2/13/2018 A.M. No.

RTJ- 04-1845

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

ATTY. FRANKLIN G. A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845

GACAL, [Formerly A.M. No. IPI No. 03-1831-RTJ]
Complainant,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
JUDGE JAIME I. INFANTE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Promulgated:
BRANCH 38, IN ALABEL,
SARANGANI, October 5, 2011
Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

It is axiomatic that bail cannot be allowed to a person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without a hearing upon notice to the
Prosecution. Any judge who so allows bail is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules, and
is subject to appropriate administrative sanctions.

Atty. Franklin Gacal, the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 1136-03 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani entitled People v. Faustino Ancheta, a prosecution for
murder arising from the killing of Felomino O. Occasion, charges Judge Jaime I. Infante, Presiding
Judge of Branch 38 of the RTC to whose Branch Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled for
arraignment and trial, with gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and evident partiality,
for the latters failure to set a hearing before granting bail to the accused and for releasing him
immediately after allowing bail.

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Antecedents

On March 18, 2003, Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani issued a warrant for the arrest of Faustino Ancheta in connection with
a murder case. Judge Balanag did not recommend bail. Ancheta, who had meanwhile gone into
hiding, was not arrested. Upon review, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, acting through
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., affirmed the findings and recommendation
of Judge Balanag on the offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an information for
murder on April 21, 2003 (Criminal Case No. 1136-03), but with a recommendation for bail in the
amount of P400,000.00. Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled to Judge Infantes Branch.

On April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and another
releasing Ancheta from custody.

On April 25, 2003, Atty. Gacal, upon learning of the twin orders issued by Judge Infante,
filed a so-called Very Urgent Motion For Reconsideration And/Or To Cancel Bailbond With Prayer
To Enforce Warrant Of Arrest Or Issue Warrant Of Arrest Anew Or In The Alternative Very Urgent
Motion For This Court To Motu Prop[r]io Correct An Apparent And Patent Error (very urgent
motion).

In the hearing of the very urgent motion on April 29, 2003, only Atty. Gacal and his collaborating
counsel appeared in court. Judge Infante directed the public prosecutor to comment on the very
urgent motion within five days from notice, after which the motion would be submitted for
resolution with or without the comment. Ancheta, through counsel, opposed, stating that the motion
did not bear the conformity of the public prosecutor.

At the arraignment of Ancheta set on May 15, 2003, the parties and their counsel appeared,
but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Barcelona, Jr., the assigned public prosecutor, did not appear
because he was then following up his regular appointment as the Provincial Prosecutor of
Sarangani Province. Accordingly, the arraignment was reset to May 29, 2003.

On May 21, 2003, Judge Infante denied Atty. Gacals very urgent motion on the ground that
the motion was pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public prosecutor, and on the
further ground that the private prosecutor had not been authorized to act as such pursuant to Section
5, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court. Judge Infante directed that the consideration of the bail issue be
held in abeyance until after the public prosecutor had submitted a comment, because he wanted to
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know the position of the public prosecutor on Atty. Gacals very urgent motion having been filed
[1]
without the approval of the public prosecutor.

On May 29, 2003, the public prosecutor appeared, but did not file any comment. Thereupon, Atty.
Gacal sought authority to appear as a private prosecutor. The public prosecutor did not oppose Atty.
Gacals request. With that, Atty. Gacal moved for the reconsideration of the grant of bail to Ancheta.
In response, Judge Infante required the public prosecutor to file his comment on Atty. Gacals
[2]
motion for reconsideration, and again reset the arraignment of the accused to June 20, 2003.

On June 4, 2003, the public prosecutor filed a comment, stating that he had recommended bail as a
matter of course; that the orders dated April 23, 2003 approving bail upon his recommendation and
releasing the accused were proper; and that his recommendation of bail was in effect a waiver of
the public prosecutors right to a bail hearing.
By June 20, 2003, when no order regarding the matter of bail was issued, Atty. Gacal sought
the inhibition of Judge Infante on the ground of his gross incompetence manifested by his failure to
exercise judicial power to resolve the issue of bail.

[3]
In his motion for inhibition, Atty. Gacal insisted that the issue of bail urgently required a
resolution that involved a judicial determination and was, for that reason, a judicial function; that
Judge Infante failed to resolve the issue of bail, although he should have acted upon it with
dispatch, because it was unusual that several persons charged with murder were being detained
while Ancheta was let free on bail even without his filing a petition for bail; that such event also
put the integrity of Judge Infantes court in peril; and that although his motion for reconsideration
included the alternative relief for Judge Infante to motu proprio correct his apparent error, his
refusal to resolve the matter in due time constituted gross ignorance of law.

Atty. Gacal contended that Judge Infante was not worthy of his position as a judge either because
he unjustifiably failed to exercise his judicial power or because he did not at all know how to
exercise his judicial power; that his lack of judicial will rendered him utterly incompetent to
perform the functions of a judge; that at one time, he ordered the bail issue to be submitted for
resolution, with or without the comment of the public prosecutor, but at another time, he directed
that the bail issue be submitted for resolution, with his later order denoting that he would resolve
the issue only after receiving the comment from the public prosecutor; that he should not be too
dependent on the public prosecutors comment considering that the resolution of the matter of bail

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[4]
was entirely within his discretion as the judge; and that the granting of bail without a petition for
bail being filed by the accused or a hearing being held for that purpose constituted gross ignorance
[5]
of the law and the rules.

Finally, Atty. Gacal stated that Judge Infante and the public prosecutor were both guilty of violating
[6]
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for giving undue advantage to Ancheta by allowing
[7]
him bail without his filing a petition for bail and without a hearing being first conducted.

On July 9, 2003, Judge Infante definitively denied Atty. Gacals very urgent motion.

On August 5, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCAd) received from the Office of the
Ombudsman the indorsement of the administrative complaint Atty. Gacal had filed against Judge
Infante (CPL-M-03-0581 entitled Gacal v. Infante, et al.), forwarding the records of the
administrative case for appropriate action to the Supreme Court as the exclusive administrative
[8]
authority over all courts, their judges and their personnel.

On August 21, 2003, then Court Administrator Prebitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the
Court) required Judge Infante to comment on the administrative complaint against him, and to
show cause within 10 days from receipt why he should not be suspended, disbarred, or otherwise
disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Bar for violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility pursuant to the resolution of the Court En Banc in A.M. No. 02-9-
[9]
02-SC dated September 17, 2002.

On October 6, 2003, the OCAd received Judge Infantes comment dated September 22, 2003, by
which he denied any transgression in the granting of bail to Ancheta, stating the following:

2. At the outset, as a clarificatory note, accused Faustino Ancheta is out on bail, not because he
applied for bail duly granted by the court but because he posted the required bail since in the first
place the Fiscal recommended bail, duly approved by the Undersigned, in the amount of
P400,000.00. Underscoring is made to stress the fact that accused Ancheta had actually never filed an
application for bail. Perforce, the court had nothing to hear, grant or deny an
application/motion/petition for bail since none was filed by the accused.

3. Thus, the twin Orders dated April 23, 2003 are exactly meant as an approval of the bailbond
(property) posted by accused Ancheta, it being found to be complete and sufficient. They are not
orders granting an application for bail, as misconstrued by private prosecutor. (Certified true machine
copy of the twin Orders dated April 23 marked as Annex-2 and 2-a are hereto attached)

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4. On April 25, 2003, private complainant in the cited criminal case, thru counsel (the Gacal,
Gacal and Gacal Law Office), filed a Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration or in the alternative
Very Urgent Motion for this Court to Moto Propio Correct an Apparent Error, praying that the twin
Orders dated April 23, 2003 be reconsidered. (Certified machine copy of the said urgent motion
marked as Annex 3 is hereto attached)

5. On April 29, 2003, during the hearing on motion, the private complainant and his counsel
(private prosecutor) appeared. The Fiscal was not present. The court nonetheless ordered the Fiscal
to file his comment/s on the said motion. The accused thru private counsel in an open court hearing
opposed the subject motion inasmuch as the same bears no conformity of the Fiscal. In that hearing,
the court advised the private prosecutor to coordinate and secure the conformity of the Fiscal in filing
his motion. (Certified machine copy of the Order dated April 29, 2003, marked as Annex 4 is hereto
attached.)

6. On May 15, 2003, the scheduled date for the arraignment of accused Ancheta, the parties and
private prosecutor appeared. Again, the 1st Asst. Provincial Fiscal, Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., failed to
appear who, being the next highest in rank in their Office, was processing his application for regular
appointment as Provincial Fiscal of Sarangani Province. He was then the Acting Provincial Fiscal
Designate in view of the appointment of former Provincial Fiscal Laureano T. Alzate as RTC Judge
in Koronadal City. Due to the absence of the Fiscal and the motion for reconsideration then pending
for resolution, the scheduled arraignment was reset to May 29, 2003, per Order dated May 15, 2003,
(certified machine copy of which marked as Annex 5 is hereto attached).

7. On May 21, 2003, the Undersigned resolved to deny for being pro forma the pending motion
for reconsideration. As held in the Order of denial, it was found that the private prosecutor was not
duly authorized in writing by the provincial prosecutor to prosecute the said criminal case, nor was
he judicially approved to act as such in violation of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. The bail issue, however, was held in abeyance until submission of the comment
thereon by the Fiscal as this Presiding Judge would like then to know the position of the Fiscal anent
to the cited motion without his approval. The arraignment was reset to June 20, 2003. Again, the
private prosecutor was orally advised to coordinate and secure the approval of the Fiscal in filing his
motions/pleadings. (Certified machine copy of the Order dated May 21, 2003 marked as Annex 6
hereto attached)

8. On June 4, 2003, the Fiscal finally filed his Comment on the Very Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration filed by private complainant thru counsel (private prosecutor). Consistently, the
Fiscal in his comment recommended bail as a matter of course and that he claimed that Orders dated
April 23, 2003 approving bail upon his recommendation are proper, waiving in effect his right for a
bail hearing. (Certified true machine copy of the Fiscals comment marked as Annex-7 is hereto
[10]
attached).

Under date of February 16, 2004, the OCAd recommended after investigation that the case be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter, and that Judge Infante be fined in the amount of
[11]
P20,000.00, viz:

EVALUATION: The 1987 Constitution provides that, all persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law (Sec. 13, Art. III).

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The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, no person charged with a capital
offense or offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be admitted to bail
when the evidence is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution (Sec. 7, Rule 114).

With the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure as a
backdrop, the question is: Can respondent judge in granting bail to the accused dispense with the
hearing of Application for Bail?

The preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 03-61, entitled Benito M. Occasion vs.
Faustino Ancheta for Murder was conducted by Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr., of MCTC, Kiamba-
Maitum, Sarangani. Finding the existence of probable cause that an offense of Murder was
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof, he transmitted his resolution to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, together with the records of the case, with No Bail Recommended. Upon
review of the resolution of the investigating judge by the OIC of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Sarangani, he filed the information for Murder against accused Faustino Ancheta but a
bail of P400,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the latter was recommended. Relying on the
recommendation of the Fiscal, respondent judge granted the Application for Bail of the accused.

The offense of Murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death
(Art. 248, RPC). By reason of the penalty prescribed by law, Murder is considered a capital offense
and, grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised only by respondent judge after the
evidence is submitted in a hearing. Hearing of the application for bail is absolutely indispensable
before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecutions evidence is weak or strong (People
vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489). It becomes, therefore, a ministerial duty of a judge to conduct hearing
the moment an application for bail is filed if the accused is charged with capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. If doubt can be entertained, it follows that the
evidence of guilt is weak and bail shall be recommended. On the other hand, if the evidence is clear
and strong, no bail shall be granted.

Verily, respondent judge erred when he issued an order granting the application for bail filed by
the accused (Annex C) based merely on the order issued by the Fiscal (Annex A) recommending bail
of P400,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the accused without even bothering to read the affidavits
of the witnesses for the prosecution. Respondent judge cannot abdicate his right and authority to
determine whether the evidence against the accused who is charged with capital offense is strong or
not.

After the respondent judge has approved the property bond posted by the accused, the
complainant, as private prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Cancel Bailbond or in
the alternative, Very Urgent Motion to Moto Proprio correct an Apparent Error. On the hearing of the
Motion on 29 April 2003, the Fiscal was absent but he (the Fiscal) was given five (5) days from
receipt of the order within which to file his comment and, with or without comment the incident is
deemed submitted for resolution and, hearing of the Motion was reset to May 15, 2003. But the
Fiscal again failed to appear on said date and, the arraignment of the accused was set on 29 May
2003. On 21 May 2003, respondent judge resolved to deny the Motion on the ground that the private
prosecutor was not authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecutions Office or the Regional
State Prosecutor to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court, pursuant to Sect. 5, Rule
110 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The need for an authority in writing from the Chief of the Prosecutions Office or Regional State
Prosecutor to the Private Prosecutor to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court,
contemplates of a situation wherein there is no regular prosecutor assigned the court, or the
prosecutor assigned, due to heavy work schedule, cannot attend to the prosecution of pending
criminal cases to expedite disposition of the case. This provision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
does not prevent the offended party who did not reserve, waive nor institute separate civil action,
from intervening in the case through a private prosecutor.

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Intervention of the offended party in Criminal Action Where the civil action for recovery of
civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 11, the offended party may
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense (Sec. 16, Rule 110 [Supra]).

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action (Sec. 1 (a), Rule 111 [Supra]).

The offended party in Criminal Case No. 1136-03 did not reserve his right to institute separate
civil action, he did not waive such right and did not file civil action prior to the criminal action, so
the offended party may under the law intervene as a matter of right.

The authority to intervene includes actual conduct of trial under the control of the Fiscal which
includes the right to file pleadings. According to respondent judge, he advised the private prosecutor
to coordinate with the fiscal and secure his approval in accord with the mandate of Section, 5, Rule
110 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure: On this point, respondent judge again erred. The
right of the offended party to intervene is conferred by law and the approval of the Fiscal or even the
court is not all necessary (Sec. 1 (a), Rule 111, [Supra]). Respondent Judge, however, is correct when
he stated that the motions filed by the private prosecutor should be with the conformity of the Fiscal.

Respondent judges errors are basic such that his acts constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable

Court is the recommendation that the instant I.P.I. be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter
and respondent Judge be held ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00.

[12]
On March 31, 2004, the Court directed that the administrative case be docketed as a regular
administrative matter.

[13]
On December 01, 2004, the Court denied Atty. Gacals ancillary prayer to disqualify
Judge Infante from trying Criminal Case No. 1138-03 pending resolution of this administrative
matter.

Ruling

We approve and adopt the findings and recommendation of the OCAd, considering that they are
well substantiated by the records. We note that Judge Infante did not deny that he granted bail for
the provisional release of Ancheta in Criminal Case No. 1138-03 without conducting the requisite
bail hearing.

I
Bail hearing was mandatory
in Criminal Case No. 1138-03

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Judge Infante would excuse himself from blame and responsibility by insisting that the
hearing was no longer necessary considering that the accused had not filed a petition for bail; that
inasmuch as no application for bail had been filed by the accused, his twin orders of April 23, 2003
were not orders granting an application for bail, but were instead his approval of the bail bond
posted; and that Atty. Gacals very urgent motion and other motions and written submissions lacked
the requisite written conformity of the public prosecutor, rendering them null and void.

We cannot relieve Judge Infante from blame and responsibility.

The willingness of Judge Infante to rely on the mere representation of the public prosecutor
that his grant of bail upon the public prosecutors recommendation had been proper, and that his
(public prosecutor) recommendation of bail had in effect waived the need for a bail hearing
perplexes the Court. He thereby betrayed an uncommon readiness to trust more in the public
prosecutors judgment than in his own judicious discretion as a trial judge. He should not do so.

Judge Infante made the situation worse by brushing aside the valid remonstrations expressed in
Atty. Gacals very urgent motion thusly:

This Court is not unaware that the charge of murder being a capital offense is not bailable xxx
xxxx
The phrase xxx application for admission to bail xxx is not an irrelevant but a significant infusion in
the cited rule (section 8), the plain import of which is that bail hearing is preceded by a
motion/petition for admission to bail filed by a detained accused himself or thru counsel.
The peculiar feature of the instant case, however, is the absence of a petition/motion for
admission to bail filed by the herein accused. On the contrary, it is the consistent position of the
fiscal to recommend bail since the prosecution evidence being merely circumstantial, is not
strong for the purpose of granting bail. xxx. This court believes that bail hearing, albeit
necessary in the grant of bail involving capital offense, is not at all times and in all instances
essential to afford the party the right to due process especially so, when the fiscal in this case
was given reasonable opportunity to explain his side, and yet he maintained the propriety of
grant of bail without need of hearing since the prosecution evidence is not strong for the
purpose of granting bail.

Further, while it is preponderant of judicial experience to adopt the fiscals recommendation in bail
fixing, this court, however, had in addition and in accord with Section 6(a) of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, evaluated the record of the case, and only upon being convinced and satisfied
that the prosecution evidence as contained in the affidavits of all the prosecution witnesses, no one
being an eye-witness are merely circumstantial evidence, that this court in the exercise of sound
discretion allowed the accused to post bail.
xxxx
The convergence of the foregoing factors - absence of motion for admission to bail filed by the
accused, the recommendation of the fiscal to grant bail, the pro forma motion of the private
prosecutor for lack of prior approval from the fiscal and this courts evaluation of the records
[14]
sufficiently warrants the grant of bail to herein accused.

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Judge Infante specifically cited judicial experience as sanctioning his adoption and approval of the
public prosecutors recommendation on the fixing of bail. Yet, it was not concealed from him that
the public prosecutors recommendation had been mainly based on the documentary evidence
[15]
adduced, and on the public prosecutors misguided position that the evidence of guilt was weak
because only circumstantial evidence had been presented. As such, Judge Infantes unquestioning
echoing of the public prosecutors conclusion about the evidence of guilt not being sufficient to
deny bail did not justify his dispensing with the bail hearing.

Judge Infante apparently acted as if the requirement for the bail hearing was a merely minor
rule to be dispensed with. Although, in theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance
of the accused at the time set for the arraignment and trial; and, in practice, bail serves the further
purpose of preventing the release of an accused who may be dangerous to society or whom the
[16]
judge may not want to release, a hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail,
[17]
whether bail is a matter of right or discretion. With more reason is this true in criminal
prosecutions of a capital offense, or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states that: No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal
action.

[18]
In Cortes v. Catral, therefore, the Court has outlined the following duties of the judge once an
application for bail is filed, to wit:

1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless
or whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion
(Sections 7 and 8, id);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond
(Section 19, id); otherwise, the petition should be denied. [emphasis supplied]

II
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Judge Infante disregarded rules and guidelines

in Criminal Case No. 1138-03

Ostensibly, Judge Infante disregarded basic but well-known rules and guidelines on the
matter of bail.

1.
In case no application for bail is filed,
bail hearing was not dispensable

Judge Infante contends that a bail hearing in Criminal Case No. 1138-03 was not necessary
because the accused did not file an application for bail; and because the public prosecutor had
recommended bail.

Judge Infantes contention is unwarranted.

Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a hearing should
still be held. This hearing is separate and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the existence
of probable cause, in which the trial judge ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty of the crime. The Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its evidence;
[19]
otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.

The fact that the public prosecutor recommended bail for Ancheta did not warrant dispensing
with the hearing. The public prosecutors recommendation of bail was not material in deciding
whether to conduct the mandatory hearing or not. For one, the public prosecutors recommendation,
[20]
albeit persuasive, did not necessarily bind the trial judge, in whom alone the discretion to
determine whether to grant bail or not was vested. Whatever the public prosecutor recommended,
including the amount of bail, was non-binding. Nor did such recommendation constitute a showing
that the evidence of guilt was not strong. If it was otherwise, the trial judge could become
unavoidably controlled by the Prosecution.

Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down by the
Supreme Court regarding the bail hearing being mandatory and indispensable. He ought to have
remembered, then, that it was only through such hearing that he could be put in a position to
[21]
determine whether the evidence for the Prosecution was weak or strong. Hence, his dispensing
with the hearing manifested a gross ignorance of the law and the rules.
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2.
Public prosecutors failure to oppose
application for bail or to adduce evidence
did not dispense with hearing

That the Prosecution did not oppose the grant of bail to Ancheta, as in fact it recommended
bail, and that the Prosecution did not want to adduce evidence were irrelevant, and did not dispense
with the bail hearing. The gravity of the charge in Criminal Case No. 1138-03 made it still
mandatory for Judge Infante to conduct a bail hearing in which he could have made on his own
searching and clarificatory questions from which to infer the strength or weakness of the evidence
of guilt. He should not have readily and easily gone along with the public prosecutors opinion that
the evidence of guilt, being circumstantial, was not strong enough to deny bail; else, he might be
regarded as having abdicated from a responsibility that was his alone as the trial judge.

Judge Infantes holding that circumstantial evidence of guilt was of a lesser weight than direct
evidence in the establishment of guilt was also surprising. His training and experience should have
cautioned him enough on the point that the lack or absence of direct evidence did not necessarily
mean that the guilt of the accused could not anymore be proved, because circumstantial evidence, if
[22]
sufficient, could supplant the absence of direct evidence. In short, evidence of guilt was not
necessarily weak because it was circumstantial.
Instead, Judge Infante should have assiduously determined why the Prosecution refused to
satisfy its burden of proof in the admission of the accused to bail. Should he have found that the
public prosecutors refusal was not justified, he could have then himself inquired on the nature and
extent of the evidence of guilt for the purpose of enabling himself to ascertain whether or not such
evidence was strong. He could not have ignored the possibility that the public prosecutor might
[23]
have erred in assessing the evidence of guilt as weak. At any rate, if he found the Prosecution to
be uncooperative, he could still have endeavored to determine on his own the existence of such
[24]
evidence, with the assistance of the private prosecutor.

3.
Judge Infantes granting of bail without a hearing was
censurable for gross ignorance of the law and the rules
[25]
Every judge should be faithful to the law and should maintain professional competence. His
role in the administration of justice requires a continuous study of the law and jurisprudence, lest

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[26]
public confidence in the Judiciary be eroded by incompetence and irresponsible conduct.

In that light, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of bail in
capital offenses was inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law and the rules as well as a
[27]
cavalier disregard of its requirement. He well knew that the determination of whether or not the
[28]
evidence of guilt is strong was a matter of judicial discretion, and that the discretion lay not in
the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation
[29]
of the weight of the Prosecutions evidence of guilt against the accused. His fault was made
[30]
worse by his granting bail despite the absence of a petition for bail from the accused.
Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of
[31]
sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.

III
Imposable Penalty

We next determine the penalty imposable on Judge Infante for his gross ignorance of the law and
the rules.

The Court imposed a fine of P20,000.00 on the respondent judge in Docena-Caspe v. Bugtas.
[32]
In that case, the respondent judge granted bail to the two accused who had been charged with
[33]
murder without first conducting a hearing. Likewise, in Loyola v. Gabo, the Court fined the
respondent judge in the similar amount of P20,000.00 for granting bail to the accused in a murder
case without the requisite bail hearing. To accord with such precedents, the Court prescribes a fine
of P20,000.00 on Judge Infante, with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the
commission of another serious offense will be more severely dealt with.

WHEREFORE, we FIND AND DECLARE Judge Jaime I. Infante guilty of gross ignorance of
the law and the rules; and, accordingly, FINE him in the amount of P20,000.00, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the offense or the commission of another serious offense will be more
severely dealt with.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for proper
dissemination to all trial judges.

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SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 44 45.
[2]
Id., p. 4.
[3]
Id., pp. 121-123.
[4]
Rollo, pp 1 -8 , 6.
[5]
Id., pp. 67 -70, 70.
[6]
Id., p. 70.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id., p. 67.
[9]
Id., p. 90.
[10]
Id., pp. 94-103 (bold emphasis is in the original text).
[11]
Id., pp. 205-212.
[12]
Id., p. 213.
[13]
Id., p. 224.

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[14]
Id., pp. 22-23 (bold emphasis supplied).
[15]
Id., pp. 101-102.
[16]
Basco v. Rapatalo, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335, March 5, 1997, 269 SCRA 220.
[17]
Te v. Perez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1286, January 21, 2002, 374 SCRA 130; Bangayan v. Butacan, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1320, November 22,
2000, 345 SCRA 301, 306.
[18]
A.M. No. RTJ-97-138, September 10, 1997, 279 SCRA 1, 18.
[19]
Directo v. Bautista, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1205, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 223.
[20]
Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1488, June 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 1, 9.
[21]
Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores, supra.
[22]
Gan v. People, G.R. No. 165884, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 550.
[23]
Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores, supra, Note 20.
[24]
Te v. Perez, AM No. MTJ-00-1286, January 21, 2002, 374 SCRA 130.
[25]
Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.
[26]
Taborite v. Sollesta, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1388, August 12, 2003, 408 SCRA 602.
[27]
Bantuas v. Pangadapun, RTJ-98-1407, July 20, 1998, 292 SCRA 622.
[28]
Aleria, Jr. v. Velez, G.R. No. 127400, November 16, 1998, 298 SCRA 611
[29]
Gimeno v. Arcueno, Sr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-981, November 29, 1995, 250 SCRA 376.
[30]
Delos Santos-Reyes v. Montesa, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-983, August 7, 1995, 247 SCRA 85.
[31]
Baylon v. Sison, AM No. 92-7-360-0, April 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 284.
[32]
AM RTJ-03-1767, March 28, 2003, 400 SCRA 37.
[33]
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1524, January 26, 2000, 323 SCRA 348.

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