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SCADA
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is a control system architecture that uses computers,
networked data communications and graphical user interfaces for high-level process supervisory management, but
uses other peripheral devices such as programmable logic controllers and discrete PID controllers to interface to
the process plant or machinery. The operator interfaces which enable monitoring and the issuing of process
commands, such as controller set point changes, are handled through the SCADA supervisory computer system.
However, the real-time control logic or controller calculations are performed by networked modules which connect
to the field sensors and actuators.

The SCADA concept was developed as a universal means of remote access to a variety of local control modules,
which could be from different manufacturers allowing access through standard automation protocols. In practice,
large SCADA systems have grown to become very similar to distributed control systems in function, but using
multiple means of interfacing with the plant. They can control large-scale processes that can include multiple sites,
and work over large distances.[1] It is one of the most commonly-used types of industrial control systems, however
there are concerns about SCADA systems being vulnerable to cyberwarfare/cyberterrorism attacks.[2]

Contents
1 The SCADA concept in control operations
2 Examples of use
3 SCADA system components
3.1 Supervisory computers
3.2 Remote terminal units
3.3 Programmable logic controllers
3.4 Communication infrastructure
3.5 Human-machine interface
4 Alarm handling
5 PLC/RTU programming
6 PLC commercial integration
7 Communication infrastructure and methods
8 SCADA architecture development
8.1 First generation: "monolithic"
8.2 Second generation: "distributed"
8.3 Third generation: "networked"
8.4 Fourth generation: "Internet of things"
9 Security issues
10 See also
11 References
12 External links

The SCADA concept in control operations

The key attribute of a SCADA system is its ability to perform a supervisory operation over a variety of other
proprietary devices.

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The accompanying diagram is a

general model which shows
functional manufacturing levels
using computerised control.

Referring to the diagram,

Level 0 contains the field

devices such as flow and
temperature sensors, and
final control elements,
such as control valves.
Level 1 contains the
industrialised
input/output (I/O)
modules, and their Functional levels of a manufacturing control operation
associated distributed
electronic processors.
Level 2 contains the supervisory computers, which collate information from processor nodes on the system,
and provide the operator control screens.
Level 3 is the production control level, which does not directly control the process, but is concerned with
monitoring production and targets.
Level 4 is the production scheduling level.

Level 1 contains the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) or remote terminal units (RTUs).

Level 2 contains the SCADA software and computing platform. The SCADA software exists only at this
supervisory level as control actions are performed automatically by RTUs or PLCs. SCADA control functions are
usually restricted to basic overriding or supervisory level intervention. For example, a PLC may control the flow of
cooling water through part of an industrial process to a set point level, but the SCADA system software will allow
operators to change the set points for the flow. The SCADA also enables alarm conditions, such as loss of flow or
high temperature, to be displayed and recorded. A feedback control loop is directly controlled by the RTU or PLC,
but the SCADA software monitors the overall performance of the loop.

Levels 3 and 4 are not strictly process control in the traditional sense, but are where production control and
scheduling takes place.

Data acquisition begins at the RTU or PLC level and includes instrumentation readings and equipment status
reports that are communicated to level 2 SCADA as required. Data is then compiled and formatted in such a way
that a control room operator using the HMI (Human Machine Interface) can make supervisory decisions to adjust
or override normal RTU (PLC) controls. Data may also be fed to a historian, often built on a commodity database
management system, to allow trending and other analytical auditing.

SCADA systems typically use a tag database, which contains data elements called tags or points, which relate to
specific instrumentation or actuators within the process system according to such as the Piping and instrumentation
diagram. Data is accumulated against these unique process control equipment tag references.

Examples of use
Both large and small systems can be built using the SCADA concept. These systems can range from just tens to
thousands of process loops, depending on the application. Example processes include industrial, infrastructure, and
facility-based processes, as described below:

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Industrial processes include manufacturing, Process control, power

generation, fabrication, and refining, and may run in continuous,
batch, repetitive, or discrete modes.
Infrastructure processes may be public or private, and include water
treatment and distribution, wastewater collection and treatment, oil
and gas pipelines, electric power transmission and distribution, and
wind farms.
Facility processes, including buildings, airports, ships, and space
stations. They monitor and control heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning systems (HVAC), access, and energy consumption. Example of SCADA used in office
environment to remotely monitor a
However, SCADA systems may have security vulnerabilities, so the process
systems should be evaluated to identify risks and solutions implemented to
mitigate those risks.[3]

SCADA system components

A SCADA system usually consists of the following main elements:

Supervisory computers

This is the core of the SCADA system, gathering data on the process and
sending control commands to the field connected devices. It refers to the
computer and software responsible for communicating with the field
connection controllers, which are RTUs and PLCs, and includes the HMI
software running on operator workstations. In smaller SCADA systems,
the supervisory computer may be composed of a single PC, in which case Typical SCADA mimic shown as an
the HMI is a part of this computer. In larger SCADA systems, the master animation. For process plant, these are
station may include several HMIs hosted on client computers, multiple based upon the piping and
servers for data acquisition, distributed software applications, and disaster instrumentation diagram.
recovery sites. To increase the integrity of the system the multiple servers
will often be configured in a dual-redundant or hot-standby formation
providing continuous control and monitoring in the event of a server
malfunction or breakdown.

Remote terminal units

Remote terminal units, also known as (RTUs), connect to sensors and

actuators in the process, and are networked to the supervisory computer
system. RTUs are "intelligent I/O" and often have embedded control
capabilities such as ladder logic in order to accomplish boolean logic
operations.[4] A SCADA schematic overview
showing control levels 0, 1 and 2

Programmable logic controllers

Also known as PLCs, these are connected to sensors and actuators in the process, and are networked to the
supervisory system in the same way as RTUs. PLCs have more sophisticated embedded control capabilities than
RTUs, and are programmed in one or more IEC 61131-3 programming languages. PLCs are often used in place of
RTUs as field devices because they are more economical, versatile, flexible and configurable.

Communication infrastructure
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This connects the supervisory computer system to the remote terminal units (RTUs) and PLCs, and may use
industry standard or manufacturer proprietary protocols. Both RTUs and PLCs operate autonomously on the near-
real time control of the process, using the last command given from the supervisory system. Failure of the
communications network does not necessarily stop the plant process controls, and on resumption of
communications, the operator can continue with monitoring and control. Some critical systems will have dual
redundant data highways, often cabled via diverse routes.

Human-machine interface

The human-machine interface (HMI) is the

operator window of the supervisory system. It
presents plant information to the operating
personnel graphically in the form of mimic
diagrams, which are a schematic representation
of the plant being controlled, and alarm and
event logging pages. The HMI is linked to the
SCADA supervisory computer to provide live
data to drive the mimic diagrams, alarm
displays and trending graphs. In many
installations the HMI is the graphical user
interface for the operator, collects all data from
external devices, creates reports, performs
alarming, sends notifications, etc. More complex SCADA animation showing control of four batch cookers

Mimic diagrams consist of line graphics and

schematic symbols to represent process elements, or may consist of digital photographs of the process equipment
overlain with animated symbols.

Supervisory operation of the plant is by means of the HMI, with operators issuing commands using mouse
pointers, keyboards and touch screens. For example, a symbol of a pump can show the operator that the pump is
running, and a flow meter symbol can show how much fluid it is pumping through the pipe. The operator can
switch the pump off from the mimic by a mouse click or screen touch. The HMI will show the flow rate of the
fluid in the pipe decrease in real time.

The HMI package for a SCADA system typically includes a drawing program that the operators or system
maintenance personnel use to change the way these points are represented in the interface. These representations
can be as simple as an on-screen traffic light, which represents the state of an actual traffic light in the field, or as
complex as a multi-projector display representing the position of all of the elevators in a skyscraper or all of the
trains on a railway.

A "historian", is a software service within the HMI which accumulates time-stamped data, events, and alarms in a
database which can be queried or used to populate graphic trends in the HMI. The historian is a client that requests
data from a data acquisition server.[5]

Alarm handling
An important part of most SCADA implementations is alarm handling. The system monitors whether certain alarm
conditions are satisfied, to determine when an alarm event has occurred. Once an alarm event has been detected,
one or more actions are taken (such as the activation of one or more alarm indicators, and perhaps the generation of

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email or text messages so that management or remote SCADA operators are informed). In many cases, a SCADA
operator may have to acknowledge the alarm event; this may deactivate some alarm indicators, whereas other
indicators remain active until the alarm conditions are cleared.

Alarm conditions can be explicit—for example, an alarm point is a digital status point that has either the value
NORMAL or ALARM that is calculated by a formula based on the values in other analogue and digital points—or
implicit: the SCADA system might automatically monitor whether the value in an analogue point lies outside high
and low- limit values associated with that point.

Examples of alarm indicators include a siren, a pop-up box on a screen, or a coloured or flashing area on a screen
(that might act in a similar way to the "fuel tank empty" light in a car); in each case, the role of the alarm indicator
is to draw the operator's attention to the part of the system 'in alarm' so that appropriate action can be taken.

PLC/RTU programming
"Smart" RTUs, or standard PLCs, are capable of autonomously executing simple logic processes without involving
the supervisory computer. They employ standardized control programming languages such as under, IEC 61131-3
(a suite of 5 programming languages including function block, ladder, structured text, sequence function charts and
instruction list), is frequently used to create programs which run on these RTUs and PLCs. Unlike a procedural
language such as the C programming language or FORTRAN, IEC 61131-3 has minimal training requirements by
virtue of resembling historic physical control arrays. This allows SCADA system engineers to perform both the
design and implementation of a program to be executed on an RTU or PLC.

A programmable automation controller (PAC) is a compact controller that combines the features and capabilities of
a PC-based control system with that of a typical PLC. PACs are deployed in SCADA systems to provide RTU and
PLC functions. In many electrical substation SCADA applications, "distributed RTUs" use information processors
or station computers to communicate with digital protective relays, PACs, and other devices for I/O, and
communicate with the SCADA master in lieu of a traditional RTU.

PLC commercial integration

Since about 1998, virtually all major PLC manufacturers have offered integrated HMI/SCADA systems, many of
them using open and non-proprietary communications protocols. Numerous specialized third-party HMI/SCADA
packages, offering built-in compatibility with most major PLCs, have also entered the market, allowing mechanical
engineers, electrical engineers and technicians to configure HMIs themselves, without the need for a custom-made
program written by a software programmer. The Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) connects to physical equipment.
Typically, an RTU converts the electrical signals from the equipment to digital values such as the open/closed
status from a switch or a valve, or measurements such as pressure, flow, voltage or current. By converting and
sending these electrical signals out to equipment the RTU can control equipment, such as opening or closing a
switch or a valve, or setting the speed of a pump.

Communication infrastructure and methods

SCADA systems have traditionally used combinations of radio and direct wired connections, although
SONET/SDH is also frequently used for large systems such as railways and power stations. The remote
management or monitoring function of a SCADA system is often referred to as telemetry. Some users want
SCADA data to travel over their pre-established corporate networks or to share the network with other
applications. The legacy of the early low-bandwidth protocols remains, though.

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SCADA protocols are designed to be very compact. Many are designed to send information only when the master
station polls the RTU. Typical legacy SCADA protocols include Modbus RTU, RP-570, Profibus and Conitel.
These communication protocols, with the exception of Modbus (Modbus has been made open by Schneider
Electric), are all SCADA-vendor specific but are widely adopted and used. Standard protocols are IEC 60870-5-
101 or 104, IEC 61850 and DNP3. These communication protocols are standardized and recognized by all major
SCADA vendors. Many of these protocols now contain extensions to operate over TCP/IP. Although the use of
conventional networking specifications, such as TCP/IP, blurs the line between traditional and industrial
networking, they each fulfill fundamentally differing requirements.[6] Network simulation can be used in
conjunction with SCADA simulators to perform varisou 'what-if' analyses.

With increasing security demands (such as North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) in the US), there is increasing use of satellite-based communication. This has the
key advantages that the infrastructure can be self-contained (not using circuits from the public telephone system),
can have built-in encryption, and can be engineered to the availability and reliability required by the SCADA
system operator. Earlier experiences using consumer-grade VSAT were poor. Modern carrier-class systems provide
the quality of service required for SCADA.[7]

RTUs and other automatic controller devices were developed before the advent of industry wide standards for
interoperability. The result is that developers and their management created a multitude of control protocols.
Among the larger vendors, there was also the incentive to create their own protocol to "lock in" their customer
base. A list of automation protocols is compiled here.

OLE for process control (OPC) can connect different hardware and software, allowing communication even
between devices originally not intended to be part of an industrial network.

SCADA architecture development

SCADA systems have evolved through four generations as follows:[8][9][10]

First generation: "monolithic"

Early SCADA system computing was done by large minicomputers.

Common network services did not exist at the time SCADA was
developed. Thus SCADA systems were independent systems with no
connectivity to other systems. The communication protocols used were
strictly proprietary at that time. The first-generation SCADA system
redundancy was achieved using a back-up mainframe system connected to
all the Remote Terminal Unit sites and was used in the event of failure of
the primary mainframe system.[11] Some first generation SCADA systems
were developed as "turn key" operations that ran on minicomputers such as
the PDP-11 series made by the Digital Equipment Corporation..

Second generation: "distributed"

The United States Army's Training
Manual 5-601 covers "SCADA Systems
SCADA information and command processing was distributed across for C4ISR Facilities"
multiple stations which were connected through a LAN. Information was
shared in near real time. Each station was responsible for a particular task,
which reduced the cost as compared to First Generation SCADA. The network protocols used were still not
standardized. Since these protocols were proprietary, very few people beyond the developers knew enough to
determine how secure a SCADA installation was. Security of the SCADA installation was usually overlooked.[11]

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Third generation: "networked"

Similar to a distributed architecture, any complex SCADA can be reduced to simplest components and connected
through communication protocols. In the case of a networked design, the system may be spread across more than
one LAN network called a process control network (PCN) and separated geographically. Several distributed
architecture SCADAs running in parallel, with a single supervisor and historian, could be considered a network
architecture. This allows for a more cost effective solution in very large scale systems.

Fourth generation: "Internet of things"

With the commercial availability of cloud computing, SCADA systems have increasingly adopted Internet of
things technology to significantly reduce infrastructure costs and increase ease of maintenance and integration[12].
As a result, SCADA systems can now report state in near real-time and use the horizontal scale available in cloud
environments to implement more complex control algorithms than are practically feasible to implement on
traditional programmable logic controllers.[13][14] Further, the use of open network protocols such as TLS inherent
in the Internet of things technology, provides a more readily comprehensible and manageable security boundary
than the heterogeneous mix of proprietary network protocols typical of many decentralized SCADA
implementations. One such example of this technology is an innovative approach to rainwater harvesting through
the implementation of real time controls (RTC).

This decentralization of data also requires a different approach to SCADA than traditional PLC based programs.
When a SCADA system is used locally, the preferred methodology involves binding the graphics on the user
interface to the data stored in specific PLC memory addresses. However, when the data comes from a disparate
mix of sensors, controllers and databases (which may be local or at varied connected locations), the typical 1 to 1
mapping becomes problematic. A solution to this is data modeling, a concept derived from object oriented
programming.[15]

In a data model, a virtual representation of each device is constructed in the SCADA software. These virtual
representations (“models”) can contain not just the address mapping of the device represented, but also any other
pertinent information (web based info, database entries, media files, etc.) that may be used by other facets of the
SCADA/IoT implementation. As the increased complexity of the Internet of things renders traditional SCADA
increasingly “house-bound,” and as communication protocols evolve to favor platform-independent, service-
oriented architecture (such as OPC UA),[16] it is likely that more SCADA software developers will implement
some form of data modeling.

Security issues
SCADA systems that tie together decentralized facilities such as power, oil, gas pipelines, water distribution and
wastewater collection systems were designed to be open, robust, and easily operated and repaired, but not
necessarily secure.[17] The move from proprietary technologies to more standardized and open solutions together
with the increased number of connections between SCADA systems, office networks and the Internet has made
them more vulnerable to types of network attacks that are relatively common in computer security. For example,
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) released a vulnerability advisory[18] warning that
unauthenticated users could download sensitive configuration information including password hashes from an
Inductive Automation Ignition system utilizing a standard attack type leveraging access to the Tomcat Embedded
Web server. Security researcher Jerry Brown submitted a similar advisory regarding a buffer overflow
vulnerability[19] in a Wonderware InBatchClient ActiveX control. Both vendors made updates available prior to
public vulnerability release. Mitigation recommendations were standard patching practices and requiring VPN
access for secure connectivity. Consequently, the security of some SCADA-based systems has come into question
as they are seen as potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks.[2][20][21]

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In particular, security researchers are concerned about:

the lack of concern about security and authentication in the design, deployment and operation of some
existing SCADA networks
the belief that SCADA systems have the benefit of security through obscurity through the use of specialized
protocols and proprietary interfaces
the belief that SCADA networks are secure because they are physically secured
the belief that SCADA networks are secure because they are disconnected from the Internet

SCADA systems are used to control and monitor physical processes, examples of which are transmission of
electricity, transportation of gas and oil in pipelines, water distribution, traffic lights, and other systems used as the
basis of modern society. The security of these SCADA systems is important because compromise or destruction of
these systems would impact multiple areas of society far removed from the original compromise. For example, a
blackout caused by a compromised electrical SCADA system would cause financial losses to all the customers that
received electricity from that source. How security will affect legacy SCADA and new deployments remains to be
seen.

There are many threat vectors to a modern SCADA system. One is the threat of unauthorized access to the control
software, whether it is human access or changes induced intentionally or accidentally by virus infections and other
software threats residing on the control host machine. Another is the threat of packet access to the network
segments hosting SCADA devices. In many cases, the control protocol lacks any form of cryptographic security,
allowing an attacker to control a SCADA device by sending commands over a network. In many cases SCADA
users have assumed that having a VPN offered sufficient protection, unaware that security can be trivially
bypassed with physical access to SCADA-related network jacks and switches. Industrial control vendors suggest
approaching SCADA security like Information Security with a defense in depth strategy that leverages common IT
practices.[22]

The reliable function of SCADA systems in our modern infrastructure may be crucial to public health and safety.
As such, attacks on these systems may directly or indirectly threaten public health and safety. Such an attack has
already occurred, carried out on Maroochy Shire Council's sewage control system in Queensland, Australia.[23]
Shortly after a contractor installed a SCADA system in January 2000, system components began to function
erratically. Pumps did not run when needed and alarms were not reported. More critically, sewage flooded a nearby
park and contaminated an open surface-water drainage ditch and flowed 500 meters to a tidal canal. The SCADA
system was directing sewage valves to open when the design protocol should have kept them closed. Initially this
was believed to be a system bug. Monitoring of the system logs revealed the malfunctions were the result of cyber
attacks. Investigators reported 46 separate instances of malicious outside interference before the culprit was
identified. The attacks were made by a disgruntled ex-employee of the company that had installed the SCADA
system. The ex-employee was hoping to be hired by the utility full-time to maintain the system.

In April 2008, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
Attack issued a Critical Infrastructures Report which discussed the extreme vulnerability of SCADA systems to an
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event. After testing and analysis, the Commission concluded: "SCADA systems are
vulnerable to an EMP event. The large numbers and widespread reliance on such systems by all of the Nation’s
critical infrastructures represent a systemic threat to their continued operation following an EMP event.
Additionally, the necessity to reboot, repair, or replace large numbers of geographically widely dispersed systems
will considerably impede the Nation’s recovery from such an assault."[24]

Many vendors of SCADA and control products have begun to address the risks posed by unauthorized access by
developing lines of specialized industrial firewall and VPN solutions for TCP/IP-based SCADA networks as well
as external SCADA monitoring and recording equipment. The International Society of Automation (ISA) started

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formalizing SCADA security requirements in 2007 with a working group, WG4. WG4 "deals specifically with
unique technical requirements, measurements, and other features required to evaluate and assure security resilience
and performance of industrial automation and control systems devices".[25]

The increased interest in SCADA vulnerabilities has resulted in vulnerability researchers discovering
vulnerabilities in commercial SCADA software and more general offensive SCADA techniques presented to the
general security community.[26] In electric and gas utility SCADA systems, the vulnerability of the large installed
base of wired and wireless serial communications links is addressed in some cases by applying bump-in-the-wire
devices that employ authentication and Advanced Encryption Standard encryption rather than replacing all existing
nodes.[27]

In June 2010, anti-virus security company VirusBlokAda reported the first detection of malware that attacks
SCADA systems (Siemens' WinCC/PCS 7 systems) running on Windows operating systems. The malware is called
Stuxnet and uses four zero-day attacks to install a rootkit which in turn logs into the SCADA's database and steals
design and control files.[28][29] The malware is also capable of changing the control system and hiding those
changes. The malware was found on 14 systems, the majority of which were located in Iran.[30]

In October 2013 National Geographic released a docudrama titled American Blackout which dealt with a large-
scale cyber attack on SCADA and the United States' electrical grid.[31]

See also
DNP3
IEC 60870
EPICS

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esign%20-%20SyScan08.pps). Archived from the original (http://www.c4-security.com/SCADA%20Securit
y%20-%20Generic%20Electric%20Grid%20Malware%20Design%20-%20SyScan08.pps) on 7 January
2009.
27. KEMA, Inc. (November 2006). "Substation Communications: Enabler of Automation / An Assessment of
Communications Technologies". UTC – United Telecom Council: 3–21.
28. Mills, Elinor (21 July 2010). "Details of the first-ever control system malware (FAQ)" (http://news.cnet.com/
8301-27080_3-20011159-245.html). CNET. Retrieved 21 July 2010.
29. "SIMATIC WinCC / SIMATIC PCS 7: Information concerning Malware / Virus / Trojan" (http://support.aut
omation.siemens.com/WW/llisapi.dll?func=cslib.csinfo&lang=en&objid=43876783&caller=view). Siemens.
21 July 2010. Retrieved 22 July 2010. "malware (trojan) which affects the visualization system WinCC
SCADA."
30. "Siemens: Stuxnet worm hit industrial systems" (http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/print/9185419/Sie
mens_Stuxnet_worm_hit_industrial_systems?taxonomyName=Network+Security&taxonomyId=142).
Retrieved 16 September 2010.
31. "American Blackout" (http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/american-blackout/). National Geographic
Channel. Retrieved 14 October 2016.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SCADA 10/11
8/8/2017 SCADA - Wikipedia

External links
UK SCADA security guidelines (https://web.archive.org/web/20130620125607/http://www.cpni.gov.uk/advi
ce/cyber/scada/)
BBC NEWS | Technology | Spies 'infiltrate US power grid' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7990997.s
tm)

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