Arzymanow (1982). gas field off Kangan, Iran, but was interrupted by
The modules include 36 process units, weighing 150500 political factors. The authors give details of the process
flow diagram, the LNG storage spheres and the fire
Figure 10.10 Modular two-unit reactor train (Hesler, 1990) (Courtesy of the American Institute of Chemical
Engineers)
protection and emergency shutdown systems. The design planning of the voyage in respect of the wind and
was done according to the requirements of the acceleration forces and of the mechanical stresses to
International Maritime Consultative Organization which the load would be subjected.
(IMCO) gas carrier codes. The installation was of the An account of a barge-mounted pulp plant installed in
dredged basin type. the upper reaches of the Amazon in Brazil using the
In the 1970s the conversion of LNG to methanol prior industrial platform system has been given by Shimpo
to transport appeared to be a potentially attractive way of (1979). The site was one with no roads and accessible
transporting energy on long hauls, and studies of barge- only by plane. There were two platforms, one for the
mounted plants for such conversion were carried out pulp plant and one for the power plant. The platforms
(R.G. Jackson, 1979). One application envisaged for such had to be designed for structural strength whilst being
units was the exploitation for smaller, shorter life fields. towed and during operation. Platform construction posed
A somewhat similar motivation underlies the use of various difficulties. It proved impossible to set up a
barge-mounted plants to process gas from fields for which longitudinal bulkhead and there were few straight
a pipeline would be uneconomic and at which the gas transverse bulkheads. There were many large irregular
would therefore be flared (Jansson et al., 1979). These openings in the main deck, especially close to the side.
fields may include subsea completions where there is no At the site the design was for the platform to be set on
production platform. The main design described is for an piles. There were problems arising from unbalanced soil
ammonia plant with the platform a flat, broad barge strength and uneven live load on the platform. The
moored at a single point mooring, but variations include project yielded much information on motions and
barge-mounted urea, methanol, natural gas liquids (NGL) stresses during the voyage and at the site.
and LNG plants and beaching of the plant.
Ricci (1981) gives an account of a barge-mounted low 10.23.4 Modular design
density polyethylene (LDPE) plant for Bahia Blanca, It is possible to adopt a modular approach to the design
Argentina. This plant was transported by the heavy lift of plant, even if modular construction is not intended. An
semi-submersible described by de Vilder (1982) and account of such modular design is given by Hesler
referred to above. This author describes in detail the (1990). A modular approach not only saves on design
costs but also allows the design to be optimized and K constant

defects eliminated and, by offering equipment suppliers p pressure at a particular point (Pa)
repeat runs, reduces equipment costs and procurement p0 static pressure in free wind (Pa)
times. For some types of plant the normal design Q volumetric air flow (m3/s)
consists of replicated modules. u wind speed (m/s)
One type of plant for which modular design is often um mean wind speed at 10 m height in open terrain
appropriate is a batch reactor system. Such plant (m/s)
generally consists of a number of similar reactor trains. ur reference wind speed (m/s)
Furthermore, these trains are frequently required to have u50 wind speed which is exceeded 50% of time (m/s)
the flexibility to permit changes in the raw materials z height (m)
used and products made and a modular design is able to
accommodate such modifications. Typical units in such temperature (K)
plant are reactors, columns, quench tanks, crystallizers, mean temperature of inside and outside air (K)
liquidsolid separators, and driers. Figure 10.10 illus- Dy temperature difference between inside and out-
trates the two-unit reactor train described by Hesler. side air (8C)
Another example given by this author is the ICI FM-21 r density of air
membrane chlorine cell. f discrimination parameter
10.23.5 Offshore modules Subscripts:

Another application of modular construction is on off- b temperature difference
shore oil and gas production platforms. The production w wind
deck of such a platform will typically consist of some
four modules which are lifted whole onto the platform. Superscript:
The lifting capacity of the floating cranes used is now in - mean value
fact such that a whole deck can be installed in one lift.
10.24 Notation Subsection 10.20.6

c concentration of contaminant in ventilated space
(v/v)
Section 10.14 ce concentration of contaminant in inlet air (v/v)
I heat flux (kW/m2) cE steady-state concentration of contaminant in
tB duration of fireball (s) ventilated space (v/v)
co initial concentration of contaminant in ventilated
Section 10.19 space (v/v)
P peak value of applied blast load q volumetric flow of leak (m3/s)
R dynamic resistance Q volumetric flow of ventilation air (m3/s)
t0 duration of blast load t time (s)
Xm maximum allowable dynamic displacement V volume of ventilated space (m3)
Xy effective yield displacement
d parameter
Z variable defined by Equation 10.19.2 Subsection 10.20.7
t fundamental period of vibration A cross-sectional area of room (m2)
c concentration of contaminant in gas layer (v/v)
Section 10.20 c0 concentration of contaminant in leak gas (v/v)
D molecular diffusion coefficient (m2/s)
Subsection 10.20.5 q volumetric flow of leak gas (m3/s)
a index y vertical distance from ceiling (m)
A area of opening y0 vertical distance from ceiling of interface between
Ab equivalent area for ventilation by temperature two layers (m)
difference only (m2)
Aw equivalent area for ventilation by wind only (m2)
A14 areas defined by Figure 10.7 Section 10.21
Cd coefficient of discharge N number of people to be sheltered
Cp surface pressure coefficient t shelter period (min)
DCp differential pressure coefficient V volume of space required per person (l)
H1 vertical distance defined in Figure 10.7 Vtot total volume of haven (ft3)

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10 Plant Siting and

10.1 Plant Siting 10/2

10.1 Plant Siting Table 10.1 Selected references on plant siting

In-works transport, roads Blast resistance (see Table 17.38)

Separation distances Compressor houses

Gugan (1976); Harvey (1976, 1979b); Langeveld (1976); Plant identification

10.6.3 Use of buildings 10.6.5 Limitation of exposure

Stairways 1.0 m wide including stringers

High pressure storage

spheres or tanks 51 bar g

Low pressure storage

B Interequipment spacings (Industrial Risk Insurers, 1992)

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Major pipebridges with medium to high R2 should be (c) a plant boundary,

B Minimum spacings between a process unit and another feature (m)

1(b) Open tank after instantaneous release

1(c) Unconfined pool from 10 cm leak after instantaneous release

2 2.5 cm steady release under pressure

3 10 cm steady release under pressure

B On-site effects  summary of distances (m)

1(b,c) After instantaneous release

Table 10.11 Continued

2 and 3 Steady releases under pressure

LFL (no jet) 16 (28) 63 (159)

10.19.3 ACMH recommendations

10.19.16 Control room layout 10.20.3 Ventilation systems

u wind and temperature difference

10.21 Toxics Protection which protection is required. Generally, it will be

costs but also allows the design to be optimized and K constant

10.23.5 Offshore modules Subscripts:

10.24 Notation Subsection 10.20.6

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B On-site effects summary of distances (m)