273 Phil.

769

MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused, Fernando Collado, Crisanto Lara, Felix Collado (alias Elex
Collado) and Romeo Gloriani, were charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide in Criminal Case No. SC-3180 before the Regional Trial Court,
4th Judicial Region, Branch 26, Santa Cruz, Laguna. The information filed
in said case reads (p. 23, Rollo):

"'That on or about January 20, 1985 at Barangay Mojon, Municipality of

Pila, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
 the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain, (with) violence against or
intimidation of person, in an uninhabited place and while
conveniently armed with a piece of wood and knife did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (P5,570.00)
in cash and one Seiko Wrist watch worth P500.00 with the total value
of P6,070.00 against the will and consent of the owner thereof, Mrs.
Maria Regay,
 and by reason and on occasion of such robbery, said accused with
treachery, abuse of superior strength and in disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of her age and sex being an old
woman, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and stab
with said piece of wood and knife Maria Regay who as a result thereof
sustained multiple injuries in the different vital parts of her body
which directly caused her death to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said Maria Regay.

"'CONTRARY TO LAW.'"
Upon being arraigned on April 15, 1986, Fernando Collado and Crisanto
Lara pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and the case against them was
set for trial while Felix Collado and Romeo Gloriani remained at large. On
September 8, 1986, Fernando Collado withdrew his former plea of not
guilty and pleaded guilty as an accomplice. The judgment with respect to
him was promulgated on September 9, 1986. Thereafter, trial on the merits
proceeded against Crisanto Lara. On May 4, 1989, the trial court rendered
its decision, the dispositive portion of which, reads (p. 43, Rollo):

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused, CRISANTO LARA, guilty beyond

reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
accessory penalties imposed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in
the amount of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

"SO ORDERED."
Hence, the present appeal by Crisanto Lara.

The antecedent facts, as stated in the plaintiff-appellee's brief are, as

follows (pp. 4-18, Appellee's Brief; p. 97, Rollo):

"On January 18, 1985, appellant Crisanto Lara went to the house of
Honorio delos Santos in Pila, Laguna and proposed to the latter that they
hold-up Maria Regay. The following day, January 19th, at around 6:00
o'clock P.M., appellant returned to his (delos Santos) house to follow up the
proposal. On both occasions, however, delos Santos told appellant that he
did not want to go as he did not like that kind of work (pp. 10-11, 16, TSN,
April 21, 1987).

"On January 20, 1985 at around 7:00 o'clock A.M., Josefina Buenaflor, a
resident of Mojon, Pila, Laguna, and a daughter of the victim Maria Regay
saw Crisanto Lara on the road walking to and fro between his house and her
house while conversing with the neighbors. Afterwards, Nanding Collado
came out from his house and went over to Crisanto (p. 6, TSN, October 14,
1986).

"At about 9:30 to 10:00 A.M. of the same day, January 21, (sic) 1985, Mario
Marasigan, son-in-law of the victim, was at the coconut plantation he was
tending which was about 100 meters from the barrio road. He was cutting
trees which he would use as posts for his house. He climbed up a tall madre
de cacao tree and after he had cut a branch, he saw Felix Collado and
Fernando Collado standing on either end of the pathway leading to
Barangay Pansol and Concepcion as if waiting for somebody. He also saw
Crisanto Lara and Romeo Gloriani at the middle of this pathway about 40
meters away from him. Crisanto Lara was holding a piece of wood and
Romeo Gloriani was hiding behind a coconut tree (TSN, September 15,
1986, pp. 5-6, 8; TSN, September 30, 1988, p. 11).

"After a few minues (sic), he saw the victim Maria Regal (sic) walking along
the pathway at a distance of more or less 40 meters from him on the way
back to Mojon from the direction of Barangay Concepcion. Felix Collado
who was on that end of the pathway hid himself and she continued walking
to where Crisanto Lara was now positioned hiding behind a coconut tree
(TSN, Sept. 30, 1986, p. 15). Then Crisanto Lara struck her on the face with
a piece of wood, a guava branch with a diameter of around 2 1/2 inches,
with such strong force that the old woman fell on the ground. Crisanto Lara
then hid himself and Romeo Gloriani dragged the stricken victim for about
5 (sic) meters to a coconut tree where Gloriani pulled out his knife and after
stabbing her once she appeared to regain consciousness and began
struggling on her back and rolling on the ground as Gloriani continued
stabbing her. The weapon used by Gloriani for stabbing was a double
bladed dagger around 6 to 7 inches long excluding the handle (TSN, Sept.
15, 1985, pp. 7-9; TSN, Sept. 30, 1985, p. 16).

"Marasigan was taken by surprise seeing his uncle hit his mother-in-law
that he was not able to shout (p. 15, ibid).

"When the old woman stopped struggling, Romeo Gloriani pulled up her
skirt and cut a cord tied around her waist where she kept her money (p.
17, ibid) and at that time Crisanto Lara reappeared and came near and both
Crisanto Lara and Romeo Gloriani left followed by Fernando Collado and
Elex Collado who took the same route through the fence and towards the
house of Fernando Collado (pp. 8-9, ibid).

"Marasigan then went down the tree but did not go near the
victim. Neither did he tell his relatives about the incident in consideration
of appellant Crisanto Lara who is his uncle. He left the place at around
10:30 A.M. and returned to his house and did his normal work there (pp.
19-20, 26, ibid).

"In the same morning at around 10:00 A.M. Josefina Buenaflor was told by
her sister that their mother who attended a wedding feast at Mojon had not
yet returned home. So they started to look for her at the coconut plantation
as this was the route she usually took in going to Mojon. They failed to find
her. They inquired from their neighbors who also did not know the
whereabouts of their mother (pp. 9-10, TSN, October 14, 1986).

"At around 3:00 o'clock P.M., a certain Ugid Balatibat told Josefina
Buenaflor that he saw the latter's mother sprawled on a coconut
plantation. She and her sister ran to the place, crying. But before they
reached the place, about three coconut plantations away from the place
where they eventually (sic) found their mother, Crisanto Lara stopped them
telling them, not to touch the body of their mother as there were no
policemen yet at that time (pp. 9, 10, 14, ibid).

"Finally, on January 21, 1985, Josefina Buenaflor was able to see the body
of her mother at the plantation. She was then with policemen and with her
barrio mates (p. 10, ibid).

"Her mother had a 'kacha' tied on her waistline where she kept the money
she earned from the sale of the pigs and chickens that she raised. When her
mother was found dead, there was no more 'katsa' wrapped around the
latter's waist (pp. 12-13, ibid).

"Maria Regay also had a Seiko watch valued at P500.00 which she placed in
her pocket. The watch, however, was not anymore in her pocket when she
was found dead (pp. 13-14, ibid).

"The wake of Maria Regay lasted for 5 days. Crisanto Lara attended the
wake and even often looked at the cadaver of Maria Regay. He even
solicited contributions from tricycle drivers (pp. 10-11, 15, ibid).

"Dr. Rosauro Framil, a Municipal Health Officer of Pila, Laguna and a

resident of Pila, Laguna conducted an autopsy on a certain Maria Regay on
January 21, 1985, at the Laguna Provincial Hospital Morgue, Sta. Cruz from
9:00 P.M. to 12:00 midnight of January 21, 1985 (pp. 4-5, TSN, September
9, 1986).

"The victim had already shown sign of putrefactive changes as shown by the
appearance of small worms on the eyes, nose and ear openings. The body
was already emitting unfavorable odor which suggest (sic) death for more
than 24 hours. In his opinion the incident took place at more or less 10:00
A.M. of January 20, 1985 (pp. 5-6, 19, ibid).
"There was a depressed fracture on the head region and on the left
temporal with contusions. There was also a periorbital contusion on the
side of the head (p. 6, ibid).

"He further testified that on the chest and back, there were multiple stab
wounds, about 9:2 stab wounds on the left and right area below the clavicle,
one on the right breast, a stab wound on the left breast, a stab wound on the
right side of the chest just above and medial to right arch, a stab wound on
the mid portion, on the left side of the chest just above the left subcostal
arch, and another stab wound on the left side of the chest along mid
auxilary line about the level of the 7th intercostal space. Length of the stab
wound on both sides of the scapular area on the back and abdominal
region, there was no external injury seen on the area. On the extremities,
the right forearm had a fracture closed and complete at its 3rd radio/ulna
bones. The left upper arm was almost macerated which could be the result
of some animal bites probably a stray dog. These were the external findings
(p. 6, ibid).

"As to internal findings, there was extradural hemorrhage on the left

temporal area; on the chest intrapleural hemorrhage bilateral due to the
wound inflicted on both lungs, right middle lobe has been hit. Left lung
middle and lower lobe have both stab wounds which produced more
hemorrhage than that of the left. The heart was not hit (p. 7, ibid).

"The affected internal organs of the body of the victim were: fracture on the
head region, so there was involvement of the brain, the extradenal
hemorrhage of the left temporal area is the result of the depressed fracture
on the head. On the body, the internal organs severed were the lungs, right
and left and in the abdominal region, there were none and also the bones
which were evidenced by the fracture on the right forearm and the right
upper arm (p. 8, ibid).

"On opening the skull, there was extradenal hemorrhage on the left
temporal area. It is located on the side. Extradenal means that the brain is
covered by denal matter and outside of that is the place where the
hemorrhage sets in (p. 11, ibid).

"By the nature of the total injuries, the instruments used by the assailant
could be that considering the fracture on the head, it could be due to some
hard object like a piece of wood or metal which most probably could give
rise to the depressed fracture. With respect to the stab wounds, probably a
double bladed knife could have been used because (sic) of the nature of the
stab wounds itself (p. 8, ibid).

"The cause of death was pulmonary failure secondary to lung

damage. Severe hemorrhage intrapleural secondary to lung damage
brought about by the penetrating stab wounds on the chest, most probably,
the weapon used was a knife. Since the hemorrhage on the brain is not as
much as that to the hemorrhage on the lungs, he presumed that the cause
of death was more due to the damage on the lungs. Assuming, however,
that there were no other wounds and that the only wound was on the skull
which caused hemorrhage, the hemorrhage on the skull would be sufficient
to cause death (p. 11, ibid).

"He could not tell the relative position of the victim and the assailant but as
to the wound on the head, however, his honest guess was that when the
victim was hit, the latter was not facing the assailant (p. 13, ibid).

"On February 5, 1985, Mario Marasigan finally reported to Pfc. Villanueva

that he witnessed the killing and robbery committed against Maria
Regay. He said that he reported the matter which he kept to himself for 15
days because he was bothered by his conscience behind the death of his
mother-in-law (pp. 22-23, 24-25, TSN, September 30, 1986).

"In April of 1985, Fernando Collado was apprehended at the

Pacita Complex, San Pedro, Laguna. Raymundo T. Matiola, a
policeman and a resident of Pila, Laguna took the sworn statement
(Exhibit C) of Fernando Collado on April 8, 1985 that there were four
who were responsible for the slaying and robbing of Maria
Regay, namely: one alias Elee, Fernando Collado Crisanto
Lara and Loriana, whose first name he did not remember (pp. 3-
4, TSN, December 12, 1986).

"The defense of appellant Crisanto Lara is one of alibi. He testified that he

was a resident of Balat-atis, San Antonio, Quezon. On January 20, 1985 at
around 9:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M., he was at the Laguna Provincial Hospital
in Sta. Cruz. He visited his nephew, Romeo Marasigan as the latter's body
become (sic) swollen. He stayed in the hospital up to more or less 2:00
o'clock P.M. (pp. 3-4, 9, TSN, March 11, 1987).
"When he left the hospital, he went to Barangay Pansol, Pila, Laguna and
arrived there at 3:00 P.M. He went to the house of the father of his
nephew. After that he rested and then he cooked food. After cooking, he
again rested for more or less one (1) hour and then he ate (pp. 5-6, ibid).

"He spent the night of January 20, 1985 in the house of the father of his
nephew. He went to sleep at more or less 6 (sic) or 6:30 P.M. He woke up
at 5:00 A.M. of January 21 (p. 6, ibid).

"After that, he went to the house of his niece at Barangay Mojon, Pila,
Laguna and arrived there at more or less 10:00 A.M. While there, he heard
that a certain Maria was missing (p. 7, ibid).

"He admitted seeing Josefina Buenaflor on January 21, 1981 (sic) while she
was on her way to see her mother and told her that it would be better to call
first the police (p. 7, ibid) but denied the testimony of Mario Marasigan that
he was one of those who participated in the slaying and robbing of Maria
Regay and the one who allegedly struck Maria with a branch of guava tree
because he cannot hold a branch as it is heavy and his left hand is
amputated and his other hand is 'pasmado.' For the record, appellant's
right hand was shown the forefinger is severed and there is a
scar at the back of his palm, and the middle finger is also
damaged as well as the ring finger. The other fingers are
deformed (p. 8, ibid).

"His left hand was amputated and right hand damaged on March
13, 1981 when he caused palay to be milled that day and he was waylaid
while going to the ricemill. Since then and prior to February 20, 1984 (sic)
that was the condition of his left and right arm (p. 2, TSN, March 17, 1987)
but he continued to have a job of 'buying banana fruits' (p. 7, ibid).

"But while he claimed that his right hand could not hold a knife,
when asked to handle a stamp pad in open court, he was able to
grasp the same (pp. 7-8, ibid).

"During the wake, he solicited from the tricycle drivers because he was told
to do so by Honorio, a member of the barangay council and an 'alalay' of
the barangay captain. The one who gave his collection to the family of
Maria Regay was Honorio (pp. 4-5, TSN, April 2, 1987).
"Fernando Collado who pleaded guilty as an accomplice in this case claimed
that he knows appellant Crisanto Lara only by face; that it was only at the
provincial jail that they came to know each other (pp. 2-3, TSN, January 14,
1987).

"On January 20, 1985 at around 9:00 A.M. to 10:30 A.M., he remembered
being in the land of a certain Jun at Mojon, Pila, Laguna whose full name
he did not know and while there, his uncle, Romeo Gloriani, called him and
told him that he was waiting for the old woman, Maria. At that time, aside
from he (sic) and his uncle, there were no other persons around (pp. 3-
4, ibid).

"When Matandang Maria showed up, his uncle pointed a balisong knife at
her. After that his uncle got her money and gave the money to him. After
he received the money, he ran away. He did not anymore see what his
uncle did to Matandang Maria (p. 5,ibid).

"He proceeded to the irrigation site of Mojon, Pila, Laguna where his uncle
followed him and he gave him the money who in turn gave him P200.00
(pp. 5-6, ibid).

"After that, his uncle left. Before the latter left, however, he told
him that if the event would be discovered, witness should tell
that it was Crisanto Lara and Felix Collado who did it (pp. 6-7, ibid).

"After that, he stayed in the town proper of Pila for 2 weeks and he
proceeded to San Pedro at the Pacita Complex where he worked at a
construction company. After 2 months of working there, however, he was
apprehended by the Pila Police in connection with the slaying and robbing
of Maria Regay. He was brought to the municipal building of Pila (pp. 7-
8, ibid).

"He alleged that during his investigation, he was given blows,

kicks, and bullets placed in between his fingers and electric
treatment by the police authorities of Pila, because he told them
that it was his uncle who was the culprit. After that he was asked
to sign a confession (Exhibit C) prepared by police authorities
(pp. 8-10, ibid).
"While detained at the Provincial Jail, he wrote a letter (Exhibit 1)
addressed to Fiscal Regaza, a portion of which, marked as Exhibit 1-a,
states as follows:

'x x x xxx xxx

'x x x aaminin ko na po ang aking pagkakasala sa harap ng hukuman,

subalit kung bibigyan po ninyo ako ng mababang sintensiya, labis na po
akong naawa sa isang tao na napasangkot o isinangkot ng aking
complainant dahil sa katotohanang siya po ay wala sa lugar na
pinangyarihan ng krimen.

'Ang tao pong ito ay si Ginoong Crisanto Lara, tatlumpu at apat na taong
gulang ng Barangay Balat-atis, San Antonio, Quezon.'
"While he initially denied being (sic) written Exhibit 1 claiming that it was
written by Jojo Acosta from San Pedro (p. 19, TSN, January 23, 1987), on
subsequent questioning by the defense counsel, however, he stated that the
whole of Exhibit 1-a are his (p. 14,ibid)."
In this appeal, the accused-appellant raises the following assignment of
errors (pp. 51-52, Rollo):

"I

"The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Mario

Marasigan.

"II

"The trial court erred in finding that accused Crisanto Lara struck the
victim with a piece of wood and that the prosecutor was able to
demonstrate that the accused can still hold and grip a stamp pad.

"III

"The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of rebuttal witness
Honorio Delos Santos.
 "IV

"The trial court erred in not giving credence to the entire testimony of
accused Fernando Collado."
I

The accused-appellant tries to destroy the credibility of Mario Marasigan by

asseverating that: 1) if he really searched the coconut plantation in looking
for a suitable post, he would have seen the four accused during that time
considering that the tree where he got the post is about 50 meters away
from the scene of the incident, unless the four accused and the victim fell
down from the sky; 2) the sound produced by cutting the branches of a tree
would not have escaped the sense of hearing of the four accused; 3) he
testified that the first time he saw the accused-appellant again since
January 20, 1985 was when the accused-appellant was apprehended by the
police but according to the daughter of the victim, the accused-appellant
attended the wake and even solicited contributions; 4) his failure to help
the victim and report the incident immediately but instead proceeded to do
his normal work is inconsistent with human nature; and 5) his cross-
examination is full of material inconsistencies as to the length of time he
stayed atop the tree and the place where the accused-appellant was
positioned.

Mario Marasigan's failure to see the four accused at the time he was looking
for posts could be due to the fact that the coconut plantation was vast (p. 4,
tsn, September 30, 1986). There were ten (10) coconut trees, seven (7)
lanzones trees, two (2) sampaloc trees and bamboo grass between the place
where he and the four accused were situated (p. 9, ibid). It was only when
he was already on the top of a tree (p. 7, ibid), about four (4) meters from
the ground (p. 8, ibid), facing the direction where the four accused were
positioned (p. 10, ibid), that he saw them. His view while on the top of a
tree was not in any way obstructed by these trees because they were tall and
far from one another (pp. 9-10, ibid).

Mario Marasigan has cut just one branch of the tree when he saw the four
accused (p. 11, tsn, September 30, 1986). He used a bolo in cutting this
branch (p. 7, ibid). The distance between him and the four accused was
about fifty (50) meters (p. 8, ibid). Taking into account these
circumstances, the four accused could not have heard the sound produced
when Mario Marasigan cut a branch of the tree. Besides, their attention
was focused on the arrival of the victim (p. 5, tsn, September 15,
1986). Thus, the four accused could not have noticed the presence of Mario
Marasigan.

It is probable that Mario Marasigan and the accused-appellant attended the

wake on different dates and time that is why the former saw the latter for
the second time since the incident only when he was apprehended by the
police.

Mario Marasigan's failure to help the victim, his mother-in-law, and report
the incident immediately but instead proceeded to do his normal work, per
se, is inconsistent with human nature. However, such failure was
satisfactorily explained by him. He failed to help the victim while the latter
was being attacked because he was taken by surprise when he saw his
uncle, the accused-appellant, hit her (p. 15, p. 18, tsn, September 30,
1986). He also failed to report the incident at once to the authorities
because one of the perpetrators of the crime is his uncle and he pities him
(p. 12, tsn, September 15, 1986; p. 26, tsn, September 30, 1986). He
reported the incident on February 5, 1985 or after 15 days, when he was
disturbed by his conscience (p. 22, tsn, September 30, 1986).

The inconsistencies referred to are de minimus which are not sufficient to

blur or cast doubt on Mario Marasigan's straightforward attestations
(see People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990, 184 SCRA 105,
citing People v. Cabato, G.R. No. L-37400, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA
98). Rather than discredit his testimony, discrepancies on minor details
must be viewed as adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous
testimonies (Aportadera, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G. R. No. L-
41358, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 695). Whether Mario Marasigan stayed
on top of the tree for ten (10) minutes or for twenty (20) to twenty five (25)
minutes and whether the accused-appellant was at the middle of the road
or behind a coconut tree is beside the point.

II

Still in relation to the questioned credibility of Mario Marasigan, the

accused-appellant alleges that he (Mario Marasigan) could not have
positively identified the piece of wood (guava branch, about 2.5 inches in
diameter) allegedly used in hitting the victim because he was fifty (50)
meters away, unless he possesses the eye of an eagle. The accused-
appellant is unable to hold a piece of wood with a diameter of about 2.5
inches much more swing and strike it with such force as to cause a person
to fall down because his left hand is amputated, his right hand is
"pasmado," with the forefinger severed, the middle and ring fingers
damaged and the other two fingers deformed. Contrary to the finding of
the trial court, nothing in the record shows that the accused-appellant was
able to hold and grip a stamp pad. Had the proceedings taken place before
the judge who penned the decision, he could have taken judicial notice that
at that point in time when the fiscal put into the right hand of the accused-
appellant a stamp pad, his right hand was then resting on the arm rest of
the chair with his palm open.

Mario Marasigan was able to specify the kind of wood used by the accused-
appellant in hitting the victim perhaps because of the fact that he is a
carpenter (p. 2, tsn, September 15, 1986), resident in a rural area and tends
a plantation (p. 4, ibid). It is, therefore, to be expected that he is familiar
with different types of wood. At any rate, the specific kind of wood used by
the accused-appellant is again of no moment. What is material is the
testimony of Mario Marasigan that the accused-appellant struck the victim
on the face with a piece of wood (p. 7, ibid). This was corroborated by the
testimony of the physician that the fracture on the head of the victim was
most probably caused by some hard object like a piece of wood or metal (p.
8, tsn, September 9, 1986).

The alleged incapacity of the accused-appellant cannot overthrow the

positive testimony of Mario Marasigan that he saw him (the accused-
appellant) strike the victim with a piece of wood which caused her to fall to
the ground (p. 15, tsn, September 30, 1986). The accused-appellant should
have proven in court his alleged incapacity. He merely testified that he is in
a position to submit to a physical examination with regard to the capability
of his right hand should the trial court desire (p. 8, tsn, March 11, 1987). It
was his duty to substantiate his contention and not rely on the desire of the
trial court. Anyway, in his cross-examination, the prosecution succeeded in
eliciting from him the vital fact that he is not left-handed and even after his
hands were damaged, he was still able to work, that is, buying banana fruits
(p. 7, tsn, March 17, 1987). Moreover, when a stamp pad was thrown to
him, he held it with his right hand (p. 8, ibid). The counsel of the accused-
appellant objected to the manner the fiscal conducted the cross-
examination because it was tantamount to making the accused-appellant
the prosecution's witness (ibid) and not because the right hand of the
accused-appellant was then resting on the arm rest of the chair with the
palm open, as he now claims. The defense of incapacity which was weak
from the very start, collapsed during the cross-examination.

III

The accused-appellant likewise puts in issue the credibility of Honorio

delos Santos because according to him, he came to know of the plan to rob
the victim on January 18 and 19, 1985 when the accused-appellant made
such proposal to him. However, it took him two years, three months and
three days before he revealed such proposal.

The delay by Honorio delos Santos to reveal the proposal made by the
accused-appellant to him was satisfactorily explained in his testimony that
it was long after the incident happened that the children of the victim
needed him (p. 26, tsn, April 21, 1987). At any rate, the accused-appellant's
conviction may be sustained even without Honorio delos Santos'
testimony. The testimony of Mario Marasigan, being positive and credible,
is sufficient to support a conviction (see People v. Mision, G.R. No. 63480,
February 26, 1991).

IV

Finally, the accused-appellant maintains that since the judge who wrote the
decision had no opportunity of observing the demeanor of Fernando
Collado when he testified in court, the most logical thing for him to do was
to consider his entire testimony or disregard it entirely.

It is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on the basis
of the record for the trial judge might have died, resigned, retired,
transferred, etc. (People v. Escalante, et al., G.R. No. L-37147, August 22,
1984, 131 SCRA 237). The fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not
the one who rendered the judgment and that for that reason the latter did
not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during
the trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not render the
judgment erroneous (Co Tao v. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188 and U.S. v.
Abreu, 30 Phil 402). Actually, it was not necessary for the trial judge, who
wrote the decision, to have observed the demeanor of Fernando
Collado. He merely considered his admission in court that money was
taken from the victim, P200.00 of which was given to him (p. 35, Rollo),
and disregarded his inconsistent testimony as to the participation of the
accused-appellant in the crime charged (pp. 40-41, Rollo):

"It is on record that Fernando Collado declared at the courtroom that

Crisanto Lara was not with them at the time of the robbery, (TSN, January
14, 1987, p. 5) but this appears to be a mere afterthought because at the
police station, he implicated the accused (Ibid, p. 7). Though this was later
explained by him as being the instruction of their uncle, Romeo Gloriani,
his excuse imply lacks reliability and acceptance. Why impute the crime, of
all people, on a nephew, Feli(x) Collado, and a friend, Crisanto Lara? Why
will his uncle involve the two? Feli(x) Collado is is (sic) his brother. Why
did he blindly follow his uncle? (W)as it not more convenient to point to
other persons not dear to them? This evidently goes against the realities of
life, unless of course, they were really in conspiracy with one another."
We note that the judge who rendered judgment in this case took on a
painstaking task of scrutinizing in great detail the records and wrote a
comprehensive decision (pp. 34-41, Rollo):

"After an evaluation of the evidentiary records, the Court finds, beyond

reasonable doubt, that the accused, Crisanto Lara, has committed the crime
of Robbery with Homecide (sic). The prosecution has sufficiently
established by strong and persuasive evidence that the accused was one of
four persons who conspired to commit robbery against the victim during
the perpetration of which the latter was killed. The evidence shows that the
accused is a principal by direct participation. No less than his nephew,
Mario Marasigan, testified that he saw him struck the victim on the face
with a piece of wood which appeared to him to be a branch of a guava tree
(TSN, September 15, 1986, p. 7). This was corroborated by the findings of
the medico-legal officer who testified that the victim also suffered a fracture
on the head due to some hard object, like a piece of wood (TSN, September
9, 1989, pp. 8 and 11).

"The overt act was the initial step of the conspirators in executing the crime
charged. After the victim was struck by the accused, she was later on
dragged and stabbed several times by Romeo Gloriani (Ibid, p. 9) who
thereafter raised her skirt and cut the cord of muslim cloth (katsa) around
her waist (TSN, September 30, 1986, p. 17; TSN, October 14, 1986, p. 12)
where she usually kept her money (TSN, September 15, 1986, p.
11). Accused Fernando Collado confirmed that money was taken from the
victim, P200.00 of which was given to him (TSN, January 14, 1987, p. 5).

"x x x xxx x x x.

"The bare fact is that Mario Marasigan was very positive that it was the
accused who struck the victim. There could not have been a case of
mistaken identity; the accused was his uncle, a brother of his father,
Dionisio Marasigan, on his maternal side (TSN, September 15, 1986, p. 3;
TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 6). And it has not been shown that Mario
Marasigan had an ill motive against his uncle.

"x x x xxx x x x.

"As the accused was positively identified, his defense that he was in a
hospital at Sta. Cruz, Laguna, at the time of the incident cannot
prosper. Alibi is unavailing as a defense against the positive identification
of the accused by a witness (See Aportadera v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
31358, March 16, 1988). It is an inherently weak defense for it is easy to
fabricate (Ibid). For alibi as a defense to succeed, it must be shown that not
only was an accused at some other place at the same time but it was
physically impossible for him to have been at scene of the crime at the time
of its commission (People vs. Almario, G.R. 69374, March 16, 1989; People
vs. Reunir, G.R. 73605, January 29, 1988).

"In this case, assuming his assertion that he was at the Laguna Provincial
Hospital at Santa Cruz is true, such fact cannot eliminate him as a possible
perpetrator. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that Sta. Cruz is just 9
kilometers away from Pila and can be reached within 8 to 12 minutes. Brgy.
Mojon is even nearer. In one case, it was held that the fact that the victim's
house is accessible by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved road in a matter of 15
to 20 minutes from the place where the accused claimed to be at the time
the crime was committed, sufficiently demonstrates that it was not
physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime
(See People v. Temblor, G.R. 66884, May 28, 1988). In the case of People
vs. Almario, supra, the Supreme Court rejected the alibi of the accused who
claimed that he was at Tondo, Manila, which is one and half hour drive
from the scene of the crime, Lumban, Laguna.

"Anyway, his self-serving defense of alibi was lacking in corroboration. His

nephew, Romeo Marasigan, whom he claimed to have visited at the hospital
was never presented to confirm his version. Hospital records could have
been subpoenaed and presented to show that he was really confined in the
said hospital. In other words, his claim is lacking in convincing details to
inspire belief.

"x x x xxx x x x.

"Moreover, his claim that he was at San Antonio, Quezon, before January
20, 1985 and arrived at Pila only in the morning of said date is belied by the
testimony of Honorio delos Santos whom he pointed to as the person to
whom he turned over his collections from the tricycle drivers (TSN, April 2,
1987, p. 5). Honorio delos Santos bluntly stated that the accused was the
mastermind because on two occasions before the incident, on the 18th and
the 19th of January, 1985, the latter approached him at their house at
Mojon, Pila, Laguna and proposed to him that they rob the victim (TSN,
April 21, 1987, p. 3 to 10)."
We find that the quantum of proof necessary to overcome the presumption
of innocence and establish the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime charged is adequate.

The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of disregard of

age and sex, uninhabited place, taking advantage of superior strength and
evident premeditation. Disregard of the respect due the offended party by
reason of his rank, age or sex may be taken into account only in crimes
against persons or honor, when in the commission of the crime there is
some insult or disrespect shown to rank, age or sex. It is not proper to
consider this aggravating circumstance in crimes against
property. Robbery with homicide is primarily a crime against property and
not against persons. Homicide is a mere incident of the robbery, the latter
being the main purpose and object of the criminal (People v. Pagal, et al.,
G.R. No. L-32040, October 25, 1977, 79 SCRA 570; People v. Capillas, et
al., G.R. No. L-27177, October 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 173; People v. Pecato, et
al., G.R. No. L-41008, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 14). Neither should evident
premeditation be considered against the accused-appellant. The requisites
necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have not been met in this
case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time
when the four accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the four accused had clung to their determination
to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between
the determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the
consequences of their act (People v. Batas, G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2,
1989, 176 SCRA 46; People v. Iligan, et al., G.R. No. 75369, November 26,
1990).

The aggravating circumstances of uninhabited place and taking

advantage of superior strength attended the commission of the
crime. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code provides, inter alia, that any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
any person shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed. Correlating this provision with Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, paragraph 2, subparagraph 1 which provides that when in the
commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance,
the greater penalty shall be applied, the proper imposable penalty is
death. In view, however, of Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R. Nos. L-38968-
70, February 9, 1989, that the cited Constitutional provision did not declare
the abolition of the death penalty but merely prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death
penalty whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but
instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua (People v. Orita, supra;
People v. Solis, et al., G.R. Nos. 78732-33, February 14, 1990, 182 SCRA
182). Reclusion perpetua, being a single indivisible penalty under Article
294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, is imposed regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63,
paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code; see People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 59713,
March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 615; People v. Manzano, G.R. No. L-38449,
November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 705; People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 70744,
May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 702).

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the civil indemnity is
increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

We are reviewing herein the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 6

February 2007, in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01396, affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, convicting father and son, Castor
and Neil Batin, of the crime of murder. The conviction was for the killing of one
Eugenio Refugio, who was shot in the afternoon of 21 October 1994, while he was
leaning against a mango tree near his house on St. Peter Street, San Paolo
Subdivision, Nagkakaisang Nayon, Novaliches, Quezon City.

The Information[2] against Castor and Neil Batin was filed by the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 11 April 1995, alleging as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of October, 1994, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, and with evident premeditation, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one EUGENIO
REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there shooting him with a handgun,
hitting him on the right side of his stomach, thereby inflicting upon him
 serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Eugenio Refugio y Zosa, in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.

Castor and Neil Batin entered pleas of not guilty.

The prosecution, presented as its witnesses Eusebio Farrales, Vilma Juadinez

Rodriguez, Florante Baltazar, Josephine Refugio, PO3 Marifor Segundo and Police
Inspector Solomon Segundo, offered the following version of the facts, as
summarized by the trial court:

Eugenios wife, Josephine Refugio, was with him when he was shot,
facing him as he leaned against the mango tree and, in fact, had her arms
resting on his shoulders. She recalled that before the shooting, she was at
home at No. 4-A St. Peter Street that afternoon when, looking out of the
window, she caught sight of Castor Batin washing his feet at a nearby
faucet. Castor was angrily muttering, and she distinctly heard him say,
among the other things he said: Mga matatandang kunsintidor, dapat
manahimik na. Then, being through with washing himself, Castor moved
towards the street. Seeing this, she went down and also went to the street
because of a feeling of uneasiness (Para po akong kinakabahan, kasi,
ganoon naman ang ginagawa nila lagi, eh, pag nalalasing). Finding her
husband leaning against the mango tree on the side of St. Peter Street, she
went to him. She tried to talk Eugenio into going home with her because
Castor was again into one of his wild ways (Nagwawala na naman, daldal
ng daldal). As he was talking with Eugenio, she glanced to her left and
saw Neil Batin standing at the gate to their (Batins) compound, looking
towards her and her husband. A few moments later, Neil went to one of
the parked cars, opened its door, and took a gun from inside. She next
noticed Castor going towards Neil as the latter stood at the side of the car
and shouting: Huwag! Castor grabbed the gun from Neil. After the gun
was taken from him, Neil just proceeded towards the right rear of the
car.Castor followed Neil and handed the gun back to him.

When she shifted her glance from the Batins, Josephine heard
Castor ordering his son: Sige, banatan mo na. Neil responded by drawing
the gun from his waistline, raising and aiming it at her and her husband,
and firing twice from his eye-level. Both Josephine and Eugenio fell to the
ground, the former, backwards, and the latter landing on top of her. As
they tried to get up, Eugenio uttered to her: Nanay, may tama ako. She
then pulled her husband by the shoulder of his shirt so that she could take
him to their house as he was already slumped to the right. She later rushed
her husband to the Quezon City General Hospital, where he underwent
surgery, but later expired.

Other eyewitnesses from the neighborhood were presented and they

substantially corroborated her testimonial account.

One of them, Eusebio Farrales, a resident of No. 7 St. Paul Street,

in relation to which St. Peter Street was perpendicular, recalled being at
the barangay outpost near the corner of St. Peter Street and St. Paul Street
between 3:00 and 3:30 pm of the afternoon of October 21, 1994 engaged
in the clearing of the debris of the recent typhoon when he heard someone
cursing and challenging to a fight. Walking towards St. Peter Street where
the voice came, he saw that it was Castor. He also saw other neighbors,
namely, Eugenio, Josephine, and Eugenios mother, Emilia
Refugio. According to Farrales, Castor was moving aimlessly for around
five minutes (Walang direktion at pa-ikot ikot lang siya doon) while
cussing: Putang ina ninyo, sino ang matapang lumabas.

Farrales stated that a white car and a white-and-yellow colored

taxicab were parked on the side portion of the street fronting the gate to
the compound of the Batins and near where Eugenio and Josephine
stood. Emilia, the mother of Eugenio, then came towards him, but he
advised her to seek assistance from the barangay tanod. After Emilia
proceeded towards St. Paul Street to do so, Neil came out through the gate,
opened the door of the white car, took out a gun from inside, and handed
the gun to Castor, but the latter returned the gun to Neil. Upon getting
back the gun, Neil reentered the yard through the gate.

Farrales asserted that in the meanwhile Eugenio remained leaning

against the mango tree with Josephine facing him and her arms resting on
his shoulders. They were in this position when Neil again came out
through the gate a few moments later and proceeded to the right side of
the car, still holding the handgun. From there, Neil fired twice at the
Refugios. The Refugios both fell to the left of the mango tree. Farrales
saw both Castor and Neil quickly enter the compound. At that point,
Farrales decided to run home in order to summon Alfredo Dizon, his
 tenant, who was a police officer because he feared that the Batins might
escape from the scene by car.

Farrales and Dizon lost no time in going to the place of the

Batins. After Dizon talked with Castor at the gate of the latters compound,
the latter entered the house of his nephew, Ricky Basilio, which was
beside Castors own house. A few moments later, Castor came out of
Basilios house to let Dizon in through the gate. It was about this time that
the responding police officers arrived at the scene. The victim had been
rushed to the hospital immediately.

Another neighbor, Vilma Juadines Rodriguez, resident of No. 7-A

St. Peter Street, declared that while she was at home taking care of her
baby at between 3:00 and 3:30 pm of October 21, 1994, she heard
someone challenging others to a fight; that looking out of her window
(dungaw), she saw that it was Boy Batin Castor and he was then walking
about on St. Peter Street; that just then, her child cried, and so she went to
him; that upon returning to the window to call her other child, she saw
Castor hand over a handgun to Neil, and the latter thereafter entered
through their gate; that she next saw Neil load bullets into the gun and
then tucking it in his right waistline; that after loading, Neil went out to
the street, went between the parked white car and yellow taxicab, aimed
the gun at Eugenio and Josephine who were at the mango tree, and then
asked Castor: Tay, banatan ko na?; that Castor replied: Sige, anak,
banatan mo na. that, at that instant, Neil fired two shots; that as she went
down to get her other child upon hearing the gunshots, she heard Josephine
say: Tay, may tama ka; that she later reentered her house; and that she
knew that Eugenio died afterwards.

Although Eugenio was rushed to the Quezon City

General Hospital right after the shooting and was operated on, he expired
the next day. His remains were properly identified in writing by his
brother, Tito Eugenio.[3]

The medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Dr. Florante
Baltazar, conducted an autopsy on Eugenios remains. In his Medico-Legal Report
No. M-1715-94,[4] he indicated that Eugenio sustained one gunshot wound, which
was, however, fatal, because it went slightly upward, slightly anteriorward from the
right to the left of the body, fracturing the right to [the] left [of the] thoracic region,
lacerating the right lumbar region. Dr. Baltazar made the certification as to the cause
of death in the death certificate.[5]

Upon a written request[6] from the Novaliches Police Station, Quezon City,
Police Inspector Solomon Segundo, Chief of the Firearms Identification Branch of
the Central Crime Laboratory, Northern Police District Command, Quezon City,
conducted the ballistics examination to ascertain whether or not the bullet recovered
from the victim was fired from the specimen firearm submitted for
examination. P/Insp. Segundo prepared Ballistics Report No. B-042-94,[7] wherein
he certified that the bullet from the recovery box[8] and the bullet recovered from the
victims body[9] were fired from the same specimen firearm.[10] This conclusion was
arrived at after a test fire and a comparison under the bullet comparison microscope.

The defense, on the other hand, presented accused Neil Batin, Castors
common-law wife Maricon Pantoja, and one Restituto Paller. Neil Batins testimony
is summarized by the trial court as follows:

Neil substantially claimed that it was his responsibility to conduct

his younger brothers to school and fetch them by car; that he also drove
their taxicab; that it was about 7:00 oclock in morning of October 21,
1994, while he was cleaning the family-owned taxicab, that he found a
short gun (de bola) underneath it beside the right rear wheel; that he picked
the gun and concealed it in the compartment of the taxicab; that he
continued with his chore of cleaning; that as soon as he finished cleaning
the taxicab, he drove the white Datsun car to Tondo to fetch his six-year
old brother Mark, the son of his father with Maricon Pantoja; that Mark
was a pupil at the Magat Salamat Elementary School in Tondo; that after
picking up Mark, they drove to the house of his uncle, Domingo Batin, in
Marulas, Valenzuela, to get his clothes from his cousin; that they arrived
there at 11:00 am, and spent around two hours there; that from Marulas,
they went home, arriving at St. Peter Street at around 2:30 pm; that he
parked the car on the road in front of their fence; that he and Mark first
entered the house to deposit Marks school things and later went outside to
await the arrival of Marks mother; that his other brothers were outside;
that Castor was also outside talking with a man whose name he did not
know but whom he had seen thrice before as well as with Boy Iigo in front
of the latters house; that Iigos house was 15 meters from their gate; that
Pantoja soon arrived at around 2:45 pm; that he continued talking and
playing with his brothers; and that at that point he decided to take the gun
 from the compartment of the taxicab then parked around 2 meters away
from where he and his brothers were and tucked it in his waistline.

Having thus tucked the gun, Neil went to stand at the right rear side
of the Datsun car which was parked facing the mango tree (halos
magkatapat lang po). Maricon came out to the street at that point to ask
him about the time he had fetched Mark. It was while he was standing
there with the others that, according to Neil, he suddenly felt the impulse
of drawing the gun from his waistline (Bigla kong naisipang bunutin ang
baril). He thus drew the gun and turned around, but, as he did so, he
accidentally pulled the trigger, causing the gun to fire twice (Tumalikod
po ako, tapos nakalabit ko, pumutok ng dalawang beses).

Neil admitted knowing the late Eugenio Refugio and his wife
Josephine because they were his neighbors with only a high wall
separating their houses; but denied seeing them that afternoon beside the
mango tree.

At the sound of gunfire, Castor rushed towards Neil from where he

was in front of Iigos house, shouting twice to his son: Huwag! Pantoja, for
her part, forced Neil to enter the compound, where she brought him inside
the house of his aunt. Neil concealed the gun in the ceiling of the aunts
house.

Neil said that he and his father did not grapple inside the Datsun
car for possession of the gun; that his father did not wrest the gun from
him; that he did not enter the compound to put bullets in the gun; that his
father did not order him to shoot Eugenio; and that his father was not
drunk and challenging others to a fight. He insisted that he and the
Refugios, with whom he was acquainted since 1987, had no
misunderstandings, for he even had shared drinks with the late Eugenio
before October 21, 1994.[11]

As regards the testimonies of the defenses two other witnesses, the trial court
could not make an intelligible narrative of the version of the facts presented by them,
considering the contradictions it found in their testimonies. The trial court found
glaring Maricon Pantojas self-contradiction as to where she and the accused were
when Eugenio was shot. During the trial, Maricon testified that she, Neil and Castor
were outside their house when Neil drew the gun and accidentally fired. However,
in her affidavit,[12] she alleged that they went outside their house upon hearing a gun
explosion and saw Eugenio Refugio alone holding his stomach x x x we have no any
knowledge whether he was hit by a bullet.[13]

On 8 June 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision finding both accused
guilty of murder, qualified by treachery, to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused

CASTOR BATIN and NEIL BATIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under Art. 248, Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and they are hereby each sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua; and ordered to pay the heirs of EUGENIO REFUGIO,
through his wife, JOSEPHINE REFUGIO, as follows:

1] P50,000.00, as death indemnity;

2] P61,500.00, as actual damages;

3] P500,000.00, as moral damages;

4] P307,920.00, as indemnity for lost of earning capacity; and

5] The costs of suit.[14]

Neil and Castor Batin filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. However,
on 13 November 2000, accused Neil Batin filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw
Appeal. The People interposed no objection to the Motion, which was granted.

On 6 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision

affirming, with modification, the Decision of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No.
Q-95-61003 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to civil
liabilities. With the exception of the award of moral damages which is
reduced to P100,000.00 and the indemnity for loss of earning capacity
which is increased to P723,840.00, the awards for death indemnity and
actual damages are retained.[15]
 Castor Batin now comes before this Court, assigning the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT

GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS PRINCIPAL FOR
INDUCEMENT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT

GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TRACHERY.[16]

Castor Batin prays that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and
set aside and a new one entered acquitting him of the crime charged. In the
alternative, he prays that he be held liable for the crime of homicide only, arguing
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently stated in the
Information.

Whether there was conspiracy in the

killing of Eugenio Refugio

It is evident from Castors Supplemental Brief and all his other issuances after
the withdrawal of Neils appeal that he had already discarded Neils theory of
accidental shooting. Instead, his arguments are geared toward his distancing himself
from the act of Neil in shooting Eugenio Refugio.

We cannot, however, dispose of the discussion of Neils theory of accidental

shooting. As Neils testimony had been the only evidence presented by the defense
to rebut the prosecutions evidence concerning the acts of Castor during the incident,
we should carefully scrutinize Neils testimony to determine his credibility.
 Neil claims that while his back was still turned against the Refugios, he
suddenly felt the impulse to draw the gun from his waistline. He drew the gun, turned
around with the gun in hand, and accidentally fired it twice without aiming it at
anyone.

As held by the trial court, this account is plainly far-fetched and

incredible. As observed by the trial court,

The revolver involved herein was a mechanical firearm which

belonged to the so-called double-action type of guns. This type has a
firing mechanism which permits two methods of firing the first is by
manually cocking or retracting the hammer and then pressing the trigger
to release the hammer; the second is by applying continuous pressure
on the trigger in order to cock the hammer and then releasing the
trigger. The drop of the hammer by either method propels the firing pin
forward so that its other end strikes the primer cap to explode the
propellant charge inside the shell which then forces out the bullet through
the gun barrel. From the nature of the firing mechanism of Exhibit O, and
there being no evidence showing that the hammer was manually cocked
before the gun fired, it was absolutely physically impossible for the gun
to fire accidentally.

In order to determine for himself how much pressure was necessary to

cock the hammer into firing position, the undersigned presiding judge
personally tested the trigger pull of Exhibit O. Even assuming that the
passage of time from the date of the shooting caused some change on the
efficiency of the firing mechanism, such change can only show up by way
of a weakening of the hammer spring. Nonetheless, it was not surprising
for the undersigned presiding judge to find heavy resistance at each trigger
pull, such that he exerted some force to cock the hammer. This actual
testing easily validated the conclusion that firing the gun accidentally
and unintentionally was impossible.[17]

Neils claim that he accidentally fired the gun twice in quick succession is,
thus, even more incredible. Given the difficulty of pulling the trigger to cock the
hammer into firing position, it is inconceivable how the gun could have been fired
by Neil twice in quick succession except by a deliberate and intentional pulling of
the trigger.
 Given the physical attributes and condition of the gun involved in the case at
bar, the testimony of Eusebio Farrales is likewise observed to be much more credible
than that of Neil. Whereas Neil claims that he accidentally fired the gun twice using
only one hand, Eusebio Farrales testified that Neil fired at the Refugios while
holding the gun with both hands and from a standing position.

While the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law
and is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence,[18] Neils credibility has been
severely tarnished by the foregoing portion of his testimony. Thus, we should
likewise take with a grain of salt the following parts of his testimony which tend to
refute the account of the prosecution concerning the acts of Castor during the
incident: (1) that Neil and Castor did not grapple inside the Datsun car for possession
of the gun; (2) that Castor did not wrest the gun from him; (3) that Neil did not enter
the compound to put bullets in the gun; (4) that Castor did not order Neil to shoot
Eugenio; and (5) that Castor was not drunk and challenging others to a fight.

As stated above, Castor has already discarded Neils theory of accidental

shooting and, instead, focuses on distancing himself from the act of Neil in shooting
Eugenio Refugio. Castors principal defense in this appeal is that the conviction of a
person as a principal by inducement requires (1) that the inducement be made with
the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and (2) that such inducement
be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor.[19]

Castor claims that there is no conclusive proof that he participated in the

shooting, and that (h)is alleged utterance of the words Sige, banatan mo na cannot
be considered as the moving cause of the shooting. According to Castor, if he had
wanted his son to shoot Eusebio Refugio, he would not have shouted Huwag and
struggled for possession of the gun.

We are not persuaded.

First of all, the theory presented by the prosecution in both the Information
and in their arguments before the courts is not Castors being a principal by
inducement, but rather his being a co-conspirator. If conspiracy is proven, the act of
one is the act of all. As stated above, the widow, Josephine Refugio, and the
neighbors -- Eusebio Farrales and Vilma Juadinez Rodriguez -- testified to the fact
that Castor handed the gun to Neil and urged the latter to fire at the Refugio
spouses. The trial court, whose assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves
great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe first-hand the
expression and demeanor of the witnesses at the trial,[20] found these witnesses
credible, thus:

From its careful and thorough evaluation of the record, the Court
finds that Castor and Neil conspired in shooting Eugenio. This finding is
inexorable because the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses that
Castor returned the gun back to Neil; that he instigated Neil to shoot by
shouting: Sige, banatan mo na; and that Neil then fired his gun twice were
credible and sufficed to prove Castors indispensable cooperation in the
killing of Eugenio. Accordingly, Castor was as much liable criminally for
the death of Eugenio as Neil, the direct participant in the killing, was.

The reliability of witnesses Farrales and Rodriguez, for one, cannot

be doubted. Being the neighbors of both the Batins and the Refugios, their
claim of witnessing the events that culminated into the shooting of
Eugenio was unassailable. The accused, in fact, could not provide any
reason or motive for them to testify against the Batins unless it was upon
the truth.[21]

While Castor was indeed heard to have shouted Huwag, this cannot be
considered as reliable evidence that he tried to dissuade Neil from firing the gun. It
was established by credible testimony that he handed back the gun to Neil and urged
him to shoot the Refugio spouses. Josephine Refugio plainly stated on cross-
examination that Castor shouted Huwag while inside the car grappling for
possession of the gun, and not when Neil was aiming the gun at the spouses. Thus:

(Atty. Siobal Cross-examining)

Q The second time around that you saw him was when he moved towards
the right rear of the car?

A I did not remove my sight at Neil Batin as he moved towards this car,
sir.
Q Also, without moving your glance or gaze at Neil Batin, you saw him
proceed to the right rear portion of the car and open the right rear
door of said car, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q And without also removing your gaze or sight at Neil Batin, you saw
him open and get a gun inside the car?

A I saw Neil Batin opened the right rear door, as if he is putting all his
body inside the car, when Mang Boy took hold of Neil, they were
grappling for possession of the gun, and raised it above, and that
was the time when my husband saw the gun raised, and I also saw
the gun.

Court

So they were both inside the car, their arms were both inside the car and
the gun was inside the car when you and your husband saw this
particular scene?

A Yes, your Honor.

Atty. Siobal

So you saw Castor Batin and Neil Batin grappling for the gun when
they were inside the car?

A Yes, sir, and then Castor Batin shouted huwag.

Q And at that time they were grappling for the gun inside the car and
Castor Batin shouted huwag, after that, you and your husband saw
the gun atop the roof of the car, is that what you want to convey to
the Court?

A The gun was still inside the car, only we saw it through the glass
window, sir.

Q And what happened after that?

 A Neil Batin got out of the car, followed by Castor Batin and then Castor
gave the gun to Neil, and after receiving the gun, Neil placed the
gun at his waist, sir.

Q You said Neil Batin got out of the car ahead of Castor Batin, where did
Neil Batin go or proceed, to what direction?

A He proceeded to that place labeled as Exhibit G-7, sir.

Q And you said Castor Batin followed Neil Batin to the place where he
proceeded here at Exhibit G-7?

A Yes, sir.

Q Of course, when Neil Batin got out of the car ahead, his back, he must
have turned his back from you?

A He was sidewise in relation to me, sir.

Q How about Castor Batin, when he got out of the car, he must have turned
his back from you?

A Yes, sir.

Q And where was Castor Batin facing when you said he gave the gun to
Neil Batin?

A He was facing Neil, sir.[22]

As concluded by the trial court, the circumstances surrounding Castors

utterance of Huwag! shows beyond doubt that Castor shouted the same, not to stop
Neil from firing the gun, but to force him to leave the use of the gun to Castor. These
circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between the Batins in committing the
crime: after the Batins grappled for the gun and Castor shouted Huwag, Castor
finally decided to give the gun to Neil a crystal-clear expression of the agreement of
the Batins concerning the commission of a felony.

Conspiracy may also be deduced from the acts of the appellants before,
during, and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose,
concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.[23] Prosecution witnesses Josephine
Refugio and Eusebio Farrales positively indicated in their testimonies that prior to
the shooting of Eugenio Refugio, Castor was drunk, was openly challenging others
to a fight, and was uttering angry words. It was at this juncture that witnesses saw
Neil retrieve his gun from the parked car, after which Castor grabbed the gun from
his son, grappled with it, returned it to his son, and ordered the latter to shoot the
Refugios.

Secondly, even if we pursue the theory that the defense is trying to stir us to,
the results would be the same. Castors argument is that (h)is alleged utterance of the
words Sige, banatan mo na cannot be considered as the moving cause of the
shooting and, therefore, he cannot be considered a principal by inducement.

Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or

agreement for consideration. The words of advice or the influence must have
actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. We have held that
words of command of a father may induce his son to commit a crime. In People v.
Tamayo,[24] we held that the moral influence of the words of the father may
determine the course of conduct of a son in cases in which the same words coming
from a stranger would make no impression.

There is no doubt in our minds that Castors words were the determining cause
of the commission of the crime. As stated above, Vilma Juadines Rodriguez testified
that the eighteen-year-old Neil Batin asked his father before shooting: Tay, banatan
ko na? Neil Batin was clearly seeking the consent of his father before proceeding
with the act, and it was Castors words Sige, banatan mo na[25] that sealed Eugenio
Refugios fate.

Whether treachery was specifically alleged

in the Information

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.[26]
 According to the trial court, treachery was attendant in the killing of Eugenio
because Castor ordered Neil to fire at Eugenio after they clearly saw that he was still
leaning against the mango tree and being restrained by Josephine who had her arms
on his shoulders. Thereby, the accused insured their safety from any defensive or
retaliatory act of Eugenio who, in that position of helplessness and unpreparedness,
obviously had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate even if he wanted
to. The accused thus consciously used the firearm to assault from a distance, all the
more to enhance the chances of killing the victim without risk to themselves.[27]

Castor does not refute the above findings of the trial court that treachery
was sufficiently proven during the trial. All that Castor claims before us is that
the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not specifically alleged in the
Information.

The Information filed against the Batins states that the accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, and with evident premeditation, attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of one EUGENIO REFUGIO y ZOSA,
by then and there shooting him with a handgun, hitting him on the right side of his
stomach, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his untimely death.[28]

Castor claims that this charge does not allege the specific treacherous acts of
the accused. According to Castor, the allegation therein that the accused with
treachery x x x, attack, assault and employ personal violence is a mere conclusion
of law by the one who drafted the said Information. Hence, it did not satisfy the test
of sufficiency of Information as provided in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court.

Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 provides:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information

shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts
or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
 aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.

SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions

complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

Pertinently, we have held in Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of

Batangas[29] that the main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be
set forth in an Information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense. We added in said case that

[I]t is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished

from facts necessary to be stated in order to render the information
sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a general rule, matters of
evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the description of the
offense, need not be averred. For instance, it is not necessary to show on
the face of an information for forgery in what manner a person is to be
defrauded, as that is a matter of evidence at the trial.

We hold that the allegation of treachery in the Information is

sufficient. Jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein we found the allegation of
treachery sufficient without any further explanation as to the circumstances
surrounding it. Here are some of the cases:

In People v. Lab-eo,[30] Wilson Lab-eo was indicted for murder under the
following Information:

That on or about October 21, 1996, at the Barangay Hall, Poblacion,

Tadian, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and with the use of a
 sharp knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, strike and stab Segundina Cay-no with a well-honed and
pointed knife and thereby inflicting a mortal stab wound upon the victim
as reflected in that medico-legal certificate, to wit:
Stab wound infrascapular area left, penetrating with massive
hemathorax, which caused the death of the victim thereafter.
That the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength and craft
attended the commission of the offense.

The accused in this case argued that the Information above, while captioned
as Murder, only charged him with homicide as written. This Court found nothing
wrong with the Information, and ruled that the Information sufficiently charged the
accused with murder, not even considering the absence of an explanation of the
treachery stated therein, thus:

The fact that the qualifying circumstances were recited in the

second paragraph and not in the first paragraph of the Information, as
commonly done, is a matter of form or style for which the prosecution
should not be faulted. That the Provincial Prosecutor decided to write the
Information differently did not impair its sufficiency. Nothing in the law
prohibits the prosecutor from adopting such a form or style. As long as the
requirements of the law are observed, the Information will pass judicial
scrutiny.
xxxx
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person
of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court
to render judgment properly. The rule is that qualifying circumstances
must be properly pleaded in the Information in order not to violate the
accuseds constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is to allow the accused
to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the
trial. Significantly, the appellant never claimed that he was deprived of his
right to be fully apprised of the nature of the charges against him because
of the style or form adopted in the Information.[31]

This Court went on to affirm the conviction of the accused therein with murder
qualified by treachery.
The allegation in the Information of treachery as a qualifying circumstance was
similarly assailed in People v. Opuran,[32] wherein the charge was as follows:

Criminal Case No. 4693

That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South

Road, Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and treachery, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab Demetrio Patrimonio,
Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5 long from tip to handle with
scabbard), thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the back
of his body, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.

All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance

of treachery.

This Court again rejected the argument of the defense by finding the allegation
of treachery sufficient, and later on finding the accused therein guilty of murder
qualified by treachery:

We do not find merit in appellants contention that he cannot be

convicted of murder for the death of Demetrio, Jr. because treachery was
not alleged with specificity as a qualifying circumstance in the
information. Such contention is belied by the information itself, which
alleged: All contrary to law, and with the attendant qualifying
circumstance of treachery. In any event, even after the recent amendments
to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be
preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to
properly qualify an offense.[33]

Finally, the following constitutes the Information in People v. Bajar[34]:

That on or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00 oclock
in the evening, at sitio Mohon, Barangay Mambayaan, Municipality of
Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
 accused, then armed with a sharp bolo, with intent to kill, and with
evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab one 85 year old Aquilio Tiwanak,
accuseds father-in-law, hitting him on the different parts of his body,
which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of Aquilio Tiwanak in such amounts as may be allowed by law.

The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, taking advantage of

superior strength, disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his
age, habitual intoxication and relationship attended the commission of the
crime.

CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation

[to] Article 14, paragraph 3 and 15, and Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Like in the previous two cases, this Court found the Information to have
sufficiently alleged treachery as a qualifying circumstance. Evidentiary facts need
not be alleged in the information because these are matters of defense. Informations
need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the
trial.[35]

Whether the civil liabilities of the accused

were correctly awarded by the lower
courts

The trial court ordered the accused, Neil and Castor Batin, to pay the heirs of
Eugenio Refugio in the following amounts:

1) P50,000.00, as death indemnity;

2) P61,500.00, as actual damages;

3) P500,000.00, as moral damages;

4) P307,920.00, as indemnity for loss of earning capacity; and

5) the costs of suit.[36]

 Jurisprudence pegs the death indemnity in the above amount (P50,000.00)
pursuant to the current judicial policy on the matter. No proof thereof is
required. The P61,500.00 in actual damages consists of the expenses incurred by the
family of Eugenio Refugio, which Josephine Refugio testified to and was
summarized in Exhibit H:[37] (1) P25,000.00 for medicines, surgery and other
expenses for the hospitalization and emergency treatment;[38] (2) P20,000.00 for
funeral expenses, inclusive of the costs of coffin, funeral services, and expenses
during the wake;[39] and (3) P6,500.00 as for burial expenses.

The Court of Appeals also modified the trial courts computation of the
indemnity for loss of earning capacity. The trial court, finding the work of Eugenio
Refugio to be hazardous, reduced his life expectancy to 20 years.

This modification is in accord with our ruling in Pleyto v.

Lomboy.[40] Pleyto offers the following computation for the award for loss of earning
capacity:

Net Earning = 2/3 x (80 Age at x (Gross Annual

Capacity time of death) Income Reasonable
& Necessary Living
Expenses)

Eugenio Refugio, who was 31 years old at the time of his death, had a daily
income of P145.00. The Court of Appeals multiplied this amount by 26 working
days to get Eugenio Refugios monthly income of P3,770.00. The Court of Appeals
thus applied the Pleyto formula as follows:

Net Earning = 2/3 x (80 31) x [(P3770 x 12) (P3770 x 12)]

Capacity
Net Earning = 2/3 x (49) x [(P45,240) (P22,620)]
Capacity

Net Earning = 32 x [P22,620]

Capacity
 Net Earning = P723,840[41]
Capacity

Lastly, the Court of Appeals found the award of P500,000.00 as moral

damages to be excessive, and instead fixed the amount at P100,000.00. In accord
with prevailing jurisprudence, however, we further reduce this amount
to P50,000.00.[42]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modification the conviction of accused-appellant Castor Batin for murder
is AFFIRMED with FURTHER MODIFICATION as to the amount of the moral
damages, which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALEJANDRO

BAJAR, appellant.

DECISION
Per Curiam:

For the killing of his father-in-law, Aquilio Tiwanak, appellant Alejandro Bajar
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death in the 17 July 2000 Decision of the [1]

Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No.
99-942.
Alejandro was charged under an amended information whose accusatory
portion reads as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00 oclock in the evening,
at sitio Mohon, Barangay Mambayaan, Municipality of Balingasag, Province of
Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, then armed with a sharp bolo, with intent
to kill, and with evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab one 85 year old Aquilio Tiwanak, accuseds father-in-
law, hitting him on the different parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Aquilio Tiwanak in such amounts as
may be allowed by law.

The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, taking advantage of superior strength,

disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his age, habitual intoxication and
relationship attended the commission of the crime.

CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation [to] Article 14,
paragraphs 3 and 15, and Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. [2]

Upon his arraignment on 8 February 2000, Alejandro pleaded not guilty,

and trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution presented as witnesses
Alejandros wife, Lolita Bajar, and their two children, Ana Bajar Rabor and
Alma Luna Bajar, to testify on the events surrounding the commission of
the crime.
On 16 August 1999, Ana Bajar Rabor, a resident of Wao, Bukidnon, visited
her parents in their house in Sitio Mohon, Mambayaan, Balingasag, Misamis
Oriental. At around 3:00 p.m.of that day, her father Alejandro arrived home
[3]

already very drunk. At 5:00 p.m., Anas mother, Lolita Bajar, suggested that
since her father was very drunk, she should sleep at the house of her maternal
grandfather, the victim Aquilio, just one hundred meters away from the house
[4]

of Lolita.
[5]

That night, at around 8:00 p.m., Ana was listening to the radio while lying
on the floor of the bedroom in his grandfathers house. With her were her 1-year-
old daughter, Maybe Ann; her 11-year-old sister, Alma Bajar; and her 2-year-
old niece, May Joy Labandia. She was lying on the side of a wall that separated
[6]

the bedroom from the sala. This wall was made of bamboo splits with holes or
gaps in between such that she could clearly see her grandfather lying on his
bed in the sala. A gas lamp lit up the bedroom, while another hung on the wall
[7]

near the foot of the bed of her grandfather. [8]

The scenario was broken by the voice of Alejandro, who was still obviously
very drunk, inquiring whether his wife was in the house. While speaking his
demand, he pushed the main door to gain entry into the house, but he was not
able to enter. Aquilio answered that his wife was in their (Alejandros) house.
Alejandro accused Aquilio of lying and of hiding his daughter. Aquilio told
Alejandro to go home. Silence thereafter ensued.
[9]

Suddenly, Ana heard a sound and saw that Alejandro was able to enter the
house through the kitchen door. He was carrying a bolo and approaching her
grandfather. She saw her father hack her grandfather, who was lying on the
bed. She got up, ran towards the sala, and saw her father still hacking his
grandfather. She yelled for her father to stop. While he was being stabbed and
attacked, Aquilio stood up to embrace his son-in-law. Ana shouted for help as
she held down the hand which her father used to wield the
bolo. Alma witnessed these two last scenes. She saw her sister Ana trying to
[10]

stay the hand of their father which held the bolo, and Aquilio embracing
Alejandro while being hacked by the latter. [11]

Lolita, having heard the cries of her daughter, came to her fathers house.
There, she saw Aquilio embracing Alejandro. She then instructed Ana to hold
on to Alejandro while she looked for a piece of wood with which to hit him. With
the piece of wood she found, she struck Alejandros head three times. Alejandro
fainted. By this time, Aquilio slowly sank down to the floor and drew his last
[12]

breath. Lolita forthwith went outside to seek the help of neighbors. Anas uncle,
[13]

Tating Aganap, arrived and later brought two policemen, who handcuffed
Alejandro. [14]

Lolita also testified that she spent P30,000 for her father Aquilios burial
expenses. She felt sad about the demise of her father and described how her
sorrow could not be quantified by monetary consideration. To prove the age of
her father, Lolita presented the latters Identification Card from the Veterans
[15]

Federation of the Philippines, which indicated that he was born on 12 May

[16]

1914. Aquilio was then 85 years old.

[17]

The prosecutions last witness was Dr. Angelita Enopia, the Health Officer
of Balingasag, Misamis Oriental. She confirmed the findings she made on the
postmortem examination she conducted on the cadaver of Aquilio and on the
[18]

death certificate she issued. She claimed that Aquilio suffered three big
[19]

wounds: one on the maxilliary area on the right cheek which was slanting
towards the mouth, one on the anterior chest left side downwards to the armpit,
and one straight to the scapular area at the back. She opined that the injuries
were probably caused by a sharp object such as a bolo or a knife. [20]

The defense presented Alejandro as its lone witness. Alejandro testified that
on the date and time in question, he left his two daughters, Ana and Alma, and
his two grandchildren, Mary Joy and Ann-Ann, at his house. He proceeded to
his father-in-laws house to look for his wife. Upon arrival, he greeted Aquilio
with respect: Pa, good evening. The latter replied that Lolita was not there and
invited him (Alejandro) to go up and see for himself. Alejandro went up, and not
finding his wife, said: She is not here Pa. Aquilio angrily retorted: Everytime you
are drunk you come here to ask me. Aquilio then suddenly clubbed Alejandro
on the head with a 2 x 3 coco lumber he saw near the door. [21]

Alejandro then touched his head, and saw blood on his hand. He felt dizzy.
Seeing that Aquilio was about to attack him again, he drew out his hunting knife
and defended himself by moving his hand from the right to left. He felt he hit
something before he lost consciousness. He regained consciousness at
the Northern Mindanao Medical Center and discovered that a policeman
brought him there for the treatment of his head wound. He was found to have
[22]

sustained sutured wound 4 cm. left temporo-occipital area; lacerated wound 3

cm. left alteral neck area and confluent abrasion 3 pts. 1 x 1 cm. 2 x 1 cm. and
1 x 1 cm., left knee, with seven days healing period. [23]

Alejandro was later brought to the Balingasag Municipal Jail, where he was
visited by his two children and wife. On their respective visits, they informed him
that Aquilio was already dead. He cried when he learned the news, and begged
for his wifes forgiveness.[24]

In its decision of 17 July 2000, the trial court found Alejandro guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged against him, with
treachery as the qualifying circumstance. It concluded that his
uncorroborated and unsubstantiated self-defense theory was self-serving and
could not stand over the positive, categorical, spontaneous, and straightforward
declarations of his daughters and wife on how Aquilio was killed. It was
convinced that no wife in her right mind would testify in a heinous crime against
her husband, and no daughter in her right mind would testify in a heinous crime
against her father, unless the crime charged is true. Considering the presence
[25]

of the generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling, disregard of the respect

due to the victim by reason of his age, relationship, and habitual intoxication,
the trial court sentenced Alejandro to suffer the penalty of death and to
pay the heirs of the victim P30,000 as burial expenses; P50,000 as death
indemnity; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
The case is now before us on automatic review. [26]

In his Brief, Alejandro claims that all the elements of self-defense are
present in this case and that he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal. There was
lack of sufficient provocation on his part, as he respectfully greeted Aquilio and
mildly asked him about the whereabouts of his wife. Hence, he was surprised
when Aquilio very angrily answered him and suddenly clubbed him on the head
with a piece of wood, causing wounds on his head. It was when he saw that
Aquilio was about to club him again that he took out his hunting knife, which
was the only weapon available to him to parry the imminent blows by Aquilio.
There was, therefore, reasonable necessity of the means he employed to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression.
Alejandro assails the appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance
in that the alleged eyewitness Ana could not have seen how the attack
commenced. Ana admitted that she was not with Aquilio or beside him when he
(Alejandro) allegedly entered the house through the kitchen door and stabbed
the unsuspecting Aquilio. In fact, she claimed that she was lying on the bedroom
floor, with her feet toward the door, about a meter from the wall which divided
her room from the sala where her grandfather lay. Even if the wall had gaps,
she was still four to five meters from her grandfathers bed. Further, her
[27]

testimony on cross-examination was unclear about whether she witnessed the

approach of Alejandro, or whether she only saw how Alejandro, later on, thrust
his hunting knife to parry Aquilios attack. Treachery was, therefore, not proved
because there was no direct evidence that the commencement of the alleged
attack on Aquilio was sudden and unexpected. In addition, even if treachery
was present, it was not specifically alleged in the information as qualifying the
killing of the victim into the crime of murder. Hence, it could only be appreciated
as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Alejandro also maintains that, other than the fact that Aquilio was then 85
years old, no specific fact or circumstance was proved showing disregard of
age. In the same vein, there was no clear proof that his alleged intoxication was
habitual or intentional.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with these propositions:
(1) the uncorroborated plea of self-defense was inconsistent with the
established evidence on record; and (2) the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and the aggravating circumstances of intoxication, dwelling,
disrespect of the victim on account of his age, and relationship were properly
appreciated. The OSG argues that treachery was properly, validly, and
sufficiently alleged in the information. Citing People v. Aquino, it claims [28]

that the words aggravating/qualifying, qualifying, qualified by, aggravating or

aggravated by need not be expressly stated as long as the particular attendant
circumstances are specified in the information. Besides, Alejandro failed to
raise during the trial this alleged defect in the information. Such was a clear
indication that the information properly forewarned him that treachery attended
Aquilios killing. The OSG then prays for the affirmance in toto of the questioned
decision of the trial court.
We affirm Alejandros conviction.
Settled is the rule that when the credibility of witnesses is in issue, appellate
courts generally defer to the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter
is in a better position to decide the question after having heard the witnesses
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
There are some exceptions to this rule, such as when the evaluation was
reached arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which, if
considered, would affect the result of the case. Not one of these exceptions is
present in this case.[29]

We affirm, therefore, the trial courts imprimatur of credence to the

testimonies of prosecution witnesses Lolita, Ana and Alma (all surnamed Bajar),
who corroborated each others testimonies on material points. Ana clearly saw
through the gaps in the bamboo walls and by going to the sala how her father
stealthily entered her grandfathers house, surreptitiously approached his
sleeping grandfather, and surprised the latter to wakefulness by his bolo
hackings. Lolita heard and then responded to Anas shouts for help. Seeing how
Ana was trying to prevent her father from further attacking her grandfather,
Lolita helped her by clubbing her husbands head with a piece of coconut
lumber. Ana and Alma corroborated their mothers account on this matter.
Thus, we agree with the trial courts observation that Alejandros
uncorroborated self-defense theory could not stand against the positive,
categorical, spontaneous, and straightforward declarations of his daughters
and wife. A plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated, especially
when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is
extremely doubtful by itself. [30]

By invoking self-defense, Alejandro had the burden of proving the existence

of the following essential requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused. This he miserably failed to do. In fact, the records clearly establish
that he was the aggressor. Without unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
there can be no viable self-defense. [31]

Besides, Alejandros version of their family tragedy invites only misgiving.

His allegation that Aquilio suddenly clubbed him with a piece of coco lumber he
saw on the side of the door is not only doubtful. It was also refuted as fictitious
by the prosecution witnesses testimony that it was Lolita who looked for a piece
of wood to thwart him from what seemed a continuous attack on Aquilio. His
alleged use of the hunting knife was likewise disproved by the prosecution
witnesses who testified to having seen him use a bob to attack the defenseless
Aquilio.
Since an unsubstantiated self-defense is similar in many respects to a bare
denial, we can say that as between categorical testimonies that ring of truth on
one hand, and an unsubstantiated self-defense on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail. The veracity of this legal principle is enhanced in this
[32]

case by the fact that the wife and children of Alejandro were the ones who
testified against him.
 We shall now discuss the trial courts appreciation of the different
aggravating circumstances.
For treachery to be appreciated, the offender must have employed means,
methods, or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons that
tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. Two elements must
[33]

concur: (1) the means of execution employed gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted. [34]

Treachery was proved by Anas testimony. She narrated that there was an
ensuing silence after Aquilio told Alejandro to go home. It was apparent that
Aquilio resumed his interrupted sleep. Even Ana was undisturbed by the
exchange of words, for she remained in the bedroom lying down and ready to
sleep. Aquilio and his grandchildren had no inkling that Alejandro would
trespass his dwelling by entering through the kitchen door. Aquilio was
completely unaware of the impending attack and, ultimately, his doom. And
suddenly, Alejandro hacked him on the face as he was lying down resting on
his bed. The means, method, and form of the attack in this case were, therefore,
consciously adopted and effectively forestalled Aquilio from employing a
defense against his attacker.
Contrary to appellants contention, treachery as a qualifying circumstance
was sufficiently alleged in the information. The information against Alejandro
states in part that he, then armed with a sharp bolo, with intent to kill, and with
evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously stab one 85-year-old Aquilio Tiwanak, accuseds father-in-law,
hitting him on the different parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous
death. The information sufficiently warned him of the circumstance of treachery
which, once proved, qualifies the crime of murder. The first paragraph of its
accusatory portion, quoted above, satisfies the requirement of the Rules that
qualifying circumstances be specifically alleged in the information in order to
comply with the constitutional right of the accused to be properly informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is to allow
[35]

the accused to prepare fully for his defense to prevent surprises during trial.
What properly informs the accused of the nature of the crime charged is the
specific allegation of the circumstances mentioned in the law that raise the
crime to a higher category.
In People v. Aquino, the Court clarified and resolved, for the guidance of
[36]

the bench and the bar, the issue of how to allege or specify qualifying or
aggravating circumstances in the information. We explained therein that it is the
specific allegation of the attendant circumstance, and not the use of the
words aggravating or qualifying circumstances, that raises a crime to higher
category. Thus, the words qualifying, qualified by, aggravating, or aggravated
by need not be expressly stated as long as the particular attendant
circumstances are specified in the information. We reiterate our
pronouncements in said case that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised
[37]

Rules of Criminal Procedure merely require that the information allege, specify,
or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law that qualify or
aggravate the offense.
Aside from treachery, the prosecution was able to prove three aggravating
circumstances, to wit, dwelling, relationship, and disregard of the respect due
the offended party on account of age.
Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling
of the offended party, who has not given any provocation. It is considered
aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to
human abode. He who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him wrong is
more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. Aquilio did not provoke
[38]

Alejandro; it was Alejandro who rudely and drunkenly interrupted the quiet and
restful evening Aquilio was enjoying. He even attempted to enter the house
without being invited and without the door being opened for him. Clearly,
because of his drunken condition, he was not welcome. After Aquilio told him
to go home, a certain quietude descended into the night, a lull which Alejandro
used as a cover to pursue his plan to kill Aquilio. He doubly violated the sanctity
of Aquilios abode when he trespassed it by entering through the kitchen door
and then killing Aquilio.
Anent the generic aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due
the offended party on account of age, it is considered present when the
offended person, by reason of his age, could be the father of the offender. This
[39]

is obvious in this case. Not only was Aquilio, by reason of his age, considered
old enough to be the father of Alejandro (who incidentally declared in open court
that he was 58 years old), he was also the latters father-in-law. The presence
[40]

of this aggravating circumstance by reason of their age difference is, therefore,

reinforced by their actual relationship by affinity. Further, it is ingrained in
Philippine culture that those advanced in age are respected especially in the
provinces.
Suffice it is to say that the alternative circumstance of relationship was
correctly appreciated, the victim being the father-in-law of the appellant.
With regard to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, which the trial
court treated as aggravating, we find that it has not been shown to be habitual
or intentional as required by Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. Lolita
testified that her husband would drink liquor once a week but was not a frequent
drinker. She also admitted that on that fateful day, there was a fiesta celebration
at Barangay Mambayaan. As Alejandro insists, it was but natural for him to
[41]

drink liquor during fiesta celebrations. In the absence of clear and positive proof
that Alejandros intoxication was habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit
the crime, it is improper to consider the same as an aggravating circumstance.
Neither can intoxication be considered mitigating in the instant case, there being
no proof that the appellant was so drunk that his will-power was impaired or that
he could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. [42]

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. With the attendance of the generic aggravating
circumstances of dwelling, disregard of the respect due to the offended party
by reason of age, and relationship without any mitigating circumstance to offset
them, the imposition of the death penalty is justified pursuant to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code [43]

On the matter of damages, we agree with Alejandros contention that the

trial court erred in awarding P30,000 as burial expenses for lack of receipts to
prove the same. It is necessary for a party seeking the award of actual damages
to produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify such
award. Only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have
been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake, or burial of the
victim will be recognized in court. Nonetheless, in line with new
jurisprudence, we shall award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000
[44]

to the victims heirs, since they clearly incurred funeral expenses.

We observe that no moral damages was decreed by the trial court. Lolita
testified that no monetary consideration could equal a daughters loss of her
father. In recent jurisprudence, we held that the award of moral damages is
[45]

mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and

proof other than the death of the victim. We therefore award moral damages in
favor of Aquilios heirs in the amount of P50,000. We reiterate what we said
in People v. Panado:

Unlike in the crime of rape, we grant moral damages in murder or homicide only
when the heirs of the victim have alleged and proved mental suffering. However, as
borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily
brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family. It is
inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one
becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing
not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever
of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that
an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded
even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering.
Verily Hilda and her son Louie Gee would forever carry the emotional wounds of the
vicious killing of a husband and a father. With or without proof, this fact can never be
denied; since it is undisputed, it must be considered proved.[46]

We affirm the award of P50,000 as death indemnity, and the award of

P25,000 as exemplary damages by virtue of the attendance of three
aggravating circumstances, pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the 17 July 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. 99-942 is hereby AFFIRMED
with modifications. Appellant ALEJANDRO BAJAR is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death. The awards of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary
damages in favor of the heirs of the victim AQUILIO TIWANAK are affirmed.
The award for burial expenses is deleted; however, in lieu thereof, an award of
P25,000 as temperate damages is hereby adjudged, payable to the heirs of the
victim. The appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

On appeal is the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated

September 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00215. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
with modification, the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City in
Criminal Case No. 013324-L, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros (Ida) guilty as an
accomplice in the commission of rape.

The present appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 013324-
L charging Bartolome Tampus (Tampus) and Ida as conspirators in the rape of
ABC[4] on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m.; and (2) Criminal Case No. 013325-L charging
Tampus of raping ABC on April 4, 1995 at 1:00 a.m.
The Information[5] in each case reads as follows:

CRIM. CASE NO. 013324-L[6]

That on the 1st day of April 1995, at about 4:30 oclock [sic] in the afternoon, in
Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Bartolome Tampus, taking advantage that [ABC] was in deep slumber
due to drunkenness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with [sic] the latter, who was at that time thirteen (13) years old,
against her will, in conspiracy with the accused Ida Montesclaros who gave
permission to Bartolome Tampus to rape [ABC].

CONTRARY TO LAW.

CRIM. CASE NO. 013325-L[7]

That on the 3rd day of April, 1995,[8] at about 1:00 oclock [sic] dawn, in Looc,
Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a wooden club (poras), by means of threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with [sic] [ABC], who was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against
her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at
the time of the incident. Ida worked as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in
Mabini, CebuCity. On February 19, 1995, Ida and ABC started to rent a room in a
house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod.

On April 1, 1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified that she was in the house with Ida
and Tampus[9] who were both drinking beer at that time. They forced her to drink
beer[10] and after consuming three and one-half (3 ) glasses of beer, she became
intoxicated and very sleepy.[11] While ABC was lying on the floor of their room, she
overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to remedyo[12] or
have sexual intercourse with her.[13]

Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he finished having
sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went to work, leaving Tampus alone with
ABC. ABC fell asleep and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her
panties was loose and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain in her head, thighs,
buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed that her panties and short pants were stained
with blood which was coming from her vagina.[14] When her mother arrived home
from work the following morning, she kept on crying but appellant Ida ignored
her.[15]

ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room
since her mother was at work at the beer house.[16] Tampus went inside their room
and threatened to kill her if she would report the previous sexual assault to
anyone.[17] He then forcibly removed her panties. ABC shouted but Tampus covered
her mouth and again threatened to kill her if she shouted.[18] He undressed himself,
spread ABCs legs, put saliva on his right hand and he applied this to her vagina; he
then inserted his penis into ABCs vagina and made a push and pull
movement.[19] After consummating the sexual act, he left the house. When ABC told
appellant Ida about the incident, the latter again ignored her.[20]

On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought the help of her
aunt, Nellie Montesclaros (Nellie). She told Nellie about the rape and that her mother
sold her.[21] ABC, together with Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic enforcer,
reported the incident of rape to the police.

On May 9, 1995, Nestor A. Sator , M.D. (Dr. Sator), head of the Medico-Legal
Branch of the Philippine National Crime Laboratory Services, Regional Unit
7, conducted a physical examination of ABC and issued a Medico-Legal
Report.[22]Dr. Sator testified that the result of his examination of ABC revealed a
deep healed laceration at the seven (7) oclock position and a shallow healed
laceration at the one (1) oclock position on ABCs hymen.

On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two Complaints. She accused Tampus of taking
advantage of her by having carnal knowledge of her, against her will, while she was
intoxicated and sleeping on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m. She declared in her Complaint
that this was done in conspiracy with accused Ida who gave permission to Tampus
to rape her. And again, she stated that on April 3, 1995, she was threatened with a
wooden club by Tampus, who then succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her,
against her will.

Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995. He claimed that at 4:00 p.m. of April
1, 1995, he left the house to go to the public market of Lapu-lapu City. When he
arrived home at 6:00 p.m., ABC and Ida were not there as they usually go to the beer
house at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m.[23] He denied forcing ABC to drink beer. He also
denied asking Ida to allow him to have sexual intercourse with ABC.[24]
Appellant Ida also testified that she and ABC left for the beer house at 4:00 p.m. of
April 1, 1995 and they came back at 6:00 a.m. the following day. [25] She said that
she always brought her daughter to the beer house with her and there was never an
instance when she left her daughter alone in the house.[26] She denied forcing ABC
to drink beer at 4:30 p.m. of April 1, 1995, and she denied giving permission to
Tampus to have sexual intercourse with ABC.[27]

Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995. He testified that he arrived
at the Barangay Tanod Headquarters between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of April
3, 1995[28] and that his actual duty time shift was from midnight to 5:00 a.m. of
April 4, 1995. Guillermo Berdin (Berdin), a defense witness, testified that on April
3, 1995, Tampus reported for duty at the police outpost at 8:00 p.m. and left at 5:00
a.m. of April 4, 1995, as reflected in the attendance logbook. However, on cross-
examination, Berdin could not tell whether the signature appearing on the
logbook really belonged to Tampus. It was noted by the trial court that the
handwriting used by Tampus in the logbook entry on April 2, 1995 is different
from his handwriting appearing on April 3, 1995.[29] It was also revealed that the
house of Tampus is just 500 meters away or just a three-minute walk from
thebarangay tanod outpost and that the barangay tanod on duty could leave the
outpost unnoticed or without permission.[30]

Agustos B. Costas, M.D.[31] (Dr. Costas), the Head of the Department of

Psychiatry of the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, issued a Medical
Certification,[32] which showed that appellant Ida was treated as an outpatient at the
Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry Department from November 11,
1994 to January 12, 1995 and was provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia,
paranoid type.

The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape, as principal in Criminal
Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case No. 013325-L. Appellant Ida was found
guilty as an accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L. The trial court
appreciated in Idas favor the mitigating circumstance of illness which would
diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of the consciousness
of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.[33] The
dispositive portion of the trial courts decision states, viz.:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds

accused Bartolome Tampus GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
of two counts of rape, as principals [sic], in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and
Criminal Case No. 013325-L and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua in each of the aforementioned cases.
 The Court also finds accused Ida Montesclaros GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT as an accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, and
she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to fourteen (14) years, and eight (8) months of Reclusion Temporal.

Both accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended
party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED. [34]

Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused Tampus died
on November 16, 2000[35] and his appeal was dismissed by the Third Division of this
Court.[36] Thus, the appeal before the Court of Appeals dealt only with that of
appellant Ida.

The appellate court gave credence to the testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial
courts decision with modification. It appreciated the mitigating circumstance of
illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was completely
deprived of intelligence on April 1, 1995. On the basis of the medical report and the
testimony of the attending physician, Idas schizophrenia was determined by both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her will-
power though it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts. The dispositive
portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the commission of rape and
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Further, she is ORDERED to pay moral damages in the
amount of fifty thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00) and exemplary damages in the
amount of twenty-five thousand pesos (Php 25,000.00).[37]

We find the findings of the lower courts to be well-taken.

The finding of guilt of Ida as an accomplice in the rape of ABC is dependent

on proving the guilt of the principal accused. Upon examination of the records of the
case, we agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate courts that the testimony of
ABC is clear and straightforward, and is sufficient to conclude that Tampus is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the rape of ABC, in Criminal Case
No. 013324-L, as well as to convict appellant Ida as an accomplice in the same
criminal case.

The findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally,
appellate courts will not overturn said findings unless the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case.[38] The rule finds
an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court
of Appeals.[39]

The trial court has carefully scrutinized the testimony of complainant ABC
and has given full faith and credence to her testimony. Both the trial and appellate
courts found that the rape of ABC by Tampus on April 1, 1995 has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable for a
young girl to impute the crime of rape, implicate her own mother in such a vile act,
allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial if she has
not been a victim of rape and was impelled to seek justice for the defilement of her
person. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full credit.[40]

Tampus was positively identified by ABC as the person who had carnal
knowledge of her against her will on April 1, 1995. The denial of Tampus cannot
prevail over the positive and direct identification by the victim, ABC. Although ABC
was asleep and unconscious at the time the sexual debasement was committed by
Tampus, circumstantial evidence established beyond doubt that it is Tampus who
raped ABC. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[41] In cases like the one at bar, the Court takes
into consideration the events that transpired before and after the victim lost
consciousness in order to establish the commission of the act of coitus.[42]

The trial court correctly determined, thus:

The prosecution has clearly established by its evidence that accused

Bartolome Tampus had carnal knowledge of [ABC] on April 1, 1995 under the
circumstance set forth in Article 335 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
that is, when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.

xxxx
 The Court cannot accept accused Bartolome Tampus defense of denial and
alibi. His denial pales in effect against the positive evidence given by [ABC] that
he ravished her [on] two occasions.

xxxx

It is true that in the first incident on April 1, 1995, [ABC] did not see
Tampus lie down with her. What she saw was the aftermath of her deflowering
upon waking up. Nevertheless, the Court has taken note of the following
circumstances: (1) The drinking session where the complainant was forced to drink
beer by both accused; (2) The conversation between the two accused when accused
Tampus requested accused Ida Montesclaros, and was granted by the latter,
permission to have sexual intercourse with the complainant; (3) Accused Tampus
and the complainant were the only persons left in the house when Ida Montesclaros
went to work after acceding to the request of Tampus; (4) The bloodstained pants,
the pain and blood in complainants vagina and the pain in her head, groin and
buttocks; (5) The threat made by accused Tampus on the complainant in the dawn
of April 4, 1995 that he would kill her if she would tell about the previous incident
on April 1, 1995; and (6) The second incident of rape that immediately ensued.
These circumstances form a chain that points to accused Bartolome Tampus as the
person who had carnal knowledge of [ABC] when she was asleep in an inebriated
condition. [43]

After establishing the guilt of Tampus as principal, the trial court then
determined the guilt of Ida. Although Ida was charged as a conspirator, the trial court
found her liable as an accomplice. The trial court ruled that her act of forcing or
intimidating ABC to drink beer and then acceding to the request of co-accused
Tampus to be allowed to have sexual intercourse with ABC did not prove their
conspiracy.[44] Hence, it held that, [u]ndoubtedly, Ida Montesclaros participated in
the commission of the crime by previous acts but her participation, not being
indispensable, was not that of a principal. She is liable as an accomplice.[45]

In her appeal, appellant Ida argued that it is against human nature for a mother
to allow her daughter to be raped. She maintained that there was no instance when
she left ABC alone in the house. The Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Idas
appeal as it also gave credence to the testimony of ABC.

In her appeal brief filed before this Court, Ida raises the following assignment
of errors:
I
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
BARTOLOME TAMPUS OF THE CRIMES OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING IDA MONTESCLAROS AS

ACCOMPLICE TO THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[46]

We affirm the trial and appellate courts in ruling that Ida is liable as an
accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC.

Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised
Penal Code, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts.[47]The following requisites must be proved in order that a person can be
considered an accomplice:

(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts;
and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice.[48]

The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the execution of the
rape by Tampus when prior to the act of rape by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink
beer and she agreed to Tampus request for him to have sexual intercourse with
ABC. Idas acts show that she had knowledge of and even gave her permission to the
plan of Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.

During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Atty. Paulito Cabrera,

of witness ABC, she testified that:

Q Before this date, April 1, 1995, did you already usually drink beer?

A No, sir.
Q So, you are telling the Honorable Court that it was only on April 1, 1995 that you
first drank beer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you say, you were forced to drink beer?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who forced you to drink beer in that afternoon of April 1, 1995?

A Bartolome Tampus and Nanay, my mother.[49]

xxxx

Q By the way, your mother proposed to you to drink beer?

A Yes, sir.

Q Before you concede to her proposition, did you not complain that you had not
been used to drinking beer and then, why suddenly, she would let you drink
beer at that time?

A No, sir.

Q Did you not tell her that, I am not used to drinking beer, so, I would not drink
beer?

A Because the beer was mixed with Coke.

Q So, you mean that you also agreed to drink beer at that time?

A I just agreed to the proposal of my mother.

Q But you never voiced any complaint or any refusal to her at that time?

A No, sir because I was afraid that she might maltreat me.

Q At that time when she proposed to you to drink beer, was she already threatening
to maltreat you if you would not drink that beer?

A Not yet.

Q And how were you able to conclude that she might maltreat you if you would not
drink that beer that she proposed for you to drink?

A Because Nanay stared at me sharply and she had a wooden stick prepared.
Q Are you sure that she was doing that while she was offering the glass of beer to
you?

A Yes, sir.[50]

xxxx

Q While you were drinking beer, your mother and Bartolome went out of the house
and you overheard Bartolome asking or proposing to your mother that he
would have sexual intercourse with you which you term in the Visayan
dialect remedyo, Bartolome would want to have a remedyo with you. When
[sic], particular moment did you allegedly hear this statement, while you
were drinking beer or after you had finished drinking beer?

A When I was already lying on the floor of the room we were renting.[51]

xxxx

Q And, of course, as you have stated now, it was you, you were quite sure that it
was you who was being referred by Bartolome Tampus when he said to your
mother in the Visayan dialect that gusto siya moremedyo nimo, he wants to
have sexual intercourse with you?

A Yes, sir, but I dont know the meaning of remedyo.

Q At that time, you did not know the meaning of remedyo"?

A Not yet, sir.[52]

xxxx

Q Was that the very first time that you ever heard of the word remedyo"?

A Yes, sir[53]

xxxx

Q And when your mother came back from work at about 7:00 oclock [sic] in the
morning of April 2, 1995, did you not also bother to tell her of what you
suspected that something serious or bad had happened to you in the previous
day?

A Because she already knew, sir.

Q How did you know that she already knew?

 A Because I heard her telling Omeng,[54] After you have sexual intercourse with her,
leave her immediately![55]

xxxx

Q Considering that you never knew what is the meaning of the word, remedyo,
when your mother arrived in the morning of April 2, 1995, did you not
confront your mother, did you not tell her that, Is this what you mean by
remedyo, as what you had agreed with Bartolome Tampus that he would do
something to my genitals?

A No sir, because when she arrived, she kept on laughing.[56]

All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to

Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was community
of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge
of and assented to Tampus intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
She forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC
alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express consent to
Tampus plan to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.

It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the

accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise,
she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows
that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the commission of rape
by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink
beer, and second because Tampus already had the intention to have sexual
intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated the act even without Idas
consent.
The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission of rape by
Tampus. They both forced ABC to drink beer; when ABC was already drunk,
Tampus asked Ida if he could have sexual intercourse with ABC and Ida gave her
consent; and lastly, Ida left ABC alone with Tampus so that he proceed with his plan
to rape ABC.

Circumstances affecting the liability of the Appellant as an Accomplice

We agree with both the trial and appellate courts in their appreciation of the
mitigating circumstance of illness as would diminish the exercise of willpower of
Ida without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9)
of the Revised Penal Code.
Dr. Costas testified that Ida was provisionally treated for schizophrenia a few months
before the incident, from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995. Based on his
expert opinion, Ida was not totally deprived of intelligence at the time of the incident;
but, she may have poor judgment. On Direct Examination of Dr. Costas by City
Prosecutor Celso V. Espinosa, he testified as follows:

Q Doctor, taking into consideration your diagnosis, as you said, is provisional,

would you say that the patient [sic] totally deprived of intelligence or
reason?

A Not totally.

Q She will be conscious of her acts?

A She may be, that is possible, for certain cause.

Q And there will be loss of intelligence?

A There could be.

Q Now, Doctor, she is charged her [sic] as one of the principals in the commission
of the crime of rape for having given her daughter to be sexually abused by
her co-accused, allegedly convinced by her co-accused on the first day of
April, 1995. Now, if she was then under treatment, Doctor, from November
11, 1994 to January 12, 1995, would you say, Doctor, that having taken this
diagnosis for [sic] schizophrenic patient, at the time, after January 12, 1995,
she must have acted with discernment?

A It is possible because you are this kind of mental illness even with the treatment,
and even without any medication, it may be what we called spontaneous,
really it will get back.

Q At that time it will loss the intelligence? [sic]

A I think because it might be back, the treatment should be yearly.

Q Doctor, in your opinion, since our office is very much concern [sic] on this, if a
person is totally deprived of intelligence, he has still discernment, she is
unconscious of her act, she or he may be exempted from any criminal
liability, please tell, Doctor, in your personal opinion for the purpose of this
proceedings she may be acting with discernment and with certain degree of
intelligence?

A It is possible but I think of a mother feeding her own daughter to somebody, I

think there is a motive, she wants to gain financial or material things from
 the daughter if no material gain, then perhaps it was borne out of her illness.
This is my opinion.[57]

xxxx

Q Doctor, is this schizophrenic person can distinguish the right or wrong? [sic]

A If they are in the [sic] state of illness, judgment is impaired to discern between
right or wrong.

Q In the case of this particular accused, what would you say at the state of her
ailment?

A When she was brought to the hospital, Your Honor, I think, although the mother
alleged that the sickness could be more than one year duration, it is in acute
stage because she was allegedly destroying everything in the house
according to the mother, so she was in acute stage.[58]

On cross-examination by Atty. Paulito Cabrera, Dr. Costas testified thus:

Q Would you say, Doctor, that that particular ailment of Ida Montesclaros affected
her sense of judgment?

A I think, so.

Q And that being scizophronic [sic] somehow, it has, while in that stage, the patient
lost contact with reality?

A Yes, that is possible.

Q In your opinion, Doctor, granting, for the sake of argument, the alleged
accusation against her is true, being an expert on scizophrania, could you
tell the Honorable Court as a mother, who would allegedly do such an
offense to her daughter, is it still in her sound mind or proper mental sane
[sic]?

A I think, as I said, one thing to be considered is the motivation if she want [sic] to
gain some material things, if not, it is because of her judgment.

Q If she would not gain anything from allowing her daughter allegedly to be
rubbished by another person, then there must be something wrong?

A There must be something wrong and it came up from scizpphrania.

A It is the judgment, in the case of the schizophrenic.[59]

We have previously held that Schizophrenia may be considered mitigating under
Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the exercise of the willpower of the accused. [60] In this
case, the testimony of Dr. Costas shows that even though Ida was diagnosed with
schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived of intelligence but her judgment was
affected. Thus, on the basis of the Medical Certification that Ida suffered from and
was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to the incident, and on the
testimony of Dr. Costas, Idas schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished
the exercise of her willpower although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of
her acts.

We note that in the case at bar, the undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABCwho
was 13 years old at the time of the incidentcould have been considered as a special
qualifying circumstance which would have increased the imposable penalty to death,
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:

ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim;

xxxx

Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender to the
victim, either as the victims parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the information and proved during the
trial in order for them to serve as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code.[61]

In the case at bar, although the victim's minority was alleged and established,
her relationship with the accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in
the Information, and even though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the
accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that would
serve to increase the penalty of the offender.

Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given

retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will
be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage,[62] every Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in
the imposition of the penalty.[63] Since in the case at bar, the Information in Criminal
Case No. 013324-L did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance
could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be
convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable
by reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act No. 9346, entitled an "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, which was signed
into law on June 24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.

Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant

The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision ordered Tampus and Ida "jointly
and severally, to indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in
Criminal Case No. 013324-L."[64] The Court of Appeals, however, did not award any
civil indemnity to ABC, and only awarded moral and exemplary damages. We deem
it necessary and proper to award ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00. Civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape. This is distinct
from moral damages awarded upon such finding without need of further proof,
because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling
the victim to such award.[65]

Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim in simple rape cases is entitled
to an award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as
moral damages. [66] However, Tampus civil indemnity ex delicto has been
extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment, in accordance with
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.[67] Thus, the amount of civil indemnity which
remains for accomplice Ida to pay is put at issue.

It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is
liable when they have different degrees of responsibility in the commission of the
crime and, consequently, differing degrees of liability. When a crime is committed
by many, each one has a distinct part in the commission of the crime and though all
the persons who took part in the commission of the crime are liable, the liability is
not equally shared among them. Hence, an accused may be liable either as principal,
accomplice or accessory.

The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature
and degree of his participation in the commission of the crime. The penalty
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed upon the
principal in a consummated felony.[68] The accomplice is only given the penalty next
lower in degree than that prescribed by the law for the crime committed[69] and an
accessory is given the penalty lower by two degrees.[70] However, a felon is not only
criminally liable, he is likewise civilly liable. [71] Apart from the penalty of
imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to indemnify the victim and to
make whole the damage caused by his act or omission through the payment of civil
indemnity and damages.

Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike
criminal liabilityin which the Revised Penal Code specifically states the
corresponding penalty imposed on the principal, accomplice and accessorythe share
of each accused in the civil liability is not specified in the Revised Penal Code. The
courts have the discretion to determine the apportionment of the civil indemnity
which the principal, accomplice and accessory are respectively liable for, without
guidelines with respect to the basis of the allotment.

Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [i]f there are two or more
persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which
each must respond. Notwithstanding the determination of the respective liability of
the principals, accomplices and accessories within their respective class, they shall
also be subsidiarily liable for the amount of civil liability adjudged in the other
classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [t]he principals,
accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable
severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those
of the other persons liable.[72]

As courts are given a free hand in determining the apportionment of civil liability,
previous decisions dealing with this matter have been grossly inconsistent.

In People v. Galapin,[73] People v. Continente,[74] United States v.

Lasada,[75] People v. Mobe,[76] People v. Irinea,[77] People v. Rillorta,[78] People
v. Cagalingan,[79] People v. Villanueva,[80] People v. Magno,[81] People v. del
Rosario,[82] People v. Yrat,[83] People v. Saul,[84] and People v. Tamayo,[85] the
principal and accomplice were ordered to pay jointly and severally the entire amount
of the civil indemnity awarded to the victim. In People v. Sotto,[86] the accomplice
was ordered to pay half of the amount of civil indemnity imposed by the trial court,
while the principal was liable for the other half. In People v. Toring,[87] the
principal, accomplice and the accessory were made jointly and severally liable for
the entire amount of the civil indemnity.

In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice were made to pay equal
shares of the civil indemnity. This makes the accomplice who had less participation
in the commission of the crime equally liable with the principal for the civil
indemnity. The degree of their participation in the crime was not taken into account
in the apportionment of the amount of the civil indemnity. This is contrary to the
principle behind the treble division of persons criminally responsible for felonies,
i.e., that the liability must be commensurate with the degree of participation of the
accused in the crime committed. In such a situation, the accomplice who just
cooperated in the execution of the offense but whose participation is not
indispensable to the commission of the crime is made to pay the same amount of
civil indemnity as the principal by direct participation who took a direct part in the
execution of the criminal act. It is an injustice when the penalty and liability imposed
are not commensurate to the actual responsibility of the offender; for criminal
responsibility is individual and not collective, and each of the participants should be
liable only for the acts actually committed by him.[88] The proportion of this
individual liability must be graduated not only according to the nature of the crime
committed and the circumstances attending it, but also the degree and nature of
participation of the individual offender.

In Garces v. People,[89] People v. Flores,[90] People v. Barbosa,[91] People v.

Ragundiaz,[92] People v. Bato,[93] and People v. Garalde,[94] the accomplice was
held to be solidarily liable with the principal for only one-half (1/2) of the amount
adjudged as civil indemnity. In Garces, the accomplice was held solidarily liable for
half of the civil indemnity ex delicto but was made to pay the moral damages
of P50,000.00 separately from the principal. In Flores, Ragundiaz, Bato,
and Garalde, the accomplice was held solidarily liable for half of the combined
amounts of the civil indemnity ex delicto and moral damages. In Ragundiaz, the
accomplice was also made solidarily liable with the principal for half of the actual
damages, and in Garalde the accomplice was also held solidarily liable with the
principal for half of the exemplary damages, aside from the civil and moral damages.

In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and severally liable with the
principal for only half of the amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages, only
for purposes of the enforcement of the payment of civil indemnity to the offended
party. When the liability in solidum has been enforced, as when payment has been
made, the person by whom payment has been made shall have a right of action
against the other persons liable for the amount of their respective shares.[95] As
against each other, whoever made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only
the share that corresponds to each, with interest for the payment already made.[96] In
these cases, therefore, payment is made by either the principal or the accomplice, the
one who made the payment to the victim could demand payment of the part of the
debt corresponding to his co-debtor. If for example the principal paid the victim the
entire amount of the civil indemnity, he could go against the accomplice for one-
fourth (1/4) of the total amount of civil indemnity and damages. The principal was
primarily liable for only one-half (1/2) of the total amount of civil indemnity and he
was solidarily liable with the accomplice for the other half. Since the principal paid
for the half which the accomplice is solidarily liable with, he could claim one-half
(1/2) of that amount from the accomplice. Thus, the principal would have become
ultimately liable for three-fourths (3/4) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and
damages, while the accomplice would have become liable for one-fourth (1/4) of
such amount.
In People v. Cortes,[97] People v. Budol,[98] People v. Nulla,[99] and People v.
Madali,[100] the principal was ordered to pay twice the share of the accomplice in the
civil indemnity. In Nulla, the Court determined the respective amounts for which
the principal, accomplice and accessory were liable for. The principal was ordered
to pay P20,000.00, the accomplice was ordered to pay P10,000.00, and the accessory
was ordered to pay P2,000.00. Unlike the cases cited above where the principal and
accomplice were held solidarily liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity
or half of it, in Nulla, the court particularly determined the amount for which each
shall respond. This is consistent with Article 109 and Article 110 of the Revised
Penal Code, which require that the courts should determine the amount for which
the principals, accomplices and accessories must respond to and upon specifying this
amount, the principals are solidarily liable within their class for their quota, the
accomplices are solidarily liable among themselves for their quota and the
accessories are solidarily liable for their quota. If any one of the classes is unable to
pay for its respective quota, it becomes subsidiarily liable for the quota of the other
classes, which shall be enforced first against the property of the principals; next,
against that of the accomplices; and lastly, against that of the accessories. [101]

There are also cases where the principal was ordered to pay more than double the
amount that the accomplice is liable for. In Lumiguis v. People,[102] the civil liability
of P6,000.00 was apportioned as follows: the sole principal was primarily liable
for P3,000.00, the four accomplices were primarily liable in solidum among
themselves for the other half of the indemnity, or P3,000.00. Thus, each accomplice
was answerable for one-fourth (1/4) of P3,000.00 or one-eighth (1/8) of the entire
amount of civil indemnity, which is P750.00.

Similarly in People v. Bantagan,[103] the principal was required to indemnify the

heirs of the deceased in the amount of P500.00. In case of his insolvency, his three
accomplices should be jointly and severally liable. The three accomplices were
jointly and severally liable for the other P500 and in case of their insolvency the
principal was secondarily liable for such amount.

In People v. Castillo,[104] the accomplice was ordered to pay one-fourth (1/4) of the
amount of the civil indemnity, while the principal was liable for the remaining three-
fourths (3/4).

In People v. Cariaga,[105] the total amount of indemnity and damages due to the
heirs of the victim amounted to P601,000.00. The sole accomplice was ordered to
pay P101,000.00 which is roughly one-sixth (1/6) of the entire civil indemnity, while
the two principals were ordered to pay the rest of the indemnity and damages
amounting to P500,000.00.
The cases cited above demonstrate the ad hoc method by which the ratio of shares
of the civil indemnity and damages among the principal, accomplice and accessory
is determined. Though the responsibility to decide the respective shares of persons
liable for a felony is left to the courts, this does not mean that this amount can be
decided arbitrarily or upon conjecture. The power of the courts to grant indemnity
and damages demands factual, legal and equitable justification, and cannot be left to
speculation and caprice.

The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual
damages, should be apportioned among the persons who cooperated in the
commission of the crime according to the degree of their liability, respective
responsibilities and actual participation in the criminal act. Salvador Viada, an
authority in criminal law, is of the opinion that there are no fixed rules which are
applicable in all cases in order to determine the apportionment of civil liability
among two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, either because there are
different degrees of culpability of offenders, or because of the inequality of their
financial capabilities.[106] On this note, he states in his commentaries on the 1870
Penal Code of Spain that the law should leave the determination of the amount of
respective liabilities to the discretion of the courts.[107] The courts have the
competence to determine the exact participation of the principal, accomplice, and
accessory in the commission of the crime relative to the other classes because they
are able to directly consider the evidence presented and the unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses.

We must stress, however, that the courts discretion should not be untrammelled and
must be guided by the principle behind differing liabilities for persons with varying
roles in the commission of the crime. The person with greater participation in the
commission of the crime should have a greater share in the civil liability than those
who played a minor role in the crime or those who had no participation in the crime
but merely profited from its effects. Each principal should shoulder a greater share
in the total amount of indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and each
accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount as against every accessory.
Care should also be taken in considering the number of principals versus that of
accomplices and accessories. If for instance, there are four principals and only one
accomplice and the total of the civil indemnity and damages is P6,000.00, the court
cannot assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the principals and
one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even though the principals, as a class, have a
greater share in the liability as against the accomplice-- since one-third (1/3)
of P6,000.00 is P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 is P4,000.00-- when
the civil liability of every person is computed, the share of the accomplice ends up
to be greater than that of each principal. This is so because the two-thirds (2/3) share
of the principalsor P4,000.00is still divided among all the four principals, and thus
every principal is liable for only P1,000.00.

In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the
principal for the entire amount of the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an
erroneous apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does not take into
account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the
principal, Tampus, versus the accomplice, Ida. Idas previous acts of cooperation
include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual
intercourse with her daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus could have still
raped ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have
the greater liability, not only in terms of criminal liability, but also with respect to
civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code states that the
apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for which members
of such class are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they are only
subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does
not provide for solidary liability among the different classes, as was held by the trial
court in the case at bar.
Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and
accomplice, the principal, Tampus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total
amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida should be
ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil indemnity for simple rape was
correctly set at P50,000.00 and moral damages at P50,000.00. The total amount of
damages to be divided between Tampus and Ida is P100,000.00, where Tampus is
liable for P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is liable
for P33,333.33 (which is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into
civil indemnity of P16,666.67 and moral damages of P16,666.67. However, since
the principal, Tampus, died while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, his
liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished by reason of his death before
the final judgment.[108] His share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be
passed over to the accomplice, Ida, because Tampus share of the civil liability has
been extinguished. And even if Tampus were alive upon the promulgation of this
decision, Ida would only have been subsidiarily liable for his share of the civil
indemnity of P66,666.67. However, since Tampus civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished, Idas subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also eliminated,
following the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Tampus obligation
to pay P66,666.67 his quota of the civil indemnity is the principal obligation, for
which Ida is only subsidiarily liable. Upon the extinguishment of the principal
obligation, there is no longer any accessory obligation which could attach to it; thus,
the subsidiary liability of Ida is also extinguished.

On the matter of exemplary damages, we find that exemplary damages were

incorrectly awarded by the Court of Appeals.

In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the offender as part of the
civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.[109]Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or
corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and
as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured
or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.[110] Exemplary damages may
be awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the
information and proved during the trial.[111]

In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was appreciated against

Ida. Although, the minority of the victim coupled with the fact that the offender is
the parent of the victim could have served to qualify the crime of rape, the presence
of these concurring circumstances cannot justify the award of exemplary damages
since the relationship of the offender, Ida, to the victim, ABC, was not alleged in the
Information.[112] The minority of the rape victim and her relationship with the
offender must both be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order
to be appreciated as an aggravating/qualifying circumstance.[113] While the
information in the instant case alleged that ABC was a minor during the incident,
there was no allegation that Ida was her parent. Since the relationship between ABC
and appellant was not duly established, the award of exemplary damages is not
warranted.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station,

dated September 29, 2006, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00215, finding appellant Ida
Montesclaros guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of rape and
sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida
Montesclaros is ORDERED to pay civil indemnity in the amount of sixteen
thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67), and
moral damages in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and
sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67). The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO

BERNALDEZ @ Dolfo, accused-appellant.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision[1] of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Ligao, Albay, convicting accused-appellant Rodolfo Bernaldez of rape committed
against his 10-year-old niece MARIA TERESA BERNALDEZ.[2]

The complaint[3] September 1990 by Pedro B. Bernaldez, the younger brother of the
appellant and father of the victim. RODOLFO was forthwith arrested and detained in jail.
After due proceedings in the MCTC, which found a probable cause against
RODOLFO,[4] the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Albay filed with the RTC of Ligao,
Albay, an information[5] charging him with the crime of rape committed as follows:

That in the morning of August 29, 1990, at Sitio Mabatia, Barangay Sugcad,
Municipality of Polangui, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with lewd design, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of her 10-
year old niece MARIA THERESA BERNALDEZ, to her damage and prejudice.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2763 and raffled to Branch 14 of said court.
RODOLFO entered a plea of innocence at his arraignment.[6]
At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented as its witnesses MARIA TERESA
and her father Pedro Bernaldez. Dr. Nancy de la Paz, who examined MARIA TERESA
and issued the medical certificate, failed to testify.[7] For its part, the defense had as its
witnesses RODOLFO; Delfin Paular, the overseer of the rice mill where RODOLFO
allegedly worked; and Melita Sasota, the teacher of MARIA TERESA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) in the Brief for the Appellee as follows:

Through complainants testimony, the prosecution was able to establish that in

the morning of August 29, 1990, complainant, then [ten] years old, was raped
by accused-appellant, her uncle, being the full-blooded brother of her father,
at his house in Sitio Mabatia, Barangay Sugcad, Polangui, Albay. She
narrated that she was carried by her uncle upstairs who then removed her
clothes and let her lie down on the floor. While she was lying down, her uncle
opened the zipper of his pants and laid on top of her, inserted his penis inside
her vagina and made a push and pull movement while on top of her. After a
while, a sticky and warm object came out from his penis. After the rape,
accused-appellant gave her P5.00 and threatened her not to tell anybody
otherwise, he would kill her parents, brothers and sisters. (TSN, March 1,
1991, pp.6-7). Complainant further claimed that accused-appellant had been
abusing her since five (5) years ago and these repeated acts were done in the
same place, with accused-appellant always warning and threatening her not
to tell anybody. (TSN, supra, pp.10-12).

On [August] 30, 1990, or the very next day after the last rape incident,
complainant was sent by her father to go to accused-appellants house in
order to borrow P10.00 from him. However, complainant refused to go
prompting her father to beat her. It was only then that she revealed to her
father the cause of her reluctance and narrated to him the repeated rape and
assaults of her uncle. Immediately after learning of the rape, her parents
brought complainant to the Polangui Police Station to report the incident and
file the complaint (TSN, supra p. 7). Complainant then executed a Sworn
Statement before the police investigator (Exhs. A, A-1 and A-2). Afterwards,
she was brought for treatment to Pio Duran Memorial District Hospital, a
government hospital where she was examined by Dr. Maria Nancy de la Paz
who issued a Medical Certificate dated September 3, 1990 (Exh. B). She
likewise identified her Birth Certificate (Exh. C). Asked to identify her attacker,
she readily identified accused-appellant in open court (TSN, supra, pp. 8-9).

Pedro Bernaldez, father of the complainant, testified that he is the younger brother of
accused-appellant who lives in a separate house about two (2) medium hills away. He
confirmed that he only discovered the rape on his daughter when she revealed to him
the reason for he reluctance or fear in going to her uncles (accused-appellants) place
when he sent her to borrow P10.00 from him on [August] 30, 1990. He likewise
confirmed that the victim told him of the repeated rapes by her uncle since five (5) years
ago, the last time being that done on [August] 29, 1990. These, his daughter revealed
after he hit her with his belt several times for refusing to go as instructed. Fearing that
something wrong would result if he directly confronted his brother, he decided to report
the matter to the police authorities instead, which he immediately did. He also executed
a Sworn Statement before the Polangui Police Station police investigator on September
2, 1990 (Exh. E). He further stressed that he had a good relationship with his brother
and had no quarrel with him. (TSN, supra, pp. 17-21.).[8]

RODOLFO had alibi for his defense. According to him he could not have committed
the crime charged because from 6:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. of 29 August 1990, when the rape
was allegedly committed, he was working as a mechanic/mill operator in the rice mill of
William Cu, located 2 to 3 kilometers from his house.[9] He was charged with rape because
in the evening of 28 August 1990, he saw one Rodolfo wearing only briefs near the door
of the house of his brother Pedro. Half a meter away from that man was Pedros wife
(MARIA TERESAs mother), who was then lying down on the floor wearing a sando and
a skirt. The next day, Pedro had a drinking spree with this Rodolfo; when he was already
drunk, he filed the case against herein accused-appellant RODOLFO.[10]
Delfin Paular, the overseer at the rice mill where RODOLFO was allegedly working,
testified that RODOLFO arrived at the rice mill at around 6:00 a.m. of 29 August 1990,
and stayed there until 6:00 p.m. because nobody was available to relieve him. [11]
Melita Sasota, MARIA TERESAs teacher at North Central School, Polangui, Albay,
testified that MARIA TERESA was present in her class on 29 August 1990 because her
record of attendance was clean and not marked absent. MARIA TERESA must have been
already in school at around 6:30 a.m. and was inside the classroom when the bell rang
at 7:15 a.m. However, Melita could not remember what time MARIA TERESA left school
after the morning session and to where the latter went, although she saw the latter again
at the start of the afternoon session until it ended at 4:20 p.m.[12]
In its decision of 19 January 1993, the trial court found RODOLFO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. It also ordered him to pay MARIA TERESA P50,000 representing moral and
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
The trial court held that the testimony of MARIA TERESA, who positively identified
RODOLFO as the malefactor, was sufficient to prove RODOLFOs guilt. RODOLFO, as
an uncle, had a great influence over MARIA TERESA, who, admittedly, was less than 12
years of age when the offense was committed; besides, there was intimidation consisting
of the threat to kill her parents and brothers and sisters. Moreover, no reason or motive
existed for MARIA TERESA or her father to fabricate the charge. Both RODOLFO and
Pedro Bernaldez admitted in open court that they had no quarrel with each other, as their
families were close-knit.[13]
As to Melita Sasotas testimony that MARIA TERESA attended her class on 29 August
1990, the trial court ruled that, as buttressed by a long line of decisions, the specific date
of commission of the offense was not so material for as long as evidence could show that
accused had actually committed the offense; and that the accused could be convicted
even if there was a mistake as to the date of the commission of the offense as long as
the evidence showed with sufficient clarity that a crime was committed and the accused
was responsible therefor.
Finally, the trial court gave weight to the medical certificate (Exhibit B) issued on 3
September 1990 by Dr. De la Paz, who was a government doctor at the time. In
considering the medical certificate despite the failure of Dr. De la Paz to testify thereon,
the trial court reasoned that such document, being an act done by a public officer, was
presumed to be done regularly unless proved otherwise. It concluded that the finding of
[o]ld lacerations at 3:00 and 9 oclock and newly-healed lacerations at 11 oclock on the
hymen of MARIA TERESA proved that someone had carnal knowledge of her.
Nevertheless, a medical examination was not an indispensable requisite in the
prosecution for rape.
In view of the penalty imposed, appeal from the decision should have been to this
Court.[14] But RODOLFOs appeal was to the Court of Appeals;[15] hence, the record of the
case was transmitted to that court.[16] On 23 April 1993, the record of the case was
forwarded to this Court.[17]
It was only on 27 March 1996 that RODOLFOs counsel, Atty. Mario Abella
Encinareal, filed the Appellants Brief. He did so only after he had been fined twice in the
amounts of P500 and P1,000, and ordered arrested and confined in the cell of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
In his Appellants Brief, RODOLFO contends that the trial court committed serious and
grave error in convicting him of the crime of multiple rape, which was not charged in the
information. He also attacks the ruling of the trial court that the specific date of
commission of the offense was not so material so long as evidence could show that the
accused had actually committed the offense. According to him, while the precise time of
the commission of the crime need not be alleged in the complaint or information,
nevertheless, it must be sufficiently definite and certain to give the accused an opportunity
to prepare for his defense; for unless the accused is informed of the day, or about the
day, he may be, to an extent, deprived of the opportunity to defend himself. [18]
RODOLFO likewise argues that he could not have sexually abused MARIA TERESA
on 29 August 1990 because (a) he was at his place of work from as early as 6:00 a.m.
until 5:00 p.m.; and (b) MARIA TERESA attended her classes the whole day of 29 August
1990, from 7:15 a.m. until the dismissal of classes in the afternoon. Moreover, MARIA
TERESA imputed the crime of rape against him just to escape from more severe beatings
from her father for her refusal to obey an errand.
 On the other hand, the OSG maintains that RODOLFO was convicted of rape
committed on 29 August 1990, and not of multiple rape. His conviction was supported by
the straightforward and candid testimony of MARIA TERESA on the details of the rape.
The motive imputed to MARIA TERESA is flimsy, illogical, and irrational; and so is the
insinuation that the case was filed against RODOLFO to cover up the alleged infidelity of
his sister-in-law (MARIA TERESAs mother).
The appeal is without merit.
RODOLFO was not convicted of multiple rape, but of one rape committed on 29
August 1990, as alleged in the information. This is very clear from the following finding of
the trial court:

The prosecution, as can be observed, tried to convey to the court that the victim Maria
Teresa Bernaldez ha[d] been repeatedly abused by the accused, her uncle and brother
of his father, repeatedly for the past five (5) years the latest of which was on the faithful
[sic] morning of August 29, 1990. No evidence, however, was presented by the
prosecution on how and when Maria Teresa was abused the past five (5) years except
that of August 29, 1990.[19]

and the dispositive portion of the decision, which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused RODOLFO

BERNALDEZ alias DOLFO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua together with the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the
aggrieved party P50,000.00 representing moral and exemplary damages, and to pay
the costs.[20]

As to RODOLFOs lament on the trial courts statement that the specific date of the
commission of the offense charged in the information is not material, it is enough to quote
Section 11 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court; thus:

SEC. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. -- It is not necessary to state
in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was
committed except when the time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the
act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual
date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will
permit.

Indeed, we have ruled that the precise time of the commission of the crime is not an
essential element of rape.[21]
In this case, the allegation in the information of the time of the commission of the
offense is specific, i.e., in the morning of 29 August 1990. RODOLFO admits its
sufficiency when he states:
A careful reading of the information clearly show[s] that accused-appellant
was charged of [sic] having committed the crime of rape on August 29, 1990,
a precise designation of the commission of the crime as determined by the
Public Prosecutor. The plain and clear meaning of August 29, 1990, only
embraces a period of twenty four (24) hours when used with respect to time.

In fact, at no time before the trial court did the defense question the sufficiency of the
information.
Even granting arguendo that the prosecution failed to prove the allegation in the
information that the rape was committed in the morning of August 29, 1990, any variance
in the evidence as to the time the crime was committed is insignificant, if not,
irrelevant. Besides, the record fails to reveal that RODOLFO objected to the testimony of
MARIA TERESA as to the time of the commission of the crime. His counsel did not even
object to the questions as to the number of times RODOLFO had been abusing MARIA
TERESA.[22]
It is settled that even a variance of a few months between the time set out in the
indictment and that established by the evidence during trial has been held not to constitute
an error so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score.[23] The failure
of the complainant to state the exact date and time of the commission of rape is a minor
matter and can be expected when the witness is recounting the details of a humiliating
experience which are painful and difficult to recall in open court and in the presence of
other people.[24] Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential
element of the crime.[25]
The ruling in U.S. v. Dichao[26] cited by RODOLFO is not applicable because the
statement of the time of the commission of the offense in the information (between
October 1910 to August 1912) was indefinite and uncertain and was, therefore, held to
be fatally defective because it deprived the accused of the opportunity to adequately
prepare for his defense.
We now proceed to the central issue of this case: whether RODOLFO is guilty of the
crime charged.
We reiterate these guiding principles in reviewing rape cases: (1) an accusation for
rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must
be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.[27] What is decisive in a rape charge is the complainants positive
identification of the accused as the malefactor.[28] Bare denial and alibi are insufficient to
overcome the positive identification made by the prosecution witness. [29]
In this case, MARIA TERESA, a 10-year-old Grade III pupil,[30] positively identified
RODOLFO as the person who raped her on 29 August 1990, [31] and who had been
sexually abusing her many times since she was 5 years old. She testified as follows:
[PROSECUTOR BIRATA]:
Q On August 29, 1990, do you remember if you were in the house of your Uncle, Rodolfo
Bernaldez?
[WITNESS]:
A Yes, sir.
Q The house of your uncle, Rodolfo Bernaldez, is in Barangay Sugcad, Polangui, Albay, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q While you were there in the house of your uncle on August 29, 1990, what did Rodolfo
Bernaldez, your uncle do to you?
ATTY. ENCINAREAL: No basis, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR BIRATA:
Q What happened?
Witness:
A He was removing my clothes.
Q After he removed you clothes, what happened?
A He was inserting his penis to my vagina.
ATTY. ENCINAREAL: Objection, Your Honor.
COURT: Continue.
PROSECUTOR BIRATA:
Q In what part of the house did he actually put his penis to your vagina?
A Upstairs.
Q When your uncle was doing that to you, were there other people?
A None.
COURT:
Q When your uncle inserted his penis to your vagina, what happened?
WITNESS:
A Something came out from his organ.
Q What is that something?
A Something which is sticky.
PROSECUTOR BIRATA:
Q How many times have your uncle done this to you?
WITNESS:
A Many times.[32]
 She affirmed the sworn statements which she gave to the police:
PROSECUTOR BIRATA:
Q Now I am going to read to you the question and answer No. 8. Kung ikaw ba inaabuso ng
iyong tiyuhin na si Rodolfo Bernaldez ano naman ang ginagawa sa iyo. Answer. Ako po
ay kanyang binubuhatpatungo sa itaas ng kanyang bahay at doon niya ako hinuhubaran
ng panti at ako kanyang ipinapahihiga sa sahig ng kanyang bahay at habang ako ay
nakahiga siya naman ay binababa ang kanyang siper ng kanyang pantalon at inilalabas
ang kanyang titi at dahandahan ito pinapasok sa akong kiki at doon ay humihindayog na
pababa at paitaas ang kanyang poit hanggang sa doon mayroong lumalabas na mainit na
galing sa kanyang titi. Do you remember having [been] asked that question and having
[given] the same answer to that question?
WIITNESS:
A Yes, sir.[33]
During the cross-examination, MARIA TERESA asserted that the answers in her
sworn statement were given by her, not by the police investigator.[34]
Against this story of MARIA TERESA, RODOLFO had nothing but alibi. For the
defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is
not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the crime scene at the time the crime was committed.[35]
Initially, there is some surface appeal on the proffered alibi because according to
RODOLFO and his witness Delfin Paular, he was out of his house the whole day of 29
August 1990, from 6:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Also, Melita Sasota testified that on the basis
of her school record, MARIA TERESA was in her class the whole day of 29 August
1990. However, their testimonies have not convincingly proved that MARIA TERESA
never went to RODOLFOs house on 29 August 1990 and that it was physically impossible
for RODOLFO to have been in his house when the rape was committed.
Sasota admitted that she did not know where MARIA TERESA went after the morning
session, much less after the dismissal of her class in the afternoon.[36] Moreover, we
entertain serious doubt as to the reliability of Sasotas record (Exhibit 2) and her testimony
regarding MARIA TERESAs attendance and presence in school throughout the whole
day of 29 August 1990. First, Pedro Bernaldez declared that on that day MARIA TERESA
did not go to school; she was in their house when he left for work and when he came
home.[37] Second, and more significantly, for 1 March 1991, Sasotas school record of
attendance did not show that MARIA TERESA was absent or tardy on that day. Yet, on
that date, MARIA TERESA was in court and testified in the rape case.
Delfin Paulars testimony does not inspire belief either. He admitted that he did not
actually keep a record of the day-to-day list of personnel working for Mr. Cu because
somebody was assigned to do it, and that he was only an overseer.[38] He also revealed
that RODOLFO was not in the list of personnel because he was only a substitute for his
brother Pedro Bernaldez, who was the one listed as employee of the rice
mill.[39] Obviously, his testimony was contrived for the alibi of RODOLFO.
 Moreover, RODOLFOs house was only about 2 to 3 kilometers away from his place
of work and could be reached in 30 minutes by walking. [40] Thus, even if indeed he went
to work on 29 August 1990, it was not physically impossible for him to have been at his
house where the rape was committed.
RODOLFOs belated theory that MARIA TERESA fabricated the charge of rape to
stop her father from further beating her for her refusal to go to RODOLFOs house to
borrow money is incredible. For one, it was never shown that MARIA TERESA had been
known to be a liar or a disobedient child. If she refused to go to the house of RODOLFO,
it must have been for a compelling reason. Her having been raped by him was, by any
measure, an overwhelming compelling reason not to go to RODOLFOs house. For
another, it is unthinkable that MARIA TERESA, a girl of tender age, inexperienced in the
ways of the world, would concoct a tale of defloration by no less than an uncle just to
avoid further beatings from her father.
MARIA TERESAs statements before the police and her testimony on the rape
incident contained delicate details which could be given by her alone and could only be
based on real experience rather than on imagination. Surely, from the time she first
disclosed the rape, that is, in the morning of 30 August 1990, until she gave her
statements to the police on 2 September 1990 and appeared before the municipal trial
court judge, she had sufficient time to reflect on the seriousness of the charge. Several
months later, she affirmed in court the same allegations of rape. We cannot discern any
plausible reason for her to falsely accuse her uncle of so grave a wrong unless it was the
truth.
The prevailing rule is that the testimony of rape victims who are young and immature
deserves full credence.[41] Indeed, no woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert
herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to
have the culprit apprehended and punished.[42]
Curiously, the alleged ill-motive on the part of MARIA TERESA was not the motive
RODOLFO disclosed in his testimony. What he told the court was that the case was filed
to stop him from revealing to the public the alleged incident showing that MARIA
TERESAs mother had an illicit affair with her neighbor, a certain Rodolfo. RODOLFO,
however, abandoned this claim, for he must have realized that it was too incredible. Pedro
Bernaldez would unlikely sacrifice the honor and reputation of his family and the future of
his young daughter, and implicate his brother to whom he usually ran for economic
support just to cover up the alleged incident involving his wife. Neither would he use her
daughter as an engine of malice, especially if by doing so her daughter would be
subjected to embarrassment and even life-long stigma.[43] Then, too, it is hard to believe
that a rape victim, like MARIA TERESA, and her family would publicly disclose the rape
incident and thus sully their honor and reputation in the community unless it was true. [44]
The trial court erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued by Dr. De la Paz
despite the failure of the latter to testify. The certificate could be admitted as an exception
to the hearsay rule.[45] However, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be
established as an expert witness,[46] it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor
who issued it be presented in court to show his qualifications. Here, a distinction must be
made between admissibility of evidence and probative value thereof. Nevertheless, a
medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.[47] The lone testimony
of the victim is sufficient if credible.
Finally, it was unnecessary for the trial court to consider the issue of force or
intimidation. Since MARIA TERESA was undisputedly below 12 years old on 29 August
1990, when the rape was committed, then any carnal knowledge of her, even if
consented, would be rape under the third paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. Said article pertinently provides:

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs shall be present.

Per current case law, a rape victim is entitled to an indemnity of P50,000.[48] She can
also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219, and exemplary damages if the
commission of the crime was attended by one or more aggravating circumstances
pursuant to Article 2230, both of the Civil Code. No aggravating circumstance was proved
in this case; hence, the trial courts award of exemplary damages is incorrect. Under the
circumstances in this case, we deem fit to award the complainant an indemnity of P50,000
and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.
WHEREFORE, the 19 January 1993 Decision of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial
Court of Ligao, Albay, in Criminal Case No. 2763 finding RODOLFO BERNALDEZ, alias
Dolfo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with the modification ordering him to pay
the victim civil indemnity of P50,000 and moral damages of P50,000.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
REYNALDO RESUMA y AGRAVANTE alias "GEROM," appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the Decision2 dated 18
February 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),3 Branch 61, of Kabankalan City, Negros
Occidental, finding appellant Reynaldo Resuma y Agravante alias "Gerom" guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In separate Informations4 dated 5 December 1995 and 23 January 1996 filed by Provincial
Prosecutor Reinaldo M. Nolido, appellant was charged with two (2) counts of rape, thus:

Criminal Case No. 96-1619

That on or about the 8th day of December, [sic] 1994, in the Municipality of Ilog, Province of
Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there,
wilfully [sic], unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] the above-named
offended party against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 96-1644

That sometime in August, [sic] 1995, in the Municipality of Ilog, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully [sic],
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] the above-named offended party
against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution
establishing the following facts:

AAA5 is the younger of two (2) children6 born to parents BBB7 and CCC.8 In 1990, BBB and CCC
separated9 and sometime later, CCC met appellant and began cohabiting with him. CCC and
appellant had three (3) children together, although one (1) child died in infancy. CCC and appellant,
with all four (4) children, resided in one house in Barangay Dancalan, Ilog, Negros Occidental. On
different dates,10 including 8 December 1994 and sometime in August 1995, appellant raped AAA.

The rape subject of the first charge occurred at around nine o'clock in the morning of 8 December
1994. AAA was home washing the dishes and babysitting her two-year old half-brother. Appellant
was likewise home, repairing an umbrella. CCC had left the house earlier with AAA's half-sister to
attend a baptism and other fiesta activities. AAA's older sister, DDD,11 had gone to a distant deep
well to do laundry.

Per AAA's testimony, when she finished doing the dishes, she went inside the bedroom and shortly
thereafter, appellant followed her. Appellant removed AAA's underwear and made her lie on her
stomach on the floor. He then undressed himself, squatted on the floor, pulled AAA's legs and laid
them on his thighs. Appellant repeatedly inserted his penis into her vagina, and AAA felt pain in her
private parts. AAA also felt wetness inside her vagina after appellant had finished his dastardly act.
AAA was crying when DDD later returned to the house. When asked, she told her older sister that
appellant had again raped her. DDD allegedly reported the incident to their mother CCC, but the
latter purportedly simply told them not to disclose the matter to anyone.12

The second rape complained of occurred sometime in August 1995 when AAA was again left in their
home alone with appellant and her toddler half-brother. In the bedroom, appellant undressed AAA
and ordered her to lie on her stomach on the floor. He then had carnal knowledge of her in the same
manner as he did on 8 December 1994. AAA told DDD of what happened the following day.13
To corroborate AAA's narration, the prosecution presented DDD who testified that in the morning of
8 December 1994, she was washing clothes at a water pump located at a distance from her house.
When she returned home at around nine o'clock or ten o'clock that morning, DDD saw AAA weak
and crying. When she asked her sister what happened to her, AAA allegedly said that appellant
raped her. Later, DDD confided the matter to their mother CCC, who advised her not to tell anyone
of the incident to avoid trouble.14

Witness Dr. Ricardo Garrido, a medical practitioner, testified that he conducted the physical
examination of AAA on 9 October 1995. He affirmed the findings and conclusions on his medico-
legal examination report and opined that the lacerations found in AAA's vagina were caused by the
penetration of a human penis.15

The sister of BBB, EEE,16 took the stand as a prosecution witness. According to her, in June 1995,
she visited her nieces upon the request of BBB for her to check on the condition of his daughters as
he was then based in Manila for work, and in that visit she learned from CCC that appellant had
raped AAA.17

BBB himself testified that he received a letter from EEE on 20 August 1995, telling him that his
children were being maltreated. Thus, on 9 October 1995, he went to see his children. BBB
recounted that his daughter AAA told him that appellant had raped her. This prompted him to
immediately take her to the police station to file charges against appellant and then to the doctor for
physical examination.18

The defense presented appellant himself, CCC and appellant's aunt, Maria Elisa Agravante Iligan
(Iligan). With denial and alibi as his defenses, appellant testified that he could not have raped nor
maltreated AAA as he loved her and DDD as his own. Claiming frame-up, appellant testified that
BBB caused the filing of the complaints against him to enable BBB to get custody over AAA and
DDD.19

According to appellant on the stand, on the day in question, 8 December 1994, their barangay
celebrated its fiesta. He spent the day at the house of his friend Angelo Cuachon, while AAA and
DDD were in school. CCC, together with her children AAA and DDD, purportedly left their home at
7:30 that morning while he left shortly thereafter or at about 8:00 a.m.20

He likewise claimed that in the month of August 1995, he stayed at his grandfather's farm for one (1)
week harvesting corn. Apart from this, he spent his days roaming from house to house in Guilungan,
Cauayan, Bocana, Ilog, Sonedco and other towns offering his services as an umbrella repairman.
On occasions, he had lunch at Iligan's house where he did some umbrella repairs.21 This was
corroborated by Iligan on the witness stand. Routinely, appellant visited Iligan's house around six (6)
times monthly.22

In her testimony, CCC sided with appellant. She denied AAA's claim that she reported to her the
rape incident of 8 December 1994. She asserted that appellant did not sexually abuse AAA.
Claiming that she did not have knowledge of the purported rape until EEE told her about it, she could
not believe the charges against appellant to be true as she was home with the children all the time
and did not see appellant committing any maltreatment or sexual abuse against her children.23

The trial court found appellant guilty of qualified rape on both charges. Thus, appellant was
sentenced to suffer the death penalty for each count and to indemnify the victim in the amount
of P75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages in each case.24
Conformably with this Court's decision in People v. Mateo,25 appellant's appeal by way of automatic
review was transferred to the Court of Appeals. Finding no sufficient basis to disturb the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, the appellate court, on 30 November 2006, rendered its decision
affirming appellant's conviction but modifying the penalty and damages imposed. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED, with

the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Reynaldo Resuma is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
liability, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each
count of rape.26

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Finding that the Informations did not allege the two qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship, the appellate court ruled that appellant was charged only with simple rape. Observing
appellant's right to be informed of the charges against him and right to due process, the appellate
court reduced the penalty imposed upon appellant to reclusion perpetua.

Now, the case is with the Court again.

Before the Court, appellant has not filed a supplemental brief, relying instead on the same brief
originally filed with this Court and later presented to the Court of Appeals after the remand of the
case. The assignment of errors in appellant's brief reads27-

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITING [sic] THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON THE GROUND THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL

COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON HIM THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF
DEATH DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
RELATIONSHIP AND MINORITY WERE NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.

Any review of a rape case begins with the settled reality that accusing a person of this crime can be
done with facility. Thus, the testimony of the complainant must always be scrutinized with great
caution. It may not be easy for her to prove the commission of rape; yet it is even more difficult for
the accused, though innocent, to disprove his guilt. This principle must be viewed in relation to that
which holds that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits; it cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.28 When a rape victim's testimony,
however, is straightforward, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, then it deserves
full faith and credit and cannot be discarded. Once found credible, her lone testimony is sufficient to
sustain a conviction.29
After judicious and painstaking study of the arguments of the parties and of the records a quo, we
reach the inescapable conclusion that the prosecution has effectively established its case and
appellant's contentions thus deserve scant consideration.

Settled is the rule that the determination of the competence and credibility of a witness rests
primarily with the trial court,30 because it has the unique position of observing the witness'
deportment on the stand while testifying. Absent any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the
assessments and conclusions of the trial court, the reviewing court is generally bound by the
former's findings.31

In scrutinizing such credibility, jurisprudence has established the following doctrinal guidelines: (1)
the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court unless there is a showing that it had
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that
could affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality as it had the opportunity to examine their
demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testified in clear, positive
and convincing manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.32

Applying the principles to the instant case, we find AAA's narration of her harrowing experience
trustworthy and convincing. AAA was seven (7) years old when her sufferings began. It is ludicrous
to believe that a child of such tender years would concoct such grave accusations against her
stepfather if the same were not true. Even more, it is preposterous to imagine that a child of her age
would already have such intimate knowledge of the sexual acts as she described in her testimony
with such clarity and coherence, unless the same were borne of personal experience.33

We have no reason to believe that AAA was motivated by any other reason than to seek justice and
vindication for the wrong done her. To be sure, a young girl's revelation that she has been raped,
coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and her willingness to undergo public
trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault to her dignity, cannot be so
easily dismissed as mere concoction.34

Likewise, appellant's imputation that BBB's desire to gain custody over his children was the impelling
motive behind the filing of these cases is too trite and feeble to merit consideration. As the Court of
Appeals aptly pointed out, "[N]o mother, or father in this case, would stoop so low as to subject his
daughter to [the] hardships and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage his own
feelings."35 Indeed, no parent in his right mind would subject his child to the humiliation, disgrace and
trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape, if the motivation were not solely the desire to incarcerate
the person responsible for his child's defilement.36

The purported delay in the filing of the charges against appellant does not infirm the credibility of
AAA nor can it be taken against her.37 We have ruled that delay in making a criminal accusation
does not impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained.38 In this case, the
following realities justified the delay in filing the cases against appellant: (a) Appellant was AAA's
foster father and at that time, the common-law husband of her mother. He thus exercised moral
ascendancy over her;39 (b) AAA was merely seven (7) years old when her ordeal began. A child of
such tender years cannot be expected to know how to go about filing a complaint against her
abuser; and (c) As AAA's complaints were ignored, if not disbelieved, by CCC, the child was left
without recourse until her father discovered her plight. No malice can be convincingly ascribed
against BBB in the delay incurred in the filing of the complaints. The allegations of frame-up are too
weak to merit consideration.
What is more, the medical certificate and testimony of Dr. Garrido corroborate the allegations of
rape. Dr. Garrido found a "healed laceration ½ cm. each with coranculae formulation at 9 and 7
o'clock positions."40 His examination of AAA likewise yielded the conclusion that she had a ruptured
hymen and had lost her physical virginity.41

Upon the other hand, appellant's plain denial of any wrongdoing cannot prevail. And so cannot his
alibi. For, in order for alibi to prosper, appellant must be able to show the physical impossibility of his
being at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.42 This, appellant failed to discharge.
Moreover, his alibi is wanting in material corroboration.43

Appellant avers that he could not have raped AAA on 8 December 1994 as AAA was at the school
whereas he was at the house of his friend, Angelo Cuachon. However, apart from failing to present
Angelo Cuachon to substantiate his alibi, appellant himself testified that the latter's house was but 50
to 100 meters from his home and AAA's school was just in Barangay Dancalan proper.44 Anent the
allegation of rape in August 1995, appellant proffered two (2) defenses: (1) he was at his
grandfather's farm for a week in August 1995 to help the latter harvest corn; and (2) on 9 August
1995, he was at Iligan's house repairing umbrellas from morning until afternoon. Again, aside from
appellant's failure to present any material corroborative witness, he admitted that his grandfather's
house was only five (5) kilometers away from his home and which distance can be covered in ten
(10) minutes by bus.45 Likewise, Iligan's testimony is too inadequate to overcome the categorical
declarations of AAA.

In both cases, appellant did not demonstrate the physical impossibility of his having committed the
offenses as charged. More importantly, the defense of alibi which is inherently weak becomes even
weaker in the face of AAA's unqualified and positive identification of appellant as the author of the
repulsive crimes against her.46 We quote the observations of the court a quo:

[T]he Court does not believe accused's testimony that some schools were holding classes
although it was the fiesta of their barangay, Dancalan. Human experience tells us that
schools do not hold classes during fiestas. The testimony of [AAA] that she was left at home
to watch the second child of the accused by [BBB] is more believable because as testified to
by [BBB], her second child by the accused was only two (2) years old in 1995, while [AAA]
was only eight years old (May 24, 1999 Hearing, page 45, TSN). In other words, it would be
unnatural to have a two-year-old child to be (sic) left alone as insinuated by herein accused.
The Court also cannot give credence to accused's testimony that he could not have raped
[AAA] on December 8, 1994 because he was in the house of his friend Angelo Cuachon. He
admitted that his friend's house is near to (sic) his (accused's) house. Accused did not even
bother to present Angelo Cuachon to corroborate accused's testimony of alibi. At any rate,
the proximity of accused's house and that of his friend will not render it physically impossible
nor difficult for the accused to perpetrate the crime imputed to him.

Likewise, the Court cannot sustain the defense of alibi simply because in the month of
August 1995, [accused] was either harvesting corn in the land owned by his grandfather
located at Kilometer 114 or he was in Guiljungan, Cauayan, Negros Occidental roaming
around to repair umbrellas of customers. The defense failed to prove that the land where he
was harvesting corn is far from his house, the scene where the alleged rape was committed.
The Court can likewise take judicial notice of the distance from Dancalan, Ilog to Guiljungan,
Cauayan and travel time which is merely twenty (20) minutes by bus. It was not physically
impossible for the accused to be present at the crime scene or at the vicinity thereof.
Accused also failed to present his grandfather Bonifacio Caldito to corroborate his testimony.
Although accused's defense of alibi that he was in Guiljungan, Cauayan repairing umbrellas
 was corroborated by his aunt, Maria Elisa Agravante Iligan, the same is still extremely
weak.47

We uphold the Court of Appeals in affirming appellant's contention that it was erroneous for the RTC
to impose the death penalty on him. For failure of the prosecution to properly allege in the
information the qualifying circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and that
the offender is a common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim, the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship could not be taken into consideration and appellant could
only be found guilty of simple rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.48 These qualifying
circumstances, even if proved at the trial and specifically alleged in AAA's sworn affidavit, cannot be
considered because they were not specifically alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the information specify the qualifying
circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of
penalty. This requirement is beneficial to an accused and may, therefore, be given retroactive
effect.49

Thus, we sustain the finding of guilt of appellant on both counts and affirm the Court of Appeals in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. We likewise affirm the award of damages in the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each count of rape.50

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00081
is AFFIRMED. Appellant REYNALDO RESUMA y AGRAVANTE alias "GEROM" is found guilty of
simple rape and sentenced, in each of the criminal cases subject of this review, to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim AAA (to be identified through the Informations in this
case) the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO

FEROLINO a.k.a. FRANCISCO FEROLINO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: Percuriam

In its consolidated decision of 29 October 1997 in Criminal Case No. DU-

[1]

5228 and Criminal Case No. DU-5229, the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City, Branch 28, found accused-appellant Antonio Ferolino alias Francisco
Ferolino (hereafter ANTONIO) guilty of rape, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of death in each case and to pay the victim Ferlyn Dumaguit
(hereafter FERLYN), his eight-year old niece, the sum of P50,000 as
indemnity, P50,000 as moral and exemplary damages, as well as the costs of
suit.

On the basis of FERLYN's sworn statement dated 31 July 1995, and the
affidavit of her mother Lorelina, both of which were executed before the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), Region VII, Cebu City, a complaint for
"Child Abuse-Rape under R.A. 7610" was filed against ANTONIO. After
appropriate proceedings, two informations for rape dated 31 October 1995,
were filed with the court below and docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-5228
and Criminal Case No. DU- 5229. The accusatory portions in both cases are
similarly worded, thus:

That sometime in April, 1995, at Mandaue City, Philippines and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, with deliberate intent and lewd design, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously through force and
intimidation commit sexual abuse and have sexual intercourse
with his niece, an 8 year old girl, FERLYN DUMAGUIT.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [2]

The prosecution established the following facts:

Even before she was born on 14 December 1986, FERLYN's family had
[3]

already been living at the house of ANTONIO at Tipolo, Mandaue City. She
grew up there with her mother Lorelina; her uncles, Emelito and Ferlo, and
their families; and ANTONIO, whom she fondly called "Papa Tonio," his wife
Fe, the sister of Lorelina's deceased husband, Femando, and their daughter
Fely. FERLYN's family moved out from ANTONIO's house sometime in May
1995, after the occurrence of the incidents subject of these cases. Exsm
[4]

Sometime in April 1995, FERLYN was taken by ANTONIO to a deserted

building near his house on the pretext that FERLYN would pluck his gray hair.
But once his niece entered, ANTONIO closed the door and immediately
removed her underwear while she was standing. He then took off his own
pants and made FERLYN lean on the wall of the building. ANTONIO parted
her knees, thereby drawing her legs apart, and inserted his penis into her
vagina. In so doing, ANTONIO made a pushing motion which FERLYN
[5]

demonstrated by clasping herhands and moving them forward. Due to the

pain she felt, FERLYN shouted "Nay," for which she was instantly
admonished by ANTONIO. The latter, however, told her that no one could
hear her. He threatened to kill all the members of her family if she would
report the incident to anybody. His dastardly deed accomplished, ANTONIO
urinated, giving FERLYN the chance to flee. As may be expected of a girl her
age, FERLYN did not disclose the incident to her mother for fear that her
Papa Tonio might harm the members of her family. [6]

The next day, using the same modus operandi, ANTONIO sought a repeat of
the previous days activity. FERLYN initially declined but her mother told her to
go with her Papa Tonio and pluck his gray hair inasmuch as they were living
in his house. Inside the building, ANTONIO took off her panty and his own
short pants. He forced FERLYN to lie down on a bench, then immediately he
went on top of her. Once more, the young girl felt pain in her vagina and body.
He squeezed his penis twice, ejaculated, then stood up. At this point, his
daughter Fely knocked on the door of the building. When he opened the door,
FERLYN saw an opportunity to ran back to the house. Again, remembering
ANTONIO's threats, FERLYN remained silent. [7]

After one incident in April 1995, where ANTONIO was boxed by her Uncle
Emelito for touching his wife Ana's private part, FERLYN finally recounted to
her mother what ANTONIO had done to her. She told her mother, "Nay Papa
Tonio is foolish." When asked why she replied, "Because Papa Tonio took off
my panty and did like that to me with is penis." She demonstrated this by
joining her hands and making a pushing motion. FERLYN added that
[8]

ANTONIO "even did this foolish thing to me twice, Nay, because the following
day, after the first time, he again did it." FERLYN explained that she did not
[9]

immediately confide to her mother because ANTONIO had threatened to kill

all of them. When asked when the incident occurred, she said (they,
happened when she was "feeling very weak." Lorelina Dumaguit recalled that
it was also in April 1995 when she brought FERLYN to a doctor because the
latter felt weak and sick. FERLYN then complained of pain in her private part.
When asked about it, she said she did not know. Kylex

Thus, Lorelina and FERLYN reported the matter to the Barangay Captain of
Tipolo. During confrontation, Fe Ferolino said that because Lorelina had been
a widow for a long time, her husband should have had intercourse with
Lorelina instead of with FERLYN. From there, Lorelina and FERLYN
proceeded to the local office of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD). The DSWD referred FERLYN to the Don Vicente
[10]

Sotto Medical Center in Cebu City, where she was examined on 26 July 1996
by Dr. Maria Louisa Baladjay-Catipon. The latter's findings were incorporated
[11]

in the Medical Certificate issued on the same date, viz.:

[12]
 Physical Condition: sthenic.............Mental state: conscious,
coherent

Breast: infantile

Areolas: pinkish.............................Nipple: pinkish

Height:..........................................Weight: 18.5 kg.

Last Menstruation: not applicable

Extra-Genital Injuries: (use diagram in addition) none

Genitalia: grossly female

Rubio Hairs: none

Labia Majora: firm, coaptated

Labia Minora: well-coaptated

Fourchette: v-shaped

Vestibule: pinkish

Hymen: intact

Orifice: admits tip of finger

Vagina: walls: no internal examination done

.....................ruganities:

Uterus: no rectal examination done

Cervix:

Discharges:

Smears: sperm identification-negative

After that, Lorelina and FERLYN proceeded to the CHR Office in Cebu City,
where their sworn statements were taken. Thereupon, on 28 August 1995, a
[13]
complaint subscribed by FERLYN was filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor. Kycalr [14]

For his defense, ANTONIO denied ever sexually molesting FERLYN. He

testified that in 1995 he was a security guard at a warehouse leased to a
certain Andrew Amadora. Alleging ill motive on the part of FERLYN and her
family, he said Lorelina's son sought his help in gaining employment at the
warehouse, but he could not do anything because there was no
vacancy. ANTONIO also declared that on 19 July 1995, he was mauled by
[15]

the Dumaguits because he allegedly touched the private part of Ferlo

Dumaguit's wife. Consequently, he filed a complaint for physical injuries
against the Dumaguits. During the barangay conciliation proceedings in the
physical injuries case, however, the Dumaguits intimated that should
ANTONIO refuse to withdraw his complaint, they would charge him for
rape. Procopio Villanueva, Barangay Captain of Tipolo, Mandaue City,
[16]

corroborated this allegation. [17]

Fe Ferolino further supported her husband's testimony regarding his

employment as well as the possible reason for his indictment, that is, the
mauling incident which was amicably settled at the barangay level after the
Dumaguits asked for ANTONIO's forgiveness. She added that, contrary to
[18]

the prosecution's statement of facts, Lorelinas family was not living with them
in April 1995. Calrky [19]

For her part, ANTONIO's daughter Fely denied that she knocked at the door
of the warehouse where the alleged incident took place in April 1995.

Francisca Bustamante, ANTONIO's neighbor, co-member of the Tipolo New

Society Livelihood Organization, and co-worker at Andrew Amadora's
warehouse, testified that during the period of her employment the warehouse
was always occupied. She admitted, however, that during daytime she would
sometimes bring her work home or leave the workplace for lunch. [20]

The trial court was fully convinced of the criminal culpability of ANTONIO. It
ruled that the gravamen of the offense of rape, which is having sexual
intercourse with a woman against her will, was fully established. FERLYN
testified that when she was sexually attacked, no full penetration occurred; yet
she added that the penis of ANTONIO touched the labia of her vagina. The
positive declaration of the victim on this matter is sufficient to support a
judgment of conviction since "a slight penetration of the labia consummates
the crime of rape." [21]
Conversely, the trial court refused to give credence to ANTONIO's denial and
the self-serving testimonies of his witnesses, and ruled that the alleged ill
motive for the filing of the rape charge was not sufficiently proven.

The trial court considered against ANTONIO the twin qualifying circumstances
of age (FERLYN was only eight years old at the time of the incident) and
relationship (ANTONIO's wife Fe is the sister of FERLYN's father Fernando,
making him FERLYN's uncle by affinity). The presence of these special
qualifying circumstances, duly alleged in the information, rendered mandatory
the imposition of the death penalty pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. [22]

Thus, in its decision of 29 October 1997, the trial court decreed as

[23]

follows: Mesm

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is

hereby rendered, to wit:

I.....Crim. Case No. DU-5228 -

Finding the herein accused declaring ANTONIO

FEROLINO alias FRANCISCO FEROLINO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape:

1)....Said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;

2)....To indemnity the offended party Ferlyn Dumaguit the

following amounts:

(a) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of

rape upon her;

(b) P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article

2219 in relation. to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code
for pain, moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of
the crime of rape with one aggravating circumstance;

3) to pay the cost.

II.....Criminal Case No. DU-5229

 Finding the herein accused ANTONIO FEROLINO
alias FRANCISCO FEROLINO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape:

1) Said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;

2) To indemnify the offended party Ferlyn Dumaguit the following

amounts:

(a) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of

rape upon her;

(b) P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under article

2219 in relation to Article 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for
pain, moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of the
crime of rape with aggravating circumstance;

3) To pay the cost.

SO ORDERED. Scslx

The judgment was brought to us for automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of

the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659. In his
Appellant's Brief, ANTONIO assigns this lone error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING

THE TWO (2) INFORMATIONS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE
PRECISE DATES WHEN THE CRIMES CHARGED WERE
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, IT BEING AN ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.

ANTONIO alleges that the two informations in Criminal Case No. DU-5228
and Criminal Case No. DU-5229 are void since they failed to state the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, as set forth in Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Such failure was a violation of the rule that in
every criminal prosecution of rape "each sexual intercourse must be proved to
have been committed at a precise date and time." The allegations in the
informations only stated that ANTONIO committed rape "sometime in April
1995." He claims such allegations are too "indefinite" and, thus, deprived him
of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him
so as to afford him an adequate opportunity to prepare for his
defense. ANTONIO concludes that the two informations are fatally defective,
[24]

and for this reason, the challenged decision of 29 October 1997 should be set
aside and anew one entered acquitting him.

These arguments have no merit.

Under Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is not necessary for the
information to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with
precision and exactitude, unless, of course, the time is an essential ingredient
of the offense. Thus,

Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense. - It is not

necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time
at which the offense was committed except when time is a
material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to
have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at
which the offense was committed as the information or complaint
will permit.

The legal implications of this provision has been explained in People v.

Lucas, where we reiterated the early ruling in U.S. v. Arcos that:
[25] [26]

Where time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of
the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the
crime, even if it appear(s) that the crime was not committed at the precise
time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some
immaterial fact set out in the complaint, providing it appears that the specific
crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the
complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations, and at a
place within the jurisdiction of the court. Slx

We do not agree with ANTONIO's contention that the two informations under
which he was charged are invalid since they failed to allege the exact date
and time of the commission of the crime. FERLYN, who was only nine (9)
years old at the time she testified, explained that her harrowing experience
occurred in 1995, although she cannot remember what particular month. Her [27]

mother, however, shed light on this uncertainty. Lorelina testified that

FERLYN complained of some pain in her private part sometime in April of
1995. This was when FERLYN divulged to her mother what her Papa Tonio
[28]

had done to her. [29]

After a rigorous study of the records of this case, we find nothing on record
that would justify a reversal of ANTONIO's conviction.

We cannot simply disregard the direct and spontaneous testimony of

FERLYN, who was merely nine (9) years old at the time she testified. It is
unbelievable for a girl of such a tender age, unfamiliar with the ways of the
world, to fabricate such sordid story of defloration, a traumatic experience with
repercussions beyond relief and irreversibly lasting in its effects. FERLYN
survived an intensive cross-examination. Her narration revealed each and
every relevant detail of the incidents. She was taken to an empty warehouse,
which was ANTONIO's modus operandi to isolate them from prying eyes. He
removed her underwear. She was made do lean on the wall and spread her
legs to facilitate his intrusion. She felt the pain when he entered her, as well
as the wetness in his private parts. We believe this declaration sufficiently
establishes beyond moral doubt the commission by ANTONIO of the crime of
rape against FERLYN in the month of April 1995, thus:

Q....Can you remember what happen last year in 1995 with

respect to while you were still living at Antonio Ferolino's house?

A....Yes.

Q....Can you tell us what was that?

A....He brought me to the building.

Q....Why did he bring you to the building?

A....To pluck his gray hair.

Q....How far is this building from Antonio Ferolino's house?

A....It is very near. Slxsc

Q....When you arrived at this building what did Antonio Ferolino

do?

A.... He brought me inside the building and then he closed the

door and immediately took off my panty.

Q....What position were you when he took off your underwear?

A....Standing.
Q....What about Ferolino, what did he do after he had taken off
your panty?

A....He also took off my pants.

Q....After that what did he do?

A....He had me lean on the wall.

Q....And what happened after that?

A....He did like that with his penis to my vagina.

COURT INTERPRETER:

....Witness demonstrating by moving her left and right hands

together forward.

FISCAL TO WITNESS:

Q....What did you feel as a result of that act of Ferolino?

A....I felt pain in my vagina.

Q....What did you tell him, if any?

A....Nothing.

Q....Did you not shout?

A....I did.

Q....And what did he, say to you when you shouted?

A....Not to shout because my nanay might hear.

Q....After he pushed his penis inside or on your vagina, what

happened?

A....I shouted saying " Nay!" And then he said.

"Your nanay will not hear, you."

Q....After that what did he do?

A....He urinated. Missdaa

Q....What about you what did you do?

A....I ran.

Q....Did you tell your mother about what Antonio Ferolino did?

A....No.

Q....Why?

A....He warned me that all of us will be killed if I tell.

Q....The next day can you tell us what unusual incident happened,
if any?

A....He again brought me to the building.

Q....Why did he brig you to the building?

A....He again told me to pluck his gray hair.

Q....Did you not say no to your Papa Tony?

A....I did but my mother told me to obey because we are living in

their house.

Q....I s this the same building where he brought you the day
before?

ATTY.SURALTA:

....Objection, leading.

COURT:

....Let her answer.

FISCAL:

....I think allowance should be granted to this kind of witness, Your

Honor.
WITNESS:

A....Yes.

FISCAL TO WITNESS:

Q....Upon arriving at the building what did Ferolino do?

A....He again took of my panty.

Q....After taking off your panty what did he do?

A....He also took off his short pants then laid me down on the
bench and immediately stayed on top of me. Sdaadsc

Q....After that what did he do next?

A....He squeezed his penis.

Q....After that what did he do?

A....His penis squirted something like water.

Q....Can you describe his movements while he was on top of you?

A....He again squeezed his penis.

Q....After that what did Ferolino do?

A....He stood up.

Q....Where did he go when he stood up?

A....His daughter knocked on the door and then he opened the

door.

Q....What about you, what did you do when he stood up?

A....I ran.

Q....Where did you go?

A....To our house.

A....Did you tell your mother right away about what had
happened?

A....No.

Q....Did you in effect later on tell your mother about these

incidents?

A....Yes.

Q....When Ferolino placed himself on top of you what did you

feel?

A....I felt pain on my body.

Q....What about particularly with respect to your sexual organ?

A ....It was painful also.

x-x-x

COURT TO WITNESS: Rtcspped

Q....You said that when Antonio Ferolino placed himself on top of

you, you felt pain in your vagina. Can you tell us why you felt pain
in your vagina?

A....Because he pushed his penis.

Q....Did his penis penetrate your vagina?

A....No, just at the sides.

Q....What do you mean by the side?

A....On the lip.

Q....Of your vagina?

A....Yes.
 Q....What about the first time when he let you lean on the wall,
you also said that you felt pain on your vagina. What was the
cause of it?

A....Because he tried to push in his penis also.

Q....And what portion of , your vagina did it hit?

A....On the lips.

Q....In other words it has not penetrated you deep inside?

A....No.

Q....Did you sustain bleeding?

A....No. (Underscoring ours for emphasis).

[30]

Let us now consider the imposable penalty. The trial court imposed the death
penalty because it considered the special qualifying circumstances of
relationship of ANTONIO to FERLYN, and the latter's age. Both informations
alleged that ANTONIO "Willfully, unlawfully and feloniously through force and
intimidation commit sexual abuse and have sexual intercourse with his niece,
an 8 year old girl, FERLYN DUMAGUIT." The prosecution was able to prove
that at the time she was raped FERLYN was only eight years old, having been
born on 14 December 1986 as evidenced by the certificate of live birth. The
[31]

prosecution likewise proved that ANTONIO's wife Fe is FERLYN's aunt, being

the sister of FERLYN's father Femando. Therefore, Fe is FERLYN's relative
by consanguinity within the third civil degree, while ANTONIO is FERLYN's
relative by affinity within the third civil degree.,

The seventh paragraph of Article 35 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended

by Section 7 of R.A. No. 7659 provides: Kortex

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is

committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1.....When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
 2.....When the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities.

3.....When the rape is committed in full view of the husband,

parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third
degree of consanguinity.

4.....When the victim is religious or a child below seven (7) years

old.

5.....When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired

Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.

6.....When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency.

7.....When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim

has suffered permanent physical mutilation. (As amended by Sec.
11, R.A. No. 7659)

These seven attendant circumstances, given that they alter the nature of the
crime of rape and thus increase the degree of the penalty, are in the nature of
qualifying circumstances. Plainly, these attendant circumstances added by
R.A. No. 7659 are not ordinary aggravating circumstances, which merely
increase the period of the penalty. These are special qualifying circumstances
which must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information;
otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed. [32]

In this case the allegation that FERLYN is ANTONIO's niece is not specific
enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstances of relationship. If the
offender is merely a relation - not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or
guardian or common law spouse of the mother of the victim - it must be
alleged in the information that he is "a relative by consanguinity or affinity [as
the case may be] within the third civil degree. That relationship by
consanguinity or affinity was not alleged in the informations in these cases.
Even if it was, it was still necessary to further allege that such relationship was
within the third civil degree. Sclaw

Consequently, ANTONIO can only be held liable for simple rape in each case
for the rape of a child under twelve years of age. The penalty therefor under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
is reclusion perpetua.

The award of P50,000 as indemnity in each case is in order. Moral damages

and exemplary damages should be separately determined. Conformably with
current case law, moral damages of P50,000 may be awarded in each case
without need of allegation and proof. Exemplary damages in the amount of
[33]

P25,000 in each case is also in order to deter the commission by others of

similar dastardly deeds. [34]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City,

Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. DU-5228 and Criminal Case No. DU-5229,
finding in each case accused-appellant ANTONIO
FEROLINO a.k.a. Francisco Ferolino, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is hereby
MODIFIED. As MODIFIED, accused-appellant ANTONIO
FEROLINO, a.k.a. Francisco Ferolino, is found in each case guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of simple rape, defined and
penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, and is hereby sentenced in each case to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with all its accessory penalties and to pay the offended
party, FERLYN DUMAGUIT the sum of P50,000 as indemnity, P50,000 as
moral damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELMER CEREDON y PAGARAN, accused-appellant.

DECISION

REYES R.T., J.:

Sa mga karumal-dumal na krimen, walang higit na nagpapasiklab ng galit, pagkarimarim at

pagkapoot kaysa sa panghahalay sa sariling laman. Ito ay kasuklam-suklam at nakapandidiri na
marapat lamang na maramdaman ng nagkasala ang ngalit at pagtatakwil sa kanya ng lipunan. Sa
pagkaka-repeal ng Death Penalty Law noong June 24, 2006 sa pamamagitan ng Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9346, ang akusadong umaapela ay sampung ulit na hinahatulan ng reclusion perpetua. Sa
piitan na lilipas ang kanyang mga araw kasama ang umuusig na gunita ng pagkakasala sa kanyang
batang-batang kapatid.
AMONG the heinous crimes, none stirs up so much public outrage, repulsion and hatred than
incestuous rape. It is so odious and disgusting that the perpetrator rightfully must feel the anger and
spurn of society.1 With the repeal of the Death Penalty Law2 on June 24, 2006 through the passage
of R.A. No. 9347,3 accused-appellant is sentenced ten times to reclusion perpetua. He is to live out
his days under incarceration with thoughts of his crimes against his sister of tender age to haunt his
conscience.

The Case

Appellant Elmer Ceredon y Pagaran was indicted for ten (10) counts of rape, defined and penalized
under Article 266(A) and (B) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 and R.A.
No. 7659, allegedly committed as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 08-1296:

That sometime in 1995, in the Municipality of Gattaran, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with lewd
design, by use of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party, AAA,4 his youngest sister, a minor, ten
(10) years of age, all against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

2. In Criminal Case No. 08-1297:

That sometime in 1995, in the Municipality of Gattaran, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with lewd
design, by use of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, ten
(10) years of age, all against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

3. In Criminal Case No. 08-1298:

That sometime in 1995, in the Municipality of Gattaran, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with lewd
design, by use of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, ten
(10) years of age, all against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

4. In Criminal Case No. 08-1299:

That sometime in 1995, in the Municipality of Gattaran, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with lewd
design, by use of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, ten
(10) years of age, all against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8

5. In Criminal Case No. 08-1300:

That sometime in 1995, in the Municipality of Gattaran, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with lewd
design, by use of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor, ten
(10) years of age, all against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.9

6. In Criminal Case No. 08-1301:

That sometime in 1996, in the Municipality of Gattaran, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with lewd
design, by use of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor,
eleven (11) years of age, all against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.10

7. In Criminal Case No. 08-1302:

That sometime in 1996, in the Municipality of Gattaran, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with lewd
design, by use of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor,
eleven (11) years of age, all against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

8. In Criminal Case No. 08-1303:

That sometime in 1998, in the Municipality of Gattaran, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with lewd
design, by use of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor,
thirteen (13) years of age, all against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.12

9. In Criminal Case No. 08-1304:

That sometime in 1998, in the Municipality of Gattaran, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with lewd
design, by use of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor,
thirteen (13) years of age, all against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.13
 10. In Criminal Case No. 08-1305:

That sometime in 2000, in the Municipality of Gattaran, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a knife, with lewd
design, by use of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party, AAA, his youngest sister, a minor,
fifteen (15) years of age, all against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.14

On August 13, 2001, at his arraignment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Aparri,
Cagayan, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to all ten (10) charges. However, on September 3, 2001,
during the pre-trial conference, his counsel manifested before the trial court the desire of appellant to
change his plea to "guilty" on all ten (10) counts. Said manifestation was granted and appellant was
re-arraigned.14-a

Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued. Teresa Andres-Teresa, Grade IV teacher of private
complainant AAA, and AAA herself took the witness stand for the prosecution.

No evidence was presented for the defense.

The Facts

Criminal Case No. 08-1296

The corruption of AAA's childhood innocence commenced sometime in 1995 when she was merely
ten (10) years of age. It occurred at mid-day in her own home at Baraoidan, Gattaran,
Cagayan.15 She was playing with her brothers BBB and CCC when appellant beckoned to her. She
ignored him for fear of getting whipped. His calls unheeded, appellant came out of the house and
ordered their two brothers to go down to the river. BBB and CCC did as they were told.16

Holding AAA by the arms, appellant then brought her into the house. She cried but appellant told her
in Ilocano "Uki ni nam, ta bedbedak ta ngiwat mo" which roughly translates to "Vulva of your mother,
I will gag your mouth." Appellant proceeded to search for a handkerchief.17

AAA ran towards her youngest brother's cradle but appellant pulled her away to another room where
he gagged her and whipped her with a belt.18 After that, appellant tied her hands together behind her
back with a rope, pulled her dress down, laid her on a bed and, with more rope, tied each of her legs
to separate corners of the bed.19 Appellant then left the room.20

When he returned, he was wielding a pair of scissors. He snipped off AAA's shorts and underwear
then shed his own clothes. Appellant then mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. The
penetration caused her great pain.21 Afterwards, appellant wiped her genital region with a
handkerchief and showed it to her. It was covered with blood.22

Moments later, appellant heard their sister DDD's voice prompting him to procure a towel with which
to cover AAA. Having concealed her nudity in this manner, appellant hastily donned his garments
and left laughing.23
When DDD and their brothers BBB and CCC entered the room, they found AAA still tied to the bed.
One of her brothers pulled off the towel and untied her.24 AAA did not tell them that appellant had
raped her because of her fear of appellant and his threats that he would kill them all.25

Criminal Case No. 1297

The second incident of rape also occurred in 1995.26 AAA was tending to their youngest brother
when appellant summoned her to extract his armpit hairs. She turned a deaf ear. Appellant then
instructed their brother BBB to take their youngest sibling to the river to bathe him. BBB
complied.27 Left alone now with AAA, appellant dragged her inside a room and ordered her to
remove her clothes.28 When she refused, he forcibly undressed her at knife-point.29

Stripped naked, AAA was then brought to the bed - the same bed on which appellant had previously
committed the dastardly deed. While lying on the bed, appellant disrobed and, while poking her with
his knife, mounted her. He then penetrated her vagina with his penis. After satisfying himself, he
again threatened to kill all of them should she report the matter to anyone.30

Criminal Case No. 08-1298

Later that same year, appellant raped AAA for the third time.31 At the time of the incident, their
parents were out of the house.32 While sleeping on top of their trunk, AAA was awakened when
appellant started undressing her. She cried and begged him to stop, but he disregarded her pleas
and proceeded to sexually abuse her.33 Despite her protestations, appellant proceeded to insert his
penis into the young girl's vagina.34 After his lust had been sated, he reiterated his threat to kill them
all should she reveal the incident to anyone.35

Criminal Case No. 08-1299

A few days after the third rape, AAA was again sexually abused by appellant inside their house, in
the same room and upon the same bed. As in the previous incidents, appellant poked a knife at her
to compel her to submit to his bestial urges.36 Out of fear, she did not struggle or resist. Thereafter,
appellant, had carnal knowledge of her.37

Criminal Case No. 08-1300

The fifth rape happened in the same year.38 By this time, appellant was already married.39 His bestial
acts towards his own sister nonetheless continued. It was noontime and AAA had just come home
from visiting their grandfather.40 When she entered the bedroom, appellant quickly followed her in,
closed the door behind him and locked it.41

Poking his knife at her, he told her to strip. When she refused, appellant forcibly undressed her. He
then removed his own clothes and laid her on the bed.42 While pointing a knife at her, he mounted
her and inserted his penis into her vagina.43

She pleaded with appellant to stop doing it to her by saying, "Manong kaasiandak kadin, husto na
kadin," which means "Brother, have pity on me, please stop it." Appellant, however, just slapped her
mouth and proceeded to rape her. Afterwards, he issued his threat not to divulge the matter to
anyone lest he would kill them all.44

Criminal Case No. 08-1301

In 1996, appellant, for the sixth time, raped AAA45 who had turned eleven (11) years old. She was
playing alone in front of their house when she saw appellant approaching her. As she was afraid of
him, she tried to run away. She stumbled, however, and he was able to catch up with her. Appellant
then dragged her inside where he laid her on the living room floor. They were alone at home as the
rest of the family had gone to harvest rice at their kaingin.46

Appellant proceeded to remove AAA's dress and underwear. Then, he removed his own clothes.
Subsequently, he mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina against her will.47 Afterwards,
he uttered the same threats to kill everyone should she expose her defloration to anyone.48

Criminal Case No. 08-1302

The seventh occurrence of rape was also in 1996. The family had just transferred to a new house
situated at the foot of a mountain in Baraoidan, Gattaran, Cagayan. They were forced to relocate to
a new house after their old home was swept away in a flood.49

When probed by the prosecutor as to the details of the seventh incident of rape, AAA disclosed that
she could no longer remember the exact manner how appellant perpetrated the rape. She was,
however, certain that she was twice raped in 1996 by the same.50

Criminal Case No. 08-1303

The eighth incident of rape took place in 199851 when AAA was thirteen (13) years of age. She was
then lying alone inside their house. Her parents, along with her other siblings, were out working in
their kaingin.52

Suddenly, appellant appeared and moved closer to her. She tried to rise but he pushed her back
down. Appellant then forcibly removed the young girl's clothes, her shorts and panty. He then
proceeded to unbutton his pants. 53

According to her, she could not have escaped while appellant was undressing because she feared
what he might do to her. After removing his own clothes, appellant went on top of her and
commenced raping her.54

Just as she did countless times before, AAA pleaded with appellant "Manong, kuston kaasiannak
kadin" ("Brother, enough, have pity on me"). Instead of desisting, appellant slapped her in the mouth.
After the sexual abuse, he issued the same threatening statements to her.55

Criminal Case No. 08-1304

Also in 1998, the ninth rape happened. It occurred under similar circumstances. The rest of their
family had gone to their kaingin and private complainant AAA was left alone in their house at the foot
of the mountain.56

Seeing that she was left alone to tend the house, appellant again pounced on the opportunity to
impose his bestial urges on his young sister. At that time, AAA was still thirteen (13) years old.

As in the previous offenses, appellant forced AAA to undress. After ridding himself of his clothing,
appellant mounted her fragile frame and penetrated the young girl's vagina.57

Criminal Case No. 08-1305

was then fifteen (15) years old. It was committed in a new house, also in Baraoidan, Gattaran,
Cagayan, where they transferred.59 Appellant had his own house by then situated about five hundred
(500) meters away.60 Their father was lying in state at appellant's house.61

On said date at noontime, their mother sent AAA home to feed the chickens.62 She obeyed and went
inside their house to fetch rice with which to feed them when appellant followed and grabbed her.
She resisted and kicked him in the abdomen. He fell down and she tried to run but he was able to
grab her foot causing her to stumble and fall.63

Thereafter, appellant removed all her clothes. He kissed her lips and breasts several times, mounted
her, then sexually violated her.64 All the while, he was flaunting his perversion by telling his sister,
"Nagimas gayam ti kabagis ko" ("I derived so much satisfaction from my sister"). Afterwards, he
issued the same previous threats to her.65

Subsequent Events

However, on September 18, 2000, AAA reached the end of her rope. Notwithstanding appellant's
threats, she revealed to her sister DDD, friend Giselle and teacher Teresa that she was raped by
appellant, her brother.66Teresa, upon hearing AAA's revelation, accompanied her to their head
teacher Felix Salvador. Then, together, they went to the barangay captain who told them to report
the matter to the police. This they did.67

On September 20, 2000, policemen were dispatched to bring appellant to the police station. There, a
confrontation arose between AAA and appellant. Upon seeing appellant, AAA punched him and said
"Hayop ka, baboy, nirape mo ako" ("You animal, pig, you raped me").68

On September 21, 2000, there was a second confrontation.69 Present were their mother, their sister
DDD, their uncle Raymundo Bumanglag, appellant's wife Josephine, and AAA's teachers Charito
Elesterio, Jerry Roque and Elpidio Salvatierra. In said confrontation, AAA accused her brother,
appellant, of raping her ten (10) times, while he admitted to having raped her thrice only. Josephine,
appellant's wife, told him to admit so that AAA could forgive him.70 He then admitted that he had
raped her ten (10) times and asked for forgiveness, beseeching her to take pity on his family. AAA
replied that she could no longer forgive him because her heart had "already hardened like stone."
Appellant cried.71

RTC and CA Dispositions

On January 8, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision72 convicting appellant on all ten counts of
rape, with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Elmer Ceredon y Pagaran "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt in all the ten (10) Criminal Informations for "RAPE" and is hereby sentence
(sic) to suffer the supreme penalty of "DEATH" in each of the ten (10) criminal informations.

SO ORDERED.73 (Underscoring supplied)

Hence, the automatic appeal to the Supreme Court. However, on the strength of People v.
Mateo,74 the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA) for intermediate review.

In its Decision75 dated January 28, 2005, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court but with
modification providing for damages, thus:
 WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that for
each count of rapethe accused should pay private complainant the amount of (1) P75,000.00
as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review pursuant to
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern
Death Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004.

SO ORDERED.76 (Underscoring supplied)

Issues

Since the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People, and the Public Attorney's Office, as
defense counsel to appellant, had both submitted Manifestations in lieu of Supplemental Briefs, the
Court is now faced in this review with the same assignment of errors appellant presented before the
CA, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON AN
IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY.

II

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NO IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY, THE

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASES
NOS. 08-1296; 08-1297; 08-1298; 08-1299; 08-1300; 08-1301; 08-1302; 08-1303 AND 08-
1304; CONSIDERING THAT THE SAID INFORMATIONS FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISH WITH PARTICULARITY THE DATES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE
OFFENSE.

III

ASSUMING AGAIN THAT THERE WAS NO IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 08-1305.

IV

ASSUMING FURTHER THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH

(SIC) WITH PARTICULARITY THE DATE OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE, THE
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE
ACCUSED AS THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE ACCUSED IS THE
BROTHER OF THE VICTIM AND, HENCE, A RELATIVE WITHIN THE SECOND DEGREE
OF CONSANGUINITY WAS NOT PROPERLY ALLEGED.77 (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

No Improvident Plea of Guilt

Appellant claims that the trial court based its ruling of conviction on his "improvident plea of guilt,"
relying on Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to
prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in
his behalf.78

He argues that when he was re-arraigned and he pleaded "guilty" to all ten charges of rape levelled
against him, he was not fully apprised of the consequences of his change of plea from "not guilty" to
"guilty." According to him, the trial court did not inquire as to the voluntariness of his plea and that it
failed to explain fully to him that once convicted, he would be meted the death penalty under R.A.
No. 7659. Hence, he contends, his conviction should be set aside.

We cannot agree.

The rule is where the accused desires to plead guilty to a capital offense, the court is enjoined to
observe the following:

1. It must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;

2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and

3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow
him to do so if he desires.79

There is no definite and concrete rule on how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper
"searching inquiry" as required by the aforecited rule. It is incumbent upon a trial judge to ascertain
and be fully convinced that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and its consequences fully
comprehended by the accused.80

Records reveal that appellant was duly assisted by his counsel, both in his first arraignment and re-
arraignment. In fact, it was his counsel who manifested before the trial court that appellant desired to
change his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty" on all ten charges of rape filed against him by his younger
sister.

Besides being assisted by counsel all throughout the proceedings, when appellant was re-arraigned,
the charges were read and explained to him in Ilocano, his native tongue.81 He cannot now claim that
he was unaware of the consequences of his change of plea.

More than that, appellant admitted raping private complainant AAA. When confronted by AAA, their
mother, sister DDD, and their uncle Raymundo Bumanglag, appellant readily admitted to violating
his sister AAA on at least three occasions. Sensing that AAA was only angered by his fractional
admission, and through the prodding of his wife Josephine for him to admit the whole truth, appellant
confessed to the ten counts of rape.

At any rate, contrary to appellant's assertion, he was convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of
his plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. As consistently
held by the Court,82 while convictions based on pleas of guilt to capital offenses have been set aside
because of the improvidence of the plea, the same holds true only when such plea is the sole basis
of the judgment.

When, as in this case, the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the same must be sustained for the simple reason that the conviction is
predicated not on the guilty plea of accused but on the convincing evidence proving his commission
of the offenses charged.

Indeed, there were instances, such as in People v. Lakindanum,83 where even when the court found
that the judge was remiss in his duty to conduct a searching inquiry, the conviction was sustained in
the interest of justice:

The Court observes that, indeed, the manner by which the trial court judge conducted the
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the accused-appellant's plea of guilty
leaves much to be desired.

xxxx

From the records of the proceedings in the court below, it can be gleaned that the trial
judge's manner of apprising Lakindanum of the consequences of his plea was at best,
cursory, to wit:

xxxx

From the foregoing, it is clear that the judge can hardly be said to have satisfied the
requirement of conducting a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
by the accused of entering a guilty plea. Worse, the judge erroneously informed
Lakindanum that by pleading guilty, the latter forfeited his right to testify and to
adduce evidence in his defense. x x x.

xxxx

From the foregoing positive identification by the child victim of her rapist and her candid
narration of the circumstances surrounding the rape, it is clear that accused-appellant was
properly convicted for robbing Catherine of her innocence and childhood. This Court
cannot, on mere procedural grounds, allow the revolting perversion of the accused-
appellant to go unpunished.84 (Emphasis supplied)

Appellant's conviction must be upheld as there was no such error of accepting an improvident plea
committed by the trial court.

There can only be an improvident plea of guilt under Section 3, Rule 116 where there is a possibility
of an accused being meted out the supreme penalty of death. In the words of said section, "When
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry x x x, etc." The
obvious rationale for this is to ascertain that accused truly understands the dire consequences of his
plea. Considering that R.A. No. 9346 has prohibited the imposition of the death penalty, the raison
d'etre behind said rule is absent in the case at bar.

Exact dates of commission

need not be alleged.
Appellant next contends that the Informations filed against him do not sufficiently charge the
offenses committed because the exact dates of commission are not alleged. Hence, his conviction is
not warranted.

The contention is without merit.

The date or time of the commission of the rape need not be alleged with precision. It is enough for
the information or complaint to state that the crime has been committed at a time as near as possible
to the date of its actual commission. Failure to allege the exact date when the crime happened does
not render the information defective, much less void.85

An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the constitutive
acts or omissions. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of
it.86 Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the
occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission.87 The failure to specify the exact date or time
when it was committed does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face.88

The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because
the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. In fact, the
precise time when the rape takes place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the
date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or
information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of
its actual commission.89

Besides, as succinctly explained by the trial court:

[Private-complainant] was only ten (10) years old in 1995 and about eleven (11) years old in
1996 she being born on February 18, 1985. It is but natural for her not to remember the
dates. More so when it has a very negative, horrifying and traumatic effect and impact on her
life.90

Further, it is already too late in the day for appellant to question the sufficiency of the information. He
had all the time to raise this issue during the course of the trial, particularly during his arraignment.
He could have filed for a bill of particulars in order to be properly informed of the dates of the alleged
rapes. However, appellant chose to be silent and never lifted a finger to question the information. As
a result, he is deemed to have waived whatever objections he had; he cannot now be heard to seek
affirmative relief. Furthermore, objections as to matters of form in the information cannot be made for
the first time on appeal.91

Relationship as qualifying circumstance

may be alleged in layman's terms.

Nor was there any defect in the Informations when they merely averred that the victim was the
youngest sister of appellant. We do not agree with the defense that in order for relationship to qualify
in this case, it must be mentioned that the victim is a "relative within the second degree of
consanguinity."

This is not a novel question. The same issue was addressed by the Court in People v. Sanchez.92 In
the said case, appellant argued that he could not be meted the death penalty for raping his sister for
failure of the information to allege that said private complainant was a "relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity."
The Court struck down appellant's argument in the following tenor:

We have held in People v. Ferolino, that:

"If the offender is merely a relation - not a parent, ascendant, stepparent, or guardian
or common law spouse of the mother of the victim - it must be alleged in the
information that he is a relative by consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be)
within the civil degree. That relationship by consanguinity or affinity was not alleged
in the informations in these cases. Even if it was, it was still necessary to further
allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree."

The present case is not within the contemplation of said ruling considering that in the
Ferolino case, the victim is a niece of the offender while in the present case the victim is a
sister of the offender. It was deemed necessary in the Ferolino case to require that it must be
specifically alleged in the Information that the offender is "a relative by consanguinity or
affinity (as the case may be) within the third civil degree" because we acknowledge the fact
that there are niece-uncle relationships which are beyond the third civil degree, in which
case, death penalty cannot be imposed on an accused found guilty of rape. However, a
sister-brother relationship is obviously in the second civil degree and no other sister-brother
relationship exists in civil law that falls beyond the third civil degree. Consequently, it is not
necessary in this case that the Information should specifically state that the appellant is a
relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree of the victim. This is an exception to the
requirement enunciated in the Ferolino case.93

Further, what is required by the Rules is that "the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment."94 Perusing the ten (10)
Informations for rape, private complainant AAA was categorically identified as appellant's younger
sister. Verily, the requirement of allegation as to relationship was more than satisfied.

Testimony of AAA as to her own

age is sufficient evidence.

Appellant argues that in Criminal Case No. 08-1305, no evidence was presented as to the age of the
victim, AAA. This is false. On the issue of age of the victim, it is enough that the victim testified on
her age vis-a-vis the time she was raped by appellant.

In People v. Pruna,95 the Court set out guidelines as to the appreciation of age, either as an element
of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. In that case, the rule was laid out, once and for all, that
although the best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth of such party, its presentation into evidence is not a sine qua non
requirement to prove her age for the appreciation of minority, either as an element of the crime or as
a qualifying circumstance. The decision goes on to state that in the absence of (a) certificate of live
birth, (b) authentic document, or (c) testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the
victim's age, complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by
the accused.

In the case at bar, private complainant categorically disclosed that she was only ten (10) years old at
the time of the first rape in 199596 and fifteen (15) years of age when she was last raped by
appellant.97 Appellant Ceredon admitted these in a confrontation between him and private
complainant, witnessed by their mother and other relatives.98

More than that, not only did the defense fail to object to complainant's claim to minority when it was
consistently bared during the trial; the accused, through his plea of guilt, admitted to the victim's age
as alleged in the informations against him.99 Furthermore, appellant cannot claim ignorance of the
age of the victim as she is his own sister.100

Anent the Pruna requirement that the court make a categorical finding as to age, the RTC had this to
say:101

True, AAA was not able to tell the exact month and date of the first nine incidents but this is
not fatal to her credibility. She is only about ten (10) years old in 1995 and about eleven (11)
years old in 1996, she being born on February 18, 1985 and therefore it is but natural for her
not to remember the dates more so when it has a very negative, horrifying and traumatic
effect and impact on her life. (Underscoring supplied)

Death penalty repeal and damages

In order that the rape be qualified, there need only be one qualifying circumstance present.
Here, We have two - relationship and age. Even assuming that the circumstance of age had
not been duly proven, it makes no difference as to the final outcome of this case as the
circumstance of relationship of appellant to the victim cannot be denied.

As the death penalty has been repealed through R.A. No. 9346,102 entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," appellant's sentence should be downgraded from
death to reclusion perpetua. Section 2 of the said law pertinently provides:

Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature
of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant, he is not eligible for parole
following Section 3 of the law, which reads:

Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose

sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible
for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended.

Anent the CA award of damages, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is correct as each
count of rape is qualified by circumstances which warrant the imposition of the death penalty.103 With
respect to moral damages, the awarded amount of P50,000.00 must be increased to P75,000.00,
without need of pleading or proof of basis.104The additional amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages to AAA is likewise justified due to the presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship.105
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed in each case is hereby changed from death
to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. Further, the award of moral damages to AAA in
the amount of P50,000.00 is increased to P75,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAYOR

ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZIOLO AMA,
BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, and
PEPITO KAWIT, accused-appellants.

DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:

. . . a plot seemingly hatched in hell . . .

This was how Judge Harriet O. Demetriou[1] of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch
70, in her 132-page Decision dated March 11, 1995 now before us on review, emphatically
described the Allan Gomez-Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay that drew strong condemnation from an
outraged populace in the middle of 1993. After a protracted and grueling 16-month trial, she found
all those charged therewith, namely: Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez (hereafter the Mayor),
George Medialdea, Luis and Rogelio Corcolon, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit
(appellants herein), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven
counts and sentenced each one of them:

. . . to suffer the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the seven
offenses or a total of seven reclusion perpetua for each accused. In addition, the Court
hereby orders all the accused to jointly and severally pay the victims respective
families the following sums by way of civil indemnity:

1. the sum of P3,432,650.00 representing the actual damages sustained by the Sarmenta
family;
2. the sum of P3,484,000.00 representing the actual damages sustained by the Gomez family;
3. the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by the Sarmenta family;
4. the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by the Gomez family;
5. the sum of P191,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses incurred by the Gomez
family; and
6. the sum of P164,250.00 for litigation expenses incurred by the Sarmenta family.
As to the antecedents, appellants all appear to agree that the trial court, in the very words of
counsel[2] who prepared the consolidated brief for the Mayor and Medialdea, made a very detailed
summary of both the prosecution and defense evidence.[3] This Court can thus conveniently provide
a briefer but fairly accurate account of the respective versions of the State and the defense on the
basis of the trial courts summary, rather than combing the heap of evidence presented by both
sides.
The prosecutions version of the events on that horrible night of June 28, 1993 was based
mainly on the recollections of its star witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan (a
member of appellant Sanchez security team) co-conspirators turned state witnesses. Both admitted
having taken part in the abduction of Eileen and Allan, but denied any personal involvement in the
rape of Eileen and the twin killings that followed. Heres their story.
Medialdea (then the Deputy Chief of the PNP Calauan), together with Centeno who was
driving an ambulance, fetched witness Malabanan at his residence in the early morning of June 28,
1993 on the pretext that they will apprehend one Rodolfo Calva alias Tisoy a notorious gun runner
and drug pusher in the locality. Next to be picked up was Ama in Barangay Masiit, then Luis
Corcolon (hereafter, Luis) in Barangay Mabacan. On board the ambulance, the five (5) men made
stopovers in Barangays Imok and Wawa until they headed back for Calauan at past 7:00 oclock in
the evening, upon orders of Luis.
At the Shell gas station in the poblacion of Calauan, the five (5) men met and picked up
Rogelio Corcolon (hereafter, Boy), Kawit and Brion, then they proceeded to Los Baos. Along the
way, Luis announced to the group that the real purpose behind the Los Baos trip is to take a pretty
young lass long desired by the Mayor and offer her to him as a gift. Luis, to satisfy his companions
curiosity, even guaranteed that her beauty will make their saliva drip.
Not for long, the ambulance arrived at the U.P. Los Baos grounds. Witness Centeno drove the
ambulance around the campus at a snails pace while Luis scoured the area with watchful eyes. As
the search inside the campus proved fruitless, Luis then ordered Centeno to slowly drive out of the
university compound and to stop upon reaching the vicinity of the Agrix complex. Luis, Boy, Ama,
Brion and Kawit alighted from the ambulance and went inside the Agrix complex. Witness
Centeno overheard Medialdea informing the Boss, via the radio, that they were already in the
area. The Boss was the Mayor.
Inside the Agrix complex is a restaurant called Caf Amalia. Parked in front of that
establishment was a Tamaraw van. Eileen and Allan were its passengers, both occupying the front
seats. She was wearing a T-shirt, white shorts and rubber shoes. Armed with guns, Luis and Boy
approached Eileen and Allan, forcibly took the two and loaded them at the back of the van. All the
appellants boarded the van while Centeno and Malabanan stayed in the ambulance. Both vehicles
then headed for Erais Farm situated in Barangay Curba, owned by the Mayor.
As soon as the group arrived at the farm, the two (2) captives were brought down the
van. Eileen was gagged by a handkerchief and her hands, like Allan, were tied. A white towel was
wound around Allans mouth. The Mayor, then wearing a jogging attire, emerged from the
resthouse and asked the group: My children, whats the problem? To this Luis respondent: Mayor,
this is our gift to you, the girl youve been longing for. Shes really beautiful. But whos that man?
asked the Mayor. Eileens companion, boss. Medialdea replied. We brought him along to avoid
complications, he continued.
The two youngsters were then brought inside the resthouse where Eileen was taken to the
Mayors room. Allan was badly beaten up by Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter thrown
out of the resthouse. Kawit followed-up by striking Allans diaphragm with the butt of an armalite,
causing Allan to fall against a cement box. Brion thought Allan was already dead, but Kawit said:
:His death will come later.
Meanwhile, Centeno, while waiting for further orders, joined the Mayors personal aides
Edwin Cosico and Raul Alorico watch television at the adjacent resthouse. Alorico told Centeno
that the Mayor had been eagerly waiting for the group and worried that they will not arrive.
At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying Eileen was dragged out of the resthouse by Luis
and Medialdea her hair disheveled, mouth covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped
of her shorts. The Mayor, clad merely in white polo, appeared and thanked Luis and Medialdea
for the gift. I am through with her. Shes all yours, the Mayor uttered in contentment. When asked
what will happen to Allan, Medialdea assured the Mayor that they will also kill him for full
measure. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van by the appellants and headed for
Calauan, followed closely by the ambulance.
En route to Calauan, Centeno, who was driving the ambulance, noticed the van swaying from
side to side. Then he heard gunfire coming therefrom. The van pulled over whereupon Kawit
dragged Allan, whose head was already drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto the road and
finished him off with a single gunshot from his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away.
The next destination was a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay
Mabacan. It was here that Luis announced that its tiime for the group to feast on Eileen (the exact
words of Luis were Turbohin na rin natin ang tinurbo ni Boss). She was laid at the back of the
van, with her hands and legs being held by the appellants while waiting for their turn. Then the
gang-rape began. The first to ravish Eileen was Luis, then Medialdea, Boy, Ama, Brion and finally,
Kawit. Bewailing the helplessness of her situation, Eileen pleaded, in between sobs and whimpers,
for the torture to stop. However, her tears for compassion fell, weak and ineffective, upon the
insensitive brutes. Kawit invited Centeno to join the sexual fiasco but the latter refused as he
cannot, in conscience, bear the bestiality being committed on Eileen who appeared to be
dead. After Kawits turn, Eileen knelt on the seat of the van and begged for her life. Unmoved, Luis
muted Eileens cried by forcing an object into her mouth and then fired his baby armalite at
her. Centeno was thereafter ordered to get rid of Eileens dead body. Moments later, all eight (8)
men boarded the ambulance and proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileens
remains behind. Along the way, Centeno and Malabanan watched in dismay as Luis, Boy,
Medialdea, Ama, Brion and Kawit savored the nights escapade, to their sickening
delight. Appellants and Malabanan were then brought to their respective homes by Centeno.
June 29, 1993 and the day following were tense moments for the group. In the morning of
June 29, Medialdea and Centeno fetched Malabanan, Luis and Ama. They were going to Barangay
Imok to make it appear that they were conducting some police operations in that area. Upon
reaching Barangay Imok, the group saw Allans body which they dumped a few hours earlier. Luis,
Medialdea and Malabanan alighted from the ambulance, whereupon Luis ordered Centeno to drive
back to the municipal hall.
Boy Corcolon, who was at the municipal hall, informed Ama that a dead female loaded inside
a Tamaraw van was found in Barangay Mabacan. Ama then radioed the PNP Chief of Calauan,
Major Cao, who at that time was summoned by the Mayor. Major Cano thereafter arrived and
ordered one SPO2 Melencio Nuez to investigate the matter. Meanwhile, Centeno received word
that he was to fetch Malabanan, Luis and Medialdea in Barangay Imok. After picking up the three
(3), Centeno drove the ambulance to Barangay Mabacan where the dead Eileen was found.
Eileens body lying inside the Tamaraw van was a pitiful sight. Her face bore a gunshot wound;
a handkerchief was stuffed in her mouth; her T-shirt was rolled up revealing her breasts; and her
panty was rolled down on one of her feet still with rubber shoes on. Medialdea covered Eileens
exposed private parts by fixing her T-shirt and underwear and by placing a sackcloth over her
lower body. The group then escorted the van with Eileens body in it, to the UP Los Baos police
station where student milled around and identified the cadaver to be Eileen indeed. Later on, the
van carrying Eileen, as well as Allans body, was brought to the Calauan municipal hall. There,
Centeno saw a prisoner named Arnold cleaning the van.
Meanwhile, Malabanan, Ama and Medialdea, on June 29, went to the site (Bgy. Imok) where
Allans body was found, started asking residents about the incident and were able to retrieve an
empty armalite shell. Malabanan thereafter handed the empty shell to Major Cao at the police
station. The three (3) men and one SPO3 Rizaldy Belen, sometime in the afternoon of the same
day, visited the Mayor at his house in Bay, Laguna. Medialdea informed the Mayor of the presence
of people from the CIS, NBI and press in the locality. The Mayor flared up and blamed them for
not using their heads. But he later on assured them that he could fix the problem in less the amount
of a brand new car.
The following day, June 30, Medialdea, upon the Mayors directive, handed a pair of white
walking shorts to Major Cao. When Malabanan asked Medialdea whose pair of shorts was that,
the latter replied that it was the short of Eileen which the Mayor wanted to be delivered to Major
Cao.
That same day of June 30, Centeno went to see the Mayor at his house in Calauan about his
worries over reports that the driver of the ambulance involved in the rape-slay was being hunted
down. The Mayor gave Centeno P2,000.00 and advised him to keep silent or better yet, to go into
hiding. Centeno did hide himself until CIS agents accosted him at the Divisoria market on August
10, 1993. As to Malabanan, he, Medialdea and Ama were brought to the PNP Sta. Cruz Command
to shed light on the cleaning of the Tamaraw van.
Coming now to the defense, each of the appellants had an alibi to tell and sought to put the
blame on Kit Alqueza, the son of a feared general (Dictador Alqueza) who earned the monicker
Barako from the local residents.
The Mayor claimed that he was at the residence of his mistress Elvira in Bay, Laguna in the
morning of June 28, 1993. They left for Makati City at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon thereafter
proceeded to San Pablo City at around 4:00 p.m., left that city at 7:30 p.m. and then returned to
Elviras house in Bay at around 10:00 p.m. He and Elvira retired at around 12:30 in the morning. He
woke up at 5:00 a.m. Jogging was his favorite form of exercise, but foul whether prevented him
from running that morning. His three (3) children with Elvira greeted him at around 6:30 a.m.
before heading for school.He took his breakfast and lunch at Elviras house.
Medialdea, Ama and Malabanan arrived between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. and informed the
Mayor of the rape-slay in which Kit Alqueza was the prime suspect. This made the Mayor very
angry, for which he ordered a thorough investigation of the incident to avoid any whitewash. "I
will not hesitate to have the perpetrators of this crime killed (by electric chair), whether a generals
son in involved or not, son of a bitch!, he blurted. The Mayor then advised appellants not to worry
if they were really innocent and that the primordial concern is that a full investigation be
conducted.
The Mayor then went to his residence in Calauan. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same day (June
29), he sent his driver Mario Puyales to Barangays Masiit and Balayhangin to inquire from the
residents about the crime. Puyales returned at around 7:00 p.m. and informed the Mayor that a card
gambler was able to retrieve a pair of white shorts lying near the national highway in Barangay
Balayhangin. Puyales was sent back to that barangay to advise the residents thereof to keep the
shorts at their fence near the highway as it may later on aid the on-going investigation.
In the morning of June 30, 1993, the Mayor, with some companions, jogged towards the
direction of Barangay Mabacan and at the same time inquired from residents whether they noticed
anything unusual on the night of June 28, 1993. A certain Mang Torio told the Mayor that he found
a pair of maong pants lying at the side of the road but left if there. After inspecting the dirty maong
pants, the Mayor instructed Mang Torio to keep the pants as the former will send someone back
to pick it up.
Eventually, the Mayor got hold of the pairs of white shorts and maong pants. The shorts was
clean, with complete beltloops and without any tear. He then ordered his driver Puyales to send
the articles to Medialdea for safekeeping. But during the trial, the Mayor, when shown the shorts
and pants, claimed that they are quite different from the articles he got hold of previously. The
maong pants shown to him by Mang Torio was of a darker shade of blue. As to the white shorts,
it was the same pair he gave to Medialdea, but now it is torn and has some missing beltloops.
Based on his own investigation, the Mayor came to know that Kit Alqueza is a feared and
dangerous student of the university, being a member of an elite fraternity in the campus and a
generals son at that. The Mayor later informed Congressman Tingzon of Kits probable
involvement in the crime. Congressman Tingzon, in turn, disclosed that Kit, his nephew-in-law
(the congressmans wife is the sister of Gen. Alquezas wife), was hiding in his house and that the
legislator will call Gen. Alqueza in Davao City to discuss the matter.
The Mayor also testified that he closely coordinated with Major Cao in investigating the
case. This included frequent evening conferences with Malabanan, medialdea and Ama who were
members of Major Caos investigation team.
Subsequently, the Mayor was requested to facilitate the surrender of Luis and Boy Corcolon
to Camp Crame since the CIS suspected them of being involved in the crime together with Kit. The
Corcolon brothers, accompanied by the Mayor, peacefully surrendered to CIS operatives in the
afternoon of July 12, 1993.
On August 10, 1993, the Mayor received an anonymous phone call advising him that he would
better leave the country because he was to be arrested in three (3) days time. He refused to heed
the advice because he had nothing to do with the crime. And so he was apprehended on August
13, 1993 at his Calauan residence and brought to Camp Vicente Lim where he was presented to
the media. There he saw Centeno and Malabanan who did not greet him. General Salimbangon
ordered the two (2) witnesses to implicate the Mayor. The general then ordered that the Mayor be
handcuffed as he is the rapist. You son of a bitch, Salibangon. You framed me up, the Mayor
cursed.
 The Mayor denied having given Centeno advice and P2,000.00 pocket money on June 30,
1993. It was only in the courtroom that he saw Centeno, although he knows the latter. The Mayor
also denied Malabanans testimony implicating him in the crime. In fact, Malabanan wrote him
letters asking for his help. The trial court noted, however, that the letter adverted to by the Mayor
were all addressed to Judge Baldo.
Appellant Medialdea was Calauan policeman until his summary dismissal on September 10,
1993. He claimed that he, being a member of a crack team formed by Major Cao and composed of
Malabanan, Luis and Ama, was preoccupied the whole day of June 28, 1993 conducting police
operations on board an ambulance in different barangays of the town in search of Tisoy. The
fruitless operations ended at about 9:00 p.m. of June 28. Driving the ambulance, he got home at
around 10:30 p.m. where he saw his wife playing mahjong with some friends. Medialdea joined
the players for about an hour, then he slept until 5:00 a.m. of the next day (June 29).
The crack team met again in the morning of June 29, 1993 to continue the manhunt for Tisoy.
At around 7:15 a.m. in Barangay Imok, they saw Tisoy speed by in a motorcycle. Medialdea and
Luis fired shots in the air but Tisoy managed to escape. Centeno was not present when this event
transpired because he was instructed to go to the municipal hall with the ambulance.
Upon hearing news over the radio that a dead body was found at Sitio Paputok, Km. 74,
Barangay Mabacan, Medialdea radioed Centeno to fetch the group at the fishpond of one Gani. As
soon as Centeno arrived at around 8:00 a.m., they proceeded to Km. 74 where they saw Eileens
body inside the van parked in the sugarcane field. Major Cao and several policemen were already
there. Medialdea had to pull down Eileens T-shirt and roll up her underwear to spare her from
numerous kibitzers staring at her naked body. He recovered several scattered items inside the van
like cigarette packs, a paddle, spike shoes, and 5 bottles of beer. The van was then driven by a
certain Gener to the UP Los Baos escorted by the ambulance and Major Caos police car.
Thereafter, at around 9:30 a.m., Medialdea, on Major Caos directive, went to the Gomez
residence and asked for Allan. The maid told him that Allan has not come home since the night
before and that she last saw him at around 6:30 p.m. with one Jet Tejada. As there was no other
person inside the house except the maid, Medialdea, with her permission, searched for Allan inside
but to no avail. Before leaving, he instructed the maid to tell Allan that he better make good his
hiding because Allan is a suspect in the crime. At the Tejada residence, Jet was neither there. So
Medialdea proceeded to the boarding house of Eileen and instructed the landlady to inform calmly
Eileens parents on what had happened to their daughter.
Medialdea then returned to the UP Los Baos security force where he told Major Cao that Allan
had escaped. Before leaving UP campus to bring Eileens body to Calauan, Major Cao ordered
Medialdea to still look for Allan. When his efforts to find Allan inside the campus proved futile,
Medialdea sought the aid of Barangay Captain Cesar Ruiz who brought him to the barangay hall
where Jet Tejada was.Tejada strongly objected to Medialdeas insinuation of his and Allans
participation in the crime, saying that they can never do anything as dastardly as that.
Afterwards, a certain Allan, a barangay tanod, volunteered that he knew Allan. This Allan
opines that if Allan was dead then Kit had a hand on it since Allan had earned Kits ire when the
former began dating the latters girlfriend named Rose. Medialdea informed Major Cao that Allan
perhaps has gone to Manila with his father. The Major replied that Allan is here, but is likewise
dead.
 Ama then informed Major Cao that they have a suspect named Kit who had an axe to grind
against Allan. Then someone in the crowd uttered Ako iyon. Kit approached and told Ama that he
and Allan had patched up their differences three (3) months ago. Medialdea noticed a drop of blood
on the middle of Kits right thigh. Kit explained that the blood oozed after punching a wall with his
right knuckle.
At the municipal hall, Ama handed an empty armalite shell recovered from the site where
Allans body was found. Thereafter, Arnold (the prisoner who was cleaning the van) was seen
carrying the rubber matting of the Tamaraw van to hang it over the municipal fence to dry. Ama
could not help but curse Arnold and ordered the latter to bring it back. Ama explained to Major
Cao that they could be dragged to the case just like what happened to the policeman in the Paraaque
massacre who burned a mosquito net and was thereafter sacked.
Medialdea also testified that it was Major Cao who ordered the cleaning of the van to diffuse
the stench caused by the blood stains therein.
Then on July 6, 1993, Medialdea, together with Ama and Malabanan, went to the PNP Sta.
Cruz Command to answer queries about the cleaning of the van. They were then brought to
Canlubang where they executed their respective sworn statements. Medialdea also recalled that
Major Cao instructed them not to say anything about the cleaning of the van. Afterwards, they
were brought back to the PNP Sta. Cruz and detained therein pending the filing of formal charges
against them.
Major Cao visited Medialdea the next day, July 7. The major advised him that they should
just point to Malabanan as the one who cleaned the van. Medialdea did not heed his advice for he
pitied Malabanan and besides, it was Major Cao who really ordered its cleaning. The major then
reiterated the reason why he caused its cleaning (the unbearable stench of blood).
Days later, on July 16, 1993, Medialdea and Ama, together with Malabanan, were brought to
the Department of Justice where Fiscal Abesamis asked them to sign a waiver of their
detention. On July 24, 1993, the three (3) men were led back to PNP Canlubang where Colonels
Gualberto and Tiangco began investigating then on July 27, 1993. During the investigation,
Medialdea was being enticed by Col. Gualberto to cooperate with the government by testifying
against the Mayor, as there is an order from the higher echelon to bring the Mayor down. He
refused, saying that the Mayor is completely innocent because he is pro-poor and the Mayor even
walks the church aisle on his knees. Col. Gualberto threatened that he will be dragged all the more
to the case if he will not cooperate. Medialdea begged for mercy and suggested that they should
investigate Kit instead. The colonel said that messing up with Kit is like ramming into a
wall. Medialdea was then asked to sign a statement that contained inaccurate answers.The
inaccuracies were supplied by Col. Gualberto.
Medialdea also professed his ignorance before Col. Tiangco. This colonel was less
diplomatic. He splashed coffee on Medialdeas face, cursed him and whipped his face. So was
Malabanan. The investigators would hit then when they try to reason. Back to his cell, Medialdea
heard Col. Tiangco order somebody to have him killed in the evening.
On August 13, 1993, one Colonel Versoza advised Medialdea to follow Malabanan in
testifying against the Mayor. They will be placed under the Witness Protection Program where
they would be entitled to allowances, free housing facilities and the chance to go abroad with their
families where they can live peacefully, Col. Versoza assured them. Medialdea refused once
again. Malabanan therafter informed him that he and Centeno had already given false statements
for they can no longer stand the torture inflicted on them. But Medialdea stood pat with his refusal,
for he cannot testify falsely against his companions just to free himself. It is still better to live than
to die a martyr, Malabanan answered.
We now to go appellant Luis Corcolons story which painted the Kit Alqueza angle in
greater detail. In the morning of June 25, 1993, three (3) men went to Luis residence in Barangay
Mabacan. They told Luis that their boss, Edgardo Lavadia alias Uod, wanted to see him the next
day. Lavadia is a very generous friend of Luis for so many years who, as a professional forger of
checks, is being protected by General Alqueza.
Luis arrived at Lavadias house at around 2:00 p.m. of June 26. There he saw Kit and Lavadias
men. Lavadia requested him to abduct and kill Allan because the latter has done something wrong
to Kit.Luis asked what Allans fault was and then suggested that if its just a small squabble, they
better forgive Allan. Lavadia insisted, but Luis appeared hesitant since it might put him in big
trouble. Lavadia tempered his request by asking Luis to merely help in getting rid of the body. Luis
agreed. He and Lavadia were to meet again on June 28, 1993 in the Bay cockpit. After this, Luis
left.
Luis was also a member of the team formed by Major Cao to hunt down Tisoy. At around
8:30 in the morning of June 28, 1993, he was fetched by Medialdea, Ama, Malabanan and
proceeded to Barangay Imok on board the ambulance driven by Centeno to apprehend Tisoy. At
around 1:00 p.m., Luis left the group and went to Bay cockpit to meet Lavadia, as agreed upon the
previous day. When he arrived at the cockpit, only Lavadias men were there. Luis then asked one
of the men to tell Lavadia that he is backing out of the agreement. He first attended the derby being
held at the cockpit before returning to Barangay Imok at around 5:00 p.m. and re-joined the
team. They left Barangay Imok at around 7:30 p.m. and proceeded to Barangay Wawa, San Pablo
City where they stayed for about two (2) hours waiting for Tisoy. Sensing that Tisoy would not be
passing by, the team headed back for Calauan. Luis was driven home first and reached his house
at around 9:30 p.m. A certain Ernesto Bustillo was waiting for him to borrow his passenger
jeepney. Thereafter, Luis slept at around 10:30 p.m.
At around 4:45 a.m. of the next day (June 29) while Luis was preparing the breakfast of his
children, a Tamaraw van, driven by Kit, stopped in front of his house honking its horn
continuously. Four (4) motorcycle-riding men, each wearing bonnet masks and maong jackets,
escorted the van. Kit sought his help in burying at once the dead female body inside the van. Luis
inspected the van and saw a naked corpse of a woman. He refused Kits summons after which Luis
immediately returned to his house, turned off the lights and closed door for fear that Kits escorts
would shoot him. The convoy then headed towards the direction of Sitio Paputok, Km. 74.
At about 6:30 a.m., Luis, Centeno, Medialdea and Malabanan met and continued their
surveillance of Tisoy at Barangay Imok. They saw Tisoy pass by at around 7:10 a.m. but were not
able to apprehend him. The group thereafter went to Ganis fishpond at about 8:30 a.m. then
proceeded to Km. 74 to verify reports of a females death. There they saw the Tamaraw van with a
dead woman inside. Luis recognized the vehicle as that driven by Kit hours earlier, but he kept
silent. The group then brought the van to the UP Los Baos campus.
 In the morning if June 30, 1993, Luis met the Mayor. The latter instructed him to investigate
on who dumped Eileens body at Km. 74. Luis obliged and said that he will make a report within a
week. He, however, did not tell the Mayor about Kits involvement in the crime.
On July 7, 1993, CIS agents of Canlubang raided his house during his absence thereat. The
agents, his wife said, planted a gun inside. The next day, Luis read in the papers that a P100,000.00
reward has been offered for his and brother Boys capture. He rushed to the Mayor who advised
him to remain quiet.
In the afternoon of July 12, 1993, Luis went to Boys house upon being summoned by the
Mayor who was with General Quizon and Colonel Hilario. He and Boy were brought to Camp
Crame for interview. After the interview, the CIS took their sworn statements. The answers
therein, Luis said, were furnished by the agents. He signed the statement out to fear without the
assistance of a lawyer of his own choice. For several days, he was investigated by PACC
agents. Then on or July 20, 1993, he and Boy were transferred to CIS Canlubang and were
interrogated by Col. Tiangco who repeatedly manhandled and cursed him. Luis insisted on his
innocence and suggested that it is Kit who they should investigate. After the interview, Luis was
tortured by way of water treatment, denied of food and was not allowed to receive visitors. In the
afternoon of June 28, 1993, Luis was brought before the PACC where he was again manhandled
during the 2-hour interrogation. He answered yes to all the questions hurled at him because he was
already dizzy. He was also informed that Lavadia had already executed a statement saying that the
latter paid him.
On August 1, 1993 at the PACC-TFH office, General Quizon was forcing him to testify
against the Mayor. He was also interviewed by media afterwhich, he was brought back to his cell
where he met Lavadia. He cursed and strangled Lavadia. Luis suggested that they should now tell
the truth about Kits involvement, but Lavadia advised him to remain silent because reprisal from
General Alqueza would be far worse. Luis was detained at the PACC until the start of the trial. He
also filed a complaint for torture before the Commission on Human Rights.
Boy Corcolon testified that he never left house on the night of June 28, 1993. He woke up at
around 7:00 a.m. of the next day and proceeded to the Calauan police station on his motorcycle
upon being informed of the discovery of a dead female in sitio Paputok, Km. 74. After going to
the municipal building where he saw Ama, Major Cao and Judge Baldo, Boy followed Major Cao
and his men in going to Km. 74. There he saw the naked body of the dead woman inside the
van. Boy thereafter followed the van to the UP compound. Moments later, the van was brought to
Calauan municipal hall compound. He did not stay in the municipal hall, but went straight home
instead.
The CIS agents raided his house on July 7, 1993. The next day, Boy read in the papers that he
and his brother Luis were being haunted down by the authorities and a P100,000.00 bounty is at
stake for their capture. He rushed to the house of the Mayor to inform the latter of the raid. The
Mayor advised him to remain calm and to avoid being visible.
In the afternoon of July 12, 1993, he and Luis were fetched by General Quizon and Colonel
Hilario at Luis residence and thereafter brought to Camp Crame. At the camp, press people
interviewed them after which they were led to a room for taking of their respective sworn
statements. Boy claimed that he was forced to give his statement after being kicked, slapped and
cursed by the investigators. He tried to correct portions of his statement but the investigating
officer did not allow him. Boy and Luis were detained at the camp until charges have been filed
against them, for their refusal to cooperate with the CIS.
On July 20, 1993, the two (2) brother were brought to an uninhabited place near a hill in
Barangay Paliparan where they were made to stand in front of the military group consisting of
Generals Quizon and Salimbangon, Colonel Gualberto and his men. Boy and Luis were each asked
to hold an armalite rifle, and then pictures were taken of them handing the rifles over to the
generals.
The next day (June 21), they were brought to CIS Canlubang and stayed there until the start
of the trial in September, 1993. Boy claimed he was subjected to electric shock and water treatment
to make him confess his guilt.
Ama, also a member of the team involved in the Tisoy manhunt, related a similar story on the
groups sorties in different barangays on June 28, 1993. After the failed mission, Centeno dropped
him off at his residence in Barangay Masiit at about 10:00 p.m. of the same day and did not leave
the house until the next morning.
At around 6:15 a.m. of the next day (June 29), he was at Barangay Balayhangin to wait for
Tisoy per Medialdeas instruction. Minutes later, he saw Tisoy pass by on a motorcycle and
thereafter reported the matter to Medialdea. Ama learned of Eileens death at around 8:00 a.m.
when he was at the Calauan police station. Centeno thereafter picked him up and they, together
with Medialdea, Malabanan and Luis proceeded to Sitio Paputok where Eileens body was found.
From the university compound, he, Medialdea, Malabanan and a UP student named Butch
went to Allans house but the latter was not there. They also went to Jet Tejadas and Eileens
boarding houses.
At Barangay Batong Malaki, Los Baos, barangay tanod Allan revealed to Medialdea that the
dead Allans enemy was Kit. Allan was fond of girls and there was a time when Kit got angry at
and threatened Allan when the latter dated Kits girlfriend Rose, the tanod narrated.
Ama and the rest of the group were able to talk to Jet Tejada who denied any involvement in
the crime. After Major Cao informed him that Allan is already dead, Ama told the major about the
friction between Allan and Kit. Then someone tapped Major Caos shoulder and identified himself
as Kit who clarified that he had patched up with Allan about three (3) months ago. Kit
angrily pointed his finger at Ama, then Major Cao pacified them. Ama asked Kit about the drops
of blood on his right thigh. Kit explained that the blood came from his right knuckle. He is our
suspect Ama blurted. Major Cao, however, reprimanded him for making such a loud comment.
*(On the cleaning of the van, Amas story is similar to Medialdeas account heretofore
discussed).
Thereafter, Ama, Medialdea and Malabanan found their way to the Mayors residence in
bay. Ama revealed to the Mayor that Kit is the suspect. The Mayor said that Kit comes from a very
powerful and influential family, and that his father, General Alqueza, is a tough man. The Mayor
nonetheless assured them of his support.
On July 1, 1993, Ama accompanied some CIS personnel at the site where Allans body was
found. They found drops of blood, cigarette butts and wrappers in the area. Later in the afternoon,
Ama went to Canlubang as he was asked by Colonel Roxas to make a written report on the Kit
Alqueza angle. He completed his statement in about five (5) hours. The officer before whom he
was sworn, Ama noticed, was drunk.
On July 3, 1993, he received word that he was to undergo counter-insurgency training
effective that same day. Two (2) days after (July 5), he asked a certain Colonel Toco why he was
being required to undergo training again. The colonel promised to look into the matter. On
that same day, Malabanan informed him that Luis appeared panicky and was acting suspiciously,
as the latter seemed to go back and forth to the municipal hall and kept asking Malabanan for the
names of people investigating the case. Also on that day, Ama gave the NBI Regional Director
some information about Kit and Luis which started the NBI investigation.
On July 6, 1993, Ama, together with Medialdea and Malabanan, executed his statement in
CIS Canlubang assisted by one Atty. Exconde who asked him to sign the same even before Ama
can read it. At PHQ Sta. Cruz, the Deputy Provincial Commander for Operations fumed when he
declared in his statement that he was absent during the cleaning of the van. He declared so because
Major Cao instructed him to keep silent on that matter. Subsequently (July 7), he learned of
Malabanans escape.
On July 24, 1993, Ama, Malabanan and Medialdea were brought to CIS Canlubang. They ate
drugged food which gave him chest pain and made him very weak and talkative. He saw Medialdea
being whipped on the head with a newspaper by one official.
Five days later (July 29), they were brought to the PACC where Luis pointed to them before
the media. The next day (July 30), he and General Alqueza met at the Department of Justice. The
general cursed him for dragging Kit in the case and even challenged him to a fistfight outside the
building.
On August 7, 1993, at General Salimbangons office, the general informed him that his
summary dismissal is on hand unless he testifies against the Mayor. When he refused, the general
cursed him.Colonel Gualberto also tried to convince him by offering promotion, house and lot,
monthly allowance, or a chance to leave the country with his family. But Ama insisted on his
innocence.
On August 13, 1993, a sobbing Malabanan embraced Ama and asked for his forgiveness
because the former has already implicated him falsely in the crime. Malabanan said he could no
longer bear the torture being inflicted on him and the threats on his life and family. He was also
advised by Malabanan to follow suit, but he refused once again.
Brion is the Mayors nephew. He denied being in the company of any of the appellants on the
evening of June 28, 1993 as he stayed at their house on J. del Valle St., Calauan the whole night. In
the morning of July 29, 1993, he was arrested at his father-in-laws house without any warrant. The
arresting officer told him that Colonel Navarro (PNP Director of Laguna) wanted to interview
him. Brion was brought to the Calamba police station from where he was taken to
Canlubang. There, Col. Navarro cursed him for being so elusive. Brion answered that he never
went into hiding. Col. Navarro informed him that Luis Corcolon has revealed that he was the third
man to rape Eileen. Brion then heard Malabanan shouting that he is taking all the blame for the
crime if they would just spare the two students (Brion and Kawit) who are totally innocent.
Brion, together with Malabanan, Ama and Luis, was brought to the office of the then Vice-
President Estrada who asked Ama and Malabanan whether they raped Eileen. Ama belied the
accusation.Malabanan, too, professed innocence and said that in the nine (9) years he stayed in
Mindanao, it is his first time to cry this way. This convinced the vice-president of Malabanans
innocence. Kawit also cried at this point. Brion saw Luis being held up by two men towards the
room as Luis appeared to be on the brink of collapse. One of the escorts then raised Luis hand so
as to point at Brion.
On July 30, 1993, Brion, Ama, Malabanan, Kawit, Luis and Boy were brought to the
Department of Justice where Fiscal Zuo asked them to sign some papers. Luis was instructed to
re-affirm his sworn statement before the PACC while Brion and Kawit were asked to sign a waiver
of detention. The three (3), however, refused. Fiscal Zuo offered them a lawyer from the Public
Assistance Office (PAO) to assist them but Brion rejected the offer.
On August 6, 1993, General Quizon asked Brion to sign a confession but he refused. When a
second statement was prepared, he cried because he was allowed to read only that portion relating
to his personal circumstances before being forced to sign it without the assistance of a
lawyer. Thereafter, he was brought back to PHQ Sta. Cruz at around 5:00 p.m.
Brion related having executed a sworn statement detailing the methods of torture he
underwent to force him into implicating the Mayor, Ama, Medialdea and Malabanan, viz:
1) he would be placed in a doghouse-like cell fitted with loudspeakers;
2) his hands would be tied behind his back and he would be tied to a bench. A towel would be
placed over his mouth and nostrils, then 7-up is poured on his face;
3) his body would be whipped with guns.
No medical examination was ever conducted on him. More, his captors would padlock his cell
whenever Atty. Arias paid him a visit.
Kawit was a houseboy of the Mayor in his Calauan residence. He claimed he slept at around
9:00 p.m. of June 28, 1993 and woke up at 6:00 a.m. the following day to water the plants.
On July 16, 1993, he was interrogated in connection with the deaths of Eileen and Allan. Later
in the day, Medialdea and some policemen fetched him at his house in Barangay Bagong Pook and
brought him to PHQ Sta. Cruz. Kawit was led into a room where Medialdea, in the presence of
Centeno and Malabanan, asked him the name of the girl who was reportedly shouting while Kawit
was dragging her at CPAMMS. Kawit answered that there were two (2) bar girls, whose names
are Carla and Ninja Joyce, who were shouting at Barangay Bagong Pook. Ama then entered the
room and requested Malabanan and Medialdea not to hurt Kawit. When Malabanan and Medialdea
left the room, Kawit explained to Ama that the two (2) bar girls complained of one Melvin Pajadan
not paying them for their services.
Thereafter, Kawit was asked by one Major Uyami to make a statement. After signing the
statement, Kawit was told by investigator Cansanay that the major wanted him to include in his
statement the Mayors involvement in the Gomez-Sarmenta slaying, but Kawit refused. He was
thus detained for the night. A policeman in civilian clothes thereafter asked him to sign a paper
bearing his name and the handwritten words: Pauuwiin ka na bukas ng umaga. Kawit signed the
paper, but he was not released the next day.
Before this Court, Mayor Sanchez and Medialdea filed their consolidated Appellants
Brief, and so did Ama, Brion and Kawit. Brothers Luis and Boy Corcolon, on the other hand, filed
separate appeal briefs. Briefly, the pith of the assigned errors and the focus of the appellants
arguments is the issue of witnesses Centeno and Malabanans credibility, whose open-court
narrations served as principal basis for the trial courts rendition of a guilty verdict.
So oftenly repeated by this Court is that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge[4] who had the unmatched
opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available
but not reflected in the record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between
fact and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone,
the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch these can reveal if the
witness is telling the truth or lying in his teeth.[5]
Judge Demetriou who presided over the entire trial until its very conclusion expressed her
satisfaction with the way witnesses Centeno and Malabanan survived the hot seat with flying
colors, so to speak.With respect to Centeno, the honorable Judge had this to say:

In thus passing upon the credibility of Centeno, this Court kept his alleged dubious
reputation for veracity in mind. But, after carefully reviewing the testimony of
Centeno in his direct examination and gruelling (sic) cross-examination for almost 3
months, this Court, even with a jaundiced eye, could not help but be impressed about
the myriad of details in his testimony and his frank, spontaneous and straightforward
manner of testifying. The lengthy and punishing cross-examination by seven lawyers
to which he was subjected failed to bring out any serious flaw or infirmity in his
perception or recollection of events or destroy the coherence of his narration. That
Centeno merely wove such a yarn from his fertile imagination, conflict with a
multitude of details, is highly improbable considering that his highest educational
attainment was sixth grade in the elementary school.[6]

Similarly, Malabanan displayed a frank, straightforward manner of answering questions and a

desire to state all the facts within his knowledge, and his credibility was never shaken on cross-
examination; there was no indication of prevarication or evasiveness. Consequently, (his)
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit, the honorable Judge observed.[7] Her impressions of
these star witnesses for the State bind this Court, for we accord great respect if not finality, to the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses.[8] They, therefore, ought not to be
disturbed.[9] And once the prosecution witnesses are afforded full faith and credit, the defenses
version necessarily stands discredited.[10]
To recall, all the appellants relied on the defense of denial/alibi, i.e., they were at their
respective homes on the night of the rape-slay. But Centeno and Malabanan confirmed the
presence of all the appellants on the night of June 28, 1993 till the early morning of the following
day and detailed the exact participation of each in the crime. Positive identification by credible
witnesses of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime, as we have consistently held, demolishes
the alibi[11] - the much abused sanctuary of felons.[12] Moreover, except for the Mayor who presented
Ave Marie Tonee Jimenez Sanchez (his daughter with his mistress Elvira) and Medialdea who
presented his neighbor Anastacia Gulay, the other appellants failed to present corroborating
testimonial evidence to butress their respective alibis.The defense of alibi is inherently weak
especially when wanting in material corroboration. Categorical declarations of witnesses for the
prosecution of the details of the crime are more credible than the uncorroborated alibi interposed
by the accused.[13] Ave Maries testimony is of no help to the Mayor, since alibi becomes less
plausible as a defense when it is invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself
and his immediate relatives.[14] Anastacia Gulays testimony is likewise worthless since the trial
court found her testimony rehearsed. We will not disturb this finding because it touches on
credibility.
In fine, the defense of alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of witnesses, and
the assessment of the trial court, unless patently and clearly inconsistent, must be accepted.[15]
In an attempt to discredit Centeno, appellants principally harp on the contradictions in four
(4) Sworn Statements executed by Centeno on August 13, 1993, August 15, 1993, August 17, 1993
and August 30, 1993. The Solicitor Generals Office summarizes appellants asseverations on this
point, viz:

Appellants point out that while in his Sworn Statement dated August 13, 1993,
Centeno stated that after the victims were seized, they were brought to CPAMMS, in
his Sworn Statement dated August 15, 1993, he claimed that the two were brought to
Erais Farm (p. 86-96, Sanchez and Medialdea; p. 11-12, Luis Corcolon; p. 38, Ama,
Brion and Kawit; p. 10, Rogelio Corcolon). Appellant also point out that in the
August 13, 1993 Sworn Statement, Centeno merely referred to a person named Edwin
(without stating his family name) and another person he did not know who was in the
place where the victims were brought. In his Sworn Statement dated August 17, 1993,
Centeno supplied the family name of Edwin as Cosico and the name of the other
person whom he did not know as Lito Angeles (pp. 96-97, Sanchez and Medialdea).

Another major contradiction pointed out is that in his August 13, 1993 Sworn
Statement, Centeno mentioned that he drove the Corcolon brothers to the house of
Edgardo Uod Lavadia in Bangkal Street, Los Baos, Laguna. Upon arriving at the
house of Lavadia, Centeno saw Lavadia and Teofilo Kit Alqueza talking. Later
Lavadia handed an envelop to Luis Corcolon. In the latest Sworn Statement dated
August 30, 1993, Centeno stated that they did not go to the house of Lavadia and that
during the whole day of June 26, 1993, Centeno was with Malabanan (pp. 99-102,
Sanchez and Medialdea; pp. 37-40, Ama, Brion and Kawit; p. 8, Rogelio Corcolon).[16]

The trial judge found Centenos explanation on these inconsistencies satisfactory, justifying
such finding with pertinent jurisprudence. The Court, therefore, affirms and adopts her disquisition
on the matter, viz:

With respect to the portion of his sworn statement dated August 13, 1993 which
implicated Kit Alqueza, Centeno explained that it was dictated by a CIS agent named
Rommel. He feared Rommel because the latter threatened him that he would be hurt if
he did not cooperate. Even when his family was already under the custody of the CIS
on August 15, 1993, he did not ask for the deletion of the said portion because he was
still under the CIS custody. It was only on August 30, 1993 when he was placed under
the Witness Protection Program that he found the courage to execute another sworn
statement for the specific purpose of deleting the reference to Kit Alqueza. Although
he was placed under the Witness Protection Program on August 17, 1993, there was a
delay in his retraction of Kit Alquezas involvement due to his inability to reach Fiscal
Arellano.

Centenos explanation is quite believable because he had already implicated the

accused Sanchez in his sworn statement of August 13, 1993. Thus, the portion
implicating Kit Alqueza does not jibe with the main story of Centeno that Eileen
Sarmenta was abducted by Medialdea, Ama, the Corcolon brothers, Brion and Kawit
to be given as a gift to their boss, Mayor Sanchez.

As to his sworn statement of August 15, 1993 where he stated that the victims were
taken to Erais Farm instead of CPAMMS as originally indicated in his August 13,
1993 sworn statement, Centeno explained that when he gave his first statement he was
still hoping that Mayor Sanchez would help him. Furthermore, he feared the power
and influence of the Mayor. Thus, according to him, he gave the wrong place to
mislead his investigators. It was only on August 15, 1993 when the accused Sanchez
was already in prison that Centeno decided to correct his previous statements.

This Court is inclined to accept the explanation of Centeno that his earlier attempt to
mislead the investigators by saying that the victims were taken to CPAMMS was out
of fear of the Mayor. Our Supreme Court has recognized that the inherent fear of
reprisal by witnesses who refuse initially to disclose what they know about a crime is
quite understandable, especially when the accused is a man of power and influence in
the community (People v. Catao, 107 Phil. 861 [1960]).

In a recent case, People v. Pascua (206 SCRA 628 [1992]), the Supreme Court
observed that Fear for ones life explains the failure on the part of a witness to
immediately notify the authorities of what exactly transpired. And, [o]nce such fear is
overcome by a more compelling need to narrate the truth, the Supreme Court went on
to say, then the witness must be welcomed by the courts to help dispense justice.

Consequently, this Court will not reject the testimony of Centeno on the basis of
inconsistencies in his sworn statements taken by police authorities which have been
sufficiently explained. What is more important is that Centeno testified on the witness
stand in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remained
consistent on cross-examination. This Court, therefore, finds Centeno a credible
witness.[17]
To further fortify this observation, we advert to that all-too familiar rule that discrepancies between
sworn statements and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the
witnesses.[18]Sworn statements/affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court
declarations because the former are often executed when an affiants mental faculties are not in
such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has
transpired.[19] Testimonies given during trials are mush more exact and elaborate.[20] Thus,
testimonial evidence carries more weight than sworn statements/affidavits.
Appellants would also quibble on the following portions of Centenos testimony, to wit:
1) he could not give exactly where the appellants went after sexually abusing Eileen;]
2) he was unsure whether it was Eileens left or right foot that hit the chair of the van when she
was struggling;
3) he was unsure of their speed while on their way to the UP compound;
4) he could not give the exact distance between the ambulance he was driving and the van;
5) he said he could see the protruding end of the roof of a kubo when he parked the ambulance in
front of the Big J restaurant. Appellants claim that from where Centeno was allegedly standing, there
was no way he could see the roof of that kubo;
6) he was able to recall what appellants were wearing on that night of June 28, 1993;
7) he saw Kawit hit Allan at his diaphragm with the butt of an armalite, but the medico-legal
finding of Dr. Escueta revealed no injury in the abdominal region of Allan;
8) his testimony that the appellants raped Eileen inside the van which was very limited space,
while appellants could have chosen a far more comfortable or remote place to do the crime. With
respect to the Mayor, it was very unbelievable for him to commit rape inside his room filled with
religious adornments and in the process risk his reputation as mayor and an established man in the
community;
9) his testimony to the effect that appellants rolled their pants down to their knees and then
climbed the van to rape Eileen. Appellants would consider such testimony impossible, claiming that
the narrow circumference of the waistline will impede and obstruct the upward movement of the legs.
10) his admission that he can lie for money, or out fear.
It may be conceded that these inconsistencies marred Centenos testimony, but they refer to
trivial details which do not, in actuality, touch upon the whys and wherefores of the crime
committed.[21]Equally settled is the rule that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when
referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their
declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Although there may be inconsistencies
on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency
in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants,[22] as in this
case. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the sincerity of a witness and prove that
his testimony is not rehearsed.[23] They are fail-safes against memorized perjury.[24] Besides,
errorless testimonies cannot be expected especially when a witness is recounting details of a
harrowing experience.[25] Even the most truthful witnesses can make mistakes but such innocent
lapses do not necessarily affect their credibility.[26] Consequently, Centenos and Malabanans
credibility still remains intact notwithstanding these inconsistencies.
 Other pieces of evidence further enhance the damaging testimonies of Centeno and
Malabanan. For one, a missing belt loop from the pair of white shorts worn by Eileen on the night
of the crime was recovered from Erais Farm by prosecution witness Major Lulita Chambers who,
together with Col. Gualberto and other officers, went there on August 19, 1993 to effect service of
the search warrant issued by RTC Judge Geraldez. Major Chambers, a forensic chemist, conducted
a series of laboratory examinations and later concluded that the retrieved beltloop matched in color,
size and fiber composition with a beltloop she detached from the white shorts of Eileen which she
(Major Chambers) used as a standard.
Another corroborating evidence is the M16 empty bullet shell recovered at the site where
Allans body was found. The ballistic examination on the empty shell conducted by FID-PNP Chief
Ballistician Vicente de Vera revealed that the striations of the empty shell were the same as those
registered by the cartridges from M16 rifle bearing Serial No. 773159 surrendered by Luis
Corcolon. Mr. De Vera also found the metallic fragments recovered from Eileens body, after
conducting microscopic examinations thereof, to bear the same characteristics as those from a
bullet fired from an M16 rifle.
The autopsy and vaginal examination conducted by prosecution witness Dr. Vladimir V.
Villaseor, medico-legal officer of the PNP-CIS, on Eileens cadaver buttresses all the more the
gang-rape story of the prosecution. Dr. Villaseors findings, in a nutshell, disclosed the presence of
multiple contusions on Eileens body, fresh shallow lacerations on her hymen, a congested cervix,
a gaping labia majora and oozing whitish fluid (tested positive for spermatozoa) from the vaginal
opening. Oozing spermatozoa, Dr. Villaseor explained, means that the amount of semen was much
more than the vaginal canal could contain and that there were several seminal ejaculations that
occurred therein. He also noted that a great quantity of whitish fluid continued to ooze from Eileens
vaginal opening despite her death for several hours. Taking into account all these findings, Dr.
Villaseor ruled out the possibility of any consented sexual intercourse. In this connection,
appellants would belittle Dr. Villaseors findings by insisting as the more convincing opinion the
defenses medical expert witness, Dr. Ernesto Brion who testified to the effect that there can be no
multiple rape if there is only one laceration on Eileens hymen as testified to by Dr. Villaseor. We
dismiss appellants argument by reiterating anew that the absence of extensive abrasions or
contusions on the vaginal wall does not rule out rape because the slightest penetrations enough.[27]It
is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of said crime.[28] Moreover, Dr. Brion
is an uncle by consanguinity and erstwhile counsel of record of the Mayor, thus making his
objectivity highly questionable.
Appellants Ama, Kawit and Brion would assail the trial courts finding that they were part of
the conspiracy to commit the rape-slay. Their concurrency of sentiment with the other appellants,
however, was evident from the time they abducted Eileen and Allan, brought the two to Erais Farm
where Eileen was raped by the Mayor and Allan beaten up black and blue, headed for a sugarcane
field killing Allan along the way, sexually abused Eileen in rapid succession and finally killed
her. In not an instance did any of the three appellants (Ama, Kawit and Brion) desist from that
common design.[29] Likewise, the complicity of the Mayor in the crime can be deduced from the
following conversations he had with some of the appellants at the Erais Farm (per Centenos
testimony), viz.:
LUIS CORCOLON: Mayor, ito po yung regalo namin sa inyo. Ito po yung babae na matagal na po
ninyong kursunada.
 MAYOR: Aba, and ganda talaga ng babaeng yan. Pero sino yung kasama ninyong lalake?
MEDIALDEA: Boss, kasama ho yan ng babae yung lalake. Isinama na rin ho namin para wala pong
bulilyaso.
After raping Eileen, the Mayor had this short exchange with Medialdea:
MAYOR: O sige mga anak, salamat sa regalo ninyo. Salamat sa regalo ninyo sa akin. Tapos na ako, sa
inyo na iyan. Bahala na kayo diyan. Ano naman ang gagawin ninyo diyan
sa lalake?
MEDIALDEA: Boss, papatayin na rin po namin ito para wala pong bulilyaso.
Finally, on appellants claim that the publicity given to this case impaired their right to a fair
trial, we need only to revisit this Courts pronouncements in People v. Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA
54), viz:

We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due
to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at
bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then
and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for,
as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden
of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press
does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public
scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverages
does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and
impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the
bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The
state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to
out breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday
menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial
judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed
the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their
impartiality. Criticisms against the jury system are mounting and Mark Twains wit
and wisdom put them all in better perspective when he observed: When a gentleman
of high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that testimony given under
the same oath will outweigh with him, street talk and newspaper reports based upon
mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance
and stupidity x x x. Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains
and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants? Our judges are learned in the
law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties
to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per
se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility or prejudice on the part of the trial
judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of
the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejsndro, et al., we rejected this standard of
possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed
actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the
pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove
that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the
burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

And so we come to hear another tale of woe, of an infamous public figure and his minions
indicted for having raped and killed a young lady and a budding lad, of these victims who had led
short obscure lives that earned an equally ignominous end, and of a criminal enterprise so
despicable only the unthinking beasts can orchestrate. It was, indeed, a plot seemingly hatched in
hell. And let it not be said that the full protection of the law had been deprived appellants. Even a
beast cannot deny this.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. In addition, each
of the appellants having been found guilty of seven (7) counts of rape with homicide and
considering that existing jurisprudence pegs the amount of indemnity for the death of the victim
at Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, this Court hereby orders each of the appellants to pay the
respective heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez the amount of Seven Hundred Thousand
(P700,000.00) Pesos as additional indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Appellant Jimmy Tabio was charged with three (3) counts of rape in a single
Information,[1] the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
 That between June 13, 2002 and June 28, 2002 in [Aurora[2]] the
said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully,
have carnal knowledge of mentally retarded AAA[3] by means of force and
intimidation three times all committed while the victim was alone inside
their house and during nighttime which was taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.[4] Trial on the merits ensued. The victim, AAA
testified that one night in June 2002, while she was alone in her home, appellant
entered her house. He pressed a knife on AAAs breast, removed her clothing,
fondled her breast, undressed himself, and mounted her as she was seated on a
bed. He inserted his penis in her vagina and ejaculated. AAA was able to recognize
the appellant as her house was lighted with a gas lamp. AAA further testified that
the appellant on two succeeding occasions again entered her home and repeated
the same acts on her. [5]

Other witnesses for the prosecution presented testimony concerning AAAs mental
condition. A doctor[6] who had trained with the National Center for Mental Health
testified that he had examined AAA and concluded that while she was 23 years old
at the time of the rape, she nonetheless had the mental age of a six-year old
child.[7] AAAs mother and grand aunt also testified on her mental retardation and
the occurrences after she had reported the rape to them. [8]

Appellant testified in his own behalf, denying that he had raped AAA and
offering as alibi that he was up in the mountain at the time of the rape.[9] Appellants
wife[10]and his brother-in-law, Jaime Bautista,[11] tried to corroborate his alibi
through their own testimony.

On 25 November 2003, the RTC handed down a decision finding appellant

guilty and imposing the penalty of death on three (3) counts of qualified rape,
defined in Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) and penalized under Article 266-B,
paragraph 6 (10) of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC also ordered appellant to
pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. [12] The
records of the case were thereafter forwarded to this Court on automatic review.
On 7 June 2005, the Court issued a Resolution[13]transferring the case to the Court
of Appeals for appropriate action.[14]

The Court of Appeals[15] affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court. The appellate court found appellant guilty of all three (3) counts for simple
rape only and not qualified rape. It also reduced the civil indemnity to P50,000.00
and added an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.[16]

The case is again before us for our final disposition. Appellant had assigned
three (3) errors in his appeal initially passed upon by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of qualified rape with the penalty of
death in view of the prosecutions failure to allege a qualifying circumstance in the
information; whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of all three (3) counts of
rape despite the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and whether the RTC erred in awarding P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity.

The Court of Appeals properly resolved the first error in appellants favor. The
information should have warranted a judgment of guilt only for simple, not
qualified rape. We quote with approval the appellate court when it said:
Under Article 266-B(10)[17] of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge
by the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical
handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is the qualifying
circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. Rule
110[[18]] of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying
and aggravating circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the
information.[[19]]
 In the case at bench, however, the information merely states that
the appellant had carnal knowledge with a mentally retarded
complainant. It does not state that appellant knew of the mental
disability of the complainant at the time of the commission of the crime.
It bears stressing that the rules now require that the qualifying
circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty should
be specifically stated in the information. Article 266-B (10) of the Revised
Penal Code could not, thus, be applied and the supreme penalty of death
could not be validly imposed.[20]

Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and unequivocal
that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged with specificity
in the information.

The Court also observes that there is duplicity[21] of the offenses charged in
the information, which is a ground for a motion to quash.[22] Three (3) separate acts
of rape were charged in one information only. But the failure of appellant to
interpose an objection on this ground constitutes waiver.[23]

We turn to the second issue. While the Court affirms that appellant is guilty
of simple rape, we nonetheless find that only the first rape was conclusively proven.
The second and third rapes of which appellant was charged and found guilty, were
not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Our courts have been traditionally guided by three settled principles in the
prosecution of the crime of rape: (1) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult
to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of
the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost
caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.[24] In a
prosecution for rape, the complainants candor is the single most important issue. If
a complainants testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the sole basis thereof. [25]

We have thoroughly examined AAAs testimony and found nothing that

would cast doubt on the credibility of her account of the first rape. We quote the
pertinent portion of her testimony:

PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness

xxx

Q Did you have any occasion to see Jimmy inside your house in June
2002?
A Yes, Sir.

Q What time was that?

A Night time, Sir.

xxx

Q You said that Jimmy went inside your house. What did he do there?
A He fondled my breast, Sir.

Q Did you have your clothes on when Jimmy Tabio went to your house?
A Yes, sir.
xxx

Q Dont be ashamed. You said that you have your clothes on. When Jimmy
saw you what did he do with your clothes, if any?
A He removed my dress, Sir.

xxx

Q So you are now without clothes because you said Jimmy removed
your clothes. What did he do after removing your clothes?
A He placed himself on top of me.

COURT: to the witness

Q Was he standing when Jimmy mounted on you?

A I was sitting, Sir.

PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness

Q When Jimmy placed himself on top of you was he dressed or nude?

A He was naked, Sir.
Q You said that he placed himself on top of you. What did Jimmy do while
he was on top of you?
A He pressed a knife on me.

Q On what part of your body did he press the knife?

A Here, Sir. (Witness indicated the upper part of her left breast)

Q What else did Jimmy do aside from pressing the knife near your breast?
A Jimmy was in our house, Sir.

Q Do you know what penis is?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Do you know what Jimmy did with hs penis?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What did he do with his penis?

A He placed his penis to my vagina.

Q What did you feel when Jimmy did that?

A I felt pain, Sir.

Q After Jimmy inserted his penis in your vagina, what else did he do?
A Nothing more, Sir.
Q Did he move while he was on top of you?
A Yes, Sir.

Q Can you demonstrate his movement while he was on top of you?

A (Witness indicated the movement by moving her body.)

xxx

PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness

Q What else did you notice while the penis of Jimmy was in your vagina?
A There was some kind of milk, Sir.

COURT: to the witness

Q Where?
A In my vagina, Sir.

PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness

Q Why did you notice that? What did you do?

A I watched my vagina, Sir.

Q That is why you saw that thing which looks like milk?
 A Yes, Sir.

Q Now, it was night time when Jimmy went into your house, is it not?
A Yes, Sir.

Q How were you able to see Jimmy while it was night time?
A I have a light, Sir.

Q What kind of light was that?

A Gas l[a]mp, Sir. [26] (Emphasis supplied.)

AAA never wavered in her assertion that appellant raped her. AAAs
testimony is distinctively clear, frank and definite without any pretension or hint of
a concocted story despite her low intelligence as can be gleaned from her answers
in the direct examination. The fact of her mental retardation does not impair the
credibility of her unequivocal testimony. AAAs mental deficiency lends greater
credence to her testimony for someone as feeble-minded and guileless as her could
not speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in
fact suffered such crime at the hands of the appellant.[27]

Appellants denials and alibi, which are merely self-serving evidence, cannot
prevail over the positive, consistent and straightforward testimony of AAA. Alibi is
an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To
merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he
was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed,
such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime
when it was committed.[28] We have meticulously reviewed the records and found
no justification to deviate from the findings of fact of the trial court that
 Accuseds alibi that he was in the mountain gathering woods
during the period when [AAA] was raped deserves no consideration.
When the accused took the witness stand, he gave an evasive, confused
and vague account of his whereabouts at the time the crime was
committed as well as with respect to the distance of his whereabouts
from the locus criminis. Accuseds wife and his brother-in-law tried to
corroborate his (accuseds) testimony that he was in the mountain during
the commission of rape but to no avail.

xxx

In the instant case, the distance of the place where the accused
allegedly was is less than half a kilometer (200 meters) which could be
negotiated in less than an hour. x x x[29]

However, as to the alleged second and third rape, we find that the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the
offense e.g., carnal knowledge and force or intimidation. The only evidence
presented to prove the two other charges were AAAs monosyllabic affirmative
answers to two leading questions if appellant repeated during the second and third
times he was in her house what he had done during the first time. We quote that
only portion of AAAs testimony relating to the second and third alleged rapes, to
wit:

PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness

Q You said that Jimmy went to your house three times. What did he do
during the second time?
 A He entered our house, Sir.

Q Yes, he entered your house. Did he repeat what he did during the first
time.
A Yes, Sir.

Q How about the third time? What did he do?

A He has a knife, Sir.

Q Yes. Did he repeat what he did during the first time?

A Yes, Sir.[30] (Emphasis supplied)

AAAs testimony on these two later rapes was overly generalized and lacked
many specific details on how they were committed. Her bare statement that
appellant repeated what he had done to her the first time is inadequate to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the alleged second and third rapes. Whether or not he
raped her is the fact in issue which the court must determine[31] based on the
evidence offered. The prosecution must demonstrate in sufficient detail the
manner by which the crime was perpetrated. Certainly, the testimony of AAA to
the effect that the appellant repeated what he did in the first rape would not be
enough to warrant the conclusion that the second and third rape had indeed been
committed. Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that
each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The quantum of
evidence in criminal cases requires more than that.

In the case of People v. Garcia,[32] wherein the appellant was charged with
183 counts of rape, we held that:
 x x x Be that as it may, however, on the bases of the evidence adduced
by the prosecution, appellant can be convicted only of the two rapes
committed in November, [sic] 1990 and on July 21, 1994 as testified to
by complainant, and for the eight counts of rape committed in May and
June and on July 16, 1994 as admitted in appellants aforementioned
letter of August 24, 1994. We cannot agree with the trial court that
appellant is guilty
of 183 counts of rape because, as correctly asserted by the

defense, each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime
so that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On
that score alone, the indefinite testimonial evidence that complainant
was raped every week is decidedly inadequate and grossly insufficient
to establish the guilt of appellant therefor with the required quantum
of evidence.So much of such indefinite imputations of rape, which are
uncorroborated by any other evidence, fall within this
category.[33] (Emphasis supplied)

We must uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of the

accused when the evidence at hand falls short of the quantum required to support
conviction.

As to the civil liability of appellant, we affirm the reduction by the appellate

court of the civil indemnity to P50,000.00 only, as well as the additional award
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, but on rather different premises, considering
our conclusion that he is only guilty of one, not three counts of rape.

The civil indemnity awarded to the victims of qualified rape shall not be less
than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00),[34] and P50,000.00 for simple
rape.[35] This civil indemnity is awarded for each and every count of rape, such that
one found guilty of two counts of simple rape would be liable to pay P50,000.00 for
each count, or P100,000.00 in all.

We note that the appellate court implicitly awarded P50,000.00 as civil

indemnity for all three counts of simple rape. Such award would have been
improper for a conviction for three counts of simple rape.[36] Still, because appellant
is guilty of one count of simple rape, P50,000.00 still emerges as the appropriate
amount of civil indemnity.

In addition, the victim or heirs, as the case may be, can also recover moral
damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. In rape cases, moral damages
are awarded without need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is
assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an
award.[37] In this respect, we agree with the appellate court in the award
of P50,000.00 as moral damages. The appellate courts award of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages by way of public example is also proper.[38]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.

01301 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is found GUILTY of only ONE
count of simple rape and ACQUITTED of the TWO other counts of qualified rape.
Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay
to the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED