Q: (a) State the two classes of penalties under the Revised Penal Code. Define each.

(b) May
censure be included in a sentence of acquittal? (1988 Bar

) A: (a) The two classes of penalties under Article 25 of the RPC are as follows:
1. Principal – A principal penalty is defined as that provided for a felony and which is imposed
by court expressly upon conviction.
2. Accessory – An accessory penalty is defined as that deemed included in the imposition of the
principal penalty.

(b) Censure may not be included in a sentence of acquittal because a censure is a penalty.
Censure is repugnant and is essentially inconsistent and contrary to an acquittal (People v.
Abellera, 69 Phil 623).

Q: Imagine that you are a Judge trying a case, and based on the evidence presented and the
applicable law, you have decided on the guilt of two (2) accused. Indicate the five (5) steps you
would follow to determine the exact penalty to be imposed. Stated differently, what are the
factors you must consider to arrive at the correct penalty? (1991 Bar)

A: 1. Determine the crime committed;

2. Stage of execution and degree of participation;
3. Determine the penalty
4. Consider the modifying circumstances;
5. Determine whether Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable or not.

Q: After trial, Judge Juan Laya of the Manila RTC found Benjamin Garcia guilty of Murder, the
victim having sustained several bullet wounds in his body so that he died despite medical
assistance given in the Ospital ng Manila. Because the weapon used by Benjamin was unlicensed
and the qualifying circumstance of treachery was found to be present. Judge Laya rendered his
decision convicting Benjamin and sentencing him to "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment". Are
"reclusion perpetua" and life imprisonment the same and can be imposed interchangeably as in
the foregoing sentence? Or are they totally different? State your reasons. (1994, 2001, 2005 Bar)

A: The penalty of reclusion perpetua and the penalty of life imprisonment are totally different
from each other and therefore, should not be used interchangeably. Reclusion perpetua is a
penalty prescribed by the RPC, with a fixed duration of imprisonment from 20 years and 1 day
to 40 years, and carries it with accessory penalties. Life imprisonment, on the other hand, is a
penalty prescribed by special laws, with no fixed duration of imprisonment and without any
accessory penalty.

Q: Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7959,
reclusion perpetua shall be from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years. Does this mean that reclusion
perpetua is now a divisible penalty? Explain. (2005 Bar)

A: No, because the Supreme Court has repeatedly called the attention of the Bench and the Bar
to the fact that the penalties of reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not synonymous
and should be applied correctly and as may be specified by the applicable law. Reclusion perpetua
has a specific duration of 20 years and 1 day to 40 years (Art. 27) and accessory penalties (Art.
41), while life imprisonment has no definite term or accessory penalties. Also, life imprisonment is
imposable on crimes punished by special laws, and not on felonies in the Code.

Q: What are the penalties that may be served simultaneously? (2007 Bar)

A: The penalties that may be served simultaneously are imprisonment/destierro and –

1. Perpetual absolute disqualification;

2. Perpetual special disqualification;
3. Temporary absolute disqualification;
4. Temporary special disqualification;
5. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for and the right to follow a
profession or calling;
6. Fine; and any principal penalty with its accessory penalties.

Principles (include R.A. No. 9346 – Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines) (1988, 1997, 2004 Bar)

Q: What offenses, if any, may be punished with the death penalty in our jurisdiction at present?
Explain. (1988, 1995 Bar)

A: At present, no offense may be punished with the death penalty in our jurisdiction at present.
The 1987 Constitution has abolished the death penalty and the abolition affects even those who
has already been sentenced to death penalty. Therefore, unless Congress enacts a law, no offense
may be punished with the death penalty at present.

Application (2005, 2013 Bar)

Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) (Refer to SPL Section)

Q: Roman and Wendy are neighbors. On Valentine's Day, without prior notice, Roman visited
Wendy at her condo to invite her to dinner, but Wendy turned him down and abruptly left,
leaving her condo door unlocked. Roman attempted to follow, but appeared to have second
thoughts; he simply went back to Wendy's condo, let himself in, and waited for her return. On
Wendy's arrival later that evening, Roman grabbed her from behind and, with a knife in hand,
forced her to undress. Wendy had no choice but to comply. Roman then tied Wendy's hands to
her bed and sexually assaulted her five (5) times that night. Roman was charged with, and was
convicted of, five (5) counts of rape, but the judge did not impose the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count. Instead, the judge sentenced Roman to 40 years of imprisonment on
the basis of the three- fold rule. Was the judge correct? (2013 Bar)

A: No, the three-fold rule is applicable only in connection with the service of the sentence not in
the imposition of the proper penalties. The court must impose all penalties for all the crimes for
which the accused have been found guilty. Thus, the court should not make a computation in it
decision and sentence the accused to not more than the three-fold of the most severe of the
penalties imposable. The computation under the three-fold rule is for the prison authorities to
make.
Q: E and M are convicted of a penal law that imposes a penalty of fine or imprisonment or
both fine and imprisonment. The judge sentenced them to pay the fine, jointly and severally, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
(a) Is the penalty proper? Explain.
(b) May the judge impose an alternative penalty of fine or imprisonment? Explain. (2005 Bar)

A: (a) No. The penalty should be imposed individually on every person accused of the crime. Any of
the convicted accused who is insolvent and unable to pay the fine, shall serve the subsidiary
imprisonment.
(b) No. Although the law may prescribe an alternative penalty for a crime, it does not mean that
the court may impose the alternative penalties at the same time. The sentence must be definite.
Otherwise, the judgment cannot attain finality.

C. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITIES 1. EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITIES (1988, 1990, 2004, 2015
BAR)

Q: (a) How is criminal liability totally extinguished? (1988, 1990 Bar)

(b) How is criminal liability partially extinguished?
(c) If an accused is acquitted does it necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the acts
complained of may be awarded in the same judgment? Explain briefly. (1988 Bar)

A: (a) Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the following causes of total extinction
of criminal liability:
1. Death of the convict as to personal penalties, as to the pecuniary liabilities, liability therefore
is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment
2. Service of sentence
3. Amnesty
4. Absolute pardon
5. Prescription of the crime
6. Prescription of the penalty
7. Marriage of the offended woman as provided in Article 344.

(b) Article 94 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the following causes of the partial
extinction of criminal liability:
1. Conditional pardon
2. Commutation of sentence
3. Good conduct allowance during confinement
4. Parole
5. Probation

(c) If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the
acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment except: If there is an express waiver
of the liability; and if there is a reservation to file a separate civil action (Rule 107; Padilla v. CA,
People v. Jalandoni).

Q: AX was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The trial court sentenced him
to a prison term as well as to pay P150, 000 as civil indemnity and damages. While his appeal was
pending, AX met a fatal accident. He left a young widow, 2 children, and a million-peso estate.
What is the effect, if any, of his death on his criminal as well as civil liability? Explain briefly.
(2004 Bar)

A: The death of AX while his appeal from the judgment of the trial court is pending,
extinguishes his criminal liability. The civil liability insofar as it arises from the crime and
recoverable under the RPC is also extinguished; but indemnity and damages may be recovered in
a civil action if predicated on a source of obligation under Art. 1157, NCC, such as law, contracts,
quasi-contracts and quasi-delicts, but not on the basis of delicts (People v. Balagtas, 236 SCRA 239).

Prescription of crimes (1987, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2009, 2010, 2015 Bar)

Q: B imitated the signature of A, registered owner of a lot, in a special power of attorney naming
him (B) as his attorney-in-fact of A. On February 13, 1964, B mortgaged the lot to a bank using
the special power of attorney to obtain a loan. On the same day, both the special power of
attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds. Because of B’s
failure to pay, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and the lot was sold to X in whose name a new
title was issued. In March, 1974, A discovered that the property was already registered in the
name of X because of an ejectment case filed against him by X. If you were the counsel of B,
what would be your defense? Discuss. (1993 Bar)

A: My defense will be prescription because the crime was committed in 1964 and almost
twenty-nine years had already elapsed since then. Even if we take Falsification and Estafa
individually, they have already prescribed. It is to be noted that when it comes to discovery,
the fact that the crime was discovered in 1964 will be of no moment because the offended party is
considered to have constructive notice on the forgery after the Deed of Sale where his signature
had been falsified was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds (Cabral v. Puno, 70 SCRA
606).

Q: On January 1990, while 5-year old Albert was urinating at the back of their house, he heard a
strange noise coming from the kitchen of their neighbor and playmate, Ara. When he peeped
inside, he saw Mina, Ara’s stepmother, very angry and strangling the 5-year old Ara to death.
Albert saw Mina carry the dead body of Ara, place it inside the trunk of her car and drive away.
The dead body of Ara was never found. Mina spread the news in the neighborhood that Ara
went to live with her grandparents in Ormoc. For fear of his life, Albert did not tell anyone, even his
parents and relatives. 20 and ½ years after the incident, and right after his graduation in
Criminology, Albert reported the crime to NBI authorities. The crime of homicide prescribes in 20
years. Can the State still prosecute Mina for the death of Ara despite the lapse of 20 and ½
years? Explain. (2000 Bar)

A: Yes. The State can still prosecute Mina for the death of Ara despite the lapse of 20 & ½ years.
Under Article 91, RPC, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. In the case at bar,
the commission of the crime was known only to Albert, who was not the offended party nor an
authority or an agent of an authority. It was discovered by the NBI Authorities only when Albert
revealed to them the commission of the crime. Hence, the period of prescription of 20 years for
homicide commenced to run only from the time Albert revealed the same to the NBI Authorities.
Q: On June 1, 1988, a complaint for concubinage committed in February 1987 was filed against
Roberto in the Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite for purposes of preliminary investigation.
For various reasons, it was only on July 3, 1998 when the judge of said court decided the case
by dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction since the crime was committed in Manila. The case was
subsequently filed with the City Fiscal of Manila but it was dismissed on the ground that the
crime had already prescribed. The law provides that the crime of concubinage prescribes in ten
(10) years. Was the dismissal by the fiscal correct? Explain. (2001 Bar)

A: No. The fiscal’s dismissal of the case on alleged prescription is not correct. The filing of the
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, although only for preliminary investigation, interrupted
and suspended the period of prescription inasmuch as the jurisdiction of a court in a criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, not by the result of proof
(People v. Galano, 75 SCRA 193).

Q: A killed his wife and buried her in their backyard. He immediately went into hiding in the
mountains. Three years later, the bones of A’s wife were discovered by X, the gardener. Since X
had a standing warrant of arrest, he hid the bones in an old clay jar and kept quiet about it.
After two years, Z, the caretaker, found the bones and reported the matter to the police. After 15
years of hiding, A left the country but returned three years later to take care of his ailing sibling. Six
years thereafter, he was charged with parricide but raised the defense of prescription.
(a) Under the Revised Penal Code, when does the period of prescription of a crime commence to
run?
(b) When is it interrupted?
(c) Is A’s defense tenable? Explain. (2000, 2004, 2009, 2010 Bar)

A: (a) Generally, the period of prescription of a crime commences to run for the date it was
committed; but if the crime was committed clandestinely, the period of prescription of the crimes
under the RPC commence to run from the day on which the crime was discovered (the discovery
rule) by the offended party, the authorities or their agents (Art. 91, RPC).

(b) The running of the prescriptive period of the crime is interrupted when “any kind of
investigative proceedings is instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his
prosecution.” (Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008)

(c) No, the defense of prescription of the crime is not tenable. The crime committed is parricide
which prescribes in twenty (20) years (Art. 90, RPC). It was only when the caretaker, Z, found
the victim’s bones and reported the matter to the police that the crime is deemed legally
discovered by the authorities or their agents and thus the prescriptive period of the crime
commenced to run. When A left the country and returned only after three (3) years, the running
of the prescriptive period of the crime is interrupted and suspended because prescription shall not
run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago (Art. 91, RPC). Since A had been in
hiding for 15 years after the commission of the crime and the prescriptive period starting running
only after 5 years from such commission when the crime was discovered, only 10 years lapsed
and 3 years thereof should be deducted when the prescriptive period was interrupted and
suspended. Hence, the 3 years when A was out of the Philippines should be deducted from the
10 years after the prescription starts running. Adding the 7 years of prescription and the 6 years
that lapsed before the case was filed, only a total of thirteen (13) years of the prescriptive period
had lapsed. Hence, the crime has not yet prescribed.
Q: Taylor was convicted of a violation of the Election Code, and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of one year as minimum, to three years as maximum. The decision of the trial court
was affirmed on appeal and became final and executory. Taylor failed to appear when summoned
for execution of judgment, prompting the judge to issue an order for his arrest. Taylor was able to
use the backdoor and left for the United States. Fifteen years later, Taylor returned to the
Philippines and filed a Motion to Quash the warrant of arrest against him, on the ground that
the penalty imposed against him had already prescribed.
(a) If you were the judge, would you grant Taylor's Motion to Quash? Explain.
(b) Assuming that instead of the United States, Taylor was able to go to another country with
which the Philippines had no extradition treaty, will your answer be the same? Explain. (2015 Bar)

A: (a) If I were the judge, I will deny the motion to quash. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code
provides when the prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall
commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article
157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who
have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence. Taylor never
served a single minute of his sentence, and thus, prescription never started to run in his favor.
Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom
(Del Castillo v. Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033, December 18, 2002).

(b) Even if Taylor was able to go to another country which the Philippines had no extradition
treaty, I will deny the motion to quash. Going to a foreign country with which this Government has
no extradition treaty to interrupt the running of prescription is not applicable nor even material
because the period of prescription is not applicable nor even material because the period of
prescription had not commenced to run in the first place; hence, there is nothing to interrupt.

Pardon and Amnesty (2006, 2009)

Q: Enumerate the differences between pardon and amnesty. (2006 Bar)

A: The following are the differences between pardon and amnesty: In pardon – The convict is
excused from serving the sentence but the effects of conviction remain unless expressly remitted
by the pardon; hence, for pardon to be valid there must be a sentence already final and
executory at the time the same is granted. Moreover, the grant is in favor of individual convicted
offenders, not to a class of convicted offenders; and the crimes subject of the grant may be
common crimes or political crimes. Finally, the grant is a private act of the Chief Executive which
does not require the concurrence of any other public officer or office. In amnesty – The criminal
complexion of the act constituting the crime is erased, as though such act was innocent when
committed; hence, the effects of the conviction are obliterated. Amnesty is granted is in favor of a
class of convicted offenders, not to individual convicted offenders; and the crimes involved are
generally political offenses, not common crimes. Amnesty is a public act that requires the
conformity or concurrence of the Philippine Senate.

2. CIVIL LIABILITIES IN CRIMINAL CASES (1987, 1990, 1991, 1992 BAR)

Q: Rico was convicted of raping Letty, his former sweetheart, by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila and he was ordered to serve the penalty of life imprisonment, to indemnify Letty in the
amount of P30, 000.00 and to support their offspring. Pending appeal in the Supreme Court, Rico
died. His widow, Bernie, moved for a dismissal of the case. What is the legal effect of Rico’s
death on his civil liability? State your reasons. (1990 Bar) A: The civil liability of Rico survives.
(People v. Tirol, G.R. L30588, January 31, 1981, People v. Naboa, et. al., 132 SCRA 410)