Republic of the Philippines Narciso Umali resulting in the latter's election as

SUPREME COURT Congressman. However, these friendly relations between

Manila the two did not endure. In the words of Punzalan, Narciso
Umali who as Congressman regarded himself as the
EN BANC political head and leader in that region including Tiaong,
became jealous because of his (Punzalan's) fast growing
G.R. No. L-5803 November 29, 1954 popularity among the people of Tiaong who looked to him
instead of Umali for political guidance, leadership, and
favors. In time the strain in their relations became such
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- that they ceased to have any dealings with each other and
appellee, they even filed mutual accusations. According to
vs. Punzalan, in May 1950, Umali induced about twenty-six
NARCISO UMALI, ET AL., defendants. special policemen of his (Punzalan's) to flee to the
NARCISO UMALI, EPIFANIO PASUMBAL and ISIDRO mountains with their arms and join the Huks, this is in
CAPINO, defendants-appellants. order to discredit Punzalan's administration; that he was
later able to contact two of his twenty-six policemen and
Jose P. Laurel, Cipriano Primicias, Alejo Mabanag, tried to persuade them to return to the town and to the
Manuel Concordia, P.M. Stuart Del Rosario, Tomas service, but they told him that they and their companions
R. Umali, Eufemio E. De Mesa and Edmundo T. would not surrender except and with through the
Zepeda for appellants. intervention of Congressman Umali, and so Punzalan had
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor to seek Umali's intervention which resulted in the
Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee. surrender of the 26 men with their firearms; that thereafter
Umali wanted to have their firearms, claiming that they all
MONTEMAYOR, J.: belonged to him from his guerrilla days when he was a
colonel, and that after liberation he had merely loaned
Narciso Umali, Epifanio Pasumbal, and Isidro Capino are them to the municipal authorities of Tiaong to help keep
appealing directly to this Tribunal from a decision of the peace and order; and that the refusal of Punzalan to grant
Court of First Instance of Quezon province finding them Umali's request further strained their relations, and
guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple thereafter Umali would not speak to him even when they
murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, and happened to meet at parties.
sentencing each of them to "life imprisonment, other
accessories of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally On September 19, 1951, the Chief of Police of Punzalan
Marcial Punsalan in the amount of P24,023; Valentin disarmed four of Umali's men, including his bodyguard
Robles in the amount of P10,000; Yao Cabon in the Isidro Capino who were then charged with illegal
amount of P700; Claro Robles in the amount of P12,800; possession of firearms. Umali interceded for his men and
Pocho Guan in the amount of P600; the heirs of Domingo Col. Gelveson, Provincial Commander, sent a telegram
Pisigan in the amount of P6,000; the heirs of Locadio stating that the firearms taken away from the men were
Untalan in the amount of P6,000; Patrolman Pedro licensed. As a result the complaint was dismissed. This
Lacorte in the amount of P500; Lazaro Ortega in the incident was naturally resented by Umali and spurred him
amount of P300; Hilarion Aselo in the amount of P300; to have a showdown with Punzalan.
Calixto Rivano in the amount P50; Melecio Garcia in the
amount of P60; and Juanito Lector in the amount of P90, Then the elections of 1951 (November 13) approached
each to pay one fifteenth of the costs, without subsidiary and Punzalan ran for reelection. To oppose him, and to
imprisonment in case of insolvency due to the nature of clip his political wings and definitely blast his ambition for
the principal penalty that is imposed upon them." continued power and influence in Tiaong, Umali picked
Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader.
The complex crime of which appellants were found guilty
was said to have been committed during the raid staged The pre-election campaign and fight waged by both
in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in factions — Punzalan and Pasumbal, was intense and
the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. It is bitter, even ruthless. The election was to be a test of
not denied that such a raid took place resulting in the political strength and would determine who was who in
burning down and complete destruction of the house of Tiaong, — Umali or Punzalan. Umali spoke at political
Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at meetings, extolling the virtues of Pasumbal and the
P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, benefits and advantages that would accrue to the town if
and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman he was elected, at the same time bitterly attacking
Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Punzalan, accusing him of dishonesty, corruption in
Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro office, abuse of power, etc. At one of those meetings he
Lacorte and five civilians; that during and after the burning told the audience not to vote for Punzalan because he
of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, would not be elected and that even if he won the election,
robbing one house and two Chinese stories; and that the he would not sit for blood will flow, and that he (Umali) had
raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by already prepared a golden coffin for him (Punzalan). After
the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by denying the charges, in retort, Punzalan would say that
Captain Alzate. Umali as a Congressman was useless, and that he did not
even attend the sessions and that his chair in Congress
To understand the reason for and object of the raid we had gathered dust, even cobwebs.
have to go into the political situation in Tiaong not only
shortly before that raid but one year or two years before To help in the Umali-Pasumbal campaign, Amado
it. Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old time Mendoza who later was to play the role of star witness for
friends and belonged to the same political faction. In the the prosecution, was drafted. He was a compadre of
general elections of 1947 Umali campaigned for Punzalan Pasumbal and had some experience in political
who later was elected Mayor of Tiaong. In the elections of campaigns, and although he was not exactly a model
1949 Punzalan in his turn campaigned and worked for
1
citizen, being sometimes given to drunkenness, still, he men in the lanzones grove just across the street from their
had the gift of speech and persuasion. In various political house, belonging to the father of Umali, and among those
meetings he delivered speeches for Pasumbal. He was men they saw Congressman Umali holding a revolver, in
ever at the back and call of Umali and Pasumbal, and the company of Huk Commander Torio and about 20
naturally he frequented the latter's houses or armed men. Afterwards they saw Umali and his
headquarters. The result of the elections plainly showed companions leave in the direction of Taguan, by way of
that Punzalan was the political master and leader in the railroad tracks.
Tiaong. He beat Pasumbal by an overwhelming majority
of 2,221 votes. Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were It would appear from the evidence that the raid was well-
keenly disappointed, and according to the evidence, planned. As a diversionary measure, part of the attacking
adopted measures calculated to frustrate Punzalan's force was deployed toward the camp or station of the
victory, even as prophesied by Umali himself in one of his Army (part of 8th B.C.T.) in the suburbs and the camp was
pre-election speeches about blood flowing and gold fired upon, not exactly to destroy or drive out that Army
coffin. unit but to keep it from going to the rescue and aid of the
main objective of the raid. The rest of the raiding party
Going back to the raid staged in Tiaong on November 14, went toward Punzalan's house and attacked it with
1951, it is well to make a short narration of the happenings automatic weapons, hand grenades, and even with
shortly before it, established by the evidence, so as to bottles filled with gasoline (popularly known as Molotov's
ascertain and be informed of the reason or purpose of cocktail). It was evident that the purpose of the attack on
said raid, the persons, behind it, and those who took part Punzalan's house was to kill him. Fortunately, however,
in it. According to the testimony of Amado Mendoza, in and apparently unknown to the attackers and those who
the morning of November 12th, that is, on the eve of the designed the raid, at six o'clock that morning of November
election, at the house of Pasumbal's father, then being 14th Punzalan and his Chief of Police had left Tiaong to
used as his electoral headquarters, he heard Umali go to Lucena, the capital, to report the results of the
instruct Pasumbal to contact the Huks through election to the Governor.
Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be killed,
Pasumbal complying with the order of his Chief (Umali) The attack on the house of Punzalan was witnessed and
went to the mountains which were quite near the town and described by several persons, including policemen who
held a conference with Commander Abeng. It would seem happened to be near the house. Policeman Tomas
that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan was Maguare who was in front of the house saw Epifanio
going to win in the elections the next day, and that his Pasumbal, Isidro Umali (brother of Congressman Umali)
death was the surest way to eliminate him from the and Moises Escueta enter the gate of Punzalan's house
electoral fight. and take part in the firing. Policeman Pedro Lacorte who
was stationed as guard at the gate of Mayor Punzalan's
The conference between Pasumbal and Commander house recognized defendant Isidro Capino as one of
Abeng on November 12th was witnessed and testified to those firing at the house. Lacorte said that he was
by Nazario Anonuevo, a Huk who was under Commander guarding the house of Punzalan when he suddenly heard
Abeng, and who later took an active part in the raid. In the shots coming from the sides of the house and going over
evening of the same day, Mendoza heard Pasumbal to the place to investigate, he saw armed men in fatigue
report to Umali about his conference with Commander and shouting "burn the house of Mayor Punzalan"; that he
Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to the was hit on the left check and later Isidro Capino threw at
proposition and had even outlined the manner of attack, him a hand grenade and he was hit in the right forearm
that the Huks would enter the town (Tiaong) under and in the right eye and became permanently blind in said
Commander Lucio and Aladin, the latter to lead the sector eye. Mateo Galit, laundryman who was sitting inside a
towards the East; but that Commander Abeng had jeep parked in front of the house of Punzalan recognized
suggested that the raid be postponed because Pasumbal defendant Pasumbal as one of the attackers who, once in
may yet win the election the following day, thereby the yard said ina loud voice as though addressing
rendering unnecessary the raid and the killing of somebody in the house "Pare, come down." Mrs.
Punzalan. Punzalan who was then inside the house related to the
court that at about eight in the evening while she was
Continuing with the testimony of Amado Mendoza, he told resting she heard shots and rapid firing. As a precaution
the court that as per instructions of Umali he went to the she took her children to the bathroom. Then she noticed
house of the latter, in the evening of November 14th, the that her house was being fired at because the glass
day following the election, with the result of the election window panes were being shattered and she heard the
already known, namely, the decisive victory of Punzalan explosion of a hand grenade inside the house, followed
over Pasumbal. He was told by Umali to come with him, by flares in the sala and burning of blankets and mosquito
and Pasumbal and the three boarded a jeep with nets in the bedrooms and she noticed the smell of smoke
Pasumbal at the wheel. They drove toward the Tiaong of gasoline. Realizing the great danger, she and the
Elementary School and once there he (Mendoza) was left children ran out of the house and went to hide in the house
at the school premises with instructions by Umali to wait of a neighbor.
for Commander Abeng and the Huks and point to them
the house of Punzalan. After waiting for sometime, Abeng Nazario Añonuevo declared in court that he was a farmer
and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with garands and was picked up and seized by Huk Commander
and carbines, arrived and after explaining his identity and Tommy sometime in August 1951, and was taken to Mt.
his mission to Abeng, he had led the dissidents or part of Banahaw in Laguna and mustered in the ranks of the
the contingent in the direction of Punzalan's house and on Huks; that just before the elections of November 13, 1951,
arriving in front of the bodega of Robles, he pointed out he saw Pasumbal come to the mountains near Tiaong
Punzalan's house and then walked toward his home, and talk to Commander Abeng; that on November 14th by
leaving the Huks who proceeded to lie flat in a canal. order of Commander Abeng he with other Huks left Mt.
Before reaching his house, he already heard shots, so, he Banahaw for Tiaong; that when they crossed the Osiw
evacuated his family to their dugout in his yard. While River already near Tiaong, they were met by Pasumbal
doing so he and his wife Catalina Tinapunan saw armed and Capino; that when they were at the outskirts of the
2
town, he and the party were told by Commander Tommy heard from Taguan. The natural and logical reaction on
to attack the 8th BCT camp in Tiaong to prevent the the part of Umali and Pasumbal would have been to rush
sending of army help to the town proper; that he took part to Tiaong, see what had really happened and then render
in firing on the camp which returned the fire in the course help and give succor to the stricken residents, including
of which he was wounded; and that because of his wound their own relatives. It will be remembered that the houses
he could not escape with his companions to the of the fathers of Umali and Pasumbal were in Tiaong and
mountains when the Army soldiers dispersed and drove their parents and relatives were residing there. And yet,
them out of the town and so he was finally captured by instead of following a natural impulse and urge to go to
said soldiers. Tiaong, they fled in the opposite direction towards
Candelaria. And Umali instead of taking the road,
As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their purposely avoided the same and preferred to hike through
participation in and responsibility for the raid was duly coconut groves so that upon arriving in Candelaria, he
established not only by the going of Pasumbal on was wet, and spattered and very tired. Had they wanted
November 12th to the mountains following instructions of to render any help to Tiaong they could have asked the
Umali, and conferring with Commander Abeng asking him police authorities of Candelaria to send a rescue party to
to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan, but also by the fact that that town. Or better still, when the army reinforcements
Pasumbal and Capino in the afternoon or evening of from Lucena sent at the instance of Punzalan, who at
November 14th met the Huks at the Osiw River as the about eight or nine that evening was returning to Tiaong
dissidents were on their way to Tiaong and later from Lucena, found at the barrio or sitio of Lusakan near
Pasumbal and Capino were seen in the yard of Punzalan Tiaong that there was fighting in the town, he immediately
firing at the house with automatic weapons and hand returned to Lucena to get army reinforcements to relieve
grenades. his town, was passing by Taguan, where they were, Umali
and Pasumbal could have joined said reinforcements and
gone to Tiaong. Instead the two continued on their way to
What about Umali? His criminal responsibility was also
established, tho indirectly. We have the testimony of the capital (Lucena) where before dawn, they went and
Amado Mendoza who heard him instructing Pasumbal to contacted Provincial Fiscal Mayo, a first cousin of Umali,
and Assistant Fiscal Reyes and later had these two
contact Commander Abeng and ask him to raid Tiaong
officials accompany them to the Army camp to see Col.
and kill Punzalan. The rest of the evidence is more or less
Gelveson, not for the purpose of asking for the sending of
circumstantial, but nonetheless strong and convincing. No
aid or reinforcement to Tiaong but presumably to show to
one saw him take part in the firing and attack on the house
of Punzalan; nor was he seen near or around said house. the prosecution officials, specially the Army Commander
Because of his important position as Congressman, that they (Umali and Pasumbal) had nothing to do
whatsoever with the raid. Umali said he was trying to
perchance he did not wish to figure too prominently in the
avoid and keep clear of Tiaong because he might be
actual raid. Besides, he would seem to have already given
suspected of having had some connection with the raid
out all the instructions necessary and he could well stay
and might be the object of reprisal. As a matter of fact,
in the background. However, during the raid, not very far
from Punzalan's house he was seen in the lanzonesan of according to Umali himself, while still in Taguan that
his father, holding a revolver and in the company of about evening and before he went to Candelaria, somebody had
informed him that Col. Legaspi of the Army was looking
20 armed men with Huk Commander Torio, evidently
for him. Instead of seeking Col. Legaspi and find out what
observing and waiting for developments. Then he and his
was wanted of him, he left in the opposite direction and
companions left in the direction of Taguan.
fled to Candelaria and later to Lucena, and the next day
he took the train for Manila. This strange act and
Umali and Pasumbal, however, claim that during the raid, behaviour of the two men, particularly Umali, all contrary
they were in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, about to impulse and natural reaction, and what other people
seven kilometers away from Tiaong where a consolation would ordinarily have done under the circumstances,
party was being held. There is ample evidence however prompted the trial court in its decision to repeat the old
to the effect that they arrived in Pasumbal's home only saying "The guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but
around midnight. An Army soldier named Cabalona who the innocent stands bold as a lion." We might just as well
happened to be in Pasumbal's home arriving there earlier reproduce that portion of the decision of the trial court, to
in the evening and who was invited to take some wit:
refreshments said that he did not see the two men until
they arrived about midnight when the Army
reinforcements from Lucena passed by on their way to . . . Considering the fact that Taguan is very near
Tiaong. Thus, we have this chain of circumstances that Tiaong so that even taking it for granted as true,
for the sake of argument, that the said accused
does not speak in favor of Umali, or Pasumbal for that
were really at the party of Pasumbal on the night
matter. But this is not all. There is the rather strange and
in question, that would not prevent them from
unexplained, at least not satisfactorily, behaviour of Umali
being in Tiaong between 8 and 9. Besides, why
and Pasumbal that evening of November 14th. Assuming
for a moment as they claim, that the two were not in was it that night the hasag lamp was replaced
Tiaong at the commencement of the raid between 8:00 with candles when the reinforcements passed
through Taguan about midnight of November 14,
and 9:00 p.m., and during the whole time the raid lasted,
1951. Why did Congressman Umali and company
and that they were all that time in the home of Pasumbal
instead of going to Tiaong which was the scene
in Taguan, still, according to their own evidence, they
of the attack hurried towards Candelaria, after the
were informed by persons coming or fleeing from Tiaong
that there was a raid going on there, and that some reinforcement has passed and went to the house
of Felix Ona walking through a muddy path under
houses were burning. As a matter of fact, considering the
the coconut groves? Why was Umali afraid to
promixity of Taguan to Tiaong, a distance of about seven
pass through the provincial road and preferred a
kilometers and the stillness and darkness of the night, the
muddy road instead? Was he trying to conceal
fire and the glow produced by the burning of three houses
and the noise produced by the firing of automatic himself? Why did Pasumbal and company also
weapons and the explosion of the hand grenades and go to the house of Ona? Why did they go to the
house of Felix Ona instead of going to the house
bottles of gasoline, could and must have been seen and
3
 of Manalo who could have given them better that when he testified in court under the observation and
protection? And again why did Congressman scrutiny of the trial court bearing in mind that he was the
Umali and the other co-accused repaired and star witness for the prosecution and his testimony
sought the company of Fiscal Reyes in going at naturally extremely important, and the trial court after the
such an early hour to the Army authorities, did opportunity given to it of observing his demeanor while on
they fear any reprisal? From whom? Why did the witness stand had regarded him as a witness, sincere,
Umali go to Manila from Lucena on November 16, and his testimony truthful, and considering further the
1951? "The guilty man flees even if no one case with which affidavits of retraction of this nature are
pursues, but the innocent stands bold as a lion." obtained, we confess that we are not impressed with such
retraction of Mendoza.
At first blush it would appear rather unbelievable that
Umali and Pasumbal, particularly the former should seek The last point to be determined is the nature of the offense
the aids of the Huks in order to put down and eliminate of offenses committed. Appellants were charged with and
their political enemy Punzalan. It would seem rather convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
strange and anomalous that a member of Congress murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery. Is there
should have friendly relations with this dissidents whom such a complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
the Government had been fighting all these years. But if etc? While the Solicitor General in his brief claims that
we study the evidence, it will be found that the reason and appellants are guilty of said complex crime and in support
the explanation are there. As already stated, during the of his stand "asks for leave to incorporate by reference"
Japanese occupation, to further the resistance his previous arguments in opposing Umali's petition for
movement, guerillas were organized in different parts of bail, counsel for appellants considered it unnecessary to
the Philippines. One of these was the guerilla unit known discuss the existence or non-existence of such complex
as President Quezon's Own Guerillas (PQOG) operating crime, saying that the nature of the crime committed "is of
in the provinces of Tayabas (now Quezon) and Laguna. no moment to herein appellants because they had
Umali, Pasumbal, Commander Abeng and even absolutely no part in it whatsoever". For that present, and
Punzalan himself were officers in this guerilla unit, Umali with respect to this particular case, we deem it
attaining the rank of colonel, and Pasumbal and Punzalan unnecessary to decide this important and controversial
that of Lieutenant-colonel, Pasumbal then being known as question, its consideration and determination to another
"Panzer". After Liberation, Abeng joined the dissidents, case or occasion more opportune, when it is more directly
and became a Huk Commander. It was not unnatural that and squarely raised and both parties given an opportunity
Umali and Pasumbal should continue their friendship and to discuss and argue the question more adequately and
association with Commander Abeng and seek his aid exhaustively. Considering that, assuming for the moment
when convenient and necessary. Umali admitted that he that there is no such complex crime of rebellion with
knew Huk Commander Kasilag. Graciano Ramos, one of murder, etc., and that consequently appellants could not
the witnesses of the prosecution told the court that way have been legally charged with, much less convicted of
back in May 1950, in a barrio of San Pablo City he saw said complex crime, and the information should therefore,
Umali confer with Commander Kasilag, which be regarded as having charged more than one offense,
Commander after the conference told his soldiers contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and Rule 113, section 2
including Ramos that Umali wanted the Huks to raid (e), of the Rules of Court, but that appellants having
Tiaong, burn the presidencia and kidnap Punzalan. Of interposed no objection thereto, they were properly tried
course, the last part of the testimony may be regarded as for and lawfully convicted if guilty of the several, separate
hearsay, but the fact is that Umali conferred with a Huk crimes charged therein, we have decided and we rule that
commander as early as 1950. Then we have the fact that the appellants may properly be convicted of said several
on November 18 of the same year Punzalan wrote to and separate crimes, as hereinafter specified. We feel
President Quirino denouncing the congressman Umali for particularly supported and justified in this stand that we
fraternizing with the Huks and conducting a campaign take, by the result of the case, namely, that the prison
among them in preparation for the elections the following sentence we impose does not exceed, except perhaps in
year. And we may also consider the fact that the town of actual duration, that meted out by the Court below, which
Tiaong stands at the foothills of Mt. Banahaw where the is life imprisonment.
dissidents under Commander Abeng, Tommy, Lucio,
Aladin, and others had their hideout, so that it was not We are convinced that the principal and main, tho not
difficult for residents of Tiaong like Umali and Pasumbal necessarily the most serious, crime committed here was
to communicate and even associate with dissidents in that not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the
region. raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking
up arms was not exactly against the Government and for
After carefully considering all the evidence in the case, we the purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of
are constrained to agree with the trial court that the three the Revised Penal code under rebellion. The raiders did
appellants are guilty. Besides, the determination of this not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local
case, in great measure, hinges on the credibility of Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of
witnesses. The learned trial court which had the force, intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act
opportunity of observing the demeanor of witnesses on of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public
the stand and gauging their sincerity and evaluating their official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong.
testimony, decided the Government witnesses, including Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient to
Amado Mendoza, to be more credible and reliable. And constitute sedition. As regards the crime of robbery with
we find nothing in the record to warrant correction or which appellants were charged and of which they were
reversal of the stand and finding of the trial court on the convicted, we are also of the opinion that it was not one
matter. We have not overlooked the rather belated of the purposes of the raid, which was mainly to kidnap or
retraction of Amado Mendoza made on October 31, 1952, kill Punzalan and destroy his house. The robberies were
about a year and 9 months after he testified in court. actually committed by only some of the raiders,
Considering the circumstances surrounding the making of presumably dissidents, as an afterthought, because of the
this affidavit or retraction, the late date at which it was opportunity offered by the confusion and disorder
made, the reasons given by him for making it and the fact resulting from the shooting and the burning of the three
4
houses, the articles being intended presumably to EN BANC
replenish the supplies of the dissidents in the mountains.
For these robberies, only those who actually took part G.R. No. L-28166 November 2, 1928
therein are responsible, and not the three appellants
herein. With respect to the crime of multiple frustrated THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
murder, while the assault upon policeman Pedro Lacorte ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
with a hand grenade causing him injuries resulting in his vs.
blindness in one eye, may be regarded as frustrated DATU TAHIL and Datu TARSON, defendants-
murder; the wounding of Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia appellants.
and Lector should be considered as mere physical
injuries. The crimes committed are, therefore, those of
sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and Jose A. Uy for appellants.
physical injuries. The murders may not be qualified by Vicente Sotto for appellant Datu Tahil.
evident premeditation because the premedition was for Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
the killing of Punzalan. The result was the killing of three
others intended by the raiders (People vs. Guillen, 47
Off). The killing may, however, be qualified by treachery,
the raiders using firearms against which the victims were
defenseless, with the aggravating circumstance of abuse AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
of superior strength. The three murders may be punished
with the penalty of death. However, because of lack of the The appellants, Datu Tahil and Datu Tarson, were
necessary votes, the penalty should be life imprisonment. convicted in the Court of First Instance of Sulu of the crime
of rebellion, Datu Tahil being sentenced to ten years'
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points imprisonment and to pay a fine of $10,000, and Datu
raised by the appellants in their brief. Tarso to five years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of
$5,000, with sudsidiary imprisonment in case of
In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition, insolvency in regard to Datu Tarson.
multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical
injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is Having encountered certain difficulties in the collection of
sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and to pay a the land and the personal cedula taxes among the
fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the resident of Patikul, due to their refusal to make this
appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to payment, the provincial governor of Sulu, Carl Moore,
indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; turned the matter over to Lieutenant Angeles of the
and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum Constabulary for the purpose of employing such means
penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the as he might consider convenient to overcome these
Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in difficulties. Datu Tahil, then the third member of the
setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of provincial board of Sulu, being amongst those who
Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or refused to make this payment, Lieutenant Angeles tried
more persons, because they even and actually saw an old and succeeded in having a conference with him, in which
lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view Datu Tahil suggested that he return the following day
of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the because he would call meeting of his people at his house
appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay in Liang in order to discuss the matter with them.
the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower Lieutenant Angeles went to Datu Tahil's house the day
court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the following this meeting and found about 70 persons
provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the present. After Lieutenant Angeles has explained to all the
duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view importance of the Government's collecting the land tax,
of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long Datu Tahil took several of those present into a room for a
duration, we find it unnecessary to fix and impose the secret conference, after which he informed Lieutenant
prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and Angeles that he, personally, had no objection to paying
physical injuries; however, the sums awarded the victims the tax, but the others asked time to do so. Lieutenant
(Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by Angeles said that he would inform Governor Moore of it
the court below will stand. With these modifications, the and left.
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
When Lieutenant Angeles returned to Patikul, Moro
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Pasingan, who had attended the conference as a secret
Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur. agent of the Government informed him that the extension
requested for the payment of the land tax was nothing
more than a pretext to gain time in order to construct a
fort. Indeed, a few days after, the construction of a fort
was commenced on a hill at a strategical location. After
the construction of the fort Datu Tahil gathered his people
therein, including Datu Tarson who was one of those who
refused to pay the tax and who attended the conference.
Then the propaganda started to extend the movement,
and they tried to attract those who were in the
Government service. The principal purpose of the
movements was to obtain the abolition of the land tax and
besides, other pretentions in connection with the
Republic of the Philippines attendance of children at school, the privilege of carrying
SUPREME COURT arms and the removal of certain provincial officials,
Manila amongst whom, Governor Moore, with the threat that if
their request were not granted, they would oppose the
5
Government by forcible means. Datu Tahil made them all, At any rate, for the purpose of the present case, suffice it
including Datu Tarson, take an oath on the Koran to this to say that upon its being intimated to Datu Tahil that he
effect. From then on they took turns in guarding the fort surrender with the object of complying with a judicial
and its surrondings under the orders of Datu Tahil, who warrant of arrest against him and his followers, he
always carried a rifle and a revolver. Lieutenant Angeles resisted this order by means of force, thus preventing the
upon being informed of this state of affairs reported it to officer charged with this duty from performing it. This
Governor Moore, and the latter, in turn, endorsed the already constitutes a crime.
matter to the provincial fiscal.
In regard to Datu Tarson, it appears that he was one of
About the middle of January, 1927, the provincial fiscal those who took an oath on the Koran to oppose the
filed a complaint against Datu Tahil and his followers Government by force; that he took part in all the activities
charging them with sedition, and the proper warrant of of the movement, assisting in the construction of the fort;
arrest was issued on the 15th. Governor Moore, however, that in the day preceding the incident he was in the fort;
did not wish to proceed on this warrant of arrest and tried and while he left in the afternoon, he returned early the
to persuade Datu Tahil and his followers to desist from following morning and was found in the fort when the
their intention, using the influence of other prominent Government forces appeared.
Moros to this end. Governor Moore even tried to have a
conference with Datu Tahil for the same purpose, but was The facts proven, however, constitute the crime of
unsuccessful because he was informed that they intended sedition, defined in section 5 of Act No. 292, and not of
to attack him. rebellion according to section 3 of the same law, the acts
committed being limited to preventing the Government
On January 30th, when Governor Moore had given up all officials, throught force, from complying with their duties
hopes of obtaining any results from his efforts, he in connection with the judicial order, the enforcement of
delivered the warrant of arrest to Commander Green of which was entrusted to them. lawphi1.net
the Constabulary of its compliance. The following day
Commander Green with a group of soldiers, stationed In our opinion, the crime committed is that of sedition, and
themselves about 50 meters in front of the fort where he the fine imposed upon Datu Tahil is therefore reduced to
found a red flag flying and demanded the surrender of $5,000 and that imposed upon Datu Tarson to $2,500, the
Datu Tahil. He did not receive any reply to his intimation, judgment appealed from being affirmed in all other
and, in turn, a group of armed Moros appeared at the left respects, with the costs against the appellants. So
flank of the Constabulary soldiers in the act of attacking ordered.
them, but were repelled. It was again intimated that Datu
Tahil surrender, but again no answer was received, and
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez
then a larger group of Moros appeared in an aggressive
and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
attitude, being likewise repelled. For the purpose of
frightening the Moros, the Constabulary soldiers fired the
stoke mortar, which caused the defenders of the fort to
flee, leaving the Government forces in possession
thereof, where they found only the bodies of those who
had been killed in this affray.

Some days after this Datu Tahil surrendered to the

authorities and, while in jail, had a conference with
Governor Moore in which he stated that Commander
Malone of the Contabulary was to blame for everything,
as he had induced them to rebel against the Government.

The appellants allege in their defense that the

construction of the fort and the meetings which took place
therein were only for the purpose of discussing their
grievances against the Government in order to present
and submit their claims through peaceful means. This
allegation, however, is not supported by the evidence.
Datu Tahil, himself, admits that he in fact did swear his
followers on the Koran, although he says that the very
purpose of this was in order that they would not oppose
the Government but would present their grievances
through peaceful means. But, if this were the purpose of
the oath, the necessity of taking it is not understood. The
said Datu Tahil admits in an affidavit having committed all
of these acts against the law, constructing the fort in order
to oppose the Government, because Commander Malone
had encouraged him to do so, promising to furnish arms
and ammunition, and visiting the fort from time to time
while it was in the course of construction. We do not
believe that Datu Tahil, as he stated during the trial,
signed this affidavit without having been informed of its
contents. Furthermore, this supposed inducement of
Commander Malone, aside from being no excuse for the
commission of the crime, was emphatically denied by
Datu Tahil.

6
Republic of the Philippines to continue on duty on the streets of Intramuros and that
SUPREME COURT private Macasinag had died as a consequence of the shot
Manila he received the night before. This rumor contributed in no
small degree in precipitating a movement for reprisal by
EN BANC the Constabulary soldiers against the policemen.

G.R. No. 17748 March 4, 1922 At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day,
December 15, 1920, corporal Ingles of the Fourth
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE Company approached private Nicolas Torio who was then
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, the man in charge of quarters, and asked him to let the
vs. soldiers out through the window of the quarters of the
GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL., defendants- Fourth Company. Private Torio was easily persuaded to
appellants. permit private Francisco Garcia of the Second Company
to saw out the window bars of the quarters, in his charge,
and to allow soldiers to escape through the window with
Vicente Sotto for appellants. rifles and ammunition under the command of their
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee sergeants and corporals. When outside of the quarters,
these soldiers divided into groups for attack upon the city
MALCOLM, J.: police force.

As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of certain One platoon of Constabulary soldiers apparently
members of the Philippine Constabulary to inflict revenge numbering about ten or twelve, on Calle Real, Intramuros,
upon the police of the city of Manila, charges of sedition fired in the direction of the intersection of Calles Real and
were filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila Cabildo where an American policeman named Driskill
against the participants in the public disturbance. was stationed, and was taking with a friend named
Convicted in the trial court of a violation of Act No. 292 of Jacumin, a field clerk in the United States Army. These
the Philippine Commission, and sentenced either to the two men were shot and died soon afterwards. To the
maximum penalty or a near approach to the maximum credit of policeman Driskill be it said, that although in a
penalty provided by the punitive provisions of that law, all dying condition and in the face of overwhelming odds, her
of the defendants have perfected an appeal to this court. valiantly returned the fire with his revolver. Jacumin was
A statement of the case and of the facts, an opinion on killed notwithstanding that in response to the command of
the pertinent issues, and a judgement, if no reversible Constabulary, "Hands up!," he elevated both arms.
error be found, regarding the appropriate penalty, will be
taken up in the order named. A street car happened to stop at this time at the corner of
Calles Real and Cabildo. Without considering that the
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS passengers in the car were innocent passersby, the
Constabulary squad fired a volley into the car, killing
On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila instantly the passenger named Victor de Torres and
arrested a woman who was a member of the household gravely wounding three other civilian passengers,
of a Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia Gregorio Cailes, Vicente Antonio, and Mariano Cortes.
Barracks in this city. The arrest of the woman was Father Jose Tahon, a priest of the Cathedral of Manila,
considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an proved himself a hero on this occasion for, against the
outrage committed by the policemen, and it instantly gave command of the Constabulary, he persisted in persuading
rise to friction between members of Manila police them to cease firing and advanced in order that he might
department and member of the Philippine Constabulary. administer spiritual aid to those who had been wounded.

The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a policemen The firing on Calle Real did not end at that time. Some
named Artemio Mojica, posted on Calle Real, in the minutes later, Captain William E. Wichman, assistant
District of Intramuros, city of Manila, had an encounter chief of police of the city of Manila, riding in a motorcycle
with various Constabulary soldiers which resulted in the driven by policeman Saplala, arrived at the corner of
shooting of private Macasinag of the Constabulary. Calles Real and Magallanes in Intramuros, and a volley of
Private Macasinag was seriously, and as afterwards shorts by Constabulary soldiers resulted in the
appeared, mortally wounded. instantaneous death of Captain Wichman and the death
shortly afterwards of patrolman Saplala.
The encounter between policemen Mojica and other
companions of the Manila force and private Macasinag About the same time, a police patrol came from the Meisic
and other companions of the Constabulary, with its grave police station. When it was on Calle Real near Cabildo, in
consequences for a Constabulary soldier endangered a Intramuros, it was fired upon by Constabulary soldiers
deep feeling of resentment on the part of the soldiers at who had stationed themselves in the courtyard of the San
Santa Lucia Barracks. This resentment was soon Agustin Church. This attack resulted in the death of
converted into a desire for revenge against the police patrolmen Trogue and Sison.
force of the city of Manila. The officers of the Constabulary
appear to have been aware of the state of excitement Another platoon of the Constabulary, between thirty and
among the soldiers the shooting of private Macasinag, forty in number, had in the meantime, arranged
Captain Page, the commanding officer of the Barracks, themselves in a firing line on the Sunken Gradens on the
increased the number of guards, and confined all the east side of Calle General Luna opposite the Aquarium.
soldiers in the Barracks. From this advantageous position the Constabulary fired
upon the motorcycle occupied by Sergeant Armada and
During the afternoon of the next day, December 15, 1920, driven by policeman Policarpio who with companions
a rumor spread among the soldiers in Santa Lucia were passing along Calle General Luna in front of the
Barracks to the effect that policeman Mojica was allowed Aquarium going in the direction, of Calle Real, Intramuros.
7
As a result of the shooting, the driver of the motorcycle, General Service of the Constabulary, residing in
policeman Policarpio, was mortally wounded. This same Santa Lucia Barracks.
platoon of Constabulary soldiers fired several volleys
indiscriminately into the Luneta police station, and the 2. To what company of the Philippine
office of the secret service of the city of Manila across Constabulary do you belong? — First Company,
Calles General Luna and Padre Burgos, but fortunately General Service of the Constabulary.]
no one was injured.
3. Where were you garrisoned yesterday
General Rafael Crame, Chief of the Constabulary, and afternoon December 15,
Captain Page, commanding officer of the Santa Lucia 1920? — In the Santa Lucia Barracks.
Barracks, and other soldiers in the streets of Manila, and
other soldiers one after another returned to the Barracks
4. Did you leave the barracks at about 7 o'clock
where they were disarmed. No list of the names of these yesterday evening? — Yes, sir.
soldiers was, however, made.
5. For what reason, and where did you go? — We
In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1920,
went in search of the policemen and secret
Colonel, Lucien R. Sweet of the Constabulary officers,
service men of Manila. It has been sometime now
and later by the fiscals of the city of Manila, commenced since we have been having standing grudge
an investigation of the events of the night before. He first against now since we have been having a
ordered that all the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks at
standing grudge against the police of Manila. The
that time, numbering some one hundred and eighty, be
wife of one of our comrades was first arrested by
assembled on the parade ground and when this was
the policemen and then abused by the same; and
done, the soldiers were separated into their respective
not content with having abused her, they gave
companies. Then Colonel Sweet, speaking in English with this woman to an American; after this incident,
the assistance of Captain Silvino Gallardo, who
they arrested two soldiers of the Constabulary,
interpreted his remarks into Tagalog, made to all of the
falsely accusing them of keeping women of bad
soldiers two statements.
reputation; after this incident, came the shooting
of Macasinag, a shooting not justified, because
What occurred on the occasion above described can best we have come to know that Macasinag did
be told in the exact language of Colonel Sweet: "I nothing and the policemen could have arrested
assembled all four companies in Santa Lucia Barracks him if they desired. Moreover, the rumor spread
and asked them to tell me which ones had been out the among us that the police department of Manila
night before and which ones had participated in the had given orders to the policemen to fire upon
shooting, which they did, and to tell me the names of any Constabulary soldier they found in the
those who were with them and who were not then present, streets, and we believe that the rumor was not
which they did. I think there were seventy-two (seventy- without foundation since we noticed that after the
three) present and they named five (four) others." Again Macasinag affair, the policemen of Manila,
the witness said: "At first I asked all those who went out Contrary to the usual practice, were armed with
on the previous night for any purpose whatever to signify carbines or shotguns. For this reason we believe
the fact by stepping forward and gave them five minutes that if we did not put an end to these abuses of
to think it over before doing so. To those who stepped the policemen and secret service men, they
forward that had gone out for any purpose whatever I would continue abusing the constabulary. And as
asked those who took part in the shooting the night before an act of vengeance we did what we had done
that in justice to themselves and to the other men who had last night.
not taken part in it, and for the good of all concerned, that
they step forward and they did." The names of the four 6. How did you come to join your companions
who took part (not five as stated by Colonel Sweet), but
who rioted last night? — I saw that almost all the
ho were taken to present, were noted by Captain
soldiers were jumping through the window and I
Gallardo.
was to be left alone in the barracks and so I
followed.
The statements of the seventy-seven soldiers were taken
in writing during the afternoon of the same day, December
7. Who asked you to join it? — Nobody.
16. The questionnaire prepared by the fiscal of the city of
Manila was in English or Spanish. The questions and
answers were, however, when requested by the soldiers, 8. Do you know private Crispin Macasinag, the
translated not their dialects. Each statement was signed one who was shot by the Manila police the night
by the soldier making it in the presence of either two or before last on Calle Real? — Yes, Sir, I know him
three witnesses. because he was our comrade.

Although the answers to the questions contained these 9. Were you offended at the aggression made on
statements vary in phraseology, in substance they are the the person of said soldier? — Indeed, yes, not
same. One of them, the first in numerical order, that of only was I offended, but my companions also
Sergeant Graciano L. Cabrera, taken in Spanish and were.
interpreted into Tagalog, may be selected into Tagalog,
may be selected as typical of the rest, and is here literally 10. State how many shots you fired, if nay, during
transcribed: the riot last night. — I cannot tell precisely the
number of shots I fired because I was somewhat
1. Give your name, age, status, occupation, and obfuscated; all I can assure you is that I fired
residence. — Graciano I. Cabrera, 254 years of more than once.
age, single, sergeant of the first company of the

8
 11. Do you know if you hit any policeman or any Roque Ebol, Francisco Garcia, Benigno Tagavilla,
other person?-If so state whether the victim was Paciano Caña, Juan Abarques, Genaro Elayda, Hilario
a policeman or a civilian. — I cannot tell whether Hibabar, P. E. Vallado, Patricio Bello, Felix Liron,
I hit any policeman or any civilian. Bonifacio Eugenio, Nemesio Deceña, Venancio Mira,
Baldomero Rodriguez, Juan Noromor, Maximo Perlas,
12. State the streets of the city where you fired and Victor Atuel, and was to the effect these men did not
shots. — I cannot given an exact account of the take part in the riot.
streets where I fired my gun. I had full possession
of my faculties until I reached Calle Victoria; The court overruled the special defenses and found that
afterwards, I became aware that I was bathed the guilt of the accused had been proved beyond a
with perspiration only upon reaching the reasonable doubt. All of the defendants were sentenced
barracks. to serve the maximum imprisonment of ten years provided
by section 6 of Act No. 292. The court, however,
13. What arms were you carrying and how much distinguished fines from that of a defendants Francisco
ammunition or how many cartidge did you use? Garcia, a private and the eight corporals E. E. Agbulos,
— I Carried a carbine; I cannot tell precisely the Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarques,
number of cartridges I used; however, I placed in Pedro V. Matero, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and
my pocket the twenty cartridges belonging to me Genaro Elayda, upon each of whom a fine of P5,000 was
and I must have lost. imposed, and of the three sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera,
Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, upon each of
whom a fine of P10,000 was imposed. The costs were
14. How did you manage to leave the barracks?
divided proportionately among the defendants.
— By the window of the quarter of the Fourth
Company, through the grating which I found cut
off. For the statement of the cases and the facts which has
just been made, we are indebted in large measure to the
conspicuously fair and thoughtful decisions of the
15. Are the above statements made by you,
Honorable George R. Harvey who presided in the sedition
voluntarily, freely, and spontaneously given? —
case and of the Honorable Carlos Imperial who presided
Yes, sir.
in the murder case. As stipulated by the Attorney-General
and counsel for the defendants, the proof is substantially
16. Do you swear to said statements although no the same in both cases.
promise of immunity is made to you? — Yes, sir;
I confirm them, being true.
In all material respects we agree with the findings of fact
as made by the trial court in this case. The rule is again
(Sgd.) G. L. CABRERA. applied that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the
judgement of the trial court in passing upon the credibility
Witnesses: of the opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstances of weight and
S. GALLARDO. influence which has been overlooked or the significance
LAURO C. MARQUEZ. of which has been misinterpreted. (U. S. vs. Ambrosio and
Falsario [1910], 17 Phil., 295; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918],
The defendants were charged in one information filed in 37 Phil., 599.) In the record of the case at bar, no such
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with the fact or circumstance appears.
crime of sedition, and in another information filed in the
same, court, with the crimes of murder and serious OPINION
physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately
before different judges of first instance. An assignment of five errors is made by counsel for the
defendants and appellants. Two the assignment of error
All of the accused, with the exception of eight, namely, merit little or no consideration. Assignment of error No. 2
Francisco Ingles, Juan Noromor, P. E. Vallado., Dionisio (finding its counterpart in assignments of error 5 and 6 in
Verdadero, and Paciano Caña, first pleased guilty to the the murder case), in which it is attempted to establish that
charge of sedition, but later, after the first witness for the Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Paciano Caña,
prosecution had testified, the accused who had pleaded Juan Abarquez, Mariano Garcia, Felix Liron, Bonifacio
guilty were permitted, with the consent of the court, to Eugenio, Patricio Bello, Baldomero Rodriguez, Roberto
substitute therefor the plea of not guilty. the prosecution, Palabay, Juan Noromor, Roque Ebol, Ildefonso de la
in making out it case, presented the seventy-seven Cruz, Cipriano Lizardo, Francisco Garcia, Genaro Elayda,
confession of the defendants, introduced in evidence as Hilario Hibalar, P. M. Vallado, Maximo Perlas, and
Exhibits C to C-76, conclusive, and with the exception of Benigno Tagavilla, did not leave the Santa Lucia Barracks
those made by Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Gamus, and in the night of the tragedy, is predicated on the special
Venancio Mira, all were identified by the respective defense raised in the lower court for these defendants and
Constabulary officers, interpreters, and typists who three other and which was found untenable by the trial
intervened in taking them. The prosecution further relied court. Any further discussion of this question falls more
on oral testimony, including eyewitness to the uprising. appropriately under consideration of assignment of error
No. 4, relating to the conspiracy between the accused.
The attorneys for the accused presented two defenses.
The first defense was in favor of all the defendants and Assignment of error No. 3, relating to the finding of the
was based on the contention that the written statements trial court that it had not been shown that the policemen
Exhibits C to C-76 were not freely and voluntarily made were not aware of the armed attack of the Constabulary,
by them. The second defense was in favor of the However, we find that the evidence supports this
defendants Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, conclusion of the trial court.
Roberto Palabay, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz,
9
The three pertinent issues in this case relate to: (1) the occasion would be more careful of his actions than
Admission of Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution ordinarily and whatever of credulity there is in him, would
(assignment of error No. 2, murder case); (2) the for the moment be laid aside. Over and above all desire
conspiracy between the accused (assignment of error No. for a more exciting life, over and above the so called esprit
4, sedition case; assignment of error No. 3, murder case); de corps, is the instinct of self preservation which could
and (3) the conviction of the accused of a violation of the not but be fully aroused by such stirring incidents too
Treason and Sedition Law (assignment of error No. 5, recent to be forgotten as had occurred in this case, and
sedition case). which would counsel prudence rather than rashness;
secretiveness rather than garrulity.
1. The admission of exhibits C to C-76
These confessions contain the statements that they were
Appellants claim that fraud and deceit marked the made freely and voluntarily without any promise of
preparation of the seventy seven confessions. It is alleged immunity. That such was the case was corroborated by
that some of the defendants signed the confessions under the attesting witnesses whose credibility has not been
the impression that those who had taken part in the affray successfully impeached.
would be transferred to Mindanao, and that although they
did not in fact so participate, affirmed that they because We rule that the trial court did not err in admitting Exhibits
of a desire to leave Manila; that other stepped forward "for C to C-76 of the prosecution.
the good of the service" in response to appeals from
Colonel Sweet and other officers; while still others simply 2. The conspiracy between the accused
didn't understand what they were doing, for the remarks
of Colonel Sweet were made in English and only
The contention of the appellants is that evidence is
translated into Tagalog, and their declarations were
lacking of any supposed connivance between the
sometime taken in al language which was unintelligible to accused. Counsel emphasizes that in answer to the
them. Counsel for the accused entered timely objection to
question in the confession, "who asked you to join the
the admission in evidence of Exhibits C to C-76, and the
riot," each of the accused answered, "Nobody." The
Attorney-General is worn in stating otherwise.
argument is then advanced that the appellants cannot be
held criminally responsible because of the so called
Section 4 of Act No. 619, entitle "An Act to promote good psychology of crowds theory. In other words, it is claimed
order and discipline in the Philippines Constabulary," and that at the time of the commission of the crime the
reading: "No confession of any person charged with crime accused were mere automatons obeying the insistent call
shall be received as evidence against him by any court of of their companions and of their uniform. From both the
justice unless be first shown to the satisfaction of the court negative failure of evidence and the positive evidence,
that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the result counsel could deduce the absence of conspiracy between
of violence, intimidation, threat, menace or of promises or the accused.
offers of reward or leniency," was repealed by the first
Administrative Code. But the same rule of jurisprudence
The attorney-General answers the argument of counsel
continues without the law. As he been repeatedly
by saying that conspiracy under section 5 of Act No. 292
announced by this and other courts, "the true test of
is not an essential element of the crime of sedition. In this
admissibility is that the confession is made freely, law officer for the people may be on solid ground.
voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any However, this may be, there is a broader conception of
sort". If the confession is freely and voluntarily made, it
the case which reaches the same result.
constitutes one of the most effectual proofs in the law
against the party making it. (Wilson vs. U. S.[1896], 162
U. S. 613.)The burden of proof that he confession was not It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to
voluntarily made or was obtained by undue pressure is on perform a criminal act, each is responsible for all the acts
the accused. (U. S. vs Zara [1912, 42 Phil., 308.) of the other done in furtherance of the common design;
and " the result is the same if the act is divided into parts
and each person proceed with his part unaided." (U. S. vs
What actually occurred when the confessions were
Maza [1905], 5 Phils., 346; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918] 37
prepared is clearly explained in the records. The source Phil., 599; decision of supreme court of Spain of
of the rumor that the defendant would be transferred to September 29, 1883; People vs. Mather [1830], 4
Mindanao if they signed the confession is not established.
Wendell, 229.)
One the contrary it is established that before the
declaration were taken, Lieutenant Gatuslao in response
to a query had shown the improbability of such a transfer. Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of
With military orders given in English and living in the city indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances which vary
of Manila where the dialect is tagalog, all of the according to the purposes to be accomplished. It be
defendants must have understood the substantial part of proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the
Colonel Sweet's remarks. What is more important, there same object, one performing one part and another part of
could be no misunderstanding as to the contents of the the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the
confessions as written down. In open court, sixty-nine of attainment of that same object, one will be justified in the
the defendants reiterated their guilt. The officers who conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to
assisted in the investigation were of the same service as effect that object. (5 R. C. L., 1088.) Applied to the facts
the defendants in their own men. before us, it is incontestable that all of the defendants
were imbued with the same purpose, which was to
avenge themselves on the police force of the city of
It must also be remembered that each and everyone of
Manila. A common feeling of resentment animated all. A
the defendants was a member of the Insular Police force. common plan evolved from their military training was
Because of the very nature of their duties and because of
followed.
their practical experience, these Constabulary soldiers
must have been aware of the penalties meted out for
criminal offenses. Every man on such a momentous The effort to lead the court into the realm of psychology
and metaphysics is unavailing in the face of actualities.
10
The existence of a joint assent may be reasonably Felisardo Favinal, Gaspar Andrade, Felix Lamsing, and
inferred from the facts proved. Not along are the men who Vicente Casimiro, to suffer imprisonment for ten years,
fired the fatal shots responsible, not along are the men and to pay one seventy-seventh part of the costs; the
who admit firing their carbines responsible, but all, having private Francisco Garcia, who sawed the bars of the
united to further a common design of hate and window through which the defendants passed from Santa
vengeance, are responsible for the legal consequences Lucia Barracks and each of the corporals E. E. Agbulos,
therefor. Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarquez,
Pedro V. Mateo, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and
We rule that the trail court did not err in declaring that Genaro Elayda, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and
there a c conspiracy between the accused. to pay a fine of P5,000 and one seventy-seventy of the
costs; and each of the sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera,
Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, to suffer
3. The conviction of the accused of a violation of the
imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P10,000
Treason and Sediton Law
and one seventy-seventy of the costs. The trial judge
appears to have made a reasonable exercise of the
Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of discretion which the law reposes in him.
commotions or disturbances in the State. The Philippine
law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty
We cannot bring to a close this disagreeable duty without
of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to
obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie making our own the pertinent observations found in the
objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or decision of the trial court in this case. Therein, along
toward the closed of his learned opinion, Judge Harvey
revenge upon the person or property of any official or
said:
agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or
Municipal Government. The trial court found that the
crime of sedition, as defined and punished by the law, had Rarely in the history of criminality in this country
been committed, and we believe that such finding is has there been registered a crime so villainous as
correct. that committed by these defendants. The court is
only concerned in this case with crime of sedition.
The maximum penalty prescribed by Act No. 292,
Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a
violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292 it is imprisonment for ten year and a fine P10,000, is
and necessary that the offender should be a private not really commensurate with the enormity of the
offense. Impelled by hatred, employing their
citizen and the offended party a public functionary, and
knowledge of military sciences which is worthy of
that what really happened in this instance was a fight
a better cause, and in disregard of the
between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government,
consequences to themselves and their innocent
is absolutely without foundation. Subdivison 3 of section
5 of the Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction loved ones, and using the means furnished to
between the persons to which it applies. In one scene them by the Government for the protection of life
and property, they sought by force and violence
there was a fights between two armed bodies of the
and outside of legal methods to avenge a fancied
Philippine Government, but it was an unequal fight
wrong by an armed and tumultuous attack upon
brought on by the actions of the accused.
officials and agents of the government of the city
of Manila.
We rule that the trial court did not err in convicting the
accused of the violation of section 5, paragraph 3, of Act
Although in view of the sentence which is being handed
No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
down in the murder case, affecting these same
defendants and appellants, it would seem to be a useless
JUDGEMENT formality to impose penalties in this case, yet it is
obviously our duty to render judgement appealed from,
The Treason and Sedition Law provides as a penalty for with one seventy-seventh of the costs of this instance
any person guilty of sedition as defined in section 5 of the against each appellant. So ordered.
law, punishment by fine of not exceeding P10,000 or by
imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both. In this Araullo, C.J. Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor,
connection, it will be recalled that the court sentenced Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
each of the private soldiers Salvador Gregorio, Juan
Noromor, Patricio Bello, Nemesio Deceña, Baldomero
Rodriguez, P. E. Vallado, Pedro Layola, Felix Liron
(Cenon), Dionisio Verdadero, Lorenzo Tumboc, Casiano
Guinto, Victor Atuel, Venancio Mira, Benigno Tagavilla,
Masaway, Quintin Desierto, Teofilo Llana, Timoteo
Opermaria, Maximo Perlas, Cornelio Elizaga, Roberto
Palabay, Roque Ebol, Benito Garcia, Honorio Bautista,
Crisanto Salgo, Francisco Lusano, Marcelino Silos,
Nicanor Perlas, Patricio Rubio, Mariano Aragon, Silvino
Ayngco, Guillermo Inis, Julian Andaya, Crispin
Mesalucha, Prudencio Tasis, Silvino Bacani, Petronilo
Antonio, Domingo Peroche, Florentino Jacob, Paciano
Caña, Domingo Canapi, Arcadio San Pedro, Daniel
Coralde, Nemesio Camas, Luis Borja, Severino Elefane,
Vicente Tabien, Marcos Marquez, Victorino Merto,
Bernabe Sison, Eusebio Cerrudo, Julian Acantilado,
Ignacio Lechoncito, Pascual Dionio, Marcial Pelicia,
Article 142
Rafael Nafrada, Zacarias Bayle, Cipriano Lizardo,
Ildefonso de la Cruz, Juan Miranda, Graciano Zapata,
11
Republic of the Philippines "The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut off
SUPREME COURT the head of Governor-General Wood, because he has
Manila recommended a bad administration in these Islands and
has not made a good recommendation; on the contrary,
EN BANC he has assassinated the independence of the Philippines
and for this reason, we have not obtained independence
G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923 and the head of that Governor-General must be cut off."
Higinio J. Angustia, justice of the peace of Pilar, in a
written statement, and Gregorio Cresencio, another
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE witness for the prosecution, corroborated the testimony of
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, the first witness. Cresencio understood that Perez invited
vs. the Filipinos including himself to get their bolos and cut off
ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant. the head of Governor-General Wood and throw it into the
sea.
Mario Guariña for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa Real for appellee. The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an
altercation took place on the morning of April 1, 1922, in
which the accused participated. But they endeavored to
explain that the discussion was between Perez and one
Severo Madrid, the latter maintaining that the fault was
MALCOLM, J.: due to the Nacionalista Party, while Perez argued that the
Governor-General was to blame. The accused testified
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, that the discussion was held in a peaceful manner, and
and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, that what he wished to say was that the Governor-General
happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in should be removed and substituted by another. On the
the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a witness stand, he stated that his words were the following:
discussion regarding the administration of Governor- "We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party which is in
General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a power but do not take into account that above the
number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must representatives there is Governor-General Wood who
use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having controls everything, and I told him that the day on which
recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has the Democrats may kill that Governor-General, then we,
killed our independence." Charged in the Court of First the Filipinos will install the government we like whether
Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the you Democratas want to pay or not to pay taxes."
Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the
Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted The trial judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant
thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court. The reason, that it had been proved beyond a reasonable
question presented for decision is, What crime, if any, did doubt that the accused made use of the language stated
the accused commit? in the beginning of this decision and set out in the
information. The question of fact thus settled, the question
A logical point of departure is the information presented in of law recurs as to the crime of which the accused should
this case. It reads in translation as follows: be convicted.

That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the
of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon, Philippine Islands, information, article 256 of the Penal Code as having been
the said accused, Isaac Perez, while holding a infringed and the trial judge so found in his decision. The
discussion with several persons on political first error assigned by counsel for the appellant is
matters, did criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and addressed to this conclusion of the lower court and is to
with knowledge that Honorable Leonard Wood the effect that article 256 of the Penal Code is no longer
was the Governor-General of the Philippine in force.
Islands and in the discharge of his functions as
such authority, insult by word, without his In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No.
presence, said Governor-General, uttering in a 14705 1), the accused was charged with having uttered
loud voice and in the presence of many persons, the following language: "To hell with the President of the
and in a public place, the following phrases: "Asin United States and his proclamation!" Mr. Helbig was
an mangña filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong prosecuted under article 256, and though the case was
gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo ni eventually sent back to the court of origin for a new trial,
Wood huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag the appellate court by majority vote held as a question of
raot con Filipinas," which in English, is as follows: law that article 256 is still in force.
"And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for
cutting off Wood's head for having recommended In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887),
a bad thing for the Philippines. the accused was charged with having published an article
reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in
Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code. violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. In this court, Mr.
Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three
At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on members of the court holding that article 256 was
behalf of the prosecution and three witnesses on behalf abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to
of the defense. According to the first witness for the American sovereignty over the Philippines, and with six
Government, Juan Lumbao, the municipal president of members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of
Pilar, what Perez said on the occasion in question was repealing so much of article 256 as relates to written
this: defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the
information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty

12
of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
libel Law. In the course of the main opinion in the Perfecto Government and obedient to the laws.
case, is found this significant sentence: "Act No. 292 of
the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition The Governor-General is an executive official appointed
Law, may also have affected article 256, but as to this by the President of the United States by and with the
point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement." advice and consent of the Senate of the United States,
and holds in his office at the pleasure of the President.
It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the
those of us who retain a contrary opinion must bow with Governor-General to be exercised in accordance with
as good grace as we can muster, that until otherwise law. The Governor-General is the representative of
decided by higher authority, so much of article 256 of the executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the
Penal Code as does not relate to ministers of the Crown sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-
or to writings coming under the Libel Law, exist and must General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people
be enforced. To which proposition, can properly be and on American sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes
appended a corollary, namely: Seditious words, [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)
speeches, or libels, constitute a violation of Act No. 292,
the Treason and Sedition Law, and to this extent, both the Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as
Penal Code and the Libel Law are modified. amended by Act No. 1692, appears to have been placed
on the statute books exactly to meet such a situation. This
Accepting the above statements relative to the section reads as follows:
continuance and status of article 256 of the Penal Code,
it is our opinion that the law infringed in this instance is Every person who shall utter seditious words or
not this article but rather a portion of the Treason and speeches, or who shall write, publish or circulate
Sedition Law. In other words, as will later appear, we think scurrilous libels against the Government of the
that the words of the accused did not so much tend to United States or against the Government of the
defame, abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write,
to raise a disturbance in the community. publish utter or make any statement, or speech,
or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct
In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are any lawful officer in executing his office or in
not directed primarily against individuals, but rather performing his duty, or which tends to instigate
against the existence of the State, the authority of the others to cabal or meet together for unlawful
Government, or the general public peace. The offenses purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious
created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people
character. Among them is sedition, which is the raising of against the lawful authorities, or which tends to
commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt disturb the peace of the community or the safety
against legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of or order of the Government, or who shall
sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such knowingly conceal such evil practices from the
a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it constituted authorities, shall be punished by a
does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, fine not exceeding two thousand dollars United
or the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier's Law States currency or by imprisonment not
Dictionary, 974; U.S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437; exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of
People vs. Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil., 64.) the court.

It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious
No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the words. He has made a statement and done an act which
freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for
to assemble and petition the Government for redress of unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done
grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the an act which suggested and incited rebellious
foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act
severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the which tended to stir up the people against the lawful
Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless authorities. He has made a statement and done an act
the intention and effect be seditious. But when the which tended to disturb the peace of the community and
intention and effect of the act is seditious, the the safety or order of the Government. All of these various
constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and
and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No.
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted 292 as amended.
authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws,
and the existence of the State. (III Wharton's Criminal A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a
Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended, is, in
422; People vs. Perfecto, supra.) effect, responsive to, and based upon, the offense with
which the defendant is charged. The designation of the
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief crime by the fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which
Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, the defendant stands charged is that described by the
like the Presidency of the United States and other high facts stated in the information. In accordance with our
offices, under a democratic form of government, instead, settled rule, an accused may be found guilty and
of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems convicted of a graver offense than that designated in the
rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the information, if such graver offense is included or
attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest described in the body of the information, and is afterwards
bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious justified by the proof presented during the trial.
tendency in the words used, which could easily produce (Guevarra's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9; De Joya's
disaffection among the people and a state of feeling Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9.)

13
The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the which is the thing prohibited and punished by article 256
limits provided by the Treason and Sedition Law, and will, of the Penal Code.
we think, sufficiently punish the accused.
Avanceña and Johnson, JJ., concurs.
That we have given more attention to this case than it
deserves, may be possible. Our course is justified when it
is recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief Justice Taft of the
United States Supreme Court, in speaking of an
outrageous libel on the Governor of the Porto Rico,
observed: "A reading of the two articles removes the
slightest doubt that they go far beyond the "exuberant
expressions of meridional speech," to use the expression
of this court in a similar case in Gandia vs. Pettingill (222
U.S. , 452, 456). Indeed they are so excessive and
outrageous in their character that they suggest the query
whether their superlative vilification has not overleapt
itself and become unconsciously humorous."
(Balzac vs. Porto Rico [1922], 258 U.S., 298.) While our
own sense of humor is not entirely blunted, we
nevertheless entertain the conviction that the courts
should be the first to stamp out the embers of insurrection.
The fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible
individual, must be dealt with firmly before it endangers
the general public peace.

The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of G.R. No. L-2535 August 9, 1906
fact, and on these facts to convict the accused of a
violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. With the THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JUAN
modification thus indicated, judgment is affirmed, it being ABAD,Defendant-Appellant.
understood that, in accordance with the sentence of the
lower court, the defendant and appellant shall suffer 2 V. Ilustre, for appellant.
months and 1 day's imprisonment and pay the costs. So Attorney-General Wilfley, for appellee.
ordered.
WILLARD, J.:
Street, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
The defendant was convicted in the Court of First
Separate Opinions Instance of the Province of Batangas of the violation of
section 8 of Act No. 292, the law defining and punishing
JOHNSON, J., concurring: treason and sedition. He is the author of the Tagalog
drama "Tanikalang Guinto" (The Chain of Gold). This
I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Villamor. I cannot drama he produced in a theater at Batangas on the 10th
give assent to a doctrine which permits a complaint to be day of May, 1903. The Government claimed and the court
presented upon one theory and the trial to be carried below held that the drama was
through upon that theory and then to condemn the seditious.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
defendant upon a theory which he nor the prosecution law library
ever dreamed of.
The story of the play is as follows: The heroine, Liwanag,
VILLAMOR, J., concurring and dissenting: is promised in marriage to the hero, K. Ulayaw. Maimbot,
who has given consent to this promise of marriage. During
I agree in that the accused should be sentenced to suffer the progress of the play he withdraws his consent, forbids
two months and one day of arresto mayor with costs, as K. Ulayaw to come to his house, and by Liwanag to
imposed by the court a quo, under the provisions of article abandon her lover. He takes into his employ Nagtapon, a
256 of the Penal Code, but not under section 8 of Act No. brother of K. Ulayaw, whom he directs to act as a spy
292. The accused, in my opinion, should not be convicted upon the movements of Ulayaw. Another of the
of the crime of sedition because there is no allegation in characters in the play is Dalita, the mother of K. Ulayaw
the complaint nor proof in the record, showing that when and Nagtapon. Nagtapon disowns her, and she dies in the
the accused uttered the words that gave rise to these first act. The gifts of Maimbot to Liwanag not producing
proceedings, he had the intention of inciting others to any result, her resorts to harsher measures, binds her to
gather for an illicit purpose, or to incite any conspiracy or a tree, and places Nagtapon as a watch over her. K.
rebellion, or to disturb the peace of the community or the Ulayaw, searching for her, finds her in this condition, and
safety and order of the Government which are the acts is killed by Nagtapon. The play ends with the translation
penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292. On the contrary, of Liwanag to the
having due regard to the place and time when the heavens.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
discussion arose between Lodovice and the accused, the law library
political rivalry between them and the difference of opinion
that they entertained regarding the administration of the This play on its face seems to be an ordinary love story
Governor-General, the Honorable Leonard Wood, it with an unfortunate termination. It is claimed by the
would appear evident that the accused expressed himself Government, however, that it was intended to represent
in biting and poignant language, unbecoming and the relations between the Government of the United
improper of a law abiding citizen and highly detrimental States and the Philippines, the claim being that Maimbot
and insulting to the authority of the Governor-General represents the United States, Nagtapon those Filipinos
14
friendly to the United States, K. Ulayaw the Filipinos who A. Many of them were glad to see it, but I can not tell
desire independence, Liwanag the Philippines, and Dalita whether it was because of the eloquent and poetical
the mother country . It is said that this significance can be phrases used or because they were aware of the fact that
given to the play by reason of the meaning of the names the play dealt with the relations between the Philippines
of the characters. The word "Liwanag" in Tagalog means and the United States.
"light" or dawn of day" ( luz o aurora); "Dalita,"
punishment, grief;" "K. Ulayaw," "lover" ( amante); Simeon Luz, another witness for the Government, and the
"Nagtapon," "spendthrift, renegade" (prodigo o governor of the province, testified as follows:
renegado); "Maimbot," "ambitious or
avaricious" (ambicioso o avaro). It is not apparent,
Q. Could the public understand the meaning of the
however, how the seditious character of the play can be
drama? chanrobles virtual law library
derived from the names of the
characters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library A. The intelligent part of the audience probably
understood it, but I do think the masses - that is, the great
majority of the spectators - understood the same, unless
In the play itself there are but few passages which in any
the character of the play were explained to
way indicate that the play is anything more than it purports
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
to be upon its face. The word "independence" or
library
"independent" occurs five times in the course of the play,
but always in connection with the marriage of Liwanag
and K. Ulayaw, and with their maintenance of a house Q. You, as the highest official of the province - did you
separate and apart from the house of her uncle. The word have an opportunity to judge of the effect produced by the
"pueblo" occurs three or four time in play, and there is a play upon the audience? chanrobles virtual law library
scene in which Maimbot and Nagtapon are becoming
intoxicated, and which Maimbot and Nagtapon are A. I did not, because I did not see the drama myself.
becoming intoxicated, and in which the former says that All I can say is that apparently it was very much
they must accustom themselves to this and sleep in the applauded, although I can not tell whether it was
streets.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law applauded because of its dramatic value or because of its
library real significance. In my opinion, I should say that the
drama in question is one of the best plays written in
This is practically all there is in the play which tends to Tagalog.
support the theory of the Government, and we think it is
every far from doing so. It is possible to give to almost any It was proved at the trial that this drama, prior to its
play a different meaning than that intended by the author. presentation at Batangas, had been presented more than
To the writtings of the greatest dramatists have been twenty times in different theaters of Manila, La Laguna,
given meanings of which the author never and Cavite, the first of these representations commencing
thought.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law in October, 1902. The defendant, the author, testified that
library after three representations in Manila, he had read in a
newspapers that an order had been issued by the public
That the public who witnessed this performance at the authorities requiring that all plays, before their
theater in Batangas did not understand the play as presentation, should be submitted for examination to the
meaning what the Government claims it means is division of information. He thereupon took his play to the
apparent from the testimony of some of the Government's office of John F. Green and left if there for examination. It
own witnesses. Jose Villanueva, one of those witnesses, was returned to him the next day, with authority to present
testified as follows on cross-examination: it. There was no evidence to contradict this statement,
although there is some evidence to show that one day
was not a sufficient time for a proper examination of the
Q. Could the audience understand the symbolism
work. However it may be, it is apparent that the play was
used by the author to represent his play? chanrobles
not considered seditious by the authorities of
virtual law library
Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
A. I can not say exactly, but I think that only a few
understood the purpose of the play.
An examination of the dramas which were considered in
the cases of the United States vs. Tolentino, 1 No. 1451,
Alfredo Cantos, another of the Government's witnesses, decided March 6, 1906, and of the United States vs.
testified as follows: Cruz, 2 No. 2128, will show that anyone reading these
dramas or seeing them presented could not fail to
Q. What political effects was produced by the drama understand their seditious tendencies, something which,
among the audience? chanrobles virtual law library according to the witnesses of the Government in this
case, a great majority of the spectators of this drama
A. I heard but few of the spectators comment upon the could not see.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
symbolical references to the relation of the United States virtual law library
with the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual The judgment of the court below is reversed and the
law library defendant acquitted, with the costs of both instance de
oficio. At the expiration of ten days judgment should be
Q. What was your impression as to the purpose of the entered in accordance with this decision and the case
drama considering the class of people who attend the remanded to the court below for execution of said
performance? chanrobles virtual law library judgment. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

15
Torres, Mapa, Carson and Tracey, JJ., concur. knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there
challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter grappling
and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus injuring
him in the process while the latter was actually engaged
in the performance of his official duties.

Contrary to law.

On arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of Not

Guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented in
evidence the testimonies of the victim himself, Lt. Edward
Leygo, and the two alleged eyewitnesses to the incident,
SPO1 Jose Bangcado and Brenda Dup-et. For its part,
the defense presented the petitioner himself and one
Alfredo Castro.
As summarized by the trial court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals in the decision herein assailed, the
Peoples version[4] is, as follows:

On March 20, 1993 at around 8:00 oclock in the evening,

Police Inspector Edward M. Leygo, Deputy Chief of Police
for Operation and Patrol of the La Trinidad Police Station,
La Trinidad, Benguet and SPO1 Joseph Basquial were
conducting routinary patrol on board a police car
somewhere in Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet when they
came upon a truck unloading sacks of chicken dung at the
stall of accused Enrique Totoy Rivera which was located
along the Halsema Highway at Shilan, La Trinidad,
Benguet. Inspector Leygo advised the driver to stop
unloading the manure as it violates La Trinidad Municipal
Ordinance No. I-91 (Exhibit C) which prohibits, among
others, the loading and unloading of chicken manure
ARTICLE 148 along the sidewalks or road shoulders or within 15 meters
from the center of the Halsema Highway located at La
THIRD DIVISION Trinidad, Benguet. The driver complied with the police
directive. The policemen then escorted the truck back to
Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet and proceeded to the
police headquarters.
[G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005]
Not long after, SPOI Jose Bangcado and SPOI Rivera
Dayap, members of the La Trinidad Police under
Inspector Leygo were conducting patrol aboard a police
ENRIQUE TOTOY RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN, petitioner, car somewhere at Km. 6, La Trinidad, Benguet when they
vs. PEOPLE OF THE observed a truck loaded with chicken dung proceeding
PHILIPPINES, respondent. towards Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet. Having in mind the
instructions of La Trinidad Mayor Edna C. Tabanda and
DECISION their Commanding Officer Inspector Leygo to Implement
Ordinance No. I-91, the two policemen followed and
GARCIA, J.: stopped the truck at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet.
Immediately they called Inspector Leygo on the radio and
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition informed him that they stopped a truck carrying chicken
for review on certiorari are the October 16, 1998 dung. Inspector Leygo ordered them to restrain the truck,
decision[1] and April 5, 1999 resolution[2] of the Court of as he would be proceeding to the area.
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17284, which respectively
affirmed in toto an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Knowing that the truck being restrained by the two
Court of La Trinidad, Benguet convicting herein petitioner policemen was the same truck which they had escorted
Enrique Totoy Rivera of the crime of direct assault, and earlier from Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet, Inspector Leygo
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. felt ignored and insulted. He immediately called SPO4
Justino Tiwtiwa, SPO1 Baldwin Ngolab and SPO1 Joseph
On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Basquial and the group sped to Cruz, La Trinidad,
Trinidad, Benguet an information[3] for direct assault was Benguet.
filed against petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows:
Meanwhile, back at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, the
That on or about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, accused arrived before the group of Inspector Leygo did
Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, and ordered the driver not to obey the policemen but
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable instead obey him, as he (accused) was the boss. The
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there truck driver followed the accuseds order and drove the
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ force truck towards Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet with the
and seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, accused following closely behind in his vehicle.
16
Inspector Leygo and his group arrived in time to see the at the side of the road while a police vehicle and three
truck pulling away and so they gave chase. The police policemen were across the road. Thinking that the
were able to overtake and stop the truck at Dengsi, policemen were there trying to extort money from the
Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet. Inspector Leygo confronted driver, the accused told the truck driver to proceed. The
the truck driver and asked him why he still insisted on truck driver complied and the accused tailed along.
proceeding to Shilan to unload chicken manure despite
the fact that he was ordered to go back earlier in the When the truck and the accused reached Dengsi, Tomay,
evening. The truck driver stated that he was just following La Trinidad, Benguet, he heard a police siren from behind.
the orders of the accused. Immediately, Inspector Leygo Immediately, a police vehicle overtook the truck, another
turned around to see the accused who had at that time police vehicle was running along side the accuseds
alighted from his vehicle behind the truck. Inspector vehicle and a third police vehicle was right behind them.
Leygo asked the accused why he insisted on defying the Thus, the truck and the accused had no recourse but to
ban on the unloading and loading of chicken manure. stop.
Instead of answering however, the accused pointed a
finger on the policeman and uttered words like Babalian Inspector Leygo alighted from one of the police vehicles
kita ng buto (Ill break your bones). Ilalampaso kita (Ill
and angrily uttered so many words at the accused. The
scrub you). Pulis lang kayo (you are only policemen) and
policeman then held the collar of accuseds jacket and
other unsavory and insulting words. Inspector Leygo who
forced the latter to get out of his vehicle while shouting
was a little bit angry warned the accused to stop uttering
Ang tigas ng ulo mo. Sige, bumunot ka. (You are very
further insulting words and cautioned him to take it easy stubborn. Go ahead, draw your gun.) The accused
and then informed him that he was being arrested for explained that he had no gun to draw while removing his
violation of the chicken dung ordinance. The accused
jacket and raising his hands to show that there was no
removed his jacket, placed it inside the vehicle, assumed
gun on his body. Inspector Leygo then held the left hand
a fighting stance and challenged the policeman. Inspector
of the accused and tried to put handcuffs on him. The
Leygo then approached the accused and warned him accused tried to resist, pleading that he had no fault and
anew that he was being arrested. The accused responded at the same time asking what infraction of law he
by punching Inspector Leygo on his face, particularly on
committed. Inspector Leygo answered by uttering
his lip. The two then grappled as Inspector Leygo tried to
insulting words and pointing his left forefinger on the
hold the accused. Finally, with the help of Policemen
accuseds face while his right hand was poking a gun on
Dayap and Bongcado, the accused was subdued. The
the accused. The accused noticed that the policeman
accused was then pushed into one of the police cars but smelled of liquor.
he resisted until Alfredo Castro, one of the chicken dung
dealers in the area, boarded the police car to accompany
him. A crowd started to gather around the scene. Sensing that
the onlookers were on his side, the accused stated that
he was going to get his camera inside his vehicle. As he
The accused was brought to the police headquarters was opening the door, Inspector Leygo suddenly slapped
where Inspector Leygo immediately called Mayor and boxed him in the stomach causing the accused to feel
Tabanda who arrived at about 10:00 oclock that same
dizzy. This assault weakened him and so he did not resist
evening. She confronted the two protagonists and at the
when the police pushed him inside the police vehicle.
same time admonished the accused for violating
Inspector Leygo then ordered his men to bring the
Ordinance No. I-91. Mayor Tabanda then accompanied
accused to the police headquarters. The accused
the accused and Inspector Leygo to the Benguet General recognized Alfredo Castro among the onlookers and
Hospital where both were examined by Dr. Antonio T.
because he (accused) knew him to be one of the chicken
Carino. In the medico-legal certificate (Exhibit A) of
dung dealers, asked him (Castro) to accompany him to
Inspector Leygo, his injury described as contusion with
the police headquarters for fear that something might
0.5 laceration, upper lip, left side with healing period from
happen.
5 to 7 days. Subsequently, this present case was filed
against the accused.
At the police station, the accused suggested that
Inspector Leygo should undergo medical examination to
Reproduced from the same decision of the appellate
determine if the policeman was positive of alcoholic
court, the defenses version[5] runs:
breath. The accused, however, was examined ahead and
was issued a medical certificate (Exhibit 4) which
At about 8:00 oclock in the evening of March 20, 1993, described his injury as erythema, lip left side face and
while the accused was at the Trading Post at Km. 5, La contusion-midepigastric area. The healing period is from
Trinidad, Benguet, the driver reported to him that he was 3 to 5 days. With him sustaining this injury, the accused
prevented by the police from unloading chicken manure now wonders why this charge was filed against him.
at Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet. The accused reminded
the driver that he should have brought the chicken After weighing the parties respective versions of the
manure to Acop, Tublay, Benguet where dealers sell it
incident, the trial court found that of the People more
when prevented from unloading within the municipality of
credible. Accordingly, in its decision of April 22, 1994, [6] it
La Trinidad, Benguet. As it would be more expensive to
convicted petitioner of the crime of direct assault and
return the chicken dung to Batangas where it came from,
sentenced him, thus:
the accused told the driver to bring the chicken dung to
Acop, Tublay, Benguet. The driver expressed his fear that
the police might stop him along the way and so the WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been
accused ordered the driver to proceed and gave him the proven beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby
assurance that he (accused) would follow later. renders judgment finding the accused Enrique Totoy
Rivera GUILTY and sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day
The truck then proceeded as instructed and the accused
of arresto mayor as MINIMUM to One (1) Year, One (1)
following after a short while. Arriving at Cruz, La Trinidad,
Month and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as
Benguet, the accused noticed that the truck was stopped

17
MAXIMUM. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of FIVE A He raised his fist. (Witness raised his hands
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) and to pay the costs. with his clenched fist in front of him).
Q How about you, what did you do when Mr.
SO ORDERED. Rivera did that?

With his motion for reconsideration having been A I informed him that I am arresting him.
denied by the trial court, petitioner then went on appeal to
Q How far were you when he faced you at first?
the Court of Appeals whereat his recourse was docketed
as CA-G.R. CR No. 17284. A At first before I went near him is about 6 feet,
sir.
As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in
its decision[7] of October 16, 1998, affirmed in toto that of Q Now, you said you approached him, is that
the trial court, to wit: correct?
A Yes, sir.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the decision
appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. Q What did you do when you approached him?
A I told him that I am arresting him, sir.
SO ORDERED,
Q And what was his response?
and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its
A He punched me at my face, sir.
resolution of April 5, 1999.[8]
Q You said he punched you, with what hand did
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari,
Mr. Rivera punch you?
submitting for our consideration the principal issue of
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the A I think it is his left hand, sir.[11]
judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court.
Nor is Lt. Leygos credibility any less diminished by
We AFFIRM. the circumstance that he failed to categorically identify
which of petitioners hands was used in punching him, and
Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be
the exact distance between them at that time. In all
committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons
likelihood, this police officer was not expecting a physical
who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or
attack by the petitioner as he was just confronting the
intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
latter about the prohibited unloading of chicken dung
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
when petitioner laid hand on him. Under this scenario, any
sedition; and second, by any person or persons who,
person, like Lt. Leygo, cannot be expected to remember
without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or
every single detail of the incident with perfect recall.[12] For
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any
sure, far from adversely affecting Lt. Leygos credibility, his
of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
failure to recall every minute detail of what transpired
duties, or on occasion of such performance.[9]
even fortifies it. We have thus held that the failure of a
Unquestionably, petitioners case falls under the witness to recall each and every detail of an occurrence
second mode, which is the more common form of assault may even serve to strengthen rather than weaken his
and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with credibility because it erases any suspicion of a coached
a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or or rehearsed testimony.[13] What is vital in Lt. Leygos
employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a testimony is the fact that petitioner punched him on his
person in authority.[10] face, about which he was steadfast and unflinching.
In this recourse, petitioner argues that the appellate In any event, this Court has said time and again that
court, like the trial court, erred in finding the testimony of the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
complainant Lt. Leygo as clear and convincing. In an testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, what with
attempt to impugn the latters credibility, petitioner reality that it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses
contends that Lt. Leygo was mumbling while giving his first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and
testimony, adding that the latter failed to identify which of attitude while testifying. Its findings on such matters,
his (petitioner) hands was used and the precise distance absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts
between them when he punched the police lieutenant. or circumstances of weight and substance, are final and
conclusive upon this Court and will not to be disturbed on
Admittedly, the record shows that the trial judge had appeal.[14]
to call Lt. Leygos attention for testifying in such a low voice
while on the witness box. Evidently, however, this did not Petitioner also asserts that the testimonies of
prevent the trial court into believing his testimony and prosecution witnesses SPO1 Jose Bangcado and Brenda
from according it full faith and credit. As it is, the witness Dup-et did not corroborate Lt. Leygos testimony. For,
was able to narrate and communicate the events that while SPO1 Bangcado merely testified during direct
transpired. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals examination that petitioner punched Lt. Leygo, this
found the witness to have clearly and adequately witness failed to reiterate said testimony during cross-
recounted how the incident happened, and we find no examination. As regards prosecution witness Brenda
valid reason to discredit the truth and veracity of his Dup-et, petitioner alleged that this witness never testified
narration. We quote: that petitioner boxed Lt. Leygo.
Q Now, you said that Mr. Rivera faced you, The imputed shortcomings in the testimonies of said
when he faced you after he removed his two (2) prosecution witnesses are not of their own making.
jacket what did you do? A witness is supposed to confine his answers only to
questions propounded of him. Here, the defense counsel
A He positioned himself in a fighting stance, sir. focused his line of questioning on what the two
Q What do you mean in the fighting stance? protagonists were doing immediately prior to the punching

18
incident, and the answer correctly received by counsel A Here, sir. (Witness referring to his lower lip.
was that both petitioner and Leygo were pushing each Witness is holding his lower lip).
other. There is no showing that counsel asked the witness
as to what happened after the pushing incident, as what Q What happened when Lt. Leygo was hit?
the public prosecutor did of SPO1 Bangcado during the A He ordered us to arrest Totoy Rivera, so were
latters direct examination, to wit: able to subdue Totoy Rivera and placed
PROS. BOTENGAN: him in the car, sir.[15]

Q And what happened when they faced each But even assuming, in gratia argumente, that Lt.
other? Leygos testimony was not corroborated by the two (2)
other prosecution witnesses during their cross-
A Totoy Rivera was shouting at Lt. Leygo, sir. examinations, still the day cannot be saved for the
petitioner. Well-settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that
Q What was he shouting? the testimony of a single witness, if straightforward and
A Bakit ninyo ako tinutugis, hindi ako criminal. categorical, is sufficient to convict. After all, witnesses are
Magbabayad kayo rito. Hindi ninyo ako weighed, not numbered, and evidence are assessed in
kaya, pulis lang kayo. And some other terms of quality, not quantity. It is not uncommon, then, to
words but I cannot remember them all, sir. reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony
of a lone witness. Corroborative evidence is deemed
Q What else, if any, did he say? necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the
suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his
COURT:
observations had been inaccurate.[16]Unfortunately for the
He said he cannot remember the other words. petitioner, the trial court found nothing to indicate that Lt.
Leygo falsified the truth or that his observations had been
WITNESS: inaccurate.
There is one thing more, sir. Ilalampaso kita. Petitioner theorizes that he could not have hit Lt.
Babalian kita ng buto. And others, sir. Leygo, what with the circumstance that his co-policemen
PROS. BOTENGAN: were present at the scene of the incident, and he finds it
unusual that none of them retaliated if he really hit Lt.
Q To whom was Mr. Rivera saying this? Leygo.
A To Lt. Leygo, sir. We are not persuaded. The evidence on record
clearly bears out that it was Lt. Leygo who was attacked
Q What was Mr. Rivera doing when he said by petitioner, not the other way around, as petitioner
these? would want us to believe. Both the witnesses for the
A He was pointing to the face of Lt. Leygo and prosecution and the defense are one in saying that it was
they are becoming closer and closer with only petitioner who was in confrontation with Lt. Leygo.
each other, sir. Evidently, petitioners anger started to burst when the
truck driver reported to him that Lt. Leygo prohibited the
Q At that time, what was Lt. Leygo doing? unloading of the chicken dung and ordered him to return,
such that when the same delivery truck was again
A What I saw was they were pushing to one
intercepted by Lt. Leygos group, petitioners anger was too
another and after that Totoy Rivera boxed
much for him to contain. We quote with approval what the
Lt. Leygo, sir.
trial court has said in its decision:
Q You said they were pushing one another,
what part of their body were they holding? The accused, however, denies that he ever laid hands on
the cop. But the bigger question is, how then did the
A At the breast, sir.
policeman sustain his injuries? It is highly improbable, if
Q So each one was holding each others breast, not absurd, for the policeman to inflict it on himself. It is
is that what you mean? also very unlikely that his co-policemen would punch him
just to make it appear that the accused did it. The accused
A Yes, sir. admits of being at the place. He admits having been
Q How long did they push each other? confronted by the policeman but he denies that he ever
lifted a finger against the policeman. Yet all the witnesses
A Seven to ten seconds, sir. both for the prosecution and the defense are in accord in
saying that it was only the accused who was in
Q And was Lt. Leygo saying anything? confrontation with the policeman. The only logical
A He was trying to arrest Totoy Rivera, sir. conclusion that can be derived from this is that it is indeed
the accused who punched the policeman. Evidence to be
Q You said that he was trying to arrest Totoy believed must not only proceed from the mouth of the
Rivera, did you hear him if he says credible witness but it must be credible in itself. No better
anything? test has yet been found to measure the value of the
testimony of a witness than its conformity to the
A He was convincing Totoy Rivera to go to the
knowledge and common experience of mankind (People
Municipal Hall, sir.
vs. Maspil, Jr., 186 SCRA 751).
Q You said Totoy Rivera boxed Lt. Leygo, what
part of the body of Lt. Leygo was hit? That the other police officers did not retaliate is no
basis for us to share petitioners submission that Lt. Leygo
A His face, sir. was the aggressor. In the nature of things, they naturally
Q What part of his face? reacted the way they should, i.e. placed petitioner under
arrest when ordered by Lt. Leygo.

19
 Petitioner next contends that Lt. Leygo was not in the Costs against petitioner.
performance of his official duties as a police officer and
as Deputy Chief of Police for Operation and Patrol at the SO ORDERED.
time he was attacked.
Again, We disagree. EN BANC
It is a matter of record that at the time of the assault,
Lt. Leygo was engaged in the actual performance of his
official duties. He was wearing the designated police
uniform and was on board a police car conducting a [G.R. No. 153119. April 13, 2004]
routinary patrol when he first came upon the truck
unloading chicken manure. Because the unloading of
chicken dung was a violation of La Trinidad Municipal
Ordinance No. 1-91, the lieutenant ordered the truck PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
driver to return from where he came, but petitioner, in ANTONIO REYES y MAGANO, appellant.
defiance of such lawful order, commanded the truck driver
to return to Shilan, the place where the truck was first DECISION
intercepted, and on being informed that the same truck
had returned, the lieutenant had every reason to assume CALLEJO, SR., J.:
it did return for the purpose of unloading its cargo of
chicken dung, thus stopped it from doing so. Before us on automatic appeal is the Decision[1] of
the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28,
Under the circumstances, it simply defies reason to convicting the appellant Antonio Reyes y Magano of
argue that Lt. Leygo was not in the performance of his robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
lawful duties as a police officer when the assault upon him penalty of death.
was perpetrated by the petitioner.
Nor are we impressed by petitioners submission that
the prosecutions failure to present the doctor, who The Indictment
examined Lt. Leygo, proved disastrous to the Peoples
case, arguing that the alleged injury of Lt. Leygo cannot
be proved without the testimony of the attending The appellant was charged with robbery with
physician. homicide in an Information, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That Dr. Antonio T. Carino did not testify on the
medical certificate he issued is of no moment. If ever, the
medical certificate is only corroborative in character and That on or about June 11, 1998, in the municipality of
is not an indispensable element of the crime of direct Lumban, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction
assault filed against petitioner. The unequivocal piece of of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
evidence against petitioner is no less Lt. Leygos credible intent to gain, and while conveniently armed with a bolo,
and consistent testimony that he was punched on his face by means of violence against or intimidation of person, did
by the petitioner. then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away one (1) ladies wristwatch marked
Lastly, petitioner puts the Court of Appeals to task for Rolex; one (1) gold bracelet; one (1) gold ring with
sustaining the trial courts observation that he exuded an birthstone of Jade; one (1) Pass Book in the name of the
aura of arrogance and defiance of authorities. victim/Aurora Lagrada, in the total amount of P80,000.00,
all belonging to Aurora Lagrada, to her damage and
We have consistently ruled that the trial court judge
prejudice, in the aforementioned amount, that by reason
is in the best of position to see and observe the demeanor,
or on the occasion of the said robbery accused with intent
actuation and countenance of a witness, matters which
to kill and while conveniently armed with a bolo, did then
are not normally expressed in the transcripts of his
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
testimony. We see no reason, therefore, to disturb the
assault and stab one AURORA LAGRADA several times
following observations of the trial court in its decision:
in the different parts of her body, which directly caused
her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of
The demeanor of the accused on the witness stand also her surviving heirs.
shows that he is the kind who is impatient with authority.
His manner of answering questions bespeaks of one who
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
has trouble abiding with authority. He portrayed a very
aggressive manner and his answers were always on the
defensive as if he had every right in this world to do and The appellant was arraigned, assisted by counsel,
say whatever he wanted to. Over all, he exuded an aura and entered a plea of not guilty.
of arrogance and defiance of authority.

In closing, let it be noted that the attention of this The Case for the Prosecution[3]
Court has not been called to of any ulterior or improper
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely
testify against petitioner. Absence such a motive, the Dr. Aurora Lagrada, a spinster of about seventy
presumption is that they were not so moved, and their years old, lived alone in her two-storey house located at
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.[17] General Luna Street, Barangay Balimbingan, Lumban,
Laguna. The doctor was the sole proprietor of the Neal
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and Construction and Supplies located at No. 90 General
the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Luna Street, Lumban, Laguna.[4] The appellants house
Appeals AFFIRMED in toto. was about four to five meters away from the doctors
house. He lived with his mother and brother.
20
 At around 11:00 p.m. on June 11, 1998, Barangay counsel was needed. Del Mundo asked Atty. Paraiso to
Captain William Magpantay received a radio report from assist the appellant. The lawyer informed the appellant of
barangay kagawad that someone managed to gain entry his constitutional rights, including his right to counsel, and
into the house of Lagrada, and that she had shouted for told the appellant that he was volunteering his services to
help. Magpantay, a barangay councilman and a barangay assist him. The appellant agreed to be assisted by Atty.
tanod responded and proceeded to the house of the Paraiso.[18]
doctor. When they knocked on the door, no one
responded. The barangay captain then proceeded to the Atty. Paraiso then explained to the appellant his
Lumban Police Station and reported the matter to the constitutional right to remain silent; that if he did not want
policemen. SPO2 Maximo Gonzales and SPO1 Pedro to make any confession, it was his right to do so; and that
Nacor, Jr. responded to the report and, accompanied by any admission he made in his confession may be used
Magpantay, proceeded to the house of Lagrada. [5] against him. The appellant told Atty. Paraiso that he
would proceed with his confession because his
When they arrived at the house, the policemen conscience bothered him. Atty. Paraiso inquired from the
passed by the garage and opened the door. They saw the appellant if he had been forced, coerced and intimidated
bloodied Lagrada, naked from the waist up, sprawled into agreeing to give a confession, or if somebody had
sidewise on the floor opposite the sink near the offered to give him any reward in consideration of any
kitchen.[6] Near the cadaver was a bolo (itak). Gonzales statement he would give to the investigator. The appellant
took custody of the bolo.[7] Magpantay noticed that replied that he was not intimidated, coerced nor forced
Lagradas neighbors, anxious to know what had into giving a confession.[19]
happened, were in the vicinity. The appellant, however,
was nowhere to be found.[8] Del Mundo, nevertheless, enumerated and
explained to the appellant his constitutional rights before
Magpantay and the policemen went to the appellants commencing with his investigation in the presence of Atty.
house. The appellants mother and brother informed them Paraiso.[20] After the investigation, Del Mundo showed the
that the latter was in Barangay Concepcion.[9] Magpantay, sworn statement to Atty. Paraiso and the appellant. Atty.
Barangay Chairman Floro Bulderon and the policemen Paraiso explained the contents of the sworn statement to
proceeded to the place, but failed to locate the the appellant. The latter then signed on top of his
appellant. They then returned to the Lumban Police typewritten name on page 1 thereof, on the left margin of
Station where Noel Saniste (Samonte) told them that the page 2, and atop his typewritten name on page 3. Atty.
appellant was in the vicinity of the town plaza in Sta. Cruz, Paraiso followed suit. However, it being a holiday, there
Laguna.[10] In a mobile police car, the policemen and was no public officer available in the municipal building
Magpantay rushed to the place and saw the appellant in before whom the appellant could swear to the truth of his
the town plaza on board a tricycle, apparently on his way confession. Del Mundo requested Atty. Paraiso, being a
to the Kapalaran Bus Station in that town. The appellant notary public, to notarize the sworn statement. Paraiso
was handcuffed and boarded in the mobile police car. He agreed and affixed his signature above his typewritten
was told that he was a suspect in the killing of name on page 3 thereof, as Notary Public.[21]
Lagrada.[11] While the car was on its way to Lumban,
Gonzales ordered Magpantay to frisk the Pictures of the articles seized from the appellant
appellant. Magpantay did so, and found the following: two were taken, including the bolo, his green t-shirt and the
watches - a Rolex and Wittnauer in the right pocket of the pair of slippers. The appellant was made to stand beside
appellants pants; bank passbook no. 164764 issued by a table on top of which the said articles were placed and
the Solid Bank under the name of Lagrada; a gold photographed.[22]
bracelet and a gold ring; and in the appellants left pocket, On June 15, 1998, Dr. Leoncia M. delos Reyes,
the amount of P130.00. Magpantay turned over the performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Lagrada and
articles and money to Gonzales.[12] submitted her postmortem report which contained her
The policemen proceeded to the house of the findings, viz:
appellant where they found a pair of slippers and the
green-colored t-shirt which the appellant wore when he Autopsy Report June 12, 1998, 2:30 AM
broke into Lagradas house.[13] At the police station,
Gonzales and Nacor, Jr. turned over the appellant to Subject: Aurora Lagrada y Macabuhay, 74 years old,
SPO2 Benedicto del Mundo who was designated as the female, single, retired government official who was found
investigator-on-case.[14] By then, it was about 1:30 a.m. of dead in her residence at Gen. Luna St., Brgy.
June 12, 1998. The incident was placed in the police Balimbingan, Lumban, Laguna, on June 11, 1998.
blotter.[15]
In the meantime, the appellant was bothered by his Findings: Cadaver in a state of rigor mortis, in right
conscience and stated that he wanted to execute an lateral position, both hands and arms
extrajudicial confession.[16] Del Mundo informed the clenched towards the chest. Both legs
appellant of his right to be assisted by counsel of his own are flexed, tongue bitten and slightly
choice. He also asked the appellant if he had any protruding, bleeding from the mouth with
lawyer. The appellant replied that he had none, and asked clots. Said cadaver wearing bermuda
Del Mundo to procure a lawyer to assist him.Del Mundo short and blouse almost worn off
managed to locate Atty. Wilfredo Paraiso, a practicing exposing the upper half of the body. Pool
lawyer in Lumban, Laguna, then President of the of (sic) around the body and floor.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Laguna Chapter, and a
member of the Knights of Columbus. At that time, Atty. External Findings:
Paraiso was at the patio of the Catholic church talking with 1. Wound incised. 3x1 cms., superficial,
fellow knights after participating in the Independence Day submammary area, 3 cms. from the
parade.[17] Del Mundo informed Atty. Paraiso that midline through and through to the back
policemen had just arrested and detained the appellant, (point of entrance).
and that the latter had expressed his desire to execute an 2. Wound incised 2 cms. infra-scapular
extra-judicial confession for which the assistance of area, right. (point of exit).
21
 3. Wound incised, 3 cms. neck, left, oozing mitigating circumstance that would offset the same,
of blood. hereby sentences the accused to suffer the SUPREME
4. Hematoma, right neck. PENALTY OF DEATH and to pay the heirs of the
deceased AURORA LAGRADA as represented by Maria,
Internal Findings: Godofredo, Norma, Herminia, Edna and Magdalena, all
No intra-thoracic nor intra-abdominal hemorrhage all surnamed LAGRADA the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
internal organs intact. indemnity for the death of Aurora Lagrada
and P65,000.00 for funeral expenses or a total amount
Pelvic Exam: of P115,000.00 and to pay the cost of the instant suit.
Underwear intact, no signs of external violence, perineum
intact and dry. SO ORDERED.[31]

Cause of Death: The appellant assails the decision of the trial court
Hemorrhagic Shock.[23] asserting that:

Dr. Delos Reyes also signed Lagradas Certificate of I

Death.[24]
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING
Gonzales and Nacor, Jr. executed a Joint Affidavit THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-
on the incident.[25] Norma Quetulio executed a sworn APPELLANT.
statement[26] in which she stated that her sister, Aurora
Lagrada, owned the ring, the bracelet, and the two
watches which were confiscated from the appellant, and II
that the said articles were worth P80,000.00.[27] She
testified that before Lagrada was killed, the latter was THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS
employed by the AMA Computer College, Sta. Cruz, EVIDENCE THE STOLEN ITEMS ALLEGEDLY SEIZED
Laguna, as Professor 2, with a monthly salary FROM THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHICH, AS THE
of P2,000.00, later increased to P5,700.00 a month; and, RECORDS DISCLOSE, WERE PRODUCTS OF AN
being a retired public school teacher, she was also ILLEGAL SEARCH.[32]
receiving a monthly pension of P3,000.00 from the Social
Security System. The victim was also the sole proprietor The Court shall delve into and resolve the
of the Neal Construction and Supplies.[28] assignment of errors jointly, being interrelated.
The appellant asserts that the extrajudicial
confession[33] is inadmissible in evidence because the
The Case for the Appellant signature above his typewritten name on page 3 thereof
is a forgery. He avers that he was forced by SPO2
Benedicto del Mundo and another policeman to sign a
The appellant denied any involvement in the killing blank page at the town plaza in the presence of Atty.
of Lagrada and of robbing her of money and pieces of Wilfredo Paraiso. According to him, that blank page which
jewelry. he signed is now the first page of the extrajudicial
The appellant testified that he was never confession. Furthermore, there is a patent and utter
investigated by Del Mundo. He did not hire Atty. Wilfredo dissimilarity between his genuine signature on page 1 of
Paraiso as his counsel to assist him while being the extrajudicial confession and his purported signature
investigated by the policemen. Del Mundo merely on page 3 thereof.
referred the lawyer to him.[29] The appellant claimed that The appellant claims that SPO2 Benedicto del
he had no conference with the lawyer before and after his Mundo and Atty. Wilfredo Paraiso are not even in accord
custodial investigation. He merely affixed his signature on as to the precise time when the appellant signed the said
a piece of paper with some writings on it when it was confession. The appellant contends that Barangay
presented to him. This was after the policemen Captain William Magpantay, SPO2 Maximo Gonzales
threatened him at the station. The signature above the and SPO1 Pedro N. Nacor, Jr. seized the money and
typewritten name, Antonio Reyes, on the third page of the articles from him in the mobile car and from his house
statement[30] was not his signature. Contrary to the without any search warrant therefor, when he was already
extrajudicial confession, he finished third year in high arrested by the policemen. As such, the articles are
school. inadmissible in evidence. Given the inadmissibility of the
After trial, the court rendered judgment convicting the extrajudicial confession and the money and articles
appellant of the crime charged. The decretal portion of the seized from him, the prosecutor failed to prove his guilt
decision reads: beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE that the appellant failed to prove that the disputed
FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds the signature is a forgery. Contrary to the appellants claim,
accused ANTONIO REYES y MAGANO, GUILTY the signatures atop the typewritten name of the appellant
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, as PRINCIPAL of the on page 3 of his confession, and on page 1 and 2 thereof,
offense of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE as alleged in the are similar. Furthermore, the warrantless seizure of the
Information and defined and punished under Art. 294, No. money and articles from the appellant made by the
1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by the DEATH barangay captain and the policemen was permissible as
PENALTY LAW, and further taking into consideration an incident to the appellants lawful warrantless arrest.
against the accused the aggravating circumstances of his
commission of the offense in the dwelling of the offended
party without any provocation given by the latter and the
The Courts Ruling
complete disregard of the respect due to the offended
party on account of her age and sex and without any
22
 The Court rejects the appellants claim that his characteristics and basing conclusions thereon; failure to
signature on page 3 of his extrajudicial confession is a reason correctly regarding the observed characteristics
forgery and that he affixed his signature on a blank paper, he sees the evidence but does not know what it means.[38]
which is now on page 1 of the said confession.
He went on to emphasize, thus:
The appellant was required to submit his counter-
affidavit during the preliminary investigation before the The process of identification, therefore, must include the
MTC of Lumban, Laguna, but he failed to do determination of the extent, kind and significance of this
so. Furthermore, in his Comment on the Formal Offer of resemblance as well as of the variation. It then becomes
Exhibits filed by the prosecution, the appellant did not necessary to determine whether the variation is due to the
claim that he was made to sign a blank paper and that his operation of a different personality, or is only the expected
signature on page 3 of the extrajudicial confession was a and inevitable variation found in the genuine writing of the
forgery. The appellant made this claim for the first time, same writer. It is also necessary to decide whether the
only when he testified before the trial court. Forgery resemblance is the result of a more or less skillful
cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive imitation, or is the habitual and characteristic
and convincing evidence. One who alleges forgery has resemblance which naturally appears in a genuine
the burden of proving the same.[34] The appellant failed to writing. When these two questions are correctly answered
discharge his burden. the whole problem of identification is solved.
The extrajudicial confession of the appellant was
notarized by Atty. Wilfredo O. Paraiso who certified that It must also be kept in mind by one who is to identify
he had personally examined the appellant and that he handwriting correctly, that the attributes and qualities of
was satisfied that the latter had voluntarily executed the writing are much more than the mere outline or forms of
same. The notary publics certification belies the the letters. Writing becomes a nearly automatic and an
appellants claim that he was forced by the police officers almost unconscious act and has many physical and
to affix his signature on page 1 of his confession. Atty. psychological qualities outside of the mere forms of
Paraiso is an officer of the court. He is presumed to have letters. The consideration of a writing by all unskilled
regularly performed his duties as such notary public. The observers gives attention only to designs of letters. If the
presumption cannot be overcome by the bare and general designs are correct the writing is considered
uncorroborated claim of the appellant that the signature genuine, or, on the other hand, if they diverge in any way
on page 3 of his extrajudicial confession is a forgery. It is or any degree, the writing is thought to be a forgery.
hard to believe that Atty. Paraiso notarized the confession
of the appellant at the town plaza without the appellant One of the most distinctive qualities of writing is that about
first affixing his signatures, not only on the left margin of it which, by its execution as shown in its line quality,
pages 1 and 2, but also atop his typewritten name on page indicates whether it was freely and unconsciously written,
3 thereof. We also note that the appellants counsel cross- or whether it was written in a constrained, slow, and
examined Atty. Paraiso, but failed to cross-examine the unnatural manner. Unconscious writing is not necessarily
latter on the alleged dissimilarity of the signatures on page skillfully written, but is written with a lack of attention to the
3 of the confession and those on the left margin of pages act. If such unconscious, careless, free writing embodies
1 and 2 thereof. Finally, the appellant himself had initialed the significant form habits shown in the genuine writing,
the corrections of typographical errors in his this is conclusive proof of genuineness. It should,
confession.[35] however, not be overlooked that a forgery by one with
more muscular skill than the writer of the writing imitated
In claiming that the signature atop his typewritten may fail by showing a higher degree of skill than the
name on page 3 of the confession is a forgery, the genuine writing. As has been said, One cannot write
appellant relied solely on the alleged dissimilarity between better than he can.
his signatures. In Causapin vs. Court of Appeals,[36] this
Court held that an accurate examination to determine
forgery should dwell on both the similarities and There often is in handwriting many of these inherent
dissimilarities of the standard and questioned evidences of genuineness, or evidences of lack of
signatures. Professor Albert S. Osborn, a noted expert on genuineness, that can be seen without comparison with
questioned documents, stated that in some measure, a any standard writing whatever. Carelessness, freedom,
forgery will be like the genuine writing, and there is always and indications of unconsciousness of the operation of
bound to be some variation in the different samples of writing, when they embody characteristic forms, are
genuine signatures of the same writer. He emphasized proofs of genuineness in handwriting. The opposite
that the identification of a handwriting, as to its conditions, undue care, attention to detail, hesitation,
genuineness or lack of genuineness, or of a continued indicating not lack of muscular control but attention to the
writing as to whether it was written by a certain writer, is process, and especially delicate, unnecessary repairs
based upon the fact that handwriting embodies various and overwriting, all point to a lack of genuineness without
qualities and dissimilarities which in combination are comparison with any genuine writing. A correct, scientific
sufficiently personal to serve as a basis of identification. discussion of these points is necessary in effective
These many attributes and qualities are of varying testimony and should also form the basis of argument on
degrees of force and evidence of identity, depending upon the subject by the attorney.
just what they are and their nature.[37]
In sum, therefore, the fact of forgery cannot be
Professor Osborn also points out that one of the presumed simply because there are dissimilarities
principal causes of errors in determining whether the between the standard and the questioned signature.
handwriting is genuine or forged, or in deciding whether a
particular handwriting was or was not written by a certain The discordance between the testimonies of Atty.
writer is the incompetence of the observer who bases his Paraiso and that of SPO2 Benedicto del Mundo as to the
conclusion entirely upon general appearance, or upon exact or precise time when the appellant signed his
general character of handwriting as a whole; basing extrajudicial confession is of minor and inconsequential
conclusions on forms or designs of letters alone; importance. Both agree that the appellant signed his
mistaking general characteristics of writing or individual extrajudicial confession in the morning of June 12, 1998.
23
 The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of T (30): May ipakikita rin ako sa iyo ditong pera na
robbery with homicide defined and penalized in Article halagang Isang Daan at Tatlumpung Piso (P130.00) ang
294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as numero ng Isang Daan ay PK-125726; ang Numero ng
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which reads: Beinte Pesos ay DS-554554 at ang Numero ng Sampung
Piso ay BQ-936130 (THIS INVESTIGATOR IS
ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation SHOWING TO THE AFFIANT/SUSPECT CASH MONEY
of persons Penalties. Any person guilty of robbery with WITH THE DENOMINATIONS AND SERIAL NUMBERS
the use of violence against or any person shall suffer: STATED HERETO), ano ang masasabi mo dito?

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by S: Iyan na nga po ang perang nakuha ko sa ibabaw ng
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of mesa sa ibaba ng bahay nina Aurora Lagrada.
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional T(31): Kailan at saan ito nagyari?
mutilation or arson.
S: Mga humigit-kumulang po sa alas 11:20 ng gabi, ika-
To sustain a conviction of the accused for robbery with 11 ng Hunyo 1998 sa loob ng bahay nina Aurora Lagrada,
homicide, the prosecution was burdened to prove the sa Gen. Luna St., Barangay Balimbingan, Lumban,
essential elements of the crime, viz: Laguna. Ang pagkakapatay ko po sa kanya ay doon sa
ibaba ng bahay malapit sa kusina at ang mga alahas
(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence naman po ay doon ko ninakaw sa loob ng isang kahong
or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus maliit na naroroon naman sa itaas ng bahay ni Aurora
taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized Lagrada.[44]
by intent to gain or animus lucrandiand (d) on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of The trial court sentenced the appellant to suffer the
homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was death penalty on its finding that the crime was aggravated
committed.[39] by the fact that it was committed in the victims
dwelling and in complete disregard of the victims sex and
The accused must be shown to have the principal advanced age of seventy years old. According to the
purpose of committing robbery, the homicide being Office of the Solicitor General, however, the imposable
committed either by reason of or on occasion of the penalty should be reclusion perpetua, because the
robbery.[40] The homicide may precede robbery or may foregoing aggravating circumstances were not alleged in
occur thereafter. What is essential is that there is a nexus, the Information.
an intrinsic connection between the robbery and the The ruling of the trial court is not correct.
killing. The latter may be done prior to or subsequent to
the former. However, the intent to commit robbery must First. Robbery with homicide is essentially a felony
precede the taking of the victims life.[41] Furthermore, the against property.[45] The aggravating circumstance of
constituted crimes of robbery and homicide must be disregard of the victims age is applied only to crimes
consummated.[42] against persons and honor.[46] The bare fact that the
victim is a woman does not per se constitute disregard of
A homicide is considered as having been committed sex. For this circumstance to be properly considered, the
on the occasion or by reason of the robbery when the prosecution must adduce evidence that in the commission
motive of the offender in killing the victim is to deprive the of the crime, the accused had particularly intended to
latter of his property, to eliminate an obstacle to the crime, insult or commit disrespect to the sex of the victim. [47] In
to protect his possession of the loot, to eliminate this case, the appellant killed the victim because the latter
witnesses, to prevent his being apprehended or to insure started to shout. There was no intent to insult nor commit
his escape from the scene of the crime. disrespect to the victim on account of the latters sex.
In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond Second. The fact that the crime was committed in the
reasonable doubt to establish the guilt of the appellant. In victims dwelling, without provocation on the part of the
his extrajudicial confession, the appellant stated that he latter, is aggravating in robbery with
barged into the house of the victim to rob her, and that he homicide.[48] However, such circumstance was not
stabbed the victim when she was about to shout and alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule
because he was drunk. Thus: 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.[49] Although the crime was committed before
T (27): May mga ipakikita ako sa iyo ditong mga alahas, the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
dalawang relos na pangkamay at pambabae, ang isa (1) the said rule should be applied retroactively as it is
ay may tatak na Rolex at ang isa (1) ay tatak Wittnauer, favorable to the appellant.[50]
isang (1) gintong pulseras; isang (1) gintong singsing na
may batong kulay-berde at isang (1) libreta de bangko o The appellant failed to prove that any mitigating
Passbook na kulay-pula, may Numero 164764 sa circumstance attended the commission of the
pangalan ni Aurora Lagrada na Passbook ng Solid Bank crime. Although he claimed that he was drunk when he
(THIS INVESTIGATOR SHOWING TO THE gained entry into the victims house, killed her and
AFFIANT/SUSPECT ALL ITEMS MENTIONED PLACED divested her of her properties, the appellant failed to
ON THE TOP OF THE INVESTIGATORS TABLE), ano prove that his intoxication was not habitual or subsequent
ang masasabi mo dito? to the plan to commit the felony charged.
There being no modifying circumstance to the crime,
S: Iyan na nga po ang mga ninakaw ko kina Aurora the appellant should be sentenced to suffer reclusion
Lagrada.[43] perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The appellant then took the victims money and
personal belongings and fled from the scene of the crime: The trial court was correct in not awarding moral
damages to the heirs of the victim. The prosecution failed
24
to present any of them to testify on the factual basis for CONSTRUED. — An offense is committed in the
such circumstance.However, the heirs are entitled to presence or within the view of an officer, within the
exemplary damages of P25,000.00,[51] in accordance with meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a
current jurisprudence. warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision proceeds at once to the scene thereof; or the offense is
of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, Branch continuing, or has not been consummated, at the time the
25, finding appellant Antonio Reyes y Magano guilty arrest is made. (3 Cyc., 886; Ramsey v. State, 17 S.E.,
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide under 613; Dilger v. Com., 11 S.W., 651; State v. McAfee, 12
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as S.E., 435; State v. Williams, 15 S.E., 554; Hawkins v.
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is AFFIRMED with Lutton, 70 N.W., 483.)
MODIFICATION in that the appellant is sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua and is ordered to 3. ID.; RESISTING AN OFFICE; ATTEMPT AGAINST
pay P25,000.00 to the heirs of the victim, as exemplary THE AUTHORITIES. — Any person who attacks the
damages. authorities of the Government, or their agents, or employs
SO ORDERED. force against them, or gravely intimidates them, or offers
an equally grave resistance while they are discharging the
functions of their office or on the occasion thereof, is guilty
of an attempt against the authorities. (Art. 249, 250, Penal
Code.)

DECISION

TRENT, J. :

The defendant, Isaac Samonte, was tried in the Court of

First Instance of the Province of Tayabas on a charge of
criminal attempt against an agent of the authorities, and
sentenced to one year eight months and twenty-one days
of prison correccional, to pay a fine of P65, in case of
insolvency to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, to the accessory penalties provided in
article 61 of the Penal Code, and to pay the costs. He
appealed to this court.

Counsel for appellant insists, first, that the prosecution

has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
policeman, Gregorio Glindo, attempted to arrest the
accused; and, second, that if said policeman did attempt
to arrest the defendant at this place he, not having a
judicial warrant, was not, under the circumstances,
authorized to make the arrest which he attempted to
make.

About 8 o’clock on the night of September 6, 1908, the

appellant, Isaac Samonte, and Basilio Rabe were
FIRST DIVISION together in the house of one Demetrio Pandeñio in the
barrio of Macalalong, jurisdiction of Pitogo Province of
[G.R. No. 5649. September 6, 1910. ] Tayabas. They both left this house and met shortly
afterwards in the street (Verdades) in said barrio. On
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ISAAC meeting there they became engaged in quarrel, the
SAMONTE, Defendant-Appellant. appellant knocking or pushing Rabe down, then
proceeded to maltreat him. At this moment Rabe called
Godofredo Reyes, for Appellant. "police! police!" Gregorio Glindo, a municipal policeman
of Pitogo, being on patrol duty that night in said barrio,
Attorney-General Villamor, for Appellee. hearing these words went to the scene, arriving just as the
offended party was getting up, and attempted to arrest the
SYLLABUS appellant, saying to him: "In the name of the United
States, don’t move." The appellant, on seeing the
policeman and hearing this command, said: "Don’t come
1. PEACE OFFICERS; RIGHT TO ARREST WITHOUT
near, because I will take your life." The policeman
WARRANT. — Any officer charged with the preservation
continued toward the appellant and when very near him
of the public peace may arrest, without a warrant, any
the appellant struck at the policeman with a knife. On
person who is committing, or has committed, a breach of
account of this resistance the policeman could not arrest
the peace in his presence. (3 Cyc., 881; Carolina v.
the appellant at the time, so he went immediately to the
McAfee, 10 L.R.A., 607; Commonwealth v. Tobin, 11 Am.
house of the councilman of that barrio, Demetrio
Rep., 375; People v. Rounds, 35 N.W., 77; Douglas v.
Pandeñio, and reported the matter. Pandeñio ordered him
Barber, 28 Atl., 805.)
to arrest the Appellant. He returned to obey this order,
being followed by Pandeñio. They found the appellant in
2. ID.; ID.; "IN THE PRESENCE OR WITHIN THE VIEW,"
25
a place called Mutingbayan. The policeman attempted to touched by the accused, these facts do not relieve him
take hold of the appellant, but he resisted, striking at the from criminal responsibility.
policeman again with his knife. The councilman then
ordered the appellant to submit himself, and on receiving The penalty imposed by the court below being in
this order the appellant said: "I do not recognize anyone," accordance with the law and the proofs presented, the
and struck at the councilman with the knife. same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the Appellant.
So ordered.
The appellant was not arrested on that night on account
of this resistance. He did not lay hands on or touch with
his knife either the policeman or the councilman, but he
did refuse to submit himself to the authorities, and
resisted arrest. The policeman did not see the appellant
knock the priest down, neither did he see him kick the said
priest, but he heard the cries of the priest calling for help,
saying "police! police!" and when he arrived on the scene
the priest was just getting up and freeing himself from
the Appellant. When the policeman heard these cries for
help he was only a very short distance — some 6 or 8
brazas — away, and when he arrived the trouble had not
terminated, although no active fighting took place after his
arrival. Under these facts and circumstances it was the
duty of this police officer to stop this disturbance by
placing the defendant under arrest.

Any officer charged with the preservation of the public

peace may arrest, without a warrant, any person who is
committing, or has committed, a breach of the peace in
his presence. (3 Cyc., 881; Carolina v. McAfee., 10
L.R.A., 607; Commonwealth v. Tobin, 11 Am. Rep., 375;
People v. Rounds, 35 N.W., 77; and Douglas v. Barber,
28 Atl. Rep., 805.)

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view

of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an
arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances
created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof; or the offense is continuing, or has not been
consummated, at the time the arrest is made. (3 Cyc.,
886; Ramsey v. State, 17 S. E. 613; Dilger v. Com., 11
S.W., State v. McAfee, 12 S.E., 453; State v. Williams, 15
S.E., 554; and Hawkins v. Lutton, 70 N.W., 483.)

In the case at bar Gregorio Glindo, being a peace officer,

not only had authority to arrest the defendant at the time,
but it was his duty to do so, he having heard the priest call
for help and having arrived on the scene before the
disturbance had finally ended.
SECOND DIVISION
Article 249 of the Penal Code provides that the following
commit criminal attempt:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library [G.R. No. 11941. December 7, 1916. ]

x x x THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN

ALVEAR ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

"2. Those who attack the authorities or their agents, or Teofilo Sison and Beaumont and Tenney
employee force against them, or gravely intimidate them, for Appellants.
or offer an equally grave resistance while they are
discharging the functions of their office or on occasion Attorney-General Avanceña for Appellee.
thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library
SYLLABUS
Article 250 of the same code fixes the penalty to be
imposed for those guilty of an attempt against the 1. ASSAULT UPON PERSONS IN AUTHORITY;
authorities or their agents, as provided in the above EVIDENCE; REASONABLE DOUBT. — A conviction of
article. the grave offense of atentado (assault upon or resistance
offered to persons in authority or their agents) cannot be
The accused in this case, after an attempt had been made sustained in any case in which a reasonable doubt arises
to arrest him by a duly authorized police officer in the as to whether the accused knew or ought to have known
discharge of his duty as such, offered grave resistance by that the persons assaulted or resisted were in fact
refusing to submit himself to arrest and by striking at the persons in authority or their agents; provided that the
policeman with a knife, thereby attempting a personal assault or resistance offered would have been justifiable
injury. Although the policeman was not wounded or in the event that the persons assaulted or resisted had not

26
been persons in authority or their agents. Upon a careful examination of all the evidence of record
we think that there is at least a reasonable doubt that
2. ID.; SELF-DEFENSE IN RESISTING ARREST. — The these accused knew or had reason to know that the two
exemption from criminal liability which is extended to any Constabulary soldiers who first entered the house in plain
one who acts in defense of his own person or rights from clothes were police officers until the third soldier entered
unlawful aggression, under article 8 of the Penal Code, in uniform.
must be held to include one who assaults or resists a
police officer under circumstances which would justify the The police officers claim that they read, or at least began
assault or resistance, if the person assaulted were not a to read a search warrant immediately after they entered
police officer in the lawful performance of his duties, when the house; but upon the whole record, and having in mind
it further appears that the person making the assault did the fact that they entered the house in plain clothes
not know, and had no reasonable grounds to believe, that evidently for the purpose of surprising the occupants, we
the person assaulted was a police officer acting in the think the weight of the evidence tends to disclose that
performance of his duties as such. whatever may have been their intentions as to the reading
of the search warrant, they attempted, before disclosing
their authority to enter the house, to compel the occupants
DECISION to stay still, lest they might conceal or get rid of the opium
for which the search was made; that to this end they used
physical force and threats with a revolver against two of
CARSON, J. : the accused, one of whom was a woman; that the cries of
the woman brought her son and others to her rescue; and
that as a result the fight was precipitated before the police
Each of the five appellants in this case, two of whom are officers had time to make themselves known as such.
women, was convicted in the court below of the crime of
atentado contra los agentes de la autoridad (assault upon A conviction of the grave offense of atentado (assault
agents in authority) and sentenced to one year eight upon or resistance offered to persons in authority or their
months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and agents) cannot be sustained in any case in which a
to pay a fine of five hundred pesetas. reasonable doubt arises as to whether the accused knew
or ought to have known that the persons assaulted or
The prosecution undertook to prove that a Constabulary resisted were in fact persons in authority or their agents;
sergeant and a soldier, who were duly provided with a provided that the assault or resistance offered would have
search warrant, entered the house where the accused been justifiable in the event that the persons assaulted or
were arrested for the purpose of searching for opium; that resisted had not been persons in authority or their agents.
immediately upon entering the house, the sergeant (Art. 1, Penal Code.)
proceeded to read the search warrant to those whom he
found within; that the occupants of the house fell upon the That these accused assaulted and resisted the police
two soldiers, violently assaulted them, snatched the officers who entered the house in plain clothes is not
search warrant from the sergeant while he was reading it, denied; but the assault and resistance would have been
threw the soldier out of one of the windows, and only wholly justifiable if these men had been what they seemed
desisted from their assault upon the sergeant when a to be to the occupants of the house; that is to say, two
uniformed Constabulary soldier, armed with a gun, who strangers, who without lawful authority had entered the
had been left on guard outside, came up into the house house and physically assaulted the first man and woman
and arrested the participants in the assault. they found there, at the same time threatening their
victims with a revolver if they moved or gave an alarm.
The accused and their witnesses testifying for the defense
swore that the two police officers entered the house in The exemption from criminal liability which is extended to
plain clothes; that the moment they entered one of them anyone who acts in defense of his own person or rights
seized and held one of the accused women, at the same from unlawful aggression, under article 8 of the Penal
time drawing and brandishing a revolver, while the other Code must be held to include one who assaults or resists
threw himself upon another of the accused who was a police officer under circumstances which would justify
sitting in a chair near by; that the woman cried loudly for the assault or resistance, if the person assaulted were not
help; that her son and some others came to her rescue; a police officer in the lawful performance of his duties,
that a fight followed, which was terminated by the arrival when it further appears that the person making the assault
of a uniformed Constabulary soldier who put the accused did not know, and had no reasonable grounds to believe,
under arrest; that they did not know that the two that the person assaulted was a police officer acting in the
Constabulary soldiers who first entered were police performance of his duties as such. (U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15
officers until the uniformed Constabulary soldier Phil. Rep., 488.)
appeared on the scene; and that when they saw him and
learned that the men who had entered the house in plain The judgment convicting and sentencing the appellants
clothes were police officers, they promptly surrendered should be reversed, and they should be acquitted of the
and offered no further resistance. crime with which they are charged in the information and
their bail exonerated, with the costs of both instances de
The witness for the prosecution and for the defense officio. So ordered.
contradict each other in practically every detail of their
accounts of what occurred, except that all of the Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.
witnesses agree that the two Constabulary soldiers
entered the house in plain clothes; that immediately
thereafter a violent altercation arose; and that all of the
accused promptly surrendered and offered no further
resistance when the third Constabulary soldier in uniform
came up into the house and put them under arrest.

27
 BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO
LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN
BELTRAN, Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA
MAZA, Rep. TEODORO CASINO, Rep. JOEL
VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by FERDINAND
GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF
LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by ATTY.
REMEDIOS BALBIN, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Respondent.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 169660 April 20, 2006

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., in his capacity as
Secretary of Defense, and GENEROSO S. SENGA, in
his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, Respondents.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 169667 April 20, 2006

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.

(ALG), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, Respondent.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 169834 April 20, 2006

PDP- LABAN, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R.
ARTICLE 150 ERMITA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006 x-------------------------x

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by G.R. No. 171246 April 20, 2006
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate
President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as
Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA,
PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR AMORANDO,
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA III,
Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C. BERNABE,
"COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA, and
EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO the INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE
ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, vs.
M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R.
RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners, ERMITA, Respondent.
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive DECISION
Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead CARPIO MORALES, J.:
and in behalf of the President of the
Philippines, Respondents. A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a
truly republican state. Even in the early history of
x-------------------------x republican thought, however, it has been recognized that
the head of government may keep certain information
G.R. No. 169659 April 20, 2006 confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the
reason for vesting executive power in only one
magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S.
28
Constitutional Convention said: "Decision, activity, Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005
secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the entitled "Clear and Present Danger"; (4) Senate
proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo
than the proceedings of any greater number; and in Madrigal – Resolution Directing the Committee on
proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in
be diminished."1 Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role
of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and
History has been witness, however, to the fact that the (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon –
power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence, Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense
the necessity to guard it zealously. and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation,
on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines.
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and
prohibition proffer that the President has abused such Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on
power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General
September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as Generoso S. Senga who, by letter3 dated September 27,
null and void for being unconstitutional. 2005, requested for its postponement "due to a pressing
operational situation that demands [his utmost personal
attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are
In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with
the recognition that the issuance under review has come currently attending to other urgent operational matters."
from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles
it to a strong presumption of constitutionality. Once the On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M.
challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the Ermita a letter4 dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully
Constitution, being the highest expression of the request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing
sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials
issuance of the government that contravenes its of the Executive Department have been invited" in order
mandates. to "afford said officials ample time and opportunity to
study and prepare for the various issues so that they may
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, investigation."
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and Senate President Drilon, however, wrote5 Executive
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are unable to accede
offices including those employed in Government Owned to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police resource persons were completed [the previous] week."
(PNP).
Senate President Drilon likewise received on September
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the 28, 2005 a letter6 from the President of the North Luzon
Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that
the Executive Department for them to appear on the hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or
September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center
hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon on the contract agreements relative to the project had
Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery been secured.
and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).
The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464,
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of
investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege
provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing
in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant
likewise issued invitations2 dated September 22, 2005 to to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient
the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding provisions of the Order are as follows:
General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C.
Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments
Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section
of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional
Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal
Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine branches of the government, all heads of departments of
Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the
and Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, consent of the President prior to appearing before either
Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as resource House of Congress.
persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28,
2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator When the security of the State or the public interest so
Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 requires and the President so states in writing, the
entitled "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral
Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2)
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive
Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered
Privilege. –
on July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-
Tapping Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of
29
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect
on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid
government and rooted in the separation of powers under of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367,
23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O.
Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and 464, and another letter8 informing him "that officials of the
Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting
classified information officially known to them by reason [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend
of their office and not made available to the public to the same without the consent of the President, pursuant
prejudice the public interest. to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the
required consent from the President." On even date which
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged
information between the President and the public officers wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter9 to Senator Biazon,
covered by this executive order, including: Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and
Security, informing him "that per instruction of [President
Conversations and correspondence between the Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer
President and the public official covered by this executive of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or
order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May Congressional hearings without seeking a written
1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. approval from the President" and "that no approval has
133250, 9 July 2002); been granted by the President to any AFP officer to
appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee
on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28
Military, diplomatic and other national security matters
September 2005."
which in the interest of national security should not be
divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May
1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Despite the communications received from Executive
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998). Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation
scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and
Information between inter-government agencies prior to Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig.
the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
(Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military
personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. were relieved from their military posts and were made to
face court martial proceedings.
130716, 9 December 1998);

As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on

Matters affecting national security and public order
(Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary Ermita, citing
July 2002). E.O. 464, sent letter of regrets, in response to the
invitations sent to the following government officials: Light
Railway Transit Authority Administrator Melquiades
(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this Robles, Metro Rail Transit Authority Administrator
executive order: Roberto Lastimoso, Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief
State Counsel Ricardo V. Perez, then Presidential Legal
Senior officials of executive departments who in the Counsel Merceditas Gutierrez, Department of
judgment of the department heads are covered by the Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
executive privilege; Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding, DOTC Secretary
Leandro Mendoza, Philippine National Railways General
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Manager Jose Serase II, Monetary Board Member
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of Juanita Amatong, Bases Conversion Development
the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Authority Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and Secretary
Romulo L. Neri.10 NorthRail President Cortes sent
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464.11
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R.
executive privilege; Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari and
prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of constitutionality of E.O. 464.
the National Security Adviser are covered by the
executive privilege; and In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna,
House of Representatives Members Satur Ocampo,
Such other officers as may be determined by the Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador
President. and Teodoro Casino, Courage, an organization of
government employees, and Counsels for the Defense of
Liberties (CODAL), a group of lawyers dedicated to the
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before
promotion of justice, democracy and peace, all claiming
Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2
to have standing to file the suit because of the
(b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior
transcendental importance of the issues they posed, pray,
to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure
in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for
the observance of the principle of separation of powers,
being unconstitutional; that respondent Executive
30
Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary President to allow [them] to appear before the public
and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be prohibited from hearing" and that "they will attend once [their] request is
imposing, and threatening to impose sanctions on officials approved by the President." As none of those invited
who appear before Congress due to congressional appeared, the hearing on February 10, 2006 was
summons. Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 cancelled.16
infringes on their rights and impedes them from fulfilling
their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate
that E.O. 464 infringes on its right as a political party Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue Ribbon
entitled to participate in governance; Satur Ocampo, et al. Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the
allege that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani
members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings scheduled
implementation of laws; Courage alleges that the tenure on October 5 and 26, November 24 and December 12,
of its members in public office is predicated on, and 2005 but most of them failed to attend, DA
threatened by, their submission to the requirements of Undersecretary Belinda Gonzales, DA Assistant
E.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress; and Secretary Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide
CODAL alleges that its members have a sworn duty to Authority Executive Director Norlito R. Gicana,17 and
uphold the rule of law, and their rights to information and those from the Department of Budget and
to transparent governance are threatened by the Management18 having invoked E.O. 464.
imposition of E.O. 464.
In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8
In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and Presidential
claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen, taxpayer Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye,19 DOJ Secretary Raul
and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of M. Gonzalez20 and Department of Interior and Local
E.O. 464, prays in his petition that E.O. 464 be declared Government Undersecretary Marius P.
null and void for being unconstitutional. Corpus21 communicated their inability to attend due to
lack of appropriate clearance from the President pursuant
In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, to E.O. 464. During the February 13, 2005 budget
Inc.12 (ALG), alleging that as a coalition of 17 legal hearing, however, Secretary Bunye was allowed to attend
resource non-governmental organizations engaged in by Executive Secretary Ermita.
developmental lawyering and work with the poor and
marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the
as an organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part incumbent members of the Board of Governors of the
of the general public, it has legal standing to institute the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the
petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on Integrated Bar of the Philippines as the official
matters of public concern, a right which was denied to the organization of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their
public by E.O. 464,13 prays, that said order be declared constitutional right to be informed on matters of public
null and void for being unconstitutional and that interest, filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition,
respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be
cease from implementing it. declared null and void.

On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary
alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the Restraining Order enjoining respondents from
issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.
imminent and material injury, as it has already sustained
the same with its continued enforcement since it directly In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on
interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the
February 21, 2006, the following substantive issues were
Senate’s powers and functions and conceals information
ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave
of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for
abuse of discretion in implementing E.O. 464 prior to its
certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional. general circulation; and (2) whether E.O. 464 violates the
following provisions of the Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28,
On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec.
party with members duly elected into the Philippine 21, Art. VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16.
Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar The procedural issue of whether there is an actual case
petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. or controversy that calls for judicial review was not taken
No. 169834, alleging that it is affected by the challenged up; instead, the parties were instructed to discuss it in
E.O. 464 because it hampers its legislative agenda to be their respective memoranda.
implemented through its members in Congress,
particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation
After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties
and transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a
were directed to submit their respective memoranda,
constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative paying particular attention to the following propositions:
branches of the government. (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its face, unconstitutional; and (2)
assuming that it is not, it is unconstitutional as applied in
Meanwhile, by letter14 dated February 6, 2006, Senator four instances, namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam;
Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen. Senga for him and (b) the NorthRail investigation (c) the Wiretapping activity
other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged of the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the Venable
wiretapping scheduled on February 10, 2005. Gen. Senga contract.22
replied, however, by letter15 dated February 8, 2006, that
"[p]ursuant to Executive Order No. 464, th[e]
Petitioners in G.R. No. 16966023 and G.R. No.
Headquarters requested for a clearance from the
16977724 filed their memoranda on March 7, 2006, while
31
those in G.R. No. 16966725 and G.R. No. 16983426 filed be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
theirs the next day or on March 8, 2006. Petitioners in constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.39
G.R. No. 171246 did not file any memorandum.
Except with respect to the requisites of standing and
Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after existence of an actual case or controversy where the
their motion for extension to file memorandum 27 was disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the
granted, subsequently filed a manifestation28 dated rest of the requisites shall be omitted.
March 14, 2006 that it would no longer file its
memorandum in the interest of having the issues resolved Standing
soonest, prompting this Court to issue a Resolution
reprimanding them.29
Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that
the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660 and 169667
Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following make it clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance
constitutional provisions: of several officials of the executive department in the
investigations called by the different committees of the
Art. VI, Sec. 2130 Senate, were brought to vindicate the constitutional duty
of the Senate or its different committees to conduct inquiry
Art. VI, Sec. 2231 in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its oversight
functions. They maintain that Representatives Ocampo et
al. have not shown any specific prerogative, power, and
Art. VI, Sec. 132
privilege of the House of Representatives which had been
effectively impaired by E.O. 464, there being no mention
Art. XI, Sec. 133 of any investigation called by the House of
Representatives or any of its committees which was
Art. III, Sec. 734 aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464.

Art. III, Sec. 435 As for Bayan Muna’s alleged interest as a party-list
representing the marginalized and underrepresented, and
Art. XIII, Sec. 16 36 that of the other petitioner groups and individuals who
profess to have standing as advocates and defenders of
Art. II, Sec. 2837 the Constitution, respondents contend that such interest
falls short of that required to confer standing on them as
parties "injured-in-fact."40
Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on the
other hand, pray in their consolidated memorandum 38 on
March 13, 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that
of merit. Chavez may not claim an interest as a taxpayer for the
implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise
of taxing or spending power.41
The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as
follows:
With regard to the petition filed by the Senate,
respondents argue that in the absence of a personal or
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of
direct injury by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the
inquiry vested in Congress;
Senate and its individual members are not the proper
parties to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the
people to information on matters of public
Invoking this Court’s ruling in National Economic
concern; and
Protectionism Association v. Ongpin42 and Valmonte v.
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,43 respondents
3. Whether respondents have committed grave assert that to be considered a proper party, one must
abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such
464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to
general circulation. the enforcement of E.O. 464.44

Essential requisites for judicial review That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right
essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the a democratic system, but more especially for sound
constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the legislation45 is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly
requisites for a valid exercise of the Court’s power of stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access
judicial review are present is in order. information that is crucial to law-making.46 Verily, the
Senate, including its individual members, has a
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the
power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) controversy and is the proper party to assail the
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and
act must have standing to challenge the validity of the privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he which they claim infringes their prerogatives as
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of legislators.47
its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must

32
In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is
(Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan Muna), Joel that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in
Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial
Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) resolution.55 In fine, PDP-Laban’s alleged interest as a
are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal
464, the absence of any claim that an investigation called standing.
by the House of Representatives or any of its committees
was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 Actual Case or Controversy
notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made
that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and
Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing
duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation
the absence of the executive officials invited by the
in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464,
implementation of laws.
particularly those on the NorthRail project and the
wiretapping controversy.
The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets
the standing requirement as it obtained three seats in the
Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy,
House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is,
there being no showing that President Arroyo has actually
therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative process
withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the
consonant with the declared policy underlying the party invited officials.56 These officials, they claim, merely
list system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized communicated to the Senate that they have not yet
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties
secured the consent of the President, not that the
who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute
President prohibited their attendance.57 Specifically with
to the formulation and enactment of legislation that will
regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the hearing
benefit the nation.48
on September 28, 2005, respondents claim that the
instruction not to attend without the President’s consent
As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have was based on its role as Commander-in-Chief of the
the standing to file their petitions, passing on the standing Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.
of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered
unnecessary.49 Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest
on an unfounded apprehension that the President will
In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials
claims to be an organization of citizens, and the before Congress, and that such apprehension is not
incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and sufficient for challenging the validity of E.O. 464.
the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members,50 invoke their
constitutional right to information on matters of public The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President
concern, asserting that the right to information, curtailed
has not withheld her consent or prohibited the
and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective
appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in
exercise of other constitutional rights51 and to the
determining the existence of an actual case or
maintenance of the balance of power among the three
controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O.
branches of the government through the principle of 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding of
checks and balances.52 consent or an express prohibition issuing from the
President in order to bar officials from appearing before
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest Congress.
of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws,
presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must As the implementation of the challenged order has
be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of
already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the
Representatives,53 this Court held that when the
hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
make no sense to wait for any further event before
mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed,
personal interest. it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would
now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of E.O.
As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is 464.
clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental
issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to
Constitutionality of E.O. 464
resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to be
accorded standing on the ground of transcendental
importance, however, it must establish (1) the character E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of
of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress of
the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of the information in the possession of these officials. To
a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public resolve the question of whether such withholding of
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, information violates the Constitution, consideration of the
and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and general power of Congress to obtain information,
specific interest in raising the questions being otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in order.
raised.54 The first and last determinants not being present
as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners The power of inquiry
in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific
interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in
PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:
allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is
vague and uncertain, and at best is only a "generalized SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of
interest" which it shares with the rest of the political Representatives or any of its respective committees may
33
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of and informed on executive operations.
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected. (Underscoring supplied) As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with
process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article information in the legislative process. If the information
VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it possessed by executive officials on the operation of their
vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by
established therein – the Batasang Pambansa – and its parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that
committees. information and the power to compel the disclosure
thereof.
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision.
Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,58 a case decided in As evidenced by the American experience during the so-
1950 under that Constitution, the Court already called "McCarthy era," however, the right of Congress to
recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less
power to legislate. susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It
may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of
anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong the Constitution.
Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault,
who was considered a leading witness in the controversy, For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon
was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of Committee,61 the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid
his refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of
important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions.
detained for contempt. Upholding the Senate’s power to Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid
punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held: such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its
invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any
Although there is no provision in the Constitution person for that matter, the possible needed statute which
expressly investing either House of Congress with power prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement
to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the
it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the furtherance thereof, there would be less room for
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the speculation on the part of the person invited on whether
power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial
effectively in the absence of information respecting the safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry.
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or The provision requires that the inquiry be done in
change; and where the legislative body does not itself accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published
possess the requisite information – which is not rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional
infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the
such information are often unavailing, and also that rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
obtain what is needed.59 . . . (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) These abuses are, of course, remediable before the
courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected,
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless,
officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing
same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of
is co-extensive with the power to legislate.60 The matters the legislative power of inquiry might be established,
which may be a proper subject of legislation and those resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to
which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It members of the executive department under the Bill of
follows that the operation of government, being a Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall
investigation. these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.

Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are
government transaction involved in Arnault was a proper still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which
exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege."
the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the Since this term figures prominently in the challenged
guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular
government agencies created by Congress and officers clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion of executive
whose positions it is within the power of Congress to privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of
regulate or even abolish." E.O. 464.

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the Executive privilege

operations of the executive branch, it would be
incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this
jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the
34
promulgation of the 1986 Constitution.63 Being of That a type of information is recognized as privileged
American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be
been defined and used in the legal literature of the United considered privileged in all instances. For in determining
States. the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must
be asked is not only whether the requested information
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also
Government to withhold information from the public, the whether that privilege should be honored in a given
courts, and the Congress."64 Similarly, Rozell defines it as procedural setting.71
"the right of the President and high-level executive branch
officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, The leading case on executive privilege in the United
and ultimately the public."65 States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974. In issue in that
case was the validity of President Nixon’s claim of
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district
concept. 66 It has encompassed claims of varying court requiring the production of certain tapes and
kinds.67Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary documents relating to the Watergate investigations. The
to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more claim of privilege was based on the President’s general
accurate to speak of executive privileges "since interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and
presidential refusals to furnish information may be correspondence. The U.S. Court held that while there is
actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the
considerations, and may be asserted, with differing U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent
degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or that it relates to the effective discharge of a President’s
legislative investigations." powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the President’s
claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be
balanced against the public interest in the fair
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state
secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court was
careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the issue
with Washington, on the ground that the information is of
of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against
such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial
congressional demands for information.
military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the
informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not
to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive
of violations of law to officers charged with the privilege against Congress are rare.73 Despite frequent
enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress,
internal deliberations has been said to attach to beginning with President Washington’s refusal to turn
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory over treaty negotiation records to the House of
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never
part of a process by which governmental decisions and adjudicated the issue.74 However, the U.S. Court of
policies are formulated. 68 Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case
decided earlier in the same year as Nixon, recognized the
President’s privilege over his conversations against a
Tribe’s comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed
congressional subpoena.75 Anticipating the balancing
Case, thus:
approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon,
the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest protected
Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials by the claim of privilege against the interest that would be
have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of served by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling that the
information the confidentiality of which they felt was balance favored the President, the Court declined to
crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities enforce the subpoena. 76
of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled
early that the executive had a right to withhold documents
In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was
that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts have
recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez.77Almonte
also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity
used the term in reference to the same privilege subject
of government informers in some circumstances and a
qualified right to withhold information related to pending of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon
investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and underscoring decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
supplied)
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his
conversations and correspondences, like the claim of
The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive
privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has
doctrine. all the values to which we accord deference for the
privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the
necessity for protection of the public interest in candid,
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
separation of powers, exempts the executive from decision-making. A President and those who assist him
disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen must be free to explore alternatives in the process of
or organization where such exemption is necessary to the shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a
discharge of highly important executive responsibilities way many would be unwilling to express except privately.
involved in maintaining governmental operations, and These are the considerations justifying a presumptive
extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is
also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of fundamental to the operation of government and
the executive’ domestic decisional and policy making inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and
deliberative communications.70 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
35
Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their
Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did not own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon
involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the request of either House, as the rules of each House
the people to information.78 Nonetheless, the Court shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House
recognized that there are certain types of information on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
which the government may withhold from the public, thus questions shall be submitted to the President of the
acknowledging, in substance if not in name, that Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives
executive privilege may be claimed against citizens’ at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
demands for information. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto. When the security of
In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this jurisdiction the State or the public interest so requires and the
recognizes the common law holding that there is a President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
"governmental privilege against public disclosure with conducted in executive session.
respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and
other national security matters."80 The same case held Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an
that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI.
limitation on the right to information. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be
interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries
Court ruled that the right to information does not extend in aid of legislation." As the following excerpt of the
to matters recognized as "privileged information under the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows,
separation of powers,"82 by which the Court meant the framers were aware that these two provisions involved
Presidential conversations, correspondences, and distinct functions of Congress.
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held
that information on military and diplomatic secrets and MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20
those affecting national security, and information on [now Section 22 on the Question Hour] yesterday, I
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies noticed that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled
before the prosecution of the accused were exempted anymore to appear before the House of Representatives
from the right to information. or before the Senate. I have a particular problem in this
regard, Madam President, because in our experience in
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of the Regular Batasang Pambansa – as the Gentleman
executive privilege, both in the United States and in this himself has experienced in the interim Batasang
jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive Pambansa – one of the most competent inputs that we
privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, can put in our committee deliberations, either in aid of
or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types legislation or in congressional investigations, is the
of information of a sensitive character. While executive testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite them,
privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may but if they do not come and it is a congressional
be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.
it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent
is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from I want to be clarified on a statement made by
the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact that the
executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of Cabinet ministers may refuse to come to the House of
the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines Representatives or the Senate [when requested under
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of Section 22] does not mean that they need not come when
disclosure. they are invited or subpoenaed by the committee of either
House when it comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or
Validity of Section 1 congressional investigation. According to Commissioner
Suarez, that is allowed and their presence can be had
under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this,
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the
Madam President?
officials covered by them to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before Congress. There are
significant differences between the two provisions, MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President,
however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity because Section 20 refers only to what was originally the
of these provisions separately. Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he
not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any refuses, he can be held in contempt of the
House.83 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The
President herself has, through the challenged order,
made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
Section 3, the coverage of department heads under legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
Section 1 is not made to depend on the department meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
heads’ possession of any information which might be compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference
covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of
to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to the proponents of the amendment to make the
executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior appearance of department heads discretionary in the
consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, question hour.
Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred
to as the question hour. So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members
of the Commission that the Committee on Style, precisely
in recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision
36
on question hour from its original position as Section 20 the Committee on the Legislative Department. His views
in the original draft down to Section 31, far from the may thus be presumed as representing that of his
provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise Committee.
to the following exchange during the deliberations:
In the context of a parliamentary system of government,
MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is a period
of the Committee on Style] We now go, Mr. Presiding of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime
Officer, to the Article on Legislative and may I request the Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts
chairperson of the Legislative Department, Commissioner and the operation of the government,85 corresponding to
Davide, to give his reaction. what is known in Britain as the question period. There was
a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Constitution86 which made the appearance of ministers
Davide is recognized.|avvphi|.net mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the
parliamentary system established by that Constitution,
where the ministers are also members of the legislature
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have
and are directly accountable to it.
only one reaction to the Question Hour. I propose that
instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow
Legislative Inquiries. An essential feature of the parliamentary system of
government is the immediate accountability of the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee
shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the
say?
program of government and shall determine the
guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential
MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to system where the tenure of office of all elected officials
reply, Mr. Presiding Officer. cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as
MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The
previously when we sequenced this but we reasoned that moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the
in Section 21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a Cabinet may be changed.87
power of Congress in terms of its own lawmaking;
whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a power in terms The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the
of its own lawmaking power because in Legislative mandatory nature of such appearance during the question
Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put Question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more
Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will fully to a system of separation of powers.88 To that extent,
consider this. the question hour, as it is presently understood in this
jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the
MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with parliamentary system. That department heads may not be
the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement required to appear in a question hour does not, however,
to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit
appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light
very essential not only in the application of check and of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need
balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the
performance of its legislative function becomes more
MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, imperative. As Schwartz observes:
we find merit in the suggestion of Commissioner Davide.
In other words, we are accepting that and so this Section Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us
31 would now become Section 22. Would it be, on the subject under discussion, it is that the Congress
Commissioner Davide? has the right to obtain information from any source – even
from officials of departments and agencies in the
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.84 (Emphasis and underscoring executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the
supplied) situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as
that in Britain, a clear separation between the legislative
Consistent with their statements earlier in the and executive branches. It is this very separation that
deliberations, Commissioners Davide and Maambong makes the congressional right to obtain information from
proceeded from the same assumption that these the executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress
provisions pertained to two different functions of the as the elected representatives of the people are
legislature. Both Commissioners understood that the adequately to be carried out. The absence of close
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different rapport between the legislative and executive branches in
from the power to conduct inquiries during the question this country, comparable to those which exist under a
hour. Commissioner Davide’s only concern was that the parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the
two provisions on these distinct powers be placed closely Congress of an institution such as the British question
together, they being complementary to each other. period have perforce made reliance by the Congress
Neither Commissioner considered them as identical upon its right to obtain information from the executive
functions of Congress. essential, if it is intelligently to perform its legislative tasks.
Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain
executive information, its power of oversight of
The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners’
administration in a system such as ours becomes a power
alone. From the above-quoted exchange, Commissioner
devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for
Maambong’s committee – the Committee on Style –
its effectiveness solely upon information parceled out ex
shared the view that the two provisions reflected distinct
gratia by the executive.89 (Emphasis and underscoring
functions of Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the
supplied)
other hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of
37
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that
complementary to each other, should not be considered will render it constitutional.
as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid The requirement then to secure presidential consent
of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22,
power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight department heads in the question hour is discretionary on
function. their part.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of
department heads are implementing the statutes which it department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
has issued, its right to such information is not as Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,
Executive, such department heads must give a report of unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made,
their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, either by the President herself or by the Executive
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, Secretary.
states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress Validity of Sections 2 and 3
requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under
Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same
reasons stated in Arnault.90 Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior
facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it
officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP
is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent
and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who,
with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the
Constitutional Commission.
same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the
AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege."
appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and
the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may
principle of separation of powers. While the executive
be determined by the President. Given the title of Section
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot 2 — "Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege"
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to —, it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the
comply with its demands for information.
determination by the President under this provision is
intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only under executive privilege.
way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
virtually states that executive privilege actually covers
Only one executive official may be exempted from this
persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive
power — the President on whom executive power is
privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in
vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
relation to specific categories of information and not to
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her categories of persons.
being the highest official of the executive branch, and the
due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government
which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with
the nature, scope and coverage of executive privilege, the
reference to persons being "covered by the executive
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are privilege" may be read as an abbreviated way of saying
also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the
that the person is in possession of information which is, in
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body;
the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged
hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not
as defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed
only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal
on the assumption that this is the intention of the
autonomy and the constitutional independence of the challenged order.
judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for
the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral
argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice. Upon a determination by the designated head of office or
by the President that an official is "covered by the
executive privilege," such official is subjected to the
Having established the proper interpretation of Section requirement that he first secure the consent of the
22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court now proceeds President prior to appearing before Congress. This
to pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.
requirement effectively bars the appearance of the official
concerned unless the same is permitted by the President.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of The proviso allowing the President to give its consent
Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any means nothing more than that the President may reverse
reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.
construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department heads in the question hour contemplated in
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the
the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading
determination by a head of office, authorized by the
is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances
President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that

38
such official is in possession of information that is covered against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that
by executive privilege. This determination then becomes certain information in the possession of the executive may
the basis for the official’s not showing up in the legislative validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress.
investigation. Thus, the case holds:

In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded
justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the
construed as a declaration to Congress that the separation of powers. The information does not cover
President, or a head of office authorized by the President, Presidential conversations, correspondences, or
has determined that the requested information is discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which,
privileged, and that the President has not reversed such like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other
determination. Such declaration, however, even without collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of
mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of
implied claim that the information is being withheld by the information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of
executive branch, by authority of the President, on the government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure
claim of privilege. by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to
The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This
Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon is not the situation in the instant case.91 (Emphasis and
illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege underscoring supplied)
authorized by E.O. 464. It reads:
Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed
In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims
Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail Project of of executive privilege. This Court must look further and
the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to
2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be informed that officials of the determine whether it is valid.
Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting
will not be able to attend the same without the consent of While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed
the President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464 (s. on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked
2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it,
Separation Of Powers, Adherence To The Rule On there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a defect that
Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of Public renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as
Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive
Legislation Under The Constitution, And For Other Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by
Purposes". Said officials have not secured the required Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific
consent from the President. (Underscoring supplied) allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the
information demanded involves military or diplomatic
The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While
that the matter on which these officials are being Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are
requested to be resource persons falls under the covered by the privilege under the challenged order,
recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is
absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not
lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere
cannot attend the hearing. statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential
or classified information between the President and the
public officers covered by this executive order."
Significant premises in this letter, however, are left
unstated, deliberately or not. The letter assumes that the
invited officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the
earlier, however, to be covered by the order means that a executive considers the requested information privileged.
determination has been made, by the designated head of It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or
office or the President, that the invited official possesses an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so,
information that is covered by executive privilege. Thus, and that the President has not overturned that
although it is not stated in the letter that such determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the
determination has been made, the same must be deemed dark on how the requested information could be classified
implied. Respecting the statement that the invited officials as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that,
have not secured the consent of the President, it only on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege
means that the President has not reversed the standing only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make
prohibition against their appearance before Congress. Congress doubly blind to the question of why the
executive branch is not providing it with the information
that it has requested.
Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermita’s letter leads to the
conclusion that the executive branch, either through the
President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an
464, has made a determination that the information obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be
required by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:
of writing, there has been no contrary pronouncement
from the President. In fine, an implied claim of privilege The privilege belongs to the government and must be
has been made by the executive. asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a
private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the
the issue of whether executive privilege may be invoked department which has control over the matter, after actual
39
personal consideration by that officer. The court itself Due respect for a co-equal branch of government,
must determine whether the circumstances are moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege
appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so clearly stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the
without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S:102
is designed to protect.92 (Underscoring supplied)
We think the Court’s decision in United States v. Bryan,
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant to these
executive privilege, there is no way of determining questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that ‘if
whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to produce
whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it the records of the association, a decent respect for the
should be respected.93 These, in substance, were the House of Representatives, by whose authority the
same criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted subpoenas issued, would have required that (he) state
against the Ombudsman in Almonte v. Vasquez94 and, (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the
more in point, against a committee of the Senate in writ. Such a statement would have given the
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its
Activities v. Nixon.95 inquiry by taking other appropriate steps to obtain the
records. ‘To deny the Committee the opportunity to
A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening: consider the objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of
its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His
[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the failure to make any such statement was "a patent evasion
of the duty of one summoned to produce papers before a
potential harm resulting from disclosure impossible,
congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned."
thereby preventing the Court from balancing such harm
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
against plaintiffs’ needs to determine whether to override
any claims of privilege.96 (Underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the
executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:97
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information
which the privilege is meant to protect.103 A useful
On the present state of the record, this Court is not called analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity
upon to perform this balancing operation. In stating its would be the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus,
objection to claimant’s interrogatories, government Hoffman v. U.S.104 declares:
asserts, and nothing more, that the disclosures sought by
claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that
The witness is not exonerated from answering merely
non-disclosure is designed to protect. The government
has not shown – nor even alleged – that those who because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate
evaluated claimant’s product were involved in internal himself – his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard
of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his
policymaking, generally, or in this particular instance.
silence is justified, and to require him to answer if ‘it clearly
Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. The
appears to the court that he is mistaken.’ However, if the
facts upon which the privilege is based must be
witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to
established. To find these interrogatories objectionable,
this Court would have to assume that the evaluation and prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually
classification of claimant’s products was a matter of required to be established in court, he would be
compelled to surrender the very protection which the
internal policy formulation, an assumption in which this
privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the
Court is unwilling to indulge sua sponte.98 (Emphasis and
privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of
underscoring supplied)
the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a
responsive answer to the question or an explanation of
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy99 similarly why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because
emphasizes that "an agency must provide ‘precise and injurious disclosure could result." x x x (Emphasis and
certain’ reasons for preserving the confidentiality of underscoring supplied)
requested information."
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in
Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America100 amplifies, thus: relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O.
a specific designation and description of the documents 464, coupled with an announcement that the President
within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for
preserving their confidentiality. Without this specificity, it Congress to determine whether the withholding of
is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of information is justified under the circumstances of each
disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected. As the case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of
affidavit now stands, the Court has little more than its sua Congress.
sponte speculation with which to weigh the applicability of
the claim. An improperly asserted claim of privilege is no In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be
claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a claim invalidated.
was made by the proper executive as Reynolds requires,
the Court can not recognize the claim in the instant case
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as
because it is legally insufficient to allow the Court to make
a just and reasonable determination as to its applicability. it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads
To recognize such a broad claim in which the Defendant of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by
executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive
has given no precise or compelling reasons to shield
on the other branches of government. It may thus be
these documents from outside scrutiny, would make a
construed as a mere expression of opinion by the
farce of the whole procedure.101 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
40
President regarding the nature and scope of executive under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the
privilege. rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of
legislation." That such rights must indeed be respected by
Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the
invalidating the challenged order the alleged unlawful Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights of persons
delegation of authority to the heads of offices in Section appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
2(b). Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, in particular, respected."
cites the case of the United States where, so it claims,
only the President can assert executive privilege to In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that
withhold information from Congress. it is essentially an authorization for implied claims of
executive privilege, for which reason it must be
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, invalidated. That such authorization is partly motivated by
once the head of office determines that a certain the need to ensure respect for such officials does not
information is privileged, such determination is presumed change the infirm nature of the authorization itself.
to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of
prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, Right to Information
subject only to the express pronouncement of the
President that it is allowing the appearance of such E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress
official. These provisions thus allow the President to for the appearance of executive officials in the hearings
authorize claims of privilege by mere silence. conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for
information pursuant to their right to information on
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in
the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive claiming, however, that what is involved in the present
privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry,
to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to but the right of the people to information.
the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the
executive branch,105 or in those instances where There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the
exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge right of Congress to information which underlies the
of highly important executive responsibilities.106 The power of inquiry and the right of the people to information
doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a
that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his
be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The right to information does not have the same obligatory
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress.
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as power to exact testimony from government officials.
to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation These powers belong only to Congress and not to an
in a particular case. individual citizen.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives
the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly
power to invoke the privilege. She may of course qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of
authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.
on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must
state that the authority is "By order of the President,"
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are
which means that he personally consulted with her. The generally conducted in public, however, any executive
privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded
issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information
only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In
in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of
other words, the President may not authorize her
information which, being presumed to be in aid of
subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less
legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern.
reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case The citizens are thereby denied access to information
where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. which they can use in formulating their own opinions on
Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on
the matter before Congress — opinions which they can
this score.
then communicate to their representatives and other
government officials through the various legal means
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds
summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own Valmonte v. Belmonte:
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he
must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free
or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for
political discussion be maintained to the end that the
invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to
government may perceive and be responsive to the
provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only
opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able
for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that
to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the
reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive
participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and
Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer
have access to information relating thereto can such bear
bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before
fruit.107(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal
means to compel his appearance.
The impairment of the right of the people to information
as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense
The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for
explained above, just as direct as its violation of the
requiring officials to secure the consent of the President legislature’s power of inquiry.
41
Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are
branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.
the need for publication. On the need for publishing even
those statutes that do not directly apply to people in SO ORDERED.
general, Tañada v. Tuvera states:

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to
those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization.
It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the ARTICLE 153
public although it unquestionably does not apply directly EN BANC
to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of
public interest which any member of the body politic may [G.R. No. 6219. March 16, 1911.]
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party,
even in courts of justice.108 (Emphasis and underscoring THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTIN
supplied) DOMINGO, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

Although the above statement was made in reference to Maximino Mina and Jose Agoncillo, for Appellants.
statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must be
covered by the publication requirement. As explained Acting Attorney-General Harvey, for Appellee.
above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern. It is, SYLLABUS
therefore, a matter of public interest which members of
the body politic may question before this Court. Due 1. ELECTION CAMPAIGNS; DISTURBANCE OF
process thus requires that the people should have been MEETINGS; MISDEMEANOR. — Hold, That the
apprised of this issuance before it was implemented. disorderly conduct of the defendants, as set out in detail
in the opinion, did not constitute the crime of "gravely"
Conclusion disturbing public order on the occasion of "a largely
attended reunion," or meeting, as defined in article 258 of
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the the Penal Code, amounting, as it did, to no more than a
executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of misdemeanor as defined and penalized in article 574 of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such the Code.
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be 2. ID.; ALLOWANCES MUST BE MADE BY BOTH
respected. PARTIES. — In the excitement of a hotly contested
political campaign, some allowances must be made for
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the the tense state of public feeling, and not every petty
executive branch to evade congressional requests for incident should be magnified into a matter of grave import.
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do Within reasonable limits, the candidates and their
so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere partisans must bear and forbear with each other.
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is 3. ID.; ASSEMBLIES, MARCHINGS AND CONDUCT OF
frustrated. That is impermissible. For CAMPAIGN IN GENERAL. — The assembling of the
people together, marching and countermarching in bands
from place to place, endeavoring by speeches and
[w]hat republican theory did accomplish…was to reverse debate, both public and private, to hold together the
the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the partisans of one set of policies or candidates and to draw
divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a away the partisans of opposing policies and candidates,
presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of while it undoubtedly tends to disturb the peace and quiet
popular sovereignty. (Underscoring supplied)109 which ordinarily reigns in the community, does not involve
a criminal breach of the peace or disturbance of public
Resort to any means then by which officials of the order.
executive branch could refuse to divulge information
cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have 4. ID.; ID.; BREACHES OF THE PEACE;
merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into CONSIDERATION IN IMPOSING PENALTIES. — In
the operations of government, but we shall have given up imposing a penalty for a breach of the peace on such
something of much greater value – our right as a people occasions, it must not be forgotten that the reprehensible
to take part in government. conduct of the partisans does not consist in their
assembling together and making public demonstrations,
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. but in exceeding those limits of public order and good
Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of behavior beyond which, under the circumstances, the
2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of citizen may not pass.
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive
DECISION

42
 the candidate who organized it was not the only one who
could boast of a substantial following at the elections to
CARSON, J.: take place the following day.

The trial judge was of opinion that each and all of the
One of the candidates for the office of president of the members of the party who stopped outside of the house
municipality of Santa Maria, Province of Ilocos Sur, at the where the meeting was being held were guilty of the crime
last municipal elections held a public meeting for the of "gravely" disturbing the public order on the occasion of
purpose of furthering his candidacy on the evening of the a largely attended reunion or meeting, as defined and
day before the election. The meeting was well attended, penalized in article 258 of the Penal Code, and found the
from 150 to 250 persons being present, most of whom appellants guilty of that crime. Five of them, who, as it
were partisans of the candidate who organized it. It was appears, were officials of the municipality, were
addressed by various speakers, including the candidate sentenced to six months of arresto mayor and the
himself. Between the hours of 9 and 10 o’clock, about the payment of a fine of 2,625 pesetas each, and seventeen
time when the last speaker was bringing his address to a others were sentenced to four months and one day of
close, a party of 100 persons, more or less, composed arresto mayor and the payment of a fine of 1,500 pesetas
largely, if not exclusively, of partisans of the opposing each. We are of opinion, however, that while the evidence
candidate for the office of president, marched down the sustains the finding of the trial court that all these
street to the inspiring airs of a guitar. When this party defendants were members of the gathering which
arrived in front of the house where the meeting was being stopped outside on the street while the meeting was in
held, it stopped. Some words passed between the progress inside, the offense committed by these
members of the crowd on the street and the people at the appellants constituted merely a misdemeanor as defined
windows upstairs where the meeting was being held, but in section 4 of article 574 of the Penal Code, which is as
no attempt appears to have been made by the party follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
outside to enter the house or to disturb the meeting inside
by any concerted action, other than by standing in a large "ART. 574. A fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas and
crowd about the doors of the house in such a way as to reprimand may be imposed upon:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
necessarily distract the attention of those attending the library
meeting inside by the mere fact that they were doing so.
The last speech having come to an end, the people inside x x x
the house crowded down the stairs and out on to the
street; some of the more timorous ones climbed out of the
windows at the back of the house, but later events "4. Those who, without being included in other provisions
demonstrate that there was no necessity for such a of this code, shall lightly disturb public order by using
superabundance of precaution, as, with possibly a single means that naturally would produce alarm or
exception, those who went on to the street either went disturbance."cralaw virtua1aw library
peaceably to their homes or mingled with the party
outside, without any attempt on the part of the latter to do The trial judge based his conclusion that the defendants
them any injury or in any way molest them. The single were guilty of the crime of "gravely" or grossly disturbing
exception to the peaceable dispersal of the crowd on that the public order as defined and penalized in article 258 of
occasion was an altercation which arose between two the Penal Code, on three grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
individuals, members respectively of the different parties, library
both of whom were arrested by the police and taken to
jail. Their arrest seems to have been occasioned by their (1) Because the meeting which was disturbed was
individual misconduct and not to have been in any way organized in connection with the municipal elections to be
the result of a conflict between the parties as a whole; and held the next day;
it does not clearly appear from the evidence which of the
two was the original aggressor. There is some testimony (2) Because it appears that the ill-will engendered
to the effect that some of the members of the party outside between the partisans of the various candidates at the
threw stones at the house where the meeting was in election, resulted in such general disorder that some days
progress, but none of the stones appear to have entered thereafter a special detachment of Constabulary was
the windows and there was certainly no general stone required to keep the peace in the municipality; and
throwing indulged in by the crowd who were standing
immediately under the windows where the meeting was (3) Because some of the members of the party comprising
being held. That there was some slight disturbance the crowd in the street held municipal offices and were
connected with the closing of the meeting can not be candidates for reelection thereto.
doubted, but on a review of the whole record we do not
think that it could have been of a very serious nature. Under the provisions of Chapter VI [Title III, Book II] of the
Partisan feeling was running very high at the time, and to Penal Code we would be entirely agreed with the trial
us it seems rather remarkable that under all the judge in his characterization of the disturbance of which
circumstances a serious disturbance did not take place. the defendants were guilty, as a "grave" or a "gross"
We are inclined to think that the party outside the house disturbance of public order, had it taken place in
did not plan a serious disturbance or intend that one connection with the actual holding of an election; for
should take place, as otherwise it could hardly have been instance, in or about a voting booth, or the place where
avoided. Their stopping in front of the house would appear the votes were being counted, or, perhaps on the public
to have had for its object an effort to induce some of the highway along which voters on their way to exercise their
persons who were attending the first meeting to right to vote must necessarily pass. But we think that
accompany them to other meetings being held at other under all the circumstances of this case, the fact that
places in the same town, where the claims of other numerous meetings were being held at which the citizens
candidates for office were being pressed upon the and voters called together in public by contending
attention of voters; and also perhaps, to impress upon the candidates and their partisans for the purpose of inducing
minds of those attending the meeting inside, the fact that or persuading them to support one candidate or the other

43
at the forthcoming election, tends to justify a lenient rather
than a severe judgment of the nature, object, and conduct
of the gathering of which the defendants formed a part. In
the excitement of a hotly contested campaign, some
allowances must be made for the tense state of public
feeling, and not every petty incident should be magnified
into a matter of grave import. Within reasonable limits the
candidates and their partisans should be willing to bear
and forbear with each other, recognizing that at such a
time things are often said and done in the heat of the
contest, which the authors themselves in a calmer
moment would be the first to deprecate. And so the
courts, in passing upon the question whether a breach of
the peace has resulted on such an occasion from the
clash of contending wills and the conflict of opposing
policies, opinions, and sentiments, and in characterizing
such public disorders as do actually arise, should keep in
mind the actual conditions. The assembling of the people
together, marching and countermarching in bands from
place to place, endeavoring by speeches and debate,
both public and private, to hold together the partisans of
one set of policies or candidates and to draw away the
partisans of opposing policies and candidates, while it
undoubtedly tends to disturb the peace and quiet which
ordinarily reigns in the community, does not necessarily
involve a criminal breach of the peace or disturbance of ARTICLE 163
public order. Where no municipal ordinance or public law
or regulation forbidding such gatherings is violated, a G.R. No. L-2747 April 11, 1906
criminal breach of the peace can not properly be said to
have been committed, unless the disturbance created is THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
such that it exceeds the limits within which the partisans vs.
may fairly be required to restrict themselves under the AGUSTIN BASCO, defendant-appellant.
circumstances; and in imposing a penalty for a breach of
the peace on such occasions, it must not be forgotten that
the reprehensible conduct of the partisans does not Vicente P. Delgado, for appellant.
consist of their assembling together and making public Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
demonstrations, but in exceeding those limits of public
order and good behavior beyond which, under the MAPA, J.:
circumstances, the citizen may not pass.
It was proved at the trial of this case that the defendant
Nor can we agree with the trial judge that the conduct of attempted to pay for a package of cigarettes which he
these accused amounted to a "grave" breach of the bought at a certain store with what appeared to be silver
peace, because of the serious disorders which it appears coin, but which, as a matter of fact, was a Philippine
broke out in the municipality after the election. Had the copper cent; that he insisted that the owner of the store
proof shown that these disorders resulted directly or even should accept the same as a peseta, that is to say, a
indirectly from the disorderly conduct of the crowd of twenty cent piece; that the latter refused to accept it upon
which these accused formed a part, that fact might noticing what the real value and denomination of the coin
perhaps be taken into consideration, in characterizing the was; that the defendant again insisted that the money be
public disorder of which they were guilty; but there is not accepted and the owner of the store refused to do so; that
a particle of evidence which shows any relation of cause as a result of such refusal a quarrel ensued between
and effect, between the conduct of these accused on the them; that a policeman then interfered, and upon being
night in question and the disturbances in the municipality informed of what had happened, placed the defendant
which took place after the election had been held. under arrest and took him to the police station, where
several Mexican and Japanese coins were found in his
So too, when it is considered that the local municipal possession together with a roll of Philippine copper cents,
officials had a perfect right to take part in an election the latter being silver plated, and identical with the coin
meeting and to join in a gathering of partisans of one which he had attempted to pass at the store as a twenty-
candidate or the other, we do not think that their presence cent piece; and that upon an examination of these plated
in the crowd substantially affected its nature, object, or coins it was found that they were genuine Philippine
purposes so as to convert the slight disorder of which its copper cents, which apparently and been whitened with
members were guilty into a grave breach of the peace. quicksilver to give them the color and brightness of silver.

The judgment of conviction and the penalty imposed by The defendant having been asked as to where he had
the trial court should, therefore, be reversed and we find obtained the said coins, first answered that he had
all of the appellants and each of them guilty of the received them as change, but later admitted that he had
misdemeanor defined and penalized in article 574, silvered them himself.
section 4, of the Penal Code, and sentence them and
each of them to pay a fine of P5 and the payment of their
The court below found that these facts constituted the
respective shares of the costs in the first instance, the
crime charged in the complaint — that is to say, the
costs of this instance to be de oficio. So ordered.
counterfeiting of money — as defined and punished in
article 286 of the Penal Code, and sentenced the
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
defendant to three years' imprisonment (presidio
44
correccional), and to pay a fine of 750 pesetas, and the
costs of the proceedings.

The Attorney-General, in his brief filed in this court,

contends that these facts do not constitute the crime of
counterfeiting money, but that of estafa, and for this
reasons asks that the defendant be acquitted of the crime
charged in the complaint without prejudice to the filing of
another complaint against him for estafa.

We think that the Attorney-General's contention is correct.

There can be no counterfeiting of money when, as in this
case, no spurious or clipped coin was used. The coins in
question were genuine copper cents and bore their
original designs and inscriptions. The defendant did not
make or attempt to make any alteration in the designs and
inscriptions of the said coins. All that he did was to give
them the appearance of silver pieces for the purpose of
passing them as twenty-cent coins. He did not, however,
attempt to imitate the peculiar design of such coins. The
ARTICLE 171
acts committed by the defendant for the purpose of
defrauding third persons by deceiving them us to the real
value of the coins in question constitute the crime G.R. No. 180314 April 16, 2009
of estafa and not of counterfeiting money. There were not
legal grounds upon which a charge for these latter offense NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, Petitioner,
could be based. vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the
defendant acquitted of the charge of counterfeiting money DECISION
contained in the complaint, and the Attorney-General is
directed to present another complaint against him for the CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
crime of estafa. It is ordered that the Mexican and
Japanese coins found in the possession of the defendant
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks
be returned to him. The costs of both instances are
to set aside the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim.
declared de oficio. After the expiration of ten days from
Case No. 27483 promulgated on 7 August 2007 which
the date of final judgment, let the case be remanded to
found petitioner Normallah A. Pacasum guilty of
the Court of First Instance from whence it came for proper
Falsification under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised
procedure. So ordered.
Penal Code, and its Resolution2 dated 22 October 2007
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion for New Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered
Evidence.

On 2 May 2002, petitioner was charged before the

Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Public Documents,
defined and punished under paragraph 1 of Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about August 22-23, 2000, or sometime prior

or subsequent thereto in Cotabato City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, a high ranking public official
being the Regional Secretary of the Department of
Tourism in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Cotabato City, while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation thereto,
taking advantage of her official position, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified her
Employee Clearance3 submitted to the Office of the
Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan,
the Supply officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for the purpose of
claiming her salary for the months of August and
September 2000.4

On 29 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for

Reinvestigation asking that she be given the opportunity
to file her counter-affidavit during a preliminary
investigation in order that her right to due process would
not be violated.5Petitioner further filed an Urgent Motion
for Preliminary Investigation and/or Reinvestigation with a
Prayer to Recall or Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.6
45
On 4 May 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s messenger available, she instead called up Laura to
motion for preliminary investigation/reinvestigation come to her office to verify the signature. Laura, whose
decreeing that petitioner was not deprived of the office was only a walking distance away, came and
opportunity to be heard before the Office of the inspected the clearance, and denied signing the same.
Ombudsman as she had waived her right to be heard on After she denied that she signed the clearance, and while
preliminary investigation.7 they were conversing, the bearer of the Employees
Clearance took said document and left.
On 16 June 2004, petitioner, assisted by counsel de
parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime Mrs. Pangilan said she did not know the name of the
charged.8 Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held and person who took the original of the Employee Clearance,
the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order.9 The parties but said that the latter was a niece and staff member of
did not enter any admission or stipulation of facts, and the petitioner. She said that all the signatures16 appearing
agreed that the issues to be resolved were as follows: in the Employees Clearance were all genuine except for
Laura’s signature.
1. Whether or not accused Normallah Pacasum,
being then the Regional Secretary of the The next witness for the prosecution was Laura Y.
Department of Tourism in the Autonomous Pangilan, the person whose signature was allegedly
Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, imitated. Laura testified that presently she was holding the
falsified her Employee Clearance, which she position of Human Resource Management Officer II of the
submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor Department of Tourism - ARMM. Prior to said position,
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, she was the Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM from 1994
by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, to January 2001. As such, she issued memorandum
the Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for receipts (MR) to employees who were issued government
purposes of claiming her salary for the months of property, and received surrendered office properties from
August and September 2000; officers and employees of the DOT - ARMM. She said she
knew the accused, as she was their Regional Secretary
2. Whether or not the accused took advantage of of the DOT - ARMM.
her official position in order to commit the crime
charged.10 Laura recounted that on 9 August 2002, Marie
Cris17 Batuampar, an officemate and niece of petitioner
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Pacasum, went to her house with the Employees
Subaida K. Pangilan,11 former Human Resource Clearance of petitioner. Batuampar requested her to sign
Management Officer V of the Autonomous Region in in order to clear petitioner of all property accountabilities.
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Laura Y. Pangilan, former She refused to sign the clearance because at that time,
Supply Officer of the Department of Tourism, petitioner had not yet turned over all the office properties
ARMM;12 and Rebecca A. Agatep,13 Telegraph Operator, issued to her. A few days later, she was called by her
Telegraph Office, Quezon City. mother-in-law to go to the latter’s office and inspect the
Employees Clearance submitted by the representative of
petitioner. She went to her mother-in-law’s office and was
Subaida K. Pangilan (Pangilan) testified that she was a
retired government employee and formerly a Human shown the Employees Clearance of petitioner. Upon
Resource Management Officer V of the ARMM which seeing the same, she denied the signature18 appearing on
top of her name. Thereupon, Marie Cris Batuampar, the
position she held from May 1993 to 28 May 2003. As
representative of petitioner, took the Employees
such, one of her duties was to receive applications for
Clearance and left.
clearance of Regional Secretaries of the ARMM. She
explained that an Employees Clearance was a
requirement to be submitted to the Office of the Regional Laura revealed she executed a joint complaint-
Director by retiring employees, employees leaving the affidavit19 dated 28 August 2001 regarding the instant
country or those applying for leave in excess of thirty case. She issued a certification20 with a memorandum
days. The person applying for clearance shall get a copy receipt21 dated 23 November 1999, signed22 by petitioner.
of the employees clearance and shall accomplish the The certification attested she did not sign petitioner’s
same by having the different division heads sign it. Employees Clearance because all the office properties
issued to petitioner had not been turned over or returned
to the Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM. Finally, she said
Mrs. Pangilan disclosed that she knew the accused-
that as of 2 January 2005, her last day as Supply Officer,
petitioner – Norma Pacasum – to be the former Regional
petitioner had not returned anything.
Secretary of the Department of Tourism (DOT), ARMM.
She narrated that in the year 2000, petitioner submitted
the original of an Employees Clearance to her office in The last witness for the prosecution, Rebecca A. Agatep,
compliance with the memorandum 14 dated 8 August 2000 Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City,
issued by Governor Nur Misuari, directing all officers and testified that she had been a telegraph operator for
employees to clear themselves of property and money nineteen years. On 31 May 2005, she was at the
accountabilities before their salaries for August and Telegraph Office in Commission on Audit, Quezon City.
September 2000 would be paid. Upon inspection of the She received two telegrams23 for transmissions both
Employees Clearance, she noticed that the signature of dated 31 May 2005. One was addressed to petitioner and
Laura Pangilan (Laura) contained in said document was the other to Marie Cris Batuampar. Upon receiving said
not hers. She said Laura Pangilan was her daughter-in- documents, she transmitted the documents through
law, and that the latter’s signature was very familiar to her. telegram. The telegram addressed to petitioner was
Mrs. Pangilan immediately photocopied15 the original received by her relative, Manso Alonto, in her residence
Employees Clearance with the intention of sending the on 1 June 2005, while that addressed to Ms. Batuampar
same to her daughter-in-law for the purpose of having the was transmitted to, and received in, Cotabato City on 1
latter confirm if the signature on top of her name in the June 2005.24
Employees Clearance was hers. There being no
46
On 4 July 2005, the prosecution formally offered25 its On cross-examination, petitioner said that prior to her
documentary evidence consisting of Exhibits A, A-1, A-1- receipt of her salary, she believed that an Employees
a, A-2, A-2-a, A-2-b, A-2-c, A-2-d, A-2-e, A-2-f, A-2-g, A- Clearance was necessary, and for this reason she had
3, A-3-1, A-4, A-4-a, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, and A-9, to which this document prepared by her staff. She said her
the accused filed her objections.26 The trial court admitted Employees Clearance was always in the possession of
all the exhibits on 10 August 2005.27 Marie Cris, her assistant secretary. It was Marie Cris who
showed her the document twice.31
For the defense, petitioner and Atty. Jose I. Lorena,
former ARMM Regional Solicitor General, took the stand. Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Solicitor General,
testified that he was familiar with the Memorandum dated
For her defense, petitioner testified that she was 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. Misuari because the same
appointed by ARMM Regional Governor Nur Misuari was the product of consultation among him, Gov. Misuari
(Gov. Misuari) as Regional Secretary of the DOT of the and ARMM Executive Secretary Parcasio. He explained
ARMM in 1999. She said she was familiar with the that this memorandum pertained only to outstanding cash
Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. advances. He added that an Employees Clearance was
Misuari directing all ARMM officers and employees to not a requirement and was not sufficient to comply with
liquidate all outstanding cash advances on or before 31 the directive contained in the memorandum, because
August 2000 in view of the impending expiration of the what was required for the purpose of release of salaries
Governor’s extended term. At first, she said the was a credit notice from the Resident Auditors of the
memorandum applied to her, she being a cabinet Commission on Audit.
secretary, but later she said same did not apply to her
because she had no cash advances. Only those with cash On 16 February 2007, the defense formally offered its
advances were required to get an Employees Clearance documentary exhibits32 consisting of Exhibits 1 to 5, with
before they could receive their salaries. She then sub-markings. The prosecution objected to the purpose
instructed her staff to work on her salary. for which Exhibit 1 was offered. The trial court admitted all
the defense exhibits.33
Petitioner said she did not know where the original of her
Employees Clearance was. Neither did she know if the On 7 August 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the
signature of Laura Pangilan therein had been imitated or assailed decision convicting petitioner of the crime
forged. She likewise said that although the Employee charged in the information. The dispositive portion of the
Clearance was in her name, she did not cause Laura’s decision reads:
signature to be affixed thereto.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
Petitioner disclosed that she was able to get her salary for accused Normallah A. Pacasum GUILTY beyond
the month of August 2000 sometime in said month, reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the
because ARMM Executive Secretary Randolph C. Information and, with the application of the Indeterminate
Parcasio told her that she did not need a clearance before Sentence Law and without any mitigating or aggravating
she could get her salary because she was re-appointed.28 circumstance, hereby sentencing her to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
Petitioner explained that she has not seen the original of MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional as
the subject Employees Clearance.29 When she first saw minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
the photocopy of the Employees Clearance, the signature prision mayor as maximum with the accessories thereof
of Laura was not there. She was able to see the and to pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
photocopy of the Employees Clearance again after this (₱2,000.00) with costs against the accused.34
case had been filed with the Sandiganbayan, already with
the alleged signature of Laura. Petitioner said it was not The Sandiganbayan found the signature of DOT-ARMM
she who placed or caused Laura’s purported signature to Supply Officer Laura Y. Pangilan appearing in the
be affixed there. Employees Clearance of petitioner to have been
falsified/forged. It did not give much weight on petitioner’s
Petitioner added that the memorandum of Gov. Misuari defense denying she was the one who actually falsified
did not apply to her, because she had no cash advances her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of
and she could receive her salary even without clearance. Laura Pangilan and that she had no idea about the
At that time, she said the Cashier, Accountant and the alleged falsification, because it was her assistant
Auditor checked her records and found that she had no secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her
cash advances.30 Because she was elsewhere, she clearance and the one who submitted the said clearance
instructed her secretary to get her salary. However, she to the Office of the Regional Governor of the ARMM. The
was informed by her staff that her salary could not be trial court found said denial unsubstantiated and ruled that
released because the Office of the Governor required a while there was no direct evidence to show that petitioner
clearance. Her staff worked on her clearance, the purpose herself "actually" falsified/forged the signature of Laura
of which was for the release of her salary for the months Pangilan, there were circumstances that indicated she
of August and September 2000. She was able to get all was the one who committed the falsification/forgery, or
the needed signatures except for Laura’s signature. With who asked somebody else to falsify/forge the subject
the refusal of Laura to sign, her staff went to Executive signature in her Employees Clearance. The
Secretary Parcasio and explained the situation. Sandiganbayan added that considering it was petitioner
who took advantage of and profited from the use of the
falsified clearance, the presumption was that she was the
Petitioner denied receiving a telegram from Asst. Special
Prosecutor I Anna Isabel G. Aurellano ordering her to material author of the falsification. Despite full opportunity,
she was not able to rebut said presumption, failing to
submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor the original
show that it was another person who falsified/forged the
of the Employees Clearance of the DOT-ARMM issued in
signature of Laura Pangilan, or that another person had
her name sometime on 22-23 August 2000.

47
the reason or motive to commit the falsification/forgery or parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty
could have benefited from the same. (30) days from notice. They filed their respective
memoranda on 21 November 2008 and on 5 November
The Sandiganbayan likewise did not sustain petitioner’s 2008.45
contention that she did not stand to benefit from the
falsification of her Employees Clearance and from the Petitioner assails her conviction arguing that the
submission thereof to the Office of the Regional Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion,
Governor, because she allegedly had no existing cash amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in:
advances. She claimed that an Employees Clearance
was not needed to enable her to draw her salary for the I. Finding that petitioner benefited from the
months of August and September 2000 under the 8 alleged falsification, hence must be deemed the
August 2000 Memorandum of Gov. Misuari, and that the author thereof, when the evidence on record does
presumption that he who benefits from the falsification is not support, but even contradicts, such a
presumed to be the author thereof does not apply to her. conclusion.
The lower court explained that the aforementioned
memorandum applied to petitioner, she being an official
II. Presuming that petitioner had unliquidated
of the ARMM. It said that the applicability of said
cash advances hence was required under the
memorandum to petitioner was even admitted by her
Misuari Memorandum to submit her Employee’s
when she, in compliance therewith, instructed her Clearance to clear herself of these, when there is
staff/assistant secretary to work for her Employees no evidence to that effect and the prosecution
Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the month
even admitted so.
of August 2000. It said that the fact that she (allegedly)
had no existing cash advances did not exempt her from
the coverage of the memorandum, because she must III. Not resolving doubt as to the authenticity of
show she had no cash advances and the only way to do the photocopy of the allegedly forged Employee’s
this was by obtaining a clearance. Clearance, in favor of the innocence of the
Accused.
Petitioner argued that the photocopy of her Employees
Clearance had no probative value in proving its contents IV. In short-circuiting the right of the petitioner to
and was inadmissible because the original thereof was present additional evidence on her behalf, thus
not presented by the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan did denying her due process.46
not agree. It said that the presentation and admission of
secondary evidence, like a photocopy of her Employees Petitioner contends that under the Misuari memorandum
Clearance, was justified to prove the contents thereof, dated 8 August 2000, she was not required to file an
because despite reasonable notices (telegrams) made by Employees Clearance to draw her salary, since what was
the prosecution to petitioner and her assistant secretary required under said memorandum was a Credit Notice
to produce the original of her Employees Clearance, they from the COA. She further contends that since she was
ignored the notice and refused to present the original of not required to file said Employees Clearance because
said document. she had no cash advances, the signature in her
Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue"
On 21 August 2007, petitioner filed a motion for because what was required was a Credit Notice.
reconsideration of the decision of the Sandiganbayan35 to
which the prosecution filed a As to the first contention, we agree with petitioner that
Comment/Opposition.36 Subsequent thereto, petitioner under the aforesaid memorandum, what was required
filed a Supplement to Accused’s Motion for before she could draw her salaries was a Credit Notice
Reconsideration & Motion for New Trial/Reception of from the COA and not an Employees Clearance. The full
Newly Discovered Evidence.37 Petitioner prayed that her text of the Memorandum47 form the Regional Governor
motion for new trial be granted in order that the testimony reads:
of Marie Cris Batuampar be introduced, the same being
newly discovered evidence. The prosecution filed its MEMORANDUM FROM THE REGIONAL GOVERNOR
Opposition.38
TO: ALL CONCERNED
On 22 October 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its
resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration SUBJECT: AS STATED
for lack of merit; and the motion for new trial, because the
evidence sought to be presented did not qualify as newly
DATE: AUGUST 8, 2000
discovered evidence.39
1. In view of the impending expiration of the
On 16 November 2007, the instant petition was filed.
extended term of the undersigned, it is hereby
directed that all outstanding cash advances be
In our Resolution40 dated 27 November 2007, respondent liquidated on or before August 31, 2000.
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP), was required to file its
2. Effective September 1, 2000, the salaries and
Comment on the petition.41 After two motions for
other emoluments of all ARMM
extension to file comment on the petition, which were
officials/employees with unliquidated cash
granted by this Court, the OSP filed its Comment dated
advance shall be withheld until they have settled
18 February 2008.42Petitioner was required43 to file a
their accounts and a corresponding Credit Notice
Reply to the Comment, which she did on 5 June 2008. 44
is issued to them by the Commission on Audit.
On 5 August 2008, the Court resolved to give due course
to the petition for review on certiorari and required the
48
 3. Due to budgetary and financial constraints did not need an Employees Clearance because she was
brought about by the drastic cut of our budget, re-appointed does not inspire belief.
memorandum dated December 01, 1998 is
hereby reiterated. Therefore all releases for Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the
financial assistance is hereby suspended presumption that if a person had in his position a falsified
effective immediately. document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking
advantage of it and profiting thereby, he is presumed to
4. For strict compliance. be the material author of the falsification. He argues that
the Sandiganbayan overlooked the fact that there was no
PROF. NUR MISUARI evidence to prove that petitioner made use of or uttered
the Employees Clearance, because there was no
evidence that she submitted it -- if not, at least caused it
It is clear from said memorandum that what was required
from officers/employees who had unliquidated cash to be submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. To
advances was the corresponding Credit Notice issued by support such claim, she said there were no "receipt
marks" in the Employees Clearance to show that the
the COA after they had settled their accounts. There was
Office of the Regional Governor received said documents.
indeed no mention of any Employees Clearance therein.
Up to this point, we agree with petitioner. However, on her
contention that the signature of Laura Pangilan in her It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified document
Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue," is separate and distinct from the "falsification" of a public
we disagree. Whether the signature of Laura Pangilan document. The act of "using" falsified documents is not
was imitated or not is the main issue in this case for necessarily included in the "falsification" of a public
falsification. document. Using falsified documents is punished under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar,
From the memorandum of Gov. Misuari, the Credit Notice the falsification of the Employees Clearance was
consummated the moment the signature of Laura
requirement was effective only starting 1 September 2000
Pangilan was imitated. In the falsification of a public
and not before. In the case at bar, the information charges
document, it is immaterial whether or not the contents set
petitioner not with failure to secure a Credit Notice, but
forth therein were false. What is important is the fact that
with allegedly falsifying her Employees Clearance by
imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, Supply the signature of another was counterfeited.54 It is a settled
Officer I of the DOT-ARMM. The Credit Notice rule that in the falsification of public or official documents,
it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain
requirement was therefore irrelevant and a non-issue as
or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that in
regards the release of salaries prior to 1 September 2000.
the falsification of a public document, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the
The questions to be answered are: (1) Was the signature destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
of Laura Pangilan in petitioner’s Employees Clearance proclaimed.55 Thus, the purpose for which the falsification
imitated? If yes, (2) Who imitated or caused the imitation was made and whether the offender profited or hoped to
of said signature? profit from such falsification are no longer material.

On the first query, the same was answered by Laura The records further show that petitioner "used" or uttered
Pangilan. She said that the signature in petitioner’s the Employees Clearance. The fact that the same was
Employees Clearance was not hers. The same was an circulated to the different division heads for their
imitation. When a person whose signature was affixed to signatures is already considered use of falsified
a document denies his/her signature therein, a prima facie documents as contemplated in Article 172. The lack of the
case for falsification is established which the defendant stamp mark "Received" in the Employees Clearance does
must overcome.48 not mean that said document was not received by the
Office of the Regional Governor. We find the certification
Petitioner argues there was no need for her to file an signed by Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive
Employees Clearance to draw her salary. She adds that Secretary of Office of the Regional Governor - ARMM, as
Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of the contained in the Employees Clearance, to be sufficient
ARMM, told her and her secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, proof that the same was submitted to the Office of the
that she did not need an Employees Clearance because Regional Governor. It must be stressed that the Executive
she was re-appointed.49 Secretary is part of the Office of the Regional Governor.

These arguments are untenable. There was a need for Petitioner denies having "actually" falsified her
petitioner to file an Employees Clearance not only for Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura
compliance with the Misuari memorandum but, more Pangilan, claiming that she had no knowledge about the
importantly, because her term of office was about to end, falsification because it was her assistant secretary, Marie
since her position was coterminous with the term of Gov. Cris Batuampar, who worked for her Employees
Misuari, the appointing authority.50 She even admitted Clearance.
that before she received her salary for August, 2000,51 an
Employees Clearance was necessary.52 Moreover, her Petitioner’s denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated,
claim that Atty. Parcasio told her and her secretary that must certainly fail. Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear
she did not need an Employee Clearance to get her salary and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving
does not persuade us. In fact, we find her alleged "re- evidence, which deserves no greater evidentiary value
appointment," when she was working for her Employees than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
Clearance at around August 2000, improbable. How could affirmative matters.56 Denial is intrinsically weak, being a
she have been re-appointed by Gov. Alvarez,53 whom she negative and self-serving assertion.57
claims re-appointed her sometime in the year 2000, when
Gov. Misuari was still the Regional Governor of the
In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as her
ARMM when she had her Employees Clearance prepared
sometime in August 2000? Clearly, her statement that she witness Marie Cris Batuampar, the person whom she
49
instructed to work for her Employees Clearance. Her well-buttressed upon reason, that in the absence of a
failure to present this person in order to shed light on the satisfactory explanation, when a person has in his
matter was fatal to her cause. In fact, we find that the possession or control a falsified document and who
defense never intended to present Marie Cris Batuampar makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is
as a witness. This is clear from the pre-trial order, justified that such person is the forger or the one who
because the defense never listed her as a witness.58 Her caused the forgery and, therefore, guilty of falsification.
attempt to present Ms. Batuampar to help her cause after Thus, in People v. Sendaydiego, the Supreme Court held
she has been convicted is already too late in the day, and that –
Ms. Batuampar’s testimony, which is supposed to be
given, cannot be considered newly discovered evidence The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified
as to merit the granting of her motion for new trial and/or document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking
reception of newly discovered evidence. advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is
that he is the material author of the falsification. This is
The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner especially true if the use or uttering of the forged
"actually" imitated the signature of Laura Pangilan in her documents was so closely connected in time with the
Employees Clearance will not exonerate her. We have forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have
ruled that it is not strange to realize that in cases of the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close
forgery, the prosecution would not always have the connection with the forgers. (U.S. v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453;
means for obtaining such direct evidence to confute acts People v. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People v. Domingo, 49
contrived clandestinely. Courts have to rely on Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People v.
circumstantial evidence consisting of pieces of facts, Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
which if woven together would produce a single network
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable In line with the above ruling, and considering that it was
doubt.59 We totally agree with the Sandiganbayan, which the accused who took advantage and profited in the use
said: of the falsified Employees Clearance in question, the
presumption is inevitable that she is the material author of
While there is no direct evidence to show that the accused the falsification. And despite full opportunity, she was not
herself "actually" forged the signature of Laura Pangilan able to rebut such presumption by failing to show that it
in the Employees Clearance in question, the Court was another person who forged or falsified the signature
nevertheless finds the following circumstances, obtaining of Laura Pangilan or that at least another person and not
in the records, to establish/indicate that she was the one she alone, had the reason or motive to commit the forgery
who committed the forgery or who asked somebody else or falsification, or was or could have been benefited by
to forge or caused the forgery of the signature of Laura such falsification/forgery.60
Pangilan in her Employees Clearance, to wit –
The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan,
1. that the accused instructed her staff Maricris as against the denials of petitioner, convince us to apply
Batuampar to work for her Employees Clearance the rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation,
in compliance with the Memorandum of ARMM one who is found in possession of, and who has used, a
Regional Governor Nur Misuari and that the forged document, is the forger and, therefore, guilty of
forged signature of Laura Pangilan was affixed on falsification.61 The effect of a presumption upon the
her clearance are strong evidence that the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting
accused herself either falsified the said signature evidence to overcome the prima facie case created,
or caused the same to be falsified/imitated, and which, if no contrary proof is offered, will thereby
that possession by Maricris of the falsified prevail.62 A prima facie case of falsification having been
clearance of the accused is possession by the established, petitioner should have presented clear and
accused herself because the former was only convincing evidence to overcome such burden. This, she
acting upon the instructions and in behalf of the failed to do.
latter;
Petitioner assails the weight given by the Sandiganbayan
2. that it was the accused who is required to to the testimonies of the two Pangilans when they failed
accomplish and to submit her Employees to report the alleged falsification to the police or alert the
Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for Office of the Regional Governor of said falsification, or
the months of August and September 2000 is tried to stop petitioner from getting her salaries.
sufficient and strong motive or reason for her to
commit the falsification by imitating the signature We do not agree with the petitioner. It is a settled rule that
of Laura Pangilan or order someone else to forge the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
it; and testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
3. that the accused was the only one who profited anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if
or benefited from the falsification as she admitted not conclusive effect.63 The determination of the
that she was able to collect her salary for the credibility of witnesses is the domain of the trial court, as
month of August 2000 after her falsified it is in the best position to observe the witnesses’
Employees Clearance was submitted and demeanor.64 The Sandiganbayan has given full probative
approved by the ORG-ARMM and therefore, she value to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. So
alone could have the motive for making such have we. We find no reason to depart from such a rule.
falsification.
Aware that the prosecution failed to present the original
On the basis of the foregoing circumstances, no from which the photocopy of petitioner’s Employees
reasonable and fair-minded man would say that the Clearance was supposed to have been obtained, she
accused – a Regional Secretary of DOT-ARMM – had no maintains that the Sandiganbayan should have doubted
knowledge of the falsification. It is an established rule,
50
the authenticity and probative value of the photocopy of release of her August and September 2000 salary as DOT
the Employees Clearance. Regional Secretary. Notwithstanding receipt of the said
telegram subpoena by her uncle Manso Alonto in her
The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the residence on June 1, 200[5], the accused did not appear
photocopy of the Employees Clearance. We agree when before or submit to Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna
it ruled: Isabel G. Aurellano, the original of the said Employees
Clearance, much less offered to produce the same.
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, Under the circumstances, since there was proof of the
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original existence of the Employees Clearance as evidenced by
document itself. The purpose of the rule requiring the the photocopy thereof, and despite the reasonable
production by the offeror of the best evidence if the notices made by the prosecution to the accused and her
prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of assistant secretary to produce the original of said
such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or employees clearance they ignored the notice and refused
secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that to produce the original document, the presentation and
the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the admission of the photocopy of the original copy of the
adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which questioned Employees Clearance as secondary evidence
its production would expose and defeat. Hence, as long to prove the contents thereof was justified.65
as the original evidence can be had, the Court should not
receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, This Court decrees that even though the original of an
such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing alleged falsified document is not, or may no longer be
that the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, a criminal case for falsification may still
produced in court. Such photocopies must be prosper if the person wishing to establish the contents of
disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren of said document via secondary evidence or substitutionary
probative weight. evidence can adequately show that the best or primary
evidence – the original of the document – is not available
The foregoing rule, however, admits of several for any of the causes mentioned in Section 3,66 Rule 130
exceptions. Under Section 3(b) of Rule 130, secondary of the Revised Rules of Court.
evidence of a writing may be admitted "when the original
is in the custody or under the control of the party against Petitioner claims she was denied due process when the
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to Sandiganbayan severely restricted her time to present
produce it after reasonable notice." And to warrant the evidence, allowing her only two hearing dates, thus
admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a resulting in her failure to present another important
writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, witness in the of person of Atty. Randolph Parcasio.
Section 6 of Rule 130 provides as follows: Petitioner was not denied due process. She was given
every opportunity to adduce her evidence. The
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s Sandiganbayan outlined the proceedings of the case as
custody or control. – If the document is in the custody or follows:
control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable
notice to produce it. If after such notice and after After the prosecution rested its case, by agreement of the
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the parties, the initial hearing for the reception of defense
document, secondary evidence may be presented as in evidence was scheduled on September 19 and 20, 2005
the case of loss. both at 8:30 in the morning. However, upon motion of the
prosecution, the Court, in its Order of September 16,
Thus, the mere fact that the original is in the custody or 2005, cancelled the setting as the handling prosecutor,
control of the adverse party against whom it is offered Pros. Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, had to attend a 5-day
does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. workshop at PHINMA in Tagaytay City on September 19-
The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power 23, 2005 and scheduled anew the hearing on November
to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said 23 and 24, 2005, both at 8:30 in the morning.
party to produce the document which may be in the form However, for failure of the defense counsel, Atty. Rico B.
of a motion for the production of the original or made in Bolongaita, to appear at the November 23, 2005 hearing
open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a despite due notice, the Court cancelled the November 23
subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody and 24 hearings, and moved the same to March 13 and
of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. 14, 2006 both at 8:30 in the morning, and at the same time
When such party has the original of the writing and does directed the said defense counsel to show cause in writing
not voluntarily offer to produce it, or refuses to produce it, within five (5) days from receipt of the Order why he
secondary evidence may be admitted. should not be held in contempt for his failure to appear
despite due notice. In compliance with this
Order,1awphi1 Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, filed his
Here, the accused admitted that her Employees
Explanation and Withdrawal of Appearance, respectively,
Clearance was always in the possession of her assistant
which were both Noted by the Court in its Resolution of
secretary, [Marie Cris] Batuampar. So the prosecution in
its effort to produce the original copy of the said January 19, 2006.
Employees Clearance of the accused, thru Assistant
Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G. Aurellano of the Office In view of the absence of the accused in the March 13,
of the Prosecutor, sent on May 31, 2005 thru the COA 2006 hearing and her continued failure to get a substitute
Telegraph Office at Quezon City two (2) telegram counsel considering that her counsel, Atty. Rico B.
subpoenas addressed to accused Normallah Pacasum, Bolongaita, had already withdrawn from the case since
and [Marie Cris] Batuampar ordering them to submit to the January 16, 2006, the Court cancelled the March 13 and
Office of the Special Prosecutor on or before June 8, 14, 2006 hearings and moved the same to July 3 and 4,
2005, the original of the Employees’ Clearance in the 2006 both at 8:30 in the morning and designated Atty.
name of Normallah Alonto Lucman-Pacasum for the Conrado Rosario of the PAO as counsel de oficio of the

51
accused and directed the accused upon receipt of the the accused has been given the last chance to present
order to immediately confer with said counsel for evidence, the Court hereby denies the motion for
purposes of preparing for her defense in the case. postponement.

On March 20, 2006, the Court issued the following "In this regard, in view of the absence of accused
Resolution, which reads: Normallah L. Pacasum in today’s hearing despite the
Order of the Court dated July 4, 2006, canceling her
Accused Normallah L. Pacasum’s letter of February 17, waiver of appearance, and ordering her to personally
2006 (received by mail on March 16, 2006) requesting appear before this Court, as prayed for by the
extension of time to engage the services of counsel is prosecution, let a Bench Warrant of Arrest be issued
merely NOTED WITHOUT ACTION as the next hearings against the said accused. The cash bond posted for her
are scheduled on July 3 and 4, 2006 and said accused provisional liberty is ordered confiscated in favor of the
would have more than ample time to engage the services government. The accused is given thirty (30) days from
of counsel of her choice. For this reason, any excuse from notice to explain in writing why final judgment shall not be
the accused on said settings that she failed to engage the rendered against the said bond.
services of counsel or that her counsel needs more time
to prepare will be unacceptable. At all events, this Court, With the Manifestation of Atty. Bantreas Lucman that
in its Order of March 13, 2006, had already appointed the defense is not ready to present its evidence today and
Atty. Conrado Rosario of the PAO as a counsel de oficio tomorrow, the last chance for it to present its evidence,
to represent the accused, with specific orders to the latter the Court is constraint to consider the accused’s right to
to confer with Atty. Rosario and assist him in preparing for present evidence as waived.
her defense.
The parties are hereby given thirty (30) days to submit
On July 3, 2006, upon the manifestation of Atty. Conrado their respective memoranda. Thereafter, the case shall be
Rosario, counsel for the accused, that since he was deemed submitted for decision.
appointed counsel de oficio, the accused has not
communicated with him and therefore he was not ready SO ORDERED.
to present any evidence for the accused, the Court
cancelled the hearing in order to give the defense another Subsequently, the accused thru counsel, filed a Motion for
opportunity to present its evidence and reset it to July 4,
Reconsideration of the above Order dated October 25,
2006, the following day as previously scheduled.
2006, and Motion to Set Hearing For Motion for
Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest dated
On July 4, 2006, the Court issued the following Order, October 31, 2006.
which reads –
At the hearing of accused’s motion for reconsideration on
"When this case was called for hearing, accused asked November 3, 2006, the Court issued the following Order,
for the resetting of the case on the ground that she just which reads –
hired a new counsel who thereafter arrived and entered
his appearance as Atty. Napoleon Uy Galit with address "When the ‘Motion To Set Hearing for Motion for
at Suite 202 Masonic Building, #35 Matalino St., Diliman,
Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest’ was called
Quezon City. With the appearance of her new counsel,
for hearing this morning, only Attorneys Bantuas M.
Atty. Conrado C. Rosario is hereby discharged as counsel
Lucman and Jose Ventura Aspiras appeared. Accused
de oficio of the accused.
Normallah L. Pacasum was absent.

"As prayed for by the accused, she is given the last

In view of the absence of the accused, the Court is not
chance to present her evidence on October 9 and 10,
inclined to give favorable action to the Motion for
2006, both at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. For repeated
Reconsideration. It must be stressed that the primordial
failure of the accused to acknowledge receipt of the
reason for the issuance of the order sought to be
notices of the Court, her waiver of appearance is hereby reconsidered in the presence of the accused in the
cancelled and she is ordered to personally appear in the
previous hearing in violation of the Court’s Order for her
scheduled hearings of this case.
to personally appear in the hearings of this case and for
her indifference to the directives of the Court. With the
SO ORDERED. absence anew of the accused, the Court has no
alternative but to deny the Motion.
On October 6, 2006, the accused thru counsel, Atty.
Bantreas Lucman, filed an Entry of Appearance, Motion Moreover, the Court notes the allegation in the Motion that
For Postponement of October 9 and 10 Hearings stating the counsel sought the assurance of the accused (and
therein that since his service as new counsel was just she promised) to appear before this Court if the motion
engaged by the accused, and that the accused herself will be granted, as if the Court owes the accused the favor
cannot also attend the said hearing because she is to appear before it. The accused is reminded/advised that
undergoing fasting until October 24, 2006 in observance the issuance of the warrant of arrest, she has to
of Ramadan, he asked to postpone the settings on voluntarily surrender and appear before the Court or be
October 9 and 10, 2006. At the hearing on October 9, arrested and brought to the Court.
2006, the Court issued the following, which reads –
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
"Acting on the Entry of Appearance, Motion for
Postponement of October 9 and 10, 2006 Hearing filed by
SO ORDERED.
accused Normallah L. Pacasum, thru counsel, Atty.
Bantreas Lucman, finding the same to be without merit,
as this case has been set for hearing several times and Acting on the Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance
Consideration of Prosecution’s Memorandum (And for a
52
Second Look on the Matter of Accused’s Right to Present said paragraph, the followings elements must concur: (1)
Defense Evidence) of the accused dated November 21, that the offender is a public officer, an employee, or a
2006, and the prosecution’s Opposition thereto, the Court notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official
issued the following Order, which reads – position; and (3) that he falsifies a document by
counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or
"This refers to the Accused "Omnibus Motion to Hold in rubric.
Abeyance Consideration of Prosecution’s November 7,
2006 Memorandum (And For a Second Look on the All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently
Matter of Accused’s Right to Present Defense Evidence)" established. There is no dispute that petitioner was a
dated November 21, 2006 and the plaintiff’s Opposition public officer, being then the Regional Secretary of the
thereto dated November 28, 2006. Department of Tourism of the ARMM, when she caused
the preparation of her Employees Clearance (a public
"Inasmuch as the accused has already appeared before document) for the release of her salary for the months of
the Court and posted an additional bond of P10,000.00 August and September 2000. Such being a requirement,
despite the aforesaid opposition of the prosecution, in the and she being a public officer, she was duty-bound to
interest of justice, the Court is inclined to reconsider and prepare, accomplish and submit said document. Were it
give favorable action to the motion and grant the accused not for her position and employment in the ARMM, she
another and last opportunity to present here evidence. could not have accomplished said Employees Clearance.
In a falsification of public document, the offender is
"WHEREFORE, the motion is granted and this case is set considered to have taken advantage of his official position
when (1) he had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise
for hearing for the accused’s last chance to present and/or
intervene in the preparation of the document; or (2) he
complete the presentation of her evidence on February 5
had official custody of the document which he falsified.69 It
and 6, 2007 both at 8:30 in the morning in the
being her duty to prepare and submit said document, she
Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in Quezon City.
clearly took advantage of her position when she falsified
or caused the falsification of her Employees Clearance by
SO ORDERED. imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan.lawphil.net

Thus, despite the initial indifference of the accused to Going now to the penalties imposed on petitioner, we find
present her defense, the Court gave her ample the same proper. The penalty for falsification under Article
opportunity to present her evidence.67 171 of the Revised Penal Code is prision mayor and a fine
not exceeding ₱5,000.00. There being no mitigating or
The Sandiganbayan properly dealt with the situation. In aggravating circumstance in the commission of the felony,
fact, we find that the trial court was lenient with the the imposable penalty is prision mayor in its medium
petitioner. The failure of the defense to present Atty. period, or within the range of eight (8) years and one (1)
Parcasio was its own doing. The defense failed to prepare day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate
its witnesses for the case. As proof of this, we quote a Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall
portion of the hearing when petitioner was testifying: be taken from the medium period of prision mayor, while
the minimum shall be taken from within the range of the
ATTY. ASPIRAS penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional
or from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Q Would you know where (sic) the whereabouts of this
Sec. Parcasio would be (sic) at this time? WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 dated 7 August
A He lives in Davao but after what happened to Gov. 2007 and its resolution dated 22 October 2007 are hereby
Misuari, we have not got together with the other members AFFIRMED.
of the cabinet of Gov. Misuari, but he lives in Davao, sir.
SO ORDERED.
Q Would it be possible, Madame Witness, to request or
ask him to testify in this case?

A After this hearing, I will look for Sec. Parcasio just to

clear my name, sir.

CHAIRMAN
EN BANC
Not after this hearing, you should have already done that.
Because we already gave you enough opportunity to
present your side, right? You should not be telling the
Court that only after this hearing, you will start looking (for) [A. M. No. OCA-01-5. August 1, 2002]
people who will, definitely, clear your name. You should
be doing that months ago, correct?

WITNESS Civil Service Commission, NCR, represented by

Nelson L. Acebedo, Dir. IV, Office of the
Yes, your Honors.68 Legal Affairs, complainant, vs. Reynaldo B.
Sta. Ana, HRMO I, Leave Division,
OCA, respondent.
Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees
Clearance under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. For one to be convicted of falsification under DECISION

53
PER CURIAM: Personal Data Sheet dated August 5, 1996 stating that he
passed said examination;[8] and (3) an official
For resolution is the administrative complaint filed Appointment dated July 9, 1996 issued by then Chief
against respondent Reynaldo B. Sta. Ana, Human Justice Andres Narvasa promoting respondent to the
Resource Management Officer I, Leave Division, Office of position of Human Resource Management Officer III.[9]
the Court Administrator (OCA), Supreme Court for In the same hearing, a certification issued by Ms.
Dishonesty and Falsification of Public Documents relative Bella A. Mitra, Officer-in-Charge, Examination and
to his promotion as Human Resource Management Placement Services Division (EPSD), CSC-NCR, was
Officer III. presented attesting that respondents name was not
Respondent gained employment in the Office of the included in the Registry of Eligibles in the Career Service
Court Administrator, Supreme Court in 1976. He started Professional Examination held on February 18,
as a Laborer and was later promoted to the position of 1996.[10] On the basis of this certification, it was deduced
Human Resource Management Officer I. Sometime in that respondent submitted a spurious certificate of
1996, respondent applied for promotion as Human eligibility and made a false entry in his Personal Data
Resource Management Officer III. In support of his Sheet.
application for promotion to the said position, he Hence, on June 22, 1998, the Hearing Officer of the
submitted the following documents: CSC-OLA recommended that respondent be dismissed
from government service.[11] This was affirmed by Atty.
(1) a Certificate of Eligibility purportedly issued by the Civil Nelson Acebedo, Director IV, CSC-OLA, on June 24,
Service Commission certifying that respondent Sta. Ana 1998.[12]
passed the Career Service Professional examination on
February 18, 1996 with a rating of 83.8%;[1] and On August 12, 1998, respondent filed a Petition to
transfer jurisdiction of the case from the Civil Service
Commission to the Supreme Court and/or to dismiss the
(2) a Personal Data Sheet (PDS) dated August 5, 1996
case for lack of jurisdiction[13] pursuant to CSC
stating, under Item 18, that he passed the Career Service
Professional examination on February 18, 1996 with a Memorandum No. 53, Series of 1998, to wit:
rating of 83.8%.[2]
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively
vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision
Upon verification by Atty. Dante Huerta, Field Officer
over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
of the Civil Service Commission in the Supreme Court, it
was found that respondent Sta. Ana was not in the CSC- Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
NCR Master List of those who passed the MOWE Career municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court
Service Professional Examination given by the Civil
personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper
Service Commission on February 18, 1996 at Ramon
administrative action against them if they commit any
Magsaysay High School.[3] Atty. Huerta recommended the
violation thereof. No other branch of government may
filing of a formal charge against respondent.
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
Thus, the Civil Service Commission Office for Legal doctrine of separation of powers.
Affairs (CSC-OLA) issued a formal charge against
respondent for Dishonesty and Falsification of Public The CSC-OLA thus referred the case to the Office of
Document committed as follows: the Court Administrator (OCA) on August 18, 1998.
On May 17, 1999, the Office of the Court
That in support of promotional appointment to the position
of Human Resource Management Officer III, you Administrator directed respondent to explain in writing
why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for
submitted a Certificate of Eligibility certifying you to have
dishonesty and falsification of public documents.[14]
passed the Career Service Professional Examination on
February 18, 1996 with a rating of 83.8%. Upon In a letter to the Court Administrator dated May 21,
verification with this Offices Registry of Eligibles, it was 1999,[15] respondent admitted the charge and asked that
found out that your name does not appear among those the penalty meted him be reduced and that he be given
who have passed the said examination. Such act is another chance to serve the court in order to correct his
contrary to Civil Service Law and rules.[4] mistake.

A copy of the formal charge was furnished On February 28, 2001, the Court resolved to docket
respondent on October 11, 1996 requiring him to file his the case as a regular administrative matter and required
Answer within five days from notice. Respondent asked the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit
for an extension of time to file his Answer which was the case for resolution on the basis of the available
granted by the CSC-OLA on December 11, records on file.[16] On April 10, 2001, the CSC-OLA
1996.[5] However, respondent still did not submit his manifested no objection to docketing of the case as a
Answer within the extended period. He also failed to regular administrative matter and submitting the same for
attend the scheduled hearings despite notices for him to resolution.[17]
appear.[6] In his Manifestation dated April 11,
On February 19, 1998, an ex-parte hearing was 2001,[18] respondent reiterated that he admits the charge
conducted by the Hearing Officer of the CSC-OLA. A against him and pleaded for forgiveness. Respondent
representative from the CSC Field Office in the Supreme asked that he be given another chance considering that
Court, Ms. Rose Perlas, testified to confirm the he has served the court for more than twenty (20) years
documents submitted by respondent in support of his and has consistently received performance ratings of
promotional appointment, namely: (1) a Certificate of Very Satisfactory and Outstanding. Pertinent portions of
Eligibility indicating that respondent passed the Career respondents Manifestation[19] reads:
Service Professional Examination held at Ramon
Magsaysay High School on February 18, 1996;[7] (2) a
54
1. That he admits with so much regret that he indeed accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish
committed the act complained of; the faith of the people in the judiciary.[25]
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to this
2. That he humbly pleads for forgiveness before this standard of conduct.
Honorable Court and he be given another chance to prove
his sincerity to correct his misdeed and promises that this One of the supporting documents respondent
wrongdoing, although not done in the performance of his appended to his application for promotion to HRMO III
duties, this will never happen in the future; was a certificate of eligibility purportedly issued by the
Civil Service Commission certifying that he passed the
3. That he respectfully informs this Honorable Court that career service professional examination on February 18,
he served the Court for more than twenty (20) years to the 1996 with a rating of 83.8%. In his personal data sheet,
best of his ability. In fact, he was given a performance respondent also stated that he passed the said
rating of Very Satisfactory (VS) and Outstanding, an examination on the same date and with the same rating.
indication that he has been faithfully performing his job However, upon examination of the records of the
well. (Please see attached supporting papers); Examination and Placement Services Division (EPSD) of
the Civil Service Commission, it was disclosed that
4. That this is the first Administrative Case filed against petitioners name was not in the list of those who passed
him; and the said examination held at Ramon Magsaysay High
School on February 18, 1996. This belied respondents
statement in his personal data sheet and led to the
5. That he respectfully prays for compassionate justice inevitable conclusion that respondent submitted a false
before this Honorable Court in inflicting a harsh penalty certificate of eligibility.
considering the future of his children and family depend
on his role (sic) financial support. Under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of the crime of use of falsified documents are (1)
xxx[20] that the offender knew that document was falsified by
another person; (2) that the false document is embraced
On January 25, 2001, the Office of the Court in Art. 171 or in any subdivisions 1 or 2 of Art. 172; (3) that
Administrator affirmed the findings of the CSC-OLA but he used such document (not in judicial proceedings); and
recommended suspension for one (1) year without pay. In (4) that the use of the false document caused damage to
reducing the penalty, the Court Administrator took into another or at least it was used with intent to cause such
account - damage.
It cannot be gainsaid that respondent was well aware
xxx the fact that respondent has already spent more than that the certificate of eligibility he submitted was false
twenty (20) years of his life in the service of this Court and because he knew for a fact that he did not pass the career
this is his first administrative complaint. It could be that he service examination. It is, likewise, undeniable that his
committed the acts complained of out of his desire to be use of such false document in support of his promotion to
promoted for the benefit of his family. Respondents HRMO III prejudiced the other applicants who were
admission and prayer for forgiveness is a good sign that genuinely qualified for the position. Then Chief Justice
he is indeed remorseful for what he did. xxx Andres Narvasa had already issued his official
appointment, even though he neither assumed the
True, respondent deserves to be penalized but the same position nor received the compensation and benefits
may (sic) tempered in the name of compassionate justice. pertaining thereto.
Unlike the respondent in A.M. No. 95-1-01-MTCC Respondents act of indicating in his personal data
respondent Sta. Ana did not defraud and prejudice the sheet that he passed that career service professional
government by his acts. He neither assumed the position examination when in fact he did not, also makes him liable
he desired nor received the compensation and benefits for falsification of a document by making an untruthful
pertaining thereto. statement in a narration of facts, as defined under Art.
171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code. In falsification by
Moreover, it appears that Reynaldo B. Sta. Ana proved to false narration of facts, (1) the offender makes untruthful
be an asset of the Leave Division, OAS-OCA. His statements in a narration of facts; (2) he has a legal
efficiency is shown by his performance ratings xxx. obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by
him; (3) the facts narrated are absolutely false; and (4) it
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for was made with a wrongful intent to injure a third person.[26]
Public Officials and Employees, Republic Act 6713,
enunciates the States policy of promoting a high standard Respondent stated in his personal data sheet that he
of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public passed the career service professional examination
service.[21] And no other office in the government service knowing fully well that it was not true because he did not
exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and pass the said exam. Being an aspirant for promotion to a
uprightness from an employee than in the judiciary.[22] higher position, he had a legal obligation to disclose the
truth because the personal data sheet is required in
Every employee of the judiciary should be an connection with the promotion to a higher position. [27] In
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.[23] The the case of Inting vs. Tanodbayan,[28] the Court ruled that
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the the accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet being a
conduct of court personnel, from the presiding judge to requirement under the Civil Service Rules and
the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and Regulations in connection with employment in the
must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of government, the making of an untruthful statement therein
responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion was therefore intimately connected with such
that may taint the judiciary.[24] The Court condemns and employment xxx. In Belosillo vs. Rivera,[29] we said that
would never countenance any conduct, act or omission since truthful completion of Personal Data Sheet is a
on the part of all those involved in the administration of requirement for employment in the Judiciary, the
justice which would violate the norm of public
55
importance of answering the same with candor need not
be gainsaid.
By making a false statement in his personal data
sheet to enhance his qualification and increase his
chances of being considered for promotion, which in fact
happened because he was issued an appointment as
HRMO III by then Chief Justice Andres Narvasa,
respondent prejudiced the other qualified aspirants to the
same position. It does not matter that respondent did not
actually assume the position and receive salaries and
benefits pertaining thereto. The law does not require that
actual injury to a third person be present. What is
necessary is that there be intent to injure. Moreover,
in People vs. Po Giok To,[30] it is held that when official
documents are falsified, the intent to injure a third person
need not be present because the principal thing punished
is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the
truth as therein proclaimed. ECOND DIVISION
The facts and evidence, coupled with respondents
admission, sufficiently established his culpability.
Respondents use of a false certificate of eligibility
constitutes an act of dishonesty under civil service rules [A.M. No. P-94-1015. March 29, 1999]
and his act of making a false statement in his personal
data sheet renders him administratively liable for
falsification. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty (par. a) and JASMIN MAGUAD and REBECCA
falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses BRIOSO, complainants, vs. NICOLAS DE
warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon GUZMAN and RUBY C.
commission of the first offense. BARCENAS, respondents.

On numerous occasions, the Court did not hesitate

DECISION
to impose such extreme punishment on employees found
guilty of these offenses.[31] There is no reason why BUENA, J.:
respondent should be treated differently. The Court takes
note of the fact that initially, respondent did not controvert This is a complaint filed by Jasmin Maguad and
this evidence against him. Neither did he admit the Rebecca Brioso against Nicolas de Guzman, Sheriff of
charge. In fact, deliberately or otherwise, respondent did Branch 47 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City
not participate in the proceedings before the CSC. He did and Ruby Barcenas, Court Social Worker in the Regional
not file any answer and failed to appear in the scheduled Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, for grave misconduct,
hearings despite due notice. When he was found guilty of falsification and immorality.
the charge by the CSC-OLA and was recommended for
dismissal, he filed a petition to transfer jurisdiction to the The complaint[1] alleges that sometime in 1982,
Office of the Court Administrator and/or motion to dismiss respondent Nicolas de Guzman (lawfully married to
the case. It was only when his case was transferred to the Corazon Punzalan de Guzman), and respondent Ruby
OCA did he confess his guilt, more than three years after Barcenas, single, unlawfully and scandalously cohabited
he was first charged in the CSC. as husband and wife at 137 Ignacio St., Pasay City; that
in October, 1983, when respondents' first illegitimate child
While we recognize that respondent committed the Nathaniel Roy was born, respondents unlawfully and
acts complained of out of an extreme desire to be maliciously conspired to falsify an entry in the Birth
promoted for the benefit of his family, the Court cannot Certificate of said child, making it appear that respondents
turn a blind eye to what is clearly a transgression of the were lawfully married on December 8, 1982; that when
law. Dishonesty and falsification are malevolent acts that respondents' second illegitimate child Natalia, was born
have no place in the judiciary.[32] Because of his conduct, in 1984, respondents unlawfully and maliciously
the Court seriously doubts respondents ability to perform conspired to falsify an entry in the said child's Birth
his duties with the integrity, uprightness and honesty Certificate, making it appear that respondents were
demanded of an employee in the judiciary. lawfully married on December 8, 1984 (perhaps a
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynaldo B. Sta. Ana is typographical error meant to be December 8, 1982 as in
hereby DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to re- the first Birth Certificate).
employment in any government agency and government- In their joint comment and/or answer,[2] the
owned or controlled corporation, and with forfeiture of respondents admitted that respondent Nicolas de
unused leaves, if any, and retirement benefits. This Guzman was married to Corazon Punzalan in 1968 and
decision shall take effect immediately. has two legitimate children with her; de Guzman
SO ORDERED. explained that he and Corazon Punzalan had long been
separated in fact and a reconciliation between them for
purposes of their living together again has become quite
remote as she is now living with another man by the name
of Eliseo Almero; de Guzman added that he has not been
remiss in his obligations as a father to his two legitimate
children, as he provided them within his means all that
they needed for their sustenance. Respondents denied
the complainants' allegation that they cohabited as
56
husband and wife under scandalous circumstances; they the performance of the official functions and duties of a
also denied that they unlawfully and maliciously conspired public officer. (Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456) No act of
to falsify the entries in the certificates of live birth of their the respondents appears or has been established which
two children. They claimed that the truth is that can be considered as misconduct in office. The charge of
respondent de Guzman had no knowledge, much less grave misconduct against them is therefore without any
any participation in the entries therein relating to their basis.
alleged marriage on December 8, 1982; that in the birth
certificates of the children, the informant appearing "With respect to the charge of falsification, the
therein is only-respondent Barcenas. The respondents complainants allege that the respondents committed the
explained that Barcenas was "constrained to supply such offense when they made, through conspiracy, an entry in
erroneous information as regards her civil status solely for the birth certificates of their children that they were
purposes of shielding her two children from the stigma of married on December 8, 1982, or December 8, 1984, in
shame and disgrace that they might encounter in their Davao City, when in fact they were not. Apparently, this
later years in life by reason of their illegitimacy." De accusation is predicated on one of the ways of committing
Guzman and Barcenas took exception to the claim of the falsification, i.e., by making untruthful statements in a
complainants that they filed the present charges as narration of facts under Article 171 (4) of the Revised
"concerned citizens." According to the respondents, "for Penal Code. One essential element of this kind of
some ulterior designs," the complainants allow falsification is that there must be a legal obligation to
themselves to be the willing pawns of one Leoncio Cesar disclose the truth of the fact claimed to be false. In other
in the latter's attempts to unduly harass herein words, there must be a law requiring, expressly or
respondents because respondent Barcenas was one of impliedly, the disclosure of the truth of the fact alleged to
the private complainants against Leoncio Cesar for Grave have been falsified. No law has been shown by the
Oral Defamation before the Metropolitan Trial Court of complainants making it either expressly or impliedly a
Pasay City, Branch 46, in Crim. Cases Nos. 93-1300 to duty of an informant in a record of birth to disclose the
1303. truth that the parents of the child covered by it are married
In a resolution[3] dated March 23, 1994, the complaint or not. Consequently, the charge of falsification against
was referred to Executive Judge Conchita Carpio Morales the respondents cannot likewise prosper.
for investigation, report and recommendation. However,
in view of the promotion of Executive Judge Morales to "It is alleged in the complaint that the respondents
the Court of Appeals, this case was referred to Acting conspired with each other in making the entry in the birth
Executive Judge Alfredo J. Gustilo of Branch 116, certificates of their children that they were
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for investigation, report married. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
and recommendation.[4] come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. (Art. 8, Revised Penal
During the hearing of the case, instead of presenting Code). The rule is that conspiracy should be shown by
proofs in support of the accusation, the complainants strong and convincing evidence. No evidence has been
offered in evidence their joint Affidavit of adduced in this case indicating that the respondents
Desistance,[5] dated August 12, 1994 stating, among agreed and decided to make the entry in the birth
others: certificates of their children that they were married. Even
on the assumption that such entry in the birth certificates
xxxxxxxxx
of Nathaniel and Natalia would constitute falsification by
making an untruthful statement in a narration of fact, only
"3. That, assisted by our private lawyer, we recently respondent Barcenas, the informant who made the entry,
conferred with the said two accused about this case and could be held liable therefor. Respondent De Guzman
we have realized: (a) that they had no malicious or could not be made to answer for it, since there is no proof
criminal intent when they made that entry and that Ruby that he conspired with his co-respondent in making such
Barcenas innocently did it in the best interest of their said entry.
children to avoid future social stigma upon the persons of
the said children when they grow up; and (b) that Mr. De
"On the other hand, the circumstances in this case
Guzman had been separated for many years from his
admitted by the respondents are sufficient to sustain the
wife, who has likewise been living her own life with a
charge of immorality. It is not in accordance with the
common-law husband in Mindoro; and that his wife and
norms of morality for a man who is legally married to
two children with her had expressly condoned and
cohabit with another woman during the subsistence of
consented to his relationship with Ms. Barcenas many
such marriage. In the same manner, it is against the
years ago;
tenets of morality for a woman to be living together with a
married man not her husband.The stigma of immorality
"4. That we are no longer interested to pursue this attaches to this kind of relationship even if the married
administrative case and that therefore, in the interest of man is separated from his wife and the woman living with
justice, we hereby request the Supreme Court, thru the him is single. This is specially so when the persons
investigating Executive Judge of Pasay City to dismiss the concerned are public officers who are supposed to
same." maintain a high standard of morality so as to live up to
their role to be looked upon as models in society.
In his Investigation Report[6] dated November 2,
1994 Acting Executive Judge Alfredo J. Gustilo (now "However, to temper justice with mercy, these
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan), made the circumstances may be considered to mitigate the liability
following findings which the Court quotes with approval: of the respondents:

"Misconduct means intentional wrong doing or deliberate "1. They have voluntarily admitted that they are living
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, specially together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage.
by a government official. (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary). To constitute an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with
57
"2. Respondent De Guzman and his lawful wife have been offense while the penalty of dismissal is imposed for the
separated in fact for a long time and his wife is already second offense.
cohabiting with another man, thereby rendering
reconciliation between them improbable. However, this being the first offense of the
respondents and there being no allegation in the
complaint that respondent Barcenas knew that de
"3. Notwithstanding their separation, respondent De Guzman was married even before they started their
Guzman has continued giving support to his children with relationship and came to know of it only when it was
Punzalan. already too late to back out, with the birth of their children,
and taking into account the circumstances enumerated by
"4. The relationship between the respondents is one of the Investigating Judge that may be considered to
the realities of life which is difficult to prevent from mitigate their liability, the Court, in order to temper justice
happening, more so because respondent De Guzman has with mercy is inclined to impose a lighter penalty upon the
been separated for a long time from his wife. respondents.

"5. Apparently, the lawful wife and legitimate children of In a Memorandum[8] for the Chief Justice dated
respondent De Guzman have tolerated the relationship September 28, 1998, the Court Administrator
between the respondents as can be implied from the fact recommended that the respondents Deputy Sheriff
that none of them has filed a complaint against them. Nicolas de Guzman and Social Worker Ruby Barcenas be
absolved from the charges of grave misconduct and
falsification, but respondent de Guzman should be
"6. There is no indication that the relationship between the suspended for two (2) months without pay for immorality
respondents has caused prejudice to any person or has and respondent Barcenas be suspended for fifteen (15)
adversely affected the performance of their functions and days without pay and that both respondents be
duties as officers of the government to the detriment of admonished to terminate their relationship or to take the
the public service. necessary steps to legitimize the same.

"7. The complainants have desisted from further Parenthetically, on February 5, 1999, the
prosecuting their complaint and asked for its dismissal, respondents filed a Manifestation[9] stating among others:
admitting that the filing of the present charges was an xxxxxxxxx
offshoot of a civil case involving complainant Maguad and
the respondents."
"5. That on May 25, 1995, respondent Nicolas de Guzman
filed a
The investigating Judge made the following
recommendation:
Petition for Annulment of Marriage before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite;
"1. Respondents Nicolas de Guzman and Ruby Barcenas
be exonerated of the charges of grave misconduct and
falsification; and "6. On August 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered by the
Honorable Judge Dolores C. Espaol in favor of the
respondent;
"2. Both respondents be found guilty of the charge of
immorality.
"7. That on November 27, 1998, Entry of Final Judgment
regarding the Annulment of Marriage was issued by the
"However, because of the aforementioned mitigating Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus,
circumstances, only the penalty of suspension from office Cavite; and,
for one (1) month without pay be imposed on them.
"8. That on October 19, 1998, the respondents had tied
"Additionally, the respondents should be admonished to their marriage knot before the Honorable Judge Leticia P.
terminate their cohabitation or to take such proper course Morales of Regional Trial Court, Makati."
of action as will legitimize the relationship between them."
WHEREFORE, respondents Deputy Sheriff Nicolas
The Court fully agrees with the findings and de Guzman and Court Social Worker Ruby Barcenas are
recommendation of the Investigating Judge that the absolved from the charge of grave misconduct and
respondents be absolved from the charges of grave falsification, but respondent de Guzman is SUSPENDED
misconduct and falsification, the same being duly for two (2) months without pay and respondent Barcenas
supported by the evidence on record and jurisprudence for fifteen (15) days also without pay, both for immorality.
on the matter.
SO ORDERED.
With regard to the third accusation, the stigma of
immorality attaches to the kind of relationship between the
respondents, the same being improper, notwithstanding
the fact that respondent de Guzman was separated from
his wife (who is now living with another man) and
respondent Barcenas was single. In Nalupta, Jr. vs.
Tapec,[7] this Court held that illicit relations is considered
disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary
action pointing out that Memorandum Circular No. 30,
Series of 1989 of the Civil Service Commission has
categorized disgraceful and immoral conduct as a grave
offense for which a penalty of suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) day shall be imposed for the first

58
 During the month of April, 1907, and for several years
prior thereto, the defendant was and had been the janitor
of the city hall in the city of Manila. He had under his
charge 12 or 15 men whose business it was to take care
of and clean the building. In the month of April, one of
these men was Manuel Manalo. The work assigned to him
was the cleaning of the water-closets. The work done by
all of these laborers had to be performed before the
offices opened in the morning or after they were closed at
night. The water-closets were cleaned only once a day
and that work was done by Manuel Manalo in the morning
before 8 o’clock. During the month of April he went to the
building every day about half past 6 and performed this
work, which was all the work that was assigned to him,
and which was all the work which he had to perform during
the entire day. He was not in the building any day after 9
a. m. There was evidence, however, that it was the duty
of these men to remain in the building so that if any
extraordinary work should be required of them they would
be there to perform it. The evidence shows that some of
the men were allowed to go away, and others stayed
there and that those that stayed there did nothing except
to perform the regular work assigned to them.

On the 1st of May, 1907, a pay roll was made out for the
month of April. It contained the names of all the workmen
and a square against each name for each day in the
month. All of the square against each name of Manuel
Manalo contain a vertical line. The defendant signed the
following certificate upon this pay roll: "I certify that I have
been in charge of the men whose names appear on the
above roll during the period indicated, that the roll is
correct, and that the labor has been performed as stated."
Manuel Manalo received pay at the rate of 70 cents a day
and for the month of April he was paid P21.

A complaint was filed against the defendant charging him,

FIRST DIVISION as a public official, with the falsification of a public
document, to wit, this pay roll, it being alleged that the
[G.R. No. L-4352. March 24, 1908. ] certificate which he attached thereto was false. He was
convicted in the court below of the crime charged against
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. him and has appealed.
RICARDO BAYOT, Defendant-Appellant.
To our minds the only question in the case is as to the
Carlos Ledesma and Ramon Fernandez, meaning of the vertical lines placed in the square opposite
for Appellant. the names of these laborers. It is claimed by the appellant
that they only mean that the persons to whom the lines
Attorney-General Araneta, for Appellee. referred had performed upon the days mentioned the
services which had been required of each one. If this is
SYLLABUS the correct meaning of these lines, then the certificate
signed by the defendant was true, because it was proven
1. FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT; PUBLIC that Manuel Manalo had performed during the month of
FUNCTIONARY. — The guilt of a public official charged April all the work which was assigned to him. It is claimed
with the falsification of a public document does not by the Government, however, that these lines indicate,
depend upon the advantage or profit which he may have not that Manuel Manalo performed all the work that was
obtained thereby. required of him during the day, but that he was present in
the building during all the day and it relies upon the
2. ID.; MARKS UPON A PAY ROLL. — Upon the following statement made at the top of the payroll: "Mark
evidence adduced in this case: Held, That the vertical the time each day in ink under the proper date, using full
lines placed upon the day roll opposite certain names or fractional marks for part of a day as earned." The
thereon did not mean that such persons were present the Attorney-General insists that, inasmuch as Manuel
entire day, but that they performed all the work required Manalo was not present all of the day, the time during
on the day. which he was present all of the day, the time during which
he was present should have been indicated by a fractional
mark. There are no fractional marks upon this time roll.
DECISION Mr. Dorrington, the then superintendent of public buildings
and a witness for the Government, was asked: "What
mark is generally made on the labor pay rolls to indicate
WILLARD, J. : a man has worked one-half a day?" and he answered: "I
do not know what would be put there in a case of that

59
kind." He further testified: "Q. Have you ever seen on the
pay roll a man’s name for one half a day’s work? — A. Not
that I recall; it may be possible in some cases; I do not
recall."cralaw virtua1aw library

If that part of the certificate signed by the defendant which

states that he had been in charge of the men was correct,
and that part which states that the labor had been
performed was correct, the only question is, Is that part of
the certificate which says "that the roll is correct," false or
true? After considerable hesitation we have come to the
conclusion, in view of all the testimony in the case, that it
can not be said that this statement was false; in other
words, that the vertical lines do not necessarily mean that
the person against whose name they appear was present
in the building during every hour of the day. The
defendant, therefore, can not be convicted of the crime of
falsification of a public document by a public official.

There are some additional facts in the case not before

stated, which to our mind have no bearing upon the
precise question in this case, namely, whether the
defendant is guilty of the crime charged against him, for
the crime thus charged does not depend upon the
advantage of profit which the defendant may obtain from
the falsification. A defendant may be guilty of this crime
without in any way profiting thereby. The additional facts
referred to are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

It was proven by the Government and admitted by the

defendant, that during the month of April, and for
sometime before, Manuel Manalo was and had been the
defendant’s cook; that after he had finished his work at
the city hall in the morning the defendant gave him money
and sent him to the market where he bought provisions;
and that he returned to the city hall, stayed there until EN BANC
about 9 o’clock, and then went to the defendant’s house
where he worked as cook until about 2 o’clock in the G.R. No. L-7236 April 30, 1955
afternoon and then went to his own house. For these
services as a cook the defendant paid nothing, although
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
he claims that he was educating the minor child of Manuel
appellant,
Manalo. That this conduct of the defendant in availing
vs.
himself of the services of Manuel Manalo under the
PO GIOK TO, defendant-appellee.
circumstances was grossly irregular and that it perhaps
constitutes a crime under the provisions of the Penal
Code is not to our minds decisive of the question here First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan,
raised. However delinquent the defendant may have Jr., and Assistant Solicitor General Lucas Lacson for
been, the question here is, Did his delinquency amount to appellant.
the crime of the falsification of a public document? If it did Borromeo, Yap and Borromeo for appellee.
not, he must be acquitted of the present charge and we
can not inquire under this complaint as to what other REYES, J.B.L., J.:
offense he may have committed.
In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the defendant
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the appellee Po Giok To was charged with the crime of
defendant is acquitted, with the costs of both instances’ falsification under the following information:
de oficio.
That on or about the 7th day of January, 1952, in
the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with intent to falsify or forge a public
document, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify, or forge a public document
consisting of residence certificate No. A-1618529
issued to him in the City of Cebu, on January 7,
1952, by e representative of the City Treasurer of
Cebu, to wit: by misrepresenting to the said
representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu that
his name is Antonio Perez, that his place of birth
is Jaro, Leyte and that his citizenship is Filipino,
and by means of such misrepresentation, said
representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu was
60
 made to issue and write, and in fact did issue and for the criminal charge to allege that the accused had
write, on the corresponding lines on said such duty.
residence certificate No. A-1618529 the name of
Antonio Perez, as the name of the taxpayer, Jaro, Anent the second element allegedly lacking in the
Leyte as his place of birth, and Filipino as his information in question, the law is clear that wrongful
citizenship, thus causing it to appear that the said intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is
residence certificate No. A-1618529 dated not an essential element of the crime of falsification of
January 7, 1952, was issued to one Antonio public document.
Perez with his place of birth as Jaro, Leyte, and
with his citizenship as Filipino, when in truth and
Article 172, par. 1, in connection with Art. 171, par. 4, of
in fact, as the accused well knew, his true name
the Revised Penal Code, under which provision the
is Po Giok To, his place of birth is Amoy, China,
accused is charged, provides as follows:
and his citizenship is Chinese.
ART. 171. Falsification by the public officer,
Contrary to law.
employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. —
The penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not to
(Appellants Brief, pp. 2-3). exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that advantage of his official position shall falsify a
the information does not allege (1) that the accused had document by committing any of the following acts:
the obligation to disclose the truth in the document
allegedly falsified, nor (2) that the accused had the xxx xxx xxx
wrongful intent to injure a third person. The City Fiscal
opposed the motion to quash claiming that the information 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of
alleges all the integral elements of the offense charged as
facts.
defined by the statute. The lower Court, however, found
the motion to quash meritorious and ordered the
amendment of the information. Upon insistence of the City ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and
Fiscal that the information was sufficient and that he was use of falsified documents. — The penalty
not in possession of any evidence that the accused made of prision correccional in its medium and
use of the residence certificate containing the alleged maximum periods and a fine of not more than
false entries, the Court a quo dismissed the case without 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
prejudice. Hence, this appeal by the Government.
xxx xxx xxx
The sole issue is whether or not the information in
question alleges sufficient facts to constitute the crime of 1. Any private individual who shall commit any of
falsification of public document. The defense contends the falsifications enumerated in the next
that the information is insufficient for failure to recite two preceding article in any other kind of commercial
alleged essential elements of the crime charged; namely, document.
the obligation on the part of the accused to disclose the
truth, and wrongful intent on the part of the accused to On the other hand, Art. 172, par 2, defining the
injure third persons. crime falsification of private document, provides:

We agree with the Solicitor-General that the first element 2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party,
allegedly lacking in the information, viz., the obligation on or with intent to cause such damage, shall in any
the part of the accused to disclose the truth as to the facts private document commit any of the acts of
that should appear in a residence certificate, is inherent in falsification enumerated in the next preceeding
the very nature and purpose of said document. Section 3 article.
Commonwealth Act 465 (otherwise known as the
Residence Tax Act) provides "that the residence The distinction made by the law between falsification by
certificate for persons shall contain the full name, place private persons, first, of public documents, and secondly
and date of birth, citizenship, civil status, length of of private documents, is clear; the first is committed by the
residence in the city or municipality where the certificate mere performance of any of the acts of falsification
is issued, occupation or calling", all of which facts are enumerated in Art. 171; while the second is committed not
required to appear therein for the purpose of establishing only by the performance of any of the acts of falsification
the true and correct identity of the person to whom the enumerated in Art. 171; but it must likewise be shown that
certificate is issued. Needless to say, this provision such act of falsification was committed to the damage of
implies that the person to whom the certificate is issued a third party or with intent to cause such damage.
must state to the officer who issues the same, the true
facts, required to appear therein, the latter having merely
The reason for the distinction is given in a decision of the
the ministerial function of recording thereon the facts as
Supreme Court of Spain dated December 23, 1885, cited
supplied by this person. And to guarantee that the facts
by this Court in the case of People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil.
given correctly and truly identify the holder of the
48; i.e., that in the falsification of public or official
certificate, he is also required by Sec. 3, supra, to sign the
documents, whether by public officials or by private
document and affix his right hand thumb mark thereon.
persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea
There is, therefore, no question that the accused had the
of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason
duty to disclose the true facts about his name, place of
that, in contradiction to private documents, the principal
birth, and citizenship to the officer or employee who
thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the
issued his residence certificate No. A-1618529; and such
destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
duty being inherent in the transaction, there was no need

61
Our own commentators on the Revised Penal Code are Revised Penal Code, or sec. 12 Comm. Act No. 465, the
also agreed on this distinction. (Francisco, Revised Penal information was sufficient, and its dismissal for
Code.) Sec. ed., Vol. II, Part 1, p. 301; Guevara, Comm. insufficiency by the Court below was improper and
on the Revised Penal Code, IV Ed., P. 172; Albert, erroneous.
Revised Penal Code, 1948 Ed., p. 398).
The order of the trial court dismissing the information filed
Moreover, the acts charged, if true, would result in in this case is, therefore, reversed, and the case is
confusion in the government records, since the fingerprint remanded to the Court below for further proceedings, with
of the accused would not correspond to that of the person costs against the defendant-appellee.
whose personal circumstances are recited in the
certificate. Such confusion in its records evidently Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A.,
operates to the Government's prejudice. Being the natural Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
and direct result of the criminal act charged, the accused
must be presumed to have intended it.

Defendant-appellee also advances the theory that a

private person can not commit the crime of falsification
charged, i. e., by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts, referring to the opinion of the late
Justice Albert that "only of the eight ways of committing
falsifications enumerated in Article 171, to wit, the first, the
fifth, and the sixth, are open to a private individual"
(Albert, supra, p. 405); and stresses that if there had been
any falsification at all in this case, it was committed by the
employee who, though innocently, wrote the allegedly
untrue facts on defendant's residence certificate. The
opinion quoted plainly refers to direct falsification by a
private person, and does not contemplate situations
where the accused, though a private person, becomes a
principal to the act of falsification committed by a public
official or employee, by induction, cooperation, or planned
conspiracy (cf. Sent. of Tribunal Supremo of Spain of 23
Mar. 1885; 28 Apr. 1905; 28 Mar. 1893). In the present
case, although it is true that it was the employee of the
Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu who performed the
overt act of writing the allegedly false facts on the
defendant's residence certificate, it was however, the
defendants who induced him to do so by supplying him
with those facts. Consequently, the employee was
defendant's mere innocent agent in the performance of
the crime charged, while defendant was a principal by
inducement.

Finally, it is argued for the defendant-appellee that there

being a special law with respect to residence certificates
expressly punishing their falsification (Commonwealth Act
No. 465), this special law, and not the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, should apply in this case; and since
Commonwealth Act No. 465, sec. 11 punishes the
falsification of a residence certificate only when it is done
"for the purpose of using the same in the payment of
revenue or in securing any exemption or privilege
conferred by law", which element is not alleged in the
information, the same was properly dismissed by the
lower Court. Again this contention is without merit. The
fact that Commonwealth Act No. 465 punishes the
falsification of residence certificates in the cases
mentioned therein does not prevent the application of the G.R. No. L-36345 November 25, 1932
general provisions of the Revised Penal Code on other
acts of falsification not covered by the special law, since
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
under Art. 10 of the Rev. Penal Code, it has
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
supplementary application to all special laws, unless the
vs.
latter should specially provide the contrary, and
PEDRO MONTANO and WENCESLAO
Commonwealth Act No. 465 makes no provision that it
CABAGSANG, defendants-appellants.
exclusively applies to all falsifications of residence
certificates. Then, again, section 12 of Commonwealth
Act. No. 465 penalize all other violations of the residence M. H. de Joya for appellants.
certificate law not covered by the preceeding sections Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
thereof. Which law is applicable should be determined
when the case is decided on its merits. At the present BUTTE, J.:
stage of the proceedings, however, it can be stated that
whether the crime charged be punishable under the
62
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First DECISION
Instance of Cavite, convicting the defendants-appellants
of the crime of falsification of public documents. The BELLOSILLO, J.:
defendant Wenceslao Cabagsang was the chief of police
and the defendant Pedro Montano was the justice of the This complaint for disbarment was filed in behalf of
peace of the municipality of Tanza in the Province of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de Rosales by the
Cavite, in the month of September, 1930, when the crimes National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against respondent
for which they were convicted occurred. It appears from Atty. Mario G. Ramos for violation of Act No. 2711 of
the evidence that on September 5, 1930, a criminal the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Title IV, Ch.
complaint against one Arturo A. Soriano for the crime of 11, otherwise know as the Notarial Law, particularly Secs.
qualified seduction was filed with the said justice of the 245 and 246 thereof.
peace. The justice, apparently to favor Soriano, delayed
In September 1990 Manuel A. Bernardo, brother of
the preliminary investigation until the offended woman on
complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de Rosales,
September 18, 1930, filed with him a motion demanding
borrowed from Rosalinda the Original Transfer Certificate
immediate action and calling his attention to the fact that
of Title No. 194464 covering Lot No. 1-B-4-H in her
his delay was a violation of the circular of instructions of
name. The lot measures 112 square meters and is
the judge of the Court of First Instance of said province.
located at the back of Manuel's house on Fabie Street,
The case was then set for hearing on September 22,
Paco, Metro Manila. On 25 November 1990 Rosalinda
1930. Thereafter administrative charges against the
sold this lot to one Alfredo P. Castro. When she asked her
justice of the peace were filed with the Court of First
brother Manuel to return her title he refused.
Instance of Cavite, alleging that the delay in the
preliminary investigation was a violation of the circular of On 22 October 1990 Rosalinda executed an Affidavit
the Court of First Instance, dated November 15, 1928, of Loss of her title and presented the affidavit to the
requiring all justices of the peace to dispose of all Register of Deeds of Manila.
preliminary investigations within ten days from the date on
which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of On 3 September 1991 the Register of Deeds
the accused.lawphil.net informed Rosalinda that her title to the property was
already transferred to Manuel by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale she purportedly executed in favor of
The evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that prior
Manuel on 5 September 1990. The document was
to the hearing of said administrative case, the defendants,
notarized by respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos on 1
in order to make it appear that there had been no violation
October 1990 and entered in his Notarial Register as Doc.
of the said instructions to the justices of the peace,
No. 388, Page No. 718, Book No. 10, Series of
falsified official records in their custody as follows:
1990. Rosalinda however denied having signed any deed
of sale over her property in favor of Manuel.
The defendant chief of police fraudulently altered and
falsified the municipal police blotter and the book of On 3 September 1991 Rosalinda filed with the NBI a
records of arrests and the return of the warrant of arrest complaint for falsification of public document against her
and Soriano's bail bond so as to make them show that the brother Manuel. The NBI invited respondent Atty. Ramos
said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and gave bond on the for questioning.The complaint alleged among others that
13th day of September, 1930, whereas, in truth and in on 12 September 1991 Atty. Mario G. Ramos executed
fact, as said records showed before said falsification, the an affidavit before the NBI admitting that when Manuel
said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and released on bond presented the purported Deed of Absolute Sale to him for
on the 6th day of September, 1930; that the defendant notarization, he (Atty. Ramos) found some defects in the
Pedro Montano conspired and cooperated with his document and that complainant Rosalinda was not
codefendant in making said falsifications in order to meet around. The NBI Questioned Documents Division also
the administrative charges then pending against him. The compared Rosalinda's signature appearing in the Deed of
court below rejected the defense of the accused that said Absolute Sale with samples of her genuine signature, and
alterations were made in good faith and corresponded to found that the signature in the purported Deed of Absolute
the true facts of the case. There is no issue of law raised Sale and her genuine signatures were not written by one
in the assignment of errors. We have made a careful and the same person.
review of the evidence and have come to the conclusion
that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed, On 5 October 1992 the NBI transmitted its findings
with costs against the appellants. So ordered. to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the
recommendation that Manuel and Atty. Ramos be
prosecuted for Falsification of Public Document under Art.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull and 172 in relation to Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code,
Vickers, JJ., concur. and that Atty. Ramos be additionally charged with
violation of the Notarial Law.
The NBI also transmitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
photocopies of the NBI investigation report and its
annexes, and a verified complaint[1] for disbarment signed
by Rosalinda. The CBD received the records on 5
[A.C. No. 5645. July 2, 2002] October 1992. On the same date, the CBD through
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez directed respondent
to submit an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15)
days from notice.
ROSALINDA BERNARDO VDA DE Respondent admitted in his Answer[2] that he had
ROSALES, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIO G. affixed his signature on the purported Deed of Absolute
RAMOS, respondent. Sale but failed to enter the document in his Notarial
Registry Book. He also admitted executing before the NBI
63
on 12 September 1991 an affidavit regarding the The notary public is further enjoined to record in his
matter. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the notarial registry the necessary information regarding the
complaint since according to him he only inadvertently document or instrument notarized and retain a copy of the
signed the purported Deed of Absolute Sale and/or that document presented to him for acknowledgment and
his signature was procured through mistake, fraud, undue certification especially when it is a contract.[16] The
influence or excusable negligence, claiming that he notarial registry is a record of the notary public's official
simply relied on the assurances of Manuel that the acts. Acknowledged documents and instruments
document would not be used for purposes other than a recorded in it are considered public documents. If the
loan between brother and sister, and that he affixed his document or instrument does not appear in the notarial
signature thereon with utmost good faith and without records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt is
intending to obtain personal gain or to cause damage or engendered that the document or instrument was not
injury to another. really notarized, so that it is not a public document and
cannot bolster any claim made based on this
The CBD set the case for hearing on 3 March 2000, document. Considering the evidentiary value given to
28 April 2000, 16 June 2000 and 5 October notarized documents, the failure of the notary
2000. Complainant never appeared. The records show public to record the document in his notarial registry is
that the notices sent to her address at 1497 Fabie Street, tantamount to falsely making it appear that the document
Paco, Manila, were returned unclaimed.[3] was notarized when in fact it was not.
On 26 January 2002 the IBP Board of Governors We take note of respondent's admission in his
approved the report and recommendation of the CBD Answer that he had affixed his signature in the
through Commissioner Fernandez that the case against purported Deed of Absolute Sale but he did not enter it in
respondent be dismissed in view of complainant's failure his notarial registry. This is clearly in violation of the
to prosecute and for lack of evidence on record to Notarial Law for which he must be disciplined.
substantiate the complaint.[4] The Investigating
Commissioner found that the notices sent to complainant Respondent alleges that he merely signed the Deed
were returned unclaimed with the annotation "moved out," of Absolute Sale inadvertently and that his signature was
and that she did not leave any forwarding address, and procured through mistake, fraud, undue influence or
neither did she come to the CBD to inquire about the excusable negligence as he relied on the assurances of
status of her case. From these actuations, he concluded Manuel A. Bernardo, a kababayan from Pampanga, that
that complainant had lost interest in the further the document would not be used for any illegal purpose.
prosecution of this case,[5] and so recommended its
dismissal. We cannot honor, much less give credit to this
allegation. That respondent notarized the document out
We cannot wholly agree with the findings and of sympathy for his kababayan is not a legitimate
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It is excuse. It is appalling that respondent did away with the
clear from the pleadings before us that respondent basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the
violated the Notarial Law in failing to register in his notarial alleged need of a friend and client. In doing so, he
book the deed of absolute sale he notarized, which fact displayed a decided lack of respect for the solemnity of an
respondent readily admitted. oath in a notarial document. He also exhibited his clear
ignorance of the importance of the office of a notary
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and public. Not only did he violate the Notarial Law, he also
duties of a notary public. It requires him to keep a notarial did so without thinking of the possible damage that might
register where he shall record all his official acts as result from its non-observance.
notary,[6] and specifies what information with regard to the
notarized document should be entered therein.[7] Failure The principal function of a notary public is to
to perform this duty results in the revocation of his authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to
commission as notary public.[8] the due execution and delivery of the document under his
hand and seal he gives the document the force of
The importance attached to the act of notarization evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring
cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive addition to the solemnity which should surround the
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such
authorized may act as notaries public.[9] Notarization documents to be given without further proof of their
converts a private document into a public document thus execution and delivery.[17] Where the notary public is a
making that document admissible in evidence without lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon him by
further proof of its authenticity.[10] A notarial document is reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, falsehood or consent to the doing of any.[18] Failing in this,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be he must accept the consequences of his unwarranted
able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a actions.
notary public and appended to a private instrument.[11]
From his admissions we find that Atty. Mario G.
For this reason notaries public must observe with Ramos failed to exercise the due diligence required of him
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of in the performance of the duties of notary public. We do
their duties.[12] Otherwise, the confidence of the public in not agree however that his negligence should merit
the integrity of this form of conveyance would be disbarment, which is the most severe form of disciplinary
undermined.[13] Hence a notary public should not notarize sanction. Disbarment should never be imposed unless it
a document unless the persons who signed the same are is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious
the very same persons who executed and personally misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of bar. Removal from the bar should not really be decreed
what are stated therein.[14] The purpose of this when any punishment less severe - reprimand, temporary
requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the suspension or fine - would accomplish the end
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party desired.[19] Under the circumstances, imposing sanctions
and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act
and deed.[15]
64
decreed under the Notarial Law and suspension from the
practice of law would suffice.
ARTICLE 178
WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the
observance of the Notarial Law, the commission of
G.R. No. 11522 September 26, 1916
respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos as Notary Public, if still
existing, is REVOKED and thereafter Atty. Ramos should
be DISQUALIFIED from reappointment to the office of THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
Notary Public. vs.
TO LEE PIU, defendant-appellant.
Respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos is also
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six Beaumont and Tenney for appellant.
(6) months effective immediately. He is DIRECTED to Attorney-General Avancena for appellee.
report to this Court his receipt of this Decision to enable it
to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.
MORELAND, J.:
The Clerk of Court of this Court is DIRECTED to
immediately circularize this Decision for the proper This is an appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant
guidance of all concerned. of the crime of using a false name and sentencing him to
2 months and one day of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
325 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
nonpayment of the fine, and the costs of the trial.
Philippines.
SO ORDERED. The appellant was charged with using a false name. The
evidence is to the effect that he came to the Philippine
Islands in 1911 and presented a section six certificate,
which is attached to the record as Exhibit A, wherein his
name appears as To Lee Piu. Thereafter, he attached to
an application for a passport the name Toribio Jalijali.
Said application was accompanied by the affidavits of two
witnesses and by a baptismal certificate showing that a
person by that name was born in the Philippine Islands in
1878. On the trial there was no denial of the fact that
appellant signed the name Toribio Jalijali to the
application for a passport; and the only evidence which
may be regarded as having been contradicted in the case
is that given by the defendant himself when he testified
that he was born in the Philippine Islands, that his name
is Toribio Jalijali, that he went to China at an early age,
and, feeling doubtful as to his ability to prove his right to
reenter, applied to the American consul at Canton for a
section six certificate; that, on such application, he stated
to the consul that his name was Toribio Jalijali, and that,
upon being told by the clerk of the consulate that it was
not necessary to put his surname in such application,
wrote therein the Christian name Toribio alone.

The charge is prosecuted on the theory that To Lee Piu

appellant's correct name and that the name Toribio Jalijali
is false.

Counsel for appellant maintains that the Government, in

order to maintain the action, must prove (a) that the two
names in question were different, and (b) that the name
alleged to be false was in fact false; and that the failure of
the Government to meet these, or either these,
requirements must result in an acquittal.

It is contended on this appeal that the Government did not

meet either of these requirements. Counsel says:

Upon the issue as to whether the two names were

identical the evidence is to the effect that To Lee
Piu is the nearest that the word Toribio can be
written in Chinese characters, and that it is the
way in which a Chinese interpreter would
naturally write such a word.

With respect to the charge that the name used in the

application for a passport was a false name, counsel
contends that the allegation upon which that charge is

65
based was not proved by the Government. He says in of American officials engaged in permitting the entry of
brief: Chinese persons into American territory is to establish
and preserve the identity of the particular individual to be
Even were the testimony upon this issue admitted. Without the ability to identify all control over the
contradictory or doubtful, conceding for the sake admission of Chinese is lost. It is not to be believed that
of argument that the two names are legally an American official whose duty it is to enforce the laws
different, the burden would be clearly upon the pertaining to Chinese exclusion and to protect the territory
Government to show which was the true and of the United States from an invasion of Chinese laborers,
which was the false name; and having made their would inform a Chinaman desiring to enter American
election and alleged that one of the two names is territory that he might dispense with the only evidence
false, affirmative proof must be introduced in upon which an identification of him could be based. The
support of this issue. Christian name is without value for the purposes of
identification until after the surname is known.
We are satisfied on the whole case that the conviction
must stand. From the fact and circumstances in evidence That the name Toribio Jalijali was a false name as applied
it appears established beyond a reasonable doubt that the to the appellant in this case is in our judgment beyond
appellant used the name of another person for the question in the record. It is undoubted that To Lee Piu was
purpose of deceiving Government and, by that deception, the name by which the appellant was known in China. It
to obtain a passport. He came to the Philippine Islands as is the name he gave to the American consul and it is the
a Chinese person traveling for curiosity and pleasure. He only name he gave. He alleged that he was born in China
so represented himself to the American consul at Canton in October, 1878, and applied for a certificate which is
and, by that representation, obtained a section six required of Chinese persons only. Upon his own
certificate. In his application for that certificate he stated statements and the statement of his government he was
that he was a Chinese person, and that his name was To given a section six certificate. It would seem to us that
Lee Piu .He came to the Philippine Islands upon those these facts are sufficient to establish, prima facie at least,
representations; and, by virtue of the certificate obtained that the appellant is a Chinese person and a Chinese
thereby, was permitted to enter the country. Desiring to subject; that he was born in China in October, 1878; and
return to China, or travel in other parts of the world and, that his name is To Lee Piu. These facts being
at the same time, be permitted to return to the Philippine established it is incumbent on the appellant to relieve
Islands at will, he sought to obtain a passport as a citizen himself of the charge that, when he stated under oath in
of the Philippine Islands under the sovereignty of the his application for a passport that his name was Toribio
United States. In order to accomplish his purpose it was Jalijali and that he was born in Santa Cruz, Manila, on the
necessary for him to show to the authorities of the 27th of April, 1878, he did not tell the truth; or to give such
Philippine Islands issuing passport that he was in fact a proof with reference thereto as would raise in the mind of
citizen of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to a the trial court a reasonable doubt as to his true name. The
passport. He thereupon took unto himself a Filipino name, only evidence offered by the appellant in this connection
one not his own, and made his application for a passport was a certificate of baptism of an infant named Toribio
attaching to his application the name Toribio Jalijali. Jalijali, born in Santa Cruz, Manila, in April, 1878. The
names of several witnesses appear in this certificate.
None of them were produced on the trial; nor was it shown
As to the difference between the two names, To Lee Piu
that these witnesses, or any of them, were dead, or that
and Toribio Jalijali, a mere glance at, or a single
pronunciation of, the two names serves to demonstrate the appellant was unable to procure their presence at the
trial. No effort was made to find or offer as a witness his
beyond question their complete unlikeness. It is true that
alleged father or mother.
the name Toribio when pronounced by a Chinaman may
sound like To Lee Piu. But it must be observed, in the first
place, that the name assumed by the appellant and On the trial the appellant testified in the Chinese
signed to the application for a passport is not Toribio but language by means of a Chinese interpreter. He
Toribio Jalijali; and, in the second place, that the name showed no familiarity with the Spanish language
assumed by the appellant in China and that under which or with any of the Philippine dialects; and the trial
he presented himself to the American consul at Canton, court said, with reference to his personal
was not Toribio nor Toribio Jalijali, but To Lee Piu, thus appearance, that so far as could be judged from
clearly implying that he belonged to the family or tribe of all surface characteristics the defendant is in truth
To, and, therefore, was not of Philippine origin or birth. and in fact a Chinese person as he describes
The claim of the appellant that the clerk of the American himself in the Philippine Carnival certificate
consulate at Canton told him that, in making an Exhibit A; and adds: "A comparison of the two
application for a section six certificate it was unnecessary documents, the certificate Exhibit A and the
to give his surname, cannot be accepted. Such a application for passport, is alone sufficient to
contention is so unusual and so opposed to universal show that the defendant's statements are
experience that it must fall of its own weight. It seems unworthy of credence, that his claim is that he
incredible that an American consul, or any of his was born m in the Philippine Islands is false, and
responsible employees, would give such information to a that the name Toribio Jalijali now claimed by the
Chinese person applying for the privilege of entering defendant is false and assumed.
American territory. It cannot be accepted without strong
corroborative proof that an American consul, or his The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs
accredited representative, would inform the appellant that against the appellant. So ordered.
the most important of his two names, his family name,
could be omitted or entirely disregarded in a proceeding
having for its main purpose his identification. The
surname is the only name by which identification is
rendered possible. The Christian name, while being the
specific and individual name, is of no value whatever for
identification purposes. One of the most important duties
66
 first time in his brief on appeal and which would constitute
ground for a conclusion of guilt, can not be accepted by
this court as competent proof to supply fatal defects in the
complaint, nor as a basis upon which to sustain
conviction. Clayton v. State, 4 Tex, App., 515.)

6. PERJURY AS DEFINED BY STATUTE; DISTINCTION

BETWEEN PERJURY AND FALSE SWEARING. —
Perjury, as modified by statute, may be define to be the
willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood, under oath or
affirmation administered by authority of law, in a material
matter, the offense being enlarged and made to extend to
false oaths other than those taken in the course of judicial
proceedings. There is a distinction between perjury and
false swearing; the one is stubborn and corrupt, while the
other is simply not true and is lacking the elements which
go to constitute the crime of perjury. (Miller v. State, 15
Fla., 577.)
ARTICLE 183
7. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE;
[G.R. No. 5751. September 6, 1910. ]
PROSECUTION FOR PERJURY. — In some
jurisdictions, a prosecution for perjury is continued until
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOPE
the proceeding in which the perjury is continued until the
ESTRAÑA, Defendant-Appellant.
proceeding in which the perjury is alleged to the have
committed is ended. But, under the law of the Philippine
Vicente Franco, for Appellant.
Islands (Act No. 1697), it is not necessary that the
proceeding in which the perjury is alleged to have been
Attorney-General Villamor, for Appellee.
committed be terminated before prosecution for the crime
is commenced. (U.S. v. Concepcion, 13 Phil. Rep., 424.)
SYLLABUS
The contrary rule obtained under the Penal Code. (U.S. v.
Opinion, 6 Phil. Rep., 662; U.S. v. Adolfo, 12 Phil. Rep.,
1. THE LAW OF PERJURY IN THE PHILIPPINE
296.)
ISLANDS. — The provisions of the Penal Code relative to
false swearing were repealed by Act No. 1697, and this
Act now constitutes the general law of perjury in this DECISION
jurisdiction. (U.S. v. Concepcion, 13 Phil. Rep., 424.)

2. PERJURY; FALSE TESTIMONY, TO CONSTITUTE

TRENT, J. :
PERJURY, MUST BE MATERIAL AND MUST BE SO
ESTABLISHED. — False testimony, in order to become
punishable under the law of perjury, must be material to The complaint filed in this case is a
some issue involved in the cause wherein such false
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
testimony is alleged to have been given; Revised
Statutes, sec. 5392; U.S. v. Landsberg, 23 Fed. Rep., "That on the 26th of July, 1909, in the municipality of
585; State v. Hattaway, 10 Am. Dec., 580) Materiality Bacolod, Province of Negros Occcidental, Philippine
must be established by evidence and can not be left to Islands, the said Lope Estraña, having been duly sworn
presumption or inference. (30 Cyc., 1443, and cases
as a witness in the Court of First Instance of the said
cited.)
province in criminal case No. 1055 , entitled "United
States v. Gil Gamao Et. Al.," 1 for murder, illegally,
3. ID.; "MATERIAL MATTER" DEFINED. — The term maliciously, willfully, and falsely testified and declared,
"material matter" means the main fact which was the under oath, that on the 15th day of May, 1909, one
subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to Dionisio Tambolero came to his house in Japitan, within
prove the fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to
the jurisdiction of the municipality of Escalante, in said
corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the
province, at about 7 p.m. on the said 15th day of May,
subject of the inquiry, or which legitimately affects the
1909, and that he remained in the house of the said
credits of any witness who testifies. (In Franklin Country accused (Lope Estraña) until the following day; when, as
5 Ohio S. & c. Pl. Dec., 691; 7 Ohio, N. p., 250; People v. a matter of fact, and as the accused, Lope Estraña, well
Greenwell, 5 Utah, 112, 13 Pac. Rep., 89.) knew, the said Dionisio Tambolero was not at Japitan on
the said 15th day of May; all of which was in violation of
4. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; FATAL
the statutes in such case made and provided."cralaw
DEFECTS IN COMPLAINT; OBJECTION ON APPEAL;
virtua1aw library
DEFECTS CURED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. —
Where a complaint is fatally defective, either in form or in The accused was arraigned, plead not guilty, tried,
substance, and no objection is taken at the trial but is convicted, and sentenced to be confined in the Insular
raised for the first time on appeal, it is not error for this
penitentiary, for the period of one year and one day, and
court to refuse to sustain such objection when the fatal
"to hereafter be incapable of holding any public office or
defects are supplied by competent proofs. (Serra v. of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands,"
Mortiga, 204, 204 U.S., 470, reported in 11 Phil., Rep., and to pay the costs of the cause. He appealed to this
762.) court.
5. ID.; ADMISSIONS BY COUNSEL MADE FOR FIRST
The Roman Catholic priest in charge of the parish in the
TIME ON APPEAL, NOT COMPETENT. — A mere
town of Escalante, Province of Occidental Negros, was
statement by the counsel for the accused, made for the
67
fatally wounded on the night of May 15, 1909, and died appellant’s house. Considering the distance from the
about 5 a.m. on the following morning. Subsequently appellant’s house to the town of Escalante, which requires
thereto criminal case No. 1055, wherein the United States at least two and one-half hours, either by land of water,
was plaintiff and Gill Gamao Et. Al. were defendants, and the difficulties to be encountered in making this
charged with the assassination of the said priest, was journey, it was a physical impossibility for Tambolero to
instituted in the Court of First Instance in the said have left the house of the appellant at the time stated by
province. The appellant, Lope Estraña, was called as a him (the appellant) and to have arrived at the convent at
witness for the defense in said criminal case and after the time he appeared there to assist in the burial of the
being duly sworn according to law, testified, among other priest. The appellant, Lope Estraña, did therefore
things, that he was then living in the barrio of Japitan, knowingly and intentionally testify falsely, under oath,
jurisdiction of the said town of Escalante, and that one before a legally constituted tribunal, when he swore that
Dionisio Tambolero came to his house in the said barrio Tambolero passed the night of May 15 in his (appellant’s)
about 7 p.m. on May 15, 1909, and remained there all house.
night, leaving about 5 a.m. on the following morning. The
prosecuting officers, believing this testimony to be false, The prosecution in this case is based on the said false
filed a complaint against the appellant, charging him with testimony of the appellant given in criminal case No.
the crime of perjury. On the trial of this case in the court 1055. It may be inferred that Dionisio Tambolero was a
below the appellant again testified that the said material witness for the prosecution in said criminal case
Tambolero passed the night of May 15, 1909, at his No. 1055. If said Tambolero did, in fact, testify as a
house, and called as witnesses to corroborate him on this witness for the prosecution in that case, the record of the
point his wife and stepson who did in fact corroborate the case at bar fails to disclose what his testimony was.
testimony of the appellant, in that the said Tambolero Tambolero did not state that he was a witness in the said
came to the appellant’s house and passed the night of murder case (No. 1055), neither did he make any
May 15 there, but they could not specifically state the hour reference to what he knew, if anything, about the
he left the following morning. commission of that murder; but on the contrary, reading
his testimony alone, it would appear that he knew nothing
Dionisio Tambolero testified in this case that he did not about the facts surrounding the commission of the crime,
know exactly where the defendant’s house is situated in as he stated that after leaving the Chinese store he went
the barrio of Japitan and that he never was at any time in to his own house, slept in the house of one of his
the house of the defendant in the said barrio; that on the employees, and was informed the following morning by a
morning of the 15th of May, 1909, he went to the church policeman that the murder had been committed. The only
in Escalante, heard mass, and returned to his house in reference to the testimony of Tambolero in said murder
the said town of Escalante; that at about 4 o’clock in the case appears in the appellant’s brief, wherein his counsel
afternoon he returned to the sacristia, arriving there about states that "In said case (referring to criminal case No.
5 o’clock that afternoon, had a conversation with Natalio 1055) a witness for the prosecution, called Dionisio
In son about certain baptisms which had taken place on Tambolero, testified that on the night of May 15, 1909,
that afternoon, and that on leaving the sacristia he went when the murder was committed he saw Mauricio
to the store of one Jose Nieva and remained there until Gamao, with a bolo in his hand, come out of the lower part
about 6:30 or 7 o’clock in the evening; that on leaving this of the convent." (Mauricio Gamao was one of the
store he returned to his own house and later went to the defendants charged with the assassination of the priest in
house of his compadre; that he and his family did not case No. 1055.) If this statement of counsel for the
sleep in his own house on the night of May 15 on account appellant be accepted as true, then Tambolero did testify
of it being used for the storage of tobacco, but that they that he saw one of the defendants in that case (No. 1055)
did sleep in the next house, which was owned by an on the night of the murder leaving the lower part of the
employee of his; that the next morning, when he was convent with a bolo in his hand. This statement of counsel
informed by a policeman named Clemente Magallon of will be considered later.
what had happened to the priest on the night before, he
went direct to the convent, arriving there a few minutes Counsel for the appellant insists that the court below
after 5 o’clock; that within one-half hour after he arrived at should have dismissed this case for the reason that the
the convent Gregorio Tudanca gave him some money facts perjury as defined and punished by Act No. 1697,
and sent to a Chinese store to buy nails to be used in basing his contention on the ground that in order to
making a casket for the deceased priest. sustain a conviction under said Act it was necessary to
show that the appellant had testified twice about a certain
According to the testimony of this witness he did not leave matter, his latter testimony being contradictory of his
the town of Escalante at any time during the night of May former, and as he had only testified once he should have
15, 1909. He was in the sacristia of the church at 4 o’clock been charged with the crime of false swearing (false
on the afternoon of May 15, and was at the convent the testimonio), under the provisions of Chapter VI of the
following morning just a few minutes after 5 o’clock. The Penal Code.
testimony of this witness as to the time he was at the
sacristia on the afternoon of the 15th of May is Section 3 of Act No. 1697 is as
corroborated by the testimony of Natalio In son, and his follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
testimony with reference to the time he went to the
convent on the following morning is corroborated in every "Any person who, having taken an oath before a
particular by the testimony of Gregorio Tudanca, competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which
Celedonia Samonte, and Vicente Olmedo, all of whom a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be
testified positively that they saw the said Tambolero at the administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or
convent about 5 o’clock on the morning of the 16th of May certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration,
assisting in the preparation of the body of the deceased deposition, or certificate by him subscribed in true, willfully
priest for interment. So it has been conclusively and contrary to such oath states or subscribed any
established that Dionisio Tambolero did not go to the material matter which he does not believe to be true, is
house of the appellant in the barrio of Japitan on May 15, guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not
neither did he spend the night of the 15th of May in the more than five years; and shall, moreover, thereafter be

68
incapable of holding any public office or of giving the attention of the trial court, the prosecuting officers, and
testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such counsel for the Appellant. It is not mentioned anywhere in
time as the judgment against him is reversed."cralaw the record, nor in the briefs filed in this court.
virtua1aw library
As we have said, the appellant willfully and contrary to the
This section specifically provides that any person who has oath which he had taken, testified in said criminal case
taken an oath before a competent tribunal that he will No. 1055 that Tambolero came to his house about 7 p.m.
testify truly or that any written testimony by him on May 15 and remained there until 5 a.m. of the next day.
subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath, This testimony was false, but the record does not disclose
states or subscribes to any material matter which he does (aside from the statement of counsel before mentioned)
not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury. This section whether or not this false testimony did affect, or could
does not impliedly require as an essential element of the have in any way affected, the questions involved in said
crime of perjury that a defendant who is prosecuted for murder case.
having violated these provisions should have testified
twice in any case or in any investigation, his second It is now necessary to determine whether or not the
testimony being contradictory of his firs, but he can be appellant is guilty of the crime of perjury under section 3
charged and convicted of the crime of perjury if he willfully of Act No. 1697, above quoted (the provisions of the
testifies, under oath, as provided in said section, to any Penal Code with reference to false testimony having been
material matter which he does not believe to be true. repealed by Act No. 1697), when it is not alleged in the
complaint, nor does it appear from the record, that the
In the case of the United States v. Concepcion (13 Phil. false testimony given by the appellant in said criminal
Rep., 424), the defendants were inspectors of the election case No. 1055 was material to the issue involved therein.
board in the municipality of Calibo, Province of Capiz, in
the election for Delegates held on the 31st of July, 1907. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, it is well settled
The defendants were accused and convicted for having that an indictment for perjury must show conclusively that
violated the provisions of the Election Law, in that they the testimony given or assertion made by the defendant
refused to inscribe the name of one Esteban Leocario and charged to be false was material to the issue on the
without just cause. The point in controversy in said case trial on which he was sworn or it will be fatally defective.
was whether or not Esteban Leocario appeared before This may be done either by a direct allegation that it was
the inspectors (the accused) in order to have his name material, or by the allegation of facts from which its
registered in the electoral list. The accused were materiality will appear. (30 Cyc., 1433, and U.S. v.
convicted of having violated the provision of the Esteban Singleton, 54 Fed. Rep., 488; U.S. v. Cowing, 25 Fed.
Law and on appeal to this court the sentence and Cas., No. 14880, 4 Cranch C.C., 613; Hembree v. State,
judgment of the lower court was affirmed. The defendants 52 Ga., 242; State v. Anderson, 103 Ind., 170; State v.
having testified in that case the said Esteban Leocario did Gibson, 26 La. Ann., 71; State v. Williams, 60 Kan,., 837;
not appear before them on the day alleged, to have his People v. Ah Bean, 77 Cal., 12; Gibson v. State, 47 Fla.,
name registered as an elector, the prosecution filed a State v. Cunningham, 66 Iowa, 94; People v. , Collier, 1
complaint against the said defendants charging them with Mich., 137; Wood v. People, 59 N.Y., 117; Buller v. State,
the crime of perjury. The fact in controversy in both cases 33 Tex Cr., 551, and numerous other cases cited.)
was only one, namely; the appearance or nonappearance
of Esteban Leocario before the election inspector. The No objections to the sufficiency of the complaint made
defendants having been convicted of the crime of perjury, were in the court below, and it is now well settled was it is
they appealed, and this court, in passing upon the not error for this court to refuse to sustain using objection
questions involved, said (pp. 425, taken for the first time on appeal when the fatal defects in
429):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph the complaint are supplied by competence proof. (Serra
v. Mortiga, 204 U.S. 420, reported in 11 Phil. Rep., 762.)
"The important question in the case, however, is whether
this offense is to be punished by the provisions of the The complaint in the case at bar is fatally defective for the
Penal Code, articles 318 and following, or whether these want of an allegation that the testimony, alleged to be
articles have been impliedly repealed by section 3 of Act false, was material to the issues involved in the murder
No. 1697. If the case falls within the provisions of the case. Our statute (section 3 of Act No. 1697 supra)
Penal Code and those provisions are still in force, the specifically makes materially an essential element of the
judgment must be reversed, because this case for perjury crime of perjury and without this the crime can not legally
was tried and decided in the court below before the exist. As no objection to the sufficiency on the complaint
termination of the case in which the false testimony was was raised this fatal defect could have been supplied by
given. competent testimony on the trial.

x x x The materiality of a matter sworn to must be established

by evidence and can not be left to the presumption or
inference. (30 Cyv., 1443, and Nelson v. State, 32 Ark.,
"Our conclusion is that the articles of the Penal Code 192; Mackin v. People, 115 III., 312; State v. Aikens, 32
relating to perjury have been repealed, and that the crime Iowa, 403; Wood v. People, 59 N.Y., 117; Garrett v. State,
is now defined and punished by section 3 of Act No. 37 Tex, Cr., 198.)
1697."cralaw virtua1aw library
The term "material matter" means the main fact which
So the reason given by counsel for the appellant as to the was the subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is untenable, tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which
but there is a good reason why the complaint is tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative
insufficient in law, and that is that there is no allegation in to the subject of the inquiry, or which legitimately affects
this complaint that the testimony of the appellant in the credit of any witness who testifies. (In re Franklin
criminal case No. 1055 was material to the issues Country, 5 Ohio S. & C. Pl. Dec., 691; 7 Ohio, N.P., 450;
involved in said case. This question apparently escaped People v. Greenwell, 5 Utah, 112, 13 Pac., 89.)

69
 the United States until such time as the judgment against
By the common law perjury is the willful and corrupt taking him is reversed."cralaw virtua1aw library
of a false oath, lawfully administered in a judicial
proceeding or the course of justice in regard to a matter The essential parts of this section (5392) and section 3 of
material to the issue or point of inquiry. (30 Cyc., 1399, Act No. 1697 are exactly the same. It is also true that
and cases cited therein.) section 3 of our perjury law is practically the same as that
of nearly all of the States of the Union wherein materially
This definition of perjury, as modified by statute, may be is made, by statute, an element of the crime.
more accurately defined to be the willful and corrupt
assertion of a falsehood, under oath or affirmation An essential element of the offense created by the statute
administered by authority of law, in a material matter, the (section 5392, Rev. Stat.) is the materially of the matter
offense being enlarged and made to extend to other false charged to have been falsely stated. (U.S. v. Landsberg,
oaths than those taken in the course of judicial 23 Fed. Rep., 585.)
proceedings. (30 Cyc., 1400, and cases cited.)
In some jurisdictions the prosecution of perjury is
In the case of The State v. Hattaway (10 Am. Dec., 580) continued until the proceeding in which the perjury is
one Shackleford having been indicated for stealing a cow alleged to have been committed has been ended, but
and afterwards discharged brought an action against the under our law (Act No. 1697) it is not necessary that the
prosecution for malicious prosecution. In this action proceeding in which the perjury was committed should be
Hattaway was called as a witness and testified that terminated before prosecution for that crime is
Shackleford purchased the cow in question from one commenced. (U.S. v. Concepcion, supra.) The contrary
Carter, and that he was present at the time. Being asked rule obtained for prosecution under the provisions of the
where he lived at the time, he said, "Near Carter’s; Penal Code. (U.S. v. Opinion, 6 Phil. Rep., 662; and U.S.
perhaps within 100 yards;" whereas it was proved that he v. Adolfo, 12 Phil. Rep., 296.)
did not live in the State. The perjury assigned was his
false testimony as to where he lived. The trial court Where materiality is made by statute, as in Act No. 1697,
instructed the jury that the testimony was not material so an essential element of the crime of perjury, the doctrine
as to constitute perjury, but the jury thought otherwise and of the courts that it must be shown by competent proof
found the defendant guilty. The defendant then moved to that the false testimony was material to the issues
set aside the verdict as contrary to the law, and the court involved, is settled beyond question. This doctrine
in passing upon this motion said (p. pervades the entire adjudged law on the subject.
581):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Wherever we more in this department of our
jurisprudence we come in contact with it. We can no more
"It seems to be agreed by all the writers on criminal law, escape from it than from the atmosphere which surrounds
that one ingredients in the crime of perjury is that the oath us."cralaw virtua1aw library
relate to some matter material to the question in issue: . .
. There can be no doubt but that an extra-judicial oath, or Aside from the statement of counsel in his brief,
one relating to a matter utterly immaterial, or even an heretofore referred to, the prosecution has failed to
impious oath, taken in idle conversation, may be as establish the legal guilt of the accused of the crime of
offensive in the eye of heaven as the most solemn oath perjury, inasmuch as it has not been proven in any
taken in a court of justice. But there are many offenses manner that the false testimony of the appellant was
against morality and religion which are not cognizable in material in the murder case.
courts of justice. For such offense, a man is answerable
only to his God, and not to the laws of his country. . . We shall now determine in what way, if any, the said
statement of counsel can affect the guilt of the accused.
"There is no offense the general character of which is As we have said, he has not committed a crime (if this
better understood than that of perjury; and no point better statement of counsel does not affect the result) for which
settled, perhaps, than that the oath must relate to some he can be punished under the law in force in this
fact material to the issue.’ jurisdiction. In order to sustain a conviction based on a
fatally defective complaint, the defects must be supplied
There is a distinction between perjury and false swearing; by competent proof. Counsel in his printed brief in this
the one is stubborn and corrupt while the other is simply court states that the witness Tambolero testified in said
not true, lacking the elements which go to constitute the murder case that when the murder was committed he saw
crime of perjury. (Miller v. State, 15 Fla., 577.) one of the defendants come out of the lower part of the
convent with a bolo in his hand. This is not a confession,
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 is a copy, with the necessary as there is a marked difference between a confession and
changes only, of section 5392 of the Revised Statutes of such a statement, but this is purely a statement by
the United States. This section (5392) is as counsel made in the appellant court. It is more than
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph probable that the appellant himself knows nothing of this
statement; no doubt he has never seen the brief filed in
"Every person who, having taken an oath before a this case. So such a statement made for the first time on
competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which appeal is not competent proof to establish the guilt of the
a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be appellant when such guilt must depend solely upon the
administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or said statement. Counsel for appellant was not authorized
certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, by his client to make this statement.
deposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully
and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any In the case of Sweet Clayton v. State (4 Tex. App., 515),
material matter which he does not believe to be true, is George Spears and Sweet Clayton were indicated in the
guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not district court of Uvalde, Texas, for the crime of conveying,
more than two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment, at or causing to be conveyed, into the jail of Uvalde Country,
hard labor, not more than five years; and shall, moreover, certain instrument for the purpose of aiding two prisoners
thereafter be incapable of giving testimony in any court of to make their escape. A motion for the arrest of the

70
judgment was made in the court of appeals, based on the ANTONIO B. MONFORT III and ILDEFONSO B.
ground of the insufficiency of the indictment. The court did MONFORT, Petitioners,
not sustain the contention of counsel for the defendants, vs.
but on its own motion reversed the judgment on another MA. ANTONIA M. SALVATIERRA, PAUL MONFORT,
ground which was not raised by counsel and which RAMON H. MONFORT, JACQUELINE M. YUSAY,
referred to the admission made by defendant’s counsel, YVETTE M. BENEDICTO, ESTER S. MONFORT,
and in passing upon this question the court, speaking SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and CITY PROSECUTOR
through Mr. Justice White, said (p. OF CADIZ CITY,Respondents.
518):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
DECISION
"The charge of the court, which was otherwise
unexceptionable, presents an error which will necessitate
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
a reversal of the case. In the fourth subdivision of the
charge the jury are told that it is admitted by the
defendant’s counsel that John Woods and Lark Clayton In this Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
were prisoners legally confirmed in the country jail of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners Antonio B.
Uvalde Country, on an accusation of felony, to wit, theft of Monfort III and Ildefonso B. Monfort seek to set aside the
a cow. As was said in the case of Nels v. The State: "The Decision dated 28 January 20052 and Resolution dated
prisoner’s counsel had no authority to make any 26 May 20053 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
statement or admission to supply the palce or have the 67109. In its Decision and Resolution, the Court of
force of evidence against him. No confession of theirs Appeals affirmed the Resolutions dated 11 October
could bind or affect him. Their admissions could not in law 20004 and 15 August 2001,5 of the Secretary of Justice
prejudice or affect his rights; nor could they be in any wise which dismissed the petitioners’ criminal complaint for
jeopardized by the assumption of any grounds whatever perjury against private respondents Ma. Antonia M.
upon which his defense may have been placed by his Salvatierra, Paul Monfort, Ramon H. Monfort, Jacqueline
counsel. Whether those grounds were correct or M. Yusay, Yvette M. Benedicto and Ester S. Monfort.
incorrect, true or false, was wholly immaterial. That was
not the question for the consideration of the jury, whose The factual antecedents are as follows:
duty it was to decide the question of the guilt or innocence
upon the law as given them by the court, and the evidence Petitioners are children of the late Antonio H. Monfort, Jr.,
as given by the witness, irrespective of any admissions by one of the original stockholders/incorporators of the
the prisoner’s counsel, or any grounds upon which they Monfort Hermanos Agricultural Development Corporation
may have rested his defense."cralaw virtua1aw library (MHADC).6 On 28 October 1998, petitioners filed a letter-
complaint for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised
In this case, defendant’s counsel no doubt admitted in Penal Code before the City Prosecutor of Cadiz against
open court, at the time the defendant were on trial and in private respondents. The case was docketed as I.S. No.
their presence, that the said Woods and Clayton were 8009. In the said complaint, petitioners claimed that the
prisoners legally confined. It does not appear that the private respondents made false statements in their
defendants made any objections to the said admission. respective counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998 which
Notwithstanding all these facts the court reversed the the latter had executed and submitted to the City
judgment solely for this reason. Prosecutor of Cadiz in connection with another complaint
for perjury, docketed as I.S. No. 7883, earlier filed by the
In the case at bar we do not find it necessary to go as far petitioners against the private respondents. The alleged
as the Texas court did, for the reason that the statement false statements referred to the declarations of the private
of counsel for the appellant was not made in the trial court respondents that the 1996 annual stockholders’ meeting
and this record fails to disclose whether said statement of the MHADC was held on 16 October 1996, and that
was made in the presence of the accused; but it does they were elected as board directors of the MHADC
conclusively show that the same was made for the first during the same meeting. Petitioners insisted that the
time in the printed brief on appeal. So much a statement 1996 annual stockholders’ meeting of the MHADC was
can not be accepted as competent proof of supply the held, not on 16 October 1996, but on 27 November 1996
fatal defects in the complaint and form the basis upon as stated in the 1996 General Information Sheet (GIS)
which a conviction can be entered. accomplished by the MHADC and submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Iloilo
Our conclusions are, therefore, that the appellant is not Extension Office. Further, there is nothing in the 1996 GIS
guilty of the crime of perjury for the reasons above set of the MHADC which states that an election of the board
forth. The judgment is reversed and the appellant of directors of the MHADC took place on 16 October
acquitted, with costs de oficio. 1996.7

Subsequently, private respondents filed their joint

counter-affidavits dated 9 December 1998 in I.S. No.
8009 before the City Prosecutor of Cadiz. They alleged
that they are stockholders of record of the MHADC; that a
stockholders’ meeting of the MHADC was held on 16
October 1996 where they were elected as board directors
Republic of the Philippines of MHADC; that the MHADC’s corporate accountant,
SUPREME COURT Litonjua, Desabelle and Associates (LDA), was
Manila responsible for the preparation of the MHADC’s GIS; that
the LDA made erroneous statements in the 1996 GIS of
MHADC; that the erroneous statements refer to the date
THIRD DIVISION
of the MHADC’s annual stockholders’ meeting and the
persons composing the MHADC’s board of directors; that
G.R. No. 168301 March 5, 2007 the LDA had admitted having committed such honest
71
error; that the LDA had rectified the same by submitting a State Prosecutor Vicente E. Aragona (Prosecutor
letter to the SEC informing the latter that the annual Aragona) denied due course to petitioners’ appeal as the
stockholders’ meeting of the MHADC for the year 1996 same was filed out of time.14 Petitioners filed a motion for
was held on 16 October 1996 and not on 27 November reconsideration but the same was dismissed by
1996; that what transpired on 27 November 1996 was not Prosecutor Aragona in his Resolution dated 22 December
the annual stockholders’ meeting of the MHADC but 1999.15Prosecutor Aragona sustained the claim of the
merely a special meeting of the board of directors thereof; private respondents that the annual stockholders meeting
and, that, the private respondents were elected as board of the MHADC was held on 16 October 1996 at Agmac
directors of the MHADC during the annual stockholders’ Building, Bacolod City, where they were elected as board
meeting on 16 October 1996.8 directors since this is supported by evidence on record
consisting of the notices of stockholders’ meeting and
Private respondents thus argue that they cannot be held registry return receipt.16 He also affirmed that patent
liable for perjury since one of the elements of perjury errors were committed in the preparation of the 1996 GIS
under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is that the of the MHADC. Pertinent portions of the 22 December
assertion of falsehood must be willful and deliberate; that 1999 Resolution of Prosecutor Aragona reads:
the terms willful and deliberate imply malice and evil intent
in asserting falsehood; and that this element is lacking in We then ruled and so rules here, that an erroneous
the case at bar.9 document is incorrect and therefore not the truth. It cannot
be used as basis to charge the respondents for Perjury,
Thereafter, Investigating Prosecutor Abraham E. Tionko for the simple reason that it is not an evidence that they
(Investigator Tionko) issued a Resolution dated 14 April lied under oath. In fact, it is an evidence not only of it being
1999 in I.S. No. 8009 dismissing the letter-complaint for an incorrect document but also of the fact that the
perjury of the petitioners for lack of probable November 27, 1996 meeting written in it was a mistake
cause.10Investigator Tionko noted that the statements in and that the dead persons listed as elected officers in that
the 1996 GIS of the MHADC are indeed erroneous. The meeting is likewise a mistake. This evidence has no
1996 GIS stated that the stockholders’ meeting and probative value to establish prima facie case for perjury
election of the board of directors took place on 27 because of its nature as being worthless due to its
November 1996. If such information were true and inherent incredibility to establish that November 27, 1996
correct, then according to Investigator Tionko, it would is the true date of the Annual Stockholders’ Meeting of the
have been impossible for some of the board directors to Monfort Hermanos Agricultural Development
be elected as such on 27 November 1996 since they were Corporation.
already deceased at that time.11Moreover, if the 1996
annual stockholders’ meeting of MHADC was indeed held In view of the foregoing, the appeal should be, as it is
on 27 November 1996 which fell on a Wednesday, it hereby dismissed.17
would have been inconsistent with the by-laws of the
MHADC which states that the annual stockholders’ Petitioners, then, appealed to the Secretary of Justice.
meeting of the MHADC shall be held on the last Thursday Finding no reversible error in Prosecutor Aragona’s
of November, which, according to the 1996 calendar, fell Resolution dated 22 December 1999, Undersecretary of
on 28 November 1996. Justice Regis V. Puno dismissed petitioners’ appeal in his
Resolution dated 11 October 2000,18 to wit:
As to the matter of whether or not the stockholders may
hold their annual meeting on a date other than that This resolves the appeal from the resolution of the
specified in its by-laws, Investigator Tionko opined that Regional State Prosecutor, Region VI, Iloilo City in the
such is not within the province of his office to rule.12 above-entitled case dismissing the complaint against Ma.
Antonia M. Salvatierra, et. al. for perjury.1avvphil.net
He, thereafter, made the following findings: that it was not
impossible for the MHADC stockholders to have Section 9 of Department Order No. 223 dated June 30
conducted their annual meeting on 16 October 1996; that 1993, as amended, (now Section 12 in relation to Section
there would have been willful and deliberate assertion of 7 of Department Circular No. 70 dated 3 July 2000),
falsehood on the part of the private respondents only if no prescribing rules on appeals from resolution in preliminary
error was committed in the preparation of the 1996 GIS of investigations provides that the Secretary of Justice may,
MHADC; that private respondent Ramon H. Monfort was motu proprio, dismiss outright an appeal if there is
not aware of the said errors at the time he subscribed and showing of any reversible error in the questioned
swore to the correctness of the 1996 GIS of MHADC as resolution. We have carefully examined the record of the
Vice-President thereof; that upon the discovery of the case and we found no such error committed by the
errors, the LDA sent a letter to the SEC providing the latter prosecutor that would justify a reversal of his resolution,
with the correct information; that such should be which is in accord with the law and evidence on the
considered as mere negligence and imprudence on the matter.
part of private respondent Ramon H. Monfort; and that the
crime of perjury cannot be committed by negligence or
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
imprudence. The dispositive portion of Investigator
hereby DISMISSED.19
Tionko’s Resolution states:
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of
WHEREFORE, the undersigned believes there is no
Undersecretary Puno’s Resolution dated 11 October
probable cause to support a finding of perjury against all
2000 but this was denied in the Resolution dated 15
of the respondents and this complaint is hereby
August 2001 of Undersecretary of Justice Manuel A.J.
dismissed.13 Teehankee since no new matter was raised to warrant the
review of the same,20 viz:
Petitioners appealed the aforementioned Resolution to
the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor for Region VI.
A perusal of the motion shows no new matter which was
In his Resolution dated 19 November 1999, Regional not taken into consideration in our review of the case.
72
Hence, we find no compelling reason to alter or modify stockholders who were already deceased as elected
our resolution. board directors of MHADC;28 b) the alleged errors in the
1996 GIS of the MHADC, particularly in the composition
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby of the alleged elected board of directors, is belied by the
DENIED with finality.21 1997 GIS of MHADC filed by private respondent Ramon
H. Monfort which reiterated the names of the deceased
stockholders as elected directors of MHADC; this is not
Petitioners appealed the resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice dated 11 October 2000 and 15 August 2001, just one mistake but two mistakes already; c) there was
respectively, to the Court of Appeals. On 28 January ill-motive on the part of the private respondents when it
sent, through LDA, a letter to the SEC to correct the
2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming
alleged errors because at the time such letter was
the said resolutions.22 It ruled that the Secretary of Justice
received by the SEC, the City Prosecutor of Cadiz had
did not commit grave abuse of discretion since its non-
already issued a resolution in I.S. No. 7883 finding
finding of probable cause for perjury against private
respondents is based on law, jurisprudence and evidence probable cause for perjury against private respondents;
on records. It also held that the private respondents had and d) at the time of the correction of errors, a total of six
or more criminal cases for perjury were already filed by
sufficiently established the fact that a stockholders’
the petitioners against private respondents and some are
meeting of the MHADC actually took place on 16 October
still pending resolution.29
1996, and that they were elected during the said meeting
as board directors. It further stated that willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood, as one of the elements Petitioners further asseverated that the private
of perjury, is not present in the instant case.23 The fallo of respondents’ statements in their respective counter-
the assailed Decision reads: affidavits dated 11 June 1998 in I.S. No. 7883 that they
were elected board directors during the 16 October 1996
annual stockholders’ meeting show willful and deliberate
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises,
judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the assertion of falsehood since the private respondents had
made these same statements as their bases in filing civil
petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the Resolutions
cases for forcible entry and delivery of personal property
dated October 11, 2000 and August 15, 2001
against petitioners which cases, however, were
respectively, issued by the public respondent Secretary of
eventually dismissed by this Court in G.R. No. 152542
Justice.24
and No. 155472.30They posited that this Court had
dismissed the civil cases as the private respondents failed
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the to establish the fact that they were duly elected as board
same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution directors of MHADC and, as such, were not authorized to
dated 26 May 2005.25 file the said cases. Based on these premises, petitioners
concluded that there is more than enough evidence to
Petitioners filed the present petition raising the sole issue support the finding of probable cause for perjury against
of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming private respondents.31
the findings of the Secretary of Justice that there is no
probable cause to indict the private respondents for the These contentions are devoid of merit.
crime of perjury.26
It should be emphasized at the outset that the function of
According to the petitioners, the insistence of the private a preliminary investigation is to determine whether there
respondents that the annual stockholders’ meeting of is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
MHADC took place on 16 October 1996, and that they a crime has been committed and the respondent is
were elected during the said meeting as board directors probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.32 It is
constitute willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the
because it is not in harmony with the constitution and by- prosecutor determines the existence of a probable cause
laws of MHADC which provides that the annual that would warrant the prosecution of a case.33 Probable
stockholders’ meeting and the election of board directors cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has
shall be held every last Thursday of November for each been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender
year. They stressed the fact that the date 16 October a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
1996 is not the last Thursday of November in the year and that the private respondent is probably guilty thereof.
1996. They also claimed that the notices of meeting dated It is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as
1 October 1996 received by the private respondents are would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
"incompetent" to prove that the annual stockholders’ believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a
meeting and the election of directors of the MHADC took thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive
place on 16 October 1996. Further, the intent of the cause;" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
private respondents to commit a willful and deliberate based on opinion and reasonable belief.34
assertion of falsehood is evident in the 1996 GIS of the
MHADC which does not specify that an election of board
In this proceeding, the prosecutor is vested with authority
directors took place on 16 October 1996.27
and discretion to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to justify the filing of corresponding
Petitioners also averred that the correction of the alleged information.35 If the prosecutor found probable cause to
erroneous entries in the 1996 GIS of MHADC was made indict the respondent for a criminal offense, it is his duty
by the LDA, MHADC’s corporate accountant, only after to file the corresponding information in court.36 However,
the lapse of two years from the execution of the said it is equally his duty not to prosecute when after an
document. They argued that the same was a futile attempt investigation, the evidence adduced is not sufficient to
on the part of the private respondents to escape criminal establish a prima facie case.37 We explained the rationale
liability since: a) at the time the corrections were made, in the case of People v. Pineda,38 thus:
they had already charged private respondent Ramon H.
Monfort with perjury and falsification of private document
for including in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC the names of
73
A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under same under oath; that he was not, however, aware of the
no compulsion to file a particular criminal information erroneous statements therein at the time when he signed
where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop it; that it was LDA as MHADC’s corporate accountant
up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand which had solely prepared the 1996 GIS of the MHADC;
points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the that he always relied on the accuracy of LDA; that he
possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the hastily signed it since, at that time, the LDA representative
prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a was in a hurry to beat the deadline in submitting the same
prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to to the SEC; that after being informed of the erroneous
work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should statements, the LDA sent a letter to the SEC informing the
give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in latter of the mistakes and supplying the correct
our courts being unnecessarily swamped with informations therein; that the erroneous statements were
unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect’s right due to the oversight of the LDA; and, that he admitted that
to due process - the sporting idea of fair play - may be he was negligent in not carefully reading and analyzing
transgressed. x x x. the statements therein.42

Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood The naïve reliance of the private respondents on the
under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law foregoing circumstances in executing their respective
on a material matter.39 Article 183 of the Revised Penal counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998 negates willful and
Code states the definition of and penalty for perjury, thus: deliberate assertion of falsehood. Perjury being a felony
by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in accused.43 Willfully means intentionally, with evil intent
solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its and legal malice, with consciousness that the alleged
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should
period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly be received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is
make untruthful statements and not being included in the equivalent to "knowingly." "Deliberately" implies
provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify "meditated" as distinguished from "inadvertent acts." It
under oath or make an affidavit, upon any material matter must appear that the accused knows his statement to be
before a competent person authorized to administer an false or is consciously ignorant of its truth.44
oath in cases in which the law so requires.
In this case, the private respondents believed in good faith
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in that, based on the above-explained events, their
lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods statements in their respective counter- affidavits dated 11
mentioned made in this and the three preceding articles June 1998 are true and correct. Good faith or lack of
of this section shall suffer the respective penalties malice is a valid defense vis-a-vis the allegation of
provided therein. deliberate assertion of falsehood in perjury cases.45

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the elements of It should also be borne in mind that perjury cannot be
perjury are as follows: willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction
as to its truth. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement
(a) That the accused made a statement under is an adequate defense.46 The private respondents had
oath or executed an affidavit upon a material consistently claimed that the 1996 GIS of the MHADC is
erroneous on its face. They have maintained all along
matter.
their stand that the annual stockholders meeting of the
MHADC was held on 16 October 1996 and not on 27
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made November 1996. They also submitted documentary
before a competent officer, authorized to receive evidence to prove that the annual stockholders’ meeting
and administer oath. took place on 16 October 1996, and that the LDA had
already communicated to the SEC the mistakes and
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused corrections in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC.47 In addition
made a willful and deliberate assertion of a thereto, they also submitted a letter coming from the SEC
falsehood. which acknowledged the corrections therein and had
noted that the same now form part of the records of the
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit MHADC.48
containing the falsity is required by law or made
for a legal purpose.40 Further, the Secretary of Justice had found that the 1996
GIS of the MHADC is patently erroneous. It concluded
The third element of perjury requires that the accused had that the same is worthless and has no probative value in
willfully and deliberately asserted a falsehood. A mere evidence because it does not establish the fact that the
assertion of a false objective fact is not sufficient. The true date of the annual stockholders’ meeting for the year
assertion must be deliberate and willful.41 1996 took place on 27 November 1996. This finding was
sustained by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 28
In the instant case, the petitioners failed to establish the January 2005.
fact that the private respondents made a willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood in their counter- As a general rule, this Court will not interfere in the
affidavits dated 11 June 1998. conduct of preliminary investigations and leave to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in
Private respondent Ramon H. Monfort had sufficiently and the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient
reasonably explained the circumstances surrounding the evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of
preparation and his signing of the erroneous statements an information against an offender.49 As an exception,
in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC. He narrated that as Vice- however, this Court may inquire into the determination of
President of the MHADC, he signed and certified the probable cause during the preliminary investigation if,

74
based on the records, the prosecutor committed grave accident with the vehicle of Ireneo S. Paz (respondent
abuse of discretion.50 In the case at bar, the City sheriff), a 1981 Ford Laser bearing plate number DAL
Prosecutor of Cadiz, the Regional State Prosecutor for 334. Complainants 18-year old son Ryan Nio Padua
Region VI, and the Secretary of Justice had consistently (Ryan Padua) was driving complainants vehicle at the
ruled that there is no probable cause to indict the private time of the accident.
respondents for the crime of perjury. We find no grave
abuse of discretion or manifest error on their part Police Officer Victoriano A. Sabuco prepared a
considering the fact that their non-finding of probable Traffic Accident Investigation Report[2] (police report)
cause is supported by the evidence on record. It is well to shortly after completing the investigation of the accident.
state, too, that the resolution of the Secretary of Justice The police report stated that at the time of the accident
declaring the absence or existence of a probable cause Ryan Padua possessed a valid drivers license with
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals is accorded high license number NO1-95-179337.[3]
respect and generally conclusive on this Court. 51 We find Complainant claimed that after the traffic accident,
no exceptional reasons to deviate from this principle. he gave respondent sheriff his calling card. This card
supposedly contained the addresses and telephone
The pronouncements of this Court in G.R. No. 152542 numbers of both the complainant and his insurer,
and No. 15547252 do not automatically imply that there is Covenant Assurance Company (Covenant).[4] Since
sufficient evidence or probable cause to indict the private respondent sheriff appeared satisfied with the
respondents for the crime of perjury. It should be arrangement, complainant believed the matter was
underscored that in G.R. No. 152542 and No. 155472, amicably settled. Thus, complainant went his own way
there is no finding with regard to the correct date of the and so did respondent sheriff.
1996 annual stockholders’ meeting and the election of the
board of directors as to bind this Court in the Petition at However, on 26 November 1998, several armed
bar. men, including police officers, claiming to be from the
Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna, awakened
complainant at 6:00 a.m. in his house. The men
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
announced that they were enforcing a writ of execution
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Bian, Laguna (Bian
CA-G.R. SP No. 67109 dated 28 January 2005 and 26
MTC). Complainant was able to convince the men from
May 2005, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
the sheriffs office to give him some time to clarify the
against petitioners.
matter, and so the men peacefully left the premises.

SO ORDERED. Complainant soon discovered the reason for the

sheriffs surprise visit. He and his lawyer found out that on
30 June 1997 respondent sheriff filed with the Bian MTC
a civil case for damages[5] in connection with the traffic
accident. The summons was allegedly sent to
complainants mother in Novaliches, where complainant
previously resided. This, complainant claims, explains
why he was not aware of the case filed against him until
the sheriffs made their surprise visit. Complainant was
declared in default for failing to file an answer within the
reglementary period. Subsequently, there was an ex-
parte presentation of evidence before a commissioner.
Soon after this ex-parte hearing, Estanislao S. Belan of
the Bian MTC rendered a decision on 24 November 1997
EN BANC
in respondent sheriffs favor. Complainant vigorously
opposed the execution of this decision because of the
alleged defective summons.
[A.M. No. P-00-1445. April 30, 2003] On 18 December 1998, complainant filed this
administrative complaint against respondent sheriff for
falsification of public document, perjury, giving false
testimony and abuse of position.[6] Complainant also
MEDARDO M. PADUA, complainant, vs. IRENEO S. asserted that under the current civil service rules,
PAZ, in his capacity as Sheriff IV, Branch 31, respondent sheriff did not possess the necessary
Regional Trial Court, San Pedro, qualifications to hold his present position.[7] Complainant,
Laguna, respondent. moreover, stated that he resorted to all the means
available to prevent the enforcement of an obviously
DECISION unjust decision considering the numerous false
statements and misrepresentations made by respondent
PER CURIAM: sheriff.[8] He narrated that he felt so aggrieved by the
numerous attempts of the sheriffs of the Bian MTC to
Complainant Medardo M. Padua charges enforce the writ of execution despite the fact that he had
respondent Ireneo S. Paz, Sheriff IV of Branch 31 of the already gone to the courts to defend himself.[9]
Regional Trial Court, San Pedro, Laguna, with grave On 25 March 1999, respondent sheriff filed an
misconduct, falsification of public document, perjury, Answer[10] denying all of complainants material
giving false testimony, and abuse of position in allegations. Respondent sheriff contended that he only
connection with Civil Case No. 3225.[1] filed the civil case for damages because complainant
On 12 June 1997, a Toyota Tamaraw wagon model failed to honor his repeated promises that his insurer
1994 bearing plate number TKU 319 belonging to would pay for the damage to respondent sheriffs vehicle.
Medardo M. Padua (complainant) figured in a traffic

75
 On 7 May 1999, complainant filed his Reply refuting As Ireneo Paz committed grave misconduct and conduct
respondent sheriffs allegations in the Answer and prejudicial to the best interest of public service, it is
reiterating some of the allegations in his Complaint. respectfully recommended that said respondent be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits,
The Court, in the Resolution of 9 May 2001, assigned and disqualification to hold any public position in any
to Executive Judge Norberto Y. Geraldez[11] (Investigating branch or agency of the government including
Judge Geraldez) this administrative complaint for government-owned or controlled corporations.
investigation, report and recommendation.
On 6 November 2001, the Court received the report Upon receipt of Investigating Judge Geraldezs
and recommendations of Investigating Judge Geraldez. findings and recommendations, the Court referred this
Some of Judge Geraldezs findings included the following: administrative case to the Office of the Court
Administrator on 10 December 2001 for evaluation, report
A. Medardo Padua alleged some irregularities and recommendation.
in the service of summons and copy of the
complaint. Medardo Padua failed to present After a careful evaluation of the record of this case,
any evidence to prove the same. The Traffic the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with
Accident Investigation Report (Exhibit B) the report of Investigating Judge Geraldez. The OCA
and Ryan Paduas drivers license (Exhibit K) affirmed in toto his recommendations and found them to
showed that Ryan Nio Paduas residence be wholly supported by evidence and jurisprudence.
was at Novaliches. There was basis to serve
the summons at Novaliches. His claim that The OCA recommended that respondent sheriff
respondent knew that he now lives in Las Ireneo S. Paz be dismissed from the service with
Pias was not supported by evidence. forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of
B. Medardo Padua claimed that Ireneo Paz the government, including government-owned or
gave a false statement in court. This was controlled corporations. Moreover, the OCA
when Ireneo Paz testified that he went to recommended that the case be referred to the
Novaliches to talk to him. Medardo Padua Department of Justice for investigation and filing, if
claimed this was not true. There was no warranted, of the appropriate criminal case against
evidence to prove this. complainant or respondent sheriff, or both.[12]
C. Medardo Padua claimed that Ireneo Paz The Court agrees with the findings and conclusions
falsified the Traffic Accident Investigation of the OCA.
Report (Exhibit B-1). In said Exhibit B-1
Ryan Paduas age was 13. He presented the Complainant first imputes to respondent sheriff the
same as evidence before the MTC. act of falsifying the police report respondent sheriff
presented to the court. Respondent sheriff presented to
Medardo Padua presented a copy of the the Bian MTC a photocopy of the police report,[13] showing
same Traffic Accident Investigation Report that at the time of the traffic accident Ryan Padua was
(Exhibit B) where the age of Ryan Padua only thirteen years old, well below the statutory minimum
was 18 years old. Respondent did not file age for driving, which is eighteen years. Respondent
any opposition to the said Exhibit B. There sheriffs copy of the police report is marked as Exhibit B-1
was evidence to prove that Ireneo Paz may and is a certified true copy of the original. However, it was
have committed falsification of the Traffic Dahlia E. Borromeo, the Clerk of Court of the Bian MTC,
Accident Investigation Report (Exhibit B-1). who certified it.
It is interesting to note that Ryan Padua, as To refute this piece of evidence submitted by
per his drivers license (Exhibit K) and respondent sheriff, complainant presented a different
Certification from the Land Transportation copy of the same police report, duly marked as Exhibit B.
Office (Exhibit K-1) was born on January 4, This copy of the police report was certified by Police
1977. Therefore, Ryan Padua, at the time of Officer Victoriano A. Sabuco of the Metro Traffic Force,
the accident on June 12, 1997 was 20 years Southern District Traffic Command, Pasay City. He was
and 5 months old and not 13 or 18 years old. also the police officer who prepared the original
document. This copy submitted by complainant states
D. Ireneo Paz in his subscribed complaint for that Ryan Paduas age is eighteen years old.
damages alleged that Ryan Padua had no
drivers license. Ireneo Paz knew the same Respondent sheriff never filed any opposition to
was false as, as per Traffic Accident Exhibit B. He never contested its authenticity. His silence
Investigation Report (Exhibit B), Ryan may be construed as a tacit admission of the authenticity
Padua had a drivers license. And, Ireneo of Exhibit B, and necessarily also a tacit admission that
Paz was well aware of this. There was the police report he presented in court is a falsified copy.
evidence to show that Ireneo Paz may have
committed perjury. Respondent sheriff stood to benefit from having the
police report reflect that Ryan Padua was an underage
E. Ireneo Paz testified in court that he never driver, showing that Ryan Padua was at the time of the
filed a claim before the Covenant Insurance accident not qualified to drive a vehicle. As a father to a
Company when there was evidence to prove minor, complainant would also be liable for the negligent
that he had filed a claim with said insurance acts of his son that cause damage to others.[14] Thus, as
company and submitted documents (Exhibit found by Investigating Judge Geraldez, there is evidence
H, H-1 to H-7). Ireneo Paz may have given a to prove that Ireneo Paz may have committed falsification
false testimony. of the Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Exhibit B-1),
an act constituting grave misconduct.
Investigating Judge Geraldez stated in his
Resolution dated 5 November 2001, that: Another charge imputed against respondent sheriff
is the act of having committed perjury. Perjury is the
76
deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any Court personnel charged with the dispensation of
material matter before a competent person authorized to justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, bear
administer an oath in cases in which the law requires such a heavy responsibility in insuring that their conduct is
oath.[15]There are four elements that comprise the crime always beyond reproach.[23] The preservation of the
of perjury, namely: (a) the accused made a statement integrity of the judicial process is of paramount
under oath on a material matter; (b) the statement was importance. All those occupying offices in the judiciary
made before a competent officer, authorized to receive should at all times be aware that they are accountable to
and administer oaths; (c) the accused made a willful and the people. They must serve with utmost responsibility,
deliberate assertion of a falsehood in the statement and, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
(d) the sworn statement containing the falsity is required justice and lead modest lives.[24]
by law or made for a legal purpose.
Indeed, all those involved in the administration of
Respondent sheriff in his verified complaint for justice must at all times conduct themselves with the
damages stated that Ryan Padua had no drivers license highest degree of propriety and decorum and take utmost
on 12 June 1997, which was the date of the vehicular care in avoiding incidents that degrade the judiciary and
accident. Respondent sheriff knew that this statement he diminish the respect and regard for the courts.[25]
made under oath was false. This conclusion is drawn from
the fact that in respondent sheriffs own copy of the police In grave misconduct, there must be substantial
report, at the time of the accident, Ryan Padua possessed evidence showing that the acts complained of are corrupt
license number NO1-95-179337. This information or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or constitute
contained in respondent sheriffs copy of the police report flagrant disregard of well-known legal
completely contradicts the statement respondent sheriff rules.[26] Respondent sheriffs introduction in evidence of
made in his very own complaint. Respondent sheriff the falsified police report, committing perjury and giving
cannot merely feign ignorance of this detail which is false testimony, are plainly corrupt acts and show an
material to his complaint for damages. Based on the intent to disregard flagrantly the law. They constitute
evidence, all the requisite elements of the act of perjury grave misconduct that corrodes respect for the courts.
exist. Clearly, respondent sheriff committed perjury in Incidentally, respondent sheriffs acts of perjury and of
filing his verified complaint for damages, an act giving false testimony, which show a predisposition to lie,
constituting grave misconduct. defraud and deceive, also constitute dishonesty.[27]

Another accusation complainant makes against The penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from
respondent sheriff is the act of giving false testimony. the service,[28] with forfeiture of all benefits and with
Complainant cites respondent sheriffs testimony in court prejudice to re-employment in any branch or agency of
that he never filed a claim with complainants insurer, the government, including government-owned or
Covenant. Complainant, however, points out that controlled corporations.[29] In Remolona v. Civil Service
respondent sheriff did file a claim with Covenant to collect Commission,[30] the Court En Banc ruled that, to warrant
on complainants admitted liability for his sons part in the dismissal, grave misconduct or dishonesty need not be
vehicular accident. committed in the course of performance of duty by the
person charged. The Court explained the rationale for this
On 21 August 1997, in an ex-parte hearing rule, as follows:
conducted before the Clerk of Court of the Bian MTC,
respondent sheriff stated under oath that he approached The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or
complainant to plead with him to pay the damages employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
respondent sheriff incurred from the accident. However, misconduct, even if said defects of character are not
complainant allegedly refused to pay the damages and connected with his office, they affect his right to continue
instead claimed that his insurance company would pay in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a
the damages. When asked if respondent sheriff contacted dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly
this insurance company, respondent sheriff claimed he and well, because by reason of his government position,
did not because complainant did not even mention to him he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of
the insurance company that insured complainants car.[16] dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices
However, ample evidence exists on record to prove and entities of the government other than the office where
that respondent sheriff indeed had filed a claim with he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and
Covenant, contrary to the statement he made under oath. possesses a certain influence and power which renders
Respondent sheriff submitted several documents to the the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and
insurance company, namely: (1) a Certificate of dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to
Registration;[17] (2) an official receipt from the Land counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of
Transportation Office evidencing payment of such an employee cannot be segregated from his public life.
registration;[18] (3) a drivers license;[19] (4) a Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer
receipt[20] from Imperial Insurance, Inc., evidencing or employee to continue in office and the discipline and
payment of premium, which receipt is duly marked as morale of the service.
received by Covenant; (5) a Private Car Policy[21] issued
by Imperial Insurance, Inc. in favor of one Ireneo Paz, also Public confidence in our courts is vital to the effective
marked as received by Covenant; and (6) a detailed functioning of the judiciary. Court personnel who commit
estimate[22] issued by Cosmetic Car Care enumerating misconduct or dishonesty diminish the faith of the people
the various repairs needed on respondent sheriffs vehicle. in the judiciarys ability to dispense justice.Respondent
sheriff failed to live up to the high ethical standards
All these are some of the requirements necessary demanded by the office he occupies. By committing the
prior to the filing of an insurance claim with Covenant. questioned acts, respondent sheriff undermined the
Respondent sheriff did contact Covenant and even filed a integrity of the service and jeopardized the publics faith in
claim with Covenant for payment of the damage to his car, the impartiality of the courts. Respondent sheriff, who is
despite his sworn testimony to the contrary. Clearly, an important court personnel because he enforces judicial
respondent sheriff gave false testimony in the ex- orders, debased the judicial process by introducing in
parte hearing, an act also constituting grave misconduct. evidence a falsified document, committing perjury and
77
giving false testimony in an effort to obtain unfairly a
favorable judgment for himself. Corporation (HTC), a corporation duly organized and
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sheriff IV
existing under the laws of the Philippines. The matter
Ireneo S. Paz of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San
Pedro, Laguna, guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT. The
Court imposes on him the penalty of DISMISSAL from the involved 151.070 tons of magnesite-based refractory
service with forfeiture of all benefits, excluding accrued
leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any bricks from Germany.[2] The case was docketed as Anti-
branch or agency of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.Let a copy Dumping Case No. I-98.
of this decision be attached to the personnel records of
Ireneo S. Paz.
The protest was referred to the Bureau of Import Services
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION (BIS) of the Department of Trade and Industry, to

determine if there was a prima facie case for violation

CRISTE B. VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 162187
Petitioner, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7843, the Anti-Dumping Law.
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman, Sometime in February 1997, the BIS submitted its report
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., to the Tariff Commission, declaring that a prima
TINGA, and
CHICO- facie case existed and that continued importation of
NAZARIO,* JJ.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF refractory bricks from Germany would harm the local
JUSTICE and HORST-KESSLER Promulgated:
VON SPRENGEISEN, industry. It adopted the amount of DM 1,200 per metric
Respondents. November 18,
2005
ton as the normal value of the imported goods.[3]
x----------------------------------------
----------x
The HTC received a copy of the said report on

DECISION February 14, 1997. However, before it could respond, the

chairman of the Tariff Commission prodded the parties to

CALLEJO, SR., J.: settle the matter amicably. A conference ensued between

RCP Senior Vice President and Assistant General

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Manager Criste Villanueva and Jesus Borgonia, on the

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP one hand, and HTC President and General Manager

No. 76999 dismissing the petition for certiorari assailing Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen and Sales Manager

the finding of the Secretary of Justice that no probable Dennis Gonzales, on the other. During the conference,

cause exists against private respondent Horst-Kessler the parties agreed that the refractory bricks were imported

Von Sprengeisen for perjury. by the HTC at a price less than its normal value of DM

1,200, and that such importation was likely to injure the

local industry. The parties also agreed to settle the case

The Antecedents to avoid expenses and protracted litigation. HTC was

required to reform its price policy/structure of its

On April 2, 1996, the Refractories Corporation of the
importation and sale of refractory bricks from Germany to
Philippines (RCP) filed a protest before the Special
conform to the provisions of R.A. No. 7843 and its rules
Committee on Anti-Dumping of the Department of
and regulations. Jesus Borgonio thereafter prepared and
Finance against certain importations of Hamburg Trading

78
signed a compromise agreement containing the terms the said importation under the decision of the Special

agreed upon which Villanueva and Borgonia Committee based on the BIS report was DM 1,200 per

signed.[4] Bienvenido Flores, an Office Clerk of RCP, metric ton. On July 28, 1998, the HTC filed an Urgent

delivered the agreement to HTC at the 9th Floor of Ramon Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment with the

Magsaysay Center Building, 1680 Roxas Boulevard, Special Committee on Anti-Dumping, praying that such

Manila by Von Sprengeisens approval.[5] decision be declared null and void on the following

grounds:
However, Von Sprengeisen did not sign the
1. THE FRAUD HAD BEEN
agreement. Borgonia revised the agreement by inserting COMMITTED BY THE PROTESTANT
DURING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE
the phrase based on the findings of the BIS in paragraph PREPARATION OF THE
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
1 thereof. Villanueva and Borgonia signed the agreement
2. THAT INSERTIONS AND/OR
and had the same delivered to the office of HTC on April SUBSTITUTION OF THE FACTS NOT
AGREED UPON WAS DELIBERATELY
AND SURREPTITIOUSLY MADE BY
22, 1997 by Lino M. Gutierrez, a technical assistant of
THE PROTESTANT IN THE
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
RCP. Gonzales received the agreement and delivered the
WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND
CONSENT OF THE PROTESTEE.[9]
same to Von Sprengeisen. After 20 minutes, Gonzales

returned, with the agreement already signed by Von

The motion was verified by Von Sprengeisen.
Sprengeisen.[6] Gonzales, who had also signed, then
The HTC averred therein that Villanueva violated Article
gave it to Gutierrez. On the same day, Notary Public
172 of the Revised Penal Code when he surreptitiously
Zenaida P. De Zuiga notarized the
inserted the phrase based on the findings of the BIS in the
agreement.[7] Gonzales delivered a copy of the notarized
agreement without the knowledge and consent of Von
Agreement to HTC.[8]
Sprengeisen and despite their agreement to put behind
RCP submitted the compromise agreement to the
them the findings of the BIS. Appended to the motion was
Tariff Commission. During the May 9, 1997 hearing before
an Affidavit of Merit executed by Von Sprengeisen in
the Commission for the approval of the agreement, a
which he alleged, inter alia, that sometime in February
representative of HTC appeared. He offered no objection
1997, the BIS came out with its Report declaring that the
to the Agreement. The Commission submitted its report
normal value of the magnesite-based refractory bricks
to the Special Committee which rendered a decision
was DM 1,200 per metric ton; before
declaring that, based on the findings of the BIS, the
HTC could respond to the report, Villanueva invited him
normal value of the imported refractory bricks was DM
to a conference for the purpose of finding the best solution
1,200 per metric ton. HTC received a copy of the decision
to the pending case before the Commission; he and
on March 4, 1998. Neither RCP nor HTC appealed the
Gonzales attended the meeting during which it was
decision to the Court of Tax Appeals.
agreed, by way of a compromise, that the parties will

accept the amount of DM 1,050 per metric ton as the

In the meantime, HTC imported refractory bricks
normal value for all magnesite-based refractory bricks
from Germany anew and noted that the normal value of

79
from Germany; when he received the draft of the he declared, inter alia, that Von Sprengeisen made the

compromise agreement prepared by Villanueva, he following false statements in the Urgent Motion, thus:

approved the same; subsequently, Villanueva transmitted a. [Complainant] was the one who called
up his office, inviting him to a
a compromise agreement already signed by him to Von meeting for the purpose of finding
the best and most equitable solution
Sprengeisen for his review, approval and signature; to the case (p. 3, Urgent Motion);

believing that the compromise agreement reproduced the b. RCP and Hamburg Trading agreed to
put behind them the findings and
recommendations of the Bureau of
contents of the first compromise agreement, he signed
Import Services (BIS) with respect
to the anti-dumping protest filed by
the second agreement without reading it; when he
RCP (p. 3, Urgent Motion);
received, on March 4, 1998, a copy of the decision of the c. The original version of the
Compromise Agreement sent to him
Tariff Commission based on the compromise agreement was merely a draft (p. 3, Urgent
Motion);
of the parties wherein the committee adopted the findings
d. The phrase based on the findings of
and recommendations of the BIS (that the normal value the Bureau of Import Services was
inserted in paragraph 1 of the final
of the shipment was DM 1,200 per metric ton), he was Compromise Agreement without his
knowledge and consent (p. 3,
shocked because he never agreed to the use of such Urgent Motion); and

findings for the reformation of its price policies; there was, e. [Complainant] was the one who
surreptitiously inserted the
in fact, an agreement between him and Villanueva to put aforesaid phrase (p. 3, Urgent
Motion).[11]
behind them the findings of the BIS; he called up

Villanueva at his office but failed to contact him despite

Villanueva also alleged that Von Sprengeisen made the
several attempts; suspecting that something amiss
following false statements in his Affidavit of Merit:
happened, he had the draft of the first compromise
a. [Complainant] invited him to a
agreement retrieved but his secretary failed to locate the conference for the purpose of
finding the best solution to the case;
same; it was only sometime later that his secretary found
b. [Complainant and he] agreed to put
behind [them] the findings and
the folder-file containing the draft and was appalled to recommendation of the BIS
submitted to the Secretary of
discover that Villanueva had substantially altered the first Finance;

draft of the compromise agreement; this made him c. We agreed to the amount of DM
1,050/ton as the normal value for all
conclude and confirm his suspicion that Villanueva, thru magnesite-based refractory bricks
from Germany;
deceit and fraud, induced him to sign the compromise
d. The original version of the
agreement to the prejudice of the HTC.[10] Compromise Agreement sent to him
was merely a draft; and

The RCP opposed the motion. But, in a parallel move, e. Through deceit and fraud,
[complainant] induced [respondent]
Villanueva, in his capacity as Senior Vice President and to sign the final Compromise
Agreement.[12]
Assistant General Manager of RCP, filed a criminal

complaint for perjury against Von Sprengeisen in the

In his Counter-Affidavit, Von Sprengeisen averred that
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Appended thereto
whoever called the other for a conference was not a
was a complaint-affidavit executed by Villanueva wherein
material matter. Since the first draft of the Compromise
80
Agreement transmitted to him was by fax, he asked the recommended the reversal of Prosecutor Supnets

complainant to send to him the hard copy of the resolution and the filing of the information. The City

Agreement for his signature. He further narrated that Prosecutor approved the recommendation of the Second

when he received the hard copy of the compromise Assistant City Prosecutor. Accordingly, an Information for

agreement, he did not bother to review since he assumed perjury was filed against the private respondent with the

that it contained the same provisions in the faxed copy. Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.

He did not suggest that the phrase based on the findings

The private respondent appealed the resolution
of the BIS be inserted in the hard copy of the agreement
to the Secretary of Justice, who reversed the resolution of
because he and Villanueva were at odds on the BIS
the City Prosecutor on September 20, 2002. According to
finding the normal price of the goods was DM 1,200 per
the Justice Secretary, the complainant failed to establish
metric ton. He insisted that it would have been senseless
the materiality of the alleged false assertions and that the
of him to agree to such insertion; as such, he did not make
said assertions were willful and deliberate. Moreover, the
any willful and deliberate assertion of any falsehood as to
allegations in the Affidavit of Merit are not altogether false
any material fact.[13]
since the intention of the parties in executing the

Investigating Prosecutor Francisco G. Supnet compromise agreement was precisely to put behind the

found no probable cause for perjury against the private ruling of the BIS, despite which the complainant inserted

respondent and recommended the dismissal of the the condition that the parties would be bound by such

complaint. Second Assistant City Prosecutor Leoncia findings and recommendations.[15] The decretal portion of

Dimagiba reviewed the resolution of Prosecutor Supnet the resolution reads:

and found probable cause for perjury against the private WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution
of the City Prosecutor of Manila is hereby
respondent for alleging in his Affidavit of Merit REVERSED. The City Prosecutor is
directed to withdraw the information for
that he was induced to sign the compromise agreement perjury against respondent Horst-Kessler
von Sprengeisen and to report the action
through fraud and deceit. According to the Second taken within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.
Assistant City Prosecutor, the allegation of the private
SO ORDERED.[16]
respondent thru deceit and fraud to sign the final

Compromise Agreement was a deliberate assertion of a

Villanueva then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
falsehood, designed as it was merely to give the BIS the
assailing the resolution of the Justice Secretary, alleging
impression that private respondent was misled into
therein that grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
agreeing to the compromise agreement. She further
excess or lack of jurisdiction, was committed in issuing the
opined that the allegation was perjurious, considering that
said resolution.[17] The private respondent, for his part,
the private respondent had sufficient time to pass upon
sought the dismissal of the petition alleging that, as found
the Compromise Agreement and could have availed the
by the Justice Secretary, there was no probable cause
services of legal minds who could review the terms and
against him for perjury.[18]
conditions thereof before signing the same;[14]hence, she

81
 On February 13, 2004, the CA dismissed the disquisitions of the Secretary of Justice in the assailed

petition and affirmed the resolution of the Justice resolution and concluded that the private respondent did

Secretary.[19] not, in the Affidavit of Merit, make a willful and deliberate

assertion of a falsehood.[21]
The CA declared that, as posited by the Office of

the Solicitor General in its comment on the petition, the Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review

parties had agreed to put behind them the findings and on certiorari with this Court against private respondent

recommendations of the BIS with respect to the anti- Von Sprengeisen and the Secretary of Justice, insisting

dumping protest. The appellate court stated that its finding that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion

is buttressed by the fact that the amount of DM 1,050 was amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing

not mentioned in the first compromise agreement and the petition and affirming the assailed resolution.

that, under such agreement, the HTC obliged itself to

The petitioner maintains that, during the preliminary
reform
investigation, he adduced substantial evidence to prove
its pricing policy and structure with respect to refractory
probable cause for perjury against the private respondent.
products being imported to and sold in the Philippines in
He maintains that probable cause does not mean actual
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7843 and its
and positive causes; nor does it import absolute certainty.
implementing rules and requirements. The CA
It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. It is
emphasized that it was inclined to believe that there was
enough that it is believed that the act or omission
no meeting of the minds of the parties when the petitioner
complained of constitutes the offense charged. He avers
inserted the phrase based on the findings of the BIS in the
that, contrary to the claim of the private respondent in his
revised compromise agreement; hence, there could not
Affidavit of Merit, the meeting between him and Jesus
have been perjury when the private respondent executed
Borgonio, on the one hand, and the private respondent
the Affidavit of Merit and the Urgent Motion to Set Aside
and HTC Sales Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the other,
and/or Vacate Judgment. The CA also agreed with the
was arranged by the latter and not by him. As gleaned
findings of the Secretary of Justice that the insertion of the
from the draft and final copies of the compromise
condition in the compromise agreement that the parties
agreement, the parties made express reference to
would be bound by the BIS findings and recommendation
the prima facie findings of the BIS that the actual export
gave the private respondent reason to believe that he was
price of HTC was below the fair market value. By agreeing
deceived by the petitioner into signing the Agreement; as
that such findings of the BIS be included in the
such, the private respondents allegation in his Affidavit of
Compromise Agreement, the said private respondent
Merit, that he was induced to signing the Compromise
impliedly agreed to such findings as basis of the price for
Agreement through fraud and deceit, was not altogether
which HTC would sell the German-made magnesite-
false. Consequently, the CA ruled, the private respondent
based refractory bricks in the Philippines. The petitioner
did not make any willful and deliberate assertion of a
avers that the fact that the amount of DM 1,050 per metric
falsehood.[20] The appellate court conformed to the

82
ton was not specifically mentioned in the compromise In his Comment on the petition, the private respondent

agreement was of no importance, considering the parties avers that the issues raised by the petitioner are factual,

acceptance of such findings is based on R.A. No. 7843. hence, improper in a petition for

He points out that the private respondent could not have review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

failed to notice the difference between the first draft and The determination of the existence of a probable cause is

the final copy of the agreement before signing it because, primarily an administrative sanction of the Secretary of

as alleged by Lino Gutierrez in his reply affidavit, it took Justice. He insists that the findings of the Justice

the private respondent twenty minutes or so after Secretary should be accorded great respect, especially

receiving the agreement to review the final draft before since the same were upheld by the CA. He asserts that

signing it. Moreover, the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the petitioner failed to establish in the CA and in this Court

and/or Vacate Judgment signed by the private respondent that the Justice Secretary committed a grave abuse of

was filed more than 15 months from the execution of the discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in

compromise agreement and after four months from the her resolution.

Tariff Commissions approval thereof.

The petition has no merit.

The petitioner argues that it is incredible that

The pivotal issue in this case is factual whether or
during the interregnum of 19 months, the private
not, based on the records, there was probable cause for
respondent failed to discover the revisions/insertions in
the private respondents indictment for perjury.
the final draft of the compromise agreement. Considering

the premises, the petitioner submits, the private Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only

respondents filing of the Urgent Motion for and in behalf questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review

of HTC was merely an afterthought, to enable the latter to on certiorari. Findings of facts of a quasi-judicial agency,

escape compliance with the terms and conditions of the as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on the

Agreement. Court, unless cogent facts and circumstances of such a

nature warranting the modification or reversal of the

The petitioner further insists that the insertion of the
assailed decision were ignored, misunderstood or
contested phrase in the final draft of the compromise
misinterpreted. Thus, the Court may delve into and
agreement was necessary although it may not be in the
resolve factual issues in exceptional cases. The petitioner
best interest of HTC. He posits that the falsehoods made
has failed to establish that any such circumstance is
by the private respondent in his Urgent Motion and
present in the case at bar.[22]
Affidavit of Merit were material to the proceedings in the

Anti-Dumping Office of the Tariff Commission because

these were used to set aside the compromise agreement The Court finds that the public respondent did not

executed by the parties. commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to

excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed

resolution, and that the CA did not commit any reversible

83
error in its assailed decision and resolution. If at all the such finding may be nullified where grave abuse of

public respondent erred in issuing the assailed resolution, discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is

such is merely an error in the exercise of established.[25]

jurisdiction, reversible by a petition for review under Rule

Perjury is defined and penalized in Article 183 of
43 of the Rules of Court especially so where, as in this
the Revised Penal Code, thus:
case, the issues before the CA were factual and not legal.
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases
The absence or existence of probable cause in a given and perjury in solemn affirmation. The
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
case involves a calibration and a reexamination of the period to prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon
evidence adduced by the parties before the Office of the any person who, knowingly making
untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next
City Prosecutor of Manila and the probative weight
preceding articles, shall testify under
oath or make an affidavit upon any
thereof. The CA thus ruled correctly when it dismissed the
material matter before a competent
person authorized to administer an oath
petition before it. in cases in which the law so requires.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal Any person who, in case of a solemn
affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall
information, has been defined as such facts as are commit any of the falsehoods mentioned
in this and the three preceding articles of
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime this section shall suffer the respective
penalties provided therein.
has been committed and that the private respondent is

probably guilty thereof. It is such a state of facts in the

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its
mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary
perpetration may affect the earnest concerns of the
caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or
parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated
strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not
when the false statement is made.[26]
mean actual or positive cause; nor does it import absolute
The seminal modern treatment of the history of
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
perjury concludes that one consideration of policy
belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require
overshadows all others the measures taken against the
an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
offense must not be so severe as to discourage aggrieved
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that
parties from lodging complaints or testifying.[27] As quoted
the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
by Dean Wigmore, a leading 19th Century Commentator,
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of
noted that English law, throws every fence round a person
evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[23]
accused of perjury, for the obligation of protecting

The determination of its existence lies within the witnesses from oppression or annoyance, by charges, or

discretion of the prosecuting officers after conducting a threats of charges, of having made false testimony is far

preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended paramount to that of giving even perjury its deserts.[28]

party.[24] The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice

Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a
declaring the absence or existence of a probable cause
falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by
affirmed by the CA is accorded high respect. However,

84
authority of law on a material matter.[29] The elements of Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his

the felony are: statement is an internal act. It may be proved by his

(a) That the accused made a statement
under oath or executed an affidavit upon admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state of
a material matter.
mind of the accused may be determined by the things he
(b) That the statement or affidavit was
made before a competent officer, says and does, from proof of a motive to lie and of the
authorized to receive and administer
oath. objective falsity itself, and from other facts tending to
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the
show that the accused really knew the things he claimed
accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.
not to know.[37]
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit
containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose.[30]
A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained

merely upon the contradictory sworn statements of the

A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a
accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two
falsehood, is not enough. The assertion must be
statements is false and must show the statement to be
deliberate and willful.[31] Perjury being a felony by dolo,
false by other evidence than the contradicting
there must be malice on the part of the
statement.[38] The rationale of this principle is thus:
accused.[32] Willfully means intentionally; with evil intent
Proof that accused has given
and legal malice, with the consciousness that the alleged contradictory testimony under oath at a
different time will not be sufficient to
perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should establish the falsity of testimony charged
as perjury, for this would leave simply
be received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is one oath of the defendant as against
another, and it would not appear that the
equivalent to knowingly. Deliberately implies meditated as testimony charged was false rather than
the testimony contradictory thereof. The
distinguished from inadvertent acts.[33] It must appear that two statements will simply neutralize
each other; there must be some
the accused knows his statement to be false or as corroboration of the contradictory
testimony. Such corroboration, however,
consciously ignorant of its truth.[34] may be furnished by
evidence aliunde tending to show perjury
independently of the declarations of
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is testimony of the accused.[39]

according to belief or conviction as to its truth. A false

statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the The term material matter is the main fact subject of the

truth of a statement is an adequate defense.[35] A false inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that

statement which is obviously the result of an honest fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to

mistake is not perjury. corroborate or strengthen the testimony related to the

subject of the inquiry, or which legitimately affects the

There are two essential elements of proof for
credence of any witness who testified. In this case, a
perjury: (1) the statement made by the defendants must
matter is material if it has a material effect or tendency to
be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the
influence the Commission in resolving the motion of HTC
defendant did not believe those statements to be true.[36]
one way or the other. The effects of the statement are

85
weighed in terms of potentiality rather than claimed by the private respondent, a copy was

probability.[40] The prosecution need not prove that the transmitted to him for his personal review, and if he found

false testimony actually influenced the Commission.[41] it to be in order, the petitioner and Borgonia would prepare

and sign the agreement and give it back to him for review
The private respondent did err when he declared, in the
and signature, with the particulars of his community tax
motion of the HTC and his affidavit, that it was the
certificate indicated in the final copy.
petitioner who invited him to a

conference. The truth of the matter is that it was Gonzales Undeniably, the identity of the person who prepared or

who did so. Nonetheless, the issue of who called for a caused to prepare the compromise agreement

conference is of de minimis importance because, after all, subsequently signed by the petitioner and the private

the parties agreed to meet after having been prodded by respondent was of prime importance because only such

the Chairman of the Commission to settle the case person should be charged for perjury. The private

instead of going through the tribulations and expenses of respondent erroneously stated in his Affidavit of Merit and

a protracted litigation. No adverse inference (related to Urgent Motion that it was the petitioner who prepared the

the merits of their respective contention in this case) can agreement that was signed by the parties. It turned out

be ascribed as to whoever called the conference. After all, that it was Borgonia who prepared the first and the second

parties are even urged to settle cases amicably. copies. However, the private respondent cannot be held

liable for perjury since it was Borgonia who prepared the

Besides, as correctly declared by the Second Assistant
agreement and not the petitioner. The Court agrees with
City Prosecutor in her resolution:
the following contention of the private respondent in his
The allegation that it was complainant
who invited respondent to the meeting counter-affidavit:
may not be a deliberate lie. Respondent
may not have known who arranged the 4.6 While complainant claims that it was
meeting, but as he was able to talk to not he but Mr. Borgonia who made
complainant, he presumed that it was the insertions, there is no doubt that,
complainant who extended the invitation. indeed, the insertions were made
Moreover, the identity of the one who into the document. Since
initiated the meeting is not material complainant is the signatory to the
considering that there was a meeting of Compromise Agreement, it is but
the minds of the Parties.[42] natural for one to presume that he
had made the insertions. At the
same time, I can not be expected to
know that it was Mr. Borgonia, as
The Court also agrees with the contention of the private claimed by complainant, who made
such insertions.[43]
respondent that the copy of the first agreement

transmitted to him was a fax copy of the draft, and that,

Indeed, Borgonia was merely the Manager of the
contrary to the allegations of the private respondent, such
Management Information Group of RCP, whereas the
agreement was prepared by Borgonia and not by the
petitioner was no less than its Senior Vice President and
petitioner. As gleaned from page two of the agreement,
Assistant General Manager, Borgonias superior. Unless
the particulars of the residence certificates of the
and until approved by the petitioner, any agreement
petitioner and the private respondent were not
prepared by Borgonia was merely a piece of paper,
typewritten, hence, cannot as yet be notarized. As
86
barren of any legal effect. In this case, the compromise recommended base

agreement prepared by Borgonia had the petitioners value and agreed for HTC to base the normal value of the

imprimatur. Borgonia was merely a witness to the importation per metric ton under R.A. No. 7843 and the

agreement. For all legal intents and purposes, the rules issued implementing the law. This is gleaned from

petitioner had the compromise agreement prepared the affidavit of Borgonia:

under his supervision and control. It cannot thus be 13. During the meeting, Mr. von
Sprengeisen suggested that the value of
concluded that the private respondent made a deliberate DM 1,050/ton be applied as the price at
which Hamburg Trading would sell
falsehood when he alleged that the agreement was German-made magnesite-based
refractory bricks in the Philippines. Mr.
prepared by the petitioner. Villanueva did not agree to the suggested
value, as we considered it low. In the
end, both parties decided to base the
determination of the price on the
The Court is not persuaded by the petitioners
provisions of Republic Act No. 7843 and
its implementing rules and
claim that, during the conference, he and the private
regulations. [44]
respondent agreed that, based on the BIS report, the

normal value of the imported refractory bricks per metric Borgonia prepared the first compromise
ton was DM 1,200, and that such report would be used as agreement and incorporated therein the agreement of the
basis for the revision of the price policy and structure of petitioner and the private respondent arrived at during the
HTC. conference, thus:

1. For the purpose of buying peace and

It bears stressing that, during the conference, the by way of concession in order to end
litigation, the SECOND PARTY
petitioner and the private respondent had agreed on three undertakes and commits to reform
its pricing policy and structure with
aspects of the case: (1) based on the prima facie findings respect to refractory products being
imported interest sold in the
of the BIS, the normal value of the goods per meter ton Philippines in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act 7843 and
was DM 1,200 and that the actual export price of HTC was its implementing rules and
regulations.[45]
below the fair market value; (2) to terminate the case,

HTC will have to adjust and revise its price policy and
If, as claimed by the petitioner in his Affidavit-
structure for imported refractory bricks to conform to R.A.
Complaint, he and the private respondent had agreed that
No. 7843 and rules and regulations implementing the law;
HTC will use as basis for its price policy and structural
and (3) if HTC fails or refuses to comply with its
revision, the BIS report, for sure, Borgonia would have
undertaking, RCP will be entitled to a writ of execution
incorporated the said agreement in the first compromise
without need of demand. However, the petitioner and the
agreement. He did not, and Borgonia has not offered any
private respondent could not have agreed on such base
explanation for such failure. The petitioner signed the
price; the petitioner insisted on the amount recommended
draft of the agreement without any plaint or revision. It
by the BIS (DM 1,200) while the private respondent
was only in the second compromise agreement that was
insisted on DM 950. There was an impasse. By way of a
later signed by the petitioner and the private respondent
compromise, the parties agreed to do away with the BIS
that Borgonia incorporated the phrase

87
 In the event that the Special Committee
based on the findings of the BIS. Borgonia and the fails to decide within the period
prescribed herein, the recommendation
petitioner made the insertion on their own, without the a of the Commission shall be deemed
approved and shall be final and
priori consent of the private respondent. executory.[46]

The Court is not convinced by the petitioners

On the matter of the revision or adjustment of the
contention (and that of Borgonia in his Affidavit) that the
price policy and structure of HTC, the parties had agreed
petitioner and the private respondent had agreed to leave
to accomplish the same in due time. It goes without saying
the final determination of the base value or price of
that the RCP retained the right to object to or protest to
importation per metric ton to a third party (BIS). The
the price policy and structure revision of HTC.
private respondent could not have agreed to the use of

the BIS report because, as mentioned, he had The agreement of the petitioner and the private

strenuously objected to its use as basis for the revision of respondent not to be bound by the base value in the BIS

its price policy and structure. For HTC to admit that the report for the revision of its price policy and structure is

BIS finding of DM 1,200 per metric ton was the normal not unexpected because: (1) the findings of the BIS are

value of the refractory bricks from Germany for the only prima facie, meaning to say, not conclusive, and

purpose of resolving the anti-dumping case is one thing; HTC was accorded a chance to base its price policy and

but for HTC to agree to be bound by the BIS structure on evidence and informations other than those

recommendation for the purpose of revising its price contained in the BIS report; (2) the normal value of the

policy and structure is completely a different matter. imported refractory bricks may fluctuate from time to time,

hence, the need for any importer to revise its price policy
With the petitioner and the private respondents
and structure from time to time; and (3) the base value to
admission of the prima facie findings of the BIS, the
be used by HTC in revising its price policy would be
Commission can prepare its recommendation to the
scrutinized and resolved initially by the Commission, by
Special Committee on the protest of the RCP to the HTC
the Special Committee and by the Court of Tax Appeals
importation subject of the case. Thereafter:
on appeal.
D. The Special Committee shall, within
fifteen (15) days after receipt of the report
of the Commission, decide whether the The process agreed upon by the petitioner and
article in question is being imported in
violation of this section and shall give due the private respondent was not only practical and fair, but
notice of such decision. In case the
decision of dumping is in the affirmative, in accord with law as well.
the special committee shall direct the
Commissioner of Customs to cause the
dumping duty, to be levied, collected and In fine, the private respondent did not commit any
paid, as prescribed in this section, in
addition to any other duties, taxes and falsehood in the Urgent Motion and his Affidavit of Merit
charges imposed by law on such article,
and on the articles of the same specific when he declared that he and the
kind or class subsequently imported
under similar circumstances coming from
petitioner put behind them the BIS report, and agreed to
the specific country.
use R.A. No. 7843 and the rules and regulations

88
 that complainant-appellee had agreed to
implementing the same to determine the base price for such a compromise. The transmittal of
the hard copy Compromise Agreement,
the revision of the price policy and structure of HTC. without any notice or mention by
complainant-appellee or complainant-
appellees office that it contained
Admittedly, the respondent did not object to the insertions or wording different from the
fax Compromise Agreement, and on
offending phrase before and after signing the agreement respondent-appellants understanding
that the wording of the hard copy
Compromise Agreement would be
and for a considerable stretch period until HTC filed its
exactly the same as the fax Compromise
Agreement, constitutes the fraud or
motion. However, we do not agree with the contention of
deceit allegedly by respondent-
appellant.[47]
the petitioner that such failure of the respondent to object

to the offending phrase for such period of time amounted

In his rejoinder-affidavit, the private respondent
to an admission that, indeed, the private respondent was
explained that:
aware of the offending phrase in the Agreement, and to
2. Again, contrary to the allegations in the
his agreement thereto; and estopped the private Reply-Affidavits, I was unable to
review the Compromise Agreement
respondent from alleging that he was deceived by the delivered by Mr. Gutierrez on 22
April 1997 as I was busy with
petitioner into signing the Compromise Agreement. In his numerous calls and business at the
time it was delivered. Also, I had
appeal to the DOJ, the private respondent declared that: been led to believe in our meetings
with Mr. Villanueva and Mr.
3.9 True, respondent-appellant Borgonia that I could trust them. So,
may have been remiss and lacking in after having seen the fax
circumspect in failing to review the hard Compromise Agreement and being
copy Compromise Agreement and notice amenable to it, I trusted that they
the insertion. Being in the trading would send a genuine hard copy. As
business, respondent-appellant it turned out, I was mistaken.[48]
personally handles hundreds of
documents daily and is on the telephone
for most of the day communicating with Moreover, even before filing the Urgent Motion
suppliers and customers. And he had no
reason to believe that either complainant- and signing the Affidavit of Merit, the private respondent
appellee or Mr. Borgonia would make
such an insertion, especially after tried for several times to contact the petitioner, but the
respondent-appellant had accepted the
fax Compromise Agreement wording and latter failed to return his calls. This reinforced the
conveyed such acceptance to
complainant-appellees office.
suspicion of the private respondent that the insertion of
Respondent-appellant also had to
reason to even think that such a
surreptitious insertion would be made; the offending phrase was not, after all, inadvertent but
after all, he had a very warm and friendly
meeting with complainant-appellee and deliberate, calculated to deceive him to the prejudice of
Mr. Borgonia and came out of it with a
feeling that he could trust complainant- HTC. The private respondent may be blamed for putting
appellee (p. 4, Annex C).
too much trust and confidence on the petitioner, but he
3.10 Hence, when respondent-
appellant alleges that he was induced to certainly cannot be indicted for perjury for lack of probable
sign the hard copy Compromise
Agreement through fraud and deceit, cause.
respondent-appellant honestly believes
that he was misled into signing it. He was
misled by the fact that he had been sent The petitioner failed to append to his petition
the fax Compromise Agreement by
complainant-appellee, that he had records of the Commission that the private respondent
conveyed its acceptability to
complainant-appellee and now appeared for HTC, on May 9, 1997, before the
requested for the hard copy for
execution, that he had been led to trust Commission for the hearing on the Compromise
that the findings and recommendation of
the BIS were being put behind them and
89
 Samaniego."cralaw virtua1aw library
Agreement; and showing that the private respondent did
The defendants were arrested under said information and
not object thereto. were confined in Bilibid, the said Samaniego on the 21st
day of December, 1907, and the said Juana Benedicto de
Perez on the 26th of the same month. After the arrest of
the said defendants, Juana Benedicto de Perez, at the
instance of the prosecuting attorney, was examined by
three physicians for the purpose of determining her
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition mental condition. On the 27th day of December, 1907, the
doctors made their report to the Court of First Instance,
expressing the opinion that the said Juana Benedicto de
is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the
Perez was mentally deranged. On the 7th day of January,
1908, the defendants were tried on the charge of adultery,
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76999 is AFFIRMED.
as presented in said information, and, after the
introduction of the proofs upon the part of the
Costs against the petitioner. Government, both the prosecuting attorney and the trial
court believed that the evidence was insufficient to
warrant the conviction of either of the defendants, and
SO ORDERED. they were both accordingly acquitted of that charge. In the
judgment acquitting the defendants the court included
ARTICLE 200 permission to the prosecuting attorney to file against
either or both of the said defendants a new information
FIRST DIVISION
charging them with the crime defined in article 441 of the
Penal Code. On the 8th day of January, 1908, pursuant
[G.R. No. 5115. November 29, 1909. ]
to such permission, the prosecuting attorney presented
against both of the defendants an information charging
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL
them with the crime mentioned in said article, as
SAMANIEGO and JUANA BENEDICTO DE
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
PEREZ, Defendants-Appellants.
"That on and for many weeks prior to the 27th day of
Joaquin Rodriguez Serra, for Appellants.
November, 1907, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said Juana Benedicto de Perez was a married
Solicitor-General Harvey, for Appellee.
woman, and that said Manuel Samaniego knew that she
was married and united in the bonds of matrimony with
SYLLABUS
and was the legitimate consort of Jose Perez Siguenza;
that during the period of time above expressed the said
1. ADULTERY; OFFENSES INVOLVING GRIEVOUS
Manuel Samaniego and Juana Benedicto de Perez,
SCANDAL OR ENORMITY. — In order to sustain a
willfully, illegally, and criminally and scandalously, without
conviction under article 441 of the Penal Code, for an
having any matrimonial tie between them, habitually
offense which "offends modesty or good morals by
appeared together in public places and frequented
grievous scandal or enormity," it is essential that the act
together places of recreation, suspicious places, vacant
or acts complained of should be committed in a public
houses, and houses of bad repute, in the daytime as well
place or within the public knowledge or view. (U.S. v.
as in the nighttime; and lewdly and indecently went to bed
Catajay, 6 Phil. Rep., 398; supreme court of Spain, April
together in the house of the husband of the said Juana
13, 1885, December 14, 1903, January 27, 1908; Viada,
Benedicto de Perez during the late hours of the night,
vol. 3, p. 130.)
dressed only in their night clothes, and indecorously,
indecently, and immodestly embraced each other and
caressed each other in the presence of the family,
DECISION
children, and servants of the said husband of Juana
Benedicto de Perez; all with public scandal and with
scandal to the community, and with shame and
MORELAND, J. :
humiliation to the husband and family of the said Juana
Benedicto de Perez."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the 20th day of December, 1907, the following
After the presentation of this information, it appearing that
information was presented to the Court of First Instance
the proofs under the charge therein contained would be
of the city of Manila against the defendants in this
the same as were those under the charge in the
case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
information first herein set forth, the prosecuting attorney
and the attorneys for the defendants agreed to submit and
"That on or about the 25th day of November, 1907, in the
did submit the case to the court for final determination
city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Manuel
upon the proofs already taken in the trial on the charge of
Samaniego did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
adultery. No witness was sworn. On the 5th day of
feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with the
February, 1908, the trial court rendered a decision in
said accused, Juana Benedicto de Perez, who was then
which he found the defendants guilty of the crime
and there, as the said accused Manuel Samaniego then
charged, condemning the defendant Samaniego to the
and there well knew, a married woman and the lawfully
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree and
wedded wife of Jose Perez Siguenza; and the said
ordering the defendant Juana Benedicto de Perez
accused Juana Benedicto de Perez, being then and there
confined in an asylum for the insane until the further order
a married woman and the lawfully wedded wife of the said
of the court. On the same day the defendants excepted to
Jose Perez Siguenza, did then and there willfully,
said decision and made a motion for a new trial. On the
unlawfully, and feloniously lie with and have sexual
12th day of February said court, upon its own motion, and,
intercourse with the said accused, Manuel
90
so far as appears of record, without notice to or consent cries brought the household to the spot. She declares in
of the defendants or their attorneys made an order her testimony that when she first saw the stranger he was
reopening said case "for the purpose only," as expressed near the cochero’s bed and, while she was watching the
in the order, "of receiving evidence as to the publicity or movements of the stranger, her mother went below and
nonpublicity of the acts charged in the complaint." On the appeared to be talking with him; that not for a moment did
15th day of April, following, additional evidence was taken she lose sight of her mother during all the occurrence.
in the case and used by the court as the basis for a further
judgment in the action. This was done over the objections The cochero testified that the stranger was Samaniego
and exception of defendant’s attorneys. On the 18th day and that he came first to the cochero’s bed and talked with
of April the court rendered a decision affirming the him a while, but afterwards the cochero went to sleep, and
judgment rendered by him on the 5th day of February in later, on hearing the cries of Conchita, he saw Samaniego
the same case. In the same decision he denied trying to conceal himself in the kitchen and also observed
defendants’ motion for a new trial. that the accused, Juana Benedicto de Perez, was going
up and down the stairs.
The witnesses for the prosecution during the trial of the
defendants on the charge made in the first information, The married daughter, Caridad, who, it appears, was not
viz, that of adultery, were Jose Perez, the husband of at the dance, testified that, when Conchita informed the
Juana Benedicto de Perez, three of his children, and his family that a stranger was in the lower part of the house,
cochero. The husband testified that Juana, after having she awoke her brother Rafael, who accompanied her
lived with him for more than twenty years, and having below, where they found the defendant Samaniego,
borne him more than five children, expressed the desire dressed only in his drawers; that she gave him a blow in
to separate from him on account of the physical abuse the face and ordered him immediately to quit the house;
and ill treatment which she had received and was that he asked her pardon and requested permission to put
receiving at his hands. He testified further that he himself on his clothes; that permission to do so was refused and
desired to terminate his marital relations with her and that she and her brother ejected him from the house by force
he wanted a divorce; and, as a preliminary step to that and later the cochero handed him his clothes over the
end, he obtained her arrest at the hands of the police, wall.
who, at his request, conducted her in a patrol wagon
publicly through the streets of the city of Manila to an Caridad also testified that Samaniego was once at the
asylum for the insane, where she was detained and house and talked with her mother through the window
imprisonment against her will. He declared further that the from the street, and on that occasion her mother delivered
reason why he thus humiliated and disgraced her and to him a pawn ticket; that once when she and her mother
deprived her of her liberty was his ardent desire to save were in a carromata on the streets the defendant
her soul; that, in ordering her arrest and reclusion, he was approached them and spoke to her mother. The testimony
acting under the advice and counsel of various lawyers of Rafael shows that one morning, as he was returning
and doctors. He further testified that, after her arrest, she from the hospital in Quiapo, he saw the defendant
many times implored him to give her back her liberty and Samaniego on foot near the carromata of his mother in
permit her to return to her family; and that, during one of the Botanical Garden talking to her.
such supplications, she admitted to him that the
defendant Samaniego was her friend, but, at the same Luisa Avesilla testified that the accused, Juana Benedicto
time, denied that he had ever taken advantage of that de Perez, paid the board of Samaniego for three months
friendship in any way whatever. in a restaurant where she was cashier, and that on one
occasion Juana ate with Samaniego in the restaurant. On
In attempting to prove the adultery alleged in the that occasion she was accompanied by her
information, the prosecution presented as witnesses the grandson. The cochero testified that he frequently had as
persons above mentioned, viz, Caridad Perez, daughter passengers in the carromata the two defendants; that on
of the defendant Juana; Rafael Perez, a student of one occasion he had waited for them while they went to a
medicine, 18 years of age, son of the defendant Juana; house in Calle Cervantes, and on another occasion they
Concepcion Perez, 12 years of age, daughter of the had gone into a house on Calle Malacañang, the witness
defendant Juana; together with the cochero of the family, supposing that the house was unoccupied because the
all of whom lived with the accused, Juana, and her accused, Juana, had told him that she was looking for a
husband at No. 257 Calle Nozaleda, Manila. house to rent; that the witness at no time observed
anything improper in the conduct or deportment of the two
According to the testimony of these witnesses, the kitchen defendants. There is no proof whatever that these places
and the toilet of the house, No. 257 Nozaleda, are situated were places of bad repute or that any of them were
on the ground floor. Here slept the cochero in a bed called unoccupied.
by the family a bench. This was the only bed in the lower
part of the house which could possibly be used for any Upon the proofs above stated, which are all of the proofs
purpose. adduced in the trial on the charge of adultery and are the
same proofs upon which the defendants were acquitted
On the night of the 6th of November, 1907, the accused, of that charge, the prosecuting attorney recommended
Juana Benedicto de Perez, accompanied by her that the defendants be convicted of the crime defined in
daughters, attended a dance given by a friend. The other article 441 of the Penal Code, of which they stood charge,
accused, Samaniego, was also present. Juana and her and the court thereupon convicted them thereof.
daughters returned home late at night. There were then
present in the house the accused, Juana Benedicto de The acts complained of lack many of the elements
Perez; her three daughters, Caridad, Rosario, and essential to bring them within the purview of the article of
Conchita, and a friend of Conchita; her son Rafael; a the Penal Code invoked by the prosecution. Every act that
younger son, Manolo; and the cochero. When the mother was in anywise public fails entirely of those qualities which
and the daughters who had attended the dance with her offend modesty and good morals by "grievous scandal or
were preparing for bed, Conchita discovered that there enormity." The occurrence at the residence on the night
was a stranger in the lower part of the house and by her of the 6th of November did not have that publicity which

91
is required by the article of the Penal Code referred to. alone in the Philippine Islands, but in the United States,
(U.S. v. Catajay, 6 Phil. Rep., 398; supreme court of Great Britain, and elsewhere. This will explain why a case
Spain, April 13, 1885, December 14, 1903, and January which otherwise would be heard and voted in Division has
27, 1908; Viada, vol. 3, p. 130.) been submitted to the court in banc for decision.

The evidence introduced on the reopening adds nothing On November 24, 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided
to the case already made by the prosecution. The case the premises known as Camera Supply Co. at 110
was reopened for a particular purpose and the evidence Escolta, Manila. He found and confiscated the post-cards
to be introduced, if any, was restricted to a particular which subsequently were used as evidence against J. J.
condition, viz, the "publicity or nonpublicity of the acts Kottinger, the manager of the company.
charged in the complaint." On the reopening, evidence
was presented by the prosecution in relation to the
Out of these facts arose the criminal prosecution of J. J.
alleged occurrence between the defendants in Plaza
Kottinger in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The
Palacio. Concerning this incident testimony had already information filed in court charged him with having kept for
been given on the trial by the witness Rafael Perez. sale in the store of the Camera Supply Co., obscene and
Testimony was also given on the reopening by the same
indecedent pictures, in violation of section 12 of Act No.
witness as to an occurrence between the defendants one
277. To this information, the defendant interposed a
morning in the Botanical Garden. In relation to this same
demurrer based upon the ground that the facts alleged
event he had already given his testimony on the trial. His
therein did not constitute an offense and were not contrary
evidence as to these two events given on the reopening to law; but trial court overruled the demurrer and the
of the case is wholly inconsistent with, if not absolutely defendant duly excepted thereto. Following the
contradictory of, his testimony in relation to the same
presentation of evidence by the Government and the
events given on the trial. Such testimony can have no
defense, judgment was rendered finding the defendant
weight.
guilty of the offense charged and sentencing him to pay a
fine of P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
The other testimony given on the reopening by this insolvency, and the costs.
witness and the testimony of the witness Amadeo
Pacheco can have no bearing or weight in the decision of
this case because such testimony relates to acts and The five errors assigned by defendant-appellant in this
relations between the defendants which are not "charged court divide themselves into two general issues. The first
in the complaint" and concerning which no evidence point sustained by counsel for the appellant is in nature a
whatever had been offered on the trial. technical objection, growing out of the defendant's
demurrer. The second point, in reality the decesive issue,
In the judgment of this court the evidence fails to show the is as suggested in the beginning of the decision. We will
defendants guilty of the crime charged. take upon the assignments of errors as thus classified in
order.
The judgment of conviction of the trial court is, therefore,
reversed, the defendants acquitted and their discharge Act No. 277 is the Philippine Libel Law. But included
from custody ordered. therein is a section, No. 12, making obscene or indecent
publications misdemeanors. Said section 12 which, it is
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur. contended by the Government, has here been violated,
and which, appellant argues, does not apply to the
information and the facts, reads as follow:
ARTICLE 201
Any person who writes, composes, stereotypes,
Republic of the Philippines prints, publishes, sells, or keeps for sale,
SUPREME COURT distributes, or exhibits any obscene or indecent
Manila writing, paper, book, or other matter, or who
designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, or
EN BANC otherwise prepares any obscene picture or print,
or who moulds, cuts, casts, or otherwise makes
G.R. No. L-20569 October 29, 1923 any obscene or indecent figure, or who writes,
composes, or prints any notice or advertisement
of any such writing, paper, book, print, or figure
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, a fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars or
vs. by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.
J. J. KOTTINGER, defendant-appellant.
Counsel has gone to the trouble to make a careful
Fisher, Dewitt, Perkins and Brady for appellant. analysis of section 12 of the Libel Law which is intended
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee. to bear out his thesis, first, that section 12 does not
prohibit the taking, selling, and publishing of alleged
obscene and indecent pictures and prints, and second,
that the information in this case charges no offense
prohibited by section 12. Recall, however, that the law
MALCOLM, J.: provides punishment, among other things, for any person
who keeps for sale or exhibits any absence or indecent
The question to be here decided is whether or not pictures writing, paper, book, or other matter, and that the
portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress information charges the defendant, among other things,
and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in with having wilfully and feloniously kept for sale,
which they live, are absence or indecent. Surprising as it distribution, or exhibition, obscene and indecent pictures.
may seem, the question is one of first impression not
92
The phrase in the law "or other matter", was apparently by the courts in determining whether a particular
added as a sort of "catch-all." While limited to that which publication or other thing is obscene within the meaning
is of the same kind as its antecedent, it is intended to of the statutes, is whether the tendency of the matter
cover kindred subjects. The rule of ejusdem charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose
generis invoked by counsel is by no means a rule of minds are open to such immoral influences and into
universal application and should be made to carry out, not whose hands a publication or other article charged as
to defeat, the legislative intent. Even if the phrase "or being obscene may fall. Another test of obscenity is that
other matter" be cobstrued to mean "or other matter of like which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as
kind," pictures and postcards are not so far unrelated to an indecency, (29 Cyc., 1315; 8 R. C. L., 312.)
writings, papers, and books, as not to be covered by the
general words (Commonwealth vs. Dejardin [1878], 126 The Philippine statute does not attempt to define obscene
Mass., 46; 30 Am. Rep., 652; Brown vs. Corbin [1889], 40 or indecent pictures, writings, papers, or books. But the
Minn., 508). words "obscene or indecent" are themselves descriptive.
They are words in common used and every person of
The line of argumentation is more refined that practical. average intelligence understand their meaning. Indeed,
Once conceded that section 12 of Act No. 277 does not beyond the evidence furnished by the pictures
cover the present case, there yet remain for application themselves, there is but little scope for proof bearing on
article 571, No. 2, of the penal code, and section 730 of the issue of obscenity or indecency. Whether a picture is
the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. The section obscene or indecent must depend upon the
of the Revised Ordinances cited is most specific when it circumstances of the case. (People vs. Muller [1884], 96
provides in part that no person shall "exhibit, circulate, N. Y., 408; 48 Am. Rep., 635.)
distribute, sell, offer or expose for sale, or give or deliver
to another, or cause the same to be done, any lewd, Considerable light can be thrown on the subject by turning
indecent, or absence book, picture, pamphlet, card, print, to the Federal Laws prohibiting the use of the mails for
paper, writing, mould, cast, figure, or any other thing." obscene matter and prohibiting the importation into the
Philippine Islands of articles, etc., of obscene or indecent
While admittedly the information is lacking in precision character. (U. S. Rev. Stat., art. 3893; 36 stat. at L., 135;
and while the content of section 12 of the Libel Law is not 7 Fed. Stat. Ann., 1194, sec. 3[b].)
as inclusive as it might be, we yet conclude that the
information is not fatally defective, and that said section "Obscene," as used in the Federal Statutes making it a
12 covers the alleged facts. criminal offense to place in the mails any obscene, lewd,
or lascivious publication, according to the united States
We come now to decide the main issue. We repeat that Supreme Court and lesser Federal courts, signifies that
our own researches have confirmed the statement of form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity,
counsel that no one parrallel case be found. We must and has the same meaning as is given at common law in
perforce reason from the general to the specific and from prosecutions for obscene libel. (Swearingen vs. U. S.
universal principle to actual fact. [1896], 161 U. S., 446; U. S. vs. Males [1892], 51 Fed.,
41; 6 Words and Phrases, 4888, 4889.)
The pictures which it is argued offend against the law on
account of being obscene and indecent, disclose six The case of United States vs. Harmon ([189], 45 Fed.,
different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the 414), grew out of an indictment for despositing an
Philippines. Exhibit A carries the legend "Philippines, obscene publication in a United States post-office in
Bontoc Woman." Exhibit A-1 is a picture of five young violator of the Postal Law. Judge Philips said:
boys and carries the legend "Greetings from the
Philippines." Exhibit A-2 has the legend "Ifugao Belle, The statute does not undertake to define the meaning of
Philippines. Greetings from the Philippines." Exhibit A-3 the terms "obscene," etc., further than may be implied by
has the legend "Igorot Girl, Rice Field Costume." Exhibit the succeeding phrase, "or other publication of an
A-4 has the legend "Kalinga Girls, Philippines. Exhibit A- indecent character." On the well-organized canon of
5 has the legend "Moros Philippines." construction these words are presumed to have been
employed by the law-maker in their ordinary acceptation
The prosecution produced no evidence proving the and use.
postcards obscene and indecent because it thought the
post-cards themselves the best evidence of that fact. The As they cannot be said to have acquired any
fiscal admitted in open court "that those pictures technical significance as applied to some
represented the natives (non-Christians) in their native particular matter, calling, or profession, but are
dress." The defendant, on the other hand, attempted to terms of popular use, the court might perhaps
show that the pictures as true to life. Dr. H. Otley Beyer, with propriety leave their import to the presumed
Professor in the University of the Philippines, intelligence of the jury. A standard dictionary says
corroborated by other witnesses, testified from his studies that "obscene" mean "offensive to chastity and
in various parts of the Islands, such as the Mountain decency; expressing or presenting to the mind or
Province, Abra, Palawan, and Mindanao and Sulu, that view something which delicacy, purity, and
none of the pictures represented poses which he had not decency forbid to be exposed." This mere
observed on various occasions, and that the costumes dictionary definition may be extended or amplified
worn by the people in the pictures are the true costumes by the courts in actual practice, preserving,
regularly worn by them. Are such pictures obscene or however, its essential though, and having always
indecent? due regard to the popular and proper sense in
which the legislature employed the term. Chief
The word "obscene" ands the term "obscenity" may be Justice Cockburn, in Rex vs. Hicklin (L. R. 3 Q.
defined as meaning something offensive to chastify, B., 360), said: "The test of obscenity is this:
decency, or delicacy. "Indeceny" is an act against Where the tendency of the matter charged as
behavior and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose
93
 minds are open to such immoral influences, and manuscripts, typewritten matter, paintings, illustrations,
into whose hands a publication of this sort may figures or objects of obscene or indecent character or
fall;" and where "it who suggest to the minds of subversive of public order." There are, however, in the
the young of either sex, or even to persons of record, copies of reputable magazines which circulate
more advanced years, thoughts of the most freely thruout the United States and other countries, and
impure and libidinous character." So, also, it has which are admitted into Philippines without question,
been held that a book is obscene which is containing illustrations identical in nature to those forming
offensive to decency or chastity, which is the basis of the prosecution at bar. Publications of the
immodest, which is indelicate, impure, causing Philippine Government have also been offered in
lewd thoughts of an immoral tendency." U. S. vs. evidence such as Barton's "Ifugao Law," the "Philippine
Bennet, 16 Blatchf., 338. Judge Thayer, in U. S. Journal of Science" for October, 1906, and the Reports of
vs. Clarke, 38 Fed. Rep., 732, observed: the Philippine Commission for 1903, 1912, and 1913, in
which are found illustrations either exactly the same or
"The word "obscene" ordinarily means nearly akin to those which are now impugned.
something which is offensive to chastity;
something that is foul or filthy, and for It appears therefore that a national standard has been set
that reason is offensive to pure-minded up by the Congress of the United States. Tested by that
persons. That is the meaning of the word standard, it would be extremely doubtful if the pictures
in the concrete; but when used, as in the here challenged would be held obscene or indecent by
statute, to describe the character of a any state of Federal court. It would be particularly unwise
book, pamphlet, or paper, it means to sanction a different type of censorship in the Philippines
containing immodest and indecent that in the United States, or for that matter in the rest of
matter, the reading whereof would have the world.
a tendency to deprave and corrupt the
minds of those into whose hands the The pictures in question merely depict persons as they
publication might fall whose minds are actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in
open to such immoral influences." unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the
Philippine community, the moral sense of all the people in
Laws of this character are made for society in the the Philippines, would not be shocked by photographs of
aggregate, and not in particular. So, while there this type. We are convicted that the post-card pictures in
may be individuals and societies of men and this case cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity,
women of peculiar motions are idiosyncrasies, or foul, or filthy.
whose moral sense would neither be depraved
nor offended by the publication now under We readily understand the laudable motives which moved
consideration, yet the exceptional sensibility, or the Government to initiate this prosecution. We fully
want of sensibility, of such cannot be allowed as appreciate the sentiments of colleagues who take a
a standard by which its obscenity or indecency is different view of the case. We would be the last to offend
to be tested. Rather is the test, what is the the sensibilities of the Filipino people and the sanction
judgment of the aggregate sense of the anything which would hold them up to ridicule in the eyes
community reached by it? What is its probable, of mankind. But we emphasize that we are not deciding a
reasonable effect on the sense of decency, purity, question in political theory or in social ethics. We are
and chastity of society, extending to the family, dealing with a legal question predicated on a legal fact,
made up of men and women, young boys and and on this question and fact, we reach the conclusion
girls, — the family, which is the common nursery that there has not been proved a violation of section 12 of
of mankind, the foundation rock upon which the the Libel Law. When other cases predicated on other
state reposes? states of facts are brought to our attention, we will decide
them as they arise.
. . . To the pure all things are pure, is too poetical
for the actualities of practical life. There is in the We seem to recall the statement of counsel that the
popular conception and heart such a thing as proprietor of the photographic concern whom he
modesty. It was born in the Garden of Eden. After represents would on his own initiative place suitable and
Adam and Eve ate of the fruit of the tree of explicit inscriptions on the pictures so that no one may be
knowledge they passed from the condition of misled as to them. Indeed, he might even go further and
perfectibility which some people nowadays aspire out of consideration for the natural sensibilities of his
to, and, their eyes being opened, they discerned customers, withdraw from sale certain pictures which can
that there was both good and evil; "and they knew be pointed out to him.
that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves
together, and made themselves aprons." From We hold that pictures portraying the inhabitants of the
that day to this civilized man has carried with him
country in native dress and as they appear and can be
the sense of shame, — the feeling that there were
seen in the regions in which they live, are not obscene or
some things on which the eye — the mind —
indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law. Disagreeing
should not look; and where men and women
therefore with the appellant on his technical argument but
become so depraved by the use, or so insensate agreeing with him on his main contention, it becomes our
from perverted education, that they will not evil duty to order the dismissal of the information. 1awph!l.net
their eyes, nor hold their tongues, the government
should perform the office for them in protection of
the social compact and the body politic. Judgment is reversed, the information is dismissed, and
the defendant-appellant is acquitted with all costs de
oficio. So ordered.
As above intimated, the Federal statue prohibits the
importation or shipment into the Philippine Islands of the
following: "Articles, books, pamphlets, printed matter,

94
 and confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10)
different magazines, which they deemed pornographic.

On September 13, 1999, petitioners with Warren

Tingchuy, were charged in an Information which reads as
follows:

That on or about May 5, 1999, in the City of

G.R. No. 159751 December 6, 2006 Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, publicly
and jointly exhibit indecent or immoral acts,
GAUDENCIO E. FERNANDO and RUDY scenes or shows at Music Fair, located at 564
ESTORNINOS, petitioners, Quezon Blvd., corner Zigay [S]t., Quiapo[,] this
vs. City[,] by then and there selling and exhibiting
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. obscene copies of x-rated VHS Tapes, lewd films
depicting men and women having sexual
intercourse[,] lewd photographs of nude men and
DECISION women in explicating (sic) positions which acts
serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market
QUISUMBING, J.: for lust or pornography to public view.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Contrary to law.4

Decision1 dated March 21, 2003 and the Resolution dated
September 2, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. When arraigned, petitioners and Tingchuy pleaded not
CR No. 25796, which affirmed the Decision of the guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. 99-176582. The prosecution offered the confiscated materials in
evidence and presented the following witnesses: Police
The RTC convicted Gaudencio E. Fernando and Rudy Inspector Rodolfo L. Tababan, SPO4 Rolando
Estorninos for violation of Article 2012 of the Revised Buenaventura and Barangay Chairperson Socorro
Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. Lipana, who were all present during the raid. After the
960 and 969, and sentenced each to imprisonment of four prosecution presented its evidence, the counsel for the
(4) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision accused moved for leave of court to file a demurrer to
correccional, and to pay the fine of P6,000 and cost of evidence, which the court granted. On October 5, 2000,
suit. the RTC however denied the demurrer to evidence and
scheduled the reception of evidence for the accused. A
The facts as culled from the records are as follows. motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic Thereafter, the accused waived their right to present
materials, officers of the Philippine National Police evidence and instead submitted the case for decision.5
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the
National Capital Region (PNP-CIDG NCR) conducted The RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence to prove
police surveillance on the store bearing the name of his guilt, but convicted herein petitioners as follows:
Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair). On May
5, 1999, Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
Court of Manila, Branch 19, issued Search Warrant No. finds accused GAUDENCIO FERNANDO and
99-1216 for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal RUDY ESTORNINOS GUILTY beyond
Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a reasonable doubt of the crime charged and are
certain Warren Tingchuy. The warrant ordered the search hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair at 564 Quezon penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
Blvd., corner Zigay Street, Quiapo, Manila, and the as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision
seizure of the following items: correccional as maximum, to pay fine of
P6,000.00 each and to pay the cost.
a. Copies of New Rave Magazines with nude
obscene pictures; For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of
accused WARREN TINGCHUY beyond
b. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazine with nude reasonable doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED of
obscene pictures; the crime charged.

c. Copies of Hustler International Magazine with The VHS tapes and the nine (9) magazines
nude obscene pictures; and utilized as evidence in this case are hereby
confiscated in favor of the government.
d. Copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic
shows.3 SO ORDERED.6

On the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. But the
served the warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who, according appellate courtlatter affirmed in toto the decision of the
to the prosecution, introduced himself as the store trial court, as follows,
attendant of Music Fair. The police searched the premises

95
 WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error on the Kottinger.14 There the Court defined obscenity as
part of the trial court, the decision appealed from something which is offensive to chastity, decency or
is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. delicacy. The test to determine the existence of obscenity
is, whether the tendency of the matter charged as
Costs against accused-appellants. obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
publication or other article charged as being obscene may
SO ORDERED.7
fall.15 Another test according to Kottinger is "that which
shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an
Hence the instant petition assigning the following errors: indecency."16 But, Kottinger hastened to say that whether
a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
I. Respondent court erred in convicting petitioner circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the
Fernando even if he was not present at the time question is to be decided by the judgment of the
of the raid aggregate sense of the community reached by it.17

II. Respondent erred in convicting petitioner Thereafter, the Court in People v. Go Pin18 and People v.
Estorninos who was not doing anything illegal at Padan y Alova, et al.,19 involving a prosecution under
the time of the raid.8 Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, laid the tests
which did little to clearly draw the fine lines of obscenity.
Simply, the issue in this case is whether the appellate
court erred in affirming the petitioners’ conviction. In People v. Go Pin, the Court said:

Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are
that at the time of the search, they were selling shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the
pornographic materials. Fernando contends that since he cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by
was not charged as the owner of an establishment selling people interested in art, there would be no
obscene materials, the prosecution must prove that he offense committed. However, the pictures here in
was present during the raid and that he was selling the question were used not exactly for art’s sake but
said materials. Moreover, he contends that the appellate rather for commercial purposes. In other words,
court’s reason for convicting him, on a presumption of the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures
continuing ownership shown by an expired mayor’s were being commercialized so that the cause of
permit, has no sufficient basis since the prosecution failed art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain
to prove his ownership of the establishment. Estorninos, and profit would appear to have been the main, if
on the other hand, insists that he was not an attendant in not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition;
Music Fair, nor did he introduce himself so.9 and it would not be surprising if the persons who
went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees
The Solicitor General counters that owners of for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly
establishments selling obscene publications are artists and persons interested in art and who
expressly held liable under Article 201, and petitioner generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to
Fernando’s ownership was sufficiently proven. As the satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather
owner, according to the Solicitor General, Fernando was people desirous of satisfying their morbid
naturally a seller of the prohibited materials and liable curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love [of]
under the Information. The Solicitor General also excitement, including the youth who because of
maintains that Estorninos was identified by Barangay their immaturity are not in a position to resist and
Chairperson Socorro Lipana as the store attendant, thus shield themselves from the ill and perverting
he was likewise liable.10 effects of these pictures.20

At the outset, we note that the trial court gave People v. Padan y Alova, et al. in a way reaffirmed the
petitionersthem the opportunity to adduce present their standards set in Go Pin but with its own test of
evidence to disprove refute the prosecution’s "redeeming feature." The Court therein said that:
evidence.11 . Instead, they waived their right to present
evidence and opted to submitted the case for [A]n actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded
decision.a1 12 The trial court therefore resolved the case by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming
on the basis of prosecution’s evidence against the feature. In it, there is no room for art. One can see
petitioners. nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity,
indecency, and an offense to public morals,
As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust
has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence
to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, specially on the youth of the land.21
immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation
or limitation. Notably, the Court in the later case of Gonzales v. Kalaw
Katigbak,22 involving motion pictures, still applied the
One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal "contemporary community standards" of Kottinger but
Code. To be held liable, the prosecution must prove that departed from the rulings of Kottinger, Go Pin and Padan
(a) the materials, publication, picture or literature are y Alova in that the Court measures obscenity in terms of
obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published the "dominant theme" of the material taken as a "whole"
or gave away such materials.13 Necessarily, that the rather than in isolated passages.
confiscated materials are obscene must be proved.
Later, in Pita v. Court of Appeals, concerning alleged
Almost a century has passed since the Court first pornographic publications, the Court recognized
attempted to define obscenity in People v. that Kottinger failed to afford a conclusive definition of
96
obscenity, and that both Go Pin and Padan y The VHS tapes also [exhibit] nude men and
Alova raised more questions than answers such as, women doing the sexual intercourse. The tape
whether the absence or presence of artists and persons entitled "Kahit sa Pangarap Lang" with Myra
interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions Manibog as the actress shows the naked body of
and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, the actress. The tape exhibited indecent and
determine what art is; or that if they find inspiration in the immoral scenes and acts. Her dancing
exhibitions, whether such exhibitions cease to be movements excited the sexual instinct of her
obscene.23 Go Pin and Padan y Alova gave too much male audience. The motive may be innocent, but
latitude for judicial arbitrament, which has permitted ad the performance was revolting and shocking to
lib of ideas and "two-cents worths" among judges as to good minds...
what is obscene or what is art.24
In one (1) case the Supreme Court ruled:
The Court in Pita also emphasized the difficulty of the
question and pointed out how hazy jurisprudence is on Since the persons who went to see those
obscenity and how jurisprudence actually failed to settle pictures and paid entrance fees were
questions on the matter. Significantly, the dynamism of usually not artists or persons interested
human civilization does not help at all. It is evident that in art to satisfy and inspire their artistic
individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging tastes but persons who are desirous of
influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of satisfying their morbid curiosity, taste and
civilization.25 It seems futile at this point to formulate a lust and for [love] of excitement, including
perfect definition of obscenity that shall apply in all cases. the youth who because of their
immaturity are not in a position to resist
There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest and shield themselves from the ill and
word is that of Miller v. California which established basic perverting effects of the pictures, the
guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, display of such pictures for commercial
applying contemporary standards would find the work, purposes is a violation of Art. 201. If
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) those pictures were shown in art exhibits
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently and art galleries for the cause of art, to
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the be viewed and appreciated by people
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a interested in art, there would be no
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific offense committed (People vs. Go Pin,
value.26 But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to 97 Phil 418).
conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion
in determining what is "patently offensive."27 No one will [B]ut this is not so in this case.30
be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of
obscene materials unless these materials depict or Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
describe patently offensive "hard core" sexual
the trial court are accorded great respect, even by this
conduct.28 Examples included (a) patently offensive
Court, unless such findings are patently unsupported by
representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on
normal or perverted, actual or simulated; and (b) patently
misapprehension of facts.31 In this case, petitioners
offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, neither presented contrary evidence nor questioned the
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the trial court’s findings. There is also no showing that the trial
genitals.29 What remains clear is that obscenity is an
court, in finding the materials obscene, was arbitrary.
issue proper for judicial determination and should be
treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound
discretion. Did petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition
of obscene materials?
In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials
obscene and the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. We emphasize that mere possession of obscene
The trial court in ruling that the confiscated materials are materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or give them
obscene, reasoned as follows: away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering the
purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of
obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the
Are the magazines and VHS tapes confiscated by
forms under Article 201 is committed only when there is
the raiding team obscene or offensive to morals?
publicity.32The law does not require that a person be
...
caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting
obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said
Pictures of men and women in the nude doing the materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the
sexual act appearing in the nine (9) confiscated public. In the present case, we find that petitioners are
magazines namely Dalaga, Penthouse, Swank, engaged in selling and exhibiting obscene materials.
Erotic, Rave, Playhouse, Gallery and two (2)
issues of QUI are offensive to morals and are Notably, the subject premises of the search warrant was
made and shown not for the sake of art but rather the Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair, named after
for commercial purposes, that is gain and profit
petitioner Fernando.33 The mayor’s permit was under his
as the exclusive consideration in their exhibition.
name. Even his bail bond shows that Hhe lives in the
The pictures in the magazine exhibited indecent
same place.34 Moreover, the mayor’s permit dated August
and immoral scenes and acts…The exhibition of
8, 1996, shows that he is the owner/operator of the
the sexual act in their magazines is but a clear store.35 While the mayor’s permit had already expired, it
and unmitigated obscenity, indecency and an
does not negate the fact that Fernando owned and
offense to public morals, inspiring…lust and
operated the establishment. It would be absurd to make
lewdness, exerting a corrupting influence
his failure to renew his business permit and illegal
especially on the youth. (Citations omitted)
operation a shield from prosecution of an unlawful act.
97
Furthermore, when he preferred not to present contrary ABAD,
evidence, the things which he possessed were
presumptively his.36 PEREZ,* and

Petitioner Estorninos is likewise liable as the store - versus - MENDOZA, JJ.

attendant actively engaged in selling and exhibiting the
obscene materials. Prosecution witness Police Inspector
Tababan, who led the PNP-CIDG NCR that conducted the
search, identified him as the store attendant upon whom
the search warrant was served.37 Tababan had no motive
for testifying falsely against Estorninos and we uphold the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties. PEOPLE OF
Lastly, this Court accords great respect to and treats with THE PHILIPPINES and PRES
finality the findings of the trial court on the matter of IDING JUDGE TITA
credibility of witnesses, absent any palpable error or
BUGHAO ALISUAG, Branch
arbitrariness in their findings.38 In our view, no reversible
error was committed by the appellate court as well as the 1, Regional Trial
trial court in finding the herein petitioners guilty as Court, Manila,
charged.
Respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 21, 2003 and
the Resolution dated September 2, 2003, of the Court of
Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 99-176582 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Promulgated:

November 21,
2011

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------- x

DECISION

THIRD DIVISION
MENDOZA, J.:

FREDRIK FELIX P. G.R. No. 191080

NOGALES, GIANCARLO P.
NOGALES, ROGELIO P.
NOGALES, MELINDA P. At bench is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
NOGALES, PRISCILA B. Present:
CABRERA, PHIL-PACIFIC of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Fredrik Felix P.
OUTSOURCING SERVICES Nogales, Giancarlo P. Nogales, Rogelio P. Nogales,
CORPORATION and 3 X 8
Melinda P. Nogales, Priscila B. Cabrera, Phil-Pacific
INTERNET, represented by
VELASCO,
its proprietorMICHAEL Outsourcing Services Corp. and 3 x 8 Internet,
JR., J., Chairper
CHRISTOPHER A.
son, represented by its proprietor Michael Christopher A.
NOGALES,
Nogales (petitioners) against respondents People of the
PERALTA,
Petitioners, Philippines and Presiding Judge Tita Bughao

98
 5. Pornographic Films and
Alisuag (Judge Alisuag) of Branch 1, Regional Trial
other Pornographic
Court, Manila (RTC). Materials

6. Web Cameras
The petition challenges the August 19, 2009
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP 7. Telephone Sets

No. 105968, which affirmed with modification the August 8. Photocopying Machines
6, 2008 Order[2] of Judge Alisuag of the RTC; and its 9. List of clients and
January 25, 2010 Resolution,[3] which denied petitioners 10. Other tools and materials
motion for reconsideration. used or intended to be used
in the commission of the
crime.

THE FACTS:

On July 30, 2007, Special Investigator Garry The application for Search Warrant No. 07-11685
Meez (SI Meez) of the National Bureau of of SI Meez was acted upon by Judge Alisuag. On August
Investigation (NBI) applied for a search warrant before 3, 2007, a hearing was conducted wherein Judge Alisuag
the RTC to authorize him and his fellow NBI agents or any personally examined SI Meez and two other witnesses in
peace officer to search the premises of petitioner Phil- the form of searching questions and their answers thereto
Pacific Outsourcing Services Corporation (Phil- were duly recorded by the court. The witnesses affidavits
Pacific) and to seize/confiscate and take into custody the were also submitted and marked as supporting evidence
items/articles/objects enumerated in his application. The to the application for the issuance of a search warrant. On
sworn application, docketed as Search Warrant the same date of the hearing, the application was granted
Proceedings No. 07-11685,[4] partially reads: and the corresponding Search Warrant,[5] issued. The
SWORN APPLICATION FOR A said search warrant is quoted as follows:
SEARCH WARRANT

xxxxxxxxx
SEARCH WARRANT

That he has been informed, verily

believes and personally verified that JUN TO: ANY PEACE OFFICER
NICOLAS, LOREN NUESTRA,
FREDRICK FELIX P. NOGALES,
MELINDA P. NOGALES, PRISCILA B. It appearing to the satisfaction of the
CABRERA and/or occupants PHIL- undersigned, after examining under oath
PACIFIC OUTSOURCING SERVICES applicant SI III GARY I. MEEZ of the
CORP. located at Mezzanine Flr., Special Task Force Division, National
Glorietta De Manila Building, 776 San Bureau of Investigation, and his
Sebastian St., University Belt, witnesses, ISABEL CORTEZ y
Manila have in their possession/control ANDRADE of 167 5th Avenue, Caloocan
and are concealed in the above- City and MARK ANTHONY C.
mentioned premises various material[s] SEBASTIAN of No. 32 Arlegui Street,
used in the creation and selling of San Miguel Quiapo, Manila that there are
pornographic internet website, to wit: good reasons to believe that VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE 201 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED IN
RELATION TO R.A. 8792
(ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACT) has
been committed and that JUN NICOLAS,
LOREN NUESTRA, FREDERICK (sic)
1. Computer Sets
FELIX P. NOGALES, GIAN CARLO P.
2. Television Sets NOGALES, ROGELIO P. NOGALES,
MELINDA P. NOGALES, PRISCILA B.
3. Internet Servers CABRERA and/or OCCUPANTS OF
PHIL. PACIFIC OUTSOURCING
4. Fax Machines
99
SERVICES CORPORATION located at direct. You are further directed to submit a return
Mezzanine Floor, Glorietta De Manila within ten (10) days from today.
Building, 776 San Sebastian St.,
University Belt, Manila, have in their
possession and control of the following:

On August 8, 2007, SI Meez submitted a Return

of Search Warrant[6] to the RTC manifesting that in the
1. Computer Sets
morning of August 7, 2007, the operatives of the Special
2. Television Sets
Task Force of the NBI implemented the said search
3. Internet Servers
warrant in an orderly and peaceful manner in the
4. Fax Machines presence of the occupants of the described premises and
5. Pornographic Films and that the seized items were properly inventoried in the
other Pornographic
Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized. The items seized
Materials
were the following:
6. Web Cameras

7. Telephone Sets

8. Photocopying Machines

9. List of clients and

10. Other tools and materials

used or intended to be used
in the commission of the
crime. 1. Ten (10) units of Central Processing Units
(CPUs);

2. Ten (10) units of monitors;

You are hereby commanded to make an 3. Ten (10) units of keyboard;
immediate search any time of the DAY of the
premises mentioned above which is Mezzanine 4. Ten (10) units of mouse; and
Floor, Glorietta De Manila Building, 776 San
5. Ten (10) units of AVRs.
Sebastian St., University Belt, Manila and take
possession of the following:

The RTC then issued an order granting the prayer

1. Computer Sets
of SI Meez to keep the seized items in the NBI evidence
2. Television Sets
room and under his custody with the undertaking to make
3. Internet Servers
said confiscated items available whenever the court
4. Fax Machines
would require them.
5. Pornographic Films and
other Pornographic
Materials
Aggrieved by the issuance of the said order, the
6. Web Cameras
named persons in the search warrant filed a Motion to
7. Telephone Sets
Quash Search Warrant and Return Seized
8. Photocopying Machines
Properties.[7] In the said motion, petitioners cited the
9. List of clients and following grounds:
10. Other tools and materials
used or intended to be used
in the commission of the A. Respondents do not have
crime. programmers making, designing,
maintaining, editing, storing, circulating,
distributing, or selling said websites or
the contents thereof;
and bring to this Court the said properties and
persons to be dealt with as the law may

100
 B. Respondents do there was no really crime being
not have any website servers; committed. As in fact, pornographic
materials were found in some of the
computers which were seized.

C. Respondents do not own the

websites imputed to them, which are
actually located outside the Philippines, 3.) In the same way that the
in foreign countries, and are owned by names listed in the Search Warrant were
foreign companies in those countries; not arrested or not in the premises
subject of the search, it does not mean
that there are no such persons existing
nor there is no crime being committed.
D. The testimony of the
witnesses presented by the NBI are
contradicted by the facts of the case as
established by documentary evidence; 4.) As a rule, Search Warrant
may be issued upon existence of
probable cause. Probable cause for a
search is defined as such fact and
E. The NBI withheld verifiable circumstances which would lead a
information from the Honorable Court reasonable discreet and prudent man to
and took advantage of the limited believe that an offense has been
knowledge of courts in general in order to committed and that the objects sought in
obtain the search warrant for their connection with the offense are in the
personal intentions; place sought to be reached. Hence, in
implementing a Search Warrant, what
matters most is the presence of the items
ought to be seized in the place to be
F. The NBI raided the
searched, even in the absence of the
wrong establishment; and
authors of the crime committed.

G. The element of publicity is

5.) The Search Warrant was
absent.
issued in accordance with Secs. 3 to 6,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Search Warrant may be quashed
or invalidated if there is an impropriety in
its issuance or irregularity in its
enforcement. Absent such impropriety or
irregularity, quashal is not warranted.
On December 26, 2007, the RTC denied the
motion[8] stating, among others, that:

Undaunted, petitioners moved for the

reconsideration of the said order on the following
grounds: (a) the trial court erred in holding that there was
1.) It cannot be said that publicity
is not present. The Phil-Pacific no impropriety or irregularity in the issuance of the search
Outsourcing Services Corp., is actually warrant; (b) the trial court erred in holding that there was
persuading its clients, thru its agents (call
center agents), to log-on to the no irregularity in its enforcement; and (c) the trial court
pornographic sites listed in its web erred in holding that publicity was present.
page. In that manner, Phil-Pacific
Outsourcing Services Corporation is
advertising these pornographic web
sites, and such advertisement is a form On February 19, 2008, petitioners requested the
of publicity.
RTC to issue a subpoena duces tecum ad
testificandum to SI Meez and the witnesses Isabel Cortez
2.) Even if some of the listed and Mark Anthony Sebastian directing them to appear,
items intended to be seized were not
bring the records evidencing publicity of pornographic
recovered from the place where the
search was made, it does not mean that materials and testify in the hearing set on March 7, 2008.
101
 The Motion to Release Seized
Meanwhile, in a resolution dated February 21, 2008,[9] the
Properties is partially granted.
3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended that the
complaint for violation of Article 201[10] of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) against petitioners be dismissed due Accordingly therefore, let the
computer sets be hereby returned to the
to insufficiency of evidence and the same was approved
respondents. The CPU and all the rest of
by the City Prosecutor. Hence, on May 6, 2008, the softwares containing obscene
materials which were seized during the
petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Release Seized
implementation of the valid Search
Properties[11] manifesting that the complaint against them Warrant are hereby retained in the
was dismissed, and that, for said reason, the State had possession of the National Bureau of
Investigation thru applicant Special
no more use of the seized properties. Investigator Garry J. Meez.

On August 6, 2008, the RTC issued the assailed SO ORDERED.[13]

second order,[12] which denied the motion for

reconsideration filed by petitioners. The RTC, however,
partially granted the prayer of petitioners. Judge Alisuag
wrote: Not in conformity, petitioners sought relief with the

Be it noted that the proceedings CA via a special civil action for certiorari alleging that
held by this Court when it heard the Judge Alisuag committed grave abuse of discretion
Application for Search Warrant by NBI
Special Investigator Meez is very much amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
different [from] the case resolved by the partially granted the motion of petitioners for the release
Office of the City Prosecutor. The case
of the seized properties such that only the monitor sets
before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
while the same [was] dismissed cannot were released but the CPUs and the softwares were
be the ground to release the seized retained under the custody of the NBI.
properties subject of the Search Warrant
issued by the Court. When the Court
issued the Search Warrant, indeed, it
found probable cause in the issuance of
The CA affirmed with modification the assailed August 6,
the same, which is the only reason
wherein Search Warrant may be issued. 2008 Order of the RTC. Thus:

On the case heard by the Office WHEREFORE, in view of all the

of the City Prosecutor, the Resolution foregoing premises, the assailed order
has its own ground and reason to dismiss issued by the respondent Judge on
it. August 6, 2008 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONthat the CPUs and
softwares which were ordered to be
xxxxxxxxx retained by the NBI through SI Meez
shall be released in favor of the
petitioners herein with the condition that
the hard disk be removed from the CPUs
That the subject of the Search and be destroyed. If the softwares are
Warrant which is now under the custody determined to be unlicensed or pirated
of the NBI [was] made subject of the case copies, they shall be destroyed in the
and as well as the witnesses for that case manner allowed by law.
which was resolved by the Office of the
City Prosecutor is of no moment.
SO
ORDERED.[14] [Underscoring supplied]
WHEREFORE, the Motion for
Reconsideration is Denied.

102
 case. In the instant case, the complaint
had been dismissed by the prosecutor for
The CA explained: insufficiency of evidence. Thus, the court
had been left with the custody of highly
depreciable merchandise. More
1.) It is undisputed that the importantly, these highly depreciable
seized computer units contained articles would have been superfluous to
obscene materials or pornographic be retained for the following reasons: (1)
files. The hard disk technically contains it was found by the prosecutor that there
them but these files are susceptible to was no sufficient evidence to prove that
modification or limitation of status; thus, the petitioners violated Article 201 of the
they can be erased or permanently Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A.
deleted from the storage disk. In this 8792 (Electronic Commerce Act); (2) the
peculiar case, the obscene materials or obscene materials or pornographic files
pornographic files are stored in such a can be deleted by formatting or removing
way that they can be erased or deleted the hard disk from the CPUs without
by formatting the hard disk without the destroying the entire CPU; and (3) the
necessity of destroying or burning the petitioners did not dispute that the files
disk that contains them. By structure, the found in the seized items were obscene
hard drive contains the hard disk and the or pornographic but the said devices are
hard drive can be found in the not obscene or illegal per se. Hence,
CPU. These obscene materials or where the purpose of presenting as
pornographic files are only stored files of evidence the articles seized is no longer
the CPU and do not permanently form served, there is no justification for
part of the CPU which would call for the severely curtailing the rights of a person
destruction or much less retention of the to his property.
same.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration

but it was denied in a resolution dated January 25,

2.) Notwithstanding, with the
advancement of technology, there are 2010.[15]
means developed to retrieve files from a
formatted hard disk, thus, the removal of
the hard disk from the CPU is the reliable
manner to permanently remove the Undeterred, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari[16] with
obscene or pornographic files. With this Court anchored on the following:
regard to the softwares confiscated and
also ordered to be retained by the NBI,
nothing in the evidence presented by the
respondents shows that these softwares GROUNDS:
are pornographic tools or program
customized just for creating obscene
materials. There are softwares which
6.1. The decision by the Court of
may be used for licit activities like
Appeals affirming the decision of the
photograph enhancing or video editing
respondent trial judge constitutes grave
and there are thousands of softwares
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
that have legitimate uses. It would be
excess of jurisdiction, as it violates the
different if the confiscated softwares are
constitutional proscription against
pirated softwares contained in compact
confiscation of property without due
discs or the pre-installed softwares have
process of law, and there is no appeal
no license or not registered; then, the NBI
nor any plain, speedy or adequate
may retain them. In the particular
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
circumstances of this case, the return of
the CPUs and softwares would better
serve the purposes of justice and
expediency.

6.2. Since the case involves

3.) The responsibilities of the pornography accessible in the internet,
magistrate do not end with the granting of this is a case of first impression and
the warrant but extend to the custody of current importance.[17] [Emphases ours]
the articles seized. In exercising custody
over these articles, the property rights of
the owner should be balanced with the
social need to preserve evidence which
will be used in the prosecution of a
103
ISSUE The CA is correct in stating that the removal

of the hard disk from the CPU is a reliable way of

Whether or not there was grave abuse of permanently removing the obscene or pornographic
discretion on the part of the CA in ordering the removal files. Significantly, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 969
and destruction of the hard disks containing the
is explicit. Thus:
pornographic and obscene materials.

Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited

THE COURTS RULING
Articles. The disposition of the literature,
Petitioners argue that there is no evidence showing films, prints, engravings, sculptures,
paintings, or other materials involved in
that they were the source of pornographic printouts the violation referred to in Section 1
hereof shall be governed by the following
presented by the NBI to the RTC or to the City
rules:
Prosecutor of Manila in I.S. No. 07H-13530. Since the

hard disks in their computers are not illegal per a. Upon conviction of the
offender, to be forfeited in
se unlike shabu, opium, counterfeit money, or favor of the government to be
destroyed.
pornographic magazines, said merchandise are

lawful as they are being used in the ordinary course b. Where the criminal case
of business, the destruction of which would violate not against any violator of this
decree results in an acquittal, the
only procedural, but substantive due process. [18] obscene/immoral literature,
films, prints, engravings,
sculpture, paintings or other
The argument of petitioners is totally materials and other articles
involved in the violation referred
misplaced considering the undisputed fact that to in Section 1 hereof shall
nevertheless be forfeited in favor
the seized computer units contained obscene of the government to
be destroyed, after forfeiture
materials or pornographic files. Had it been
proceedings conducted by the
otherwise, then, petitioners argument would have Chief of Constabulary.
[Emphasis and underscoring
been meritorious as there could be no basis for supplied]
destroying the hard disks of petitioners computer

units.
Clearly, the provision directs the forfeiture

of all materials involved in violation of the subject law.

While it may be true that the criminal case for
The CA was lenient with petitioners in modifying the
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code was
ruling of the RTC in that the CPUs and softwares,
dismissed as there was no concrete and strong
which were initially ordered to be retained by the NBI,
evidence pointing to them as the direct source of the
should be released in their favor with only the hard
subject pornographic materials, it cannot be used as
disk removed from the CPUs and destroyed. If the
basis to recover the confiscated hard disks. At the risk
softwares are determined to be violative of Article 201
of being repetitious, it appears undisputed that the
of the RPC, unlicensed or pirated, they should also
seized computer units belonging to them contained
be forfeited and destroyed in the manner allowed by
obscene materials or pornographic files. Clearly,
law. The law is clear. Only licensed softwares that can
petitioners had no legitimate expectation of protection
be used for legitimate purposes should be returned to
of their supposed property rights.
petitioners.

104
 This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 24162
affirming, on appeal, the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
To stress, P.D. No. 969 mandates the Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 49, in People v.
Rubin Tad-y, et al., Criminal Case No. 98-19401. The
forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials
RTC ruling had affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial
involved in the violation of Article 201 of the Revised Court in Cities (MTCC) in Criminal Case No. 57216
finding the petitioner guilty of direct bribery.
Penal Code, even if the accused was acquitted.

The Antecedents
Taking into account all the circumstances of this
case, the Court holds that the destruction of the hard disks Engineer Rubin Tad-y, Structural Analyst and
and the softwares used in any way in the violation of the Engineer Nestor Velez, Building Inspector, both of the
Office of the City Engineer (OCE), Bacolod City, were
subject law addresses the purpose of minimizing if not charged with direct bribery under Article 210 of the
totally eradicating pornography. This will serve as a lesson Revised Penal Code in an Information filed on July 26,
1995 with the MTCC of Bacolod City, docketed as
for those engaged in any way in the proliferation of Criminal Case No. 57216. The accusatory portion of the
Information for direct bribery reads:
pornography or obscenity in this country. The Court is not
unmindful of the concerns of petitioners but their supposed That on or about the 24th day of July 1995, in the City of
Bacolod, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
property rights must be balanced with the welfare of the
Honorable Court, the herein accused, public officers,
public in general. being then engineers at the City Engineers Office,
Bacolod City, with corrupt intent and motivated with
pecuniary interest for themselves, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and accept
marked money in the amount of Four Thousand
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The (P4,000.00) Pesos from Julio Encabo, electrical
August 19, 2009 Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED contractor and duly-authorized representative of Mildred
Wong, offended party and owner of Atrium Building
WITH MODIFICATION in that only the CPUs and those located at Gonzaga Street, Bacolod City, in an
softwares determined to be licensed and used for entrapment operation conducted by the PNP Criminal
Investigation Service Command at Andres Bakeshop,
legitimate purposes shall be returned in favor of the Bacolod City, which amount was earlier solicited by said
accused from the offended party in exchange for the
petitioners. The hard disk drives containing the
signing/approval of permit for building occupancy of the
pornographic materials and the softwares used in any building owned by the offended party, the
signing/approval of said building permit is in connection
way in violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, with the performance of the official duties of said accused
unlicensed or pirated shall be forfeited in favor of the as engineers in the Office of the City Engineer, Bacolod
City, in violation of the aforementioned law.
Government and destroyed.
Acts contrary to law.[3]

Velez and Tad-y were also charged with violation of

SO ORDERED. Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019[4] in an Information
filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. 17186.
This case was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC of Bacolod
City.

ARTICLE 210

SECOND DIVISION The Case for the People[5]

The prosecution presented Julio Encabo, a licensed

master electrician and electrical contractor, who testified
[G.R. No. 148862. August 11, 2005]
that Mildred Wong contracted his services for the
construction of her 6-storey Atrium building along
Gonzaga Street, in front of the Central Market in Bacolod
City.[6] On February 16, 1994, the Office of the City
RUBIN TAD-Y y BABOR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF Engineer/Building Official issued Building Permit No.
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. 0694509798[7] for the construction of the building. The
construction of the building was finished by April 25,
DECISION 1995.[8]
CALLEJO, SR., J.: Between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m. of even date, Encabo
arrived at the OCE to arrange the conduct of final building
inspections, and, thereafter, the signing of the

105
corresponding certificates. Rene Cornel, Jose Sotecinal, wearing his orange OCE bowling team t-shirt. Encabo and
Ephraim Hechanova, Jose Mari Sales, Mateo Tuvida and Tad-y inspected the building together for about ten to
Rubin Tad-y, were the OCE officers-in-charge of the twenty minutes. Velez, on his own, made a separate
various aspects[9] of the building construction. If all went inspection of the building. After the inspection, Encabo,
well, the Building Official would then sign the certificate of Tad-y and Velez agreed to have a snack and proceeded
occupancy, conformably with the provisions of the to the Andres Bakeshop at the ground floor of the Atrium
National Building Code (Presidential Decree No. 1096). Building along Gonzaga Street.[23] Velez and Tad-y
walked side by side while Encabo followed.[24] By then,
Encabo had the certificates of final inspection and Muoz, Castaeda and the other police officers were
occupancy form typed by an OCE secretary. However, already in the vicinity to await Encabos signal.
Tad-y, Encabos compadre, approached the latter and
dissuaded him from processing the certificates of final Inside the bakeshop, Encabo brought out the
inspection and occupancy on the building since he (Tad- certificate of final inspection, which Tad-y forthwith
y) was the one responsible for it; also, Mildred Wong still signed.[25] Encabo then gave the envelope containing the
had an unpaid balance of P4,000.00 for his services. forty P100.00 bills to Tad-y. The latter asked Encabo,
When Encabo told Tad-y that collecting the amount from What is it for? Encabo replied that it was the money Tad-
Wong would be problematic, Tad-y replied, [Its] up [to] y had been waiting for.[26] Tad-y opened the envelope and
you. saw its contents.[27] He asked Encabo if it was dangerous
for him to receive the envelope, and the latter answered
Shortly thereafter, some of the officers at the OCE, that it was not.[28] Instead of putting the envelope in his
including Tad-y and Tuvida, conducted their final pocket, Tad-y handed the same to Velez under the table.
inspection of the building. During the first week of May Velez asked Tad-y what it was, and Tad-y told Velez to
1995, Encabo and Tad-y had an altercation and in his just keep it.[29] Thereafter, Tad-y and Velez, followed by
anger, Tad-y squeezed Encabos neck in the presence of Encabo, exited from the bakeshop. Encabo then removed
the latters wife.[10] Thus, the relations between Tad-y and his eyeglasses and placed it on his shirt collar, the signal
Encabo became strained. that Tad-y had received the money.[30] The police officers
In the meantime, other officers of the OCE made then accosted Velez and Tad-y, and asked the latter
their respective final inspections during the months of May where the white envelope was. Tad-y denied that he
to June 1995, and signed the respective certificates of received the envelope. Encabo told the police officers that
final inspection for the building. Tad-y did not make his Velez had the envelope.[31] When asked where the
final inspection, and refused to do so unless the money envelope was, Velez brought it out from the right pocket
he had demanded was given to him.[11] Encabo even of his pants.[32] Muoz told Velez to open the envelope and
sought the aid of the City Mayor but did not tell the latter inspected its contents. Velez did as he was told, and saw
that Tad-y was demanding money because he did not that the envelope contained P100.00 bills.[33] Tad-y and
want to place the latter in a bad light. Velez were arrested and brought to the CIS
Headquarters, PNP Crime Laboratory.[34] Tad-ys shirt
Nonetheless, on July 6, 1995, Encabo reported the was turned over by the accosting officers. Castaeda also
matter to the Criminal Investigation Section (CIS) of the turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory the white
Philippine National Police (PNP) in Bacolod City, and envelope and its contents, with a request[35] for the PNP
signed a complaint sheet[12] against Tad-y for extortion. Crime Laboratory to test Velez and Tad-y for ultraviolet
Police officer Alexander Muoz was then ordered to powder and the latters shirt to be tested.[36]
conduct an investigation on the complaint.
Forensic Chemist Rea Villavicencio conducted the
Muoz decided to conduct entrapment operations examination and prepared an Initial Laboratory
against Tad-y. He asked Encabo to procure P4,000.00, Report,[37] stating that Rubin B. Tad-y was positive for the
consisting of forty (40) pieces of P100.00 bills for the presence of yellow ultraviolet powder on his right arm.
purpose.[13] Encabo complied. Muoz listed the serial Villavicencio, likewise, prepared a sketch[38] depicting the
numbers of the bills and placed his initials AM on the right body of Tad-y, and showing that his right forearm was
lower corner of each bill.[14] The PNP Crime Laboratory in positive for ultraviolet powder.
Bacolod City applied ultraviolet powder on the bills.[15] The
money was placed in a white envelope,[16] and the On cross-examination, Encabo admitted that Velez
envelope was turned over to Encabo for the was not aware of everything.[39]
entrapment.[17] The police officers and Encabo had Edgar Occea, the Chief of the Inspection Division,
agreed that the police officers would position themselves later affixed his signature on the certificate of final
within the vicinity of the Andres Bakeshop, and after inspection bearing Tad-ys signature.[40] The City Building
giving the envelope to Tad-y, Encabo would place his Official approved and issued the certificate of occupancy
eyeglasses in front of his shirt collar to indicate that Tad- on July 27, 1995.[41]
y had already received the money.[18]
After two aborted attempts,[19] Encabo informed
Muoz by telephone that he and Tad-y would inspect the The Case for the Accused Tad-y
building at about 3:00 p.m. on July 24, 1995, and that Tad-
y would sign the certificate of final inspection
afterwards.[20] Police officers Eriberto Castaeda and Accused Tad-y denied demanding and
Muoz, along with civilian agents, proceeded to Gonzaga receiving P4,000.00 from Encabo in consideration for the
Street and positioned themselves as planned.[21] conduct of the building inspection, and his signature on
the certificate of inspection and the certificate of
Encabo and Tad-y, accompanied by OCE building
occupancy. He insists that under P.D. No. 1096, he is not
inspector Engr. Nestor Velez, arrived at the building at
authorized to sign and issue a certificate of occupancy.
about 5:00 p.m. on July 24, 1995. Encabo brought with
He testified that in the afternoon of April 25, 1995, Encabo
him the envelope[22]containing the forty P100.00 bills and
arrived at the OCE requesting that the appropriate
the certificate of final inspection bearing the signatures of
officials inspect the 6-storey Atrium building preparatory
all the other OCE officers concerned, which Tad-y was to
to the issuance of a certificate of final inspection.[42] The
sign after the inspection of the building. Tad-y was then
106
next day, he, Tuvida, Tordesillas, Baja and Danoy Tad-y parried the attempt and refused to receive the
conducted the building inspection.[43] They discovered envelope.[56]
that only four floors were completed.[44] Encabo agreed to
inspect the building at 3:00 p.m. of July 24, 1995, which, Tad-y marked and offered in evidence the transcript
at Encabos request, was reset to 4:30 p.m.[45] He and of stenographic notes[57] taken during the trial of
Engr. Velez conducted the inspection of the building on September 25, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 17186.
that day and found some defects in the construction of the
building.
The Case For the Accused Nestor Velez
After the inspection, Tad-y left Velez and Encabo
behind as he was going to a bowling tournament, but, as
he was crossing Gonzaga Street, Velez and Encabo Nestor Velez denied the charge. He corroborated the
called him and invited him to join them for a snack at testimony of Tad-y and declared that he was appointed
Andres Bakeshop.[46] He agreed because he was hungry. as building inspector of the OCE only on March 16,
He and Encabo were seated beside each other at the 1995.[58] When he and Tad-y inspected the building in the
table in the bakeshop, while Velez was seated at the afternoon of July 24, 1995, they did so separately. After
opposite side.[47] While taking their snacks, Encabo the inspection, Tad-y told him and Encabo that he was
brought out the certificate of final inspection bearing the going ahead because he was going to play
signatures of the other officers of the OCE who had bowling.[59] When Encabo invited him and Tad-y for a
inspected the building. Tad-y affixed his signature above snack, Tad-y reluctantly agreed.[60]
his typewritten name with the notation see back page for
structural requisites at the dorsal portion of the document. Momentarily, Encabo brought out the certificate of
Appearing at the dorsal portion of the certificate is Tad-ys final inspection and handed it to Tad-y for the latters
handwritten notation: Please Post the Allowable Load on signature. However, Tad-y told Encabo that he would note
[conspicuous] places especially [in the] area to be used the deficiencies of the building. Tad-y then signed the
as storage.[48] Before then, he inquired from Encabo certificate after being assured by Encabo that he had all
where the other requisite certificates of final inspection, the other certificates. Tad-y gave Velez the envelope and
plumbing, Fire Safety Inspection and logbook were, and told him to keep it because he was going to a bowling
Encabo replied that he brought the requisite certificates game.[61] Velez received the envelope and put it inside the
with him gesturing to his portfolio. Encabo assured him right pocket of his pants, thinking that it contained the
that all the requirements were in his portfolio.[49] With requisite final safety inspection certificate and other
Encabos assurance, he then affixed his signature in the certificates.[62]
certificate of final inspection.[50]
On his way from the bakeshop, he and Tad-y were
Momentarily, Encabo told him that he had another arrested by policemen. He opened the white envelope as
document, and forthwith handed a white envelope to him. the policemen ordered, and saw money inside. He was
Believing that the envelope contained the requisite forced to approach Tad-y, and another policeman forced
certificate of final inspection signed by the other officers the latter to touch the money contained in the envelope.
in the OCE, he received the envelope and, without Tad-y resisted.
opening it, immediately handed it over to Velez who would
examine its contents. He then left the bakeshop with Edgar Occea testified that he signed the original and
Velez ahead of him, followed by Encabo. He was crossing duplicate copies of the certificate of final inspection with
Gonzaga Street on his way to the bowling tournament the requisite certificates of the other officers appended
when he was arrested by policemen, who asked him thereto. The City Engineer/City Building Official signed
where the white envelope he had earlier received from the Certificate of Occupancy on July 27, 1995. The
Encabo was. He told them that the envelope was with original copy of the certificate of final inspection and
Velez.[51] occupancy was then released to Wong, while the
duplicate was retained by the OCE.[63]
Tad-y then saw Velez being held by a policeman,
and that the envelope was already opened. A policeman Mateo Tuvida testified that he was the engineer in
forced Velez to go near him. Another policeman forced charge of the Mechanical Section of the OCE of Bacolod
him (Tad-y) to touch the envelope, but he parried the arm City since February 1975.[64] On April 25, 1995, he, Baja,
of the policeman with his right forearm and refused to Tad-y, Cornel and Yolando Ilog inspected the building at
touch it.[52] They were then brought to the PNP the Gonzaga side of the street and found that it was
headquarters where they were tested for ultraviolet already complete but that the structure along Cuadra
powder. Street was still incomplete. He found the mechanical
aspect of the building completed when he inspected it in
Encabo filed a complaint against him because on the first week of June 1995.[65] He then affixed his
four (4) prior occasions, he refused to sign the certificate signature on the certificate of final inspection.[66]
of final inspection of a house owned by a certain Nelson
Seores, as well as the application for a building permit of Venancio Baja testified that he had been in charge
Joey Yao, unless the latter paid a 100% surcharge for of the Electrical Division of the OCE since 1990. He was
deficiencies.[53] Seores and Yao were the principals of the assistant of Jose Sotecinal, the Chief Electrical
Encabo. In the evening of April 25, 1995, after he, Tuvida, Engineer. He inspected the Atrium building on April 25,
Baja and Tordesillas had their initial inspections of the 1995 and found it incomplete. He again inspected the
building, they had dinner at the Tasty Treat. When he was building and found it in accord with the plans. He then
about to pay the bill for their food and drinks, Encabo signed the certificate of final inspection only in the first
insisted that he would pay the said bill. This infuriated him, week of June 1995.[67]
and he squeezed Encabos chin with his hand.[54] On September 28, 1998, the MTC rendered
Jimmy Gonzales, a newspaper vendor, corroborated judgment convicting Tad-y of direct bribery defined and
the testimony of the accused that someone forced Velez penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
to hand over the opened envelope to Tad-y,[55] but that Velez was acquitted of the charges. The fallo of the
decision reads:

107
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: The RTC denied Tad-ys motion for reconsideration.
However, the RTC agreed with Tad-ys contention that
1. Accused Engineer Nestor Velez is hereby what the latter signed was a certificate of final inspection
ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of and not a certificate of occupancy.
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code on In a parallel development, the RTC rendered
the ground that it is the finding of this Court judgment on May 18, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 17186,
that he was innocent of the crime charged; acquitting Tad-y and Velez of the charge.[70]

2. Accused Engineer Ruben Tad-y is hereby The accused, now the petitioner, filed a petition for
pronounced GUILTY BEYOND review of the decision of the RTC. The CA rendered
REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of judgment on February 2, 2001 affirming the RTC
Paragraph 2 of Article 210 of the Revised decision in toto.[71] Upon the denial of the motion for
Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to reconsideration of the said decision, the petitioner filed his
suffer imprisonment of 2 years and 4 petition for review on certiorari with this Court.
months, as minimum, to 3 years, as
The threshold issue raised by the petitioner is factual
maximum, in the absence of any
whether the prosecution adduced proof beyond
mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
reasonable doubt of his guilt for direct bribery under the
in accordance with the mandatory
second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Code.
Law, and, to pay the fine in the amount
of P8,000.00 pesos. The petitioner avers that under the Information, and
as held by the courts a quo, he was charged with direct
3. Accused Ruben Tad-y, in case of his bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the
insolvency to pay the fine, shall suffer a Revised Penal Code, for soliciting and
subsidiary penalty of imprisonment at the receiving P4,000.00 on July 24, 1995 from Mildred Wong,
rate of one day for each 8 pesos and shall through Encabo, in consideration for his signing/approval
remain in confinement until his fine is of the certificate of occupancy of the Atrium Building, and
satisfied. However, his subsidiary that he signed said certificate on said date.
imprisonment shall not exceed one-third
The petitioner maintains that he did not sign a
of the term of the sentence, and in no case
certificate of occupancy. He posits that a certificate of
shall it continue for more than one year,
occupancy is signed by the city building official, and that
and no fraction or part of day shall be
he has nothing to do with the execution of such certificate.
counted against the prisoner, in
Hence, he is not criminally liable for direct bribery, one of
accordance with Article 39 of the Revised
the essential elements for the crime being that the act
Penal Code; and
which he agreed to do or execute is connected to the
performance of his official duties.
4. Accused Ruben Tad-y is also hereby ordered
to suffer the penalty of special temporary The petitioner assails the credibility and probative
disqualification and is hereby ordered to weight of Encabos testimony. He avers that Encabo had
be deprived of his right to hold office and an axe to grind against him because, on prior occasions,
employment in the City Engineers Office, he had denied the applications for building permit filed by
as well as for holding similar offices or his principals due to structural deficiencies in the
employments either perpetually or during buildings.
the term of his sentence in accordance
The petitioner further insists that he did not demand,
with paragraph 4 of Article 210, in relation
nor could have demanded the amount of P4,000.00 on
to Article 31, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
April 25, 1995, or thereafter, because as of the said date,
Revised Penal Code.
the Atrium building had not yet been completed. The
petitioner avers that Encabos claim that he
SO ORDERED.[68] demanded P4,000.00 for the signing the certificate of final
inspection is belied by the fact that he indicated the
The MTC gave full credence and probative weight to deficiencies of the building at the dorsal portion of the
Encabos testimony, ruling that Tad-y demanded and certificate. It was only in the first week of June 1995 that
received P4,000.00 from Encabo on July 24, 1995 in Baja and Tuvida made their final inspection and signed
consideration for his signing a certificate of occupancy. It the certificate of final inspection.[72] Even Encabo
further ruled that the accused signed the said certificate admitted that the petitioner refused to sign the said
on the said date. certificate because as of July 24, 1995, there had been no
final inspection of the building, and not because he was
Tad-y appealed the decision to the RTC, which
demanding P4,000.00 from Encabo.
rendered judgment on September 13, 1999, affirming the
decision of the MTC with modification as to the penalty The petitioner posits that the case for the prosecution
imposed. The fallo of the decision reads: was enfeebled by its failure to adduce in evidence the
certificate of final inspection he signed on July 24, 1995.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is hereby It adduced in evidence only the certificate of final
affirmed except for the modifications that the accused inspection bearing all the signatures of the officers in the
Ruben Tad-y y Babors sentence should consist of an OCE, except his.[73] He claims that the respondent failed
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of Arresto to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he knew of the
Mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and contents of the white envelope. He, in fact, believed that
twenty- one (21) days of Prision Correccional, as the envelope contained the requisite certificates of
maximum, and for him to pay the cost. inspection. Moreover, he did not open the envelope and
instead passed it over to Velez for verification, as he was
SO ORDERED.[69] on his way to a bowling game.

108
 The petitioner further contends that the respondent suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its maximum
even failed to adduce in evidence the white envelope he period to prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine
received from Encabo, or prove that the said white not less than three times the value of the gift.
envelope was what he actually received from Encabo. He
posits that there is no probable cause for his and Velezs In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding
warrantless arrest; hence, any evidence confiscated by paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of special
the policemen from them is inadmissible in evidence. temporary disqualification.
The respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), avers that it adduced proof beyond The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs
reasonable doubt of the petitioners guilt for direct bribery. shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators,
It insists that the petitioner failed to prove that Encabo had appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other
any ulterior motive to falsely charge and testify against persons performing public duties.
him. The OSG points that the testimony of Encabo is
honest and straightforward; hence, entitled to full Direct bribery has the following essential elements:
probative weight. It is hard to believe, the OSG avers, that
the petitioner would accept the envelope without knowing 1. the offender is a public officer;
its contents. The petitioner demanded and received from
Encabo the P4,000.00 contained in a white envelope in
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or
consideration of his signing the certificate of occupancy.
receives a gift or present by himself or
The OSG avers that the petitioners signing of the through another;
certificate of occupancy was his duty as the engineer in
charge of the structural design in the City Engineers 3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or
Office of Bacolod City. The OSG notes that the petitioner present be received by the public officer
was found positive for ultraviolet powder. with a view to committing some crime, or
in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime but the
act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing
The Ruling of the Court
something which it is his official duty to do;
and
The petition is meritorious.
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only or which he executes is connected with
questions of fact may be raised in this Court on a petition the performance of his official duties.[75]
for review on certiorari. The reason is that the Court is not
a trier of facts. However, the rule is subject to several
The prosecution is mandated to prove, beyond
exceptions. The Court may delve into and resolve factual
reasonable doubt, the essential elements of the felony
issues in those cases where the findings of the trial court
and that the petitioner is the perpetrator thereof.[76]
and the CA are absurd, contrary to the evidence on
record, impossible, capricious or arbitrary, or based on a Official duties include any action authorized. It is
misappreciation of facts.[74] sufficient if the officer has the official power, ability or
apparent ability to bring about or contribute to the desired
In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings
end. The acts referred to in the law, which the offender
of the MTC, the RTC and the CA, on the substantial
agrees to perform or execute, must be ultimately related
matters at hand, are absurd and arbitrary, and contrary to
to or linked with the performance of his official duties. It is
the evidence on record.
sufficient if his actions, affected by the payment of the
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code provides: bribe, are parts of any established procedure consistent
with the authority of the government agency.[77] However,
Art. 210. Direct Bribery. Any public officer who shall agree where the act is entirely outside of the official functions of
to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the officer to whom the money is offered, the offense is
the performance of his official duties, in consideration of not bribery.[78]
any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, The agreement between the public officer and the
personally or through the mediation of another, shall bribe-giver may be express or implied. Such agreement
suffer the penalty of prison mayor in its minimum and may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Proof
medium periods and a fine of not less than three times the of such an agreement may rest upon relevant and
value of the gift, in addition to the penalty corresponding competent circumstantial evidence. To hold, otherwise,
to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been would allow the culprit to escape liability with winks and
committed. nods even when the evidence as a whole proves that
there has been a meeting of the minds to exchange
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of official duties for money.[79]
the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime,
and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same It is not necessary that the money is received by the
penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said offender before or at the time he agreed to perform or
act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall execute an act. It is sufficient if he received the money
suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its medium afterwards in pursuance of a prior arrangement or
period and a fine of not less than twice the value of such agreement.[80]
gift. Indisputably, the petitioner is a public officer under
Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code.[81] There is no
If the object for which the gift was received or promised allegation in the Information that the issuance of the
was to make the public officer refrain from doing certificate of occupancy is a crime or is unjust.
something which it was his official duty to do, he shall
109
 The Court agrees with the petitioners contention that Encabo, in exchange for the signing of the certificate of
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime occupancy. Indeed, it is incredible that the petitioner
charged beyond reasonable doubt. would demand the said amount as a precondition to his
signing a certificate, considering that, under Section 309
The MTC convicted the petitioner of direct bribery on of P.D. No. 1096,[85] the authority to sign said certificate is
its finding that the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from vested specifically on the building official, and not on the
Wong, through Encabo, in consideration of signing a petitioner:
certificate of occupancy, and that on July 24, 1995, the
petitioner received the said amount from Encabo and
signed the said certificate for the Atrium building. The CA Section 309. Certificate of Occupancy
affirmed the said findings of the MTC in its decision, thus:
No building or structure shall be used or occupied and no
All the elements above are present in the case at bench. change in the existing use or occupancy classification of
Petitioner Ruben Tad-y was an employee at the City a building or structure or portion thereof shall be made
Engineers Office of Bacolod City. That petitioner-accused until the Building Official has issued a Certificate of
accepted the amount of P4,000.00 which he demanded Occupancy therefor as provided in this Code.
from Julio Encabo, a representative of Mildred Wong who
will secure a certificate of occupancy for the building of A Certificate of Occupancy shall be issued by the Building
the latter and handed it over to his subordinate Nestor Official within thirty (30) days if after final inspection and
Velez, petitioners co-accused, on April 24, 1995 at Andre submittal of a Certificate of Completion referred to in the
Bakeshop. And in consideration of the amount thus given, preceding section, it is found that the building or structure
petitioner would sign the certificate of occupancy, which complies with the provisions of this Code.
is his duty as engineer in charge of structural designs at
the City Engineers Office of Bacolod City. It must be The Certificate of Occupancy shall be posted or displayed
added that petitioner signed the certificate of occupancy, in a conspicuous place on the premises and shall not be
the original of which was kept at the records section of the removed except upon order of the Building Official.
City Engineers Office, after receiving the envelope
containing P4,000.00. [82] The non-issuance, suspension and revocation of
Certificates of Occupancy and the procedure for appeal
However, there is no iota of competent and credible therefrom shall be governed in so far as applicable, by the
evidence to support these findings. There is no evidence provisions of Section 306 and 307 of this Code.[86]
on record that the petitioner and Encabo met on April 24,
1995. In fact, it was only on April 25, 1995 that Encabo Calibrating the testimony of Encabo, the prosecution
arrived at the OCE to make arrangements for the final sought to prove that the petitioner agreed to conduct a
inspection of the building by the officers concerned, the final inspection of the building and sign a certificate of final
signing of the certificate of inspection by said officers, and inspection upon the receipt of P4,000.00.
the signing of the certificate of occupancy by the building
official. However, the testimony of Encabo is not entitled to
full probative weight since it is evasive and chameleonic,
There is also no dispute that what was signed by the enfeebled by frontal inconsistencies on substantial
petitioner, on July 24, 1995, following his final inspection matters which the trial court and the CA ignored.
of the building, was the certificate of final inspection and
not a certificate of occupancy of the building. Thus, In the court a quo, Encabo testified, on direct
Encabo testified: examination, that on April 25, 1995, the petitioner
dissuaded him from following up and seeing the approval
Q- But in (sic) July 24, 1995 when you for the certificate of occupancy because Wong failed to
mentioned that they inspected again the pay the P4,000.00, the balance due for the petitioners
building? services in securing the building permit. However, Encabo
A- Yes, Sir. also claimed that the petitioner agreed to conduct a final
inspection of the building and sign a certificate of final
Q- And after inspection you went down to Andre inspection if the money was given to the latter. When he
Bakeshop which is the ground floor of the testified in Criminal Case No. 17186, Encabo declared
Atrium Building. What happened there at that the petitioner refused to sign a certificate of
Andre Bakeshop? inspection on April 25, 1995 unless the P4,000.00 he
demanded was paid.[87] However, Encabo gave a
A- I gave him the papers and let him sign the completely different story to the CIS when he gave his
necessary papers. sworn statement; he claimed that, on April 25, 1995, the
Q- What necessary papers are you referring to? petitioner demanded P4,000.00 in consideration for his
signature on the certificate of occupancy.[88]
A- This certificate of Final Inspection where he
is the one who never affixed his signature. When he testified in Criminal Case No. 17186,
Encabo admitted that the petitioner did not
Q- When you gave the Certificate of Final demand P4,000.00 as a precondition to his final
Inspection, he signed it? inspection of the building and his signing of the certificate
of final inspection. The petitioner refused to sign a
A- Yes, Sir.[83]
certificate of final inspection for the sole reason that he
It was only on July 27, 1995, after the petitioner had had not yet conducted the required final inspection.
signed the certificate of final inspection on July 24, 1995,
Atty. Sorbito:
that the city building official approved and issued the
certificate of occupancy for the building. [84] On April 25, 1995, when you went there
accused Ruben Tad-y refused to sign?
There is also no credible evidence on record that the
petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Wong, through WITNESS:

110
 Yes, Sir. A Yes, Sir.
ATTY. SORBITO: Q And how many bottles have you consumed,
if you can still recall?
You mean to say Mr. Encabo that even
without final inspection any of the A Two bottles.
signatories to the occupancy permit can
affixed (sic) their signatures without Q And it was even Mr. Encabo who paid the bill
inspection? for the drinking spree?

WITNESS: ATTY. SORBITO:

They have to inspect. Misleading, your Honor.

ATTY. SORBITO: COURT:

So when Ruben Tad-y refused to sign the Who pay (sic) for the bills?
permit on April 25, 1995, its because there A That is (sic)where the trouble began because
was no final inspection made yet? after I have consumed two (2) bottles of
WITNESS: beer, he asked the bills with the intention
of paying it because there is among the
Yes, Sir. group are (sic) my relatives and it was my
purpose to pay.[92]
ATTY. SORBITO:
Encabo testified that he sought the help of the City
It is not because there was no money Mayor for the petitioner to conduct the final inspection of
or P4,000.00? the building, but did not inform the Mayor that the
WITNESS: petitioner had demanded P4,000.00 in consideration for
his inspection of the building. He claimed that the
No, Sir. petitioner was his compadre and he did not want to put
him in a bad light:
ATTY. SORBITO:
ATTY. SERFINO:
In short, Ruben Tad-y did not ask for
anything because only there in (sic) no Q- When you went to the City Mayor, you are
inspection was (sic) made? yet thinking that you will go to the CIS?
WITNESS: A- I have already reported that.
Yes, Sir.[89] Q- What is your reason of not telling the mayor
that Ruben Tad-y demanded money?
Encabo could not have asked the petitioner or any of
the officers in the OCE for that matter to sign the A- Being the government employee and he is
certificate of occupancy because only the building official my kumpare, I do not want to cause very
has the authority to sign the same. Moreover, the city bad occasion.[93]
building official could not have signed the certificate
because no final inspection of the building had been Encabo projected himself as solicitous and
conducted, and no certificate of final inspection had been protective of the petitioners well-being and the
signed by the OCE officers. maintenance of the communitys regard to his compadre,
the petitioner. However, when asked why he had to
Encabos claim that the petitioner agreed to make a complain to the CIS and thus placed the petitioner in
final inspection of the building if he was paid P4,000.00 is jeopardy for prosecution of an offense, Encabo replied
belied by his testimony in the court a quo, that, during the that he did so because the petitioner had mauled him:
second week of May 1995, the petitioner and the other
officers of the OCE conducted an inspection of the Q Now, you have already gone to the CIS, as
building.[90] Encabo did not give any centavo to the you said, is it not?
petitioner on that occasion. However, the petitioner and A Yes, Sir.
Encabo had a quarrel in the course of which the petitioner
tried, in anger, to squeeze Encabos neck.[91] As testified Q And, you have already reported to the CIS
to by the petitioner, Encabo insisted on paying for the food that supposed demand from you?
and drinks consumed by him and the other OCE officers
after their inspection of the building, despite the A Well, he is (sic) trying to maul me.[94]
petitioners insistence that he should pay for the bill: What is so disconcerting is that Encabo claimed that
Q You have also mentioned about that incident even months after the city building official had already
whether you were antagonized by Mr. issued the certificate of occupancy to Wong on July 27,
Encabo which you said you have 1995, the petitioner still conducted inspections of the
squeezed his chain (sic) with your hands, building, along with the other officers, in September and
where was that establishment? October 1995:

A At the second floor of Tasty Treat at Araneta Q So, you are now certain you have not
Street, Bacolod City. inspected the building and several other
officials of the City Engineers Office in the
Q And you were drinking beer with Mr. Encabo afternoon of April 25, 1995, when you went
during that time? to the office?
A When I arrived they were already drinking. A We do the inspection together with the
accused and others during and after April
Q And you also started to drink beer? 25 and October 1995.
111
 Q Please answer me, you are definitely sure Third. When Encabo handed the envelope to the
that it was on April 25, 1995? petitioner, the latter inquired what the envelope was for.
The petitioner opened the envelope in full view of Velez
A Yes, the inspection. and saw its contents. He handed the envelope to Velez
Q When you said yes, it was not on that date? instead of putting it into his pocket, even after Encabo had
assured the petitioner that it was not dangerous for the
A The date is (sic) April 25, 1995 is not exactly latter to receive it. It is incredible that, as claimed by
the date of inspection. Encabo, the petitioner handed over the envelope to Velez
under the table.
Q In what month after April 25, 1995 when you
inspected the building but prior to October Such facts and circumstances show that the
25, 1995? petitioner had no intention to accept the money and
consider it his own; they negate the prosecutions
A It was October or September, somewhat like
contention that the petitioner demanded and expected to
that. That September or October I cannot
receive P4,000.00 as bribe money. Indeed, this Court
pinpoint the exact date because I dont
ruled in Formilleza
have the record of that.[95]
It is incredible that the petitioner and the other The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in
officers would continue with their inspections of the Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public
building even months after the issuance of the certificate officer concerned must have accepted the gift material
of occupancy, and when the petitioner had already been consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part
charged with direct bribery in the MTC. Indeed, on of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider
September 21, 1995, Encabo was already testifying in the same as his own property from then on, such as
Criminal Case No. 17186 for the prosecution against the putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the
petitioner. same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other
sign, circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not
The prosecution cannot find solace in the
sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of
entrapment operations conducted by the CIS and the
indirect bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise
aftermath thereof.
will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up
First. The petitioner brought along Engineer Nestor public officers by simply putting within their physical
Velez, a building inspector in the OCE, on his final custody some gift, money or other property.[97]
inspection of the building after which they had a snack
with Encabo. If, as claimed by Encabo, the petitioner The foregoing ruling of this Court applies not only to
expected to receive P4,000.00 from him, as bribe, it would charges of indirect bribery but also to direct bribery. The
be contrary to human experience to bring another person respondents contention that the petitioner handed the
along (in this case, Velez) to witness the receipt of the envelope to Velez under the table is belied by the
envelope containing the money. Moreover, the Andre testimonies of the petitioner and Velez.
Bakeshop is a public place where people enter to make
purchases. Indeed, this Court in Formilleza v. Fourth. The police officers even forced the petitioner
Sandiganbayan,[96] declared to incriminate himself by forcing him to touch the contents
of the envelope, but the petitioner managed to parry the
attempt with his right arm. Thus, Velez testified:
However, what is revealing is that Mrs. Sevilla and Mrs.
Dimaano were present around the table in the canteen Q What happened outside the bakeshop?
with the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia when the latter allegedly
handed the money to the petitioner. There were other A When we went out of the Atrium building,
persons in the premises like the PC agents whose because we plan to left (sic) the place
identities petitioner possibly did not know. Under the separately or to part ways.
circumstances and in such a public place it is not probable Q You mean to say that Engr. Tad-y was going
that petitioner would have the nerve to accept bribe to his own direction and you to another
money from Mrs. Mutia even under the table. If the direction and Mr. Encabo to a different
petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money direction?
from Mrs. Mutia at the canteen, the petitioner would not
have invited her officemate Mrs. Sevilla to join them. Mrs. A Yes.
Sevilla stated she did not see the alleged passing of the
money. She could not have seen the money as it was Q Were you able to do that?
passed on under the table or when, as petitioner said, it A When I was already at the middle of Gonzaga
was quickly placed in her hand when she stood up. What Street, somebody took hold of my arm,
Mrs. Sevilla is sure of is that when they were about to almost my shoulder.
leave the canteen, two (2) men approached petitioner,
one of whom took pictures, and the petitioner shouted at Q Then what happened?
Mrs. Mutia, What are you trying to do to me? The reaction
A I was shocked or surprised, somebody took
of petitioner is far from one with a guilty conscience.
hold of my arm.

Second. The petitioner walked ahead of Velez and Q Did he say anything?
Encabo out of the Atrium building after the final
A When I turned my head, he told me that I am
inspection, and was on his way to the bowling
(sic) under arrest.
tournament. However, he joined Encabo and Velez for a
snack only because Encabo had invited him. Such Q What else?
behavior on the part of the petitioner is inconsistent with
one who expected to receive P4,000.00 from Encabo A After hearing that, I asked him what sins (sic)
after his final inspection of the building. have we committed?

112
Q What did he say? A Yes.
A He was trying to search on my trousers. Q Was it [the] left or right hand?
Q Did he show any warrant or authority for him A At first left, when he pulled me it was already
to do that? his right hand.
A Never. Q What happened when you were near Engr.
Tad-y?
Q No warrant of arrest or search warrant?
A When I have already opened the envelope
A No. and when they saw the content of that
Q So, what did he find in your trousers? envelope, the money, they try (sic) to pull
that so that Engr. Tad-y will receive the
A While he was searching me, I was asking him, money from me.
what money and he asked me, where is
that envelope you received, while he was Q How did you open that envelope in that stage,
holding me, its in your pocket, get it. So, I was it already opened or did you have to
get (sic) it because he was holding me in exert some efforts to open?
my hand and at the same time squeezing A I opened it because it was closed.
it.
Q Did Engr. Tad-y received (sic), take hold of
Q What arm? that money?
A At first, it was my left hand that he was A When he found out that the content is money,
searching, he was able to took (sic) hold of he did not hold it.
my right arm as it is used to be the one to
pick the particular envelope. Q What did he do?
Q So, how actually sure were you, when you get A He tried not to receive it but he was forced by
(sic) the envelope from your pocket? one arresting officer.
A It appears that myself because he was doing Q What else took place at that stage on that
it by squeezing my hand. day?
COURT: A When they were not able to force Engr. Tad-
y to take hold of the money, they tried to
Q About what part of your pocket? stop a taxi.[98]
COURT INTERPRETER: The testimony of the petitioner on this matter reads:
At this juncture, the witness is pointing at the Q Now, what happened after you saw that there
right side of his pocket. was another person holding your co-
ATTY. SERFINO: accused?

Q And after you have (sic) involuntarily taken A They were searching him in order to have the
that envelope from your pocket, what did white envelope out.
they do? Q So, did you see any envelope after that?
A When he was squeezing my hand, I was able A Yes, Sir.
to get the money and they brought me to
Engr. Tad-y. Q How did you see it or how did you happen to
see it?
Q How far was Engr. Tad-y when they brought
you there? A Because he let Mr. Velez open his pocket and
have it left opened.
A Maybe ten to fifteen meters.
Q And then what happened?
Q And when you were already near Engr. Tad-
y, did you notice what was happening to A When the said envelope was already opened
Engr. Tad-y? he hold (sic) Mr. Velez and pulled Mr.
Velez towards me.
A When I was there going toward Engr. Tad-y, I
saw one person holding his hands. Q Were they able to come near you?
Q When you were near him, what happened A Yes, Sir.
next?
Q Now, while your co-accused was already
A When I was near Engr. Tad-y, they let me near you, what transpired among you?
open that particular envelope.
A A person of small size holding the hands of
Q Who was handling that particular envelope Mr. Velez holding the white envelope
towards Engr. Tad-y? because he wants that I will hold the white
envelope.
A Its myself holding it while he was holding me
towards Engr. Tad-y. Q Go ahead.
Q You mean the very hand he was holding, A It was already opened and he wanted me to
squeezing, its also the hand holding the hold the white envelope.
envelope?

113
Q When you were still inside the bakeshop, will Q How did that incident in front of that street
you please inform the Hon. Court if the came to close?
envelope was already opened or not?
A I stayed calm but I was afraid of them.
A Not yet.
Q After you relaxed because of your fear, is
Q The prosecution witness, Julio Encabo here there anything else that took place?
testified that inside the bakeshop, after he
handed to you the envelope, you opened it A They stopped a taxi and then pulled me to ride
and peeped inside the envelope, is this in the taxi together with the co-accused,
true? Nestor Velez.[99]

A It is a big lie. The testimonies of Velez and the petitioner were

corroborated by the Initial Laboratory Report of Forensic
Q Why do you say that it is a big lie? Chemist Rea Villavicencio that the petitioners right arm
tested positive for ultraviolet powder. The Report and
A It will be subject of the evidence in the Police Sketch drawn by Villavicencio did not show that any of the
Laboratory. It was only shown that there fingers of the petitioner were positive for ultraviolet
was fluorescent powder. powder.
(Witness, at this juncture is pointing to his right In sum then, the Court rules that the prosecution
arm.) failed to prove the guilt of petitioner Rubin Tad-y of the
Q You are referring to Exhibit 4-A? crime charged. Consequently, the Petition is GRANTED.
The decisions of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, the
A Yes, Sir. Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is
ATTY. SERFINO:
ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the Information.
I would like to manifest, your Honor that on
SO ORDERED.
Exhibit 4, there is nothing there that
indicates that there was any powder marks
in the hands of this accused.
Q Now, what else happened when your co-
accused was already near you?
A They tried to let the hands of Nestor come
towards me but I was trying to move away.
Q On the basis of what you saw, if you know
what was the reason that (sic) they were
trying to let you hold the envelope?
ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR CENTENO:
Asking for a conclusion, your Honor.
COURT:
Sustained.
COURT:
Reform.
ATTY. SERFINO:
Q From that stage, what else happened?
A Since they cannot do the thing of letting the
hands of Nestor Velez go near me, it was
the person who picked the white envelope
and tried to give it to me, but I was trying to
parry it. (Witness is pointing to his right
forearm.)
Q Thereafter, what happened?
A (Witness, at this juncture is trying to hold the
left hand at his waist.) I do not know
whether it was a camera or a gun.
Q What else happened?
He said to me, relax ka lang, you might be fell
(sic) down.
Q Was he a Tagalog?
A I do not know but he speak (sic) in Tagalog.

114
 Everyone who was to participate in the entrapment was
ready. Mrs. Mutia went to see the petitioner in her office
ARTICLE 211 after which the two of them proceeded to the canteen.
Some of their officemates — Mrs. Florida Sevilla and a
G.R. No. 75160 March 18, 1988 certain Mrs. Dimaano — joined them in the canteen. They
occupied two squareshaped tables joined together. The
LEONOR FORMILLEZA, petitioner, petitioner sat at the head of the table with Mrs. Mutia
vs. seated at her left, Mrs. Dimaano at her (the petitioner's)
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division right and Mrs. Sevilla at the right of Mrs. Dimaano.
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Sergeants Bonjoc and Labong sat at another table while
Sergeant Abanes was alone in still another table. The
K.V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner. latter brought along a camera in order to take
photographs of the entrapment. The marked money was
folded altogether.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Mrs. Mutia maintains that after they had finished taking
their snacks, she handed the marked money bills under
the table with her right hand to the petitioner who received
GANCAYCO, J.: the same with her left hand. At that moment, Sergeant
Bonjoc approached the petitioner and held her hand
This is a Petition for review of a Decision of the holding the money bills. Sergeant Abanes brought out his
Sandiganbayan. camera and took photo. graphs of the sequence of
events. He was able to take seven photographs. 1
The records of the case disclose that petitioner Leonor
Formilleza has been with the government service for The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers despite her
around 20 years. She was the personnel supervisor of the objections to the entrapment. She was brought to the PC
regional office of the National Irrigation Administration crime laboratory in the locality where she was found
(NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte since October 1, 1982. Her positive for ultra-violet powder. In the presence of the
duties include the processing of the appointment papers corporate counsel of the NW the petitioner denied
of employees. accepting any bribe money from Mrs. Mutia.

On the other hand, a certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was an The case was brought to the Sandiganbayan where it was
employee of the NIA from February, 1978 up to March, docketed as Criminal Case No. 9634. Arraigned on
1985. Her appointment was coterminous with a project of January 1 0, 1985, the petitioner entered a plea of not
the NIA. On December 31, 1983, her appointment wag guilty and went to trial on May 13, 1985.
terminated. This notwithstanding, she continued working
for the NIA pursuant to the verbal instructions of the In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, the
regional director of the Administration. prosecution argued that the entrapment arranged by the
PC operatives was n because the petitioner was asking
Mrs. Mutia testified that she took steps to obtain either a money from Mrs. Mutia in consideration for having the
permanent or at the least a renewed appointment; that appointment papers of the latter facilitated. On the other
when she approached the regional director about the hand, the petitioner maintains her innocence — that there
matter she was advised to see the petitioner who was to was no entrapment; the scenario was but a scheme set
determine the employees to be appointed or promoted; up by Mrs. Mutia and her husband's colleagues in the PC.
and that the petitioner refused to attend to her The petitioner denies having accepted the supposed bribe
appointment papers unless the latter were given some money.
money.
The Sandiganbayan relying on the theory of the
On February 27, 1984, Mrs. Mutia reported her problem prosecution observed in a decision promulgated on July
to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) authorities in the 14, 1986, 2as follows —
province. The PC officials told her that steps were to be
taken to entrap the petitioner. The entrapment equipment Upon consideration of the evidence. We
consisted of marked paper money bills worth P100.00. find the p petitions version credible.
The PC officials concerned were colleagues of the
husband of Mrs. Mutia in the PC. Two days before the entrapment, Mrs.
Mutia complained to the PC authorities
The first attempt to entrap the petitioner was on February about the inaction of the on her
28, 1984. The plan did not materialize as the petitioner did appointment papers due to her failure to
not show up at the designated rendezvous at the NIA give Mm money. She executed a sworn
building canteen. statement to that effect, ... It was the PC
who planned the entrapment and
The second attempt was on February 29,1984, this time supplied the marked money. Sgt. Efren
with results. That morning, the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia Abanes who dusted the money bills with
met in their service bus on their way to work. The two fluoresence powder and who was a
women supposedly agreed to meet at the canteen later member of the entrapment team,
that morning at 9:00 o'clock. Thereafter, Mrs. Mutia witnessed the delivery and receipt of the
notified the PC authorities who were to arrange the money by the accused and the
entrapment. The PC soldiers involved in the arrangement complainant and he saw how the folded
were Identified as Sergeants Eddie Bonjoc, Efren Abanes money was handed by Mrs. Mutia with
and Ignacio Labong. her right hand underneath the table and
received by the with her left hand. That
115
was also how Mrs. Mutia described the The respondent court ruled that the crime committed by
manner she delivered the money to the the petitioner was not Direct Bribery as defined in Article
accused — the money bills were rolled 210 of the Revised Penal Code cited in the Information
winch she handed to with her right hand but Indirect Bribery as defined under Article 211 of the
underneath the table. Although Sgt. same code. Citing the case of People v. Abesamis, 4 the
Abanes had a camera with him to respondent court was of the opinion that she could be
photograph the entrapment, he could not convicted for Indirect Bribery under the Information for
prematurely expose the camera to allow Direct Bribery to which she pleaded and entered into trial
a shot of the actual giving of the money inasmuch as it is the allegation of facts rather than the
lest the notice his presence and intention denomination of the offense by the provincial fiscal that
and thereby thwart the operation. But determines the crime charged.
after the money had been delivered and
received, he immediately took out his Thus, the respondent court found the petitioner guilty of
camera and snapped pictures, one of Indirect Bribery and sentenced her to four months
them depicting the accused held by Sgt. of arresto mayor, suspension from public office,
Bonjoc and Labong on the left hand ..., profession or calling, including the right of suffrage, and
and another showing the accused also public censure.
held on the left hand by one of the PC
men, and the complainant, Mrs. Mutia,
On August 23, 1986, the petitioner elevated the case to
drinking from a glass ... this Court by way of the instant Petition for Review. The
thrust of the Petition is that the conclusions reached by
The fact that Mrs. Mutia's husband is a the Sandiganbayan are not supported by the evidence.
PC -An himself does not detract from the Moreover, the petitioner disputes the applicability and/or
credibility of Sgt. Abanes who took part in correctness of the ruling of this Court in People v.
the Sgt. Abanes entrapment, took Abesamis relied upon by the respondent court.
pictures, and testified about the incident
in court. Sets. Abanes Bonjoc and
As instructed by this Court, the Office of the Solicitor
Labong were not the only public
General submitted its Comment on the Petition. In
authorities privy to the operation. Capt.
opposing the Petition, the Solicitor General maintains that
Pedro Pates was the one to whom Mrs. only questions of law may be raised in the instant case
Mutia reported the accused demand for and the respondent court did not commit any error of law.
money; it was he who broached the Idea
The Solicitor General also stresses therein that the
of entrapping the accused; and it was
findings of fact made by the Sandiganbayan are
Mador Fernando Pace who supplied the
supported by the evidence on record and deserve full faith
money and caused it to be marked with
and credit. The Solicitor General adds that the question of
powder. It is inconceivable that an these credibility is addressed mainly to the trier of facts, in this
commissioned and non-commissioned case, the Sandiganbayan.
officers had lent themselves to take part
in an unholy cabal of falsely incriminating
a female government employee on the The parties submitted subsequent pleadings in support of
mere urging of one of their associates. their stand. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted
for decision.
Just as unreasonable is the insinuation
that Mrs. Mutia had inveigled the We find merit in the Petition.
accused to the canteen and resorted to
the insidious machination of planting Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, governs the
money in her hand in a simulated procedure through which cases originating from the
entrapment simply because she thought Sandiganbayan are elevated to this Court.5 Under
the accused was not helping her in her Section 7 thereof, the decisions and final orders of the
application for appointment to a regular Sandiganbayan are subject to review on certiorari by the
item. Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. This Court has ruled that only questions of law
Mrs. Florida Sevilla's presence on the may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45,
same table with the complainant and the subject to certain rare exceptions. 6 Simply stated, one
accused may be conceded. But her way 7 through which a decision or final order of the
testimony that she did not see anything Sandiganbayan can be elevated to the Supreme Court is
that took place between the complainant a Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and, as a general
and the accused before the PC operative rule, only questions of law may be raised therein. The
pounced upon the accused, and the latter Solicitor General cites the case of Peñaverde v.
angrily asked the complainant what she Sandiganbayan 8 in support of this view.
was trying to do to her, does not improve
the cause of the defense. As portrayed Going now to the question of law raised in the instant
by the accused, she was at the head of Petition, We believe that the ruling in People v. Abesamis,
the rectangular table with the contrary to the contention of the petitioner, is authority for
complainant at her left: Mrs. Dimaano at the view that the allegation of facts, not the denomination
her right, and Mrs. Sevilla next to Mrs. of the offense by the prosecutor, determines the crime
Dimaano. Since the money, according to charged. Anent the argument on the correctness of the
the complainant and Sgt. Abanes was ruling, the petitioner had not succeeded in showing any
handed to and received by the accused cogent basis for reversing or modifying the same.
underneath the table, it is not surprising
that Mrs. Sevilla who was two seats away The remaining argument that the judgment of conviction
from the accused did not see it. 3 is not supported by the evidence raises a question of fact
116
inasmuch as the resolution of the issue would require this public officers by simply putting within their physical
Court to sort out and re-examine the evidence presented custody some gift, money or other property.
in the trial. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Peñaverde
v. Sandiganbayan, the Solicitor General moves for the Did the petitioner accept the supposed bribe money?
denial of the Petition. The Solicitor General adds that the
credibility of witnesses is a matter better left to the
The Sandiganbayan noted that the photographs of the
appreciation of the trial court, in this case, the
entrapment show that the petitioner was accosted by the
Sandiganbayan. PC soldiers after she accepted the marked money.
Against the evidence of the pro petition that the money
Indeed, the general rule is that only questions of law may was handed to petitioner by Mrs. Mutia under the table is
be raised in a petition of this character. The general rule the assertion of petitioner that it was when she stood up
admits exceptions, one of which is when the findings of that Mrs. Mutia suddenly placed something in her hand
fact made by the trial court overlooked certain facts of which she did not know to be money and when she saw
substance and value which, if considered, might affect the that it was money she threw it away. 11 An examination of
result of the case. This observation was made by this the seven photographs that were allegedly taken
court in Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan, cited by the immediately after the passing of the money shows that the
Solicitor General, to wit — petitioner was standing up when the PC agents
apprehended her. This corroborates petitioner's story.
With respect to the allegation that there There was no picture showing petitioner to be seated
was error on the part of respondent which should be her position immediately after the money
Sandiganbayan in concluding that was handed to her under the table, which should be the
petitioners conspired in the commission case according to the version of the prosecution.12 None
of the offense, suffice it to say that the of the photographs show the petitioner in the process of
basis of its finding was the credibility of appropriating or keeping the money after it was handed to
witnesses. Pursuant to Section 7 of her. Two of the seven photographs that were taken
Presidential Decree No. 1606, in relation outside the canteen appear to be of no relevance to the
to Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of operation.
Court, the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are entitled to great As the petitioner was admittedly handed the money, this
respect and only questions of laws (sic) explains why she was positive for ultra-violet powder. It is
may be raised to the Supreme Court. possible that she intended to keep the supposed bribe
Besides, well settled is the rule that the money or may have had no intention to accept the same.
findings of (the) trial court on credibility of These possibilities exist but We are not certain.
witnesses will not be disturbed unless
much findings overlook certain facts of However, what is revealing is that Mrs. Sevilla and Mrs.
substance and value which, if considered Dimaano were present around the table in the canteen
might affect (the) results of (the) case. 9
with the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia when the latter allegedly
handed the money to the petitioner. There were other
We believe that the exception to the general rule calls for persons in the premises like the PC agents whose
application in this case. Identities petitioner possibly did not know. Under the
circumstances and in such a public place it is not probable
The fundamental axiom underlying a criminal prosecution that petitioner would have the nerve to accept bribe
is that before the accused may be convicted of any crime, money from Mrs. Mutia even under the table. If the
his guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money
if there are substantial facts which were overlooked by the from Mrs. Mutia at the canteen, the petitioner would not
trial court but which could alter the results of the case in have invited her officemate Mrs. Sevilla to join them. Mrs.
favor of the accused, then such facts should be carefully Sevilla stated she did not see the alleged passing of the
taken into account by the reviewing tribunal. money. She could not have seen the money as it was
passed on under the table or when, as petitioner said it
In the case before Us, there are substantial facts and was quickly placed in her hand when she stood up. What
circumstances Which appear to be favorable to the Mrs. Sevilla is sure of is that when they were about to
accused but which were not carefully considered by the leave the canteen, two (2) men approached petitioner,
Sandiganbayan. The failure to do so is most unfortunate one of whom took pictures, and the petitioner shouted at
considering that the Sandiganbayan is the first and last Mrs. Mutia, "What are you trying to do to me?" 13 The
recourse of the accused before her case reaches the reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guilty
Supreme Court where findings of fact are generally conscience.
conclusive and binding.
Moral certainty, not absolute certainty, is needed to
The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in support a judgment of conviction, Moral certainty is a
Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code 10 is that the public certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and
officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material conscience of those who are to act upon a given
consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part matter. 14 Without this standard of certainty, it may not be
of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider said that the guilt of the accused in a criminal proceeding
the same as his own property from then on, such as has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the
same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other With all these circumstances taken into account
sign, circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not altogether, We are left at a loss as to the guilt of the
sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of accused. Overlooked by the Sandiganbayan, these facts
indirect bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise and circumstances make out a good case for the
will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up petitioner.

117
Accordingly, the Court holds that the guilt of the petitioner without violence, intimidation or force toward
in Criminal Case No. 9634 has not been proved beyond persons or things, abstract, take possession of,
reasonable doubt. She is, therefore, entitled to an and steal, for the sake of personal gain and
acquittal. without the consent of the owner and by abusing
the confidence of his chief, various checks
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of belonging to the United States, credited to
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 9634 is hereby Captain L. F. Garrard of the United States Army
SET ASIDE. The petitioner Leonor Formilleza is hereby in Iloilo, to wit:
ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt. We make
no pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is Check No. 141528
immediately executory. P344.00
....................................

SO ORDERED. Check No. 139856

525.48
....................................
Check No. 141471
212.00
....................................
Check No. 137651
272.00
....................................
Check No. 137691
10.00
....................................
Check No. 141489
1,500.00
....................................

2,500.00

and, in coin, the sum of P178.08, making a total

of P3,041.56 Philippine currency; the checks
above mentioned having been drawn on the
Treasury of the Philippine Islands, depositary of
the Treasury of the United States. Acts in
violation of law.

There is no controversy as to the facts, the defendant and

appellant, through his counsel, having admitted the truth
of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The
defendant was the chief clerk in the quartermaster's office
in Iloilo, to whom was intrusted the combination and the
key to the quartermaster's safe. He did not, however,
have charge of the cash book, which was kept by another
clerk in the office; nor did he have authority to open the
safe or to withdraw funds therefrom except at the direction
of his superior office, the quartermaster, who was in
charge of the safe and its contents, and under whose
immediate control it was. The only duty of the defendant
ARTICLE 214 in regard to the safe and its contents was to keep safely
the combination and the key, and to open and close it at
the direction of his superior officer, the quartermaster in
G.R. No. L-6781 November 6, 1911
charge of the office; he had no control whatever over the
contents of the safe and was not charged with the
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, withdrawal or distribution of the funds, checks and other
vs. property which were kept in it.
F. WICKERSHAM, defendant-appellant.
During the absence of his superior officer and while in a
Bruce, Lawrence, Ross & Block, for appellant. state of intoxication, defendant opened the safe and
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee. abstracted therefrom the cash and checks described in
the information. Before judgment of conviction in the court
CARSON, J.: below, the cash and all of the checks were recovered,
except three which were indorsed by the parties to whom
The information in this case charges the defendant and the defendant sold them, and paid by the Treasurer of the
appellant with the crime of hurto (theft) committed as Philippine Islands, upon whom they were drawn. The face
follows: value of these checks was refunded to the quartermaster,
so that at the time when judgment was entered in the court
That one day in the month of July of the present below all of the stolen property or its value had been
year, 1910, in this municipality of Iloilo, Province recovered.lawphil.net
of Iloilo, Philippine Islands, the said defendant, F.
Wickersham, being chief clerk in the office of the Counsel for appellant, without denying that the record
Quartermaster of the United States Army in Iloilo, discloses highly reprehensible conduct in the abstraction
did willfully, maliciously and criminally, and of the checks and cash from the safe, and the negotiation
118
of some of the checks, contends nevertheless that the case of U. S. vs. Webster (6 Phil. Rep., 393), the
judgment of the lower court should be reversed on various defendant was a forage master in charge of Government
grounds. forage, subject to the orders of the quartermaster, who
was directly responsible therefor to the owner, the United
Counsel insists that the trial court erred in refusing to States Government, and without whose order no forage
declare the information fatally defective because, as could be issued. The forage master had no authority to
counsel contends, it does not set out the value of the issue any orders or give out any forage except upon the
stolen checks. Counsel apparently does not deem the use requisition of the quartermaster, nor was he authorized to
of the sign "P" in the information a sufficient designation receive money on account of sales of this forage. Without
or equivalent of the term "pesos Philippine currency," and such authority and without an order from the
he insists that the tabulated form in which the checks are quartermaster he disposed of hay and oats to the value of
described in the information does not affirmatively some P2,015, for which he failed to account to the
disclose that the checks were worth the amount for which Government. In tat case we said:
t is alleged they were drawn. Counsel's contention can not
be sustained. The sign or character P is general accepted The qualified charge of this forage, subject to the
in these Islands as the equivalent of the words peso or orders of a superior, who alone was responsible
pesos Philippine currency; by Executive Order No. 44 o the Government for it, without the right on the
dated Manila, October 29, 1904, this character was made part of the accused to sell it or to part with the
the official "designation for the new Philippine pesos," and physical custody of it unless on written orders,
since that date its use for the purpose has become was not such a possession as to render the
uniform and universal. We think that the allegation that the abstraction of the property by him malversation
defendant stole the checks described in the tabulated instead of theft.
statement set out in the information, and the sum of
P178.08 in cash "which amount in all to the sum of Counsel's remaining contentions may, for convenience,
P3,041.56 pesos Filipinos," is a sufficiently definite be summoned up in the proposition that since, as counsel
allegation of the value of the stolen property; and that it is suggests, checks have no value in themselves, or at most
so clear and explicit as "to leave no room for doubt in the a mere nominal value, that is, the value of the piece of
mind of any person of even rudimentary intelligence" that paper on which they are written, they are not properly the
it meant to charge the defendant with the theft of the sum subject of larceny; and that whatever offense is committed
of money therein mentioned and of the checks therein by one who abstracts a check, the property of another,
described, the total value of which was the sum therein and thereafter negotiates it, it is not theft. It is contended
indicated, the value of each separate check being the that the offense of abstracting and negotiating a check
amount for which it was drawn as set out in the tabulated may be estafa (embezzlement) or one of its kindred
statement. offenses, but that is not theft. This was the theory of the
common law under which commercial paper was not the
The bill of rights for the Philippines, giving the subject of larceny, for the reason, as it was said, that it
accused the right to demand the nature and has no intrinsic value, and is merely an evidence or token
cause of the accusation against him does not of the existence of money or property elsewhere. The
fasten forever upon those Islands the inability of common law rule, however, has been abrogated in most
the seventeenth century common law to American jurisdiction by statutes making commercial
understand or accept a pleading that did not papers the subject of larceny (18 Am. & Eng. Ency. of
exclude every misinterpretation capable of Law, p. 515) and it is not in force in these Islands. The
occuring to intelligence fired with a desire to supreme court of Spain has repeatedly held that checks
pervert. (Paraiso vs. United States, 207 U. S., (cheques) and other commercial papers (valores) are
368; 11 Phil. Rep., 799.) subjects of larceny. Decisions of March 16, 1899, and of
March 7, 1900.
Counsel also contends that whatever be the nature of the
offense committed by the defendant in abstracting money In those States where commercial paper has by statute
and checks from the safe of which he carried the key, it is been made the subject of larceny, the statute generally
not theft (hurto). His argument is that one can not steal provides that the face value shall be taken, prima facie,
from one's self, and that one who misappropriates funds as its value for the purpose of the statute, though this last
or other personal property which are under his control provision is not universal. In Vermont, commercial paper
may perhaps be convicted of some offense of the nature was by statute made the subject of larceny without any
of estafa (embezzlement), or misappropriation or regulation as to its value. In the recently decided case
defalcation of public funds if the funds abstracted are of State vs. McClellan (23 L. R. A. ( N. S.) 1063), an
public funds; but that theft necessarily implies the taking unendorsed check was held to be the subject of larceny,
of property from the possession of another. We do not and for the purpose of determining the degree of the crime
question the soundness of the legal proposition thus its value was held to be its face value, or the amount for
stated, but as we understand the admitted facts in this which it was drawn and which could have been realized
case, the defendant did not have the funds and property upon it by its legal owner.
contained in the safe under his control. He had no
authority of his own volition to withdraw funds from the A check in the hands of its lawful owner is something more
safe upon any pretext whatever. The funds were placed than a mere evidence or token of the existence of money
in the safe and could only be taken from it by his superior elsewhere. It is an instrument which, from its peculiar
officer or by his order. Defendant's possession of the key qualities as a commercial document, places certain funds
and the combination of the safe gave him no control over under the special control of its lawful holder so long as he
the contents. His relation to the contents of the safe was retains it in his possession. It confers upon its holder
merely that of a guard whose duty it was to see that no exceptional and peculiar powers as to the disposition of
one but his superior officer had access to the funds, and the funds against which it is drawn, and enables him to
he had no more right of disposition of the contents of the realize those funds without regard to the mutual relations
safe than has a watchman of a warehouse to whom the existing between himself and the drawer of the check or
key is intrusted the right to dispose of its contents. In the
119
the depository wherein the funds are actually placed. to order is concerned, its value is the same whether he
Furthermore, as a result of the peculiar qualities of a has actually endorsed it, or has yet to do so before
check as a commercial instrument, the lawful holder, so demanding payment.
long as he retains possession, has not only the right to
the funds against which it is drawn, but a claim against the We find no prejudicial error in the proceedings in the court
drawer and previous endorsers in the event of a failure of below; the judgment of conviction and the sentence based
these funds in whole or in part; provided, however, there thereon should therefore be affirmed, with the costs of this
is due diligence on his part in asserting his claim, and in instance against the appellant. So ordered.
case of endorsers in protesting the check in the event of
nonpayment. The loss of possession of a check deprives
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
the owner of the immediate control of the funds against
which it is drawn, and may involve the loss of the fund
itself, unless he adopts prompt and efficient measures to
protect himself; indeed if the check be made payable to
bearer its abstraction from his possession exposes him to
the risk of loss of the fund without redress except only as
against the guilty person. Manifestly these peculiar
qualities which the law confers upon commercial
instruments of this kind, and the exceptional incidents
attaching to such instruments in the hands of a lawful
owner, give them an actual substantial value in his hands
which may and should be measured by the amount of
cash which may be realized upon them, that it to say, in
the case of a good and valid check, by its value; and
evidence that a check is a good and valid check is prima
facie proof that it is worth its face value in the hands of the
lawful owner. We are of opinion that a check is in a very
real sense personal property, and that when abstracted
with the intention of converting it to use of the person
taking it, the abstraction of the check constitutes a taking
of personal property from the possession of another,
defined and penalized as the crime of hurto (theft) in the
Penal Code.

As to the unendorsed checks made payable to order, the

contention that they are of no value seems also to be
based on the theory tat the value of stolen property is to
be determined by its condition when taken; that a check
payable to order is an incomplete instrument as long as it
remains unendorsed; that no one can draw money on a
stolen check in the condition in which it is found at the time
of the theft as long as it remains unendorsed by the
payee; and that consequently stolen checks payable to
order have only a nominal value at the time of the theft.
We are of opinion, however, that it is not necessary that
the subject matter of a larceny should be of value to a third
person if valuable to the owner, and the value of good and
valid checks and similar commercial paper to the owner
is, as we have seen, the amount which he is entitled to
receive therefor, ordinarily their face value, that is to say
the amount for which they are drawn. In the case at bar
the defendant took personal property of this character
from the constructive possession of its owner with the
intention of converting it to his own use. The fact,
admitting that it was a fact, that he could not make use of
this property in the condition in which it was at the moment
when he deprived the owner of it without indorsing it, does
not and ought not to determine its value when he is called
to account for his criminal act. The checks in the hands of
their lawful owners were completed instruments. They
gave their lawful owner control of the amount of currency
corresponding to their face value, with the power of
transferring that control by an appropriate endorsement
was not absolutely essential to the value of these checks
in the hands of an honest holder. A formal assignment in
an appropriate public instrument and perhaps a parol FIRST DIVISION
agreement with manual delivery would have been
sufficient for that purpose: as between the assignor and
assignee, such an assignment would be complete and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 157399
effectual, and the holder of a check thus assigned could Appellee,
enforce his right therein by appropriate legal proceedings. Present:
So far, therefore, as the lawful holder of a check payable
120
 D and Foreign Trader Analyst, respectively,
avide, also of NAPOCOR, and accused Raul
Jr., C.J Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas, alias
. George Aonuevo, alias Mara Aonuevo, a
(Chair private individual being a foreign
man), exchange trader, said public officers
- versus - Quisumbing, taking advantage of their official
Ynares-Santiago, positions, with grave abuse of authority
C and committing the offense in relation to
a their office, conspiring, confederating
r and mutually helping one another, with
p their private co-accused, did then and
i there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
o falsify or cause to be falsified the NPCs
, application for managers checks with the
a Philippine National Bank (PNB), NPC
n Branch in the total amount of ONE
d HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION
A EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND
zcuna, TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS
JJ. and TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS
JOSE TING LAN UY, JR. (Acquitted), (P183,805,291.25), Philippine Currency,
ERNESTO GAMUS y SOTELO, intended for the purchase of US dollars
JAIME OCHOA, all of the National from the United Coconut Planters Bank
Power Corporation, and RAUL (UCPB), by inserting the account number
GUTIERREZ alias Raul Nicolas, of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-121204-4,
Alias George Aonuevo, alias when in truth and in fact as the accused
Mara Aonuevo (At large), well knew that the Payment Instructions
Accused. Promulgated: (PI) when signed by the NAPOCOR
authorities did not indicate the account
JAIME OCHOA, number of Raul Gutierrez, thereby
Appellant. November 17, 2005 making alteration or intercalation in a
x ------------------------------------------------------------------------- genuine document which changes its
--------------- x meaning, and with the use of the said
falsified commercial documents,
DECISION accused succeeded in diverting,
collecting and receiving the total amount
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY
ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.75),
Philippine Currency from the National
Power Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase of
Power Corporation, which they thereafter
US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank malverse, embezzle, misappropriate and
convert to their own personal use and
(UCPB), Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., Ernesto Gamus,[1] Jaime benefit to the damage and prejudice of
the National Power Corporation in the
Ochoa and Raul Gutierrez were indicted before the aforementioned sum.

Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation CONTRARY TO LAW.

through Falsification of Commercial Documents defined

and penalized under Articles 217 and 171 (8), in relation Upon arraignment, Gamus, Uy and Ochoa pleaded not
to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, in an amended guilty to the charge, while Gutierrez has remained at
Information,[2] docketed as Criminal Case No. 19558, large.
which alleges

On pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated

That sometime in July 1990, or for
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the 1. That accused Uy at the time stated in
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the information was a Treasurer
accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a public at the NPC;
accountable officer, being the Treasurer
of National Power Corporation 2. That accused Ernesto Gamus was at
(NAPOCOR), Ernesto Gamus and Jaime the time mentioned in the
Ochoa, both public officers being the information was (sic) the
Manager of the Loan Management and Manager of Loan Management
Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED)
121
 and Foreign Exchange Division Ermita, Manilaor Suite 603 VIP
(LOMAFED); Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila.

3. That accused Jaime Ochoa was the SO ORDERED.[5]

Senior Financial Analyst,
LOMAFED, at the time
mentioned in the information;
Aggrieved, Ochoa interposed this appeal alleging that the
4. That accused Gamus does
Sandiganbayan erred in
not have any custody to (sic)
public funds;
1. convicting him based on the
5. That accused Ochoas allegations in the information;
position as Sr. Financial Analyst
did not require him to take 2. admitting and considering his alleged
custody or control of public sworn statements;
funds;
3. considering the alleged transcripts of
6. That the application forms stenographic notes and the NBI
for cashiers check or Managers Report.[6]
check are not accountable forms
of the NAPOCOR.[3]

The factual antecedents of the case, as summed by the

Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. On May 28, Sandiganbayan, are not disputed by the parties:
2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, [4] the In July of 1990, the National Power
Corporation (NPC) became embroiled in
dispositive portion of which reads:
a controversy involving the
disappearance of P183,805,291.25 of its
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
funds which were originally on deposit
accused Jaime B. Ochoa is hereby found
with the Philippine National Bank, NPC
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
Branch (PNB) but were subsequently
crime of Malversation thru falsification of
used to purchase two (2)
Commercial Documentand is sentenced
managers/cashiers checks (the first
to suffer the penalty of reclusion
check was in the amount of
perpetua and to pay a fine equal to the
P70,000,000.00 while the second was for
amount malversed which is ONE
P113,805,291.25) in order to comply with
HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION
its loan obligations to the Asian
EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND
Development Bank (ADB). As NPCs debt
TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS
in favor of ADB was in yen, NPC was
AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS
obligated to follow an intricate and
(P183,805,291.25) solidarily with
circuitous procedure of buying US dollars
accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr. Accused
from a local bank (in this case, United
Ochoa shall also suffer the penalty of
Coconut Planters Bank or UCPB T.M.
perpetual disqualification. Costs against
Kalaw Branch), which local bank was
the accused.
supposed to remit the US dollars to an
off-shore bank. This off-shore bank (in
On the ground of reasonable doubt,
this case, the Credit Lyonnais, New York)
accused JOSE TING LAN UY, Jr. is
was then supposed to remit the yen
hereby ACQUITTED of Malversation of
equivalent of the US dollars to a third
Public Funds thru Falsification of
bank (in this case, the Bank of Japan,
Commercial Document. However,
Tokyo Branch) which would then credit
because of preponderance of evidence,
the funds to the account of the ADB. The
he is CIVILLY LIABLE for the damages
contracts of NPC with the concerned
suffered by the NPC in the amount of
banks (embodied in three [3] Payment
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE
Instructions) included a value date (which
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE
was July 13, 1990), the mere arrival of
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY
which would trigger the above-mentioned
ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE
procedure, culminating in the payment to
CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25)
ADB of the NPC obligation in the foreign
solidarily with accused Jaime Ochoa.
currency agreed upon.
The Hold Departure Order against the
accused embodied in this Courts
On value date, per routing procedure,
Resolution dated April 18, 2002 is
Credit Lyonnais (the second bank)
recalled.
remitted Japanese Yen
1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan,
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued
Tokyo Branch. Likewise, per routing
against Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul
procedure, UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch
Nicolas, alias George Aonuevo, alias
was supposed to have remitted on said
Mara Aonuevo with last known address
value date the amount of
at 1348 A. Mabini Street,
US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M. Kalaw,
122
 however, despite the fact that the PNB
had already issued two (2) To be found guilty of malversation, the prosecution must
managers/cashiers checks (Managers
check for brevity) for such purpose, did prove the following essential elements:
not make the agreed remittance to Credit
Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais received no
a.] The offender is a public officer;
payment for the funds it had remitted to
the Bank of Japan, Tokyo. Both the State
b.] He has the custody or control of funds
and the accused have offered
or property by reason of the
explanations for the failure of UCPB,
duties of his office;
T.M. Kalaw Branch to remit the dollar
equivalent of P183,805,291.25 to
c.] The funds or property involved are
Credit Lyonnais. Both explanations,
public funds or property for which
naturally, were diametrically opposed.[7]
he is accountable; and

d.] He has appropriated, taken or

The prosecution theorizes that the accused diverted the misappropriated, or has
consented to, or through
funds covered by the two PNB Managers checks by abandonment or negligence,
permitted the taking by another
falsifying a commercial document called an Application for person of, such funds or
property.[8]
Cashiers Check (ACC) by inserting an account number

(A/C #111-1212-04) of a private individual after the name

Appellant insists that he could not be convicted under the
of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It claims that
allegations in the information without violating his
NPC did not authorize the insertion considering that the
constitutional right to due process and to be informed of
Payment Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB
the accusation against him. He points out that the
to prepare a Managers check to be charged to NPCs
information alleges willful and intentional commission of
savings account did not contain any account number.
the acts complained of while the judgment found him
Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded
guilty of inexcusable negligence amounting to malice.
in diverting the funds from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch

in favor of Raul Gutierrez @ Raul Nicolas @ George

Appellants contention lacks merit. Malversation may be
Aonuevo @ Mara Aonuevo, who is still at large.
committed either through a positive act of

misappropriation of public funds or property or passively

In his defense, appellant asserts that there was no
through negligence by allowing another to commit such
evidence that he committed any of the acts alleged in the
misappropriation.[9] To sustain a charge of malversation,
information, particularly the intercalation on the ACC; that
there must either be criminal intent or criminal
he deposited the checks subsequently issued or that he
negligence[10] and while the prevailing facts of a case may
received the proceeds thereof; or that he conspired with
not show that deceit attended the commission of the
any of his co-accused. He claims that his conviction was
offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to
based on the alleged sworn statement and the transcript
prove the existence of negligence
of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with
because both are equally punishable in Article 217 of the
appellant by the NPC personnel and the report of the
Revised Penal Code.
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant

maintains that he signed the sworn statement while

More pointedly, the felony involves breach of
confined at the Philippine Heart Center and upon
public trust, and whether it is committed through deceit or
assurance that it would not be used against him. He was
negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a
not assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of his
uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information
constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit.
charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation

123
through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence The fact that the information does not
allege that the falsification was
ultimately proves that mode of commission of the committed with imprudence is of no
moment for here this deficiency appears
offense.[11] Explicitly stated
supplied by the evidence submitted by
appellant himself and the result has
Even on the putative assumption that the proven beneficial to him. Certainly,
evidence against petitioner yielded a having alleged that the falsification has
case of malversation by negligence but been willful, it would be incongruous to
the information was for intentional allege at the same time that it was
malversation, under the circumstances of committed with imprudence for a charge
this case his conviction under the first of criminal intent is incompatible with the
mode of misappropriation would still be in concept of negligence.
order. Malversation is committed either
intentionally or by negligence.
The dolo or the culpa present in the In People v. Consigna, et al.,[14] we ruled that the afore-
offense is only a modality in the
perpetration of the felony. Even if the stated rationale also applies to the felony of malversation,
mode charged differs from mode proved,
the same offense of malversation is that is, that an accused charged with willful malversation,
involved and conviction thereof is
proper.[12] in an information containing allegations similar to the

present case, can be validly convicted of the same

The question of whether or not an information offense of malversation through negligence where the

charging the commission of the crime by means of deceit evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the

will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is offense.

neither novel nor of first impression. In Samson v. Court

of Appeals, et al.,[13] we ruled that an accused charged Appellant next claims that he should be acquitted since

with willful or intentional falsification can validly be his conviction was based on his sworn statement,

convicted of falsification through negligence, thus: transcript of stenographic notes from which the sworn

While a criminal negligent act is not a statement was taken and the NBI Report, which are
simple modality of a willful crime, as we
incompetent evidence. He contends that his sworn
held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of
Bacolor, but a distinct crime in itself, statement was taken without the benefit of counsel, in
designated as a quasi offense in our
Penal Code, it may however be said that violation of his constitutional right under Section 12,
a conviction for the former can be had
under an information exclusively Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
charging the commission of a willful
offense, upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense. This is the
situation that obtains in the present case. Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Appellant was charged with willful
Constitution states that
falsification but from the evidence
submitted by the parties, the Court of
Appeals found that in effecting the Section 12. (1). Any person under
falsification which made possible the investigation for the commission of an
cashing of the checks in question, offense shall have the right to be
appellant did not act with criminal intent informed of his right to remain silent and
but merely failed to take proper and to have competent and independent
adequate means to assure himself of the counsel preferably of his own choice. If
identity of the real claimants as an the person cannot afford the services of
ordinary prudent man would do. In other counsel, he must be provided with one.
words, the information alleges acts which These rights cannot be waived except in
charge willful falsification but which writing and in the presence of counsel.
turned out to be not willful but negligent.
This is a case covered by the rule when
there is a variance between the
allegation and proof, and is similar to The investigation under the above-quoted provision refers
some of the cases decided by this
Tribunal. to a custodial investigation where a suspect has already

.... been taken into police custody[15] and the investigating

124
officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and provision also does not extend to admissions or

confessions or admissions from the suspect.[16] More confessions made to a private individual,[22] or to a verbal

specifically admission made to a radio announcer who was not part

Custodial investigation involves any of the investigation,[23] or even to a mayor approached as

questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into a personal confidante and not in his official capacity.[24]
custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant
manner. And, the rule begins to operate Along the same vein, we held that a videotaped
at once as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an interview showing the accused unburdening his guilt
unsolved crime and direction is then
aimed upon a particular suspect who has willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen
been taken into custody and to whom the
police would then direct interrogatory is not covered by the provision although in so ruling, we
question which tend to elicit incriminating
statements.[17] warned trial courts to take extreme caution in further

admitting similar confessions because we recognized the

Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to distinct possibility that the police, with the connivance of

the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to

to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place

begun to focus on a particular person as a them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused

suspect.[18] Such a situation contemplated has been more admit an offense on television.[25]

precisely described thus where

Neither does the constitutional provision on
After a person is arrested and his
custodial investigation extends to a spontaneous
custodial investigation begins a
confrontation arises which at best may be statement, not elicited through questioning by the
termed unequal. The detainee is brought
to an army camp or police headquarters authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
and there questioned and cross-
examined not only by one but as many accused orally admits having committed the crime,[26] nor
investigators as may be necessary to
break down his morale. He finds himself to a person undergoing an audit examination because an
in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding,
and every person he meets he considers audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer.[27]
hostile to him. The investigators are well- Thus, the flaw in appellants argument in this
trained and seasoned in their work. They
employ all the methods and means that regard becomes immediately apparent vis--vis the
experience and study has taught them to
extract the truth, or what may pass for it, foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that his statement
out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their was taken during the administrative investigation of NPCs
constitutional rights. And even if they
were, the intimidating and coercive audit team[28] and before he was taken into custody. As
presence of the officers of the law in such
such, the inquest was still a general inquiry into an
an atmosphere overwhelms them into
silence....[19] unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet, no

specific suspect.
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the

constitutional provision invoked by accused-appellant are Much less can appellant claim that he was in
not available before government investigators enter the police custody because he was confined at the time at the
picture.[20] Thus we held in one case[21] that admissions Philippine Heart Center and he gave this statement to
made during the course of an administrative investigation NPC personnel, not to police authorities.[29] Appellant can
by Philippine Airlines do not come within the purview of hardly claim that, under the prevailing circumstances at
Section 12. The protective mantle of the constitutional
125
the time, whatever degree of compulsion may have confession or information by any means serving to

existed went beyond the borders of the unobjectionable overcome his power of resistance, or making the

where impermissible levels of duress would force him into confession or admission involuntary.[33] In this case, we

making false and incriminating declarations against his find nothing on record to support appellants claim that his

interest. While he may have been persuaded into doing statements were extorted from him.

so, he cannot feign that he was intimidated in such a way

as to bring his statements within the ambit of the Furthermore, while indeed Galman taken

exclusionary constitutional provision. together with the 1986 deliberations on what was later to

become Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution may lead

The fact that an NBI investigation was being
to the conclusion that the rights are available when the
contemporaneously conducted at the time the sworn
person is already in custody as a suspect, or if the person
statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his
is a suspect even if he is not yet deprived in any significant
predicament. The essence of the constitutional safeguard
way of his liberty, Fr. Bernas[34] qualified this statement by
is protection from coercion. The interview where the
saying that [J]urisprudence under the 1987 Constitution,
sworn statement is based was conducted by NPC
however, has consistently held, following Escobedo, the
personnel for the NPCs administrative investigation. Any
stricter view, that the rights begin to be available only
investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding
when the person is already in custody.[35]
separate, distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry
Appellant next advances the argument that even
and should not be confused or lumped together with the
if his sworn statement were admissible in evidence, the
latter.
contents thereof may not be sufficient to sustain a

conviction. He contends that although his statement was

Appellant invokes Galman v. Pamaran[30] in
supposedly gathered from the transcript of stenographic
insisting that the constitutional safeguard should have
notes of the conversation between him and Atty. Bagcal,
been applied notwithstanding that he was not yet arrested
neither Atty. Bagcal nor the person who actually prepared
or under detention at the time. He also invites our
the sworn statement was presented. Therefore, the sworn
attention to the pronouncements of Fr. Joaquin G.
statement is hearsay.
Bernas[31] that the right to counsel is available if a person

is in custody, even if he is not a suspect; or even if not yet

The argument is puerile. It bears stressing that
in custody but he is a suspect.
the prosecution presented as witness Atty. Lamberto P.

Melencio who saw appellant at the hospital to show him

The contention is tenuous. Although we held
the prepared statement and to verify from him the truth of
in Galman that the constitutional protection covers not
its contents.[36] Atty. Melencio testified that he asked
only confessions but admissions as well, we qualified the
appellant to go over the document before affixing his
ruling with the statement that what is being eschewed is
signature thereto.[37]He also inquired whether or not
the evil of extorting a confession from the mouth of the
appellant was coerced or intimidated by anybody when
person being interrogated. As defined, extortion is an act
the statement was taken.[38] Appellant denied that he was
or practice of taking or obtaining anything from a person
coerced or intimidated,[39]affirmed the contents of the
by illegal use of fear, whether by force, threats or any
document as a true reflection of his
undue exercise of power.[32] In the context of obtaining an
statements,[40] and signed the same.[41] It need not be
admission, extorting means compelling or coercing a
126
overemphasized that the sworn statement is a duly and due execution of the NBI Investigation report albeit

notarized document which has in its favor the without admitting the truth of its contents. If at all, the

presumption of regularity and, thus, it can be contradicted admission of the reports existence is an acknowledgment

only by clear and convincing evidence. Without that sort that it is neither spurious nor counterfeit.

of evidence, the presumption of regularity, the evidentiary

weight conferred upon such public document with respect All told, given the paucity of substance in the

to its execution, as well as the statements and the arguments advanced by appellant to prop up his cause,

authenticity of the signatures thereon, stand.[42] his appeal must fall.

WHEREFORE, the May 28, 2002 Decision of the

In disclaiming the authenticity of his sworn Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

statement, appellant insists that at the time he signed the

document, he was confined in the hospital and therefore SO ORDERED.

not physically and mentally fit to assess the significance

of his signature. This pretext however collides with the

testimony of his own witness, Dr. Teresita Sadava, who

stated that appellant was confined for three days and,

who, when queried whether ischemic heart disease had

any emotional or psychological effect, gave the

inconclusive reply that it may or may not. Moreover, as

aptly observed by the Sandiganbayan, although

supposedly violated and repulsed as he was by the

alleged falsity of the affidavit, it is strange that appellant,

who is supposedly astute in business matters as he then

occupied the position of Foreign Trader Analyst of the

NPC, nevertheless felt it unnecessary to execute another

affidavit retracting the same after his recovery from

illness. Verily, evidence to be believed must not only

proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must

be credible in itself such as the common experience and

observation of mankind can approve as probable under

the circumstances.[43]

Appellant finally contends that both the NBI

Investigation Report and the transcript of stenographic

notes are hearsay for having been made extra-judicially.

The record, however, shows that the prosecution

presented the team leader of the NBI investigators who

conducted the investigation, although his testimony was

dispensed with as the parties stipulated on the existence

127