BIAFRAThe Slave Trade and Culture PDF
BIAFRAThe Slave Trade and Culture PDF
BIAFRAThe Slave Trade and Culture PDF
The Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra dissects and
explains the structure, dramatic expansion, and manifold effects of the
slave trade in the Bight of Biafra. By showing that the rise of the Aro
merchant group was the key factor in trade expansion, G. Ugo Nwokeji
reinterprets why and how such large-scale commerce developed in the
absence of large-scale centralized states. The result is the first study to
link the structure and trajectory of the slave trade in a major exporting
region to the expansion of a specific African merchant group – among
other fresh insights into Atlantic Africa’s involvement in the trade –
and the most comprehensive treatment of Atlantic slave trade in the
Bight of Biafra. The fundamental role of culture in the organization of
trade is highlighted, transcending the usual economic explanations in a
way that complicates traditional generalizations about work, domestic
slavery, and gender in precolonial Africa.
G. UGO NWOKEJI
University of California, Berkeley
cambridge university press
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,
São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo, Mexico City
A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.
1 Introduction 1
2 The Aro in the Atlantic Context: Expansion
and Shifts, 1600s–1807 22
3 The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context: Aro Commercial
Organization in the Era of Expansion, 1740–1850 53
4 Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier,
c. 1740 to c. 1850 82
5 Household and Market Persons: Deportees
and Society, c. 1740–c. 1850 117
6 The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 144
7 Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 178
8 Summary and Conclusions 204
vii
Tables and Figures
Tables
0.1. Estimated Volume of Biafra Captive Exports,
1551–1850, by Twenty-Five-Year Period page xiv
2.1. Estimated Volume of the Transatlantic Captive
Departures from the Bight of Biafra and All African
Regions Combined, Primarily Five-Year
Intervals, 1531–1740 33
2.2. A Sample of Captive Prices (in Copper Bars) in
New Calabar and Old Calabar, 1678–1704 36
2.3. The Volume of the Transatlantic Captive Departures
from the Bight of Biafra and All African Regions
Combined, Five-Year Intervals, 1701–1805 38
2.4. Time Spent by Ships at African Ports, 1751–1800 39
2.5. Daily Average Number of Captives Loaded
Per Vessel, 1701–50 41
2.6. Daily Average Number of Captives Loaded
Per Vessel, 1751–1800 41
2.7. Estimated Departures of Captives from Bight of Biafra
Ports by Quarter Century, 1651–1850 (in thousands) 46
3.1. Division of Spheres among Aro Lineage-Groups 61
3.2. Principal Aro Settlements at the Edge of the Igbo
Heartland 62
ix
x Tables and Figures
Figure
2.1. Arochukwu Structure 28
THE BIGHT OF BIAFRA
AND ITS HINTERLAND Map NIGERIA
Area
Rio
CAMEROONS
Nun GABON
0 25 50 75 100 km Cape
Bight Lopez
of
Scale 1:2 800 000 Biafra
MODERN
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BENUE RIV
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M I D D L E B E L T
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iv
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ra
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xi
Preface
The human traffic through which African societies supplied the labor
needs of the Americas invokes many fundamental questions. Some of the
most persistent questions are why Africa supplied so many captives; how
the trade was organized; what its political, social, and cultural implica-
tions were; what the gender and ethnic composition was; and how the
trade affected the societies involved. The answers to these questions are
the primary focus of this book. They are addressed from the vantage
point of the Bight of Biafra, a major exporting region, extending from
the Niger Delta (exclusive of the River Nun) in modern Nigeria to Cape
Lopez in modern Gabon. The region supplied an estimated 13 percent of
all captives exported between 1551 and 1850, which made it the third
most important supply region after West-Central Africa and the Bight of
Benin. What marked out the Bight of Biafra slave trade was its unusual
trajectory. Departures of captives from the region increased fivefold
between the last quarter of the seventeenth century and the last quarter
of the eighteenth century (Table 0.1). Concomitantly, the majority Igbo
of the hinterland were probably the largest single African group arriving
in North America and several Caribbean destinations for much of the
eighteenth century. The traffic closed down quickly in the 1840s, but for
most of the preceding century, the Bight of Biafra had been the second
most important region for captives taken to the Americas (though lagging
well behind West-Central Africa). How did a region that once supplied
a small number of captives so quickly become the second most impor-
tant supply region in the eighteenth century, in spite of the absence of
large centralized states? In comparison to the well-known ever-increasing
demand for African slave labor that the sugar revolution stirred in the
xiii
xiv Preface
Americas, there is still much to explore about how African regions met
this demand.
The Aro, who call themselves “Aru,” inhabit a conspicuous place in
the history of the inglorious slave trade. They dominated the slave trade
in inland Bight of Biafra from their Arochukwu homeland, north of the
Cross River–Enyong Creek estuary in the southeastern portion of the
Nigerian section of the region. The Aro were a peculiar group. Though
the region was marked by “stateless” societies, Aro organization did in
fact have characteristics of a state. Yet, it was rather a peculiar organi-
zation as a diaspora – rather than a state – which explains the rise and
expansion of the region’s transatlantic slave trade. The following chap-
ters elaborate this proposition.
This study treats the Aro trading network as a trade diaspora, in spite
of the relatively small geographic space of the Bight of Biafra. The enor-
mous ethnolinguistic diversity and the evolution of ethnic identity of
the region warrant such a perspective and explain the treatment in this
study of the slave-trade-era Aro as a separate cultural phenomenon, even
though they are today little more than a subgroup of the Igbo. By the
seventeenth century, Arochukwu culture and dialect had emerged as a
hybrid of Igbo, Ibibio, and Akpa elements; Arochukwu itself is located in
the Igbo-Ibibio-Ejagham borderland. Hybridity – a process undergone in
Preface xv
different forms and degrees by much of Atlantic Africa during the slave
trade era – continued in the Aro diaspora. The process was perhaps more
marked among the Aro than was the norm in the Bight of Biafra.
Although the vast majority of present-day Aro people either identify
themselves or are identified by others as Igbo, to impose such an iden-
tity on the period covered in this study is an anachronism. Arochukwu’s
multiethnic origin shaped Aro social structures and identity during the
period covered in this study. Contrary to the sections of pre-twentieth-
century Aro population that originated among groups that came to see
themselves as Igbo, the case with the Aro tracing their own origins else-
where is different. Neither can we simply conflate as Igbo the Aro com-
munities that still remain outside Igboland, principally among the Ibibio
in the Cross River region and the Igala in the Middle Belt. It should be
noted that the Igbo group covered a much smaller area before the late
nineteenth century than they came to occupy in the twentieth century.
That an Igbo group in the sense that we have come to know them in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries did not exist in the era of the trans-
atlantic slave trade is not in question; what is subject to debate is whether
there were any people who identified themselves as Igbo and, if so, when
they began to do so.1
For the most part, the application of “Igbo” to much of the period cov-
ered in this book is not meant to project a pan-Igbo identity as currently
exists but to refer to a group of societies that later constituted Igboland.
A reading of historical and anthropological studies of the region, as well
as ethnographic observations during the late twentieth century, suggests
that Igboness came to involve (perhaps not exclusively) four basic ele-
ments in addition to a common language – two deities, the Ala/Anị/Ana
earth deity and Chi personal god, and reverence for two crops/foods, yam
(ji) and kolanut (ọjị). Except for peripheral societies that migrated into
the Igbo area after the overseas slave trade had gathered momentum in
the region, the societies that became Igbo seem to have in the main shared
a strong social and spiritual attachment to yam and kolanut, but only
those within the perimeter referred to as the Igbo heartland and which
had additionally subscribed to Ala and Chi deities are assumed to have
1
The earliest written reference to the group was when Spanish missionary in the Americas
Alonso Sandoval entered “Ibo” in his collection of ethnolinguistic groups, which was
how some people located in a place we now know as Igboland were referred to and
probably how some people referred to themselves as well ([1627] 1956:94). For various
perspectives, see Leith-Ross 1939:56; Oriji 1994:5; Gomez 1998, chapter 6; Nwokeji
2000:629–33; Northrup 2000; Chambers 2002; Byrd 2008:17–33, 56, 261n.
xvi Preface
become Igbo at the onset of the overseas slave trade.2 At any rate, the
process of Igboization would seem to have begun with – at least in part –
the embrace of yam and kolanut reverence.3 These two foods/crops – as
will be shown in this study – played important roles in shaping the struc-
ture of the slave trade in the Bight of Biafra.
2
Explicitly and implicitly, anthropologists have identified Ala as the most important deity
among the Igbo (Meek 1937:20, 24–33; Ottenberg 1959:136). There was a larger num-
ber of units in the Igbo pantheon, but some of these were not pan-Igbo even at the turn
of the twentieth century, in the sense that nearly all the groups that referred to them-
selves as Igbo had come to be associated beyond Ala and Chi. The heartland is the home
of an inner core, the “autochthonous” communities of Igboland – a group of societies
whose peoples have continuously occupied the area for so long that their traditions locate
their origins in the vicinity of their present abodes. For the autochthones, see J.O. Ijoma
1986c:11; Ifemesia 1979:21; Isichei 1976:67; G.I. Jones 1963; Ohadike 1994:12; Oriji
1994. The autochthones may be deemed the first-order Igbo, followed by the rest of the
heartland. Beyond the heartland, we find an outer ring of groups that had significant
non-Igbo elements, such as Arochukwu, several other Cross River Igbo groups, southern
Igboland – principally the Ngwa, Ndoki, and communities to their south – as well as the
societies around and beyond the city of Enugu. Finally, there are groups that migrated
into the region in the course of the transatlantic slave trade, mostly in riverine regions,
such as Onitsha, Oguta, Abo, Igga, and many of the West-Niger Igbo societies. Historian
John Oriji (1994:5) has drawn attention to the presence in the Igbo heartland of Amaigbo
(Ama-Igbo, meaning “Igbo Square”), the ancient town to which many Isuama Igbo com-
munities trace their origins, and the historic Igbo-Ukwu (“Grand Igbo”), in which the
archeologist Thurstan Shaw (1970a, 1970b) uncovered artifacts of ninth-century vintage,
which suggests that the nucleus of Igboland was perhaps the Amaigbo/Igbo-Ukwu axis
of the so-called Igbo heartland. The human figures found among the artifacts had the
distinctive ichi marks on their faces, a practice that continued in the Nri-Awka area up
to recent decades (Ifemesia 1979:18–19, 89). There is a dialectical variation in the ways
people of the Amaigbo and Igbo-Ukwu subregions of the Igbo heartland pronounce the
earth cult – Ala in the case of Amaigbo and Anị/Ana in the case of Nri. There are no
dialectical variations in the pronunciation of the other key terms – ọjị (kolanut), ji (yam),
and Chi, except for the nasalization that mark some dialects. The cultural landscape of
the region was, however, more fluid than this schema might imply. A given group may
have combined cultural forms that related more to groups outside than the ones inside
the category it is placed in, a reflection of relentless movement of people and ideas. Aro
diaspora communities were in very recent centuries established in areas long settled by
autochthones and heartland groups.
3
Originally, Ikeji itself celebrated the beginning of yam harvest among the Aro, although
the festival changed significantly after trading became the principal occupation of the
Aro. Kolanut also played a central role in Aro covenants with their trading and political
allies as well as in inducting newly acquired slaves into the household (Kanu-Igbo 1996b;
J.G. Okoro 1996). The present writer has not seen any evidence in support of the exis-
tence of Chi and the Ala cult among the Aro before the nineteenth century. An instance
of Ana emerges among the Aro diaspora of the Ndieni cluster, located in the Nri-Awka
region, in the late nineteenth century. Ikeji, Ihu, and to an extent the Ana cult (Ajana) are
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The role of yam and kolanut in shaping the structure of
the slave trade is analyzed in Chapter 6. Aro traditions refer to gifts of kolanuts and yams
accompanying the Ihu “homage” rite, and to wives giving their husbands kolanuts during
the Ikeji festival (Arodiogbu 1996; Nwankwo and Okereke 1996).
Preface xvii
of these connections – the use of the average daily loading rates of slave
ships to measure the intensity of slaving interregionally and the implication
for the gender structure of the slave trade of the culture and commerce that
developed around kolanut – are introduced here for the first time.
The arrangement of the chapters is both chronological and thematic.
There are chronological overlaps, but even within the affected sections,
I have strived to present the material chronologically. Chapter 1 details
the historical and historiographical contexts of the Biafra Atlantic slave
trade, and stakes out the claim that the rise and expansion of the Aro
merchant group and their organization as a trade diaspora were pivotal
to the massive expansion of the Biafra trade in the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury. In Chapter 2, I relate the chronology of Aro expansion during its
first and second phases to the oscillations in the Biafra Atlantic trade up
until 1807, when the British, carriers of the bulk of the region’s trade,
abolished the traffic. Focusing on the second and third phases, Chapter 3
situates Aro slaving in the regional context with an emphasis on Aro
organization between the 1740s and 1850s, a period that captured both
the expansion and decline of the Biafra Atlantic slave trade. I link cultural
and economic processes within the Bight of Biafra to the Atlantic slave
trade in Chapters 4–6, presenting slaving within the region, not just in
terms of economic relationships, but also in terms of collateral, social,
cultural, and ideological systems. Chapter 4 illustrates how the formation
and expansion of the Aro diaspora as a result of the expanding overseas
slave trade reconfigured the geocultural landscape of the Bight of Biafra
hinterland. On the other hand, endogenous sociocultural practices, such
as slavery, means of enslavement, and conceptions of the Atlantic world
helped to shape the composition of export captives. The means, process,
and structure of slaving are thus the subject of Chapter 5, with a focus
on who got enslaved or retained in the region, and who got shipped to
the Americas, how and why. Chapter 6 engages with the unusual gender
structure of the Biafra slave trade and explains it by patterns of domestic
consumption, ritual, warfare, gender division of labor in agriculture, and
long-distance trade. Chapter 7 continues the story of cultural changes
imposed by the Atlantic slave trade into the final phase of Aro expansion
between 1850 and 1902, highlighting the increased incidence of warfare
both as the long-term effect of slaving and as the immediate impact of
the end of the overseas slave trade. Detailed analysis of the demographic
impact has been left out because it has received attention elsewhere
(Nwokeji 2000). It suffices here to affirm that the demographic impact
was less severe in the Bight of Biafra and its hinterland than in most other
Preface xix
regions, not because fewer captives were removed from here, but because
the region gained population from immigration from outlying inland
areas, and did not suffer the adverse effect of the additional slave trade
from across the Sahara. Unlike other West African regions, that trade was
marginal in the region. Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes the study.
A detailed note on the sources appears at the end.
In the course of writing this book, I have accumulated debts of grati-
tude to numerous individuals and organizations. At the University of
Toronto Ph.D. program where it all began, the history department, School
of Graduate Studies, and the Center for International Development gave
generous funding. Over the years, funding has also come from the history
department and the Institute for African American Studies, both of the
University of Connecticut (UConn), as well as from the African American
studies department and the Chancellor of the University of California,
Berkeley. This book has benefited from the congenial atmospheres and
resources afforded me in the following institutions where I have held visit-
ing positions over the years – the history department of Emory University,
the DuBois Institute for Afro-American Research at Harvard University,
the Gilder Lehrman Center at Yale University, and Zentrum Moderner
Orient, Berlin, Germany. I enjoyed the assistance of many librarians and
archivists in several countries, but I would like to single out U.O.A. Esse
of the Nigerian National Archives, Enugu, and Father Leo Laden of the
Holy Ghost Provincialate, Dublin, Republic of Ireland. Among the elders
who taught me aspects of Aro and Igbo history are the late Eze John O.
Dike and Eze Jonas Ekemezie Uche, as well as K.G. Ufere, the late Aaron
Muotoh, Michael Sunday Igwe, the late Jacob Okoro, Ukobasi Kanu-
Igbo, J.G. Okoro, Thomas Okereke, the late Eneanya Akpu, and Azubuike
Nkemakonam Nwaokoye-Emesuo (Periccomo). The late Princewill Imo
gave me an insight into the Izuogu lineage in a way few are able and
willing to offer. Obi and Ngozi Uche helped me clarify some items in
the Aro vocabulary. Ohiaeri Okoro, Aloy Igbo and Fritz-Canute Ngwa,
and my cousins Ifeanyi Ike and Emeka Okoronkwo, helped during cru-
cial junctures of the fieldwork; Udi Ojiako provided me invaluable mate-
rial about and insight into Nri-Awka history. I would like to single out
J. Okoro Ijoma and the late Rev. Canon Amos Egwuekwe D. Mgbemene
(“AED”) for their assistance during my fieldwork, including giving access
to sources and contacts and their own invaluable intellectual reflections
on Aro history. All my colleagues in the history department of UConn
during 1999–2003 and in the African American studies department at
Berkeley since 2003 have given me every support possible.
xx Preface
Brown, Alex Byrd, Michael Echeruo, Felix Ekechi, Peter Ekeh, Michael
Gomez, Gwendolyn Hall, Axel Herneit-Sievers, Jocelyn Jacquot, Joseph
Inikori, Ray Kea, Tony Kirk-Greene, Joseph Miller, Kristin Mann, Phil
Morgan, Ben Naanen, Onwuka Njoku, Chidi Nwaubani, Onaiwu
Ogbomo, Andrew Okolie, Rachel Sullivan, Vincent Bakpetu Thompson,
Maureen Warner-Lewis, and Hans Zell. My thanks also go to the late
Don Ohadike, to whom this book is dedicated.
Finally and by no means the least, I salute my family for doing every-
thing for me. My parents, Godwin Ukobasi and Christiana Ejenene
Nwokeji, challenged me to be the best I can be but they are no longer
around to see this book. I am grateful to my wife Nnenna and our chil-
dren Anaezi, Nwaka, and Ukaobasi, who have come to enrich my life
and have sacrificed much in the long course of writing this book. I also
salute my siblings and their spouses for their support: Georgy Umenaa
and Philip Umunnakwe, May Enda and Tony Okafor, Uche Cele and Fab
Amobi, Oby and Uche Ikoro, and Maureen and Obi Anadi. For many
stimulating intellectual exchanges, I am grateful to my father-in-law, His
Royal Highness Eze (Professor) Green Nwankwo. Of course, I alone am
responsible for any remaining errors.
Foreword
Paul E. Lovejoy
The interior of the Bight of Biafra has been somewhat of an enigma in the
attempt to reconstruct the history of Africa during the era of transatlantic
slavery. Its importance in the peopling of the Americas is clear. Perhaps
one in six enslaved Africans came from the region. And while there is
disagreement in estimating the relative proportions of people who can be
identified as Igbo, Ibibio, and other ethnic categories and, indeed, in the
meaning of these categories, it does seem certain that most people came
from the relatively densely populated areas immediately inland from the
coast behind the Niger Delta. Although Portuguese and other European
traders did acquire some enslaved Africans from the Bight of Biafra in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the overwhelming majority of
people from the region left in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
and especially in the century after circa 1730. The enigma is that it has
been difficult to document this migration, the causes of enslavement,
and any relevant political and economic factors that might explain the
phenomenon and its timing.
The reason for this difficulty relates to two factors. First, there is a
paucity of documentary and oral sources that might be used in historical
reconstruction for the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Second,
there seems to be what might be called a “wall of silence” in the region
about the past. Perhaps the lack of centralized institutions that can pre-
serve details of the past explains this problem. There seem to be few
historical benchmarks, such as the accession to office of political figures,
their deaths, major battles, and such chronologically specific details that
can be useful in historical reconstruction. There is historical memory, of
course, but it is often connected with titled societies and associations that
xxiii
xxiv Foreword
Introduction
1
I reconstruct the foregoing detail from the following sources: NAE 81/27-OKIDIST
4/9/70; NAE OR/C/823-ORLDIST 3/1/359; NAE 12481A-MINLOC 16/1/1326; NAE
OKIDIST 19/1/1 1908–25; NAE ORLDIST 14/1/3; NAE 35/1920-OKIDIST 4/2/32;
NAE 38/22 OKIDIST 4/4/29; NAE CSE 1/85/6197A; Arodiogbu 1996; J.O. Dike 1996;
K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:205–08; Goodlife 1933, 1952; Heslop 1936; M.S. Igwe
1996; Michael Ike 1995; Mayne 1935; J.C. Nwankwo 1973; C. Okoli 1996; J.G. Okoro
1
2 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
The Atlantic slave market provided attractive profits, but the Aro
always ensured that they retained within their group many of the people
they traded. As a small group, the Aro concentrated on group expansion
and depended economically on slaves as both merchandise and laborers.
Aro political contests, such as the civil wars and succession disputes, as
well as such social facts as marriage, tribute, and the incest prohibition
were deeply entangled with slaving. The people’s belief system and their
media of worship were grounded in, and reinforced by, slaving-related
processes. Their value system celebrated the ownership and prolifera-
tion of people and encouraged the sale of captives into Atlantic slavery.
The decision regarding whom to send into Atlantic slavery and whom
to retain was central to Aro political economy and, ipso facto, to this
study.
Aro slave trade involved both business and social engineering. The
overwhelming majority of captives that Aro traders bought from the
non-Aro people were random victims of war, kidnapping, and sundry
methods but many were innocent. The Aro welcomed craftsmen, artists,
medicine men, fortune seekers, refugees, and others who desired the pres-
tige and protection that Aro citizenship conferred during that time. But
even these noncaptive immigrants found that they could enter Aro society
only as protected persons under Aro patrons – normally males – who
were already well established there. The Aro concept of mmuba, mean-
ing, at the most basic level, “proliferation,” captured the phenomenon
of expansion. Aro oral history and folklore often refer to mmuba as an
end in itself, but this ideology also encapsulated the people’s desire to
increase the labor pool and to strengthen the Aro population for geopo-
litical purposes.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the Aro world comprised more than
150 diaspora settlements across the Biafra hinterland. These com-
munities celebrated common observances and maintained linkage
institutions, such as the annual Ikeji festival, the Ekpe society, and the
Ihu routine homage system. These institutions fostered and sustained a
strong pan-Aro identity that facilitated Aro political interests and com-
mercial hegemony. Yet, in spite of these linkage institutions, the Aro
diaspora was susceptible to the cultural influence of host societies and
1985:23–28; J.E. Uche 1996; Umo n.d. One enslaved African of Ibibio origin told German
Moravian missionary Christian Georg Andreas Oldendorp in Pennsylvania in the late
1760s that the Aro, whose land “was not too far from [Ibibioland],” supplied the Ibibio
with “riffles, sabres, powder, lead, linen, and the like” (Oldendorp 1987: 167).
Introduction 3
of the societies from which the Aro drew immigrants. For example, an
estimated more than 1 million inhabitants of the Aro settlements in cen-
tral Igboland, the vast majority of whom descended from people who
were not Aro 250 years ago, speak a dialect that deviates substantially
from the one spoken in metropolitan Arochukwu.2 The frontierspeo-
ple also brought with them new media of worship and developed new
taboos and even notions of class consciousness. These developments did
not result simply from the routine domestication that is associated with
frontier societies, colonists, or immigrant groups adapting to a new
environment; they were also shaped by the Aro struggle to dominate
trade in various parts of the Biafra hinterland. Ironically, while the Aro
diaspora altered Aro ways, sometimes radically, the Aro nevertheless
often remained aloof and distinct from the preexisting communities in
their immediate neighborhood, ostensibly in order to maintain strict
fidelity to Aro culture.
After the trade in palm oil replaced the Atlantic slave trade in the mid-
nineteenth century, most of the region’s food-producing groups devoted
more of their efforts to the production of palm oil and palm kernel oil.
Other groups became actively involved in the new trade, giving the Aro
keener competition than they had had in the days of the overseas slave
trade. These developments restructured the Aro economy and affected
Aro relationships with the non-Aro. By the 1890s, the Aro had begun to
produce foodstuffs for domestic consumption and, increasingly, for the
market, while continuing to dominate what was left of the slave traf-
fic, until the British Aro Expedition of 1901–02 overthrew the Aro and
imposed a new order. The present study elaborates the foregoing story
and situates it in Atlantic and regional contexts.
2
This estimate is from a 1.5 percent compounded annual growth rate of 45,000 inhabit-
ants in 1927 for Arondizuogu, by far the largest Aro diaspora settlement, plus a roughly
equal number of inhabitants for the rest of Aro settlements in central Igboland. A 1927
estimate put Arondizuogu’s population at 30,000 (see NAE 81/27-OKIDIST 4/9/70.
“Anthropological Report on Aros of Ndizuogu and Others”). The report itself shows that
colonial officials made their estimate based on one part of the town alone, the part that
fell into the Orlu District (making up most of the Arondizuogu territory west of the Imo),
leaving out the part that fell into the Okigwe District (east of the Imo and some territory
on the west bank). One 1935 report again covered only the Orlu part, as did the map
accompanying it (see Mayne 1935). I have increased this figure to 45,000 because the
1927 estimate underrepresented the population after leaving out east-Imo Arondizuogu.
This situation obviates any attempt to derive reliable census figures. Theresa Nwankwo
(1991:10) has claimed that a 1931 census put the population at 180,000, which would
drastically escalate present estimates. I have not seen this census.
4 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
3
Except when otherwise stated, overall Biafra export figures are calculated from the
Expanded Online Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database (Slavevoyages.org). There are
many contending estimates. See Anstey 1975; Behrendt 1997; Curtin 1969, 1976; Eltis
1978, 1987, 1989b, 1995; Eltis and Richardson 1995a; Inikori 1976a, 1976b, 1978,
1992b; Lovejoy 1982b; Richardson 1989a, 1989b; Richardson and Behrendt 1995. See
Henige 1986; Inikori 1994a, 1994b, 1998; Lovejoy 1989; and Manning 1998b for analy-
ses of the historiography.
4
For the Biafra Atlantic slave trade to 1700, see Thornton 1999. John Thornton
states: “Undoubtedly … the greatest source of slaves for New Calabar [then the dominant
port] was the Igbo-speaking region” (11). As early as 1627, Spanish missionary priest
Alonso de Sandoval reported that Caravalies, as Biafra captives were then called, were
“innumerable” in Spanish America and spoke a variety of tongues (de Sandoval [1627]
1956:94, 96). A 1790s British House of Lords survey shows that the Bight of Biafra and
West-Central Africa accounted for 78 percent of all captives arriving in Jamaica from
known African ports. This pattern reflects that of other English colonies. Between these
two regions, the Bight of Biafra exported more (H. Klein 1978, 147–48, 150, 173). It
accounted for 40 percent of all British purchases just before abolition in 1807 (Law and
Lovejoy 1996).
Introduction 5
percent of the region’s overseas trade. The mid-century surge had impli-
cations for Biafra’s major ports. Bonny, serving mainly the trade from
the Igbo heartland, superseded Old Calabar as the region’s preeminent
port between 1726 and 1750; by 1750 it was the single busiest slaving
port in Africa north of the Equator. Turnaround rates at Biafra’s ports
also became significantly shorter than they were elsewhere. Indeed, the
1740s marked a turning point in the Biafra Atlantic trade. By the third
quarter of the century, the “trust” system, by which Europeans advanced
goods to African merchants on credit, had been well established (Lovejoy
and Richardson 1997, 1999). In addition to this extraordinary expan-
sion of trade, the Bight of Biafra exported higher proportions of females
than any other major coastal region. This characteristic deviated from
the focus of New World demand, which tilted heavily toward males. To
properly understand these unique features of the Biafra Atlantic slave
trade, a close examination of the institutions and processes that under-
pinned the trade in Africa is imperative.5
The Nigerian section of the Bight of Biafra was home to numerous
ethnolinguistic groups. The Igbo and Ibibio people predominated in the
region south of the Benue River, known today as southeastern Nigeria.
These two groups had long provided most of the export captives.6 German-
born Moravian missionary Christian Georg Andreas Oldendorp reported
a substantial Igbo and Ibibio presence in the Caribbean and North
America during the late 1760s. By the mid-eighteenth century, Biafrans
had become the largest African group in the Chesapeake.7 They were
also a substantial presence in the British Caribbean. Most of the captives
exported from Biafra – some 70 percent, according to most estimates –
passed through the Aro network (K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990, 250;
Ijoma and Njoku 1991:300). The Aro were also the largest slaveholders
in the hinterland. More than any other group, they were linked directly
to region-wide institutions. Along with the coastal city state of Old
Calabar and Cross River Igbo warrior groups, the Aro participated in
5
Eltis 1986; Eltis and Engerman 1992, 1993; Galenson 1986:97–114; Geggus 1989:37–38,
40–41; Inikori 1992a; H. Klein 1978:174, 241–42; 1983:35–37; Lovejoy and Hogendorn
1979; Robertson and Klein 1983; Thornton 1991, 1998.
6
A 1953 census shows that the Igbo and the Ibibio made up respectively 68.56 percent
and 10.36 percent of the region south of the Benue River known today as southeast-
ern Nigeria. International Population Census 1953. (See “Population Census of Eastern
Region of Nigeria 1953.”)
7
Oldendorp [1777] 1995, 2000: ms. 427–28, 431–32, 459, 462, 464, 466. For the Virginia
evidence see Chambers 2005:10–11; Gomez 1998:115–16; Kulikoff 1986:321–23;
Morgan 1998:62, 63; Sobel 1987:5; Walsh 1997:67.
6 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
the Ekpe confraternity.8 This society settled credit matters and provided
local law enforcement, as well as monopolized the Nsibiri writing system.
The Aro controlled the Ibiniukpabi oracle, which served as the highest
court of appeal, including for the coastal city-states and communities on
the west side of the Niger River. Further, they maintained alliances with
Cross River Igbo warrior communities that facilitated Aro wars in differ-
ent parts of the region, operated the region’s rotational slave fairs, and
zoned virtually all parts of the region to individual Aro lineage-groups
as spheres of influence (mbia). Overseeing these mbia on a day-to-day
basis were a variety of permanent diaspora settlements corresponding to
the respective Aro lineage-groups. These settlements ranged from small,
peacefully established Aro presences within preexisting non-Aro lineage-
groups to large conquest settlements. The existence of Aro settlements in
areas separated by distance, language, and cultural practices within the
Biafra hinterland was an Aro hallmark.
In spite of this highly visible role, Aro organization and its basic chro-
nology are still in need of integration into Atlantic scholarship. Perhaps
the most promising line of inquiry is to relate Aro expansion to the
expansion of the Biafra Atlantic trade and to explain the correlation of
the two processes. Aro expansion occurred in four main phases. The first
phase – lasting from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the end
of the 1730s – witnessed the consolidation of the Arochukwu metro-
pole, the establishment of Aro influence in the Cross River Region, the
foundation of the principal market at Bende, Aro forays into Ibibioland
and central Igboland, and the rise of Old Calabar (the city closest to
Arochukwu) as Biafra’s principal port. The second phase – beginning
in about 1740 – witnessed great expansion in the Biafra export slave
trade, the establishment of Aro settlements in the Biafran hinterland,
and Bonny’s supersession of Old Calabar as Biafra’s principal port. This
period ended in 1808 when the British, carriers of some 80 percent of
Biafra captives, abolished slave traffic. The third phase of Aro expansion
began in 1808, following British abolition, to the end of the Atlantic
slave trade by 1850, the region’s deeper involvement in the overseas palm
oil trade, and the expansion of the domestic slave market. The fourth
and final phase began in the 1850s and ended in 1902, when the British
8
This society took the name Okonko in other areas, such as the Niger delta states and
southern Igboland where the Aro exported this institution. The role of this variant of the
society comes out most clearly in the work of John Oriji (Oriji 1982, 1983). The exami-
nation of the role of the Ekpe society as an agency of slave procurement awaits future
research.
Introduction 7
9
For studies dealing with the Atlantic slave trade with a focus on coastal states, see Alagoa
1964, 1970, 1971a, 1971b, 1972, 1986; Cookey 1974; Hargreaves 1987; Latham 1973;
Nair 1972; Noah 1980; Wariboko 1991.
10
Allen and Thomson 1848a; Baikie 1856; Burdo 1880; Crowther and Taylor 1859; J.A.B.
Horton 1863:183–85; Hutchinson 1861.
8 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
germinated during that era did not produce much notable information
on the Aro trading system. Instead, it concentrated on Aro origins (G.I.
Jones 1939:101). In tune with the Hamitic hypothesis – the tendency to
attribute “civilizations” found in Africa to descendants of the Biblical
Ham – the British seemed bent on locating external provenance for the
Aro, one that would ultimately be linkable to Caucasian influence. The
resulting theories of Aro origins were so speculative that historian Adiele
Afigbo has insisted on putting them on the same footing as Aro sagas.
Afigbo’s analysis has itself come under severe criticism, illustrating the
continued interest in the subject.11
Major Arthur Leonard’s firsthand account of the Aro market at Bende
during 1896 was the first published work on the Aro. While Leonard
provided useful glimpses into a changing Aro society, as a harbinger of
British invasion, he was interested mainly in immediate strategic mat-
ters (Leonard 1898). Several British military officers generated useful
ethnographic information in a round of publications that appeared in
the wake of the Aro Expedition of 1901–02.12 The multivolume work by
colonial officer and anthropologist Amaury Talbot, published in 1926,
provided equal measures of useful and chimerical information on Aro
organization.13 In the 1920s and 1930s, the colonial government com-
missioned “intelligence” and anthropological reports that produced
significant knowledge of the Aro.14 From the 1930s through the 1960s,
local historians and other scholars in many communities in the region
did much spadework.15 The aforementioned sources did not, however,
11
Afigbo (1971b, 31; 1972a). Afigbo’s critique has, with some justification, been termed a
stretch (Nwauwa 1995, 110). As made clear in Chapter 2, however, Afigbo’s comments
on the genealogies collected by colonial administrators should be taken seriously.
12
A.G. Leonard 1906:34, 175, 183, 308–09, 287, 486; MacAlister 1902; Mockler-
Ferryman 1902:127, 222; Steel 1908; Venour 1902; Vickery 1906. For an illuminating
scholarly account of Aro-British relations up until the invasion, see Anene 1959.
13
Instances of the latter category are his claims that the Aro were of Carthaginian prov-
enance and that they ran a theocracy (Talbot 1926a:183; 1926b:50, 52, 338; 1926c:
592, 821).
14
See Anthropologists’ Papers 1927; Mathews 1922; Mayne 1935; Shankland 1933.
15
See Nwana [1933] 1950; Ojike 1947; Umo n.d. [1947?]; Igwegbe 1962, and Uku 1993.
A portion of Uku’s account that appeared in the West African Review (Dec. 1953) is
quoted widely. For more recent works see A.O. Anyoha 1977; Irono 1988; Mbadiwe
1991; E.O. Mmeregini n.d; E.O. Okoli 1977; J.G. Okoro 1985. For a representative
sample of theses, see Agu 1985; Anaba 1988; Chuku 1989; Emeruwa 1992; C. Eze 1987;
C.E. Igwe 1992; Imo 1980; G.C. Mmeregini 1978; Monye 1991; I.O. Nwankwo 1986;
J.C. Nwankwo 1973; T. Nwankwo 1991; D.C. Nwosu 1978; Onyensoh 1985; B.N.N.
Orji 1978.
Introduction 9
provide reliable chronologies and did not explicitly place the Aro in
regional trade, let alone the Atlantic system.
Serious historical inquiry into the Aro role in regional trade, however,
began with the seminal work of historian K. Onwuka Dike. Although
he focused on the coastal trading states, Dike referred to the Aro as the
“economic dictators of the hinterland,” and emphasized the role of their
oracle, Ibiniukpabi (K.O. Dike 1956:38). The role of oracles in Igbo social
organization has since been studied, as have the workings of Aro influence
and the importance of Ibiniukpabi, leading to the finding that this oracle
was not a major source of captives (S. Ottenberg 1958; 1971:24–26).16 It
was, however, the former British colonial officer and anthropologist G.I.
Jones who began to place the Aro in a regional chronological framework.
Based on the traditions of the coastal port states, Jones suggested that
the Aro had been formed by the mid-seventeenth century (Jones 1963,
134). This means that the Aro had been well established by the eighteenth
century when the Biafra Atlantic trade became prominent. Together, the
aforementioned works established the significance of the Aro in the region’s
political economy and commercial history. Unfortunately, however, these
important contributions did not stimulate scholarship in the hinterland.
Systematic analysis of hinterland trade began during the late 1960s.
The genealogy of this historiography starts with regional geographer
Ukwu I. Ukwu’s pioneering study of the regional marketing system, trade
routes, and delivery systems. Ukwu identified the conscious coordina-
tion of diaspora settlements with fairs and trade routes as the distinctive
feature of the Aro system (Ukwu 1967:1969). His work foreshadowed
the scholarly interest in regional trade, as well as in Aro operations and
the institutions that underpinned them, that developed during the 1970s.
Similar studies proliferated in the early 1970s (Ekejiuba 1972a, 1972b;
Northrup 1972; Ofonagoro 1972). Further, Afigbo mapped the extent of
regional trade and highlighted the hitherto neglected trade links between
southeastern Nigeria and the Middle Belt to the north, complementing
extant studies on Igbo–Middle Belt relations.17 It is noteworthy that the
relevant scholarship of the late 1960s and early 1970s concentrated on
trading mechanisms, trade routes, goods, and supply systems. It had little
to say on the implications of these processes for politics, culture, and
social organization.
16
K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990, 250; Ekejiuba 1972b, 12; J.O. Ijoma 1986c; Ijoma and
Njoku 1991:206, 300; Northrup 1978, 138; Ofonagoro 1972:83.
17
Afigbo 1973b, 1977; Boston 1968; Shelton 1971; Sargent 1999:173–89, 252–59.
10 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
18
For examples of pertinent studies done by professional historians, see Afigbo 1977,
1981a, 1981b, 1987; Ifemesia 1978, 1979; Ijoma and O.N. Njoku 1991; Oguagha 1991;
Ohadike 1994; Oriji 1987; O.N. Njoku 2000; Uya 1984. Of no less significance is the
work of anthropologist M. Angulu Onwuejeogwu 1975, 1981, 1987. For published
work dealing specifically with aspects of Aro history by a variety of authors, see K.O.
Dike and Ekejiuba 1990; Eni 1973; Ezekiah Muotoh 2000; Igwegbe 1962; Ijoma 1986b,
1994; Pita Nwana 1933; Ohia 2007; J.G. Okoro 1985; Uku 1993; Umo n.d. [1947?].
Introduction 11
the region.19 The gender structure of the slave trade has only recently
been the focus of analysis in the region (Nwokeji 1997b, 2000a, 2001).
Yet, the Bight of Biafra is of particular interest in understanding African
conceptions of gender. If, in other regions, the Euro-American drive to
secure men was only partially successful, it all but broke down in the
Bight of Biafra. In this region, the character of African warfare and the
role of women in the indigenous economy and in social institutions
shaped the age and gender structure of the slave trade differently from
elsewhere. Key elements in this process were African conceptions of slav-
ery and the division of labor, reproduction in the context of the lineage,
polygyny, and methods of enslavement. Because of the failure to tie the
Biafra trade to its Atlantic context, the implications for the aforemen-
tioned processes of the Aro being the preeminent trading group remain
unexplored.
Despite its limitations, the scholarship since the mid-1970s has repre-
sented two significant shifts. First, it reintegrated trade with its politics in
the manner Onwuka Dike enunciated in 1956. Some scholars now argue
that the Aro dominated regional trade precisely because they developed
strong state structures (see also K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1978, 1990;
Ijoma 1986b; Stevenson 1968). Second, this scholarship located the Aro
within the region-wide socioeconomic process. The Aro phenomenon
became central to the analysis of the regional political economy.
19
For gender relations in the region, see Hargreaves 1987; Martin 1988, 1995; Oriji 1982.
For studies that have commented on the gender structure, see Eltis 1986, 1998; Eltis
and Engerman 1992, 1993; Eltis and Richardson 1997; Geggus 1989; Inikori 1992a;
H. Klein 1983, 35–37; Manning 1998a.
12 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
20
This observation has been confirmed by Martin Klein’s recent survey of slaving in
decentralized societies, of which the Igbo region provides a prime example (M. Klein
2001, 63). Peter Ekeh has gone as far as arguing that slaving was actually heaviest in
decentralized societies (Ekeh 1990:680–82).
21
Although the Aro were central to Northrup’s work, his respondents were overwhelm-
ingly Ibibio (Nwauwa 1995:114). Northrup’s interviews with Aro people, although not
Introduction 13
always indicated or necessarily borne out by respondents’ names, are self-evident in the
content of the interviews. In my estimation, seven of Northrup’s forty interviews were
among the Aro. They are Asiegbu 1973; Inokun 1972; Merem and Nwankwo 1973; K.
Oji 1972; F.E.S. Okoro 1973; Okori 1972; J. Udo 1972. For the transcripts, see Northrup
1972–73.
22
Northrup argues that the Aro were a political force only in Afikpo in Cross River
Igboland but were only economic imperialists elsewhere (Northrup 1978b, 121). Such
a distinction is unstainable given that such settlements as Inokun, Arondizuogu, and the
Ndieni cluster dominated both economic and political affairs.
23
Bentor 1994:104–08; K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:165–71, 174–86; Isichei
1976:82–87.
24
See, for example, K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:180–81; Igwegbe 1962:15–16, 43,
46–47, 91–93, 114–19; J.G. Okoro 1985:40–42.
14 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
of the Aro was a difference in kind, not simply of degree. The Aro were
the only group in the region that deliberately and consistently established
settlements abroad for the purposes of trade that were tied to the home-
land through systemwide institutions.
Fitting the Aro tightly into a stateless mold merely draws from and
reinforces the idealized notions of Igbo segmentarism rampantly assumed
in the literature.25 A detailed study of the Niger riverine states of Abo,
Oguta, Onitsha, and Osomari revealed that generalizations about an
Igbo political framework are only meaningful after each Igbo “cultural
area” has been studied in detail (Nzimiro 1972). Such research as has
been carried out in the past forty years or so no longer sustains the idea
that the region lacked rulers, or what Northrup (1981) called a “ruling
class.”26 For example, after examining the empirical evidence the mem-
bers of a multidisciplinary panel of Igbo social scientists generated, a
colloquy declared in 1986: “It will probably come as a surprise to many
of us, nurtured as we are on the principle [that is] now clearly under
severe pressure that Igbo enwegh eze (the Igbo have no king), to learn
that in traditional Igboland the ultimate authority figure was very often a
monarch of some kind” (Ahiajoku Lecture Colloquium 1986:ii). The fact
that the region had many rulers is not evidence that it had none (Afigbo
1981b). We cannot understand indigenous slavery and the Atlantic
slave trade by laying undue emphasis on leveling structures. The power
held by some individuals in the region over others determined people’s
fate – whether they would be enslaved and, if so, whether they would be
enslaved within the region or sent to the Americas.
Some of the most effective arguments against overemphasis on leveling
mechanisms come from Dike and Ekejiuba, who focus on stratification
and state institutions, as these characteristics concerned the historical
development of trade in the region. They insist that analyzing what the
Aro did, instead of pinpointing what they did not do, is more useful in
determining the true nature of their political organization. The ultimate
measure of Aro hegemony should emerge from a comparison with
regional polities unanimously acknowledged to have evolved state struc-
tures: the Middle Belt Igala kingdom suffered decentralization, disinte-
gration, and defections; Bonny (Biafra’s premier port state) split after a
25
Meek 1937; Green 1964; Carlston 1968:190–210; Echeruo 1979; Horton 1976;
Henderson 1972; Nwaubani 1994.
26
Afigbo 1973a; Anikpo 1985; Anyanwu 1993a:31–32; P.C. Dike 1986; Ubah
1987:168–72.
Introduction 15
civil war in 1869; and the Niger riverine Onitsha kingdom simply lacked
military muscle. Decentralization and disaggregation usually happened
to states – including Arochukwu – as a result of trade (K.O. Dike and
Ekejiuba 1990:81, 83–85). Dike and Ekejiuba periodize the history of the
Aro state into three phases – the pre-1650 period, the post-1650 period,
and the nineteenth century. The pre-1650 period corresponded with the
segmentary lineage system usually ascribed to the entire Aro history. The
period after 1650 was when King Akuma initiated state building, when
primogeniture prevailed, and Omu Aro (Aro coat of arms) was intro-
duced as a symbol of central authority.27 Finally, the nineteenth century
witnessed the accommodation of ethnic heterogeneity and a “dynamic
response” to external regions, such as “the absence of a centralized power
to challenge and compete with the Aro in the control of the [trade] of the
vast hinterland” (K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:81–82, 96–103, 123).
The existence of spheres of influence among the respective Aro lineage-
groups is characteristic of state organization.
Yet, it is unlikely that the Aro had a high degree of centralization at
any point in their history. For instance, if the wars that produced Aro
settlements resulted from the initiatives and efforts of “a handful of Aro
households,” as Dike and Ekejiuba posit, these settlements can hardly
have simultaneously been private enterprises and state-sponsored proj-
ects (K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:165). The crucial point perhaps is that
Aro expansion up to the early eighteenth century was state sponsored –
as illustrated in the appointment in a newly settled area of a resident
Mazi (Consul), usually a trusted confidant of the Aro king (K.O. Dike and
Ekejiuba 1990:69) – but had become the responsibility of private indi-
viduals just before mid-eighteenth century. This change perhaps resulted
from the rapid proliferation of diaspora settlements and the concomi-
tant expansion of the Bight of Biafra slave trade. This scenario contrasts
sharply with Dike and Ekejiuba’s own characterization of a trend toward
27
Okoro Kanu stresses Eze Agwu before Akuma was the first Aro to be addressed as
“Eze” as a title rather than a first name (Okoro Kanu 2000:15). Possibly, “Eze” was his
first name but because he turned out to be – in the words of Kanu – a “powerful” and
“accomplished ruler,” the largely acephalous Igbo adopted the name as a title to refer to
a person who exhibited authoritarian power, barring contrary evidence from elsewhere
in Igboland, notably Nri. Scholars are unsure of when such an institution emerged in Nri,
but they generally suggest a date much later than indicated by ninth-century artifacts
suggesting concentration of power in the hands of an individual or individuals. While M.
Angulu Onwuejeogwu asserts that the institution of Eze Nri did not emerge until “the
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,” Thurstan Shaw suggests the end of the
fifteenth century (Onwuejeogwu 1975:49; Shaw 1978:124).
16 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
28
Judith Okely (1996) has reiterated the pitfalls of the nondialectical characterization of
culture contact.
Introduction 17
29
Baier 1980:57–67; A. Cohen 1969, 1971; Curtin 1971b, 1975, 1984; Eades 1993; Lovejoy
1980:28–45; 1982a; Lovejoy and Hogendorn 1979; Meillassoux 1971a; Roberts 1987.
18 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
underpin human existence.30 Thus, this study takes into account, not only
the market mechanisms, but also the geocultural context and implica-
tions of the slave trade.
The Aro diaspora presents a challenge for contemporary Igbo and
Nigerian cultural studies. The settlements are incompatible with the
existing taxonomies of Igbo subcultural areas. Daryll Forde and G.I. Jones
identify five subcultural groups for the Igbo: northern, or Onitsha; south-
ern, or Owerri; western; eastern, or Cross River; and northeastern (Forde
and Jones 1950). This spatial framework has advanced regional cultural
studies, but it is singularly inadequate for understanding the Aro cultural
experience. It restricts Aro settlements to Igboland, whereas many Aro
settlements existed and still exist in non-Igbo areas, such as Idomaland,
Igalaland, and Ibibioland. Inokun in Ibibioland was one of the largest Aro
settlements. Second, the Forde-Jones taxonomy locates the “Aro” in the
eastern or Cross River subgroup where the Aro metropole of Arochukwu
is located, and places Aro diaspora settlements in the cultural categories
of their respective vicinities. This framework implies that Aro settlements
lacked cultural personalities and had completely assimilated into neigh-
boring subcultures. Also, by not applying the Aro cultural category to
these Aro settlements, the taxonomy unwittingly collapses Aro (a group)
with Arochukwu (a place). Perhaps, a more appropriate taxonomy is the
one, advanced by Afigbo, based on interregional variations in the manifes-
tations of pan-Igbo achievement norms. For Afigbo, two distinctive ways
by which rewards and recognition were allocated to individuals sprouted
two subcultures – Igbo-Ọzọ, which emphasized title – taking, prominently
the Ọzọ, and Igbo-Abamaba, which emphasized membership of secret
societies (Afigbo 1991d). The Aro diaspora, like the homeland, clearly falls
into the latter category. Although this taxonomy is based on more mea-
surable criteria and does not claim to embrace all Igbo communities, it
shares the focus in Forde-Jones’s model in “areas” and so places different
Aro settlements in different “culture areas”. In short, the aforementioned
taxonomies ignore the distinctiveness of the Aro. Certainly, the Aro factor
renders futile any attempt to subdivide Igboland into subculture “areas”
and to straitjacket the Aro into being one more Igbo group.
There is a distinction between the terms “Arochukwu” and “Aro,”
and recognizing this distinction is crucial to understanding the Aro.
Arochukwu is a place, and Aro refers to a people and/or their culture
30
Polanyi 1957:245–46; Polanyi et al. 1957b:241; Bohannan and Bohannan 1968:220;
Curtin 1984:14; Ekkehart 1998.
Introduction 19
Perspective
The rise and expansion of the Aro was the key influence that shaped
the character of the Biafra Atlantic slave trade. Aro incursions into the
densely populated Igbo heartland and the establishment there of their
most important settlements in about the mid-eighteenth century coin-
cided with the steady increase observed in the Biafra trade during this
31
For the Ikeji festival, also see K. Ike 1972; C. Okafor 1986:127–28; N. Okoli 1972 and
for masquerading in Igboland, see Nwabueze 1984.
20 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
32
Ndieni is a cluster of several Aro settlements on the northeastern fringes of the Nri-
Awka region in present Anambra State. The rest of Ndieni more or less proliferated from
Ujari and Ndikerionwu (Ndikelionwu) over time. For example, Ndiokwaraeze prolifer-
ated from Ujari when the descendants of Ujari’s founder’s first son Okwareze and their
dependents and clients left Ujari to establish it. Another Ndieni settlement Ndiowuu
proliferated when the descendants of Owuu Mgboro and his people, who had existed as
an appendage of Ndikerionwu, left Ndikerionwu to establish it (see Eni 1973:19–21).
33
Old Calabar adopted Ekpe “as early as the seventeenth century” from the Ekoi (Aye
1967:70).
Introduction 21
34
Fred Cooper (1996) has explicated the interactive approach, distinguishing it from the
comparative method. Sargent (1999) has shown how environmental, economic, and
political change in one place in West Africa could affect other regions.
2
The dramatic rise of the slave trade in the Bight of Biafra during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was remarkable, notwithstanding the
dense population of the region’s hinterland. Of all the captive-exporting
regions of Atlantic Africa, Euro-American buyers had the least incentive to
trade in the Bight of Biafra. Its harbors were apparently the most unpleas-
ant, discouraging Euro-American slavers from building permanent bases.
The mortality rates of captives from the region were significantly higher
than other African regions – 18.3 percent, compared to 10.8 percent
among captives from all other regions combined. In the Americas, Euro-
American slavers got lower prices for captives from Biafra than from
any other African region. The region supplied the largest proportion of
females in a trade that placed a premium on males. During the seventeenth
century, when the proportion of females embarked on African ports was
at its highest, only the Bight of Biafra actually sent more females than
males to the Americas – 50.6 percent as opposed to the African aver-
age of 41.5 percent (Table 6.1). That the region’s slave trade experienced
rapid expansion after 1650 despite the aforementioned impediments is
attributable, at least in part, to its ability to deliver captives quickly and
efficiently during the sugar revolution in the Americas.
The outlines of the process by which the Aro attained dominance of
the inland Bight of Biafra trading system that fed the region’s ports are
clear enough, but linking the process to oscillations in the Biafra Atlantic
trade and working out its basic chronology are another matter.1 The
1
For these outlines, see K. O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990; Ijoma and Njoku 1991; Northrup
1978b; Ukwu 1969:132–36.
22
The Aro in the Atlantic Context 23
2
Dike 1956; Jones 1963; Alagoa 1970, 1971a, 1971b, 1972; 1986.
3
Notable among these exceptions are Alagoa 1970, 1971a, 1971b, 1986; Cookey 1974;
Latham 1973; Lovejoy and Richardson 1997, 1999.
4
On Bonny, Hargreaves 1987; Brass, Alagoa 1964; Opobo, Cookey 1974; New Calabar,
(Elem – Kalabari), Wariboko 1991; and Old Calabar (Calabar), Latham 1973:26–28;
Nair 1972; Noah 1980).
24 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
To the Aro, the captive was both a commodity and a resource within an
institution of slavery. This connection between indigenous African slavery
and the Atlantic slave trade is an important theme of African history. The
question of whether slavery was important in African societies before the
Atlantic slave trade era or whether it resulted from the slave trade itself
has been of particular interest.5 Did the Atlantic slave trade feed on an
entrenched slave system or did slavery emerge because of the trade? Both
sides of the debate agree that the Atlantic slave trade interacted intimately
with indigenous slavery, but any role of preexisting slavery in the devel-
opment of the overseas slave trade – would likely differ from region to
region, according to the extent and spread of slavery.6
The extent of slavery in the Bight of Biafra vis á vis the export slave
trade unfolds from a few pertinent facts of regional history. First, up to
the beginning of the seventeenth century, the coastal city-states were still
fledgling formations. Second, the later large-scale slaveholders of the hin-
terland – Arochukwu, Abo, Asaba, Oguta, and Osomari – were only just
emerging at this time, out of a series of migrations.7 Third, if the theory
that abundant land (relative to population) promoted slavery has any
validity, the case for large-scale slavery in the Bight of Biafra is weak. The
region does not seem to have experienced abundant land at any point in
the last millennium. Localized cases of depopulation resulted from the
Atlantic slave trade, but they were a consequence of the overseas slave
trade rather than a cause of indigenous slavery (Nwokeji 2000a:632–33;
1997c:707–10).8 But none of the foregoing observations in itself proves
the nonexistence of slavery in the Bight of Biafra prior to the Atlantic slave
5
For the first view, see Fage 1969, 1975, 1980; Thornton 1998: chap. 3. The second view is
most closely associated with Davidson 1961, 1971; Rodney 1966, 1967; Inikori 1982b,
1992a, 1994a; Noah 1980:76–77; Thompson 1987. Other scholars have explained the
expansion, not the origin, of slavery in terms of the influence of the Atlantic slave trade
(see M. Klein 1978, 2001:56, 58; Klein and Lovejoy 1979; Lovejoy 1979, 1983, 1989;
Manning 1981, 1982:10; 1990; Meillassoux 1982). Except for Meillassoux, the scholars
in the third category describe nineteenth-century political economies as slave modes of
production.
6
For details, see Nwokeji forthcoming
7
K.O. Dike 1956:25–26; Henderson 1972:41–65; Noah 1980:1–19; Northrup 1978b:45–47;
Ogedengbe 1971; Ohadike 1994:xvi, xviii–xix, 46–48, 49–50; Onwuejeogwu 1987:34;
Oriji 1994:11, Nwokeji 2000a:629–30. As Latham explicitly states, “it is unlikely that
the Efik [of Old Calabar] were owners of many slaves when they were simple fishermen”
(Latham 1973:31). The coastal city-states had also come to depend on slavery by the end
of the eighteenth century, about which period relevant work exists (Hargreaves 1987:87,
91–92, 93, 101; Nair 1972:37).
8
For surplus land as a determinant of slavery, see Nieboer 1900; Hopkins 1973:24–25.
The Aro in the Atlantic Context 25
trade era. Our concern here is not the existence of slavery per se – because
it most likely existed in some form – but the extent to which it was prac-
ticed and its relationship to the export slave trade. The “crucial issue,”
Inikori persuasively argues, “is what the export slave trade [Saharan and
Atlantic] did to the extent and character of slavery in the region” (Inikori
1982b:45; 1992a:127, 130, 157).9 The Atlantic slave trade was however
but one of the factors that shaped domestic slavery in the region.
Slavery does seem to have become widespread by the second half of the
eighteenth century, however. Even if we assume that Olaudah Equiano’s
description of Igboland was based on accounts he garnered from Igbo-
speaking people in the Americas, his references to gifts of slaves and
fines paid in slaves, and to a man’s “family and slaves” sometimes being
“numerous” are instructive (Equiano 1995:37). We also know that a few
of the Aro settlements were founded in the mid-eighteenth century by
men whom Arochukwu slaveholders had enslaved as boys.10 Whereas
the available evidence points to widespread domestic slavery only in the
heyday of the Atlantic slave trade in the region, the question of whether
slavery in Africa aided the development of the Atlantic slave trade is not
as critical as once supposed. First, Africa was only one of many world
regions in which this ancient institution existed, so that its mere existence
cannot satisfactorily explain why the continent supplied slave labor to the
Americas. Second, there is no necessary connection between the extent of
preexisting slavery and the volumes of captives exported. The Bight of
Biafra became one of the most important supply regions, but regions
with well-established preexisting slave regimes – of which the kingdom
of Benin is a prime example – were not necessarily the most important
supply regions (Ekeh 1990:677n). Other reasons consigned Africa to the
role of captive supplier at that point in history.11 In fact, some recent
major studies have avoided altogether the relationship between slavery in
Africa and the Atlantic slave trade, without detracting from their impact
9
See also Ekeh 1990:677n. Cookey believes that slavery existed, but like Thornton
(1998: 86–88) and Kopytoff and Miers (1977) later claimed for all of Africa, he argues
that the slave status “lacked the odium which it subsequently acquired” (Cookey
1974:18).
10
Nevertheless, the initiative of ex-slaves in founding Aro settlements has sometimes been
overstated. Although K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba do this in an attempt to theorize the slave
element as the motive force of Aro dispersal, their own data show that this element was
relevant only in a handful of cases (K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba, 1990:71, 75, 78, 97–98, 99,
120, 176, 206, 217).
11
Curtin 1990, 1993:171–76; Eltis 1993, 2000:57–84; H. Klein 1978:3–8; Menard and
Schwartz 1993; Walvin 1997:24; E. Williams 1944:6–10; Wolf 1982:201–04.
26 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
12
For details of the events described here, see K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990: Ch. 2;
Ijoma 1986c:10–11; Okoro Kanu 2000:10–40. See also Ifemesia 1979:39; G.I. Jones
1963:30–31; Northrup 1978b:34–35.
The Aro in the Atlantic Context 27
never seem keen to dwell on. At the apex of the confederacy were three
confederates – Ezeagwu, Okennachi, and Ibom Isii – which the Aro refer
to as “kindreds” (Figure 2.1). The three confederates comprised uneven
numbers of a grand total of nine inalienable lineage components called
the Ọtụsị, all of which were conceptually equal politically, culturally,
and spiritually. Each of the nine Ọtụsị, in turn, served as an umbrella
for a number of the nineteen Arochukwu lineage-groups (or sections of
them), which the British referred to as “towns,” and Aro themselves as
“villages.”13 The various Aro diaspora settlements were connected to
these units, from which the founders of the respective diaspora settle-
ments were drawn. The heads of the nine Ọtụsị (singular form: Eze Ọtụsị)
constituted Ọkpankpọ, the highest ruling council headed by a troika –
Nna Atọ (Three Fathers) – chaired by Eze Aro (Aro king), who must be
the senior Ọtụsị of his lineage-group cluster or confederate. In effect, Eze
Aro was not an absolute ruler but a committee man.
The resulting confederacy reflected the defeat and marginalization of
the Ibibio. Many, if not most, of the Ibibio would have fled the site, and
those that remained behind would have been subsumed into Igbo and
perhaps Akpa collectivities or lineage-groups because none of the three
confederates or lineage-group clusters was Ibibio dominated. Ezeagwu
was constituted by the descendants, relatives, and associates of Ezeagwu,
said to have been a distant descendant of the legendary pioneer immi-
grant from the Igbo heartland called Ụrụ. Okennachi was constituted by
the relatives, followers, and associates of Nnachi, said to have immigrated
from Ada, a Cross River Igbo group claiming origins in Akunakuna, a
Cross River non-Igbo group to the northeast. Ibom Isii was constituted
by the Akpa group led by Akuma Nnubi. Instead, we see lineage-groups
and lineages claiming Ibibio origins staggered across Arochukwu towns
or villages.
The uneven distribution of the Ọtụsị among the confederates suggests
long-standing power struggles among the component parts. In an ideal
world, the three confederates would have had an equal number of Ọtụsị,
to march the putative equality of the Ọtụsịs and, by extension, the con-
federates. Yet, while Ezeagwu and Okennachi were composed of two and
three Ọtụsị, respectively, Ibom Isii was composed of four. The number of
13
Some of the villages or towns are split between the two Ọtụsị, but parts of the same
village belonged to Ọtụsịs in different “Igbo” confederates – Ezeagwu and Okennachi.
In the case of the “non-Igbo” Ibom Isii, this kind of overlap occurred only within the
confederate.
28
Arochukwu
Okwara Alu
Ezeagwu Okennachi Bianko Amaja Nnakuma Amata Ivejioku
Agwu Akuma
Isimkpu
Amasu
Obinkita Amoba Amankwu Amuvi
Amangwu
Atani Ugwuavo Utughugwu Ugwuakuma Agnagwu Amukwa
14
Many of the details on Aro origins as presented by colonial officials are contained in
NAE ARODIV 20/1/15:Anthropologists Papers on Aro Origin: Discussion and the Basis
of the Widespread of Aro Influence, 1927.
15
For this view, see Latham (1973:26–28); Bentor (1994:79). The genealogies that Mathews
used are so flawed that even Apollos Nwauwa’s rigorous reinterpretation yielded con-
spicuously improbable results. Nwauwa’s chronological charts place the genealogies of
almost all the major characters of Aro formation in the generation 1690–1720 and the
establishment of “many of [Arochukwu’s] constituent villages … in the next genera-
tion (ca. 1720–1750)” (Nwauwa 1990:227, 233–36; 1991:296, 308). This chronology,
which places the foundation of Arochukwu in 1690–1720, is about one century late
and does not correlate Aro expansion with the expansion of the Biafran export slave
30 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
Using the traditions of the Niger Delta corporate kin groups, G.I.
Jones (1963:134) concluded that the Aro oracle, Ibiniukpabi, played a
crucial part in their formation. He attributed the blunderbusses’ element
in Aro traditions of origin to telescoping and places Aro formation at the
period before the mid-seventeenth century. This view is widely accepted.
Still, there have been suggestions that the Aro had been formed by the
early seventeenth century and probably before.16 These suggestions are
realistic, given the uncertainty about the length of the time lag between
the occupation of the Unene region (the Arochukwu area) and the foun-
dation of Arochukwu. If Arochukwu was formed in the early seventeenth
century, the region seems to have been occupied before then, probably
long before.
The chronology of the wider regional history brings early Aro his-
tory into sharper relief. Developments relating to the Middle Belt state of
Kwararafa in particular throw light on Aro origins and political structure,
and on the Biafra trade. The demise of the long troubled state of Kwararafa
dovetailed with the formation of the Aro state. The firearm-bearing Akpa
who intervened in the crisis that produced Arochukwu appear to have rep-
resented advance elements of Kwararafa migrants, in an exodus that had
commenced in the sixteenth century.17 The Kwararafa diaspora groups that
crystallized in the seventeenth century as a result of the centralizing project
of the successor state of Jukun shared a political culture in which power
trade. It places the foundation date of Arondizuogu within 1795–1825 and identifies
two settlements, Amawom and Nkalunta in the western Cross River Igbo area, as the
earliest diaspora settlements, formed in the mid-eighteenth century. If they were the first
diaspora settlements, they would have been established considerably earlier. At any rate,
if the location of these two obscure settlements outside the Igbo heartland would hardly
have generated the high volumes of captive exports observed in the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury. The genealogies from which these chronologies were derived came from families
of relatively recent origins, from whom the British drew the early warrant chiefs. To
legitimate their claim to authority, these individuals impressed on the British that their
lineages began with the establishment of Arochukwu (Ekejiuba 1972a:13n). Fieldwork
and information from local histories provide a better insight into dating Aro expansion
than is available in the colonial texts informed by such traditions.
16
For the first group, see K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:44; Isichei; 1976:6, 58, 76; Oriji
1994. The second group comprises Northrup 1978b:36; Ijoma 1986c:16; Ijoma and
Njoku 1991:204.
17
According to Sargent, the Jukun migrated into the region just north of Cross River region
in c. 1610. “Apa later became known as their homeland” (Sargent 1999:226, 236, 249).
Apa probably refers to the land of the “Akpa,” the group that decisively intervened in
Aro formation. If claims to Akpa origins of a section of the Aro are accurate, the Aro
would have been produced in the same process associated with Kwararafa’s conflict with
Kano and Bornu, as well as resulting migrations and internal conflicts.
The Aro in the Atlantic Context 31
devolved among major blocs in a multiethnic setting. Each bloc was repre-
sented in central administration, as an alternative to the centralized model
of Benin-derived kingdoms of the Middle Belt (Sargent 1999:218–19,
243–51). The multiethnic confederacy the Aro established in the Cross
River basin, described earlier in this chapter, resembled the pre-Jukun
Kwararafa political structure. The Akpa’s reputation as seasoned warriors
and strategists fitted into a culture shaped in the context of the volatile
Benue valley geopolitics associated with Kwararafa’s disintegration.
The notion that Arochukwu was founded in the early seventeenth
century at the latest is also compatible with new evidence regarding the
antiquity of the major slave market at Bende. The Bende market was
organized around the Aro trading network; its major and minor fairs,
respectively, were named after the Aro families Agbagwu and Bianko, so
that evidence of its existence implies Aro trading activity. Indeed, Bende
was thriving by the 1670s. French mariner John Barbot, who made at
least two voyages to the Biafra coast between 1678 and 1682, wrote in
1682 that “There is … a large market for slaves in Belli, a large town
west of Old Calabar inland” (John Barbot 1732:381, emphasis added).
In July 1699, James Barbot and John Grazilhier (1699:109), referred to
a “Bendi” market where 247 bars exchanged for twenty-three captives.
The inland market was, according to them, three or four days away from
the New Calabar port. The descriptions of both “Belli” and “Bendi” fit
into the location of Bende, situated in Cross River Igboland. These obser-
vations were made a century before Mathews’s projected date of Aro
formation – the second half of the eighteenth century.
Although the Bende market was in existence by the 1670s, exactly
when it came into being or when the Aro took control of it is unclear. It
is likely, however, that it would have taken considerable time – perhaps
several decades – between the foundation of Arochukwu and the 1670s,
when the market had attained such a strategic status in the slave trade
that information about developments there reached European traders on
the coast, who never ventured inland. It would likely have taken more
time still between Aro formation and Aro establishment of the market
or Aro control of it and its conversion to a slave mart. Given the forgo-
ing logic, it seems plausible that the Aro came into prominence in the
mid-seventeenth century (Afigbo 1980:87; Ekejiuba 1972a:13). Nothing
suggests that any other group controlled the Bende slave mart before the
Aro. In light of this new information about Bende and other evidence,
blunderbusses are not central to dating Aro formation. Firearms certainly
came into the region well before John Latham’s 1713 date. Guns and
32 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
gunpowder are known to have been imported in the second half of the
seventeenth century: over £1,000 worth of these goods were imported
between 1662 and 1703, and importation may well have begun even ear-
lier.18 Not surprisingly, the blunderbuss that Mathews saw in Arochukwu
was, by his own testimony, of “a primitive type.” It is now clear, based
on the foregoing, that Arochukwu was formed during the early Atlantic
slave trade era in the Bight of Biafra. This event fits into a general pat-
tern of immigration into the region, aimed at taking advantage of the
coastal trade in captives. The contemporaneous formation in the seven-
teenth century of the Niger riverine states – Abo, Oguta, Onitsha, and
Osomari – has been linked to non-Igbo people interested in the slave
trade (K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:56, 57). Indeed, these societies all
came to be deeply involved in the slave trade.
The Aro formation appear to have resulted from three related
developments.
The Atlantic trade provided the incentive for Aro expansion, just as
Aro modes of organization made the expansion possible and enduring.
Aro expansion correlates closely with the rise of the Biafra Atlantic
slave trade. The Biafra trade was in its infancy up to the mid-seventeenth
century, a period for which we lack evidence of Aro expansion (Table 2.1).
Between 1501 and 1650, captives leaving the region’s ports accounted for
only 4.7 percent of captives from all African regions combined. If the
sample of enslaved Biafrans in the Americas that Alonso de Sandoval
recorded in 1627 is anything to go by, the proportion of the Igbo in the
Biafra trade was still small; there was only one captive who was of “Igbo”
origin among fifteen slaves from the Bight of Biafra.19 This indicates that
the slave trade still drew heavily on coastal populations.
18
For gun importation during 1662–1703, see Eltis 2000:300. Latham’s 1713 date seems
to refer to commercial importation, while firearms could have trickled into the region
during more than 150 years of trade with Europeans (Nwauwa 1990:235).
19
De Sandoval ([1627] 1956:94). See also Hair (1967:263n).
The Aro in the Atlantic Context 33
20
John Barbot (1732:381, 383). John Barbot “made at least two voyages to the West coast”
between 1678 and 1682. His A Description was originally written in French in 1682 and
translated into English in 1732 (Donnan 1930:282). While Elizabeth Donnan’s version
implies that Barbot may have made more voyages, Paul Hair, Adam Jones, and Robin
Law pinpoint only 1678–79 and 1681–82. They doubt that Barbot made any further
voyages after 1682 (Hair, Jones, and Law 1992b:ix, xiii). But they conceded that the
John Barbot reference may have been made in connection with the journey of the Griffin
or with that of the Dragon, which apparently made its journey later, in 1699, and which
involved his brother, James Barbot. John Barbot may have borrowed from the journal of
his brother and his mates or may himself have been part of the Dragon’s 1699 trip (Hair,
Jones and Law 1992b:cxlix, lxxiii, xciii).
The Aro in the Atlantic Context 35
demand for captives, even though that demand still was much smaller
than it was to become.
Two demand conditions also influenced the trend observed in export
volumes in the Bight of Biafra before the eighteenth century. The first was
that captives from the Calabars “were not in high favor with the English.”
Discrimination against captives from the Old Calabar, in particular, was
reported in Barbados as early as 1675–76 (see Donnan 1930:108, 205).
They were referred to as “supernumerary Negroes” in 1679 (Stede and
Gascoigne 1679). Reinforcing this negative attitude was what European
sailors in the late seventeenth century described as the turbulence of Old
Calabar waters and its “intemperate air” (John Barbot 1682:300; Van
Nyendael 1702:467–68). “Intemperate air” conspired with malaria and
high mortality to discourage Europeans from establishing a permanent
presence in the region, as they did elsewhere in Atlantic Africa (Thornton
1996:1).
Though significant increase in the Biafra slave trade did not happen
until after 1650, there was some increase during the first half of the
seventeenth century. Out of recorded to have been enslaved 5,278 Africans
who were enslaved in Peru between 1560 and 1650, entries for “Biafra”
and “Caravali” total 682, or nearly 13 percent (see Bowser 1974:40–41).
Indeed, Biafrans “became quite numerous” in Peru between 1610 and
1640 (Thornton 1996:5). The Spaniards at Jamaica and Barbados were
buying captives from the Bight of Biafra as early as the 1660s (see Donnan
1930:108). In about 1668 and about 1693, a total of about 215 cap-
tives from “Callebar” were imported into the island of Bermuda (Bennett
1704:48).21 In 1672, a Royal African Company (RAC) document con-
cerning New and Old Calabar read in part, “whither many ships are sent
to trade [and where] slaves and teeth … are to be had in plenty.”22 Up to
1705, the British were trailing the Dutch, who had “the greatest share”
in the Old Calabar trade (John Barbot 1682:299–300; James Barbot, Jr.
1705:14). In June 1699, James Barbot learned of an English ship com-
manded by one Captain Edwards, who “got his compliments” of 500
captives in three weeks’ time in New Calabar (James Barbot 1699:432).
James Barbot, Jr., claimed to have seen ten or more slave ships in New
Calabar in October 1700 (James Barbot, Jr., 1705:14). In October 1702,
it was expected that there might be too many ships in New Calabar, but
21
Slightly more than a half of the captives were reshipped to North Carolina and
Virginia.
22
See “The Royal African Company, 1672.” See Donnan (1930:193).
36 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
Table 2.2. A Sample of Captive Prices (in Copper Bars) in New Calabar
and Old Calabar, 1678–1704
the situation was much worse again in Old Calabar (see Starke 1702:81).
Prices correspondingly increased, though James Barbot, Jr.’s comment
in December 1705 that New Calabar suppliers “rais’d price of negroes
from 40s.–50s. to £12 or £14” probably reflected short-term phenom-
ena (James Barbot, Jr. 1705:14n) (Table 2.2). Supply had fallen behind
demand, and although the market was still not as tight here as it was else-
where in Atlantic Africa, this trend could indicate a hinterland situation
in which protracted resistance on the part of central Igbo checked captive
supplies before the Aro eventually gained influence in the region.
In spite of increasing prices, probably due in part to fluctuations in the
value of the iron bar, which was in use then as currency, the British Board
of Trade reported in 1709 that, along with the situation at the ports
below the Equator, prices of captives were lowest in the Bight of Biafra,
“from whence the greatest number of Negroes are exported” (Board of
Trade 1709:56–57, 59). The Board of Trade was either behind the times
in its appraisal of the volume of the Bight of Biafra trade or it based its
report on a short-term fluctuation. Relatively smaller numbers of captives
left the region during the first four decades of the eighteenth century.
Shortfalls in supply and competition from independent traders compelled
the RAC to send factors23 “to try if an allyance cannot be made with the
princes of the Country of the Bight, and to learn what sort of Trade may
be carryed on there,” according to an internal report of February 1721
23
A “factor” was a resident trade representative of European companies. The factor oper-
ated out of the company’s “factory” (basically a buying and warehousing structure/build-
ing) or fort as the case may be. The factor was the one in regular contact with African
traders, making deals and purchases on behalf of his company.
The Aro in the Atlantic Context 37
The time during which the slave ships are absent from England, varies according
to the destination of the voyage, and the number of ships they happen to meet
on the coast. To Bonny, or Old and New Calabar, a voyage is fully performed
in about ten months. Those to the Windward and Gold Coasts, are rather
more uncertain, but in general from fifteen to eighteen months. (Falconbridge
1788:11)
Table 2.3. The Volume of the Transatlantic Captive Departures from the
Bight of Biafra and All African Regions Combined, Five-Year Intervals,
1701–1805
for Sierra Leone, 215.9 in Windward Coast, 137.4 in Gold Coast, 145 in
the Bight of Benin, 162.3 in West-Central Africa, and 126.8 in Southeast
Africa (Table 2.4). Only Senegambia records fewer days – 103.7 – but
this figure is misleading and requires an explanation. The Bight of Biafra
consistently posted significantly higher loaded-captives-per-ship num-
bers than Senegambia, and the volume of captives embarked there far
outnumbered those that embarked at Senegambia (Table 2.4).
The relatively short times vessels spent in Senegambia ports reflects
the intention of ships’ crews to spend less time in the region more
than the ports’ capacity to supply captives quickly. Ships departed
Senegambia ports quickly because captives from there had a high
tendency to rebel. According to David Richardson, captives on ships
leaving Senegambia had the highest tendency to revolt of all other
African regions, and ships leaving Senegambia ports were fourteen
The Aro in the Atlantic Context 39
times more likely to experience revolts than those leaving the Bight of
Biafra (Richardson 2001:77). Before the mid-eighteenth century, ships
visiting Senegambia were generally larger than the ones sent to the
Bight of Biafra before mid-century, but they consistently loaded fewer
captives than those that traded in the Bight of Biafra. This means
that ships often left Senegambian ports with either unloaded space
or loaded with other African commodities. Perhaps as a result of this
phenomenon, slavers at mid-century began to send smaller ships to
low-yield Senegambia. The decline in the average tonnage of ships
that traded in Senegambia after mid-century certainly reflected the
decline in the general tonnage of French vessels during the second half
of the century as did the decline in the tonnage of Portuguese vessels,
which became very active in the region after 1790. The average size of
French ships was 258 tons during 1701–50, compared to 238.3 during
1751–1800. This decline was progressive. The average size of French
ships declined from 250.1 during the 1751–1775 quarter to 189.3
during 1776–1800. The decline in the size of Portuguese/Brazilian
ships took similar trajectory and was of an even greater magnitude
during the last quarter of the century when they became more active in
Senegambia, 222.1 tons compared to 342.2 tons in the preceding quar-
ter. This decline was steepest in the 1790s, when the size of Portuguese
ships declined to 146.7 tons from 266.7 tons in the 1781–1790 decade
(Slavevoyages.org).
Incidentally, mid-century witnessed a significant increase in the tonnage
of ships sent to the Bight of Biafra, in response to the region’s high yield
40 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
Table 2.5. Daily Average Number of Captives Loaded Per Vessel, 1701–50
Table 2.6. Daily Average Number of Captives Loaded Per Vessel, 1751–1800
This method is not foolproof for a number of reasons. The daily aver-
age number of captives that were loaded on a vessel at a particular port
depended in part on the total number of vessels that called there. For
example, a port hosting five ships would likely have loaded at faster rate
than when the same port had ten ships competing for the same trade – all
things being equal. While the daily average number of captives loaded
per vessel may not necessarily reflect a port’s actual supply capacity, we
can assume that in the long run the number of ships that called on a
particular port depended largely on its perceived ability to deliver cap-
tives. The daily average number of captives loaded per vessel is a useful,
if imperfect, reflection of the actual rates at which ships loaded captives
at African ports because information about trading conditions in the dif-
ferent ports, including supply capabilities, had become in the eighteenth
42 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
The Eboes [are] a superior race, and the inhabitants, generally, are a fair dealing
people, and much inclined to a friendly traffic with the Europeans, who humor
their peculiarities. Their general honesty, when the loose nature of their laws as
respects Europeans. … The Eboes, tho’ not generally robust, are a well-formed
people, of the middle stature: many of their women are of remarkably symmetri-
cal shape, and if white, would in Europe be deemed beautiful. This race is … of
a more mild and engaging disposition than the other tribes … and though less
suited for the severe manual labor of the field, they are preferred in the West India
colonies for their fidelity and utility, as domestic servants, particularly if taken
young, as they then become the most industrious of any of the tribes taken to the
colonies. (Crow 1830:197–99)
Impressions were mixed, but captives from the Bight of Biafra had
gained wide acceptance by the second half of the eighteenth century, and
possibly, half a century earlier. Although he noted in 1788 that Biafra
captives were “weakly, and more liable to disorders,” Liverpool mer-
chant James Jones (1788:590) considered “the Trade [in Biafra] most
Advantageous … both as to Our Manufacturies and the Number had
from thence.” All this suggests a shift in Euro-American attitudes toward
Biafra captives or, at the very least, that an ever-increasing need for labor
left planters with no choice but to take captives from wherever they
could be found. Some who expressed very negative views of the Igbo
even offered advice on how to make them better slaves. In 1864, physi-
cian and poet James Grainger opined that they needed to be “bought
young” and Edwards recommended “the gentlest and mildest treatment”
(Edwards 1793:74).
The entry of Liverpool merchants and their subsequent takeover of
the trade from their Bristol counterparts in the Bight of Biafra is relevant
to understanding the expansion of trade despite the negative reviews of
44 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
26
See E. Williams (1944:61, 63), Hopkins (1973:96), and Minchinton (1976) for informa-
tive details concerning the Liverpool slave trade.
27
For changes in ship size, see Behrendt 1998:7, 8–9.
The Aro in the Atlantic Context 45
high prices in different regions and over long spells complicates planters’
apparent lukewarm attitude to them.
If increases in volumes of captive exports from the Bight of Biafra
reflected increasing demand for captives, they also manifested greater
organization, on both sides of the Atlantic, to meet the labor needs of
a rapidly expanding plantation complex in the Americas. On the Biafra
coast, the “trust” system of credit had become operative by the 1760s.28
Through this system, European buyers advanced goods to coastal trad-
ers on deferred payment basis, to be repaid in captives. In turn, coastal
traders advanced these goods to the Aro. The rise of the Biafra trade has
been attributed to this peculiar practice, which was made possible by
the operation of the indigenous Ekpe society (Drake 1976:149; Forde
1956:16; Latham 1973:27–28, 35–39; Lovejoy and Richardson 1999).
This institution was important, but like other important factors, it only
partially explains the rise of the region’s trade. Developments in the hin-
terland anchored by Aro organization facilitated the supply of captives to
the coast and justified European credit investment in the region.
28
Cowan (1936:53–54); Latham (1973:27); Hargreaves (1987); Lovejoy and Richardson
(1997, 1999).
46 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
There are now seven large vessels in the river, each of which expects to purchase
500 slaves, and I imagine there was seldom ever known a greater scarcity of
slaves than at present, and these few chiefly from the low country (emphasis
added). The natives [are engaged in a bloody internal conflict]. The river of
late has been very fatal both to whites and blacks. There have three captains
belonging to Bristol died within these few months, besides a number of officers
and sailors …. The major part of the vessels here have very dangerous disorders
amongst the slaves, which makes me rejoice that I have very few on board. I do
not expect that our stay here will exceed eight months. The adjoining coasts
of trade seem all to be very much thronged with shipping … . (reproduced by
G. Williams 1897:535)
The gist of this report is that European buyers went to Old Calabar
with large vessels, and each vessel was to collect as many as 500 captives.
Earlier in 1762, the Liverpool owners of the Marquis of Granby had
sent Captain Ambrose Lace hoping for a “larger than … expected” cargo
of 550 captives (Crosbies and Trafford et al. 1762:486). But the reality
was that captives were becoming comparatively scarce in Old Calabar,
and coastal middlemen calculated their prices based on supply and
demand. European demand at Old Calabar had placed pressure upon
supply, a situation that local rulers sought to exploit sometimes by hiking
the comey. Violent rivalry between two leading factions of Old Calabar
symptomized a structural problem. Old Calabar and European factions
hankered over dwindling supplies of captives (relative to demand) in
a series of messy, complicated, and violent incidents (see G. Williams
1897:535–36). Declining supplies at Old Calabar and increasing supplies
at Bonny as a function of the shifting focus of Aro operations, rather than
Euro-American demand patterns, best explain Bonny’s supersession of
Old Calabar as Biafra’s principal port.
The Aro in the Atlantic Context 49
political alliance to the shift in trade that had become noticeable by the
1750s, since it is unclear when the alliance took effect. The explanation
for Bonny’s rise lies elsewhere.
The relative attractiveness of the ports to overseas buyers was largely
dependent on the ports, supply links with the hinterland, from where
the vast majority of export captives were drawn. The location of Bende
(eastern Igboland), which had been well established since the 1670s, sug-
gests the existence of a trade-route network that crisscrossed Igbo and
the Ibibio countries down to Calabar (Nwokeji 1997a). These routes led
southward to the ports of Bonny and New Calabar and northward into
the Igala and Idoma lands in the Nigerian Middle Belt, probably from
the early eighteenth century and toward the end of the second phase
or beginning of the second phase of Aro expansion. This would partly
have resulted from the policies of the Atta dynasty of the Igala kingdom
of Idah, which came into existence in c. 1687–1717. The Atta dynasty
“turned energetically to the development of slave trading, and became a
major supplier to the Niger River markets and the Aro overland system”
(Sargent 1999:8, 61). Of particular interest are the changes that took
place in trade-routes network. Four north to south routes had emerged
by 1750, according to Afigbo (1987).
The second and third of these routes passed through central Igboland
and headed toward the central Niger delta, and the second route ter-
minated at Bonny. The Niger route was probably the oldest (Afigbo
1987:41). This picture squares with the trends in Biafra Atlantic exports.
The pattern of exports from Old Calabar suggests that the easternmost
route was also older than the central routes; New Calabar was the old-
est port of significance and received most of its trade from the Niger
route closest to it, as did Brass, the westernmost port in the region. As
The Aro in the Atlantic Context 51
Biafra’s easternmost port, Old Calabar, “dealt with the Ibibio along the
lower Cross River” and bought captives from the Aro (Cookey 1974:19).
Whereas the captives sold at Brass included significant numbers of non-
Igbo from farther north, Bonny received its trade principally from the Aro
network (Alagoa 1986:127). It was more practicable to reach the Niger
through the Brass River than through the Bonny River; the Bonny River
was not even a branch of the Niger (Burdo 1880:95; Whitford 1967:159).
Thus, Bonny received its captive supplies almost exclusively from central
Igboland. Its rise as the principal port had to await the development of
the central route. Old Calabar, which superseded New Calabar, received
its trade from the easternmost route via Arochukwu, so that a higher pro-
portion of non-Igbo captives were exported from there than from Bonny
(Nwokeji 2000a:621). The two central routes leading to Bonny through
the Igbo heartland were the new elements in the trade-route system
during the eighteenth century. The Bonny port, which became preeminent
by the mid-eighteenth century, linked these two routes via the major Aro
settlements in the greater upper Imo River area. Thus it is clear that both
internal and external dynamics were linked. The Aro mobilized captives
from the hinterland, and Euro-American traders bought and transported
those captives overseas, underscoring the fact that both internal processes
and external Euro-American circumstances shaped the region’s trade.
Conclusions
This chapter correlates with uncommon specificity changes in coastal
trading activities – in particular the rise of slave exports and shifts in the
relative importance of embarkation ports – not just with external factors
or internal developments confined to coastal trading societies, but also
with changes in inland organization of the slave trade. Aro expansion
into the Igbo heartland and the rise of the Biafra Atlantic slave trade
were linked. Aro incursions, manifested in the establishment of the prin-
cipal Aro diaspora settlements, were both a cause and effect of the Biafra
Atlantic system. The Aro had been trading in the Igbo heartland prior
to the shift in export activity from Old Calabar to Bonny in the mid-
eighteenth century, and their setting up of settlements in the heartland
resulted from the quest to satisfy increasing demand for captives. Trade
with Europeans encouraged Aro forays in the hinterland, which in turn
both increased Biafra’s supply of captives and shifted the thrust of trade
from Old Calabar to Bonny. As the Aro network matured in the Cross
River region, Old Calabar, situated near Arochukwu, became dominant
52 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
The Aro trading complex had not only an Atlantic context but also a
regional political and economic one.1 The Aro created what K. Onwuka
Dike termed a regional “pax” under which large-scale trade flourished in
a multiethnic region, and their operations eased exchange and “brought
rapid impetus to economic expansion” in a region with a multitiered
currency system. Some further argue that the Aro brought stability to the
region.2 It bears noting, however, that the Aro were only one of several
groups in the seventeenth century that resulted from migrations into the
Bight of Biafra to partake in the slave trade. Both Arochukwu and the
Niger riverine states underwent a period of growth and consolidation
throughout the seventeenth century and after. Yet, it was the Aro, rather
than these states or any other groups, who came to dominate the hinter-
land trade. Did the Aro weave their trading network using an organiza-
tion similar to the organizations of other communities in the region or
did they fashion a truly unique model?
That the Aro used an organization based on a fundamentally different
model seems to have been the case. While Abo and Igala established a few
trading outposts, they did not open up new markets for captives per se.
1
For the regional context, see Dike and Ekejiuba 1990; Ekejiuba 1972a, 1972b; Ifemesia
1978:32–37; Ijoma and Njoku 1991; G.I. Jones 1989:34–36; Northrup 1978b; Ofonagoro
1972; Oriji 1981, 1982; S. Ottenberg 1958, 1971:24–27; Stevenson 1968:Ch. 9; Ukwu
1967, 1969.
2
For the first view, see Crowder 1978:65; K.O. Dike 1956:38–39; Ekejiuba 1991:313–14;
Isichei 1976:64 and, for the second, see Grier 1922.
53
54 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
These settlements only dotted the banks of the lower Niger.3 The most
spectacular development of the eighteenth century was the establishment
of Aro settlements virtually everywhere in the region. In fact, the Aro
soon carried their trade into the turfs of some of these immigrant trading
communities and even their parent communities outside Igboland, where
the Aro established settlements, including the main Igala market at Idah
at the northern reaches of the Lower Niger.4 These diaspora settlements
also enabled the Aro to participate actively in the Niger riverine trade.
Thus, they played a vital role in Aro trade, probably accounting for more
than 85 percent of all the captives that resulted from Aro operations
(K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:250). The diasporic character of Aro orga-
nization was the decisive factor in Aro ability to meet the demands of the
expanding Biafra Atlantic trade. Aro settlements coordinated activities
and strongly identified with the metropole.
Aro settlements were more than permanent settlements in the common
sense because their routine contact with, as well as determined cultural
and political fidelity to, the Arochukwu metropole were an essential
feature. As a pivotal element in Aro expansion and the expansion of the
Biafra Atlantic trade, the diaspora phenomenon calls for detailed exami-
nation. Placing Aro settlements in the diaspora context highlights, on
the one hand, the internal relations among Aro groups and, on the other,
their relations with the host communities. In this way, too, we can estab-
lish the process and direction of cultural evolution, the incorporation of
outsiders into Aro groups, and how the Aro system both resembled, and
deviated from, other trade diasporas.
3
These outposts included Akri-Atani, Akri-Uteri, Akri-Ugidi, Nsugbe and Oko See Afigbo
(1977:131), Isichei (1976); K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba (1990:83).
4
For Oguta, see Ofonagoro (1972:89); Isichei (1976:62); Northrup (1978b:130); G.I.
Jones (1989:36). For Igala, see Dike and Ekejiuba (1990:200).
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 55
5
The theoretical and comparative insights in this paragraph are drawn from Curtin
(1975:63–64; 1984:2, 3, 5, 25). See Kea (1982:ch. 2) for an elaboration of a central place
in a different context.
56 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
6
See Umo (n.d.:10); S. Ottenberg (1958:301); Stevenson (1968:204); Dike and Ekejiuba
(1990:196–97); Ijoma and Njoku (1991:305).
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 57
7
Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:197; Ukwu 1967, 1969.
58 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
8
See Umo (n.d.); Igwegbe (1962) and J.G.Okoro (1985) for Arondizuogu; J.C. Nwankwo
(1973) for Ndikerionwu; and Eni (1973:9) for Ujari. Eni claims that Ujari was established
in the 1730s.
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 59
1750. Notably, he observes that this period was “still within the peak
period of the slave trade in West Africa, and the colony was set up as
a convenient base for the collection of slaves” (J.G. Okoro 1985:43).
One calculation from the genealogies collected by colonial officers during
the early twentieth century suggests 1790–1820 (Isichei 1976; Nwauwa
1990). According to this scheme, the Atlantic slave trade was almost over
when the community was founded. This faulty date resulted from gene-
alogies collected among descendants of recent immigrants, who sought
to advance their position within the colonial-era indirect-rule system
whereby the British apparently ruled the people through their traditional
rulers. Clearly, the foundation of the settlement happened considerably
before the late eighteenth century.
Researchers in the Bight of Biafra commonly use thirty years as the
standard for the male generational marker (Nwauwa 1990; Sargent
1999). There should never be a standard to apply to all societies,
except where too little is known to allow for special circumstances and
specific cultural practices that influence the demographic process. Each
society is different, and special circumstances might exacerbate differ-
ences in generational averages among different societies. The thirty-
year paradigm assumes that a male was always the first child and that
first male children (who were not necessarily first born or by the first
wife) all survived. High infant mortality and late marriages on the part
of men ensured that these constants hardly applied to any real situa-
tion. According to an Aro elder, Michael Igwe, “Before a man could
say in those days that he was getting married, he would be up to fifty
years, or at least forty” (M.S. Igwe 1996). His testimony most likely
exaggerates the phenomenon, but it does indicate that early marriages
cannot be assumed. When men eventually did marry, it sometimes took
several years and additional wives before they had male children. The
problem is further complicated by the fact that one can hardly trace
the lines of first sons with consistency. Because Arondizuogu leadership
is based on gerontocracy, rather than promogeniture, there are few
traces left in oral tradition on which one can base the genealogies of
the ruling house on first sons. Reliance on later sons, whose genealo-
gies are nonetheless known, stretches the generational gap even wider.
For example, the following calculation based on the genealogy of the
late Eze, John Dike II, exhibits such a problem. Dike II was one of
his father’s last children, born when Dike Oti would have been well
into his seventies (P. Imo 2003). Given the foregoing demographics,
forty-five years seems a more accurate marker in this case. John Dike
60 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
was born in about 1918 as the son of Dike, and using the forty-five-
year rule, this date puts the hypothetical birth date of Dike Oti at
1873.9 John’s grandfather, Oti Okoronkwo, would have been born
about 1828. Oti’s father, Okoronkwo, would have been born in 1783.
From this, we derive at 1738 birth date for Awa, Izuogu’s second son,
born of Izuogu’s junior wife.10 This would have put Izuogu’s own birth
date in about 1693. As Izuogu seems to have traded in the area for
some time when he founded the settlement, he would have been suf-
ficiently advanced in age, perhaps forty years. This puts the date of the
formation of Arondizuogu at about 1733, with a five-year margin of
error. This range is largely correspondent with genealogies collected
from the pioneer lineage-groups. Izuogu was the great grandson of
Nnachi, the Igbo pioneer of the Aro state.
The intensification of Aro activities in central Igboland that is evident
from the concentration of the major Aro settlements there, starting about
the 1740s, suggests strongly that the trade of these Aro communities was
oriented toward Bonny and New Calabar. Given that this trend was the
most significant element in Bonny’s supersession of Old Calabar (and New
Calabar) during the 1726–50 period, the correlation of these byproducts
of Aro expansion to the expansion of the Biafra Atlantic trade compels
the examination of the mechanisms of Aro expansion.
9
This date is clearly inaccurate, as Dike Oti would have been born about twenty-five years
earlier, but this should be offset by other stages in the genealogy that are shorter than
forty-five years.
10
Awa’s elder brother was Uche born of Izuogu’s senior wife.
11
E.g. J. O. Dike 1996; Obinani 1996; Michael Ike 1995; Kanu-Igbo 1996b; J.G. Okoro
1996; J.O. Okoro 1996.
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 61
Just as individual Aro traders knew, and were expected to respect, the
boundaries of the zones of influence, their non-Aro suppliers knew their
particular Aro men. As one respondent testified:
It was already recognized at home before they came out. Individuals focused
on lines familiar to them. The customers who supplied them with trade goods
already knew their [Aro] men. Aro groups never collided over spheres of influ-
ence. … Nobody would move from the Amankwu team to buy captives being
supplied to the Ujari; nobody from the Ujari team would buy those being sup-
plied to the Amuvi, and so forth. (Kanu-Igbo 1996)
An Aro person from one lineage-group went into another Aro lineage-
group’s area of influence only if sponsored by somebody from the group
wielding influence (Kanu-Igbo 1996; J.O. Okoro 1996). “In those days,
trade through commission agents was part of trade. [Trader A] may find
the price of a commodity unfavorable. [He] then decides to shift it to [his
friend, trader B] to consider if [B] could cope with the price. [Trader B]
may even decide to send it to [trader C]. Buying the commodity did not
give [trader C] the right to trade in [trader A’s] area of trade” (Kanu-Igbo
1996). One Aro tradition from Ihiala in the southern periphery of the
Nri-Awka area relates that an Aro person who scouted for pilgrims to
the shrine or for non-Aro caravans in an area controlled by another Aro
group forfeited the commission accruing from such a transaction (E. Ike
1985). There can be no doubt that the Aro quarreled among themselves
over spheres, but they evidently contained the quarrels sufficiently to pre-
vent such problems from disrupting their activities.
In zoning the region and in forging commercial ties, the Aro capitalized on
their multiethnic origins and the strategic location of their homeland.12
The zoning of spheres directed the various lineage-groups often to
the areas of their ethnic origins. Thus, Arondizuogu, an Amankwu
offshoot, controlled much of the Nri-Awka market. Amankwu, in turn,
Table 3.2. Principal Aro Settlements at the Edge of the Igbo Heartland
12
Dike and Ekejiuba 1990; Ijoma and Njoku 1991:208; G.I. Jones 1989:35; Northrup
1978:48.
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 63
There are nineteen “villages” in Aro-Chukwu. … the Aro “villages” shared out
eastern Nigeria into areas of influence. Arondizuogu’s share was the region from
Uzuakoli to Okigwe up to Akokwa, Uga and the rest of the places. These were the
places that this Amankwu dominated. The people whose area of influence bor-
dered that of Arondizuogu was nde-Ikelionwu, the Ibom people here. The Ibom
and Amankwu peoples knew their areas and one group would not intrude in
another group’s domain. A person from one group went into another group’s area
of influence only through a person of the group responsible for the area. This other
person took a cue from the person that brought him. He could secure trade goods
only through the person that brought him. So, nde-Ikelionwu and Arondizuogu
had a boundary. This was at Ekwuluobia. Nde-Ikelionwu was responsible for
one side, including Umunze and Oka. Arondizuogu had Ekwuluobia up to Unu
(Orlu). The group with which Arondizuogu shared a boundary there was Atani.
Arondizuogu did not go beyond there to buy captives. Arondizuogu people could
only go there through the Atani group. Nde-Owu and Ujari (Ajali) were respon-
sible for the area from Umunze. The Ibom group and nde-Ike also shared the
area. Ajali, Ibom and nde-Ike were all involved in the same place. Arondizuogu
controlled Adazi and Nimo. Nde-Ikelionwu controlled Umuchima, Oko and
other places. The Ajali people had a stake in these places too. Beyond these places
were places like Eziama, Nokpa and others. … The peoples of Ugbo and Amoba
controlled them. (J.O. Okoro 1996)
Obviously, Arochukwu lineage-groups did not carve out large, neat zones,
but respectively controlled small spheres of mostly noncontiguous com-
munities, which were interspersed with communities controlled by other
Aro lineage-groups.
The methods employed by various Aro groups to penetrate the differ-
ent areas depended on local circumstances. One notable local variant –
observed in the Nri-Awka region – saw the Aro planting large settlements
near the peripheries rather than at the core of the high-density areas, as
was done elsewhere. Although major Aro settlements did not pervade the
area, the Aro nonetheless formed lineages in many communities there.13
13
The settlement in Ihiala in southern Nri-Awka was quite substantial (see I.O. Nwankwo
1986). This evidence shows that, contrary to Northrup’s view, Aro settlements do not
64 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
“halt” at the edge of the Nri-Awka region (Northrup 1978b:131, 134–35). For refer-
ences to the Aro settlement in Ihiala, see Onwuejeogwu 1987:40; C. Okafor 1986:126;
Oriji 1994:39–40, 48, 53, 64, 105.
14
Polanyi refers to existence in the port of trade of an apparently private trader, who is in
reality a state trade and/or financial officer (Polanyi 1963:32). In Robin Law’s studies of
Dahomey, which raise the usefulness of analyzing precolonial African economy in terms
of private/state enterprises, it appears that the functions of the Mazi corresponded roughly
to Dahomian “Captain of the Market,” in a foreign land. The latter’s duties “included …
the maintenance of order and the collection of a sales tax on all transactions in the mar-
ket,” and the regulation of the cowry currency and prices (Law 1977, 1978:42–45; Law
1991:51; Law 1996). The rulers of the Malinke and Wolof of Senegambia appointed
lieutenants to supervise trade (Aschcroft-Eason 1997). In the mid-seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries Benin, the king’s traders were called Fiadors – Portuguese for guaran-
tors (see Anonymous Dutch, pp. 50–51; Van Nyendael 1702:434). Falconbridge (1788:8)
reports of “officer boys” in Old Calabar during the second half of the eighteenth century.
In the Congo River emerged the office of the Mafouk, which was “central to the broking
systems in the major states along this coast [and] which had emerged during the slave
trade as the royal official responsible for regulating trade with Europeans; he appointed
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 65
through the Mazi, the Aro king seems to have controlled the conditions
of trade in an era when the Aro council (Ọkpankpọ) probably had not yet
come into existence or was less influential than it later became. The role
of the Mazi as a state office became less important thereafter, although
the freelancing merchants retained the appellation and the term came to
apply to virtually every person of achievement and to all well-born male
elders sometime in the nineteenth century. The period from the eighteenth
century onward was the era of private enterprise.
The ascendancy of private enterprise changed the character of Aro
expansion. It was accompanied by the introduction of violence into the
process. We do not have any evidence that the Aro resorted to violence
before the eighteenth century. The intensifying warfare as groups jos-
tled to take advantage of the slave trade and the need of warring groups
for powerful allies called for the services of Aro merchants who built
and supported alliances as well as initiated conflicts. Aro wars in the
eighteenth century did not involve the entire Aro community; typically
merchant-warlords and their followers were involved.
The merchant-warlords were a motley crowd of successful and
adventurous merchants. Whatever their backgrounds were, there is suf-
ficient evidence to call into question Dike and Ekejiuba’s claim that the
merchant-warlords were “acculturated Aro.” According to them, the
ambitious among the “acculturated Aro”, “excluded from politics at
Arochukwu could find scope for their energies in the various settlements
which the expanding Aro commerce necessitated … In other words,
exclusion from politics at home did not spell doom for the ambitious
individual.” In fact, Dike and Ekejiuba are explicit in stating that such
individuals “were more strongly motivated to pursue risk-taking, and
long-distance trading ventures for their survival in the Aro system than
the prudent and proud elite and the ruling groups.”15 Of course, the
dynamism and risk-taking propensities of certain persons of servile and
recent origins are well-known. These characteristics fed on the fact that
Aro society honored achievement. Many acculturated Aro contributed
the brokers (maekedores) who received the caravans bringing produce from the interior”
(Lynn 1997:64). In the early nineteenth century, they were referred to as “governors”,
whose powers were “great and almost uncontrolled” (Bold 1822:72). At Addamugu,
immediate south of the Niger-Benue confluence, the office of Nufia or “Captain of the
Port” existed by 1841 (see Allen and Thomson 1848a:273). John Adams reports about
“the king’s trader” in Benin (Adams 1832:31). This phenomenon of African trade should
make an interesting study.
15
Dike and Ekejiuba, 1990:71, 75, 78, 97–98, 99.
66 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
Pioneer Aro traders probably shuttled between Arochukwu and their market
destinations. In the process, they built up a chain of rest-houses along the routes.
16
For information about Oti Emesinwa, see Eni 1973. Although Dike and Ekejiuba argue
that the merchant-warlords were often not free- or well-born, elsewhere in their book,
they describe Izuogu, correctly, as the great grandson of Nnachi, “one of the co-founders
of Arochukwu” and argue in apparent contradiction of their thesis that “the population
of Ndizuogu … is made up exclusively of people of Aro extraction [and] those who have
long associated with them” and that the diaspora settlements “freed the Aro nobility
from the strenuous competition for power” (K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:72, 176, 206,
217). They also note that the “Aro saw the need for colonizing strategic routes in the
interests of their trade. Successful Aro traders used their agents[,] who were either sons or
trusted household retainees and lieutenants, to pioneer the new settlements and develop
an intelligence network over the entire region” (K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:120). For
the record, whereas it may be true that the population of Arondizuogu has a higher
proportion of originally Aro people and their long-term associates, the settlement is not
composed “exclusively” of these people. In all probability, up to one-third of present-day
Arondizuogu families trace the origin of their entry into the society in the second half of
the nineteenth century.
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 67
Gradually, the more important of such places developed into trading centers
and finally into Aro settlements. The settlements became launching pads for the
commercial penetration of the Aro into new areas and for the founding of new
settlements, partly through Aro initiative and, partly on the invitation of local
people. It was very common for non-Aro communities to invite the Aro to estab-
lish in their areas in order that they would benefit from Aro trade and protection.
(Ijoma and Njoku 1991:300)
Perhaps [raiders] were incited to this by those traders who brought the European
goods … amongst us. … When a trader wants slaves, he applies to a chief for
them, and tempts him with his wares. It is not extraordinary, if on this occasion
he yields to the temptation with as little firmness, and accepts the price of his
fellow creature’s liberty, with as little reluctance as the enlightened merchant.
Accordingly he falls on his neighbors, and a desperate battle ensures. If he pre-
vails and takes prisoners, he gratifies his avarice by selling them; but, if his party
be vanquished, and he falls into the hands of the enemy, he is put to death; for, as
he has been known to forment their quarrels, it is thought dangerous to let him
survive. (Equiano 1995:40)
In this desperate struggle for survival, the Aro would have been “invited”
by one side or the other, or by both.
Non-Aro communities also welcomed the Aro because of Aro abil-
ity to dispense “justice,” including the removal of categorized persons
to Atlantic slavery (see J.G.C. Allen n.d.:149; Grier 1922:35). Where the
Aro were required to pay rent, it was usually a token amount. The annual
tenancy renewal required the presentation of “kola” in Ngwa communities
in one of the areas with strong Aro presence. In one community, the
“rent” consisted of only two gallons of palm wine, eight manillas, and
one cock (Wamuo 1973). In Ibibioland, the acquisition of land required
a case of drinks, a piece of cloth, a gun, and some salt (J. Udo 1972). The
Aro contracted igba ndu (covenant) with their hosts as an instrument of
68 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
17
For details regarding igba ndu, see Dike and Ekejiuba (1990:118–19, 163, 164, 198–99,
244–45); Ekejiuba 1972c; Ukwu 1969:127, 131–32.
18
See Dike and Ekejiuba 1990; Ijoma 1986c, 1994; Ijoma and Njoku 1991; Northrup
1978b:138; C. Okafor 1986.
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 69
This seems to have been the key deterrence for wars, not that the Aro
made war only on numerically inferior groups instead of such populous
groups as Onitsha, Ogidi and Igbo-Ukwu (Northrup 1978:138–139).
The view that the presence of populations of potential adversaries was
the primary criterion for Aro to make wars gives the impression that
the Aro were war-mongers who would make war on any group except
those strong enough to give them a good fight.19 The Aro resorted to
wars in central Igboland despite strong opposition from populous societ-
ies, including the Nri during the nineteenth century (Chapter 7). There
were other reasons the Aro did not make war on certain groups, whether
large or small. In the first instance, the Aro would have seen little pur-
pose in making war upon communities with whom they enjoyed peaceful
relations. Besides, speculating on the size of the communities which the
Aro did not make war against runs the risk of anachronism: present-
day populations are not always an accurate measure of the historical
strengths of societies. Wars had severe impact on many communities, and
subsequent demographic developments have been uneven. Some societies
gained from immigration out of devastated areas, while others lost out in
the same process (Nwokeji 2000a). In one extreme case, Ora, in the vicin-
ity of Arondizuogu, was completely destroyed during the establishment
of the Aro settlement. Present-day population densities reflect, in part, the
effect, rather than the cause, of wars. Rather than being a deterrent, the
presence of numerically strong groups could have been the very cause of
the conflicts in the region.
If the size of potential foes was not necessarily a determinant of Aro
invasions, we are still left to explain why warfare prevailed during the
mid-eighteenth-century establishment of the principal Aro settlements in
the greater upper Imo/Nri-Awka region. The resort to warfare was more
likely a consequence of the tighter land-tenure rules that were a corol-
lary of population pressure in the area and that anthropologist Thurstan
Shaw attributes to “the antiquity and effectiveness of yam cultivation and
the exploitation of the oil palm.”20 The quest for space would likely have
increased levels of intransigence in the preexisting societies and led to the
breakdown of diplomatic alternatives. The situation was probably helped
by Aro’s determination to establish themselves strongly in a region that
had great potential for them; Aro incursions into the heartland were, in
the first instance, a function of the search for captives, and as has been
19
For such a suggestion, see Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:75; 164, 166–67, 177–79; 208.
20
Cited by Ohadike 1994:2. See also Nwokeji 2000a: 632.
70 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
already mentioned, they met with some resistance. This point is impor-
tant because in pursuing their interests, the Aro generally preferred peace
to war. They made war part of their overall strategy in order to dominate
trade.
The wars of this period are well documented in Aro historiography.21
With the use of armed force, each of the principal Aro settlements
destroyed or subdued the most important power in its immediate
neighborhood. The most spectacular example was Izuogu’s destruc-
tion of Ora, east of the upper Imo River, in one of the severest acts
of violence committed during the Atlantic slave trade era. “What hap-
pened to Ikpa-Ora had no parallel in this part of the world. The people
were massacred and the entire population was wiped out. The ter-
ritory was plundered and completely laid waste. [The land has] ever
since, remained desolate … The territory became known as ‘the land of
blood’ ” (J.G. Okoro 1985:24). The complete destruction of Ora does
not seem to have been necessary for the establishment of Arondizuogu
because Arondizuogu was sited thirty kilometers west of the Imo and
about forty kilometers west of Ora. Nevertheless, the massacre instilled
fear into the communities of the upper Imo River region, leaving them
with “awful expectations” (J.G. Okoro 1985:25). Mobilizing warriors
for this purpose from the Cross River Igbo community Ohafia was easy
for Izuogu, in part, because his mother came from there. The Ohafia
people therefore intervened in favor of their nwadiana (child of a local
woman married to an outside man).22 Conflicts among the preexisting
communities also worked in Izuogu’s favor. These conflicts gave him
opportunities to increase his influence over the communities. Acting as
a broker for the warring groups increased his access to captives, receiv-
ing some as gifts from leaders who sought to maintain friendly relations
with him and buying war captives from their captors.23 The traditions
of Uruala to the southwest of Arondizuogu report that at one time all
21
Dike and Ekejiuba 1990; Igwegbe 1962; C. Okafor 1986:121–122; J.G. Okoro 1985.
22
Igwegbe 1962; C. Okoli 1986:121–22; J.G. Okoro 1985:23–24.
23
Izuogu is said to have attacked Ora because Ora rejected Izuogu’s demand for a tribute
of 400 captives (see K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:177). Traditions relate that Okoli
Ijoma’s forces displaced the present Ugwuoba on the Mamu River from their original
site around Enugwu-Ukwu, some sixty kilometers to the south (see Agu 1985). Although
Veronica Agu bases her thesis on traditions collected mainly in Awka, I found corobo-
rating evidence in a colonial-era intelligence report, which noted that Ugwuoba (and
Amsim) “acknowledge no relationship at all” with the rest of Mbasato-Awka, Amawbia,
Ebenebe, Nawgu, Nibo and Nise. See NAE MILGOV – 13/1/17: Mbanasataw-Awka
Division, 1936.
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 71
24
NAE 81/27 – OKIDIST 4/9/70:Anthropological Report of Aros of Ndizuogu and
Others,” 31 March 1927.
72 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
You kept the person as your slave. You brought the person up. When the person
grew up and he was a good person, you got a wife for him and he had children. …
After the slave had married and prospered, he could begin to buy his own slaves,
and people continued to multiply. In turn, the persons he bought replicated the
same pattern. What was important is that people recognized the person under
whom they were (J.O. Okoro 1996).
25
For the various estimates, see Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:206, 217; J.O. Dike 1996; M.S.
Igwe 1996; T.O. Okereke 1996; Ufere 1996.
26
Emeruwa 1992; C. Eze 1987; G.C. Mmeregini 1978; I.O. Nwankwo 1986; J.C. Nwankwo
1973.
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 73
Medicine men prepared Oda to arrest infant mortality and other forms
of premature death.
The practical utility of the compulsive acquisition of people is hard
to fathom at first. Anthropologist Claude Meillassoux’s view that
the channeling of surplus exclusively to reproduction in precolonial
African societies meant the “destruction of surplus” might suggest that
the Aro penchant for accumulating people was counterproductive and
could not have advanced their trade. Reproduction was in fact a form
of reinvestment; it entailed such forms of “social insurance” as the
accumulation of women; “conspicuous consumption [and] redistribu-
tion as gifts.”27 The broad conceptualization of capital as being any
resource for future wealth, and not in the restrictive sense of build-
ings, machinery, and so forth, as has been noted in the West-Central
African case, was held by the Aro as well.28 In a slave-trading group, an
increase in population meant an increase in the pool of slave dealers.
Partial exogamy carried practical advantages. The marrying of non-
Aro women and barely marrying out Aro women, not only aided popu-
lation increase, but also facilitated the acquisition of the languages
and dialects of the groups the Aro wives came from. These “mistresses
of language” imparted the necessary linguistic proficiencies to their
young Aro children (Umo [1947?] n.d.:18). Some nineteenth-century
European visitors to the Biafra hinterland believed that the Aro spoke
virtually all the languages in the region (e.g., Baikie 1856:319–40;
Burdo 1880:159). In fact, like traders from other trading groups in
the region, the Aro trader was often bilingual or multilingual depend-
ing on the range of his operations (Afigbo 1981a:20). The enormity of
the pool of languages the Aro commanded reflected the range of Aro
operations and their incorporation of outsiders, especially women. The
wives of Aro traders sometimes accompanied their husbands on trad-
ing tours. “The wives helped to supervise their husband’s food, [and
looked] after the currency and trade goods. They took care of very
young slaves between ages … one and five while they traveled from the
market to the settlements” (Ekejiuba 1972a:18). Thus, the Aro chan-
neling of surplus to reproduction was not destructive.
The measure of Aro affluence went beyond the number of slaves one
owned or wives one had: it was the total number of dependents, includ-
ing slaves, ex-slave clients, and all kinds of immigrants that one brought
27
Meillassoux cited by Coquery-Vidrovitch and Lovejoy 1985b:14.
28
See Miller 1988:42–43 for West-Central Africa.
74 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
into the society. The successes of one’s dependents in both trade and the
acquisition of people enhanced one’s status. Having many slaves was
esteemed, but it was even better to have many dependents who were
themselves prosperous with many dependents of their own. Dependents
of one’s (ex-)dependents were deemed to be as advantageous, ultimately,
as one’s dependents within the Aro hierarchical order. This was the key to
the accelerated manumission embedded in the Aro slave system. The idea
that a slave system could be based on accelerated manumission sounds
contradictory, but the Aro slave system did in fact draw strength and
sustenance from manumission. This is obviously what one source has
referred to as “seemingly contradictory organizing principles of hierarchy
and incorporation” (K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:56, 264–65). In not-
ing the transcendence of slave status in the Biafra region, another source
notes:”[t]he designation ‘slave’ could be little more than a sign of origin
and association with the commercial firm of the slave’s original master.
Once slaves had assumed … independence and an effective social free-
dom that placed them in the class of slave owners, emancipation had
effectively taken place. Here was a system that promoted slaves as a
means of securing strict loyalty and dependence” (Lovejoy 1983:180).
The Aro system typifies this model.
The imaginary and real benefits of having many (ex-)dependents
encouraged Aro communities to welcome the refugees that vio-
lence and famine produced, particularly in the Nri-Awka region.
Established members of Aro society often gave asylum to economic
and political refugees from other communities, but on the condition
of dependency. These refugees boosted the sizes of Aro communities.
The refugee factor is so strong that one of my respondents emphasized
that most immigrants to Arondizuogu were refugees from war-torn
communities of the Nri-Awka region (Nwokoye-Emesuo 1996).
This phenomenon seems to have been particularly acute during the
period from the second quarter of the eighteenth century to the end
of the nineteenth. The most dramatic case uncovered by the pres-
ent writer during 1995–96 fieldwork concerns Owa, an erstwhile
community once located by the Agulu Lake in the Nri-Awka region.
Refugees from Owa poured into Arondizuogu, the largest Aro set-
tlement, when an alliance of Owa’s four neighbors sacked it dur-
ing the mid-nineteenth century and divided up its territory among
themselves (Maduadichie 1996). Owa has a place in Arondizuogu
folklore only because of this tragic event and because it was the
ancestral home to many people in Arondizuogu, most of whom are
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 75
Relevant Institutions
Aro dominance of the hinterland slave trade rested on identifiable insti-
tutions. These institutions defined the means and ways of relating to the
non-Aro, the community’s modes of expansion, the settlement of civil
disputes, and rules of credit, among other functions. Chapter 4 offers a
detailed description of linkage institutions that were focused on inter-
nal Aro relations; here, it is more useful to examine the institutions that
directly promoted Aro influence over the non-Aro because they played a
central role in Aro expansion. Such institutions often had political over-
tones, so that even when they were geared primarily toward intra-Aro
relations, they were ultimately a means of dealing with the non-Aro. The
Arochukwu metropole alone sponsored these institutions in its capacity as
the “central place” in the diaspora: they were the Ọkpankpọ (Aro central
council), the Ibiniukpabi oracle, and the Ekpe/Okonko confraternity.
The Aro central council, Ọkpankpọ, the highest level of authority in
the Aro system, was the main institution by which the Aro counteracted
fissioning. Ọkpankpọ maintained “a structured control of Aro bands in
pursuit of military, political and social exploits in South-Eastern Nigeria”
(P.C. Dike 1986:15).30 The centralizing function of Ọkpankpọ was evident
29
This dimension excited my curiosity about Owa. I had assumed that it must have been
an existing small and obscure community, but then I wondered how such a small com-
munity could have supplied the large number of people predicted by the frequency with
which late twentieth-century Arondizuogu families trace their origin there. When I
sought further information and planned to visit the community, I was jarred to learn that
it no longer existed. See further details in Chapter 6.
30
Afigbo 1971b:32; Dike and Ekejiuba 1990; Ijoma 1986c:22–24; Lovejoy and Hogendorn
1979:230.
76 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
31
Although they do not mention the word “state,” Lovejoy and Hogendorn (1979:230)
imply this when they note that one of the functions of Okpankpo was to punish those
merchants who violated the zoning system.
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 77
32
Cookey 1974; Mathews 1922:8; Ofonagoro 1972:76, 88.
33
P.C. Dike 1986:15). The use of Nsibiri, the Ekpe language (see Amankulor and Okafor
1988:40–43; K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:77, 142, 287–88.
78 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
34
Membership of the society is the route to the Nsibiri script, the knowledge of which will
enrich our understanding of the history of the Bight of Biafra. The problem is that Ekpe
membership prohibits a member from revealing the Nsibiri and other secrets.
35
The joint origin of the two institutions is implied by Lovejoy and Richardson 1999,
although they seem to suggest that this was in the eighteenth century.
36
For Old Calabar, see Noah 1980:30 and for the Aro, see Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:40,
58, 287.
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 79
interviewed in 1972, the Aro gave the Ekpe to certain Ibibio communities.
In return, the community gave the Aro “very many slaves” among other
gifts (U.U. Obong 1972). One such community became famous for Ekpe
and assumed the name Ikot Ibit Ekpe.
The possibility that the society diffused to the Aro independently of
other Cross River groups seems more promising. It has recently been
argued, based on fieldwork among coastal Cameroonians, that Cross
River cultures were enriched by institutions and practices brought by
slaves from the grassfields in the north, which “occasionally gave rise
to a new cult agency” that their masters “adapted to existing ideas and
needs in the forest” (Röschenthaler 2006: 73 n5, 87). Precisely which
society/societies the institution diffused from or when are unclear, but the
Jukun is among those mentioned. If slaves could disseminate this culture
among coastal Cameroonians, nonslave migrants from the north could
also have bequeathed the cult to their host societies. The powerful Akpa
from the north – who, as suggested in Chapter 2, probably derived from
Jukun-related groups – may already have adopted the society at the time
of their arrival at Arochukwu in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth
century, independent of the Efik and other Cross River groups, and were
thus well placed to introduce the cult to other Aro groups. Ekpe or Ekpe-
like societies may have existed among the Jukun and other Middle Belt
peoples of present-day Nigeria and Cameroon before the Atlantic slave
trade era; however, it seems that this cult crystallized in the forest region
of the Bight of Biafra when the trade was already underway.
Other strategies aided Aro expansion as well, not least of which was
the structure and organization of the market. The Aro rotated the fairs
between Bende and Uburu to foster rivalry between the two groups over
Aro patronage. This strategy enabled the Aro to maximize its advantages
and maintain control of hinterland commerce (see Ekejiuba 1972a, 1972b;
Ukwu 1969:135). The four-day fairs were spaced so that each had a cycle of
twenty-four days. This system facilitated the participation of suppliers from
different parts of the region. Strategically interspersed between the fair sites,
Aro diaspora settlements were useful to passing traders from different parts
of the region. “The trading settlements … became ‘free cities’ to which all
who wished to ‘traffic and exchange’ safely repaired, international courts
where individuals and clans in conflict sought justice from the undisputed
authority of the Oracle” (K.O. Dike 1956:39, 45). As hubs of commercial
transactions, the Aro diaspora communities provide a framework for under-
standing precolonial urbanization. Although some hinterland groups, such
as the Awka and the Nkwere, had participated in long-distance trade, Aro
80 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
Conclusion
To understand expanding trade in the eighteenth century, it is best to see Aro
organization in conjunction with other factors at play in central Igboland.
In the Nri-Awka region, for example, the impetus for enslavement was a
pressure on resources. High population densities in the region had since the
time of ancient Igbo-Ukwu been the cause of migrations into less populated
areas, such as the west Niger and northern Igboland.37 Centuries of inten-
sive agriculture seem to have exhausted the soil. Aro traditions regarding
the peopling of central Igbo Aro settlements refer frequently to famine in
the Nri-Awka region. And warfare, which was a constant experience from
the seventeenth century onward, contributed to slaving there as well.38
In spite of Aro’s role as slaveholders who created institutions that
facilitated the slave trade and sometimes employed coercion and vio-
lence in their dealings with the non-Aro, there is hardly any evidence
of a widespread non-Aro perception that the Aro were exploiters. The
Aro were virtually immune from molestation. This is probably because
they contracted kinship networks across the region and, perhaps more
importantly, because Aro interests were linked closely to those of the
influential groups and individuals in other societies. Non-Aro consum-
ers needed the foreign goods that the Aro supplied, and individuals and
groups needed the Aro in their struggles among one another over political
power and economic opportunities. Moreover, the Aro committed their
allies to igba ndu (covenant), which deterred the allies from delinquency
and apparently justified Aro retribution in the event of a breach of the
covenant, saving the Aro from the odium of being perceived as bullies or
37
Afigbo 1981a, 1981b, 1987; G.I. Jones 1963:30; Ohadike 1984.
38
For references to famine in the Nri-Awka area, see M.S Igwe 1996; Kanu-Igbo 1996a; C.
Okoli 1996; G.N. Okoli 1996. For warfare in the region, see Agu 1985; Amaechi 1987;
E.O. Okafor 1978; Nkeokelonye 2005:129–31, 181–221.
The Trade Diaspora in Regional Context 81
1
For this view, see Afigbo (1991c: 1–2); Dike and Ekejiuba (1990:161–90); Ekejiuba
(1991); Ijoma and Njoku (1991).
82
Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier 83
of the Aro, and the “Aroization” of the non-Aro.2 Thus, Aro expansion
involved trade as much as it involved culture.
The massive incorporation of outsiders into Aro society had implications
for culture formation in a manner that was perhaps more intense,
or at least different from, what was the norm in, other trade diaspo-
ras. Arondizuogu, the largest Aro diaspora settlement, epitomized the
incorporation of large numbers of non-Aro groups and the development
of a frontier culture during a period of expansion and decline of the slave
trade and the unprecedented proliferation of Aro diaspora settlements.
Aro tendency to incorporate outsiders was most marked in Arondizuogu
(Bentor 1994:120). This settlement offers a useful case study for under-
standing cultural formation in the Aro diaspora and the role of the Aro
diaspora in the expansion of the Biafra Atlantic slave trade.
The problem of locating all of the Aro within existing taxonomies of
Igbo subgroups (Chapter 1), calls for a framework that accounts for both
the complexities of locating the Aro culturally and the major cultural
influences in the Aro diaspora. Although the immediate cultural envi-
ronment had an impact, Arondizuogu culture developed more from the
interaction of the dominant Aro ethos, the cultural input of persons who
came into the society through slavery, voluntary immigration, and, least
of all, the influence of preexisting groups in the immediate neighborhood
of Arondizuogu. Most of the immigrants came from the Nri-Awka region.
While resembling Aro ways in some critical respects, Arondizuogu cul-
tural formation also reflected migrant and slave origins of the group.
Distinguishing between the historical Arochukwu in which the founders
of the settlements originated and present-day Arochukwu is a prerequisite
for any comparison of the latter and the Aro diaspora. The Arochukwu
state was less than 300 years old in the 1730s when the first major settle-
ments were founded Arochukwu institutions continued to evolve thereaf-
ter. In the frontier environment of the new settlements, some Arochukwu
customs became anachronistic and gave way to cultural forms that were
attuned to the new realities. By historically examining cultural exchange
involving the Aro and other Igbo and non-Igbo groups, we are able to
distinguish what actually happened from what might seem apparent to
the twentieth-century observer. While the Aro in the Igbo-speaking areas,
such as Arondizuogu, have identified themselves as Igbo since the twenti-
eth century, they desisted from identifying themselves with any particular
ethnic group in the region during the period of study. They settled among
2
Eli Bentor (1994) also uses the concept of Aroization.
84 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
all groups, and consciously promoted a distinct identity and cultural per-
sonality. This strategy was characteristic of trade diasporas, which begin
and take shape in frontier situations.
The use of the frontier concept to characterize relationships among
African groups has gradually gained ground in the past half century.3
While anthropologist Igor Kopytoff’s insight that frontiersmen “came to
the frontier with a mental model of what constitutes a good society” is
helpful in understanding the Aro experience, his argument that merely
“cultural and sociological” reasons drove frontier formation in Africa is
less persuasive. According to him, the frontier continually shifted outward
as the more established sections of society became “corrupted” (Kopytoff
1987b:13, 17–18). This essentialist model – metropolitan culture mon-
gers immune from instrumental and structural concerns – is inadequate
for understanding the Aro frontier. Among the Aro of the upper Imo
River, it was not just a commitment to culture that determined the evolu-
tion of the new culture; it was also outside influences, not least of which
were the consequences of the Atlantic slave trade. The outward growth of
the frontier was a product of people’s quest for living space, personal and
group freedom, and economic opportunities, principally trade. Toward
the end of the nineteenth century, the economic impetus for extending the
frontier began to also include the quest for agricultural land (Chapter 7).
The forces that conditioned the Aro frontier culture included the new
environment, the cultural packages that immigrants both from the metro-
pole and other backgrounds brought, as well as the influence of neigh-
bors of the Aro. The Aro did not meet a terra incognita in the diaspora
upon which to impress their “mental model”; instead, they encountered
terrains with robust social organizations adapted to these terrains.
3
De Gregori (1969); Kopytoff (1987a); V.B. Thompson (1995). For the use of “slaving
frontier” to refer to the innermost reaches of Atlantic slaving operations, see Miller
(1988:148–53); Neumark (1957); Lovejoy and Richardson (1997:3). Slaving frontier has
served to describe relationships involving slave-using and slave-supplying societies in the
Upper Nile region (James 1988:148–53).
Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier 85
Much of the “Sylvan wealth throughout the area and … the number of
iroko trees” survived to impress Mayne. The Umualoma people of the
“Isu” group, who largely inhabited the area, were the custodians of this
wealth. The many raphia palm trees (Raphia vinifera) in the area provided
them with plenty of wine (as did oil palm) and the bamboo thatch they
made their roofs with. The tradition of tapping palm wine was still strong
4
To the east, northeast and south – east were what are presently referred to as the Otanchara
and Otanzu groups, both of which straddled the upper Imo. Umuobom was located to
the south of the area that Arondizuogu settled initially – 30 kilometers west of the Imo.
Finally, the communities collectively called Mbanasaa (Seven Towns) were located to the
west through the north, but, unfortunately, data are scantiest on the older of these com-
munities – Isuokpu (now Umualoma), Uzii, Osina, and Umuobom. Arondizuogu Aro
referred to neighboring communities generically as “Isu”, but this term seems to have
acquired a pejorative quality at some point. A colonial anthropological officer suggested
in 1927 that this derogatory term “may have acquired some such meaning as ‘peasant’.”
See NAE 6/1927A – CSE 1/12/1:Anthropological Officer, Owerri, to District Officer,
Okigwe, 23 February 1927. Theses dealing with “Isu” groups include Alaka 1984; M.M.
Anaedobe 1977; S.O. Eke 1978; F.N. Egbo 1987; P.N. Ogbuozobe 1986; U.E. Ohaegbu
1991; J.C. Okoli 1977; Onyenkpa 1981; Onyiuka 1983; S.I. Uche 1988; C.O. Udeagha
1978; N.N. Udeagha 1980; A.E. Udueze 1982; C.S. Umeh 1984; P.N. Uwazuruike 1987;
Nnolim 2007.
5
The traditions from these groups that I have seen show the same trend (e.g., Alaka 1984;
Ipere 1983; Ihimnaegbu 1986; Uwazuruike 1987). The 1930s intelligence report dealing
with the “Nkalu” clan (including Akpuru, Obodo – Ukwu, Osina, Uzii, Uruala) reported
that “the Nkalu claims to have been where it is now since the beginning of time” (Heslop
1936?:11).
86 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
in Umualoma in the late twentieth century. The rich vegetation also con-
tained such semi-domesticated edible plants as castor oil beans (Ricinus
communis); breadfruit ([artocarpus?] Treculia africana); ube (Dacryoides
edulis); starapple (Chrysophylum albidum); uchakiri (Vitex doniana),
and oil bean (Penthacclettara macrophylla). There were also edible
wild vegetables, fruits, and spices, such as uturukpam (Pterocarpous
mildbraedi); uziza (Piper guineense); utazi (Gongronema ratifolium);
okazi (Gnetum africanum); utu (Landolphia owariensis); mkpodu
(Napolenaea imperilis); oil palm (Elais guineensis), and more.6
Animal husbandry has considerable antiquity in the Igbo heartland.
Oral traditions of the upper Imo valley mention the abundance of domes-
tic animals, a phenomenon that goes back at least to the eighteenth cen-
tury. Writing about mid-eighteenth-century Igboland, both Oldendorp and
Olaudah Equiano give the impression that domestic animals were abun-
dant among the Igbo. Equiano’s account is consistent with the oral tradi-
tions from central Igbo communities. According Equiano, the “manner of
living is entirely plain … bullocks, goats, and poultry supply the greatest
part of their food. These constitute likewise the principal wealth of the
country, and the chief articles of commerce.” They lived with the relative
abundance of agricultural products and poultry (Equiano 1995:35, 36).7
The share-raising of domestic animals, such as goats, dogs, chicken,
and ducks, seems to have become a common part of their social orga-
nization.8 There is, however, no conclusive evidence indicating when it
6
These botanical names are variously from A.O. Anya (1982), Basden (1912) and B.N.
Okigbo (1980). I have presented the Igbo and botanical terms where the English translation
of any plant is unknown. Zac O. Gile, n.d. “Indigenous and Adapted African Vegetables”,
International Society for Horticultural Science. http://www.actahort.org/members/
showpdf?session=7671 (also see Igbokwe 2001; J. Okafor 1999; and E.C. Okeke 2009).
7
Relying on enslaved the Igbo in the Americas, Oldendorp was not specific regarding the
part of Igboland he was referring to (Oldendorp 2000: ms. 431). The local studies include
Maduagwu n.d.; Anaedobe 1977; J.C. okoli 1977; N.N. Udeagha 1980; Udueze 1982;
C.S. Umeh 1984; Ogbuozobe 1986; Egbo 1987; C.O. Udeagha 1987; Uwazuruike 1987;
S.I. Uche 1988; Onyekwelu 2001:2; Nnolim 2007. The academic theses among these
sources are all accompanied by transcripts of the oral traditions the authors collected, so
I was able to read the testimonies myself and not rely only on the interpretations these
scholars offered.
8
S.U. Uche (1988:18). Share-raising was a form of accumulation, which is how the prin-
cipal character in Achebe Things Fall Apart, wealthy Okonkwo, got his start in life. It
involves an owner giving a female baby animal to another person to raise, so that the
owner and the keeper shared the expected offspring that the animal would begin to bear
upon maturity. The offspring were shared equally – compensating the owner for his prop-
erty and rewarding the other party for their effort in raising the parent animal. If the
number of any set was odd, the person who had the smaller share would make it up
Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier 87
during the sharing of the next set of siblings. The sharing lasts the entire child-bearing
duration of the animal. Share raising gave the wealthy both help with raising animals
and an opportunity to forge and promote social ties. Sometimes, the animals were given
to very young children, even babies, who could not themselves look after the animals, in
expectation that their parents would raise the animals.
9
One Akokwa scholar has been suggested that slavery existed among the people before
the Atlantic slave trade (S.U. Uche 1988:29). This is improbable, given that the tradition
of origin of this society accepted by this and other scholars indicate that Akokwa was
founded between the early and mid-eighteenth century, long after the Atlantic slave trade
had begun. It does, however, suggest that slavery likely existed among the older preex-
isting groups of the region. It is perhaps also an indication that slaving for the Atlantic
market began effectively in Akokwa after the arrival of Arondizuogu.
10
The tapper went round the trees routinely three times in a day – at dawn, in the early
afternoon, and just before dusk. Each time, he opened up more stem for wine. During
the dawn and dusk visits, he also took away the wine that percolated into the calabash.
This professional group had been well established among the people that later became
Arochukwu. The Ujari lineage-group is said to have descended from professional win-
etappers (see K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:60). For a contemporary description of palm
wine, see Equiano (1995:37).
88 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
usually his discretion. The owner of the palm wine tree received the pro-
duce on two days (Eke and Oye) of the four-day market cycle (izu) while
the tapper took the wine on the other two (Awho and Nkwo).11 While
wine owners could afford to consume their wine and serve it to guests
and workers, the tapper could not afford to consume all product of his
labor and would have to dispose of the surplus. John Barbot reported as
early as the 1680s that palm wine, of which there was a “great plenty,”
was one of the commodities the Igbo supplied to the coastal peoples
(John Barbot 1732:461). This means that by 1866, when W.E. Carew of
the Church Missionary Society (CMS) reported the abundance of palm
wine in a lower Imo River market, the commercialization of the product
was already centuries old in the region.12
As an integral part of the Igbo heartland, the preexisting groups
had long practiced settled agriculture, cultivating such crops as cow-
pea (Vigna unguiculata), cococoyam (Colocassia) benniseed (Sesamum
Indicum), corn (Zea mays), and white yam (Dioscorea rotundata).13
Land use practices before the slave trade era are still unclear, but
British colonial officer Heslop, perhaps surmising from oral traditions,
observed in the 1930s: “When there was still primeval forest, it was
customary that any man farming on the verge of the forest had the right
to reclaim part of the forest bordering on his farm” (Heslop 1936:9).
Heslop intended to portray a situation of resource abundance, but his
comment about the reclamation of virgin forest actually suggests that
there was increasing pressure on resources. By the late seventeenth cen-
tury, as new groups began to arrive in the greater upper Imo, the period
of abundance seems to have begun to give way to a period of greater
scarcity and intergroup competition for resources. The ecology of the
region seems to have been a “pull” factor for streams of migrants. When
the Izuogu established a trading center on the elevation in the contested
zone, interfacing Umuobom, Uzii and Isuopku, and Akokwa, sometime
in the 1730s, (Table 4.1) the Aro were not the only group migrating to
11
There is a tendency to translate izu as “native week” or “Igbo week,” but this is an
awkward and even misleading translation. The two units – izu and week – are incom-
mensurate. The four-day izu has the following cycle: Eke, Oye, Afo and Nkwo. Baikie
(1856:316) records this incorrectly as Eke, Oye, Nkwo and Afo.
12
The Carew report is cited by Isichei (1976:66). Writing about Akokwa before the advent
of Arondizuogu, Akokwa scholar, S.U. Uche (1988:2, 7), tells us that Akokwa had prac-
ticed farming and hunting; that they also did some blacksmithing and weaving; and that
Akokwa began to trade after the arrival of Arondizuogu.
13
The use of only this species of yam for new yam festivals and other rituals in Igboland
underline its antiquity (O.N. Njoku 1991:117).
Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier 89
Sources: 1. Eze J.O. Dike (1996); 2. NAE OKIDIST – 19/1/1 1908–25 Intelligence Book,
Okigwe Division, 1908–25:21; 3. G.N. Okoli (1996); 4. Kanu-Igbo (1996b); 5. NAE
ORLDIST – 14/1/3; 6. J. Uche 1996; 7. NAE 35/1920 – OKIDIST 4/2/32:Land Cases; 8.
NAE 38/22 OKIDIST – 4/4/29:Political Report on Ndeziorgu, 14 April 1922:13.
was able to subdue their enemies with the help of Ohafia and the Aro. Maduagwu him-
self informed me in February 1996 that Umunze pays annual homage to the Cross River
warrior group of Ohafia – an indication of Umunze’s provenance.
15
The clearest indication of group consolidation is seen among Umuchu, sandwiched
between Arondizuogu and the Ndi – Eni cluster. Umuchu was formed from a number
of neighboring small groups for defense purposes (Nnolim 2007:21–23); the same for
Amaokpala in the Ndi-Eni area (Onyekwelu 2001:1–2). Seven towns in the immediate
surrounding of Arondizuogu, which may each have been originally fragmented formed a
cluster known as Mbanasaa (meaning “seven towns”).
Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier 91
16
This area is the site of the present site of National High School and Ojike Memorial hos-
pital. Thereafter, the lineage-groups relocated to the Umuobom country (B. Asuzu 1992;
D. Igwe 1992; E.U. Igwe 1992:4; E. Uche 1992; J.E. Uche 1996).
Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier 93
almost the entire region. Ndi-Iheme later nucleated into seven lineage-
groups. Ndiamazu, originating from another of Izuougu’s dependent and
pioneer, Amazu,17 settled the region to the immediate north-west of the
initial area. Ndiejezie was located on Umualoma land slightly removed
from the initial area in the north-easternly direction. Ndiadumoha,
originating from Adumoha, who had become Izuogu’s direct dependent
after Iheme had used him to redeem himself from Izuogu, settled ini-
tially by Ndiamazu. Ndiadumoha later moved eastwards into the marshy
Umuduru country, in a location removed from the initial area.
Initially, the sequence of nucleation is unclear. The genealogies and
the traditions nonetheless permit a more accurate representation of the
sequence of entry into Arondizuogu society. The migrations that accom-
panied lineage-group formation implied continual expansion and the set-
ting up of new frontiers eastwards and northwards in the direction of
Umualoma. Given this pattern, it becomes clear why the youngest lin-
eage-groups, whose founders entered the society after 1840 (step six in
Table 4.2), did not have a place in the favored upcountry, west of the
Imo. Although the founders of these younger lineage-groups had entered
Arondizuogu society in the mid-nineteenth century, it was not until very
late in that century and early in the twentieth that their descendants
could secure settlements of their own. By the time the new arrivals were
ready to establish settlements, only the east Imo remained unoccupied by
Arondizuogu groups. The Ndi-Ndiakunwanta lineage-group, formed after
1840, was the exception, but this was mainly because of the personal con-
quests of Okoro Udozuka at the expense of Umualoma. But formation of
lineage-groups after the pioneers had been well established was not a free-
for-all affair. It must have been sanctioned by the rest of the lineage-groups.
Ndiakunwanta had to pay 3,600 “monies”/”markets” (nnu ahia teghete,
or £180, which is equivalent to £12,800 in 2010 U.K. pound sterling), one
barrel of gunpowder, and one cow to secure recognition as an autono-
mous lineage-group in about the late 1870s (E.N. Okoli 1977:35).18
17
Some Ndiamazu traditions claims that Amazu was Izuogu’s trading partner (e.g., M.S. Igwe
1996). It is, however, likely that Amazu, who originated from Oro in the Oji River, came as
Izuogu’s dependent – his first direct dependent. The basis for this assertion is that, though
Iheme may have arrived before Amazu, Iheme had come in the first instance as Izuogu’s wife’s
slave boy, whom she later gave to her husband. It is said that the name Iheme derived from
the prayer, ihe emene di m (let no harm befall my husband) (Kanu-Igbo 1996a).
18
This value is derived using the Retail Price Index (RPI). Other 2010 values for the same
1870 amount, using other criteria, are £17,600 (GDP deflator), £106,000 (average earn-
ings), £124,000 (per capita GDP), £244,000 (Share GDP) (Economic History Services,
http://eh.net/hmit/ukcompare/).
94 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
The Aro case also raises a point that is often ignored in the analysis
of slave incorporation in Africa. The enslaved people’s relationship to
society was not just characterized by assimilation into a dominant cul-
ture. The extension of the aforementioned liberties – though designed to
serve Aro interests and not necessarily those of the enslaved – departs
from Kopytoff and Miers’s assertion that the change in the life of the
enslaved “was usually dramatic and total” and that he lost “his social
personality, his identity and status [and] suffered a traumatic and some-
times violent withdrawal from kin, neighbors, and community, and often
from familiar customs and language.” The social experience of people of
slave origin was hardly consistent with what Kopytoff and Miers char-
acterize as “playing dead” (I. Kopytoff and Miers 1977:14–15). Enslaved
people in Aro settlements did actually influence the culture of host societ-
ies, contrary to the phenomenon of “social death” advanced by Orlando
Patterson in his monumental Slavery and Social Death (1982). Despite
this formulation, however, Patterson sees “absolutely no evidence from
the long and dismal annals of slavery to suggest that any group of slaves
ever internalized the conception of degradation held by their masters,”
and that enslaved people never lost “the quintessential human urge to
participate and want a place” (Patterson 1982:97). But his argument that
all slavery is an alternative to death – as apt as it is in many historical
instances – is too rigid to accommodate the Aro experience. The enslaved
in Aro society certainly were not usually – if ever – “denied all claims …
on his more remote ancestors” and disallowed from freely integrating “the
experience of their ancestors into their lives,” as Patterson has asserted
(Patterson 1982:5). Aro masters and their societies did under several sig-
nificant circumstances – probably even routinely – encourage and enable
slaves to reach back to their ancestors. It must be conceded though that
these privileges presupposed certain codes of conformity on the part of
the enslaved that sustained and reproduced the Aro slave system. Except
for “free” migrants, the incoming people did not bring shrines or deities
upon arrival; they did so after they had earned the confidence of their
owners.
Apart from the Aro’s special interest in Nri-Awka people, the social
and economic conditions in the Nri-Awka region exposed its people to
enslavement and emigration. Needy parents often sold their children.
Igbudu and Ebuteilo of Ndiakunwanta in Arondizuogu were brothers
by the same mother in Nimo. Ebuteilo, in particular, later acquired many
people from the region (Maduadichie 1996). Similarly, the Ndieni Aro
heavily acquired people from non-Aro communities in their immediate
96 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
The Anambra [Nri-Awka] people … were more prudent than the people from
many communities in our immediate neighborhood. And they did not have food
… At that time, there were no cities. Many people arrived here due to yam
cultivation possibilities.20 These people multiplied in the process. At that time
too, Mazi Izuogu Mgbokpo traversed that country in his slave dealing business.
After he had settled here, he got his own people from the same place that he
got trade slaves. He retained those with good character. Those retained in this
process may have come overwhelmingly from Anambra. (M.S. Igwe 1996)21
Linkages
An analysis of the Aro cultural network is an analysis of linkage institu-
tions, rites, or practices in both the metropole and the diaspora and of
those that linked them. In addition to the formal institutions through
which the metropole regulated the operation of the diaspora – the Aro
central council (Ọkpankpọ), the Ekpe secret society, and the Ibiniukpabi
oracle – already discussed in Chapter 3, there were those that governed
conventions and rites. Linkage institutions maintained political prece-
dence and routine contact within the diaspora populations and between
the metropole and the diaspora. The Aro diaspora paid regular visits to
Arochukwu to conduct and discuss trade, take the non-Aro to Ibiniukpabi,
receive advice from oracular priests, partake in the annual Ikeji festival,
join the Ekpe society or partake in its rites, and visit kin members.22
19
Chinyele 1972; J. Ike 1972; Iloha 1972; C. Kanu 1972; J, Kanu 1972; Ngene 1972;
Nwene 1972; F. Obi 1972; N. Okoli 1972.
20
Only those arriving in the last decade of the nineteenth century onward did so for the
purposes of farming because farming became important only at that time. This claim
exemplifies telescoping in the traditions. “Anambra” is the present state in Nigeria domi-
nated by the Nri-Awka.
21
The traditions of the Nri-Awka communities recognize these movements into Arondizuogu
as well. Among the traditions that I have seen, the ones from Awka seem most explicit
on this matter. They mention large-scale “migrations” to Arondizuogu (Agu 1985; I.
Oguocha 1996).
22
N.A. Anyakoha (1996); Chinyele (1972); Dike and Ekejiuba (1990); C. Okafor
(1986:124–25); J.G. Okoro (1985).
Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier 97
23
The festival originated in pre-trade Arochukwu, to mark the harvest of the new yam, but
it came to lose its agricultural purchase over time as the Aro became traders, to the extent
that homeland and some diaspora Aro had come to mark it at the opposite ends of the
agricultural season by the nineteenth century.
24
Because I was on my way to Arondizuogu, Okoro requested me to, and I did personally con-
vey letters from him to some Ndiamazu leaders, in which he reported the end of the case.
98 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
The system of this person acquiring that person and that person acquiring yet
another was quite complicated. The way that people clarified who was who was
the ihu, observed during the Ikeji festival in Arondizuogu. For instance, my father
came to Arondizuogu [from Arochukwu] through Anumba. When he celebrated
the Ikeji, he gave ose ihe to Anumba as ihu. For his part, Anumba gave to Mazi
25
Arochukwu elder Kanu-Onuoha (1996) recalled the 1928 second burial at Arochukwu
of Okoro Udozuka of Arondizuogu. Such funerals would have involved considerable
material cost, but before the late nineteenth century, the diaspora people were generally
affluent enough to support this important rite of passage or to have that financed by
relatives.
26
These parts are rib cage (with seven ribs on each side) (ose anu), chest (ntinana), upper
bowel (isi akpakwuru), a tiny portion of the liver (umeji), a small portion of the spleen
(anyinya), a small piece of flesh from the upper abdomen (ofufe enu), and a small part of
the lower abdomen (ofufe ana). I am grateful to the late Orizu Nwokeji (1996) for this
information. The meat parts were also accompanied by “five big yams”, one keg of palm
wine and four kolanuts (Muotoh 2000:43–44).
Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier 99
Ufere [of Ndiamazu] because it was Ufere who had brought Mazi Anumba. He,
Mazi Ufere himself, had an elder/superior under whom he was. That person was
a descendant of Mazi Izuogu Obunukpo Akuma Nnachi. Mazi Izuogu was the
person who left this Arochukwu to open up the way up to Arondizuogu to estab-
lish a settlement. (J.O. Okoro 1996)
single status group but was incumbent on all. It also encouraged defer-
ence based on age within all status groups.27
In the face of these relationships, British colonial anthropologists
noted the following. “The Aros were clan-conscious rather than town-
conscious, and today the average man will declare with pride that he
is an Aro before he gives the name of his town, recalling the spirit of
St. Paul triumphantly declaring ‘Civis Romanus sum’, followed by the
information ‘I come from Tarsus, no mean city’” (Anthropologists’
Papers 1927:16). Later, a colonial officer reported that the people of
Arondizuogu had “retained their Aro customs.”28 While these realities
demonstrate strong linkages, they also mask the deviations from the Aro
cultural grid.
27
Only two recent studies have mentioned Ihu – although they do not analyze it in detail
(see Bentor 1994:167; K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:210, 274).
28
NAE EP 12481 – MINLOC 6:1. 306: Intelligence Report on the Ndizuogu Village Area,
Orlu District, Okigwe Division, Owerri Province: Resident’s Covering Report.”
29
For this development, see Dike and Ekejiuba (1990:63, 67).
Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier 101
families of Arochukwu society. The second group was the amuda, con-
sisting of immigrants, their descendants, and those of slaves. The ohu, the
first-generation slaves, were the lowest group (K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba
1990:79, 284; Uku 1993:3, 18–20). The status hierarchy in the different
diaspora settlements was bound to take different courses, reflecting the
specific circumstances of each settlement.
The starting point of the status distinction in Arochukwu, then, was the
foundation families. All nineteen Arochukwu lineage-groups were either
foundation communities or direct offshoots of these.30 Consequently, all
the lineage-groups had their amadi and corresponding lower orders. Not
surprisingly, therefore, status formation in Arondizuogu took a differ-
ent turn where the history-specific phenomenon of the seven stones was
absent. The differences in status formation between Arondizuogu and
Arochukwu reflected their differing circumstances of societal formation
and the fact that the Arochukwu institutions continued to undergo trans-
formations after the establishment of Arondizuogu. The Arondizuogu
case was more complicated. Arondizuogu was formed with just Izuogu’s
family and the persons of his household (Table 4.2). Of the resulting
original nine lineage-groups, eight were founded by persons of Izuogu’s
household. After the increase of the lineage-groups to sixteen in the
course of the nineteenth century, Izuogu’s direct descendants came to
compose the ruling minority of only two lineage-groups, Ndiawa and
Ndiuche, while the ruling minorities of all fourteen other lineage-groups
descended from Izuogu’s dependents. The ruling groups of the remain-
ing two of the present eighteen lineage-groups of Arondizuogu come
from the descendants of Izuogu’s brothers, Njoku and Udensi. These
last groups, Ndinjoku and Ndimoko, migrated late into the region dur-
ing the 1850s and 1870s, respectively, as separate and autonomous
Aro settlements (see T.O. Okereke 1996). Izuogu’s direct descendants
constituted minority ruling elites in Ndiawa and Ndiuche. By virtue of
their position, these elites also exercised authority over the rest of the
lineage-groups, forming the amadi both in these lineage-groups and
over Arondizuogu at large. The direct descendants of the other lineage-
group founders, for their part, constituted the minority amadi within the
respective lineage-groups, as they also massively incorporated outsiders
through slavery and other forms of immigration. These incorporated
outsiders formed subordinate lineages within the lineage-groups, and
30
The best informed discussions of this subject are Dike and Ekejiuba (1990) and J.O. Ijoma
(1986c).
102 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
31
Initially, after the change in seasons, the different Arondizuogu lineage-groups had cel-
ebrated Ikeji variously, but consecutively during the long season from March to April.
Since the emergence of the Arondizuogu Patriotic Union (APU) in the 1930s, the whole
of Arondizuogu have celebrated the festival on the same dates in April. For a compre-
hensive history of this union and informative details of Ikeji and its evolution, see Ohia
2007.
Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier 103
among the Aro until the last decade of the nineteenth century, after the
festival had been in existence for centuries. The shift of the Ikeji season
from August to April not only marked a shift in season but also the sepa-
ration of Ikeji and the new yam festival. The new yam festival, which in
late twentieth-century Arondizuogu was celebrated in September, when
the rest of the Igbo and Arochukwu celebrated it (the latter calling it
“Ikeji”), was most probably (re-)introduced or revived when yam agricul-
ture became important in Arondizuogu. Yam agriculture did not become
important in Arondizuogu until the final decade of the nineteenth cen-
tury, when the people began to establish settlements in areas east of the
original Arondizuogu site. This (re-)introduction of the new yam festival
should explain why Arondizuogu celebrates in September today, to avoid
a conflict with the Arochukwu event in August.
The domestication of the Ikeji festival in the diaspora served prac-
tical and symbolic purposes. The need to protect the settlements and
to legitimize them in the eyes of the preexisting societies called for a
more demonstrative presence that Ikeji provided. Since the frontierspeo-
ple were always concerned with security against the occasional hostile
neighbor, it would not have been in their interest to embark on a predict-
able annual mass trip to the distant metropole. Simultaneously, Ikeji pro-
vided opportunities for diplomacy. As Chinyere Okafor has pointed out,
people in the diaspora and in the preexisting communities exchanged
visits during festivals. Ikeji gave the Aro the opportunity to reciprocate
these invitations (C. Okafor 1986:124). Internally, the festival offered
the ruling members of the diaspora a regular opportunity to renew and
routinize their hegemony over their wards through the Ihu institution.
Such symbolisms were essential to maintaining order and control in the
dynamic diaspora environment. The festival was remarkable for its blend
of metropolitan and frontier practices. The rituals were metropolitan,
while the entertainment aspects bore the signature of preexisting and
Nri-Awka groups.
The Aro diaspora deviated more completely regarding incest rules. In
the Aro metropole, loose incest rules permitted marriage between sec-
ond cousins. But in the central Igboland frontiers, rigid incest rules pre-
vailed. Among the all Aro, women could only marry men of the same or a
higher status – never below. These practices implied the social isolation of
unmarried women among the original Aro migrants to the frontier, who
could not marry the majority of men in society because these men came
from lower status groups. Because the original Aro in these settlements
often descended from one person or, sometimes, from a few close blood
104 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
relatives, creating a scarcity of eligible men for the original Aro women.
The impact of this restrictive marriage practice on the marriageability of
high-status Aro women would have been great. It also created an artificial
scarcity of women for men of slave origin, who either had to secure wives
from non-Aro groups or remained unmarried. This partial exogamy, by
which Aro men married outside women without giving out any of their
own, as mentioned in Chapter 3, ruled out the rest of Igboland as a source
of spouses for high-status unmarried women. In Arondizuogu, as in the
other Aro frontier settlements, men outside Izuogu’s pedigree were out-
side the eligible pool, as were comparable classes in both Arochukwu and
in the diaspora. High-status women were left to marry only men from the
amadi nkume asaa, but this was a small and very exclusive group found
only in Arochukwu and those diaspora settlements whose founders were
Aro amadi. The adoption of strict incest rules in the diaspora resulted
from the influence of Igbo norms, especially those of Nri-Awka.
Yet, in one important respect, Arondizuogu deviated, not only from
Arochukwu, but also from the rest of the Igbo world, notably the Nri-Awka
culture area from which most of the frontier populations were drawn.
Both Arochukwu and the rest of the Igbo observed the “twin taboo,”
which was based on the belief that twins were spiritually unclean and
purveyors of communal misfortune. The Igbo are known to have thrown
twins into the “bad bush” (unused bush, often a virgin forest, where all
things considered sacrilege and evil were thrown). The involvement of
Arochukwu in the twin taboo is ironic, given the people’s emphasis on
group expansion. Perhaps because their slave trading activities made
them more likely to see human beings as commodities, the Aro tended to
eschew Igbo practices that wasted human lives. For example, while the
Igbo normally threw into the bad bush children who cut their upper teeth
first, the Aro diaspora in the perimeters of central Igboland preserved
them. Despite the varying attitudes of Arochukwu and the Aro diaspora
toward the twin taboo, however, Arochukwu shared the Igbo world’s
perception of twin birth as a major abomination and both Aro groups
considered twins sellable commodities.32 Given the twin taboo prevail-
ing in much of Igboland, the Aro tendency to buy and sell twins and the
apparent absence of a similar practice elsewhere in Atlantic Africa, the
32
The taboo against twins in Arochukwu is so strong that it survives to date. For instance,
it was first ascertained that I was not a twin during my fieldwork in February 1996
before I was admitted to a historical site, Ogbuti Okoroji (the house of the late nine-
teenth-century slave trader, Okoroji), even though the Nigerian government had declared
it a national monument in 1972.
Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier 105
The little victims are no sooner born than one or both are taken away, placed in
the neighboring thicket in earthen pots or baskets, and left there to become the
food of hyenas or other wild beasts. The unfortunate mother is separated for
ever from her conjugal alliance; she is obliged to pass a long period or repen-
tance and purification, in a rude hut some distance from the town; and if she
outlives all these trials, mental and physical, and returns once more to society, she
is regarded as an especial object of Fetish wrath, and no woman will knowingly
sit in her company, or hold communion with her. (Capt. W. Allen and Thomson
1848a:243)
33
This date is an estimate from genealogies. Traditions related by various respondents
in different lineage-groups show the same basic pattern (Arodiogbu 1996; Ekwobi
1996; Igwegbe 1962:30–31; Igwilo 1996a; C. Okoli 1996). Whatever truth there may
be to this story, it suggests to me that the idea of accepting twins has been entrenched
in Arondizuogu folklore since the early nineteenth century. None of my respondents
seemed aware that this act deviated from the Aro norm. They simply used the incident
to illustrate the principle of mmuba. Igwegbe (1962) renders the traditions in the same
manner.
106 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
recent origin and were the results of migration, and recent migration to
the area did not prevent these communities from invariably adopting the
Ana, or analogous agrarian-oriented cults. Residency status did not deter-
mine the adoption of the earth shrine. Arondizuogu did not adopt it only
because agriculture was, until a decade before British colonial conquest,
marginal to the trade-based political economy. Up to the 1890s, the com-
munity depended on its neighbors for the supply of provisions. Although
oral traditions often tout the “strangers” idea, the term is not useful in the
Igbo historical context. As part of a strategy of colonial domination, the
British played up the idea to help intimidate the intractable Arondizuogu
community and to isolate it from neighboring non-Aro communities. In
itself, the stranger status is not useful in understanding the prevalence or
otherwise of the Ana cult. The cult’s diffusion was not coterminous with
the series of migrations that mark the histories of many Igbo groups.
After all, most of Arondizuogu peoples originated from areas in which
the Ana cult prevailed.34 They could have brought it with them, but, as
already mentioned, the cult had little reason to exist in a trading fron-
tier. Instead, ancestral cults were, according to Dike and Ekejiuba, often
central among trading groups, such as the Aro (K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba
1990:132). As with the adopted shrines, these ancestral cults were impor-
tant in Arondizuogu – even among immigrants.
However, evidence from the Ndieni, a commonwealth of other major
Aro communities in central Igboland, complicates the trade-based expla-
nation for the absence of agricultural shrines in a trading frontier. Up
to the 1920s, these Aro groups still subscribed to Ajana, the earth deity
of the respective preexisting groups amid whom their ancestors had set-
tled a century and a half earlier.35 The reason for this difference between
Arondizuogu and Ndieni may lie in Arondizuogu’s more thorough sub-
jection and its greater displacement of preexisting groups than Ndieni
experienced with its neighbors. In the Ujari case, according to an Ujari his-
torian, the preexisting community of Akpu offered Ujari people land that
“was near the grove around the shrine of a local deity called Ajana.”36 Like
the Ujari, other Ndieni communities generally settled in close proximity
to preexisting societies, establishing Aro dominance over time, often by
34
For the centrality of the Ana cult, see Meek (1937:Ch. 2; Green 1964:26–28, 100). In
Arochukwu, the trade cult, Inyamavia, prevailed.
35
NAE ONPROF – 7/16/150:Awka Division Intelligence Notes on the Towns of Ajalli
Native Court Area 1929. See abstract of file, p. 2.
36
The Ujari community had just been harried out of their original place of settlement at
Uvume by the hosts (Eni 1973:12).
Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier 107
Dialect Formation
Language is an important distinguishing characteristic of the Aro diaspora.
The Aro dialect of Igbo in the upper Imo River region is a reflection of the
historical interactions of religion, commerce, the large-scale incorporation
of elements from other societies, and marriage. One way to measure the
distinctness or otherwise of any Aro diaspora community is to compare
its dialect to those of its immediate neighbors, metropolitan Arochukwu,
and the major source of originally non-Aro immigrants. The task is best
accomplished by comparing vocabularies – the basic methodology of
lexicostatistics, which establishes the relationship between two or more
languages, including how long ago they separated from a single, common
language. However, the task in this case is primarily to determine the
extent to which each of three major dialectal areas influenced the dialect
of a fourth group – Arondizuogu.
Unfortunately, however, the Igbo orthography does not capture some
basic phonemes in Igbo dialects, a limitation that is striking in the case.37
Such a limited orthography forecloses any necessity, or even the possibility,
37
John McCall encountered the same problem with respect to his work among the Ohafia
(McCall 2000:161). Although interested in the historical development of language, both
traditional and modern linguistics ignore the sociocultural contexts in which languages
emerge. Yet patterns of speech shape and are shaped by “dominance and exchange pat-
terns of kinship and other idioms of speech” (H.C. White 1995:5, 41). To be sure, the
Igbo orthography ignores sociocultural realities. When I once raised this matter on the
electronic interactive medium, Igbonet, early in 1995, the views of the other contributors,
108 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
including one Igbo linguist, favored the existing orthography. They rested their case
on the political imperative of Igbo integration, a view that illustrates the connection
between language and politics and sacrificing cultural interaction and historical context.
This view is not only at variance with the postmodernist sensibility to the multiplicity of
identities but it also certainly hampers the historical understanding of Igbo societies.
38
Such nuances in Igbo phonemes complicate scholars’ efforts to transliterate names of
enslaved people in the Americans because the people who first transcribed the names
approximated the sounds with the orthographic traditions the transcribers were familiar,
regardless of whether Igbo orthography would later incorporate the sounds. Maureen
Warner-Lewis uses “rl” to throw light on “Durl,” the name of the father of the Igbo
Archibald Monteith, who was enslaved in Jamaica, as transcribed by Europeans. Warner
Lewis suggests that this name represents the name that appears in standard Igbo as
“Duru,” observing that despite the apparent strangeness of “rl” in Durl, “erery Igbo
speaker recognizes this word to have been Duru” (Warner-Lewis 2007: 28).
Culture Formation in the Trading Frontier 109
(continued)
110 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
39
Wherever there are two variants of an Arondizuogu word, I have placed the western Nri-
Awka version first. When there is a northern Nri-Awka variant, the alternatives appear
in the following order: western, northern, and eastern.
112 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
of these late arrivals, who came to the area in c. 1850s and c. 1860s,
respectively, but it should be noted that, in spite of their incorporation of
significant numbers of non-Aro, their dialects are closer to the dialect of
Arochukwu than to Arondizuogu. They must have found the multicul-
tural character of Arondizuogu remarkable.40
Conclusions
Far from severing regular ties with the Arochukwu metropole from the
onset, the Aro diaspora settlements and the metropole were linked, and this
linkage can only be understood as a historical process. One must separate
earlier periods from later ones, when host and immigrant cultures (and
in the twentieth century, colonial, capitalist, and Christian presence) had
made their marks on the diaspora settlements. Aro diaspora perceptions
of the settlements in the mid-eighteenth century had changed somewhat
in the mid-twentieth century when Kanu Umo remarked that: “Ndizuogu
settlers are naturalized or, in other words have become planted in the set-
tlement that the average medial Settler (sic) is not very much interested in
home Aro and her ways” (Umo n.d.:21). Still, the severance of relations
had not even by the mid-twentieth century gone as far as is claimed in the
recent literature for much earlier periods (e.g., Northrup 1978). As Umo
himself – despite his synchronic tendencies – points out for the first half
of the twentieth century, “an infinitestimal minority in cursory compari-
son with the block population, are being deadly concerned with home
affairs. During the ‘Ikeji’ annual festival some outside settlers … usu-
ally go home to enjoy the ‘Ekpe’ and ‘Ayanma’ displays” (Umo n.d.:22).
When these pan-Aro observances are considered together, it is clear that
the Aro maintained what one can call a system. In this way, they differed
from the Hausa diaspora in mid-1960s Ibadan, which apparently did not
feel the pull of home. Many new migrants into the Hausa diaspora came
to look for a relative who had left and never visited home (A. Cohen
1969:39–42). The far greater geographic range of the Hausa diaspora
was, of course, a major reason for their less frequent trips to their home-
land. Although many Aro, to a lesser degree, also did not opt to return
home permanently, they nevertheless always retained that option, were
always welcome back in Arochukwu, and often maintained dual resi-
dences. The examination of Aro organization as a trade diaspora explains
40
In an implied comparison with Arondizuogu, Thomas Okereke of Ndi-Imoko told me
early in 1996: Ndi-Imoko “tradition and customs are purely Aro” (T. Okereke 1996).
116 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
The rise of the Atlantic slave trade increased not only the number
of captives exported to the Americas but also the number who were
retained in the region. The increasing importance of slave use in African
political economies during the Atlantic slave trade era had implica-
tions for the trade in quite material terms: it implied a relationship
between indigenous slavery and the Atlantic slave trade, which raises
two inversely related central questions about Aro political economy.
Why did the Aro retain people when the trade in people was the basis
of their wealth and power? And why did the Aro and other slave-
holders sell people when their social organization was based on group
expansion?
In the Angolan case, Joseph Miller has asked and persuasively
answered the second question. According to him, West-Central African
entrepreneurs, who calculated their advantages based on the number
of dependents that remained with them and the degree of their depen-
dency, became slave traders reluctantly. They released “a portion of
their hard-won dependents” to Euro-American slave traders as a last
resort in order to acquire the imported goods that were necessary to
attract dependents, even if the foreign slave traders came across as
agents of a bad spirit and harbingers of death for those they took with
them (Miller 1988:40, 105). Biafran entrepreneurs shared with their
West-Central African counterparts a tendency to retain large numbers
of dependents, especially from the mid-eighteenth century onward, but
unlike the West-Central African entrepreneurs, they neither intended
nor hoped to retain all the captives that came into their possession;
instead, the Biafran entrepreneurs – particularly professional Aro and
117
118 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
1
Hair (1965:196–97). The sample is from Koelle (1963).
Household and Market Persons 119
much since the second half of the eighteenth century (Oldendorp 2000).
Although scholars have relied heavily on the Kolle sample, as they will
likely now also rely on the Oldendorp data, both sources actually tell us
only about those captives who were exported to the Americas during the
respective periods; they do not necessarily offer great insights into the
general nature of slaving in Atlantic Africa. To rely on such data in assess-
ing the general character of slaving in Africa is to ignore the bias inherent
in them and to assume that hinterland slave users did not discriminate
between the people they retained and those they sold away. It is also
unclear how much can be extrapolated from the general Atlantic-African
information to explain the situation in the Bight of Biafra. We must there-
fore analyze these sources in conjunction with the pertinent ethnographic
evidence and historical evidence from the Bight of Biafra.
The nature and scope of Aro operations permit the use of evidence from
across the region to understand the means of enslavement. In outline, the
slave systems of the Aro and coastal city-states were similar, and both
differed from the systems found in most parts of the Biafra hinterland.
This distinction has been made clear in the Aro case, where slavery
emphasized incorporation based on acculturation and accumulation. “In
contrast, Igbo and Ibibio patrilineages and village heads continued to be
ascriptively filled and were respected not because of achieved position
but as the link between the villages and ancestral spirit” (K.O. Dike and
Ekejiuba 1990:209). Nonetheless, the rest of the Igbo and Ibibio groups
do not seem to have become significant holders of slaves until after the
suppression of the Atlantic slave trade in the nineteenth century.
Two further reasons justify the emphasis on the Aro and the coastal
states instead of other groups in the region. First, slavery existed among
the Aro in the heyday of the Atlantic slave trade. Second, the incorpora-
tive nature of these systems warranted the careful selection of household
persons (domestic slaves), which impinged on the composition of cap-
tives for export overseas. The preferences of indigenous slave users and
the way modes of enslavement influenced these preferences determined
the composition of slavery on both sides of the Atlantic and thus throw
light on slavery in both regions. As historian Herbert Klein has noted,
“since African slavery was quite dissimilar from the American chattel
plantation variety, its demands for slaves were quite distinct as well”
(H. Klein 1978:241).
It is appropriate to begin by distinguishing between the household and
market categories of captives. Understanding the meaning of the term
slave in its historical context clarifies our understanding of why people
120 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
2
Curtin (1971a:81–82; 1990:29); Davidson (1971:61–62).
Household and Market Persons 121
labels as slaves people of slave origin who are no longer slaves. Because
colonial reports tended to focus on the slave – versus-free differentiation,
modern scholars of slavery in Africa have tended to dismiss the contrary
indications that are found in the oral traditions as strands of apologist
ideology. Ironically, however, those who stress the prevalence of a more
rigid regimen claim that colonial reports whitewashed slavery and uti-
lized information that was collected when the institution was already in
decline. This view that the ideology of slavery promotes the kinship idiom
is one-sided; the ideology of slavery does more than simply give a benign
veneer to a harsh system, by, for example, attempting to essentialize slav-
ery where masters’ control over slaves was tenuous or where slavery had
effectively ended. When early ethnographers and modern scholars talk
about a “slave” owning a slave, they may actually be referring to a former
slave owning a slave. A broader view of ideology allows us to transcend
the mainstream ideology of slavery, which essentializes slavery with regard
to people who were no longer slaves. Contrary to the prevailing tendency
in African studies to see only the side of dominant ideology that expressed
the kinship idiom that was used to whitewash slavery, charter groups often
denied kinship and free status to previously enslaved groups, after they
had earned full citizenship status, or after the charter groups had lost their
ability to enforce the servile subordination of the ex-slaves. Rather than
simply deemphasizing the oppressive character of slavery, colonial reports
sometimes also ignored or understated “the degree of assimilation which
wealth or the kinship idiom could produce” (Northrup 1981:118–19).
The key parameters that figured in the consideration of who became a
household or a market person throw light on indigenous slavery and its
relationship with the overseas human traffic.
Preferences 1: Skills
The incorporation of skilled outsiders was important in Aro society.
There is some evidence that the Aro began to do this during their for-
mation in the early seventeenth century. Other Igbo evidence shows the
continuing importance of craftsmen. Oral traditions inform us that the
upper Imo River Aro settlement Arondizuogu harbored skilled dissidents
from non-Aro societies and other skilled immigrants during the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries.3 One of my Arondizuogu respondents,
in 1996, referred to such acquisitions and showed me some apparently
slave-produced archaic works of art, including a special war drum called
3
See Dike and Ekejiuba (1990:58; 73), C. Iroh (1991); O. Mgbemena (1991); Okorie
(1991); O. Udensi (1991); T.O. Okereke (1996); J.E. Uche (1996) for the Aro, and Equiano
(1995:42–43) and Uchendu (1977:123) for Igboland.
Household and Market Persons 123
Preferences 2: Regional
Region played no less a role than skills in determining the fate of a
captive. Based on positive stereotypes, indigenous slave holders pre-
ferred captives from certain sections of the region to others. Again, the
evidence of this is clearest among the Aro. For reasons explicated in
Chapter 4, the Aro had an ongoing interest in cultivating persons from
the Nri-Awka region. This means that even when every other factor
that could determine the fate of a captive was taken into consider-
ation, a captive from outside the Nri-Awka region was more likely to
end in the market than an Nri-Awka counterpart. Aro preference for
Nri-Awka people went beyond captives. In fact, the Aro, especially the
diaspora in central Igboland, incorporated huge numbers of Nri-Awka
people as refugees and voluntary immigrant[s], and seldom incorporated
non-Nri-Awka for these purposes. This process gained momentum in
the mid-eighteenth century, following the foundation of the major
124 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
4
For the suggestion that the Aro deliberately incorporated people from far away places, see
Dike and Ekejiuba (1990:74).
5
Igwegbe (1962:12); Dike and Ekejiuba (1990:206); Kanu-Igbo (1996).
6
The most forceful idea statement about kinlessness as a necessary condition of slavery is
perhaps in Moses Finley (1968:308–09).
Household and Market Persons 125
the composition of the captives the Bight of Biafra sent to the Americas.
While captives from the Nri-Awka region dominated the enslaved
Igbo population in the Americas up to the early eighteenth century
(Chapter 3), their numbers had declined substantially by the nineteenth
century. The sub-ethnic breakdown of the Sierra Leone sample makes
this point. The sample is small, but, significantly, none of the five Igbo
respondents comes from the Nri-Awka region, and only one of the fifteen
Igbo “countries” represented in Sierra Leone, “Mudioka” (Umudioka),
falls in within the Nri-Awka area (the present Anambra State), a region
of sixty odd claus or towns.7 Even then, it is equally possible that this
was another Umudioka, the one located outside of the Nri-Awka area,
near Orlu. Most of the Sierra Leone Igbo respondents have been traced
to Isuama in south-central Igboland (including the Orlu area) and Agbaja
in present Enugu State in northern Igboland.8 Although we have little
information about the sub-ethnic composition of Igbo captives sent to
the Americas during the second half of the eighteenth century, the mas-
sive Aro incorporation of Nri-Awka people suggests that it was likely
to have been closer to the nineteenth-century pattern in which captives
from the Nri-Awka region accounted for a relatively small proportion
of those exported. While this dimension of the geography of regional
slaving calls out for further research, it is reasonable to hypothesize that
Aro expansion and the concomitant rise of the Biafra Atlantic slave trade
corresponded with increasing proportions of southern Igbo people and
declining proportions of Nri-Awka people arriving the Americas from the
mid-eighteenth century onward.
Other Preferences
Social and religious taboos also affected preferences. Individuals catego-
rized as abnormal were likely exported overseas, as long as their abnor-
malities would not discourage Euro-American buyers. As many of those
who were deemed abnormal in the Bight of Biafra would have passed
Euro-American standards of normality when measured principally in labor
worth and potential, the presence of the Aro in the region made it easier
7
This evidence is from Koelle (1963:8).
8
Northrup 1978b:62; Oriji 1981:318. Among these subgroups, Isuama is the reference
least used in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries was the most populous and it was
actually a cluster of several major Igbo subgroups, such as Mba-Ano, Mbanasaa, Mbaise,
Orlu area (including Nkwere) and the Owerri area. It is home to virtually all the autoch-
tonous Igbo communities. For an outline of Isuama’s boundaries, see Ojiaku (2008:5).
126 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
9
Meek (1937:31, 224–25); Goodlife (1952:6); Onyiukah (1983:27). “Bad bush” refers to
the sacred forest, which was never cut and into which repugnant items were thrown.
Household and Market Persons 127
12
For what it worth, Equiano recalled a case in which a man was arraigned for kidnap-
ping a boy. “[A]lthough he was the son of a chief or senator, he was condemned to make
recompense by a … slave.” Equiano (1995:35).
13
See also Anyakoha (1996); J.O. Dike (1996); Kanu-Igbo (1996b); M.S. Igwe (1996);
Igwilo (1996a); Maduadichie (1996); Muotoh (1996); E. Nwankwo (1996); E. Okoro
(1996); J.G. Okoro (1996). For the Old Calabar case, see Waddell (1970:429). See Baum
(1999:114–17) for the Diola case.
Household and Market Persons 129
at some point but were never redeemed” (Oldendorp 2000: ms. 489).
Oldendorp also reported that the enslavement of people in lieu of the
death penalty was rare. Both the Oldendorp and the Koelle data show
war and kidnapping to be the two most important sources of the cap-
tives they interviewed. But Oldendorp and Koelle differ on the relative
importance of the two modes of enslavement, with Oldendorp assigning
greater importance to kidnapping.
Can we then infer that kidnapping was the most important single
source of enslavement among Atlantic-bound captives in the late eigh-
teenth century, and wars the most important in the early nineteenth?
This is quite possible. It could also mean that the greater importance of
warfare in producing captives during the nineteenth century reflected
the increased incidence of warfare during that century. If we factor in
the greater exponential potential of incidents of war because of the rela-
tively large numbers of captives usually involved, however, war captives
may account for a greater share of the sample than the nominal figures
suggest.
On the average, an incident of war or raiding was likely to yield more
captives than an incident of kidnapping. On the one hand, Oldendorp
referred to thirteen people who became captives in only twelve incidents
of kidnapping. On the other, he referred to twenty-four who became
captives in only fifteen incidents of war or raiding. Apart from this
twenty-four captives, in five of the war/raiding incidents he described,
Oldendorp makes references to unspecified numbers of “children,” as well
as “many,” “many others,” “several others,” and “a number of others”
captives, respectively, were also being taken. Oldendorp’s interpreta-
tions of some incidents may differ from those of this writer. He notes, for
example, the overlap between invasions and “slave chasers’ robberies”
and that they differed “only in regard to their method of catching people”
(Oldendorp 2000: ms. 489). His conclusion was clearly informed more
by his own ethnographic observations than the actual data he presented.
This exponential factor and the lack of information about the destina-
tions of the “many other” captives suggest that wars and raiding may
have yielded more captives than can be derived from the information col-
lected from individual captives in the Americas. The exponential factor
also certainly underlines the importance of warfare as source of captives
during the eighteenth century.
It would be a stretch to read too much from the few specific descrip-
tions Oldendorp and Koelle give about captives from the Bight of
Biafra, but the picture that emerges bucked the general African trends
130 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
the role of warfare varied from region to region.14 The Aro relied heavily
on Cross River Igbo warrior groups to fight Aro wars, which were often
reprisals against communities that had offended the Aro or resisted their
trading overtures. Headhunting rather than slave-catching was the pri-
mary motivation of the warriors, and so warfare was not a major source
of captives in the Bight of Biafra, although captives inevitably were
taken.15 In contrast to the Western Sudan, where warfare as a means
of procuring captives was institutionalized, cutting human heads was
an avenue for attaining full citizenship status and prestige within the
warrior communities throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries. The killing of war prisoners by the militarist states of Senegambia
became widespread only following the decline of the Atlantic slave trade
and as a security measure because they could no longer dispose of cap-
tives at Atlantic markets (Klein 1983:72; Meillassoux 1982:89, 90).
As common as kidnapping was during the slave trade era, however,
it was, like warfare, less important for enslavement as a whole than the
export samples suggest. The exclusive reliance on these samples in trans-
atlantic scholarship tends to exaggerate the importance of kidnapping,
but most regional specialists working with other evidence deemphasize
it, which suggests that the means of enslavement were highly varied.16
Kidnappers knew that they were often breaking the law and that the
punishment for this was often harsh; they often had to carry their victims
far away from the place of capture to prevent them from escaping and to
avoid discovery. Kidnapping was a risky venture – riskier if the intended
victim was a man, who was more likely to escape and expose the kidnap-
per’s identity if known. An attempt to kidnap a man could result in the
kidnapper himself being seized and sold. Children were easier to capture,
subdue, confine, or to trick than adults. Logically, a lot of kidnapping
efforts targeted children.17 But one can deemphasize warfare and kid-
napping without necessarily denying that “any of these sources was. …
14
For accounts showing that sale into Atlantic slavery was deemed extreme punishment,
see Lovejoy (1983:56, 61, 68–78); Curtin (1990:37–38, 119); Thornton (1992:99, 110).
15
This conclusion has been anticipated by K.O. Dike (1956:40); Northrup (1978b:65–69);
Afigbo (1981a, 1981b).
16
K.O. Dike (1956:40); Afigbo (1980:86; 1981a:21; 1981b:267); Ijoma (1986a); Dike and
Ekejiuba (1990).
17
In the late eighteenth century, Aniaso, or Archibald Monteith, was tricked by a young
prospective suitor of his sister, who asked the unsuspecting ten-year-old boy to accompany
him to the market, where Aniaso was sold into slavery (Monteith [1853] 1966: 30–31).
Equiano also claims that kidnappers were themselves sold into slavery when caught
(Equiano 1995:38).
132 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
18
For such a suggestion, see Noah (1980:74–75).
19
It nevertheless is unlikely that kidnapping was the predominant means of enslavement
in the region as some scholars have maintained. See Isichei (1976:45–47); Northrup
(1978b:77–80); Oriji (1987:161–63); Geggus (1989:40). For examples of kidnapping see
Equiano (1995); Monteith (1853:29–52).
20
Davidson (1971:65); Miller (1988:116, 128); Thornton (1991); Lovejoy (1994a); Bay
(1997).
Household and Market Persons 133
21
Baikie (1856:312). Oku muo refers to hell.
134 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
Persistent troublemakers were not tolerated. The simple village code only permit-
ted execution of thieves and witches: other minor offences were punished by the
enforced payment of a fine or compensation to the victim. But if these penalties
proved insufficient to control the more intransigent characters the ultimate pun-
ishment was to be sold into slavery, and the Aro “missionaries” waxed fat on
these sales, whereby the villagers effectually disposed of their incorrigibles and
the slave dealers profited by the transaction.23
22
N.A. Anyakoha (1996); J.O. Dike (1996); Echemazi (1996); Kanu-Igbo (1996);
Nwaokoye (1996); Ufere (1996).
23
This quotation is from J.G.C. Allen (n.d.:149), but also see Grier (1922:35).
24
E. Akpan (1972); L.U. Akpan (1972); Ebu (1972); J. Inokun (1972); S. Isangedighi, et al.
(1973); U.U. Obong (1972); I.A. Odung (1972); A. Okori (1972); Russell (1972); J. Udo
(1972); Udonyah (1972); D.K. Eshiet (1973); Ibok (1973); Wamuo (1973).
Household and Market Persons 135
respondents was one Okon (or John Thomas, as they called him in
Sierra Leone) from the Igbo warrior community of Ohafia, northwest of
Arochukwu, who was sold at Bonny for adultery in about 1820. He was
married to two women and had a ten-year-old child (Koelle 1963:8).25
Apparently, whether adultery was deemed a criminal or a lesser offense
depended on the status and gender of the perpetrator. It was unlikely that
a wealthy man or some other member of the elite would be sold as pun-
ishment for committing adultery with the wife of a dependent or some
other low-status woman. On the contrary, selling away was usually the
fate of a man who committed adultery with the wife of a man of superior
standing.
The judicial role of the Aro oracle, Ibiniukpabi, reinforced the Aro
role as disposers of people who had been incriminated in their communi-
ties. As agents of the oracle, the Aro paraded themselves as harbingers
of “peace” and “truth” who mediated disputes and disposed of “bad”
people, even though their main interest was in the human traffic. Baikie
recorded in 1854 that one unidentified informant had alone located up to
twenty Ibiniukpabi victims in Cuba. Another informant had bumped into
several in Sierra Leone (Baikie 1856:313). The role of the oracle in pro-
curing captives seems to have been unique in the Biafra case, but while
earlier studies portrayed the oracle as the major direct source of captives,
recent studies have correctly deemphasized it.26 The oracle neverthe-
less played an important role in dealing with dissidence and criminality.
Faced with the choice between owning up to a crime and being sent to
25
Although Koelle mentioned “Mbofia” instead of “Ohafia,” there can be little doubt that
he meant Ohafia. His location of Mbofia south of Ebiriba (Abiriba) is imprecise (Ohafia
is located east of Abiriba, not south), but it is as close as a description can be without
reference to maps. Even then, he correctly locates Ohafia east of Bende and roughly
north of Otutu (Ututu). The fact that Okon spoke a language “similar to that of Aro”
suggests Koelle meant to reference to Ohafia. The term “Mbofia” does not specific to any
particular locale or community. It is a generic reference – meaning “bush country” – to
the uncouth, badly behaved. The pronunciation of the term varied in dialectical areas.
The variant “Mbofia” was used by the Cross River Igbo, exclusive of Arochukwu, and by
northern Igbo, most of the Nri-Awka area, and the Niger riverine and west Niger com-
munities. The Isuama area and southern Igboland pronounced it “Mbohia.” The Aro and
the Awka pronounced it “Mbovia.” From all indications, however, the Aro do not refer as
such to Ohafia, who were one of the most reliable allies of the Aro. Mbohia, as recorded
by Baikie during 1854, lay “north or north–northwest of O’zuzu,” which in turn lay
northwest of Ngwa, close to Ogoni (Baikie 1856:309). Ozuzu was located northwest of
Ngwa (p. 308); it would not have been close to Ogoni, which lies southeast of Ngwa,
beyond the Ikwerre. “Ozuzu” is a term Koelle used to refer to yet another Igbo group in
Sierra Leone. It is actually a community, west of Ngwa.
26
Afigbo (1980:86; 1981b:267); Ijoma (1986a); Dike and Ekejiuba (1990).
136 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
27
Duke (1956:43, 75, 94). Duke’s diary has the ship as Combesboch, but a search of
the DuBois Database strongly suggests that this is the Gascoyne, captained by Peter
Comberbach. No ship in the database is named Combesboch. The spelling discrepancy
between Comberbach and Combesboh is probably a mistaken reading of Duke’s diary,
which was originally handwritten by those who prepared the manuscript for printing.
28
Koelle (1963:8). Most of my Aro respondents, at least, implied that resale was
common.
138 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
29
Captain John Adams, who carried captives from the Bight of Biafra between 1786 and
1800, noticed “a class of Heebos [whom] masters of slave-ships have always had a strong
aversion to purchase.” These captives had enjoyed an “exalted rank … in their own
country” (Crow 1830:199; Adams 1832:41). These were ozo men, holders of the highest
social rank in the Nri-Awka area.
Household and Market Persons 139
30
Captain Hugh Crow reports taking a 15-year-old boy, Finebone, who was travelling
from Bonny to England in early 1793 (Crow 1830:45). Also, John Africa, a Bonny court-
ier, “had been several times in England” by 1807 (Crow 1830:139). For the Senegambian
case, see Ashcroft- Eason (1997); Law and Lovejoy (1996:14–16).
31
Baikie (1856:333). About Mohammed Bello, see Lovejoy (1994b); Old Calabar mer-
chants, see Lovejoy and Richardson (1996); G. Williams (1897:543); and for Bonny, see
Falconbridge (1788:8) Crow (1830:87).
140 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
32
Baikie (1856:336); Hutchinson (1861:46–47, 54); G.I. Jones (1963:69, 87, 147, 152,
210); A.G. Leonard (1906:486, 254). For Aro settlements in coastal societies, see
Anthropologists’ Papers (1927:Appendix 1V); K. Oji (1972); G.I. Jones (1989:35–36);
Aro-Okeigbo Ancestral Almanac (1996); Kanu-Igbo (1996).
33
Anikpo (1985:35–38); P.C. Dike (1986); Ahajioku Lecture (1986:iii). Okonko is the ref-
erence for Ekpe in southern Igbo communities.
34
Membership did not, however, mean immunity to sale. An Ekpe member could be seized
and sold in a foreign community whose people might not have known or cared about
his Ekpe status. Also, an Ekpe member could be sold officially as punishment for serious
malfeasance. At any rate, seizing a person for sale was stealing, and thieves did not dis-
criminate, except if they could foresee severe repercussions (Igwe 1996; Kanu-Igbo 1996;
C. Okoli 1996).
35
There may be exceptions to the rule of selling people as punishment. Traditions of Oron
on the west bank of the lower Cross River claim that the sale of a community member
was taboo and that the people never participated in the slave trade. Here, “a person
who constituted a nuisance to the community” is said to have been “buried alive with
common consent.” The claim that community did not participate in the slave trade is
doubtful; the same traditions acknowledge that slavery was practiced among the people
Household and Market Persons 141
This man, named Mazi Oji, is kind to me because of the disaster that has hit
me on this trip. He has therefore told me that it is a shame that I have lost all
my wares, and for me and all my porters to go back to our land empty-handed.
Because of this, he has suggested that I and some of my porters return home today
so that this my relative and some of my other porters [go with him] for three days
to enable him to give you things to carry back to me. I will depend on these things
to survive. (quoted by Nwana 1950:7)36
by the late nineteenth century (see Uya 1984:79, 112–13). There is no indication that the
practice of slavery among the Oron was more recent than in other communities.
36
The text was translated by the author.
142 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
what we know about the Biafra hinterland during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries (K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:249, 255; Isichei
1976:46–47).
Conclusions
The relationship between the means of enslavement and the composition
of captives exported from the Bight of Biafra shows that cultural factors
shaped the structure of the slave trade there just as much as market forces
did. The deportation element, that is, the sale of people into Atlantic slav-
ery for judicial and political reasons, for instance, does not lend itself
to cost-benefit analysis. Market forces had a rather limited role to play
in the decision to retain a person in the region or to sell him to Euro-
American slave buyers. Internal slave users did not bid for captives in the
categories that were considered undesirable, who were rarely available
on the local market anyway. The deportation element and the role of
persons of the household in lineage expansion (especially among the Aro)
transcends conceptions of people merely as commodities or even as units
of labor. Market forces were not the primary determinant of whether
dangerous war captives, kidnapping victims (who could find their way
back home), rebellious slaves, incriminated persons, or rivals ended up
in the Atlantic market. Quite apart from economics, the choices slave
holders made reflected their idea of the ideal society, even though such
an idea was manifestly unjust, and the means of achieving it inherently
violent. Some palpably nonmarket circumstances limited their choices,
compelling them to choose not to choose certain categories of captives,
irrespective of region.
6
1
Fogel and Engerman 1974:75–77; D. G. White 1985:67–68, 98–105; Beckles 1989:7–23;
Higman 1976:194; Craton 1978:142–47; Walvin 1992:119–21; Moitt 1989; Berlin
1998:111.
144
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 145
labor in the fields, and the price differential between males and females
was generally much lower in the Americas than on the African coast (Eltis
and Engerman 1992:253).
The labor needs of New World planters were articulated in the categor-
ical instructions Euro-American shipowners gave to West Africa–bound
agents. Let us consider just two examples of these instructions from the
peak years of the Atlantic slave trade. On October 7, 1725, a group of
Bristol merchants, who then dominated the Biafra trade, directed Captain
William Barry of the Dispatch to buy 240 “Choice slaves” from the
obscure port of Andoni. None of these should “exceed the years of 25 or
under 10 if possible, among which so many men, and stout men boys as
can be had seeing such are most Valuable at the Plantations” (Hobhouse
et al. 1725:327). Although plantation America and the organization of
the slave trade had undergone important changes, due partly to major
wars, rising shipping costs (Eltis and Engerman 1993:314–15), and a sub-
stantial drop in the male/female price differential in Biafra ports (Inikori
1992a:137–38), Africa-bound ship captains continued to receive similar
instructions. On July 18, 1803, seventy-eight years after Captain Barry’s
instructions, Thomas Leyland (1803:651), owner of the Enterprise and
a member of the Liverpool merchant community that had since the
1740s assumed the helm of the British slave trade, charged Bonny-bound
Captain Caesar Lawson with the following instruction:
By Law this vessel is allowed to carry 400 Negroes, and we request that they may
all be males, if possible to get them, at any rate buy as few females as in your
power, because we look to a Spanish market for the disposal of your cargo, where
Females are a very tedious sale. In the choice of the Negroes be very particular,
select those that are well formed and strong; and do not buy any above 24 years
of Age, as it may happen that you will have to go to Jamaica, where you know
any exceeding that age would be liable to a Duty of £10 per head.
Some Americanists have supplied details about how New World planters
chose the sex configuration of captives, but the gender structure of the
slave trade reflected African choices as well.2
African gender studies, on the other hand, have rarely focused on the
era of the Atlantic slave trade. Economic historians have generally avoided
gender questions, and historical demographers who address the issue
have usually assumed uniform sex and age ratios for all African regions.
2
For the American angle, see Littlefield 1981:56–73; Sheridan 1994:241–42, 253; Wax
1973.
146 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
3
African gender studies have been the subject of special issues of three major Africanist
journals since the early 1970s (Wipper 1972; Bay and Hafkin 1975; Marks and Rathbone
1983). Only the last has contributions (Donald Crummey, “Family and Property amongst
the Arnhara Nobility,” pp. 207–20, and Anne Hilton, “Family and Kinship among the
Kongo South of the Zaire River from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries,” pp. 189–
206) dealing with the era covered in this chapter, and only Hilton’s deals with Atlantic
Africa. Most other historical works on this sphere have concentrated on the nineteenth-
century transition from the Atlantic slave trade to other economic activities, made most
explicit in Roberts 1984. See also Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997; Robertson and Martin A.
Klein 1983a; Robertson 1984; Martin 1988. Other exceptions include Bay 1977, 1998;
Alpers 1984; Greene 1996; Ogbomo 1997. The interdisciplinary volume edited by Flora
Kaplan provides the widest range of precolonial case studies about gender, overwhelmingly
from West Africa. These case studies provide a window into the intricacies of gendered
power structures, allowing us to discern that rather than all African women simply being
objects of gender constructions, some were actually players whose power helped to shape
the slave trade (Kaplan 1997). Sandra Barnes’s contribution makes a vigorous case for the
focus on elite women power, mostly in terms of its role in shaping political conflict; Edna
Bay grounds some of the key themes of elite women with an empirical analysis of their
power Dahomey; Sabine Jell-Bahlsen, Flora Nwapa and Helen Henderson provide use-
ful analyses of elite women in Igbo communities, mainly post-eighteenth century (Barnes
1997; Bay 1997; Jell-Bahlsen 1997; Nwapa 1997; H. Henderson 1997). However, the
volume’s focus on elite women is of necessity a limited view of how gender constructions –
particularly with regard to labor – affected the slave trade, and try as one may, several
of the contributions cannot be read backward beyond the mid-nineteenth century. For
historical demography, see Thornton 1980, 1981; Inikori 1981; Manning 1981; 1990:61.
4
Robertson and Klein 1983; Manning 1990:42; Lovejoy and Richardson 1995a, 1995b.
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 147
5
Edwards 1793:74; Adams 1832:41; Crow 1830:198; Lander and Lander 1832:240–41;
Leonard 1898:207.
148 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
The present study does not reject outright the conclusions of any of the
recent work on age and gender in the slave trade. It does, however, attempt to
recast the question of gender by taking into account African factors to explain
not only the overall demographic structure of the trade but also interregional
differences.6 In particular, it draws on the insights of the historian Sandra
Greene, even though her work has been chiefly concerned with the impact of
the slave trade on Africa, whereas the present study examines how African
constructions of gender interacted with and shaped the Atlantic slave trade.
For the Ewe group on the both Gold Coast and the Slave Coasts, Greene
links demographic pressures on land arising from conflict to the evolution
of a culture of conspicuous consumption, both of which stemmed ultimately
from the slave trade. She traces the impact of this process on constructions
of gender and gives a central role to ethnicity in her analysis. In short, she
recognizes that gender relations often varied from group to group (Greene
1996). Differing conceptions of gender among African peoples are central to
explaining the structure of the slave trade as well as its impact.
While markets mediate both economic and noneconomic values,
economic behavior has many cultural determinants. As was made clear
in Chapter 5, there are some obvious patterns of behavior in the Bight of
Biafra (and no doubt elsewhere) that are difficult to account for in terms
of maximizing profits. It seems unlikely that economics will explain why,
for example, the region’s specialized warriors decapitated the men they
captured in warfare instead of selling them, especially when Europeans
went to the coast looking first and foremost for men. Profit maximization
was only one factor that shaped African conceptions of gender. Of the three
slave markets known to have coexisted in Africa during the Atlantic slave
trade era, the Saharan market was generally female oriented, whereas both
females and children predominated in the domestic market. The Atlantic
market concentrated on dealing in males, preferably adult males. The spe-
cific configuration of any of these markets in a particular region, as well as
the nature and local uses of other commodities produced there, might be
expected to have some impact on the gender structure of export captives.
In the Bight of Biafra, the institution of female slavery was marginal and
the influence of the Saharan market was remote.
The role of two agricultural products – yam (ji) and kolanut (ọjị) –
distinguished the Igbo from their neighbors and was also a major factor
6
Significant steps have already been taken in this direction. See Eltis 1986:257–72; Eltis
and Engerman 1992:237–57, 1993:308–23; Eltis and Richardson 1997:29–33; Geggus
1989:23–44; Nwokeji 1997b.
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 149
7
Ojiaku 2008:14. Ojiaku places palm oil on the same level of importance among the Igbo.
Though this may have been the case before palm oil was heavily commercialized in the
nineteenth century and even though the product continues to have use value, it is no lon-
ger handled reverentially if it ever was. Although the Oron and Anang – as well as the Efik
and Ibono – see themselves as different peoples, historical and linguistic evidence strongly
suggests that they are subgroups of the Ibibio (Essien 1991:48; E.A. Udo 1983).
150 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
8
This was the case in the Gold Coast before the seventeenth century, a phenomenon
explained below.
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 151
Table 6.1. Proportion of Females Leaving the Gold Coast, the Bight of
Benin, and the Bight of Biafra, 1601–1864
Source: slavevoyages.org
9
Manning 1981:501, 1990:42; Thornton 1977, 1980; Miller 1988:159–67.
152 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
were said to “have so much Employment, that they ought not to sit still.” In
the same period in Whydah in Dahomey, women “Till[ed] the Ground, for
their Husbands only.” In West-Central Africa, the Capuchin priest Denis de
Carli reported that, while seventeenth-century Kongo men served in large
armies and carried “great Logs of wood of a Vast weight,” they neverthe-
less enjoyed considerable leisure time. Women, on the other hand, worked
from morning to evening tilling the ground, sowing all crops, cultivat-
ing, and harvesting in addition to their family and household duties. The
same was true of contemporaneous coastal societies of the Upper Guinea
Coast, a region that also exported small proportions of females, according
to reports written in both halves of the seventeenth century. In southern
Mozambique, men were said to have done next to nothing.10 The forego-
ing situations reflected the immediate agricultural needs in many African
societies in which women performed the bulk of agricultural labor.
Yet do all these indications of a major economic role for women mean
that the cultural determinants of unbalanced sex ratios were the same in
all sub-Saharan societies and remained constant over time? For historian
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, the pattern that held in most of West Africa
was also valid in the Bight of Biafra. She claims that among the Igbo “it was
women who worked in the fields” (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997:11). But if
the economic role of women was so great, why was a higher proportion of
females sent into the trade from this region than from elsewhere in Atlantic
Africa? Interregional differences in the gender division of labor suggest
interregional differences in conceptions of gender that may have affected
the sex ratios in both the slave trade and in societies supplying that trade,
at least as much as did the requirements of planters in the Americas.
Enough is known about women’s work in the Bight of Biafra to ques-
tion Coquery-Vidrovitch’s observations (Ekechi 1981:41; Hargreaves
1987:94). In this region, both males and females contributed significantly
to agriculture. The hoe per se has never been, as Coquery-Vidrovitch
claims, principally a women’s tool among the peoples of the Bight of
Biafra. Generally, men used the big hoe to till the ground, and women and
children used the small one for weeding.11
The division of labor was particularly clear-cut among the two groups
that supplied the overwhelming majority of the region’s captives – the
10
For Dahomey, see Bosman 1705:344; for Benin, Van Nyendael 1702:463; for Kongo, de
Carli:622, 629, 630–31; for southern Mozambique, Alpers 1984:39–40; and for Upper
Guinea Coast, Rodney 1970:103, and Thornton 1983:44, 1992:107.
11
Leith-Ross 1939:89–92; Forde and Jones 1950:13, 70; Uchendu, 1965:24; Paul Bohannan
and Laura Bohannan 1968:66; Njoku 1991:120.
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 153
Igbo and the Ibibio. Females performed a wide range of tasks, such as
weeding and planting vegetables and other crops – pumpkins, maize,
okra, beans, pepper, and cocoyam (Colocassia). Tilling the ground,
planting and stemming yam, building, and climbing trees were exclu-
sively male tasks. Both men and women were involved in clearing, but
it was nevertheless a predominantly male activity.12 In several Igbo com-
munities, the historical agricultural role of men was such that women
assumed a major role only in the twentieth century largely because men
were at the time diverting their labor to the new opportunities created
by the colonial economy (Chuku 2005:88). In the coastal societies, male
slaves dominated the market for manual labor related to trade and did
the same when agriculture became important. Most women performed
“non-slave, low-status” domestic, agricultural, and commercial activities.
Captain Hugh Crow, in his regular visits to the region from the late eigh-
teenth century to 1807, observed that in Bonny it was the women who
fetched condiments for the kitchens of European ships.13 So unimportant
was women’s role in agriculture made to seem in the patriarchal order
that even in the second quarter of the twentieth century the missionary
G.T. Basden omitted it altogether in his otherwise informative chapter
on “women’s work” (Basden 1966:325–33). The major role of males in
the agriculture of the Bight of Biafra–Igbo societies, in particular, is not
replicated in other African regions that supplied captives to the Americas.
The one place where a similar phenomenon has been observed is a small
part of Senegambia – the Balanta country. Here, as in the Bight of Biafra,
men, rather than women, dominated agriculture, and, again, as in the
Bight of Biafra, the societies he studied supplied a higher proportion of
female captives to the Atlantic trade than was the norm (see Hawthorne
2003:14–15, 137–39).
It is not always easy to determine how much of the gender division
of labor antedated the slave trade and shaped its gender structure or
how much of this division was a direct result of the trade. Historian
John Thornton presents a useful method for measuring change during the
Atlantic slave trade. He assumes that the preponderantly male exports
affected the women the transatlantic traffic left behind in two major ways.
First, the export slave trade depleted the size of the working population
12
In the twentieth century, these crops included the new varieties of yams, which were
considered as inferior: Forde and Jones 1950:13, 70; Green 1947:170–71; Uchendu
1965:24–25; Ifemesia 1979:62; Mba 1982:29–30; Nwala 1985:178.
13
Crow 1830:44; Nair 1972:37, 42–43; Latham 1973:91–96. The quotation is from
Hargreaves 1997:95–97.
154 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
14
For the entire Igbo, Nwokeji 1998b:325–26; for the entire Biafra, Nwokeji 1997b; for
southern Igboland, Martin 1988:25; for Bonny, Hargreaves 1987:94–97.
155
Table 6.2. Women, Girls, Men, and Boys Leaving Major Embarkation Points in the Bight of Biafra, Selected Quarters,
1651–1850 (in percents)
Bonny/New Old Calabar Bonny/New Old Calabar Bonny/New Old Calabar Bonny/New Old Calabar
Calabar Calabar Calabar Calabar
1651–1675 46.3 45.7 4.2 3.7 39.2 43.7 10.4 6.9
1676–1700 45.4 50.5 3.9 3.2 44.2 39.8 6 6.4
1776–1800 37.8 30.7 8.2 10.5 46.8 46.8 6.8 12
1801–1825 21.3 19.7 17.9 13.4 49.6 53 11.2 14
1826–1850 13.7 15.9 17.8 19.2 51.3 42.8 17.2 22.1
1651–1850 31.2 30.9 11 12.4 47.3 42.6 10.3 14.3
The quarters 1701–1725, 1726–1750, and 1751–1775 are omitted because of a lack of data. For a full representation of the data for 1651–1850,
including measures of variance and tests of significance, see http://www.wm.edu/oieahc. Rows do not always total 100 percent owing to varying sample
sizes for each demographic group.
156 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
15
A database of Africans on board recaptured Americas-bound vessels in the nineteenth
century shows that no less than 10 percent of captives leaving Old Calabar between 1822
and 1837 came from western Cameroon (Nwokeji and Eltis 2002b:204). The proportion
of Cameroonians among captives leaving Old Calabar in the eighteenth century would
have been much smaller than is suggested by the nineteenth-century sample; above all,
the Cameroons slave trade did not come into its own until after the mid-eighteenth
century. Information about the gender division of labor in western Cameroons comes
from historian Fritz-Canute Ngwa and his students at University of Beua, Cameroon, on
October 26, 2002.
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 157
three ports (together accounting for 85 percent of all departures from the
Bight of Biafra) deviating from other African regions, though the Bight of
Biafra, in common with most other African regions, sent increasing pro-
portions of males and children into the Atlantic slave trade over time. To
the extent that there were differences among ports in the Bight of Biafra
(and readers should keep in mind the gaps in the data in the important
mid-eighteenth-century period), they show up in the last quarter of the
eighteenth century when the slave trade from the Bight of Biafra was at
its peak. Bonny in these years (and possibly, too, in the preceding two
quarters when data are lacking) sent more females into the trade than
did the Cross River port of Old Calabar, probably due to the presence of
western Cameroonians among captives leaving Old Calabar.
Fieldwork among the Aro supports the argument that female slavery
was marginal in the region. Asked whether men routinely acquired slave
women, respondents indicated that even if a man retained a female trade
captive in his household, the relationship invariably changed to that of
husband and wife. Alternatively, the man might give her to his wife as
a slave or to one of his sons or dependents as a wife. One respondent
reported that, among the Aro, women were a small part of slavehold-
ing: “There were [women slaves], but not so many. A female slave would
be given to a slave man because a woman could not establish an ama
[lineage].”16 Moreover, as one elder noted, an important reason for the
accumulation of male slaves is that they could be used in fighting wars
(M.S. Igwe 1996). According to another elder, the Aro believed that
Women were difficult. Their mobility was minimal. It was only practical to buy
a woman and she became your wife or that of your son, or she became a fellow
woman’s slave. Except if she was sold to a far away place or overseas, it was not
very practical. In certain circumstances, people bought female slaves, but they
invariably ended as wives. I do not think, however, that a person set out to buy
a woman so that she would become his wife. What I am sure of is that women
bought women slave. (N.A. Anyakoha 1996)
16
Kanu-Igbo 1996. See also Akpu 1996; Anyakoha 1996; M. S. Igwe 1996; Maduadichie
1996; E. Nwankwo 1996; C. Okoli 1996; Elizabeth Okoro 1996; J. G. Okoro 1996;
J. O. Okoro 1996; J. E. Uche 1996.
158 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
17
Amadiume 1987. Contrary to Amadiume’s claim, many of my respondents indicated
that slave women were eventually labeled “wives” (Akpu 1996; Anyakoha 1996; M.S.
Igwe 1996; Maduadichie 1996; C. Okoli 1996; E. Okoro 1996; E. Nwankwo 1996;
Igwilo 1996; Martina Ike 1995; Aloy Nwankwo 1996; M. N. Okoli 1996; Umunnakwe
1996).
18
The change must be associated with slavers’ response to the antislavery efforts of the
British colonial administration, which peaked in the 1930s. This was when child dealing,
especially in girls, became endemic. Most of the transactions were cloaked as “marriage,”
confusing the colonial administrators who came to regard all bridewealth payment as
slave dealing (Nwokeji 1998b:337). Buchi Emecheta’s novel Slave Girl, set in the 1900s
through the 1920s, confirms that these marriages were indeed slavery: “Many of the
market women had slaves in great number.” The female slaves referred to in the novel
are all owned by mistresses. Even Chiago, who was sold by her father and purchased by
another man, is presented to her buyer’s wife. Yet selling girls to mistresses is actually
expressed in terms of “marry[ing] her away” (Emecheta 1977:50, 58, 60–61). When it
did not involve slavery, it was probably proxy marriage contracted by the first wives of
male Christian converts who sought to maintain Christian status while being polygynous,
as Oliver Akamnonu’s novel, Taste of the West, makes clear (Akamnonu 2008: 99–102).
Marriage differed from slavery because, unlike a slave, a married woman and her total
labor power were not alienated from her lineage (Kilkenny 1981: 158–59). In her impor-
tant biography of the wealthy, late-nineteenth, early-twentieth-century Onitsha market
woman Omu Okwei, Felicia Ekejiuba writes that Okwei “acquired beautiful girls mostly
‘adopted’ children or children pawned to her by her debtors.” In 1921, Okwei admitted
that one Uyanwa was her slave as Okwei struggled to retain the right of inheriting the
property that Uyanwa’s husband, a European United African Company manager to whom
Okwei had given her in “marriage,” would leave behind (Ekejiuba (1967: 633–46). As
in Emecheta’s novel, the story revolves around girls. The idea that the “female husband”
relationship is an ancient institution seems to have sprung from the unfortunate tendency
of much existing literature to view Igbo women as unchanging.
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 159
in the proportion of the overall females entering the Bight of Biafra slave
trade. Bonny was the main outlet for captives from central Igboland. The
expansion of the Biafra trade, the rise of the Aro network, the shift of
trade from Old Calabar to Bonny, and changes in gender ratios were cor-
related developments. In the Bight of Biafra, then, unlike in other African
regions, preexisting gender constructions seem to account for the export
of a high proportion of females.
The objective here is to recognize, first, that men played an important
role in agriculture, second, that scholars of the slave trade have given this
male role insufficient attention in the recent literature, and third, that the
gender ideology that emerged (or was “constructed”) in some societies in
the Bight of Biafra had more to do with preexisting cultural norms than
with the reality of what women could or could not do. On this last point,
among the Tiv of the Middle Belt in the hinterland of the Niger Delta,
male and female roles in agriculture were initially carefully defined and
to a large extent, separated. The Tiv explained this division as a function
of the physical inequality of men and women and the need for females to
be modest, even though the differentials in the strength requirements of
tasks on either side of the divide are not obvious and modesty is cultur-
ally determined (Bohannan and Bohannan 1968:66).
Cultural, as opposed to biological, factors were important in the allo-
cation of crops and crop tasks in most of Igboland and had important
implications for the slave trade. Although yam was the staple food in many
societies bordering on both the Bight of Benin and the Bight of Biafra,
including the adjacent Middle Belt, only among the Igbo and the Ibibio of
Biafra was it regarded as the king of crops and cultivated exclusively by
men. Among the Igbo and Ibibio, yam, if available, would be eaten before
anything else, but the significance of yam was more far-reaching among
the former. As anthropologist Charles Meek put it, “all other crops [were]
merely subsidiary” to the yam among the Igbo. Alexander Falconbridge
observed that “Yams are the favorite food of the Eboe.” This preference
remained constant into the twentieth century, which cannot be said of
their neighbors. While ownership of a large yam barn was also a mark
of high status among the Oron on the Cross River for the known pre-
colonial period, cultivation of the most valued species quickly “petered
out” during the colonial period (Uya 1984:61), which was when Basden
observed that yam “stands to [the Igbo] as the potato does to the typical
Irishman. A shortage of the yam supply is a cause of genuine distress, for
no substitute gives the same sense of satisfaction.” More important, the
amount of yam a person possessed was a key measure of his wealth, and
160 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
yam had varied ritual functions as well. Women’s role in yam cultivation
was restricted to weeding. The so-called subsidiary crops such as maize,
cocoyam, okra, and beans surpassed the yam in both nutritional quality
and yield, but yam was considered supreme because it was in the male
domain. Literary luminary Chinua Achebe calls yam “a very exacting
king” and writes that “for three or four moons it demanded hard work
and constant attention from cock-crow till the chickens went back to
roost.” Basden further assessed the cost effectiveness of yam cultivation:
Although Basden’s observation reveals the Igbo and the Ibibio fixa-
tion on the yam, perhaps beyond the point of economic rationality, the
crop did yield reasonable economic returns (Achebe 1996:33; Basden
1966:389–90, 394; Falconbridge 1788:21; Meek 1937:16–17, 32–35,
49, 168, 188, 215, 238; Onyekwelu 2001:82–84).
Yam production owed something to women’s input, but females occu-
pied a lesser agricultural role in the Bight of Biafra compared to other
African coastal regions. In Biafra, anthropologist Victor Uchendu writes,
“women’s crops follow the men’s.” Apart from symbolizing the degrada-
tion of women’s role in agriculture, this statement indicates that part of
women’s labor (principally weeding) went to yam production. Women
were made to plant their crops, in Uchendu’s words, “between the spaces
provided by the yam hills.”19 Yams occupied the central point of the hill
or mound of earth, while women’s crops were planted around its base,
a symbolic representation of perceived inferiority of women’s crops and
women’s labor. This mentality affected day-to-day decisions and food-
preference patterns. Because women did not primarily work yam and
were not acknowledged as important in its production, this region’s
leaders, it would seem, were more willing to countenance the forced
migration of females. By contrast, in the Gold Coast, Upper Guinea
Coast, and West-Central Africa, females were vital to the production of
rice or corn, and, as a result, smaller proportions of females were sent
19
Uchendu 1965:24–25; P. Ottenberg 1959:207; Ifemesia 1979:62; Amadiume 1987:28–30,
37–38. Among the Owan, northwest of the Igbo, where yam was also gendered, men and
women appeared more powerful in localities where they respectively controlled this crop
(Ogbomo, 1997:97).
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 161
Means of Enslavement
If, as was shown in Chapter 5, the means of enslavement shaped the
composition of captives exported overseas, it would have had an impact
on the gender and age composition as well. Although enslavement strat-
egies might be expected to have adjusted to whatever means supplied
the market best, some practices in the Bight of Biafra are hard to explain
in those terms. Male captives were more valuable than their female
counterparts in Atlantic markets, but instead of Bight of Biafra warriors
targeting male captives, they cut off heads as a matter of honor – pro-
vided the victims were men. Surviving prisoners tended to be women
and children (Nwokeji 1997b). The fact that the Upper Guinea Coast,
through which the Western Sudan supplied captives to the Atlantic,
recorded the highest proportion of men, and the Bight of Biafra, the low-
est indicates significant differences in social processes, including enslave-
ment mechanisms. In the Senegambia section of the Upper Guinea Coast,
where the economies of the Bambara and Tukolor states – particularly
the resources needed to socially reproduce their warrior class – were
heavily dependent on slaving during the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, warfare was so central to slave procurement that it assumed the
proportions of a means of production (Roberts 1980). All kinds of war
20
For gender division and specialization among the Yoruba, see Belasco (1980:7, 59,
68), Toyin Falola (1984:54), Coquery – Vidrovitch (1997:11). It is important to note
that recent studies of the Yoruba have suggested the fluidity of gender (Matory 1994).
Oyeronke Oyewumi has gone as far as denying any notions of the gender division of
labor and suggests that the concept of gender is alien to Yoruba culture (Oyewumi 1997,
esp. 64–77). Even Jane I. Guyer (1980:362), who deals specifically with gender division
of labor in Yorubaland, notes in a comparative context that the notion was “phrased in
terms of pragmatism rather than metaphysics.” These are useful pointers. Nevertheless,
we must still come to terms with why one sex was over-represented in some activities
and not in others, and why the sexes were sent into the Atlantic traffic in a significantly
unequal distribution.
162 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
pivotal role.21 The nuts remained so valuable into the nineteenth century
that Hausa caravan traders en route to Asante still used them to pay
tolls to local authorities because they were “much relished and not easy
to get” (Herskovits 1936:18). Given the proximity of kolanut-produc-
ing Igboland to Hausaland, a trade in kolanut between the two regions
should have resulted as, according to Onuora Nzekwu (1961:305), it
did between the Cameroon section of Bight of Biafra’s forest region and
Bornu in present-day northeastern Nigeria. Why, then, did the kolanut
not support the trans-Saharan trade in the Igbo-dominated part of the
Bight of Biafra, in spite of its potential to generate substantial demand
among the Hausa majority of the savanna?
The special significance of kolanut in Igbo life is one important factor.
Much of the information we have about the kolanut in the Bight of Biafra
comes from twentieth-century sources, but since there is no hint in Igbo
oral traditions, or in the relevant historical and ethnographic studies, that
the significance of the kolanut has changed significantly since the days
of the slave trade, this evidence is valuable in understanding the role of
kolanut in Igbo life before the twentieth century. As has been mentioned,
several West African groups used kolanut, but none – certainly in the Bight
of Biafra – seems to have attached to it as much social and ritual signifi-
cance as did the Igbo.22 The special niche that kolanut had occupied in Igbo
life is well stated by one character in Achebe’s storied novel Things Fall
Apart: “He who brings kola brings life” (Achebe 1996:6). Kolanut served
as the mandatory focus of prayers; its rites invoked ndị-ichie (the ances-
tors) at the commencement of any significant occasion, such as festivals,
contracts, covenants, adjudication of cases, asking for important favors,
and rites of passage. During festivals, women of the household, extended
family, or town – depending on the level at which the particular rite was
celebrated – usually supplied the kolanuts. Women presented kolanuts to
men as special gifts in appreciation for a favor done or simply to demon-
strate obeisance. The kolanut also had immeasurable quotidian uses. It
was the first thing a host was expected to present to a visitor.23 Individuals
21
Lovejoy has observed that kolanuts have “been singled out as the commodity of most
interest” in the trade between the Hausa of Nigeria and the Asante in today’s Ghana
(Lovejoy 1980:1).
22
One other group among whom kolanut meant more than mere stimulant and/or snack
were the Ibibio. Anthropologist P. Amaury Talbot has described how kolanut was used
welcome guests and for divination (Talbot 1967:238).
23
The presentation of kolanut by a woman to a man required no ceremony; the man
would simply accept the kolanuts, thank the woman and keep them for future
164 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
who could afford kolanut beyond the aforementioned uses also used it as
a stimulant or snack, but social and spiritual uses predominated. The rit-
ual of “breaking” kolanut was an elaborate four-step process, with minor
local variations.24 The fact that kolanut and yam were among the earliest
Igbo crops seems to account for the spiritual and social importance they
acquired in Igbo culture.25
occasions. If, however, the kolanuts were presented at the beginning of an occasion,
the kolanuts or some of them were utilized for the prayers. Both men and women
ate kolanut among the Igbo, but it was taboo for women to break kolanut except
in the absence of a male. As long as a male is old enough to break kolanut, which
could be as young as 4, he was his responsibility to do so. For the ritual and social
aspects of kolanut, see Talbot 1926b:316; Meek 1937:21, 22, 32, 62, 151, 167, 168–69,
170, 174, 194, 205, 239, 241, 245; Nzekwu 1961; Uchendu 1965:84–85; Ezeliora
1994:43, 60–61; Muotoh 2000:44–46; Ohia 2007:25–26; Achebe 1996:18–19; Metuh
1973:5; H.A.P. Nwana n.d.: 34–36; Onwuka Njoku 2000:70; Alisa 2003. Igbo Catholic
priest Asonye Ihenacho has likened the ritual around kolanut with the Christian Holy
Eucharist (Ihenacho 2004:106, 160–65). Oral tradition from Amaokpala in the Ndi-
Eni area asserts that dispute over kolanut protocol was the immediate cause of one war
between Amaokpala and Aro Ndikelionwu in the second half of the nineteenth century
(Onyekwelu 2001:4–7).
24
The first step involved the relay presentation of the kolanut(s) (icho oji) that recognized
every person present in the order of their relationship to the host, representing the sym-
bolic “travel” of the kolanut to the respective hometowns of all adult males present, with
the kolanut ultimately “returning” to the host. The second step consisted in the offer of
prayers to the ancestors, usually by the oldest male present. The third act consisted in the
actual breaking of the kolanut(s) by the oldest male present (or his delegate), who would
give one cotyledon to the ancestors by throwing it on a shrine or the ground as may be
deemed appropriate, take one cotyledon or a piece of it for himself. Finally, the youngest
male present passed the remaining pieces to all present. The remainder was then returned
to the host as aka oji, which literarily translates as “hand of kolanut” but actually refers
to the share of the person (hand) who had brought the kolanut.
25
Following the theory advanced by Russian botanist and geneticist Nikolai Vavilov that
the region of the greatest diversity of species of any plant is likely to be the location
where the plant was first domesticated, life scientist A.O. Anya has significantly argued
that what we know today as Igboland was the center where these two particular plants
were first domesticated (Anya 1982). Although Anya did not analyze the implications
of kolanut and yam in terms of gender, slavery or interregional trade specifically, he did
stress a relationship among the economy and ecology and social organization.
What is clear is that even the cosmological and religious constructs of a society – the
way it sees the world around it and the forces which shape its world are functional
derivatives of the ecological and economic situation. The lgbo polity must, therefore,
be understood against the background of its evolution and stability through the mil-
lennia: it was a viable organism designed to mediate and conserve relations in a sophis-
ticated and successful but nevertheless predominantly sedentary agricultural economy.
Even the religious and moral attributes which are associated with this culture bear the
imprint of its ecological and thus agricultural origin (Anya 1982).
Whether or not Igboland was where the kolanut was first domesticated, as Anya has
suggested, the antiquity of the use of kolanut (and yam) in Igbo life is beyond doubt.
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 165
26
With modern agricultural methods, C. acuminata bears fruits in seven to eight years, but
it needs to be watered regularly (www.tradewindsfruit.com). Since the Igbo did not water
fruit trees regularly, their kolanut trees would have taken somewhat longer to yield fruits.
27
Despite the impression given by Anya that the Igbo have produced multiple varieties kola-
nut for centuries, however, it is unclear that C. nitida was among their products before
the twentieth century. One strong indication of this is that the twentieth-century Igbo
identified C. nitida specifically with the Hausa, referring to it as ojị Ausa (Hausa kolanut)
or “gworo,” which is the generic Hausa reference for all kolanut. Hausa traders in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may in fact have given C. nitida the little popular-
ity it gained in Igboland, if they did not introduce it in there in the first place.
166 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
While there is evidence of goods entering the region from Asia and
the Middle East as early as the ninth century and probably considerably
before, suggesting long-standing trade links with regions across the Sahara,
nothing shows that such trade contacts survived into the slave trade era.
The religion of Islam, which usually accompanied the trans-Saharan trade
in West Africa, was lacking in the Bight of Biafra because trade contacts
with the north were made before Islam became a significant force in West
Africa. One other indication of the marginality of the trans-Saharan trade
in the region is that the Middle Belt does not appear to have accounted
for a large share of the captives exported through Bight of Biafra ports
in the period up to 1700, even though the Hausa and the Bornu raided
the Middle Belt for captives as early as the early sixteenth century.28 After
the seventeenth century, Hausa traders drew from the Middle Belt most
of the captives they sold in Gold Coast markets, where they were valued
as ndonko (foreigner slaves) (Herskovits 1926:20; Lovejoy 1982, 271;
Reynolds 1974, 12). This practice escalated in the nineteenth century and
the Hausa continued to send many of the victims to Gold Coast markets
(Herskovits 1936:17, 20, 22; Mason 1969). Based on his frequent slaving
voyages to the Bight of Biafra in the last twenty years of the eighteenth
century, Captain John Adams confirmed that captives leaving the Bonny
port rarely included people from north of the Igbo. No evidence of trade
from across the Sahara exists for this period for the forest region of the
Bight of Biafra. Certainly, there were no horses, and in spite of all the talk
about their high mortality rates in forest conditions, horses became an
instant attraction when they eventually reached the forest region of the
Bight of Biafra during the nineteenth century. It is true that several crops –
such as bananas, plantains, cocoyam (or Colocassia esculata) and even the
Dioscorea species of yam – and domestic animals such as goat and fowl
that have long been considered basic items in the diet of people of the Bight
of Biafra are said to have derived from South Asia sometime in the distant
past. Other than these artifacts of the Igbo-Ukwu vintage, dating back to
the ninth century, are the only goods from the Indian Ocean commerce
known to have traveled into the region from across the Sahara.29 Other
28
In the 1520s, Leo Africanus reported of Hausa raiding their neighbors and Hausa mer-
chants being involved in trade with distant lands, principally “the Region abounding in
Gold” (Africanus 1896:831, 832). Raymond Mauny is of the view that the raids were
directed against against southern groups (Middle Belt) (Mauny 1961:190). See also
Barbour and Jacobs 1985: 127.
29
Adams (1832:33). See Hair (1967:262–64) for ethnolinguistic distribution of Americas –
bound captives up to 1700, Sargent (1999:8, 9, 13, 106–31) for Benin expansion
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 167
items that may have continued to enter the Bight of Biafra from the Indian
Ocean during the Atlantic slave trade era were more likely to have done so
via east-west routes through Central and East Africa in the east and Benin
in the west. The four-day market cycle, which Central African communi-
ties as eastward as the Kongo shared with groups in the Bight of Biafra, is
probably an indication of long-standing commercial interactions between
this part of West and Central Africa.30 Clearly, there were important struc-
tural reasons for the failure or virtual absence of the trans-Saharan trade
in the Bight of Biafra during the centuries of the overseas slave trade. These
reasons go beyond the simple idea that the forest is a great impediment to
the horse- and camel-driven caravan trade. Hausa traders did, after all,
trade as far as Kumasi in the Gold Coast, a trade which Leo Africanus
informs us was well in place by the 1520s when he visited West Africa
(Africanus 1896:831, 832).
The isolation of the forest region of the Bight of Biafra from the
trans-Saharan trade during the Atlantic slave trade era seems to have
also been associated with the rise and special circumstances of the state
of Kwararafa in northeastern Middle Belt by the fourteenth century.
Incessant conflicts with neighboring Muslim Hausa states, including
the trans-Saharan commercial powerhouses Kano and Borno, forced
Kwararafa southward, transforming it “from a Sudanic state with lim-
ited access to the trans-Saharan commercial system to a troubled mid-
dle belt polity competing for Benue commerce and overland trade to
[Old] Calabar in the south.” Kwararafa then clashed perennially with
the Middle Belt polities, until its demise and supersession by non-Is-
lamic states in the seventeenth century (Sargent 1999:8, 211–40). These
conflicts in both the north and south disrupted the trans-Saharan trade
in the Middle Belt, especially in the eastern axis adjacent to the Bight
of Biafra, a process that culminated in the decimation of the Kwararafa
successor state Jukun by the Tiv and Igala by the eighteenth century. The
westward and northward expansion of Benin after 1500 enabled the
kingdom to link the transatlantic trade to northerners, who increasingly
desired goods from the trade, but no comparable process promoted
31
See Lovejoy and Hogendorn 1979:225 for the decimation of the Jukun trade, and Sargent
1999:93, 191, 194 for the role of Benin in facilitating north–south trade in the seventh
century.
32
This import would have catered, in part, to the needs of the Lagos Afro-Brazilian com-
munity, among whom Kristin Mann found kolanut to be of some economic and cul-
tural significance during the second half of the nineteenth century (Mann 2007:127). It
was also around this time that the Egba Yoruba of Abeokuta joined the kolanut trade
(Biobaku 1965:10). Evidence from the nineteenth century suggests that the Yoruba used
kolanut in divination and as can be gleaned from the work of Saburi Biobaku also as
status symbol and the symbolic “breaking kola together” (sharing a kolanut) was used
to mark the settlement of disputes (see Biobaku 1965:14–15 n1, 28, 106n; Ojo 1966:53).
No doubt, kolanut was important among the Yoruba, but Afolabi Ojo appears to have
exaggerated its historical, social and spiritual significance among them when he stated
in the 1960s: “Kolanuts remains the choicest present and offering on all occasions: no
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 169
of the kolanut trade between Bight of Benin’s forest belt and Hausaland
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reflects the fact that trade
between the two regions was not as robust as is usually assumed and
pales in comparison to contemporary trade between Hausaland and the
Gold Coast. When in the first half of the twentieth century anthropologist
Melville Herskovits asked Hausa elders who had participated in the cara-
van trade late in the previous century, “whether or not trading was car-
ried on to the south into the territory of the Yoruban peoples of Southern
Nigeria, or into Dahomey, the reply was negative – for both countries
it was said that ‘the donkey doesn’t go there’” (Herskovits 1936:19).
Had this trade been robust and had production of kolanut resulted as
expected in Bight of Benin’s forest belt, more Hausa traders would have
traded in this region and likely would have bought more female captives
from there than they did, reducing the pool of female captives available
for overseas export through Bight of Benin ports.
The Gold Coast provides perhaps the starkest example of the kola-
nut trade impacting the gender structure of the slave trade. The propor-
tion of females sent overseas from the region was noticeably higher than
the African mean during the late seventeenth century, but their numbers
declined drastically in the eighteenth century, suggesting changes in the
pattern of demand for female captives in the hinterland (Table 6.1).
Evidence from the nineteenth century, which in all likelihood held for the
eighteenth century as well, shows that female captives were sold at a pre-
mium in inland Gold Coast, where Hausa traders operated (Herskovits
1936:20). This trend suggests the existence of a virile northbound export
market for female captives in the Gold Coast. Since we know that the
Atlantic market placed a higher value on males, this export market would
have seen the trans-Saharan sector featuring Hausa buyers, who resold
the bulk of the female captives to buyers from across the Sahara. The
sharp decline seen in the female proportion of Atlantic-bound Gold Coast
captives has recently been attributed to the decline of the male labor-
intensive gold economy and the rise of nonmining sectors, principally agri-
culture (Nwokeji, forthcoming). To this must be added the kolanut trade
ceremony or function, ancient or modern, is complete without it. Its antiquity and useful-
ness are further attested to in its being entrenched in the life and thought of the people”
(Ojo 1966:52–53). These comments effectively place kolanut among the Yoruba on the
same pedestal as among the Igbo, but the ubiquity of kolanuts in historical and anthro-
pological studies of the Igbo appears to be unmatched in Yoruba studies, and the kolanut
ritual is not as prominent in Yoruba life as Igbo. In fact, the only source Ojo cites in sup-
port of his comments is Igbo scholar Onuora Nzekwu (1961).
170 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
Ikelionwu Ufere and Owuu Mgboli, grew up, became free, rich, and
famous, and established Ndikelionwu and Ndiowuu, respectively, in
the eastern Nri-Awka area. The higher numbers of children and young
adolescents sold in the internal markets suggest that indigenous slavery
focused on increasing the existing population by integrating outsiders
(K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:74, 250–51; Ekejiuba 1972b:12). The
basic reason for slaveholders’ preference for children within the Bight of
Biafra was the ease of assimilating children into kin groups in most soci-
eties. This calculation remained important even in the late nineteenth
century when the labor consideration seems to have been predominant.
Adults might pose social problems if incorporated into the household.
Although the price data are sketchy and they do not distinguish between
boys and girls, we might still ask what implication this trend would
have had on prices in the hinterland. In contrast to the assumption that
girls fetched higher prices than boys in African markets (e.g., Galenson
1986:107–10), ceteris paribus, a higher cost of boys (relative to girls) in
the Biafra hinterland should be assumed.33
Although such values are scarcely unique to the Igbo, the extension of
Aro influence had some exceptional features that have implications for the
falling female ratios in the Bight of Biafra. The Aro network was the only
non-Muslim trade diaspora and a large African organization espousing
what Uchendu describes as “big compound” ideals to acquire slaves pri-
marily by trade (Uchendu 1965:54–56). Military activity was probably
33
Most available prices are quoted in different currencies and exchange rates are not avail-
able. Moreover, sources are often vague in describing the categories of captives whose
prices they quote. For example, although British observers in Abo tell us that a sixteen-
year-old cost sixty shillings in 1832 and a woman “something more,” the age of the
woman and sex of the sixteen-year-old are unclear (Laird and Oldfield 1837:103, 106).
Another Abo price in 1854, is quoted at one pair of ivory for three captives (Baikie
1856:56). In about 1855, four to six adult captives exchanged for one horse in the major
fairs of the hinterland. Whatever may be the specific value of ivory or horses, the sizes of
which could vary significantly, it is clear that these prices were very low, at least in part, a
reflection of the ending of the slave trade. These low prices for adults are consistent with
contemporaneous information on the hinterland fairs, where an adult sold for one bull-
ock (Ekejiuba 1972a:21). Late nineteenth-century information shows that adults above
twenty-six years old, disparagingly called otankwu (s/he who consumes palm nuts), were
the least expensive. They sold for only 40 mkpona (brass rods) or £3, compared with
£5 to £10 for apapa and 400 mkpona or £30 for asamiri (Fox 1964:23). Although Fox
gives the exchange rate at 1 mkpona = 1s. 6d, the conversion of the figures results in rates
drastically different from his £30 = 400 mkpona. This works out at 13.33 mkpona = £1.
The low prices offered for the otankwu not only reflects low desirability for them but
also the effect of the elimination of the overseas market. For the complexity of African
price data, see Law (1991a).
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 173
34
The female ratio is drawn from www.Slavevoyages.org.
174 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
35
Philip Curtin (1964:252) has observed that “polygyny stood out as a special evil” to
Europeans of the Enlightenment. The British slave trader John Hippisley pointed to
the gender imbalance of export captives and men lost in wars. But the tendency for
the richest men to have many wives “does not prevent the poorest from having one
or two …. The number of women must, therefore, exceed that of men” (Hippisley
1764: 14–16, 16n). For a modern opinion that the trade encouraged polygyny, see
Manning 1990:41; 1981:501, 503.
36
Bosman 1705:344. The importance of sex ratios in polygyny is well recognized by mod-
ern scholars, for example, Manning 1990:42; 1981:501, 503; Miller 1988:163; Thornton
1980:425.
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 175
the higher proportions of females among the captives sent from these
regions.
The sex ratio does not, however, appear to be the principal factor driv-
ing polygyny. In one region in Kongo (West-Central Africa), for instance,
a baptismal register for the years 1774 and 1775 reveals that only fifty-four
(10.6 percent) of the 507 recorded families were polygynous. Among this
polygynous group, perhaps forty-six (9.2 percent of all the families in the
register) had only two wives. Only one man, described as “the lord of
the area,” had as many as four. As John Thornton notes, “the majority of
marriages were monogamous” (Thornton 1977:411–12). His conclusion
accords with what we know of the conditions in the vast majority of Bight
of Biafra societies, beyond the trading states, and likely also for much of
Atlantic Africa, at least up to the early nineteenth century. Of the fifty-six
ex-slaves in the Koelle Sierra Leone sample who were married at the time
of enslavement, only ten (18 percent) were polygynous – four of them had
only two wives each; only two had three wives; there was one each with
four, five and seven wives, and another (an Ewe) had married two wives
and inherited twenty-two or more wives from his father (Hair 1965:194).
How representative were these statistics? Because the ex-slaves in Koelle’s
sample were mostly young at the time of enslavement – only nine or 5
percent were more than forty years old – the rate of polygyny among them
appears to be considerably less than in the general African population. But
if, as Hair has observed, the average age of marriage for the contempo-
raneous African male population was twenty-five, and 53 percent of the
male respondents was aged twenty-five or more, with more than half of
these being over thirty years old at the time of enslavement, then the Koelle
sample is more representative of the general population than appears to be
the case at first. In light of low life-expectancy rates in precolonial Africa,
the ex-slaves who were married at the time of enslavement would have
been closer in age to the average age of married men in the general popula-
tion because they were likely drawn overwhelmingly from the ones who
were older at the time of enslavement. Yet, while West-Central Africa, with
a similar rate of polygyny with the Bight of Biafra and indeed much of
Atlantic Africa, sent into the Atlantic slave trade the lowest proportion of
females after the Upper Guinea Coast, the Bight of Biafra sent the highest.
This comparison suggests that polygyny was not universal in Africa and
that men married women, not simply because of the abundance of women,
but also because men needed women’s labor and reproductive resources.
In the final decades of the slave trade from the Bight of Biafra, the
declining female ratio was reinforced by a change in the economic role
176 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
of women in the Niger Delta and Cross River areas. Palm oil production
became a major activity in the region. Because palm oil was a labor-
intensive industry in which the Aro had a major role (though less so
than the slave trade) and because by the late 1830s the value of palm oil
exports surpassed those of captives sent to the Americas, the pressures on
the Aro to hold women at home are evident. Less easy is a quantitative
assessment of this effect.
Conclusion
African conceptions of gender shaped the sex and age structure of the
overseas slave trade. These constructs emerged from factors altogether
more profound than the merely economic. The unusual pattern in the
sex ratio of captives exported from the Bight of Biafra is perhaps best
explained by the cultural determinants of the male and female roles in
agriculture, the virtual absence of the trans-Saharan market, and by
enslavement methods in an environment of decentralized political power.
The convergence of these factors resulted in large numbers of women
being sent into the overseas trade. The region with female ratios closer
to those of the Bight of Biafra is the Bight of Benin. This is because the
gender division of labor in the Yoruba region of the Bight of Benin and
the region’s involvement in the trans-Saharan trade were more similar to
those of the Igbo in the Bight of Biafra than is often recognized. Though
the influence of the trans-Saharan trade seems to have been consider-
able in the Bight Benin during the early stages of the transatlantic slave
trade era, the former trade seems to have waned after the seventeenth
century, following the rise of the kolanut trade between the Hausa and
the Asante of the Gold Coast. The kolanut trade seems to have diverted
trans-Saharan trade from the Bight of Benin to the Gold Coast.
This proposition is indicated in fluctuations in the female proportions
of captives exported through both the Bight of Benin and the Gold Coast.
While the female ratio declined sharply in the Gold Coast with the rise
of trans-Saharan demand via Hausa traders between the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, it increased appreciably in the Bight of Benin dur-
ing the same period with what appears to have been a decline in trade
with the Hausa. While females accounted for 40.6 percent of captives
exported through Bight of Benin ports and 50.6 in the Bight of Biafra
during the seventeenth century; the corresponding figures were 38.5 per-
cent and 42.5 percent in the eighteenth century; and 33.3 percent and
35.5 percent in the nineteenth century (Table 6.1). The continuing lag
The Slave Trade, Gender, and Culture 177
Cultural transformations of the Atlantic slave trade era and the after-
shocks of the traffic conspired to promote new value systems in the
second half of the nineteenth century that were markedly different
from earlier times. These changes occurred in the production and mar-
keting of the commodities that had replaced captives in the overseas
trade. The Bight of Biafra dominated the production of palm oil,
which had become the key commodity in West African trade. This
fact bespeaks an intensive economic activity in the region that had
far-reaching implications for the social structure, understood as an
identifiable pattern of social relationships among the principal groups
and institutions in society over the long term. Profound cultural,
demographic, and economic changes deriving from the Atlantic slave
trade and the increasing involvement of the British in the internal
affairs of the region converged in a maelstrom of violence. This pro-
cess is consistent with the violence that pervaded Africa during the
nineteenth century.
Nowhere in Atlantic Africa, however, was this violence as intense and
widespread as in the Bight of Biafra. The impact of external trade had
been perhaps more far-reaching here than in any region in Africa during
the period. The slave trade era had witnessed continuing Aro expansion
and its consolidation of existing diaspora settlements. Although trade
remained a significant part of Aro life, the Aro trading economy entered
a terminal crisis. The nature and intensity of warfare changed, and agri-
culture became a significant part of the equation in Aro life. Particularly
striking was the Aro’s development of a martial ethos – militarization and
its representations as an integral part of its value system – personified in
178
Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 179
We found that our system of working the trade by steamers answered well, as
compared with the old-fashioned way followed by other Merchants of sending
sailing ships out with full cargoes, and keeping them waiting for months in the
River until they were loaded, as in addition to our advantage of getting out fresh
goods by each steamer, we also had the advantage of sending our Produce home
by them, thus getting it to the market, and the proceeds converted into the goods
1
Various studies have detailed the local effects of this change. Davidson (1961); M. Klein
(1968, 1971, 1972); Newbury (1969); Hopkins (1973:125–35); Reynolds (1974); Inikori
(1979, 1986, 1994a, 1994b); Noah (1980); Lovejoy (1983:159–83; 1989); Manning
(1986, 1988, 1990:140–47); Eltis (1987:223–42); Eltis and Jennings (1988); Becker
(1988); Law (1993, 1995b); Zeleza (1994:370–89); Sundiata (1996). For work dealing
with nineteenth-century changes in the region in the Bight of Biafra, see Dike (1956);
Northrup (1976, 1978, 1979); Noah (1980); Lynn (1981, 1997); Martin (1988); Oriji
(1982, 1983).
2
Hartley (1977:8); Eltis and Jennings (1988:946).
3
Lynn 1997:5, 7, ch. 6. See also P.N. Davies 1976:89n; Zeleza 1993.
Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 181
two or three times, while other Merchants had theirs waiting until their ships
arrived, when the same process was again repeated. (Cotterell n.d.:38)
4
For a documentation of these invasions, see J.U.J. Asiegbu 1984.
182 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
the British in the Bight of Biafra welcomed and even advocated the use of
slave labor in the production of export commodities. This was evident in
discussions British officials and traders had among themselves and with
the regional rulers with whom they came in contact (T.J. Hutchinson
1858:113, 264; Whitford [1877] 1967;163). In 1858, British governor of
Fernando Po and former consul in the Bight of Biafra Thomas Hutchinson
praised Kings Eyo and Eyamba of Old Calabar for having in 1842 sought
technical assistance in exploiting slave labor in the cultivation of coffee
and cotton and in the manufacture of sugar. “These men, with a sagac-
ity which did them much credit, saw that the slave population, becom-
ing superabundant by the forbiddal of their exportation, would require
employment to keep them from mischief, as well as to contribute to their
daily sustenance.” Apparently, Commander Raymond of Royal Navy’s
Spy, with whom coastal kings had made an antislave trade treaty, was
equally impressed (see T.J. Hutchinson 1858:113). In fact, Hutchinson
saw the enslavement of people within the region not only as a source
of labor for producing export staples but also as a direct solution to the
Atlantic slave trade. He argued that
the external as well as internal slave trade will only be effectually put an end to
when the chiefs and masters in Africa are taught, and understand, how far more
profitably to themselves they can exercise slave labor in the cultivation of their
soil, than by selling it. They will then be brought to see, that it is not consistent
with common sense, transporting away the native Africans to Brazil to cultivate
and manufacture sugar, to America to grow and pick cotton, to Cuba to aid in the
tilling of tobacco, when the very same products can be obtained from their own
ground at home. (Hutchinson 1858:264)
In about 1875, a British trading agent on the Niger, John Whitford ([1877]
1967:163), urged an Abo prince to “make your slaves collect palm-oil to
exchange for those desirable things” – a sure reference to European prod-
ucts. British policy of promoting commodity production as an alternative
employer of slave labor formerly exported to the Americas fueled the
domestic slave market.
Demand for labor in the region sustained a sizeable slave mar-
ket. Although the use of slave labor in palm produce production was
minimal, the extreme labor intensity and inefficiency of the industry
stretched household labor to the limit and indirectly encouraged the
growth of slavery in other industries. With much woman and child
labor occupied by working in aspects of the multifaceted palm pro-
duce production process, particularly the tedium of cracking palm
kernels, entrepreneurs in other industries looked to the slave market
Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 183
5
For details, see Nwokeji 1999:201; Hartley 1977:716–18; A. Martin 1956:12; S. Martin
1988:33; R.K. Udo 1970:73.
6
Becroft, et al. 1844:268, 271; Cookey 1974:15, 63; Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:252;
Ekejiuba 1972b:14; Latham 1973:91–96; Lovejoy 1983:178; Nair 1972:37, 42–43;
Walker 1875.
7
The palm belt also encompassed the entire Ngwa and Isuama as well as much of the
Cross River areas, especially Ibibioland.
8
For the role of women in palm produce production, see Becroft et al. 1844:274; S. Martin
1988:32; R.K. Udo 1970:73.
9
Also Floyd 1969:50–51. These processes were a source of bloody conflicts among groups
in this region, such that were still prevalent in the early colonial period (see Bridges
n.d.:68–69).
10
Northrup 1979:9–10; W.R.G. Horton 1954:311; G.I. Jones 1961.
184 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
11
Agu (1985:17); Chinyele (1972); Dike and Ekejiuba (1990:180–81); J. Ike (1972);
M. Iloha (1972); J. Kanu (1972); Ngene (1972); Nwene (1972); C. Okafor (1986:122);
N. Okoli (1972).
12
For Aro activity in late nineteenth-century northern Igboland, see W.R.G. Horton
(1954:311); G.I. Jones (1961); Northrup (1979:10).
13
It was in the nineteenth century that the Aro became truly influential in the Middle
Belt (Ijoma and Njoku 1991:208). For Aro settlements and markets in this region, see
Mathews 1922:9.
14
Baikie (1856:308); Crowther and Taylor (1859:23, 256, 288); Moor (1902:1). For rel-
evant traditions, see Mefo and Ibe (1972); Chukwura (1977); Kwentoh (1977).
Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 185
of Aro influence. European visitors during the second half of the nine-
teenth century frequently reported on this influence.15 The new state of
Opobo established in 1869 made trade with the Aro the cornerstone
of its economic policy. King Jaja, whom A.A. Cowan described as “the
most powerful potentate the Oil Rivers ever produced,” was desirous
to court and protect Aro trade (Cowan 1935:400; Johnston 1923:178).
He “made certain that those within his sphere of influence respected the
authority of the Aro oracle.” In one instance, he had a leading citizen of
Ndoki, north of Opobo, flayed alive for ignoring the oracle’s injunction
(Cookey 1974:90). The Obi of Abo named one of his sons Chukwuma,
signifying a person whose birth was connected with the Aro oracle,
Chukwu (Ibiniukpabi).16 In the 1890s, as many as 800 persons from the
Niger communities visited the oracle yearly, according to British High
Commissioner Ralph Moor in 1902.17 The influence of the oracle rein-
forced the domestic slave trade.
While the internal slave trade continued, Aro society and economy
began to change fundamentally in the late nineteenth century. The catalyst
was not Aro an inability to compete in the produce trade, but the conse-
quences of production and marketing – the same forces that sustained the
internal slave trade. Thus, the main problem that confronted the Aro was
not the end of the Atlantic slave trade per se, but the response of non-Aro
groups to the palm-oil trade, the macroeconomic consequences of palm
produce production, and British imperialist maneuvers. Aro influence
worried the British, who took care to monitor Aro activities, especially in
the Niger riverine states of Oguta, Atani, and Assay (Anene 1959:22–23).
The Aro were an obvious target for British imperialists, who could justify
their actions by citing the Aro role as the principal slave traders.
It was not until the 1890s, however, that the Aro came under the
direct searchlight of the British. Why did it take the British so long
after the onset of European commercial encroachment on the interests
of coastal middlemen to encroach on Aro commercial spheres in the
hinterland? The coastal traders’ success, up to the 1880s, in holding
their own against British maneuvers accounts for the time lag. Until
this time, the British were still “pacifying” coastal middlemen and had
15
Baikie (1856:336); J.A.B. Horton (1868:183–85); Hutchinson (1861:46–47, 54); Moor
1902:1–2; ; A.G. Leonard (1906:486, 254); G.I. Jones (1963:69, 87, 147, 152, 210).
16
Names of persons born after consulting Chuwku were Chukwuma, Uzoaru, Ukpabi,
Chukwu (K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:150).
17
CO 520/14: “Memorandum Concerning the Aro Expedition,” April 24, 1902, p.10;
Moor (1908:22).
186 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
not yet decided to rule them directly or to turn on the Aro. With the
establishment of the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1891, the British for-
mally declared their rule over the Niger Delta and explicitly set about
establishing “control over the tribes of the coast who acted in all cases
as middlemen or carriers for the transport of trade goods to the interior
and that of the produce factories of the [European] merchants which
were all situated on the coast line at the mouths of the various rivers.”
British planners also realized that “the Government of the territories
could not be regarded as in any sense established” until the “country
of the producers,” specifically, “this Ibo country dominated by the Aros
was dealt with.” The British reckoned that the Aro “could practically
cause almost cessation of trade by stopping production.”18 Fearing
that the Aro were expressly misrepresenting “the Government and the
whiteman,” the British began to send officials to assess the Aro, begin-
ning in 1892 when they made “overtures” to Aro traders on the Cross
River and explained “the aims and objectives of the Government.” Aro
responses developed from “tolerant contempt” for the British, as Moor
put it, to angst that the British were scheming to encroach on their turf.
British affirmations of good intentions did nothing to assuage Aro fears
and anxiety.19
These pressures were building against the backdrop of dwindling
world commodity prices. A major international economic depression
seems to have driven British moves to subjugate inland traders, given
that successful subjugation would increase the profit margins of the
European traders and cushion them from the depression. By the 1890s,
the British had also inched closer to ending slaveholding, and their
intervention in the inland trade and the fall in world commodity prices
had begun to impact Aro interests adversely. British forays into inland
markets, suppression of coastal middlemen and dwindling world com-
modity market prices all converged in the 1890s to push the Aro over
the edge.
18
CO 520/14: “Memorandum Concerning the Aro Expedition,” pp. 4–5, 6, 12–13.
19
They continued along these lines through such emissaries as Roger Casement in 1894,
Captain A. Turner in 1896, as well as the party of Major Leonard and F.S. James. Further
attempts in 1897 culminated in a meeting in the Cross town of Itu between Aro repre-
sentatives and British Consul General Major Gallwey in March 1898. The Aro thwarted
these attempts, but the encounters had given the British much valuable intelligence on
the Aro. CO 520/14: “Memorandum Concerning the Aro Expedition,” pp. 6, 7–8, 9;
Leonard 1898.
Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 187
20
CO 520/14: “Memorandum Concerning the Aro Expedition,” pp. 8–9, 12.
21
Anthony Nwabughuogu (1982) has argued that penetration into the interior by European
traders and, therefore, the displacement of African middlemen in the lower Niger did not
start until 1905. While this may be true for the Cross River region, where Nwabughuogu
draws his data exclusively from, the Niger delta was different. In the Niger, unlike
the Cross River region, European traders and firms had been a common feature since
the mid-nineteenth century, evidenced by the activities of William Cole (1862), Harry
Cotterell, John Whitford (1877) and Harold Blindloss (1898).
22
CO 520/6/33280: More to Secretary of State, October 11, 1900.
23
CO 520/14: “Memorandum Concerning the Aro Expedition,” pp. 9–11.
24
CO 520/14: “Memorandum Concerning the Aro Expedition,” pp. 14–15.
188 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
village, and carrying off all they could seize to sell as slaves.”25 No doubt,
the British viewed such incidents as hostile acts, and they were inclined
to blame the Aro for any obstacle they faced. Their reports were not
simply exaggerations by British officials intent on justifying their colonial
project. Traditions from among the Aro and other groups in the region
confirm the trend reflected in the reports. The wars of the era are fresh
in the memory of Aro people, and they reflected the changed Aro percep-
tions of violence and its place in their relationships.26
25
CO 520/12/25807: Moor to Secretary of State, July 7, 1901, p. 3.
26
Mbonu Ojike, born in the 1900s in the Aro diaspora settlement of Arondizuogu,
recalled his father and his father’s friend “talk invariably … about wars” they had wit-
nessed in “the good old days” (Ojike 1946:9). Missionaries in the Okigwe area, near
Arondizuogu, in 1910 reported about the impact of “continual wars” and slave raiding
(Isichei 1976:85). I was informed that merchant-warriors from late-nineteenth-century
Arondizuogu carried out operations in northern Igboland (Maduadichie 1996).
27
“The trading settlements … became ‘free cities’ to which all who wished to ‘traffic and
exchange’ safely repaired, international courts where individuals and clans in conflict
sought justice from the undisputed authority of the Oracle” (K.O. Dike 1956:39, 45).
A British observer in the early twentieth century described them as “mission stations”
(J.G. Allen n.d.:iii). Some of their inhabitants acted as “trade callers” and some others as
money lenders (G.I. Jones 1989:36; Ottenberg 1971).
Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 189
The very process of acquiring people fomented friction and civil crisis;
wars arose, among other reasons, as a means of acquiring and retaining
dependents. One of the most frequent causes of conflicts among the
merchant-warriors was the granting of asylum to (or the acquisition of)
disgruntled slaves by “powerful nobles” from groups competing with the
ones the dependents defected from (K.O. Dike and Ekejiuba 1990:180;
Igwegbe 1962:114). This was the case in the skirmishes involving rival
merchant-warlords Okoro Idozuka of Arondizuogu and Okoli Ijeoma
of Ndeikelionwu. Okoro Idozuka’s internal enemy, Ozigbo Okereke of
Ndiogbuonyeoma, also called Itejirisinkakwu (a pot used to cook bush rat,
meaning “atrocious” pot), allied with Okoli Ijeoma. Okoro Idozuka was in
the habit of making punitive expeditions against those who “kidnapped”
his men (E.N. Okoli 1977:31, 33). In spite of the violence that accompa-
nied this activity, these disputes did nothing to stop the massive expansion
of the Aro populations that was observed during the period.
The acquisition of land was even more contentious. Struggles over land
gave free reign to the martial ethos among the Aro. Arondizuogu groups, in
particular, fought against one another in the scramble for land seized from
non-Aro groups. As one of my respondents put it, “we first opened up the
place and later began to quarrel over boundaries” (Maduadichie 1996).
Eastward migrations to the Imo River and other areas from the last years
of the nineteenth century onward resolved the crisis of agricultural space
among the Aro, but it increased Aro conflicts with their non-Aro neigh-
bors. Land grabbing placed a higher premium on having dependents than
ever before, and at the same time presented the dependents with the oppor-
tunity to raise their economic and social standing through acts of valor.
The Nri-Awka cultural influence was a major agent of militarization
and increased violence among the Aro. Nri-Awka traditions often refer
to the Aro as predators, but martial ethos probably diffused to the Aro
diaspora from the Nri-Awka area. The contemporary history of the Nri-
Awka region is replete with wars and violence, and their repercussions, as
the region’s oral traditions and numerous undergraduate theses in Nigerian
universities and colleges testify.28 Since these wars often involved strug-
gles over arable land and living space, which had been scarce in Igboland
for at least the previous century, militarization would have taken root
in the region before it diffused to the Aro. One warrior from a nearby
war-like community in eastern Nri-Awka reportedly founded one of the
28
Amaechi 1987; Anaedobe 1977; Ezenibe 1977; Ifediora 1987; Ogbuozobe 1986; E.O.
Okafor 1978; J.C. Okoli 1977; C.S. Umeh 1984.
190 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
Features of Militarization
In addition to the increased incidence of Aro wars during the second half
of the nineteenth century was the phenomenon of Aro civil wars, which
had been extremely rare in Aro history up to this point. The earliest inci-
dence of Aro civil wars of the nineteenth century was perhaps the Ọgụ
Amakọba (Allied War), between Ndieni groups of Ndikelionwu and Ujari
in what appears to have been the 1820s.29 Such conflicts became more
29
The date of this war is inferred from genealogy. Ijeoma was the fifth son of Ikerionwu,
the mid-eighteenth-century progenitor of Ndeikelionwu. Ijeoma died shortly after the
Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 191
frequent in the second half of the century, as Aro groups feuded over
spheres of influence and agricultural space. British Major A.G. Leonard,
who had ventured into Igboland as far as the main Aro market town of
Bende in 1896, reported that the Aro traders had split into rival factions
(Leonard 1898:205). Another British observer, Roger Casement, had
reported in 1894 that two Arochukwu lineage-groups were at war with
one another (see Northrup 1978b:141). One such conflict had occurred
in about 1862 between Arondizuogu and the Ndieni cluster.30 In fact,
each Arondizuogu lineage-group at one time or another engaged another
in a war that involved “a significant element of firearms.”31
Not only did militarization increase friction among Aro groups, it also
promoted reliance on external alliances in intra-Aro disputes. During the
Allied War of about the 1820s, for example, Ndeikelionwu under the
leadership of Ijeoma relied on an alliance that included several non-Aro
communities in the vicinity of Ndieni to make a protracted war on fellow
Ndieni group Ujari.32 These alliances developed at the same time the Aro
civil wars became frequent.
Defensive requirements against invasions and raids facilitated the evo-
lution of new residential structures. Up to second half of the nineteenth
century, the Aro maintained a compact residential structure, reminiscent
of what Equiano describes for the eighteenth century.
Each master of a family has a large square piece of ground, surrounded with a
moat or fence, or enclosed with a wall made of red earth tampered, which, when
dry is as hard as brick. Within this, are his houses to accommodate his family and
slaves, which, if numerous, frequently present the appearance of a village. In the
middle, stands the principal building appropriated to the sole use of the master
and consisting of two apartments; one in which he sits in the day with his fam-
ily, the other is left apart for the reception of his friends. … These houses never
exceed one story in height. (Equiano 1995:37)
Allied War, suggesting that he was probably advanced in years at the time of the war (Eni
1973:15–17).
30
This date is provided by Dike and Ekejiuba (1990:180).
31
M.S. Igwe (1996); Igwegbe (1962); Maduadichie (1996); E.N. Okoli (1977:34). The
quotation is from Igwe.
32
For details of these alliances, see Eni (1973:15–17).
192 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
that produced highly dispersed settlements in the new areas. At the same
time, Aro architecture changed in response to the defense requirements
of the period. Architectural change was marked in Aro settlements in
central Igboland, where some merchant-warriors built two-storey struc-
tures; the upper floor served as a guard post, while the base housed the
cannons and other ordnance.33 One of these structures was still intact in
Arondizuogu in 1996.
The frequency of wars inevitably led to specialization in different fac-
ets of war-making. Specialized strategists and tacticians, generically called
ọkpa ịta, got credit for valor (M.S. Igwe 1996). Men who bestrode the
commercial and military life of the time emerged in all the central Igbo
Aro settlements. Perhaps the two most prominent merchant-warriors of
this period were Okoro Udozuka of Arondizuogu and Okoli Ijeoma of
Ndieni. These merchant-warriors were sometimes generally known as
agawhu (bandit, outlaw, crook, hero). Depending on the context, this
awe-inspiring term evoked abhorrence and contempt or endearment and
reverence. Men of valor generally enjoyed high status as heroes or, at
least, were feared. Nicknames like Ogburie (may the conqueror appro-
priate the booty), Ụgbọgụ (war chest/war vessel), and Ọsụachara (grass
terminator/general terminator) gained currency. Some of those names,
such as Nkpụñụghụñụ, Ogbujingidi, Otirigidi, and Ogbunyịvwa, have no
definite meanings outside their onomatopoeic value, which at any rate is
suggestive of ruthlessness and inspires awe. Okoro Idozuka, also called
Agadagbachiriụzọ (the pillar that blocks the way), took an additional
awe-inspiring alias after every major triumph (Igwegbe 1962; E.N. Okoli
1977:33–34).
The moral economy of the region all but broke down. The Aro had had
merchant-warriors before this time, including men like Izuogu Mgbokpo
of Arondizuogu, Ikelionwu Mgboro of Ndikelionwu and Oti Emesinwa of
Ujari (Ajali). These merchant-warriors were primarily entrepreneurs, but
they commanded respect by virtue of their wealth in trade goods and people
and their ability to influence non-Aro using tact and diplomacy, while not
hesitating to mobilize the Cross River Igbo warriors when this approach
33
Information about Aro architecture is based on fieldwork observation and interviews with
respondents in Arochukwu, Arondizuogu and Ujari. Information from Ndeikelionwu
comes from N. Okoli (1972). I am particularly indebted to Ezumoha Okoroji 1996;
Igwilo (1996b); Mgbemene (1996); Okoro Ndubisi (1996); J.G. Okoro (1986). I first
became interested in the towers after reading J.G. Okoro’s (1985) concern about their
disappearance. There is also detailed information in Ojike (1946:21–25). Some of these
structures are now disappearing.
Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 193
34
Eni (1973:42). Parentheses are Eni’s.
194 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
Consequences of Militarization
Not surprisingly, the wars of the nineteenth century left permanent scars
on the region. Owa in the Nri-Awka axis is one of the communities known
to have disappeared completely during the mid-nineteenth century. Oral
traditions of the area attribute Owa’s destruction to its neighbor Nimo,
which was joined in an alliance by Adazi-Nnukwu and Oraukwu. These
towns shared the despoiled Owa territory. Two other towns, Umu-Ori
and Ozu, are said to have also been destroyed in that part of the Nri-
Awka region during the same era (Ogbukagu 1997: 323, 330, 331–33).
As noted in Chapter 3, Owa exists in Arondizuogu folklore only because
many of its inhabitants descended from Owa refugees, including the
founder of a major lineage-group, transferred to Arondizuogu. Traditions
relate that an Aro merchant-warrior displaced the present-day Ugwuoba
on the Mamu River from their original site around Enugwu-Ukwu
(Agu 1985).35 Many of the people of Amaokpala, a preexisting group
35
Indeed, Ugwuoba people were reported in the 1930s to have acknowledged “no relation-
ship at all” with the rest of Mbasato – Awka, Amawbia, Ebenebe, Nawgu, Nibo and
Nise. See NAE MILGOV. 13/1/17: Mbanasataw-Awka Division, 1936. Agu attributes
Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 195
Apart from the strain in the Aro relations with the warriors, the
declining relevance of the machete-wielding head hunters was also a
consequence of the proliferation of firearms. Firearms were by far more
effective offensive weapons than machetes, and the British embargo in
the 1890s did not change that. The spread of firearms was a key devel-
opment of nineteenth-century West African history. Not only had the
weaponry stock of African societies increased over time, principally from
the exchange of captives for guns and gunpowder, but importation of
weapons increased during the nineteenth century. Imports into Africa
increased most dramatically between the 1820s and 1860, from £10.6
million to £41.3 million (in 1988 British sterling). The value of British
exports to Africa increased tenfold between 1817 and 1820 and 1846
and 1849 (Eltis and Jennings 1988:940, 941). Per capita gun imports
into Africa were probably highest in the 1860s.37 Because the elite groups
of this region had the most purchasing power in western Africa, they
were the ones who would have acquired much of the weaponry imported
before the ban took effect. The likely existence of a weapons stockpile in
the Bight of Biafra would have been enough to stimulate militarization,
and increased importation in the second half of the century made such a
prospect even more likely – a fact that prompted the British to suspend
imports of this item. More than simply increasing the frequency of war-
fare, however, the increasing influx of firearms changed its character and
the structure of relationships and alliances. As Cross River Igbo fight-
ers did not significantly modernize their tactics and, certainly, did not
modernize their arms, the Aro invariably relied less on them over time.
The increasing participation of the Aro in fighting wars was therefore
also consequence of changes in the structure of warfare in the region.
Faltering alliances with Cross River Igbo neighbors, the accumulation
of firearms, and the rise of martial ethos among the Aro reinforced one
another in a vicious cycle of violence.
Decadence
Violence during the second half of the nineteenth century symptomized
deeper systemic malaise than had originated in the slave trade and its
37
European and American exports to Africa are estimated as follows: one gun per 118
persons in the 1780s, one gun per 145 persons in the 1820s, and one gun per 103 per-
sons in the 1860s (Eltis and Jennings 1988:954). The quantities could be higher; guns
were recorded under “iron wrought” (p. 361). Except for ordinance, firearms were not
normally recorded separately in British Customs figures (Johnson 1984:364).
Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 197
ending. The effective ending of the Atlantic slave trade in the 1840s occa-
sioned major changes in economic and social practices. For example,
those deemed as miscreants and political enemies and had typically been
exported overseas in the heyday of the Atlantic slave trade now ended
up in the hands of indigenous slave owners, creating problems of social
control. Sale to Euro-American buyers had given the authorities a way
of dealing with these individuals. Their sale raised revenues and made
expenditure on prisons unnecessary (Curtin 1990:119, 120; 1993:177).
One respondent, who lived long enough to have witnessed the immediate
post–slave trade era, recalled in 1996 that the Aro bought two dissenting
Ọzọ titled men from leaders of their communities in about 1900 (G.N.
Okoli 1996). Her description of their Ọzọ marks and the circumstances of
their sale recall the image of rebellious captives that Captain John Adams
carried regularly to the Americas in the late eighteenth century (Adams
1832:41). The acquisition and retention of such individuals added to the
tensions and violence of the period. This category of people would often
have been killed during the second half of the nineteenth century, or their
incorporation into their owners’ societies would have been a potential
source of violence.
Of importance in understanding these tensions is the fact that the reckless
oppression of dependents on the part of Aro notables breached the moral
economy of slavery. The remnants of late-nineteenth-century architecture
eloquently testify to increasing oppression. A dark, windowless room
that served as a detention chamber (mkpuruisi) became an indispensable
part of the homes of late-nineteenth-century Aro slave owners. Torture
platforms, such as the one observed in the residence of late-nineteenth-
century merchant-warrior Okoroji, seem to have been widespread as
well. These structures were necessary to control recalcitrant captives now
employed domestically. If the ideology of slavery emphasizing the social
mobility of acquired persons and their assimilation into Aro society had
seemed realistic and facilitated acquired people’s embrace of Aro society
before the mid-nineteenth century, such an ideology was harder to sus-
tain in the face of the systematic and routine oppression that prevailed
in the second half of the century. Increased oppression was the necessary
consequence of the insecurities of a master class threatened by the pres-
ence of large slave populations.
Dependents and subordinate groups did not always choose to remain
victims. For example, two large subordinate groups in Arondizuogu
formed a “grand alliance” against the local amadi group sometime in
the second half of the nineteenth century, and won a “decisive victory”
198 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
38
C. Okoli (1996). Ogbuofelu’s owner’s grandson is Igwilo (1996a).
39
For the Senegambia case, see M. Klein 1968:10; Tamari (1991).
Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 199
osu means servant of a shrine” (J.G. Okoro 1996). Although these names
are common among the Aro, it is unclear that all or even most of the bear-
ers of the names were priests.
While the institution seems to have been well-established among the
Igbo by the nineteenth century, the Aro did not discriminate against the osu,
and their society did not develop the institution, except in Arondizuogu
in the late nineteenth century. When, for example, Oti Emesinwa made
his early trips to the Nri-Awka region from his Arochukwu base in the
mid-eighteenth century, outcasts (presumably osu) were among the indi-
viduals he “gathered around” him, showing that the Aro were willing
to incorporate the osu. Later, he and his Ujari group settled among the
Umu-Ajana (people of the earth shrine) of preexisting Akpu, on whose
land the Ujari settled (Eni 1973:9, 15). This location was reminiscent of
an osu quarter, but there is not even a hint that the Ujari were bothered
by such an arrangement. Thus, the Aro embraced a group which central
Igbo people rejected. Why then did the institution emerge in Arondizuogu
toward the end of the century?
If the Atlantic slave trade changed the character of the institution in
other parts of Igboland, it was the ending of the trade that generated these
changes in Arondizuogu.40 Flight from the oppression that hallmarked
the tensive transition of the late nineteenth century was the immediate
cause of the osu institution in Arondizuogu. Aggrieved Mgbawho Ogirisi,
a slave of Okoro Udozuka’s wife, fled to the Ududonka shrine with her
children during a time that would have been the 1890s, becoming perhaps
the first osu family in the town. One free family, running away from their
creditor, sought refuge in the Haba deity in another lineage-group.41 At
the destination deity, the refugee would say the ritual:”Arusi, mbaa!”
(Shrine, I submit myself to your protection).42
The Arondizuogu version of the osu institution differed in character
from that of the rest of Igboland in other ways. Some of my respondents
40
Kanu Umo (n.d.:19) has claimed that the shrines that produced the institution became
part of Arondizuogu “after the decline of ‘Chuku’” (i.e., the Ibiniukpabi oracle).
Ibiniukpabi did not decline until after the British Aro Expedition of 1901–02. As late
as 1878, the Belgian mariner Adolphe Burdo had noted Ibiniukpabi’s influence as far as
the Niger River (see Burdo 1880:159–61). The shrines in Arondizuogu coexisted with
Ibiniukpabi. Ibiniukpabi’s main function was judicial, for the non-Aro. The Aro, both in
the metropole and in the diaspora, had the shrines they worshipped.
41
M.S. Igwe (1996); Kanu-Igbo (1996b); Maduadichie (1996); A. Muotoh (1996);
J.G. Okoro (1996).
42
This particular dimension was given by Kanu-Igbo (1996b). He could not tell the mean-
ing of the word mbaa. It is probably not an Igbo word.
200 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
43
For osu as a priestly function originally, see R. Okeke (1986); Isichei (1976). For the
sacredness of the osu, see M.S. Igwe (1996); Igwegbe (1962:102); J.G. Okoro (1996).
44
M.S. Igwe (1996); Kanu-Igbo (1996b); Muotoh (1996); C. Okoli (1996); J.G. Okoro
(1996). The fluidity of the Arondizuogu variant of the institution probably led the
historian J. Okoro Ijoma (1994:41) to deny that the osu institution even existed among
the Aro.
45
For example, a pioneer member of Arondizuogu and founder of the Ndiamazu lineage-
group, Amazu, came from Oro in the Oji River region of today’s Enugu State with
Iyi-Ogba. Another, Iheme from Nise near Awka, came with Ajagu. Udogwugwu of nde-
Ejezie came from Eziama, the original home of Ejezie, the founder of the lineage-group.
Nde-Ukwu has Ochichi from Achi. Many subordinate groups within these lineages also
brought shrines corresponding to their original homes. For example, Nkwo Adazi of
Ndiamazu was brought by the section that immigrated to nde-Amazu from Adazi near
Nri. The same was the story of Haba in nde-Aniche. Haba was adopted from Agulu.
Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 201
46
The practice of “gun salutes” had developed by the end of seventeenth century when
European slave traders used it to entertain and honor both themselves and prominent
Africans they dealt with. For example, on or about May 1, 1699, the slaver Albion-
Frigate fired seven-gun salute for King William of New Calabar when he went aboard to
collect duties. In late June of the same year, King William and master of another English
ship at the port were also each recipients of a seven-gun salute; later, Captain Edwards
of the Albion-Frigate received another seven rounds, when “he returned ashore” (James
Barbot).
47
Dike and Ekejiuba (1990:252–53); Ekejiuba (1972b:14); Ofonagoro (1972:80). For
head hunting, see Maduadichie (1996).
202 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
and insecurity. The ending of overseas slave export did not end the slave
trade. Human sacrifice escalated as stratification deepened. Warfare
became more frequent and more deadly as, among other factors, old
slave trading elites resisted the challenge of powerful groups that emerged
from the new economy. Finally, increased slaveholdings and inability to
export recalcitrant slaves increased social problems and oppression. In
the case of the Aro, the development of the warrior ethos and militariza-
tion added to the conundrum of violence.
A Comparative Perspective
The extent of the region’s involvement in the broader Atlantic and
global contexts bespeaks not only the impact of external trade on these
changes but also how these changes compared with changes elsewhere
in Atlantic Africa. Nowhere else in Atlantic Africa, except perhaps
Senegambia, did the ending of the overseas slave trade provoke as
much tension as in the Bight of Biafra. The crisis that led to the even-
tual disintegration of the Oyo Empire had originated in the dynam-
ics of the overseas traffic itself, rather than its ending, a process that
was completed during the slave trade era.48 In the Gold Coast, rather
than disintegrate under the weight of the ending of the traffic, Asante
expanded and consolidated its hegemony. In fact, the Gold Coast had
witnessed its own crisis in the seventeenth century, when gold export
plummeted and thereafter trade in captives lagged, which drastically
reduced the region’s stature in Atlantic Africa’s economy. The Islamic
jihads that contributed so much to the pressures of the nineteenth cen-
tury in much of West Africa had nothing to do with the ending of the
slave trade; they had been in progress well before. One fact that escapes
the notice of historians is that, in comparison to earlier periods, most
regions outside the Bight of Biafra witnessed political stability in the
immediate aftermath of the ending of the transatlantic slave trade. In
West-Central Africa, the effect of the ending of the overseas traffic also
differed from the Biafra case. To start with, unlike in the Bight of Biafra,
where the trade ended quickly (by the late 1830s), captive exportation
lasted the longest in West-Central Africa, which in the nineteenth cen-
tury exported more captives than it did in any previous century, and did
so until as late as the 1860s.
48
For the Oyo Empire, see Law 1977:245–99, esp. 255, 268, 274–75.
Cultural and Economic Aftershocks 203
Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the impact of the Atlantic slave trade not
already anticipated in earlier chapters, as well as the impact of the ending
of the traffic. The political, social, and ideological developments of the
nineteenth century received impetus from the expanded internal slave
trade and ongoing cultural transformations that resulted from the mas-
sive incorporation of non-Aro. The developments also resulted from Aro
attempts to continue their dominance of trade against the backdrop of
challenge from many other groups, often with British encouragement. The
widening of the commercial sector encouraged other hinterland groups to
become heavily involved in trade and in palm-oil production, at the same
time that coastal traders were moving inland to trade rather than continue
to depend entirely on the Aro as intermediaries between the hinterland
and the coast. Extensive economic activities in the region, highlighted by
its role as the center of palm produce production worldwide, accounted
for the attention the British paid the region as the imperial power sought
to influence affairs here. As traders and an influential group, the Aro drew
much of this attention. The intensification of militarization and violence
among the Aro must be understood in the contexts of long-term cultural
evolution among the Aro and the nineteenth-century regional political
economy of the Bight of Biafra.
8
In this book, I have departed from the sharp distinction that is often made
between the roles of internal and external agencies in bringing about
change in African history. Rather than seeing agency and causation in
terms of these binary opposites, the book acknowledges the collaborative
relevance of African and external agencies in shaping the transatlantic
slave trade and its impact. Central to this approach is an emphasis on the
interactions between slaving and culture and between the Bight of Biafra
and the rest of the Atlantic world. Such a perspective has shaped the five
main questions that have underpinned this study. These questions have
implications for both the history of the region and the Atlantic system
at large.
The first question concerns the dramatic rise of the Biafra Atlantic
trade during the mid-eighteenth century. The emergence of the Aro
in the early seventeenth century and their expansion that gathered
momentum in the second quarter of the eighteenth century, facilitated
the expansion of the Biafra Atlantic slave trade and shaped its character.
Although this study has emphasized that Aro organization rested on
identifiable institutions that had both state and diaspora characteristics,
an Atlantic perspective is key to an understanding of the slave trade and
its aftermath. The region responded to escalating labor demand in the
Americas, and it was the Aro organization that ensured the gathering,
bulking, transportation, and delivery of huge numbers of captives to the
coast. The cultural corollary of this economic process was that, while
captives from the region embarked on their forced journey to various
American destinations with their experiences, including those relating
to their deportation, the slave trade reconfigured the cultural landscape
204
Summary and Conclusions 205
of the region, including the culture of the Aro who orchestrated the
traffic in the hinterland.
An Atlantic perspective also throws light on a second question
addressed in this study, namely, why there was a relatively high propor-
tion of females in the Bight of Biafra slave trade. The gender structure
of the slave trade provides a window for a more thorough understand-
ing of transatlantic interactions involving African patterns of supply,
American patterns of demand, and the sociocultural processes underpin-
ning them. By focusing on the region’s institutions and sociocultural pro-
cesses – including the spiritual and social importance the Igbo attached
to yam and kolanut – comparing them with other African regions, and
relating them to developments elsewhere in the Atlantic region, the study
has explained the unusual gender structure of the region’s slave trade.
Gender is part of a third, larger question about the means by which
individuals became slaves or captives and why some were sent overseas
and others were retained in the region. For example, while warfare in
the region produced large numbers of women and children, it reduced
the numbers of men because the region’s principal warriors fought for
men’s heads, creating the possibility that war captives would be, over-
whelmingly, women and children. At the same time, captives convicted of
various criminal offences or classified as dissidents were overwhelmingly
men. Dissidents, incriminated persons, and kidnap victims were sent into
Atlantic slavery, while individuals who were enslaved out of economic
necessity were mostly enslaved locally in the region, illustrating that the
means of enslavement was a key determinant of where a captive served
as slave. I have used both export samples and local sources to derive
reliable information on the general character of enslavement, including
the difference between those forced into Atlantic slavery and those who
remained within the region. Until this study, scholars have relied exclu-
sively on export samples in explaining the composition of the slave trade,
an approach that distorted the reality of enslavement in Africa during the
centuries of the Atlantic slave trade.
The fourth question with which this study was concerned is how the
Aro coped with the suppression of the Atlantic slave trade in the nine-
teenth century and the long-term impact the export slave trade had on
indigenous value systems. Many decades of significant integration of
people from the war-ridden Nri-Awka region and the violence inherent
in a slaving culture had resulted in a definite change in the Aro value sys-
tem by 1850, specifically, the embrace of warrior ethos. Previous studies
either ignored or glossed over these developments and have failed to link
206 Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra
them to the impact of the Atlantic slave trade. Consequently, the irony in
stories of the ravages of nineteenth-century Aro merchant-warriors, who
commanded forces equipped with firearms, existing alongside a wide-
spread belief that the Aro never took part in war but completely relied on
the machete-wielding Cross River Igbo fighters to prosecute their wars
remained unresolved.
A final central question that spurred this study is how such a large-
scale commercial complex flourished in the Bight of Biafra, a region
apparently characterized by segmentary political organization. This
study has identified the evolving role of the state in Aro expansion, in
particular the shift by the second quarter of the eighteenth century from
state-sponsored expansion to expansion driven by state-supported pri-
vate enterprise. Rather than emphasize either the presence of state or its
absence as the key factor, however, this study has emphasized that the
role of a trade diaspora is distinct from that of centralized state systems.
The social organization of a trade diaspora enabled the Aro to establish
and control a vast and sophisticated trading network and to preserve
their identity and unity in the face of radical developments, especially
during the nineteenth century. In contrast to explanations of Aro expan-
sion that stress predilections and attributes of individual Aro, this study
has pointed to identifiable institutions that had both state and diaspora
characteristics.
Given their political and judicial influence, one might wonder if the Aro
did not constitute an imperialism rather than a trade diaspora. After all,
commerce was an important component of British imperialism – perhaps
the best example of imperialism in modern history. The existence of a
range of specialized political institutions in Aro organization supports such
a proposition. At the apex of Aro organization was the Nna Ato (Three
Fathers) chaired by Eze Aro (Aro King). Ọkpankpọ (Aro central council)
was the most important of these institutions. The relevance of Ọkpankpọ
to the present question of imperialism has been noted by the anthropolo-
gists P.C. Dike and Simon Ottenberg, who use the term “imperialism” to
characterize Aro influence. As discussed below, the Aro promoted clones
of some of their institutions in areas that were within the Aro network.
In spite of these imperial characteristics, the Aro are best seen as a
trade diaspora. Unlike the British, for example, who often (although
not always) maintained specialized sections of imperial agents (traders,
soldiers, administrators, and missionaries), every male Aro was, at least
until the 1890s, primarily involved in trade. Up until the mid-nineteenth
century, their fighters were exclusively non-Aro. These Aro communities
Summary and Conclusions 207
prominent role in ending the traffic. The slave trade involved African
patterns of supply, American patterns of demand, and a whole range of
processes underpinning them. Thus, a study of this kind also highlights
the interaction of regional developments with those in the rest of the
Atlantic world. The internal developments included macroeconomic
processes, demographic trends, institutional development, and political
and ideological change. On the other side of the Atlantic were mines
and plantations that depended on African slave labor. In European cities,
such as Bordeaux, Bristol, Liverpool, and Nantes, were financiers and
merchants who organized the trade. These are well-known developments,
but the interactive approach allows us to appreciate the extent to which
African history helped to shape Euro-American processes.
Notes on Sources
209
210 Notes on Sources
1
For example, the Enugu archives file, “Cases of Slave Dealing,” includes all manner of
cases such as petty theft, marital squabbles, and land disputes that say little about slaving.
NAE 1/1920 – OKIDIST 4/2/1:”Cases of Slave Dealing.”
Notes on Sources 211
according to the retired pastor, had not been forthcoming on the question
of slavery (Duignan 1995).
Although the Aro were a literate group, I have not been able to master
their script enough to benefit from the information embedded in it.
Together with the Cross River Igbo warrior groups and the Ibibio, the
Aro had a script called nsibiri (or nsibidi in the Ibibio language).2 This
study could have benefited from the script, but literacy in it is restricted
to the Ekpe confraternity.
These problems reinforce the role of oral tradition in this research,
despite its many pitfalls. I formally interviewed forty-five respondents
and discussed Aro slavery and slave trade with many more people,
mainly in Arondizuogu and Arochukwu. I also studied hundreds of
other traditions collected by such illustrious earlier researchers as David
Northrup, Elizabeth Isichei, and the various authors of undergraduate
theses in Nigerian universities. The purpose of this effort was threefold: to
interrogate and buttress my evidence, infuse non-Aro perspectives into
the study, and situate the Aro in the regional context.
Given that oral traditions constitute a significant part of the material
utilized in this study and given their rather controversial reputation, it
is necessary to clarify related methodological issues. My understanding
of oral tradition is broad and consistent with the ideas of Jan Vansina
and E.J. Alagoa, to whom oral tradition refers to all orally transmitted
testimonies about the past, especially those passed from generation to
generation, as well as a people’s folklore (Alagoa 1966, 1968; Vansina
1961:142–64; 1985:25–27). But given that traditions tend to appear in
synchronic form when cast in the longue durée, how does one deal with
the important question of chronology? By posing this question, I do not
mean that indigenous groups lacked a sense of chronology, that is, about
what happened before or after, or the coincidences of events. They did,
by and large.
Conscious of the established standards of my discipline, I urged respon-
dents to endeavor to cite concrete examples of the issues and events they
discussed and to indicate when they occurred. They did not always do so,
leaving me to devise remedial strategies in my conceptualizations, data
collection, and analysis. This is one reason that I, unlike some scholars,
prefer to use the term “respondents” to “informants” for people inter-
viewed. Many of them not only resisted my attempt to hedge them in
through my professionally informed prescriptions, but they also taught
2
For details about Nsibiri, see Dayrell 1911; Macgregor 1909; Talbot 1912: Appendix G.
212 Notes on Sources
me a lot about their history while relying on their own devises.3 From
this, I learned like a critical student. While traditions may not refer to
specific or actual events, they embody the cosmogony of a people and
indicate historical trends. They also express abstract and real possibil-
ities, as well as limitations, in such a people’s society. As Afigbo has
observed,
the functions of oral tradition in a preliterate society go beyond the need to vali-
date social structures, groups or institutions. They also serve as ideologies as well
as represent a genuine attempt to reconstruct a meaningful story of the past. The
interpretation of the past in the light of the present and vice versa is not peculiar
to oral tradition. It is also characteristic of history in the best tradition of the
word. It is this fact that makes Groce’s famous dictum that all history is contem-
porary meaningful and valid. (Afigbo 1981b: 233n)
3
Bentor reports of a similar experience in Arondizuogu. “I began to feel irritated. Things
were not working the way they should. … My hosts resisted the division of labor. I had
to rethink my relationship with them. My own response was to abandon terms such as
informant and field research” (Bentor 1994:3, 4).
Notes on Sources 213
4
The reputation as a knowledgeable historian is obviously a cherished one. To maintain or
claim it, some respondents in the diaspora communities switched to archaic Aro dialect,
or resort to theatrics or other antics.
214 Notes on Sources
5
There are contesting traditions regarding Uche’s supersession by Awa. The popular version
relates that Izuogu disinherited Uche, his first son, in favor of Awa, during Izuogu’s life-
time. It is claimed that Izuogu had inadvertently killed a fellow Aro amadi (aristocrat) over
a disagreement in an Aro council meeting. In the last analysis, Izuogu was asked to present
one of his sons. Failing to do this, Izuogu would pay with his own head. Uche’s mother,
Mpi, took her son away in order to protect him. By contrast, Awa’s mother, Egbocha,
offered her young son. As luck would have it, Izuogu was spared the ordeal when, either
he was pardoned or a slave was accepted in his son’s stead. Consequent upon this expe-
rience, Izuogu made Awa his heir. But the tradition put forward by nde-Uche does not
acknowledge this incident, claiming instead that Izuogu’s dependents used their matriclan
216 Notes on Sources
connections with Awa to support Awa in Awa’s wrongful bid for power. Whatever be the
case, both traditions affirm the fact that Uche was Izuogu’s first son and that Izuogu’s
dependents determined the outcome of the succession dispute between the two princes.
6
Bentor 1994; Dike and Ekejiuba 1990; Ekejiuba 1972a; Eni 1973; Ijoma and Njoku
1991; Isichei 1976; G.I. Jones 1963; Latham 1973; Northrup 1978; Nwuauwa 1990,
1991; J.G. Okoro 1985; Oriji 1994.
7
Following the tradition, J.G. Okoro writes: “The success of [Izuogu’s] business adventures
soon attracted his brothers Njoku and Imoko, to the commercial centers. They also joined
in the business and later founded their own colonies which, with time, became merged
with that of Mazi Izuogu under one name by mutual consent” (J.G. Okoro (1985:12). The
dates for Ndinjoku’s and Ndimoko’s arrivals are my estimates, working from the genealo-
gies of the settlements concerned.
Notes on Sources 217
8
Since Chinua Achebe had in article published in 1978 identified Iseke as Equiano’s natal
home, it is unclear that Isieke resulted wholly from Acholonu’s linguistic analysis (Achebe’s
218 Notes on Sources
point out that Acholonu’s work did not assuage the skepticism about
Equiano’s account that has been raised by such scholars as S.E. Ogude
and Afigbo. Both noted that Equiano quarried large portions of his
account of Igboland from contemporary descriptions of Africa authored
by others as well as indulged in fiction and embellishment. Nonetheless,
these critics attributed these shortcomings to natural lapses in memory
that should be expected in a story told by an adult who was removed at
a tender age from the context he was describing. They did not question
Equiano’s claim to have been born in Igboland (Afigbo 1981:147–84;
Ogude 1982).
The landscape of the Equiano discourse has shifted entirely in the
past ten years. Preoccupation with where in Igboland Equiano origi-
nated and which elements of his descriptions of the Igbo country are
accurate and which are not has given way to whether Equiano was born
in Africa at all and, ipso facto, whether his descriptions of Igboland can
be relied upon as an eyewitness account. The literary scholar Vincent
Carretta has uncovered evidence that suggests that Equiano was prob-
ably born in South Carolina rather than Igboland, which Equiano pur-
ported to write about in parts of his Interesting Narrative (Carretta
1999, 2005). Central to Carretta’s work are two documents – a record
of Equiano’s baptism at St. Mary’s Church in the then London suburb
of Westminster in January 1759 and one of his service on the Racehorse
during the Arctic expedition of 1773 (Carretta 1999, 2005). Carretta
deserves a lot of credit for his startling discoveries, not only of the docu-
ments that cast doubt on Equiano’s nativity, but also of related informa-
tion that strengthens our hands in scrutinizing Carretta’s own inferences
article is cited by Ogude 1982:34). Acholonu’s interprets “Oye-Eboe,” the name Equiano
claimed his people called red-colored slave traders, as Oyibo, claiming it is the term the
Igbo used to refer to light-kinned people rather than Europeans. It is unclear when the
Igbo began to make such a distinction, if they did at all. The Igbo referred to White
people/Europeans as Bekée. It is likely that late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century
Igbo may have borrowed “Oyibo” from the Yoruba, who used (and still use) it to refer to
Europeans or White people, which is probably why that reference is more current among
the western Igbo who had greater intercourse with the Yoruba. Perhaps, the most curious
aspect of Acholonu’s findings is that Equiano’s family name Ekwealuo has survived since
the eighteenth century and continues to be used as surname by the family. In the actual
fact, the Igbo practice of surnames prescribed the use of the name of somebody’s imme-
diate ancestor, usually father, as surname. The practice of static surnames – a European
rather than precolonial Igbo practice – was adopted with Christianity and colonialism in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so that family names of the eighteenth
century did not survive into the twentieth century. Also, the name Ekweanua/Ekweanuo
is more plausible as Equiano’s last name than Ekwealuo.
Notes on Sources 219
9
www.brycchancarey.com/equiano/nativity.htm.
10
At the conference “Olaudah Equiano: Representation and Reality,” conference held at
Kingston University-upon-Thames on March 22, 2003, Ogude who first raised serious
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265
266 Index
Ana (deity), XV, XVIn3, 105–109, 106n34 and the Aro slave trade, 178
Andrew the Moor, 141–142 and Aro state structures, 11–19
Angelo, Michael, 154 Arondizuogu lineage-groups in, 102
Anglo-Aro relations (post-Atlantic slavery), and the Biafra geocultural landscape,
7–8 XVIII
Angola, 117, 151 cohesion of, 17
Anị (deity). See Ala; Ana and cultural deviation, 100–107
antislavery task force, 210 culture formation in, 83–84, 100–101
Anya. A.O., 164n25, 165n27 economic vs. political, 13, 206
architecture of the Aro, 191–192, 192n33, and human proliferation, 71–75
197, 217 hybridity in, XV
archival sources. See under sources and the Ikeji festival, 102
overview incest in, 103–104
Aro, rise of and indigenous slavery, 25
first phase (1600-1720s), 26–37, 64 lineage-groups in, 60–62, 61, 62, 76, 184
second phase (1740s-1807), 37–45, 64 linkages with Arochukwu, 96–100, 115
Aro agriculture, 7, 102–103, 105–106, on the Niger River, 54
178, 188 and Nigerian cultural studies, 18
Aro central council (Ọkpankpọ), 27, 54, oppression and spiritual life in, 198
65, 75–76, 78, 96, 206 origins of, 26–27
See also Aro diaspora/expansion; Aro the osu in, 198
organization political economy of, 71
Aro commercial organization. See Aro and private enterprise, 15, 56, 64–71
organization; Aro trade networks/ and regional slave preferences, 125
diasporas and the slave trade, XVII–XVIII, 15,
Aro culture, XIV–XVII, XVIn2, XVIn3, 20–21, 45, 54, 115–116, 178
1–3, 16, 18–19, 22–26, 82–83, 95–97 slave trade routes during, 50–51, 66n16
Aro diaspora settlements state-sponsored, 15–16
and agriculture, 188 strategies of, 56
Aro influence continued by, 184 systems in, 115
and Arochukwu, 115–116 timing and location of, 57–64
vs. centralization, 15–16 and warfare, 15, 68–71, 106–107,
cultural interpretations of, 19 188–189, 193
as free cities, 188n27 and women slave ratios, 177
immigrant populations of, 2–3, 16 Aro economic imperialism, 13n22, 206
institutions of, 76–80, 98 See also Aro diaspora/expansion; Aro
lineage-groups of, 6, 60, 61, 62, 76, trade networks/diasporas
90–93, 102, 108 Aro identity, XV, 18–19, 42–45, 55, 77,
and the Nri-Awka region, 124 83–84, 178–179, 206
overviews, XVIn2, 54–64 Aro imperialists, 77, 206
Aro diaspora/expansion Aro languages and dialects, XVII, 60–62,
See also Aro central council; Aro 61, 62, 73, 76, 78n34, 107–111
organization; Aro regional Aro lineage-groups, 6, 12, 15, 60, 61,
dominance; Aro trade networks/ 62–63, 68, 76
diasporas; Arochukwu region; Aro merchant-warlords, 58, 65–66, 66n16,
Atlantic slave trade; Biafra 68, 189, 194
hinterland; culture formation; Igbo See also warfare
ethnic group; Igboland Aro militarization. See Aro warfare
and agriculture, 188 The Aro of Southeastern Nigeria (Dike and
alliances in, 64–71 Ekejiuba ), 11
Aro influence continued by, 184 Aro organization
Index 267
See also Aro diaspora/expansion; Aro slaves’ cultures absorbed in, 94–95, 197
regional dominance; Aro trade and social mobility, 197
networks/diasporas women in, 154, 157, 173
and the Aro’s ascendancy, 80 Aro statehood, 11–19
in Atlantic scholarship, 6, 8 Aro trade diasporas. See Aro trade
and the Atlantic slave trade, 34–35, 45, networks/diasporas
54, 115–116, 204 Aro trade networks/diasporas
characteristics of, 204 See also Aro organization; Aro regional
as economic/political, 13, 206 dominance
and the Ekpe, 77–78 and agriculture, 188
overview, 11–19 and Aro rule, 173, 206
state characteristics of, XIV, 204 and the Atlantic slave trade, 23–26
as trade network/diaspora, XVIII, Bende market as central to, 31
115–116 British encroachment on, 185–186,
Aro political economy, 2, 11, 117 186n19, 203
Aro politics/political organization, XVII, combined, XIV
XXIII–XXIV, XVIn3, 11–14, 16–17, as defining Aro characteristic, 17, 206
23–24, 26, 30, 53–56, 75–76, 195, elements of, 54–56
206 free cities in, 188n27
Aro regional dominance, 181, 186–187 in the hinterland, 10
See also Aro diaspora/expansion; Aro regional context overview, 53–81
organization; Aro slave trade in southern Igboland, 10
Aro script (nsibiri), 6, 78n34, 211 as study focus, XIV, 11, 18
Aro slave trade Aro warfare, 12, 65, 68–71, 106–107,
See also Aro diaspora/expansion; 178–181, 187–196, 188n26, 203
Atlantic slave trade; Biafra See also Cross River Igbo warriors;
hinterland; domestic slave trade; merchant-warlords; warfare
slave traders Aro-Anglo relations (post-Atlantic slavery),
and the Aro economy, 71, 207 7–8
and the Aro political economy, 2, 26 See also British headings
vs. Aro warfare, 6, 179 Arochukwu region
British abolition of, 2–3, 181–184 See also Aro diaspora settlements; Aro
and British imperialism, 181–185 diaspora/expansion; Aro trade
and culture formation, 83 networks/diasporas
dominance of, XIV, 1–3, 11, 22–23, 31, architecture of, 191
75 and the Atlantic slave trade, 23
and the Ekpe, 79 class structure in, 100–101
emerging, 34–35 cultural developments in, 83
and firearms, 196 and cultural deviation, 100–107, 113
human commodity in, 104 early ethnic groups in, 87n10
and human proliferation, 72 formation/consolidation of, 6, 20,
indigenous, 6–7 31–32, 53
institutions of, 75–80, 132–143 Ibiniukpabi oracle in, 77
labor pools of, 188 Igbo ascendancy in, 100
and the Nri-Awka, 80, 94 Igbo-Akpa confederacy in, 26, 31
overviews, 118–128, 134–143 and Igboland, XVII, XVn1
and the palm oil trade, 183–184 Ikeji festival in, 102–103
as punishment/reprisal, 76, 81, 99, 118, immigration into, 26–27, 32, 53
131n14, 132, 140n35, 195 indigenous slavery in, 25
routes of, 50–51 languages and dialects of, 107–112,
slave demographics in, 2 109–110
268 Index
Benin kingdom, 12, 25, 31, 43, 64–65n14, Aro trade oriented toward, 60
149, 151–152, 168, 168n31 captives departing from, 46
Bentor, Eli, 19, 83, 212 captives loaded per vessel in, 41
Bermuda, 35 civil war’s effect on, 14–15
Biafra hinterland documentation on, 154, 156
Aro control in, 15, 22, 53, 75 female slaves exported from, 158–159
Aro expansion into, XVIII, 2–3, 6, 9–10, as historical focus, 23
18–19, 45, 50–51, 58, 205, 207 Igbo slaves exported from, 51, 159
British encroachment into, 185 lineage-groups of, 61
captives drawn from, 50 loading times in, 40
map of, XI percentage of slave exports, 155
population of, XIX, 22, 188 preeminence of, 5–6, 20, 44–48, 51, 60,
and the slave trade, 7, 23–24, 43, 45–52, 159
75, 119, 134 resistance among slaves brought to, 132
zoning of, 60–64 routes to and from, 50–52
Biafra slave trade vs. trans-Saharan slave trade, 166
See also Aro slave trade; Atlantic slave trust system in, 78
trade; gender structure of slave voyage times to England, 37
trade; Igbo ethnic group; Igboland; Bosman, William, 127
indigenous slavery; slave traders boys as slaves, 36, 137, 151, 155, 156, 171
in the Biafra hinterland, 7, 23–24, 43, See also children as slaves; gender
45–52, 75, 119, 134 structure of slave trade; girls as
historiography of, 7–19 slaves
mental models in, 118 Brass (slave port), 23, 47, 49–51
overview, XIII–XIV, XVIII, 4–7 Bristol (England), 42–46, 48, 145, 208
quantitative date on, 150–151, 151 British abolition of slave trade, XVIII, 2–3,
Bight of Benin, XIII, 38, 39, 151, 159, 168, 4n4, 6, 181–184
170, 176–177, 180 British Anti-Slavery Squadron, 118
Bight of Biafra British Aro Expedition (1901-02), 3, 29,
See also Aro diaspora/expansion; Aro’s 179, 199n40
rise; Atlantic slave trade; Biafra British Board of Trade, 36
hinterland; historiography; slave British Caribbean, 5
ships British colonial antislavery efforts, 158n18
British incursions into, 181–188, 187n21 British colonial rule, 98, 106, 111, 158n18
captives exported from, XIII–XIV, XIV, British imperialism, 178–179, 181–188,
4n4, 5, 22, 33, 33–42, 38, 41, 46, 187n21, 206–207
123–125, 140, 143, 151 British incursions in Biafra, 181–188,
economy of, 180 187n21
evidence of slavery from, 119 British Niger Expeditions, 105, 133
indigenous slavery in, 24 British slave trade, 4, 4n4, 43–46, 48
kidnapping in, 127–130 British theories on the Aro, 8
map, XI Burdo, Adolphe, 199n40
political economy of, XVII, 9, 11, 21
regional relationships, 20–21 Cameroon (Bight of Biafra subregion), 44,
slave prices in, 36, 36 46, 47, 78, 79, 156, 156n15, 163
slave trade ended in, 202 Cape Lopez, Gabon, XIII
turnaround rates in, 37–38, 39 capitalism, 115
warfare/violence overview, 178–203 Carew, W.E., 88, 88n12
women slaves exported from, 151 Carli, Denis de, 151–152
blunderbusses, 29–32 Carretta, Vincent, 218–221
See also firearms Casement, Roger, 186n19, 191
Bonny (state and slave port) caste systems, 198–199, 200n43, 200n44
270 Index
Ujari people, 20n32, 62–63, 106, 106n36, and the slave economy, 148
190, 199 and slavery, 118, 126–132, 157,
Ujari region, 57, 58n8, 62, 66, 87n10, 98, 161–162, 188–189, 205
190–191, 199 Warner Lewis, Maureen, 108
Ukwu, Ukwu I., 9, 80 West African states, XIII, 23
Umo, Kanu, 61, 115, 199n40 West Niger, XVIn2, 80, 184
Umu Chukwu (children of God), 76, 81 West-Central African slave trade
Unene region, 26, 30 as capital resource, 73
See also Arochukwu region; Iwerri children in, 147
region dependents in, 117, 127
Upper Guinea Coast, 127, 160–162 end of, 202
upper Imo River region, 1, 51, 57, 70, prominence of, XIII, 4n4, 38, 39, 209
84–85, 85n4, 107, 122, 184, 216 and slave wives, 174
women in, 160–161, 174–175
Vansina, Jan, 211 Western Sudan, 131
Vassa (Equiano slave name). See Equiano, Whitford, John, 182
Olaudah Whydah (slave port), 40
Vavilov, Nikolai, 164n25 Windward Coast, 37–39
violence. See Aro warfare; British women
imperialism; Nri-Awka region, See also gender division of labor; gender
warfare/violence in; warfare structure of slave trade
vocabulary comparisons, 107–108 as business assets, 173
cursed with barrenness, 187
war captives, 70, 127–130, 143, 161–162, as domestic slaves, 148
205, 207 economic roles of, 151–152
War of Jenkin’s Ear, 207 forced immigration of, 160
warfare in human proliferation, 73
See also Aro merchant-warlords; Aro in the Ihu rite, 99
warfare; Cross River Igbo warriors; in the indigenous economy, 11
Nri-Awka region; women political power of, 114
and the age structure of slavery, 11 and restrictive marriage practices, 104
and agriculture, 189–190 as sacrificial victims, 112–113
among lineage-groups, 191 and the twin taboo, 104–105
and Aro diaspora/expansion, 15, 68–71, as war captives, 127, 161–162
106–107, 188–189, 193 and yam cultivation, 160
and Aro identity, 178–179 women as slaves
and Aro slave trade, 6, 179 See also slave wives
Aro state created by, 15 in Atlantic vs. domestic slave trade,
and Aro trade, 68 144–148
and Arondizuogu, 107, 191, 193 Biafra exports of, 5, 22
civil, 2, 13, 15, 26, 32, 91, 179, 190–191 as marginal, 148
and decadence, 196–202 preferences for, 43, 147
and the end of the slave trade, 202 in quantitive data, 150–151
and firearms, 196 ratios, 149, 151, 156–158, 160–161,
and the gender structure of slavery, 169, 176–177, 183, 205
XVIII, 11, 205 values of, 161
and the Igbo-Akpa alliance, 26 and warfare, 205
in Igboland, 68–71 women owners of, 158, 199
and the indigenous economy, 11
and kolanuts, 163n23 yam festivals, 88, 88n13, 97n23, 98n26,
Nri-Awka model of, 190 102–103
Ọtụsịs’ roles in, 27, 29 yams
Index 279
cultivation of, 88, 96, 153n12, 159–160 reverence for, XV–XVII, 19, 149,
cultural significance of, 205 159–160
and the gender division of labor, 149, as ritual gifts, XVIn3
160 species of, 166
and the Ibibio, 159–160 Yoruba culture, 161, 161n20, 168–169,
and the Igbo, 148–149, 159–160, 168–169n32, 176, 217–218n8
164n25, 205