Concept of Legal Ethics

- Legal Ethics, Definition

- What is the practice of law?
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's
decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a
college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an
appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the
practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as
an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing
and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St.
23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to
settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and
Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where
the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr.
p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having
no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of
the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p.
665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree
of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term
"practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the
provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the
Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long
as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within
COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up
on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members
of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work;
it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit.
And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today,
although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners.
(Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners.
Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of
the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the
practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986],
p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire
practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's
role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that
the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this
wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies
today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do
both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different
legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers
of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a
narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly
different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range
of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers
find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the
way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a
departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers
and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are
finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-
making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation.
The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the
need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process,
wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of
action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the
subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved
through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management,
functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the
"big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and
industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer
does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many
others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal
problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of
concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how
one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved
in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all,
international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign
country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the
overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries.
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-
educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who
perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the
traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an
incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known
as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer
reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for
are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-
state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those
who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and
operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally
require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of
seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups
actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and
to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to
managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the
context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement,
and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in
all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including
hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate
the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks
of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are
being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational
fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is
not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade
as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of
the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least,
 also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or
will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC
in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%.
He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been
paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in
Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since
1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in
his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers,
for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the
various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the
legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies
for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11).
(Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is
concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1)
business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid.,
p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the
tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining
their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory
Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the
law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work
with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and
signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support
personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the
other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in
the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice,
and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and
a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according
to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he
does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied,
the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the
Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which
modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice
Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week
and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of
law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by
the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of
law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself
that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the
law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose
sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years.
This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground
that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought
against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for
the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise
clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential
nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved)
for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three
inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah
was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator
calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the
letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same
tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria
Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday
to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232;
521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member
of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is
not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the
act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens
Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de
Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar
associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with
appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder
excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by
them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal
support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to
layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign
visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations.
Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused
by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain
respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question
give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so,
as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being
used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the
rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears
with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members
of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and
name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may
still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or
whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent
would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that
legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign
divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered
into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation
of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply
going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects
in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems
to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a
marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions
one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal
services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only
logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the
public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent
should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and
retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly
benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of
such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other
fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such
field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching"
upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in
any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection
of the public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such
services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively
to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the
factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as
acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal
and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating
information regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it
is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not
authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which
course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a
clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent
himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without
any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove
to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the
corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to
lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to
the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme
Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's
own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law
belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to
their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See
Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be
evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or
device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of
its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons
who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject
the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons
and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all
who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to
persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support
services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its
Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as
enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of
court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall
squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection
of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be
engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there
are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with
the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this
Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those
who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about
by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being
advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect
the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such
services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to
them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It
gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are
lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals"
are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder,
Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which,
as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of
lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that
in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret
marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said
agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the
Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for
said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to
advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their
particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one
(cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended
so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible
in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here,
when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done
(and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by
circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from
the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel
agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact
that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is
familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the
law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our
conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers,
liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching
their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar
with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who
draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by
the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he
recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In
my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise
him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who
performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved
for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is
not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and
business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in
such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like
the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized
staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function
have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by
the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let
me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as
part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment
of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent
particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept
the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated
by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-
way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute
and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can
accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should
not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not
presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board.
An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the
Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The State of New
Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before
the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board
give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules
and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney,
and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully
 do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v.
Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge
of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly
states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of
law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition).
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas
(See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The
business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on
the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals
may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles
or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem
does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the
text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts.
Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary
to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE —
THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common
problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport
to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication
and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction
against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a
divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings
relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or
$100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and
counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection
with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed.
(State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute
practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be
necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong
notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages
(See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not
necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal
support services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the
issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial
construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of
the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of
legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity:
legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in
court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct
with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine
whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St.
23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations
as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for
the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice
of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of
the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the
case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and
lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern
information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case;
fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or
non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment
 records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption
laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for
the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as
the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such
function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign
laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is
look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so
called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper
course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The
Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose
and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of
the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation
and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a
battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization,
it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's
what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they
observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been
categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal
Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss
can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of
these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-
confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative
who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer
you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in
order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in
taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your
rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in
court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is
engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly
beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law
cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character.
The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain
proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The
doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to,
the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members
of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed
to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the
courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights
claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an
occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but
be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there
which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the
"paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general
public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants.
There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As
pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf
of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations
granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person
who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one
of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer
in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of
the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of
their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The
prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of
his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer
degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary
activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the
rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of
clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor
may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name
of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory
but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task,
which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold
that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification
relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved
in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of
the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the
public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with
respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of
the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this
point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain
that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded
to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except
in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales,
who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he
is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be
dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was
created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is
clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of
course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present
state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This
interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who
can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant
of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to
the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or
causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as
Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action
in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ.,
concur
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his
capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for
the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said
examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take
the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice
before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the
Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their
being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications
for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not
involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so
much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by
the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring
further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the
preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of
provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as
the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States
Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents
to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly
authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or examinations the
passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first
time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or
otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not
appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is
included in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having
no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement
of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and
application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the
Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with
law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal
principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance:
Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to
public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by
others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any
foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the
Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent
belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any
mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such
cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30
mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for
cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time
after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the
patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the
Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate
extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the
condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine
of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to
food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal
principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has
been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve
questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61,
provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to
obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court
from any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and
decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically,
the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which
is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent
Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-
judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any
person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a
patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his
action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should
decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the
article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the
bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further
examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that
members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that
a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do
business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases
prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the
following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in the Patent Office on
which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the
preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these
rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the
highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the
provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register
of attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the
Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character
and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to
render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation
and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a
person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof
of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be
submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination
may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized
by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and
regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other
parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as
representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute,
are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service,
and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of
their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity
for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice before his office any
person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to
comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or
threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other
person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The
reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed
upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the
District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine.
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced,
then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit
to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as
regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary
qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing
may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this
important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to
determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or
general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and
to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937,
known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the
approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338
of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the
Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in
and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to
require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent
Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the
business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods,
imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any
lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to
qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law,
and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said
office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as
well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring
members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ.,concur.
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several actions against
his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors;
during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge
Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired:
xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?
The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied:
You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance xxx xxx.
Thereafter, the respondent said:
Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer!
To this the complainant remarked:
Your Honor, Im not xxx xxx.
Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:
Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.
Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer
or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having
appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondents imputations of complainants misrepresentation as a
lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases
respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna! were
uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant
before the public.
Complainant claims that respondents display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct in the performance
of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very
ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding appropriate penalty or sanctions for the
said administrative violations should be imposed on the respondent.
In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade him from
appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to
further complainants illegal practice of law; complainants complaint occurred during a judicial proceeding wherein complainant
was able to represent himself considering that he was appearing in barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when
she issued an order stating [i]n todays hearing both lawyers appeared; because of which, respondent stated: Your honor I would
like to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a lawyer, to which
complainant replied: The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer; the reason he informed the court that complainant
is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform
the presiding judge that he is not a lawyer when he stated: for the plaintiff your honor; he stated pumasa ka muna out of
indignation because of complainants temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it is surprising that the City Prosecutor of
Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation against him considering that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: It is
a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged
(Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540); in another malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant
against the Mina family pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit the
appearance of complainant as counsel for himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated
among other; to wit:
In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruzs motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise denied, movant not having satisfied
the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, Sections 1 and 2.
Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge Priscilla Mijares when said Judge
stated in Tagalog in open court Hay naku masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK? the same was dismissed by the
Honorable Courts Third Division which stated among others: That the questioned remarks of respondent were uttered more out
of frustration and in reaction to complainants actuations and taking into account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was
already lecturing the court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance on the part of the
complainant. Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended respondents suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that respondents averment that the utterances he
made in open court is (sic) privileged communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the
case in question under trial before the said court.
Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against the complainant had been the basis for
his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively,
pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City.
Likewise respondent did not refute complainants allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt and was not allowed to
practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on
December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using contumacious language in his dealing with others.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the manner, substance and tone of his
voice which was not refuted by him that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself
not only abusive but insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination
required of them.
Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his purpose relative to complainants
appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in his behalf but not for others if he had complied with the requirements
of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court.
Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional dealings so as not to offend the
sensitivities of the other party as in this case.
On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside the recommendation of the
investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack of merit.
Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the Board of Governors which states:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP
Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the
Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the
submittal of the Investigators report. (Emphasis supplied)
In Teodosio vs. Nava,[1] the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that the decision of the Board of
Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of
record, thus:
For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court the findings
with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge,
or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.[2]
In this case, the Board of Governors resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct does not contain any findings of
facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case.
Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and the issues involved could be resolved
on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of
cases.[3] This case falls within the exception.
We hold that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial court that complainant is
not a lawyer to correct the judges impression of complainants appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14,
2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer.[4] Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant
respondents suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument
between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment,
because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.[5]
Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A partys right to
conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party
may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
In Maderada vs. Mediodea,[6] this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress -- from its commencement to
its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure
as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted
to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law.
One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself.
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for gain,
mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has
been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to
the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from
engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer
and demanding payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer.
Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.[7]
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal
profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.[8] Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.[9]
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, admonished to be more circumspect in the
performance of his duties as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a
stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries,
Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the
government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in
1997. 6
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et
al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant,
who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages
without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. 9 He resolved the
criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article
116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself
from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that
respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit
to support the complaint. 15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of
January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April
1996. 18
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for
defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the
criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five
years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn
duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of
impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent
from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without
mental reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would
exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February
1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my
father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or complainant.
Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 27Respondent argues that
complainant failed to establish that respondent’s act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28
Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat
employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the
employees or present them for cross-examination. 29
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but
claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy
services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering
consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondent’s asking,
intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or
translate as a specie of ‘conflict of interest’. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-
mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32
Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against
complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January
1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner
Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’
resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-
2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and
Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and
violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in
deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict
with his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of
Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat
(p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel
and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore,
Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240,
are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics
and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain
inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he
previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest except justice. It
should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he
previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he
previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor
Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent
had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent
was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the
years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel
Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover,
he was an employee of the corporation and part of its management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being an Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had
long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial
Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a
legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal
profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal
principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People
v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we
find the evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and
violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. 40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of
Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties." 43 A
government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests." 44However, this rule is subject to
certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a
written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship
exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes
violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official
functions." 47
Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of
interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment. 49 In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s
confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented
him. 50
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal
complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that
occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since
he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used
against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established
participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary
investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his
previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as
government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A
lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the
client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –
x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
"To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." 51
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the
public as a lawyer. 52
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of
Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy
services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of
their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government prosecutor.
Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by
complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the
violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no
jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 – the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees – unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat
fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule
1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to
Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the
practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the public. 54
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts. 55
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of
profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation
in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious
Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later
on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo
City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The
condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on
official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as
private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial
Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then
argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On
December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private
Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars
certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the
motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law
practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment
on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability,
the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to
intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.
Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It
does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes
committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos
are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no
possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private
prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a
right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted
together with the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the
Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended
party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the
apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the
fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the
Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that
City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated
appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules.
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public,
as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as
counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following
observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the
Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all
respects, with costs against appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Practice of law is a privilege
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT
AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr.
A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon
him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then
entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of
the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application
for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period
of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise
him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In
this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit
him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order
dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of
Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early
Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a
high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained
and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts
which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive a
license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the
court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of
bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character
ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line
of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do
the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the
duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's
fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he
deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court,
whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
5
In Re Application of Kaufman, citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight and
narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons
the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore
becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute
examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no
further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as
to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if
possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and
has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the
court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary
trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness
in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all
will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the
fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who
maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional character is
one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an
examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
 Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights and
interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or
assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the
agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the
law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first
instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in
the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general
public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law
unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more
important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal
learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will
remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling —
a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a
Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of
such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in
scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court cannot
reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be
cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that
in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's
character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs
that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be
more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of
such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral
character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately
led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted
such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a
"neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the
very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and
mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally
irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the
question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of
application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission
to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His
evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment
of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless
killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other
words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the
ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and
addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from
notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his
previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites
sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The
eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of
imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer
recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his
discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C.
Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others
two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a
scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family
and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental.
The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying
abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the
mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy
Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one
of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son
whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the
gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the
sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers
who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out"
lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking
the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's
admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral
fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the
participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a
parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to
causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle
between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and
commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the
Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the
contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give
him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at
ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted
themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he
will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the
Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi
City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co.,
Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the
4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of
the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith,
a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa
& Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement
entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your
company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract
void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract
an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the
bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and
closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I
categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence
the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner
above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit &
Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in
connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he
said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated
contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the
housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of
the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real
facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia
Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3,
1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M.
Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop
deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was
allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on
Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of **
(Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified
complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope
bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of
evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all
concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings
with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the
service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage that notices
of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was
signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to
require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice,
and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's
office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the
Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family
**."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones, [5] Alauya
requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon.[6] He stated that his acts
as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of
Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly
deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had
suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that there was no basis for the
complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of
the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the
mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person,
an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent
himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use
of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had
occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-
at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because
"counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. [11] He was induced to
sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but
she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject
of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS
policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He
also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent
documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction,
none of which he ever saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to
the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996
and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty.
Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY
M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. [14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against
Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and
blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse
of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and
interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and
doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the
State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. [16] Section 4 of the
Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of
an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others,
strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." [18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the
rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm
to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated,
that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." [19] Righteous indignation, or
vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a
Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government
workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all
times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical
deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction
that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who
pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is
an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are
pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or
not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence
adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is
warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992
EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.
Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.
RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent Sabandal and
accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of
Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of which were either denied or
"Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his
willingness to reform and the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its
earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall
strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal
profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each filed separate
motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989
hereunder quoted, in part, for ready reference:
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No.
609 also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing respondent to take his oath. They
alleged that respondent had deliberately and maliciously excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That,
of course, is without merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent had discussed said cases
quite lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and
Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that they are in no position to submit their
respective Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take his oath, was a testimonial
from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986, certifying that respondent was "acting
with morality and has been careful in his actuations in the community."
Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then President of the IBP,
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without authorization from the Board of Officers of
said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's
parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration
was a Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty.
Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had not
issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that the IBP testimonial referred
to by Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President,
Atty. Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had not
submitted to the Court any certification from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-
1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board of Officers of the IBP,
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give a testimonial certifying to
respondent's good moral character as to entitle him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor.
The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a
COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25 August 1989, pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not aware of any acts
committed by him as would disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to mention,
however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Director of
Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of
Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which
said respondent, per complaint filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free
patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a
swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural
Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and respondent
has not redeemed the land until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by its Secretary Peter Y.
Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court—Municipal Trial
Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the Provincial
and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending
derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the above findings, the Board does not find any acts committed
by the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's
comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in
SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that there is a pending case before his Court
involving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal
and required Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747),
pending before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin
in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as
manipulative and surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44, informed the Court that her
relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she
finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him. Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his
admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere repentance and reformation which she believes make him morally fit to become a
member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to the
legal profession and request this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted
in the Resolution of 2 October 1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:
Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition which raises the question
whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe
and maintain the importance and finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to change or amend said final
resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions,
these cases therefore should not in the least be considered as anything which is subject and subservient to the
changing moods and dispositions of the parties, devoid of any permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming
change in tactics and strategy could not improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8,
Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having availed of optional retirement on 30 June
1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case 3747,
entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to
him, was already considered closed and terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached between the principal parties,
approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in Sabandal's name and the
latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the Register
of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with
defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to
pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-
claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January 1991. In the
same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to comment on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of
Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his
admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our
Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the complainants with the
Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29 August 1991, stating
that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the
rights of complainants he violated," and that "there is no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in
the Resolution of 24 September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from the time he
took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration of his show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also
taken cognizance of were the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness. At that time, we
had not received the objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the civil
case against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by the
Government in 1985 and was brought about because of respondent's procurement of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of
land belonging to the public domain and its use as security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was
an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any defense and was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26
November 1986. The controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent surrendering the bogus
certificate of title to the government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further expenses of litigation
incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection
to the approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable
settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the time said
case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then
submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character without, however, mentioning the
pendency of that civil case against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now entertains second thoughts
about respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his
procurement of the free patent title over property which he could not but have known was public land. This was manipulative
on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service,
which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed by the Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or
innocence was made because the suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable
settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of
his title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure
of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed
against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to
this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting several
Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency
of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
case instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of
dishonesty and lack of good moral character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not submitted any
opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already expressed their objections in their earlier
comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the
basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who
are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal
profession, both in academic preparation and legal training as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court
and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of
achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be
honest and to possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common
honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has
also been held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar
Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10
February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in
protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this
Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues,
who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying
"that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then
vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by
this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his
petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and
counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith
and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila
Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional
and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000,
without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members
of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and
will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection
therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear
itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty.
Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15,
1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He
served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court
denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty.
Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card.
This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the
plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction &
Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be
dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as
it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-
113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a
useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636,
June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time
he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of
the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date
filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the
appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in
 its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417,
May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling
is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on
grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date
of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in
the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's
restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court
passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of
November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the
appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual
members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually
surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded
to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To
said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay,
said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive
or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on
November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him."
Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to
require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall
be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public
hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the
event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a
written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen
unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be
judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou
see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how
can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a
beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then
thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law
and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he
refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in
the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of
the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE
BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the
particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our
pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this
COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of
the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the
attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY
and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason,
NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with
 emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: —
"the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines
today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that
justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this
Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but
we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never
interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has
placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with
"circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to
speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be prevented
is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous
apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE,
what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct such abuses
considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these
abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices.
We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of
this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice;
dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal
has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason we
offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be
regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to
when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be
condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us
examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms2 expressed against this
Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the
law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject
frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to
have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly
frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand
critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry
out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will
have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may read
different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying petitions
for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical
considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress
has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three
terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the
Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do
its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that
would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently
move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review
undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of
merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the
petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and
even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no
 need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court
of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was
patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit
of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting
them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to
give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will
be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,
or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records, that
the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable
decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its
supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that
for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion
upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he
did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5
(formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be
served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same
Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in
such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638,
Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of
Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant
sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or
objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any
period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own
negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from
himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of
a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous
outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural
for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why
lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in
which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is
especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open
to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property,
and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial
officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty, with
"imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who
assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court
are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless
advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of
courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of
justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F
Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he
points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of
courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As
aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of opinions as to
the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for
observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his
profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a
position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty
to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct
of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the character
and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an
interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W.
212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to
give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the
merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72
N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture
into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The
first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to
maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged
by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from
all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v.
Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in
the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his
patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as
necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of
the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the
foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And he may
suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated
to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political,
campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office," the
Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which
brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate
penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments
and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction
of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration
of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE???
IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his
clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote:
"They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did
not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to
bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who
published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which
referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to
keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the bar may
make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate
publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and
integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas
197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed,
for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed
against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of
its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by the
respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the
privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness,
especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of
justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a
divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press
the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel, lies,
and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law
allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he
was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's
disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against
a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public
interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the
people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys,
who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to
intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit,
together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute
with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying
that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or
decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two
years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against whose
members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the
people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive
him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts
of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and
criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as
independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit
reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements,
and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the motives and
integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of
justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every
attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the
authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer
that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has
improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon
reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of
the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of
criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not
against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in
the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the
courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
 I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations more or
less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too
much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an
unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and
make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court
and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he impugned
the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose
undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good, if the
conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of
the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under our
system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to
private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be
served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that
members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts
where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the
bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water
supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and
malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has
reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law
itself demands retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in
respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and
confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered
conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in
case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in
the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It
seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and
vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court
emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a
committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its
hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a
statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and
quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the Chief
Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and
the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts
done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never
subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and
humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial
capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege
which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No
judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned
by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge
alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or
libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law
(2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly
different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are
applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen,
guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been
made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a
citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he
proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize,
but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers.
"This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it
includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally
for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no
 distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge,
induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the
judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from
criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and
well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has
been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it
held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the
court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by
insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the
judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people
by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by
taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such
conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional delinquency for
which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being
defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his
integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133
App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City
Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of
the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it
common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a
contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power
to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at
the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals
or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied
grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration
of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the case at bar.
The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due
course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the
judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was
rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and
thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application
to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v.
State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65,
374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our duty to
impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a
newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a
judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in
general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in
intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring
the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of years vicious
attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit
as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-
litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a
crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them
into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave
professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the
Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the
legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those
catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of
courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless
illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely
erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed
at the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all
the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by
resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without
such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
 ... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the
court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the
parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights
of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for
contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused
to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ...
the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced
as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times
of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress
would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of
good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent does
not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending
consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of
this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing
the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court
which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order
to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of
justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of
bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders
and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is
on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice
by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the
Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court
and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts,
Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which
he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such
guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being
guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged
this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was
unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration, implications
there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly
fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the
tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a
sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making
any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The
plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the
industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It
pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries.
Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial
court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court.
They bring into question the capability of the members — and some former members of this Court to render
justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule
against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be
reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious statements made in
pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily
be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the
conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that
the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of
no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the
prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the
then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which
upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which
asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said
examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice
Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been
terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A
publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to
bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by
courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper
comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the
second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or
conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no
contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by
the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is
sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in
them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under
consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for
contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation utterances
and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an
officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and
ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest
of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective
of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has
proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to
determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline
and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of
record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is
equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the
right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in
the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and
respect. So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of
the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its
officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is
almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege
conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has
been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the
utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though
it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and
coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated
entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its
members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice
administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this
Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice"
while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the
cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated
effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he
expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative
attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites
incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious
language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They
could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important
of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any
pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation
of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The
way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable
democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and
discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no
means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant
striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by
perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have
appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is
an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest
is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is
necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic
nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their
distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the
case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights,
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by
the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said
practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it
cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively
are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because
public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The
present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his
transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or
disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice,
should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the
dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the
stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and
believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that
abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for
the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in
his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that
suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered
to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting
support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no
reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that
authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself
how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this
Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the
practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their
information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
 Practice of law is a profession, not a business
- Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G.
HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G.
GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C.
IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V.
PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA,
ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN
MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5,
1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed
to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of
September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of a
deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph
that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name of a
deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner liable
for any debts contracted by such person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm
names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization
given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in
respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates
that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm
name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association
declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not
unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased partners were well-
publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all
leading national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom
or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily
Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S.
Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world.8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the
Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was
resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has
long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila
vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting
thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still
being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and
Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use
of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their
continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart from the policy it
adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist
from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in
view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the high
standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote
degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name
"PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are
partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil
Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
 Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the name of one
or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the
liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living partners and. in
the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code
prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of
a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are
non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and
heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased
lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent
service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for
transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no
corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased partners. The
public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of
the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able
lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that
it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the
exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts
contracted by the person or partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased
partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of
a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its
individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise
in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the
right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name
of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d,
s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the members, such as
partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution,
however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the
partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. For one
thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of
accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular
purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding
property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law from those
pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from
Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of public service, — no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and
reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose
in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association" in support of their
petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm
name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former
partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more
senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this
country would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership
changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it is proper only
where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of
a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new
one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used
cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing
in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name
of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in
their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the
present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any
statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory provision or
legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar Association and
the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a deceased
or former partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in
the city use the names of deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the
courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter and reached The conclusion
that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use of the firm name
herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of
conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts
take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a
source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like
any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same,
wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for
purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can
supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the
Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased partners in their
firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This
is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which
are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered like an
ordinary "money-making trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at
personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free
opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may
seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much of the world's
good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the member of a profession does not regard himself as in
competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the
products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers'
or physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a
trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no
expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised
is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession,
namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that
spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical
impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA"
from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners
in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid
any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:
xxxxxxxxx
That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in September, 1998, in his office
at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally
represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract;
That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and some other legal papers,
for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta
suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing
fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed
immediately;
That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed in court, and that I
should receive notice of its progress;
That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no
progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty.
Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even
brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City
Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of
Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my
draft of Atty. Magultas complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that there was no record at all of a
case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his office the following
day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and
only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the
filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated
June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as Annexes D
and E;
That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for
misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;
x x x x x x x x x.[1]
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,[2] respondent filed his
Answer[3] vehemently denying the allegations of complainant for being totally outrageous and baseless. The latter had allegedly
been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the formers law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a
demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the
business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another demand letter -- this time addressed to
the former -- be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the
process server of the formers law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a complaint (which
was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also
requested by complainant to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainants wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files pertinent to the Regwill
case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract.
Respondent, whose services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal
fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised
to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondents secretary and told her that it was for the
filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of complainant,
informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told
that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the complaint because
the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of
land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint. Respondent reminded
him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of
respondents acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer
returned the amount using his own personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time,
and their office personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondents checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone had been
shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
The IBPs Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the
Regwill complaint. With complainants deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the
part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client, the
complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant,
and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement
by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.[4]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Commissions recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Clients Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his
client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence, the formers failure to
file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999
was for attorneys fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense of the clients
cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends
of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession.[5] Members of the
bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity
of the profession.[6]
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant, because
the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for
the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for
legal advice regarding the formers business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed
the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither
is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment
is established.[7]
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the
complainant or the nonpayment of the formers fees.[8] Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner
of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was
duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to
protect the clients interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal
matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.[9] They owe entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the clients rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities
to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.[10]
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to complainant on January 4,
1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be
prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the
mistake -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should have lost no
time in calling complainants attention to the matter and should have issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the
payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business.[11] Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits.[12] The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration.[13] Duty to public service and to
the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest
eminence may be attained without making much money.[14]
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office
of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them
in their professional capacity.[15] Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all
moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession.[16] It may be true that they have a lien upon the clients funds, documents and other
papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have
been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations
do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct.[17] In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their clients interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties
not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.[18] Respondent fell short of this standard when he
converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact
that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the
character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.[19]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy
in respondents file.
SO ORDERED.
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against
Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients[2]to transfer legal
representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To induce them to
hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail
upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan
of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6]

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,[9] found that respondent had
encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or
brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138[12]of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be
reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional practice in violation of
Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted
distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be
made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
 CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize
the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
character of service to which every member of the bar is called.[14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED
PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE
ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano
and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals
suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR
and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers
client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.[20] Again the
Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals.
Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest
of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or
premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not
be adversely affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect
acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may
lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his
interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients),
the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist.The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only
allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
 (e) special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients
(who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled
to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability.
This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the
absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and
directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines,
and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, respondents.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.
Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own client, more often than not, in the matter of fees.
The lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have his petition decided on pure questions of procedure, yet, the Court cannot let
pass unnoticed the murkier face of the controversy, wherein the law is corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the
law profession, debased into a simple business dealing. Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only of the questions raised
by the petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering its serious ethical implications, on its merits as well.
We turn to the facts.
The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of land located in Quezon
City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he obtained various loans from the L & R Corporation, a financing institution, in various sums
totalling P420,000.00 As security therefor, he executed deeds of mortgage in favor of the corporation over the parcels aforesaid.
On August 28,1979, and upon the maturing of said loans, the firm caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following his
failure to pay, as a consequence of which, the said eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of land were disposed of at
public auction, and in which L & R Corporation was itself the highest bidder.
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against L & R Corporation, to enjoin consolidation
of title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. He was represented by the petitioner. Two
years later, and with no imminent end to the litigation in sight, the parties entered into a compromise agreement whereby L & R
Corporation accorded the private respondent another year to redeem the foreclosed properties subject to payment of
P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one per cent per month. They likewise stipulated that the petitioner shall be entitled to
attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982, the court 3 approved the compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits — a fact the petitioner himself concede 4 — for which reason
he failed to acquire the finding to repay the loans in question, let alone the sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees demanded by
the petitioner. That notwithstanding, the petitioner moved for execution insofar as his fees were concemed. The court granted
execution, although it does not appear that the sum was actually collected. 5
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief for the latter with respect to his liability to L
& R Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to the petitioner on the other. The petitioner contends that the private
respondent "earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem the said properties; the private respondent maintains that it was the petitioner
himself who 'offered to advance the money," 7 provided that he, the private respondent, executed a "transfer of mortgage" 8 over
the properties in his favor. Who implored whom is a bone of contention, but as we shall see shortly, we are inclined to agree
with the private respondent's version, considering primarily the petitioner's moral ascendancy over his client and the private
respondent's increasing desperation.
The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of
Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled the petitioner, first, to redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to
register the same in his name. The private respondent alleges that he subsequently filed loan applications with the Family
Savings Bank to finance a wet market project upon the subject premises to find, according to him, and to his dismay, the
properties already registered in the name of the petitioner. He likewise contends that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of
Redemption and/or to Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds (for Quezon City) had been falsified as follows:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I, FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and
convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to
redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public auction
by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No.
Q30679 ... 9
whereas it originally reads:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I, FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and
convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of equity of redemption and/or to
redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public auction
by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No.
Q30679. . .10
As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim upon the respective certificates of title
embracing the properties. Upon learning of the same, the petitioner moved for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the
issuance of a writ of possession. The court granted both motions. The private respondent countered with a motion for a
temporary restraining order and later, a motion to recall the writ of possession. He likewise alleges that he commenced
disbarment proceedings before this Court against the petitioner 11 as well as various criminal complaints for estafa, falsification,
and "betrayal of trust" 12 with the Department of Justice. On December 1, 1983, finally, he instituted an action for reconveyance
and reformation of document, 13praying that the certificates of title issued in the name of the petitioner be cancelled and that
"the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem dated May 3, 1983 ... be reformed to
reflect the true agreement of Francisco Herrera and Paterno R. Canlas, of a mortgage." 14 He vehemently maintains that the
petitioner's "agreement with [him] was that the latter would lend the money to the former for a year, so that [petitioner] would
have time to look for a loan for the wet market which [the petitioner] intended to put up on said property." 15 Predictably, the
petitioner moved for dismissal.
The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the alteration complained of did not change the
meaning of the contract since it was "well within [the petitioner's] rights" 16 "to protect and insure his interest of P654,000.00
which is the redemption price he has paid;" 17 secondly, that the petitioner himself had acquired an interest in the properties
subject of reconveyance based on the compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in the injunction case, pursuant to
Section 29(b), of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made him a judgment creditor in his own right; thirdly,
that the private respondent had lost all rights over the same arising from his failure to redeem them from L & R Corporation
within the extended period; and finally, that the petitioner cannot be said to have violated the ban against sales of properties
in custodia legis to lawyers by their clients pendente lite, since the sale in question took place after judgment in the injunction
case abovesaid had attained finality. The complaint was consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually attained a character
of finality.
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for "Annulment Of Judgment 18 in the respondent Court of
Appeals, 19 praying that the orders of Judge Castro: (1). granting execution over the portion of the compromise agreement
obliging the private respondent to pay the petitioner P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; (2) denying the private respondent's prayer
for a restraining order directed against the execution: and (3) denying the motion to recall writ of possession, all be set aside.
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to dismiss. On December 8, 1986, the
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the first of its challenged resolutions, denying the motion to dismiss. On March 3,
1987, the Appellate Court denied reconsideration. 20
Hence the instant petition.
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper procedure. Specifically, he assigns the
following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON
THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED OUT OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT
BE GIVEN DUE COURSE.
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON
THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING AC G. R. 07860 AS
MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE
FILING OF THIS SUIT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED THEREIN ARE BUT REHASH OF THE
ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE PETITION. 21
The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is actually a petition for certiorari," 22disguised as a
pleading for annulment of judgment and that in such a case, it faces alleged legal impediments (1) It had been filed out of time,
allegedly two years from the issuance of the assailed orders, and (2) It was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration. He
adds that assuming annulment of judgment were proper, no judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid two orders
being in the nature of interlocutory issuances.
On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment of judgment, we have had occasion to rule,
rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic fraud" means is explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation : 23
xxx xxx xxx
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, however, that can serve as a basis
for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the
rule, "where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contest, or from presenting
all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but of the
manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy." In other words,
extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside
of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the
case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. 24
A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the respondent Court reveals no cause of action
for annulment of judgment. In the first place, and as herein petitioner Canlas correctly points out, the judgment itself is not
assailed, but rather, the orders merely implementing it. Secondly, there is no showing that extrinsic fraud,
as Makabingkil defines it, indeed vitiated the proceedings presided over by Judge Castro. On the contrary, Herrera's petition in
the respondent court will show that he was privy to the incidents he complains of, and in fact, had entered timely oppositions
and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims under the compromise agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to expedite the former's collection of his fees.
He alleges that his counsel had deliberately, and with malevolent designs, postponed execution to force him (Herrera) to agree
to sell the properties in controversy to him (Atty. Canlas) subject to redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that respondent
Atty. Paterno R. Canlas did not implement the writ of execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that petitioner would
sign the questioned documents. This was the clincher of the plan of respondent Atty, Paterno R. Canlas to divest petitioner of
his properties. For this purpose, it is obvious that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court
judge to achieve his plan." 25) Aside from being plain speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not
amount to extrinsic fraud as the term is defined in law.
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the absence of an appeal 26 and while
there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies in case of irregular implementation of the writ. 27 In the case at bar,
there is no irregular execution to speak of As a rule, "irregular execution" means the failure of the writ to conform to the decree
of the decision executed. 28 In the instant case, respondent Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in denying his
motions for temporary restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that His Honor had acted hastily (". . . that
respondent court/judge took only one [1) day to resolve petitioner's motion for issuance of [a] [restraining] order. . ." 29) in
denying his twofold motions, do not make out a case for irregular execution. The orders impugned are conformable to the letter
of the judgment approving the parties'compromise agreement.
The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid to hold on to his lands and constraints of
economic privation have not been lost on us. It is obvious that he is uneasy about the judgment on compromise itself, as well as
the subsequent contract between him and his lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038 of the Civil Code applies:
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of
documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330 of this Code ...
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud
is voidable.
in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. 30 The court notes that he had, for this purpose, gone to the Regional Trial
Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in which the decision had become final.
We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure — for the enlightenment solely of the bench and the bar. It
does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As we have intimated, we cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the
proceeding, in which a member of the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural law to score a "technical knockout" over his
own client, of all people. Procedural rules, after all, have for their object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 31If procedure were to be an impediment to such an objective, "it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy." 32 It was almost eight decades
ago that the Court held:
... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art
of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending
party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits.
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by the a rapier's thrust ... 33
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever.
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity was willing to extend
him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees
awarded in the Compromise Judgment," 34 a development that should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious
reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ...
with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." 35 The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking
venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law
advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do
not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money." 36
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a commercial enterprise; but
that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate,
is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that,
unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with a public
interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 37 Anent attomey's fees, section 24, of Rule 138, of the Rules, provides in part
as follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the
attorney... A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court
to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do not believe that it satisfies
the standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the
records will yield, is not impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan amount. The case itself moreover did not involve
complex questions of fact or law that would have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to
warrant his demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome prices in the market should not be
a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. We are not likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants
the sum claimed.
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to P20,000.00.
It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation similar to that vested upon
redemptioners. 38 To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a result of execution in satisfaction of judgment. In this case,
however, redemption was decreed by agreement (on compromise) between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give the
petitioner any right to the properties themselves, much less the right of redemption, although provisions for his compensation
were purportedly provided. It did not make him a redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not named one in the amicable
settlement. To this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil Case No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal
right, independent of the questioned deed of sale and transfer which was executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the
subject realty from the L & R Corporation pursuant to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 39 Whatever right he had, it
was, arguably with respect alone to his renumeration. It did not extend to the lands.
Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the "just fees and disbursements" 40 due him. It is
still subject to the tempering hand of this Court.
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the compromise agreement and subsequently, to force the
transfer of the properties to himself. As we have observed, in spite of the issuance of the writ of execution, it does not appear
that the petitioner took pains to implement it. We find this perplexing given his passionate and persistent pleas that he was
entitled to the proceeds. There can indeed be no plausible explanation other than to enable him to keep an "ace" against the
private respondent that led finally, to the conveyance of the properties in his favor. To be sure, he would have us beheve that by
redeeming the same from the mortgagee and by in fact parting with his own money he had actually done the private respondent
a favor, but this is to assume that he did not get anything out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to the
properties have been issued to the new owners long before the filing of private respondents [sic] petition for annulment." 41 To
say that he did not profit therefrom is to take either this Court or the petitioner for naive, a proposition this Court is not prepared
to accept under the circumstances.
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the private respondent sign the "Deed of Sale and
Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a pre-prepared document apparently, that allowed him (the
petitioner) to exercise the right of redemption over the properties and to all intents and purposes, acquire ownership thereof. As
we have earlier averred, the private respondent, by reason of bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his counsel's moral
influence and ascendancy. We are hard put to believe that it was the private respondent who "earnestly implored" 42 him to
undertake the redemption amid the former's obstinate attempts to keep his lands that have indeed led to the multiple suits the
petitioner now complains of, apart from the fact that the latter himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to
above. We are of the opinion that in ceding his right of redemption, the private respondent had intended merely to forestall the
total loss of the parcels to the mortgagee upon the understanding that his counsel shall acquire the same and keep them therefore
within reach, subject to redemption by his client under easier terms and conditions. Surely, the petitioner himself would
maintain that he agreed to make the redemption"in order that [he] may already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded
him in the Compromise Agreement," 43 and if his sole concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the properties in their
entirety.
The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the properties as a gesture of magnanimity and
altruism He denies, of course, having made money from it, but what he cannot dispute is the fact that he did resell the
properties. 44
But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to reword the conveyance document executed by
the private respondent? It shall be recalled that the deed, as originally drafted, provided for conveyance of the private
respondent's "rights of equity of redemption and/or redeem" 45 the properties in his favor, whereas the instrument registered
with the Register of Deeds purported to transfer "any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem," 46 in his favor.
He admits having entered the intercalations in question but argues that he did so "to facilitate the registration of the questioned
deed with the Register of Deeds" 47 and that it did not change the meaning of the paper, for which Judge Santiago acquitted him
of any falsification charges. 48 To start with, the Court is at a loss how such an alteration could "facilitate" registration.
Moreover, if it did not change the tenor of the deed, why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his client? At any
rate, the agreement is clearly a contract of adhesion. Its provisions should be read against the party who prepared it.
But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification — this is not the proper occasion for it — we condemn him
nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no falsehood" 49
This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the petitioner is subject to the ban on acquisition
by attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state as follows:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to them, unless the consent of
the principal have been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any
government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the administration of which has been instrusted to
them; this provision shall apply to judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in
the sale;
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.**
In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409, paragraph (7), of the Civil Code,
defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v. Ababa 51 however, we said that the prohibition does not apply to
contingent contracts, in which the conveyance takes place after judgment, so that the property can no longer be said to be
"subject of litigation."
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to
Redeem" was executed following the finality of the decision approving the compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract
— not one in pursuance of what had been agreed upon on compromise — in which, as we said, the petitioner purportedly
assumed redemption rights over the disputed properties (but in reality, acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a
subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties which are "the object of any litigation." Parenthetically, the Court
states that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from possession unless sought in connection with: (1) a land
registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property
provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is noteworthy that
in this case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale between him and the private
respondent and not the judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a writ of execution on the compromise agreement
but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it should be noted,
superseded the compromise.) The writ does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific performance.
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil Code. But like all voidable
contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue influence, 53 which is in turn subject to the right of
innocent purchasers for value. 54
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as earlier detailed. While the respondent
Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear tenor of his petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It
appearing, however, that the properties have been conveyed to third persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for
value, the petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual damages, for such a loss of properties.
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot
overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his hability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas
alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations
against the other. To obviate debate as the actual amounts owing by one to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera, the private
respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of P654,000.00 representing the redemption price of the
properties, 55 in addition to the sum of P20,000. 00 as and for attomey's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the
respondent Herrera the amount of P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the resale thereof, 56 such that he shall, after proper
adjustments, be indebted to his client in the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages.
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking cognizance of the petition below. But as we
have stated, we are compelled, as the final arbiter of justiciable cases and in the highest interests ofjustice, to write finis to the
controversy that has taxed considerably the dockets of the inferior courts.
Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and as a matter of general policy, to leave alone
moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to dispense justice. At the outset, we have made clear that from a technical vantage
point, certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have likewise stated, the resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate of
technical rules, but if the decision is to have any real meaning, on the merits too. This is not the first time we would have done
so; in many cases we have eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would establish a barrier upon the administration
ofjustice. It is especially so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and counter-suit appears imminent and for which it is high
time that we have the final say. We likewise cannot, as the overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go
unpunished what convinces us as serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.
1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, the sum of
P326,000.00, as and for damages;
2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be imposed on him for violation of his oath, as
a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, after which the same will be consolidated with AC No. 2625;
3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of Appeals for execution; and
4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.