HUDEIBIYA

TRUCE OF HUDEIBIYA
Background
Intention of the Muslims

The Truce of Hudeibiya was signed in early April 628 (late Ziqad 6 Hijira).
The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), set out for Makkah in the middle of March.
His intention was to perform an off-season pilgrimage known as ‘Umra’. He took
along with him 1,400 Muslims armed with swords and a large number of sacrificial
animals.

Fears of Quraish

The Quraish, however, feared that the Muslims were coming to fight a battle
and subdue them in their home town, for the initiative had now passed to the
Muslims. Consequently, the Quraish moved out of Makkah and concentrated in a
camp nearby, from where Khalid was sent forward with 300 horsemen on the road to
Madina to intercept the Muslim Army. When the Muslims arrived at Usfan, their
advance was preceded by a detachment of 20 horsemen, who had been sent forward
as a reconnaissance element. This detachment made contact with Khalid at Kura-ul-
Ghameen, and informed the Prophet (peace be upon him) of the position of Usfan and
strength of Khalid’s force.

Decision of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him)

The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) decided that he would not waste time
in fighting an action at this place. He was in any case anxious to avoid blood-shed, as
his primary intention was pilgrimage and not the battle. He ordered his forward
detachment to remain in contact with Khalid and keep his attention diverted. With
Khalid so engaged, the Prophet (peace be upon him) moved his army from the right,
travelling over little used tracks difficult hilly country. It was not till the outflanking
movement was well under way that Khalid realizing what had happened hastily
withdrew to Makkah.

The Truce

The Muslims continued the march until they reached Hudeibiya, thirteen miles
west of Makkah, where they pitched a camp. Some skirmishes took place, but there
were no casualties. After a few days, however, the Quraish realized that the Muslims
had indeed come for pilgrimage and not for war. Thereafter, envoys travelled back
and forth between the two armies, and finally a truce was agreed upon, which became
known as the “Truce of Hudeibiya”. It was signed on behalf of Muslims by
Muhammad (peace be upon him) and on behalf of the Quraish by Suheil Bin Amr.
The terms of this Truce were as follows: -

a. There would be no war, no raids, no military action of any sort

between the Muslims and the Quraish for ten years.

b. Muslims coming to Makkah for ‘Haj’ or ‘Umra’ pilgrimage, or for

trade enroute to Yemen or Taif would be afforded security of person
and property and likewise anyone from Quraish going to Madina

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enroute to Syria or Iraq for trade, enjoy security of person and

property.

c. Any member of the Quraish, Muslim or non-Muslim, who deserted to

Muslims without the permission of his guardian, would be returned;
on the contrary whoever went to the Quraish from among those who
were with Muhammad (peace be upon him) would not be handed back
to the Muslims.

d. There shall be no secret help, violation of neutrality or unfaithful

action.

e. Other tribes or persons were free to join either party or make an

alliance with it and would be bound by the same terms.

f. The Muslims were to return in that year without performing the

pilgrimage; they could come next year for this purpose, carrying only
one sheathed sword each, but shall return after three days stay in
Makkah.

g. The animals of sacrifice brought by the Muslims will be slaughtered at

Hudeibiya and would not be conducted to Makkah.

The whole treaty reads like a story of concessions. It gives an impression more
of a ‘surrender’ than of a peace with honour. The clause, which laid down that anyone
from Makkah who sought refuge with the Prophet (peace be upon him) was to be
extradited, while no reciprocal measures were to be taken by the Makkan Quraish,
roused deep resentment among the Muslims. On the face of it, the whole document
reads like a treaty imposed on the defeated people by their conqueror. When the
Treaty was being signed at Hudeibiya, there was nothing but deep disappointment in
the Muslim Camp. The whole Muslim Camp, already downcast with a sense of
frustration was shocked to the core and their sympathy for Abu Jandal, their brother-
in-faith, who had been captured by the Quraish and was being subjected to miseries
by them. He had managed to escaped to the Muslim camp.

The decision of the Prophet to return a Muslim to the Quraish cast a cloud of
gloom over the entire Muslim Camp. The Muslims feet further dejected when the
Prophet ( peace be upon him) ordered the slaughter of the animals, which the Muslims
had brought with them for purposed of sacrifice connected with the pilgrimage. So
deep was the sense of frustration that the Prophet (peace be upon him) took the lead
that the rest followed. The whole camp returned three days after signing of the Treaty.

Anticipated Advantages of the Truce

At the time of signing of the Treaty, some of Muslims failed to perceive the
effect of the agreement. The Truce actually gave certain long term and solid
advantages to the Muslims, which were not understandable by everyone at that time.
These following were the clear advantages of this Truce: -

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 HUDEIBIYA

a. It would be to the Muslims’ advantage to be generous in their terms,

as this would have a favourable psychological impact on the Arab
tribes and would show the confidence that the Muslims enjoyed in
their dealings with the infidels.

b. If some Muslims were not permitted to leave Makkah, they would act
as the eyes and ears of the Muslims in the midst of the enemy, and
could in certain ways influence the people in Makkah. Their presence
within the Quraish camp would in fact be a source of strength to the
Muslims.

c. The ten years’ truce would give time and opportunity for the spread of
Islam and thereby establish its political and spiritual superiority on the
minds of the infidels including the Quraish.

ANALYSIS OF THE TRUCE OF HUDEIBIYA

Maintenance of Aim.

When the Muslim contingent set off for Makkah their aim was not to fight
against the Quraish and every effort was made to resolve the problem peacefully.
They maintained their aim by following actions: -

a. Adopting a difficult route to avoid any chance f conflict with Quraish.

b. Releasing the Quraish prisoners of war who had tried to interfere in the
advance of Muslim Army, without any conditions or bargaining;
although Muslims had all the right to treat them as war criminals.

Importance of Discipline.

The Muslim contingent was in a state of suspense and agony as it was not
sure if it would be allowed to perform the ‘Umra’. It was really disappointed when it
was told to move back to Madina without performing the pilgrimage. Despite being
thoroughly frustrated by the Truce, the Muslims showed high degree of patience and
self-discipline. They remained cool and composed when the tragic incident of Abu
Jandal took place. It was not easy for the Muslims to swallow such an emotional
setback. The Prophet (peace be upon him) had a complete command and control over
his followers during all the stages of the Truce. Some of the conditions of the Truce
were quite humiliating for the Muslims but all these events are clear indication of
Muslims’ patience and collective discipline, even under adverse circumstance. Had
the Muslims not shown their exemplary state of self as well as collective discipline,
some conflicts could occur which might have jeopardized the very wisdom behind the
Truce.

Psychological Impact.

The Muslims had created the psychological impact on Quraish once

they moved for ‘Umra’. They announced their peaceful intentions which are proved
through events, occurring later on. When the Quraish stopped the Muslims’ entry into

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Makkah for performing pilgrimage, rest of the Arab tribes considered it a matter of
injustice to the Muslims and inadvertently became their sympathizers. Halis Bin
Alqama who was sent to carry out negotiations with the Prophet (peace be upon him)
returned without having had any conversation with the Muslims, when he saw the
sacrificial animals with them and advised Quraish to refrain from their intentions. In
fact, the ‘Truce of Hudeibiya’ was a remarkable type of psychological warfare
adopted by the Muslims.

Contact with fellow Muslim in Makkah

Before the Treaty, the Muslims had no means of contact with Makkah. The
Treaty however provided free access, which made all the difference to the cause of
Islam. The following year, in March 629 (Ziqad, 7 Hijra) the Muslims, led by the
Prophet (peace be upon him), performed the pilgrimage. The Quraish evacuated
Makkah and lived in the surrounding countryside for three days, and did not return to
their homes until after the Muslims had departed for Madina.

Increase in the strength of Muslims

The period intervening between the Treaty of Hudeibiya in 6 AH, is the most
fruitful period of Islam, for it brought in its fold, the largest number of Muslims in
Makkah before its final surrender. At Hudeibiya the Prophet (peace be upon him) had
only fourteen hundred followers with him but only two years later for the conquest of
Makkah he had ten thousand strong Muslims. The commanders, who were later
entrusted the tasks to conquer Syris and Egypt: Hazrat Khalid Bin Waleed and Amr
Bin As were the fruits of this period of contact between Madina and Makkah.

Long term benefits of the clause pertaining to repatriation of convertees

The clause which had created the greatest measure of dismay in the Muslim
Camp pertained to the repatriation of convertees to Islam to Makkah. Muslims thus
sent back to Makkah, however, were not likely to renounce Islam. On the contrary,
they were to set examples and be a rallying point for others to come to the fold of
Islam. Thus very few could see the profound wisdom of the Prophet (peace be upon
him) in allowing them to go to Makkah rather than live in Madina. The Quraish were
obviously unaware of its far-reaching implications and when the clause started
operating to their own detriment in winning over converts to Islam, they took the
initiative in modifying it and agreed that it would cease to operate. This opened the
way for Muslims held as prisoners at Makkah to proceeds to Madina. Abu Jandal,
whose plight had nearly wrecked the Treaty in Hudeibiya, was one of the
beneficiaries of this amendment.

Political Moral and social victory

Hudeibiya was great victory, moral, social as well as political. The terms in
the treaty show the greatness of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and the
superiority of his cause. Though the treaty seemed outwardly humiliating for the

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Muslims, it gave the Prophet (peace be upon him) great advantages. He political
status as an independent power and a de facto recognition of the state of Islam was
acknowledged by the Treaty. As the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) felt
secure of his position after the Truce, he despatched emissaries to different rulers of
Arabia, inviting them to accept Islam. Many rulers accepted the new Divine faith.

Role and Achievement of the Prophet (peace be upon him)

In Hudeibiya, the Prophet (peace be upon him) acted as a diplomat and a

negotiator with a clear vision and with firm grasp over the essentials of his objectives.
He was one who had full control over his own self under most trying circumstances.
He was able to preserve his calm nerves and maintain his balance in the face of
extreme provocations. He proved himself as an ambassador completely devoted to the
ideals of peace and dedicated to winning it without sacrificing the dignity of man.

Conclusion.

The Truce of Hudeibiya was a manifestation of great political wisdom

on the part of the Prophet (peace be upon him). Its immediate gains were that the
Muslim achieved equal status with that of Quraish and their separate identity was
acknowledged. Due to the Truce, the Prophet (peace be upon him) got wonderful
opportunity of concentrating his attention on spreading the message of Islam. The
Muslims also got opportunity to enhance their military strength, which proved of
immense value in the conquest of Makkah. The fighting efficiency of the Quraish on
the other hand was reduced, due to the absence of battles.

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 BATTLE OF AJNADEIN

BATTLE OF AJNADEIN

Background

Caliph Hazrat Abu Bakr’s plan of invasion of Persian and Roman Empires
was based on a sense of time and space.

By May 634, Hazrat Khalid had taken Hira and Muslim Armies were crossing
into Palestinian borders. The Emperor Heraclius was in Emessa, planning counter
measures against the Muslims. When he first heard of the crushing defeat suffered by
the Persian Army at the hands of Hazrat Khalid, Heraclius was taken aback since he
did not correctly understand the Muslim strength. As a precaution, he ordered the
positioning of several Romans at Ajnadein, where from they could operate against
any Muslim force entering Palestine or Jordan. When the Muslim corps set off from
Madina, the Roman Army got information of this move from the Christian Arabs.
Apprised with the latest situation and the direction of the Muslims’ advance,
Heraclius apprehended a substantial threat to his domain. Soon after, he also learnt of
the defeat of the Roman covering force (sent from Ajnadein) at the hands of the
leading corps of the Muslim Army. He planned to punish the intruders and throw
them back into the desert. He ordered moves of large size forces of Roman Army to
Ajnadein from garrisons in Palestine and Syria.

The mobilization of the Roman Army a little earlier than expected by the
Muslims did not upset the Muslim strategic plan. Caliph Hazrat Abu Bakr,
immediately ordered Hazrat Khalid Bin Waleed to march at the head of half the
Muslim Army to Ajnadein leaving the second half at Hira and assume the command
of Muslim Armies in Syria and Palestine.

Khalid’s Preparatory Manoeuvre

Three were two known routes available to Hazrat Khalid for his march from
Hira. Southern route via Daumat-ul-Jandal (where from the Army could move along
the normal carvan track into Syria) was the easiest and simplest approach, with ample
water on the way and no enemy to interfere with his movement. But it was also the
longest route requiring considerable time to complete the movement. After due
consideration Hazrat Khalid rejected this route. Other route was the northern one
along he Euphrates to North-Eastern Syria. This was a well-travelled route, but it
posed hindrances by the Roman garrisons on the Euphrates. He could, no doubt,
overcome this opposition, but not without a delay. He had to find another way of
getting the Muslim force into Syria. Finally Rafe Bin Umeira informed Hazrat Khalid
about a third route which passed through the land of Samaena. The Army could
proceed from Hira to Quraqir via Ein-ut-Tamr and Muzayyah, and this would be an
easy march. Quraqir was a well watered oasis in the west of Iraq. Thence to Suwa
there was a little known route that led through a barren, waterless desert. At Suqa
again there was ample water, and on one day’s jouney before Suwa there was a spring
which would provide sufficient water for the Army. The most dangerous part of the
journey was from Quraqir to this spring about 120 miles. Hazrat Khalid adopted this
route by saying “We shall take this route let not your resolve be weakened. Know that
the help of Allah comes according to our desires. Let not the Muslims fear anything
so long as they have the help of Allah”

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Hazrat Khalid left Hira at the head of his 9,000 Army (leaving remaining
9,000 at Hira) in the third week of June 634 AD. At this time three of the four
advancing groups under Abu Ubeida, Shurahbeel and yazid Bin Al-Waleed were at
Basra sizing up for a battle with the Romans while Amr Bin Al-Aas was operating in
Wadi Al-Arabia. Hazrat Khalid marching through the waterless and difficult terrain
reached Basra in July and inflicted the first defeat on the Romans. From there he
moved straight to Ajnadein. Hazrat Khalid reached Ajnadein on 24 July 634 AD and
joined with the Muslim Armies there. He took over the command of the Army from
Hazrat Abu Ubeida.

The Muslims had taken a week to concentrate their Army at Ajnadein. One
remarkable feature of the movement of this great army of 32,000 men, the largest
force yet assembled for battle, was that it was independent of the lines of
communication. Behind it stretched no line of supply, since it had no logistical base.
Its food trotted along with the army; and if it ran out of meat, the men, women and
children could live for weeks on a simple ration of dates and water. This army could
not be cut off from its supplies, for it had no supply depots. It needed no roads for its
movement, for it had no wagons and everything was carried on camels. Thus this
army could go anywhere and traverse any terrain so long as there was path over which
men and animals could move. This ease of movement gave Muslims a tremendous
edge over the Romans in mobility and speed.

Move and Assembly of the Roman Army

The Muslims had taken a week to concentrate their army at Ajnadein, a task
which took the Roman more than two months. The Roman Army, 90,000 like any
regular, sophisticated military force, needed time for its movement, and had to spend
weeks in preparation in collecting supplies, wagons and horses, and in issuing
weapons and equipment. Since it travelled with thousands of wagons and carriages, it
needed good roads for its movement. But over these two months the Romans had
successfully concentrated an army of 90,000 men at Ajnadein under the command of
Werdan, Governor of Emessa. Another general, named Qubuqlar, acted as the Chief
of Staff or the Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

Choice of Ajnadein as Battle Ground

The Muslims had marched to Ajnadein as a matter of choice. So long as the

Roman Army remained at Ajnadein, it posed no immediate threat to the Muslims
corps. Threat to the Muslims could only arise if a move by Romans was undertaken
beyond Ajnadein. Normal Arab strategy in that case would be to pull back to the
eastern or southern part of Jordan and fight a battle with their backs to the desert, into
which they could withdraw should they face the reverse. The Muslims could have
waited for the Romans to start the first move.

The Muslim Army moved away form the desert and entered deep into a fertile,
inhabited region towards a Roman Army three times its size in the long run, Hazrat
Khalid’s decision proved to be right one. With a large Roman Army poised at
Ajnadein, the Muslims would have remained tied down to the area occupied by them,

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which in itself was of little importance. This Roman threat, cleverly engineered by
Heraclius, had to be eliminated before the invasion could proceed deeper into Syria.

Motivation.

a. Muslims. Ths sight of the gigantic Roman camp had a somewhat

disturbing impact on the Muslims. Everyone knew the strength of the
Roman Army-a staggering figure of 90,000. The majority of the
Muslims had never taken part in a great battle. Hazrat Khalid went
around visiting various units in the camp and spoke to their
commanders and men. He said, “Know, O Muslims, that you have
never seen an army of Rome as you see now. If Allah defeats them by
your hand, they shall never again stand against you. So be steadfast in
battle and defend your faith. Beware of turning your backs on the
enemy, for then your punishment will be the Fire. Be watchful and
steady in your ranks, and do not attack until I give the orders”. This
inspired confidence and had a tremendous effect on the Muslims.

b. Romans. In the opposing camp, Werdan called a council of war and

spoke to his generals. “O Romans”, he said, “Ceasar has placed his
trust in you. If you are defeated, you will never again be able to make a
stand against the Arabs; and they shall conquer your land and ravish
your women. So be steadfast. When you attack, attack as one man. Do
not disperse your efforts. Seek the help of the Cross; and remember
that you are three to each one of them”.

THE CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF AJNADEIN

Deployment

Muslim Army. Early in the morning of July 30, 634 Ad (the 28th of Jamadi-
ul-Awwal, 13 Hijra), as the men finished their morning prayers, Hazrat Khalid
ordered the move to battle positions, detailed instructions for which had been given a
day before. The Muslims moved forward and formed up for battle on the plain a few
hundred yards ahead of the camp. Hazrat Khalid deployed his army facing west on a
front of about 5 miles, stretched sufficiently to prevent numerically superior Roman
Army from overlapping his flanks. The army was deployed with a centre and two
strong wings. On either side of the army, next to the wing, as an extension of the
front, was positioned a flank guard to counter any Roman attempt to envelop the
Muslim flanks or to outflank their position entirely.

The centre was placed under Hazrat Mauz Bin Jabal, the left wing under
Hazrat Saeed Bin Amir and the right wing under Hazrat Abdur Rahman, the Caliph’s
son. The left flank guard was commanded by Hazrat Shurahbeel, but the name of the
commander of the right flank guard has not been recorded in history. Behind the
centre, Hazrat Khalid placed 4,000 men as a reserve and for the close protection of the
Muslim camp in which the women and children stayed. Hazrat Khalid’s place was
near the centre, where he kept a number of officers near him to be used as champions
or as commanders of groups needed for any specific task in battle.

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Roman Army. When the Romans saw the Muslims moving, they also rushed
out and began to form up in their battle positions about half a mile from the Muslim
front line. They formed up on the same frontage, but had much greater depth in their
dispositions, the detailed layout of which is not known. Werdan and Qubuqlar stood
surrounded by their bodyguards in the centre. The massive formations of the Romans,
carrying large crosses and banners, were an awe-inspiring sight.

a. First Day

(1) A couple of hours before noon, the battle began with the action of the
Roman archers and slingers. Many Muslims were wounded and
several killed. The Romans were out of reach of Muslim bowmen. The
Muslims were, therefore, unable to do anything to offset the Roman
advantage. When Muslims became impatient to attack the Romans
with swords and lance, Hazrat Khalid decided to let individual
champions go into combat against Roman champions. In this dueling
the Muslims would have the advantage, and it would be useful to
eliminate as many of the Roman officers as possible, as this would in
turn reduce the effectiveness of the Roman Army. Several Romans
were killed by Hazrat Zarrar including tow generals, one of whom was
the Governor of Aminan and the other the Governor of Tiberius.
Gradually the dueling increased in extent and intensity, and continued
for about two hours, during which the Roman archers and slingers
remained inactive. This phase restored the balance in favour of the
Muslims, for most of the Roman champions were killed in combat.

(2) While this dueling was still in progress-and it was now past midday-
Hazrat Khalid ordered a general attack; and the entire Muslim front
moved forward and hurled itself at the Roman Army. The main battle
was now on with sword and shield.

(3) It was a frontal struggle with no fine manoeuvre and neither side
attempting to outflank the other. It was hard slogging match at close
quarters, and continued for some hours. Then in the late afternoon
both sides by then very tired, broke contact and fell back to their
original lines. No more could be doe on this day.

b. Second Day

(1) Werdan, the Roman Army Commander, was shocked to learn that
thousands of his soldiers lay dead on the battle-field, while very few
Muslims had been accounted for. A plot was hatched to kill Hazrat
Khalid, the Commander of the Muslim Army by Werdan and his men
by inviting Hazrat Khalid for peace talks and killing him when he was
near enough. The plot got compromised at the hands of the same
Roman messenger, who had carried the message on behalf of the
Werdan and the next morning both Werdan and the concealed Roman
soldiers were killed by Hazrat Zarrar ad his men on the signal from
Hazrat Khalid.

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(2) When no other tactical advantage was possible and manoeuvre was
restricted, Hazrat Khalid exploited the psychological effect of killing
the enemy Commander-in-Chief and ordered general attack. The
centre, the wings and the flank guards swept forward and assaulted the
Romans, who were now under the command of Qubuqlar. As the two
armies met, another phase of violent hand-to-hand fighting began.
Soon the fighting became vicious, with no quarter given or taken. The
Muslims struck fiercely at the Roman formations, and the Romans
struggled desperately to hold the assault. Hazrat Khalid and all his
officers fought in front of their men, and so did many of the Roman
generals who prepared to die for the glory of the empire. The battle-
field soon turned into a wreckage of human bodies, mostly Roman, as
the men struggled mightily without respite.

(3) At last, as the two sides were reaching the point of exhaustion, Hazrat
Khalid threw his reserve of 4,000 men into the centre; and with the
added impetus of this reinforcement, the Muslims broke through at
several places, driving deep wedges into the Roman Army. In the
centre a Muslim group got to Qubuqlar, the Roman resistance
weakened, and soon after collapsed entirely. The Romans fled from
the field of battle.

(4) As the Romans sought to escape, they turned in three directions, some
fled towards Gaza, other towards Jaffa, but the largest group of
fugitives made for Jerusalem. Hazrat Khalid soon launched his
cavalry. The Romans suffered even more grievous damage than n the
two days of fighting on the plains of Ajnadein. The Roman Army had
been torn into pieces. Their casualties were 50,000 dead at the cost of
only 450 Muslims.

ANALYSIS OF THE BALLET OF AJNADIEN AND APPLICATION OF

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

General Analysis. It was a full and fierce battle, but without any fine manoeuvres.
The Roman Army had not attempted any outflanking move, since it was too large and
unwieldy to do so. With comparatively smaller size of their army, the Muslims also
failed to undertake any large manoeuvres. Manoeuvres against the flanks and rear of
the enemy could only have been carried out by weakening the centre-clearly
unjustifiable risk. Hence this had been a frontal clash of massed bodies of men in
which Muslim leadership, their courage and skill of the warrior prevailed over the
great size of the Roman legions.

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Following principles of war were applied/violate by the opposing forces: -

a. Offensive Action. Hazrat Khalid’s move from the desert, entering

deep into a fertile, inhabited region towards a Roman Army three times
its size shows the offensive design of the Muslim Army. Hazrat Khalid

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planned to launch an offensive at the point of decision and required a

room for manoeuvre. The Roman threat had to be eliminated before the
invasion could proceed deeper in Syria. On first day of the battle while
the dueling was still in progress-and it was now past midday-Hazrat
Khalid ordered a general attack; and the entire Muslim front moved
forward and hurled itself at the Roman Army.
b. Concentration. On the third day of the campaign both the armies were
reaching a point of exhaustion. When Roman Army started showing
cracks in their defences Hazrat Khalid threw his reserves of 4,000 men
into the centre; and with the added impetus of this reinforcement, the
Muslims forced the Romans to flee from the battle-filed.

c. Economy of Effort. The deployment of Muslim Army shows

adherence to this principle of war. Hazrat Khalid organized and
deployed his Army through an economical way to face the Roman
attack. To offset the Roman advantage in men and material, Hazrat
Khalid ordered to let the individual champions go into combat against
Roman champions. The Muslims had a great advantage in this field
and managed to eliminate a number of Roman officers, which in turn
reduced their effectiveness. That is how the Muslim Army restored the
balance in their favour. Although the Muslim Army was very small,
Hazrat Khalid managed to keep a reserve of 4,000 warriors who played
havoc on the Roman Army during the last stages of the battle. Whereas
the Romans formed up in their traditional way with whatever they had
brought at Ajnadein. Their violation of the principle of economy of
effort went against them.

d. Unity of Command. The Muslim Army was fighting under once

commander. Hazrat Khalid ordered his army to remain watchful and
steady in their ranks, and not to attack until he gave the order. The
personality of the commander and the supreme confidence, which
emanated from him had marvelous effect on the Muslim ranks. The
Romans had professional rivalry amongst some of their generals,
which adversely affected unity of their command.

e. Security. Both the armies were active in intelligence and in collecting

the information on each other’s move. Hazrat Khalid therefore
adopted an unknown route from Hira to Quraqir which provided
security to his army and by this he preserved freedom of action and
denied enemy the information about move of his forces.

f. Simplicity. The Muslim Army was organized, on the decimal system-a

system started by the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) at Madina.
There were commanders of 10,100 and 1000 men, the latter
corresponding to regiments. The regiments could be grouped to form a
larger forces which were flexible according to their traditional
environments.

g. Morale. Huge strength of the Roman Army reached the figure of

90,000. Majority of the Muslims had never taken par in such a great

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battle. Hazrat Khalid’s visits to various units and his motivational talks
to the commanders and men gave them confidence. Hazrat Khalid’s
presence in front line always kept morale of the Muslim Army very
high.

h. Administration. The Roman Army, 90,000 like any regular,

sophisticated military force, needed time for its movement, and had to
spend weeks in administrative preparation. Although they had catered
for all the eventualities yet due to long logistic bases they could not
maintain their forces during the operations. Muslims on the other hand
were marching with small administrative tail but sufficiently stocked
enough to sustain them during the operations. They did not stretch their
supply lines since they had no logistic base. They established mobile
administrative echelon and were trained to live for weeks on simple
ration of dates and water. Their line of communication was absolutely
safe as they were moving with light echelons. No roads were needed
for their movement and they could go anywhere. The case of
movement with light logistic load gave Muslims a tremendous edge
over Romans.

i. Surprise. Hazrat Khalid’s choice of a difficult route, after careful

appreciation of ground and enemy factors, brought a great surprise to
the Romans. The approach to contact was unexpected due large tract of
desert and entailed numerous physical hardships in traversing the
route. Achievement of surprise through adopting a difficult approach
has always paid the dividends, later also proved through Napoleonic
wars upholding the truth of the famous maxim, “Sweat Saves the
Blood”.

Conclusion

Victory in the Battle of Ajnadein opened the way for the conquest of Syria.
This land could, of course, not be conquered with a single battle, for large imperial
forces remained in the cities of Syria and Palestine, and the Roman Emperor could
draw on the resources of the whole Empire, which stretched from Armenia to the
Balkans. But the first great clash with the Romans was over and the Muslims could
now continue their operations with the confidence that they would have no less
success in the mighty champions that undoubtedly lay ahead. The fleeing of the
Romans in this Battle was like the Prussians who had fled after being defeated by the
Germans. The weaponry and the logistic material left by the Romans became
extremely useful to the Muslims in their future encounters. This victory reinforced the
fighting sprit of the Arab tribes and large contingents were sent out for further
consolidation of the forces of Islam.

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 BATTLE OF BADR

BATTLE OF BADR
ANALYSIS OF BATTLE OF BADR AND MILITARY LESSONS LEARNT FROM
THIS BATTLE

Analysis of Battle of Badr indicates the following important military lessons:-

a. Disrupting the Strategic Balance of their enemy.

b. Good planning. The Prophet’s (peace be upon him) planning for the battle
depended on two major factors.
(1) Firm control over the Army.
(2) Faith in God and Conviction.

a. Disrupting the Strategic Balance of Their Enemy. It was achieved by the

following:-

(1) By threatening the vital route of enemy’s trade.

(2) By concluding treaties with different Arab tribes the Muslims gained the
following strategic advantages:-

(a) Depriving the enemy of ‘external basis’ which could enable him to
launch direct or indirect aggression against them.
(b) Depriving the enemy of ‘freedom of action’ by narrowing the space in
which he could manouver against Muslims.
(c) Isolating the enemy by creating neutral forces in the area in fight
against Muslims.
(d) Ensuring freedom of preaching Islam which constituted a serious
threat to their enemy’s present and future.

(3) By depriving the enemy of water, through controlling all wells of Badr and
forcing him to face one of the most critical situations in desert warfare.

(4) By inflicting heavy losses on the enemy in a short intense battle.

(5) By seizing initiative and achieving surprise.

b. Good Planning. The prophet’s (peace be upon him) planning for the battle depended
on two major factors:-

(1) Up-to-date Information About the Enemy. Two reconnaissance detachments

were sent out before the battle. The first one revealed that Quraish’s forces
were about 950 men and the second disclosed the time of the enemy arrival at
Badr.

(2) Making use of consultation. Islam considers consultation (Al-Shurah) as a

vital element in making decisions. The Prophet (peace be upon him) consulted
his companions about the situation before he decided to fight Quraish and he
approved the suggestion of Al-Hubab to move the camp to a better position.

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 BATTLE OF BADR

C. Firm Control Over the Army. Effective command and control enables direction of
all efforts and means towards the objective with the minimum loss of lives, material and time.
The Prophet (peace be upon him) set the example of such good and firm control:-

(1) By organizing the army into two battalions.

(2) By organizing each battalion into rows. This ‘linear combat formation’ was
more suitable-as far as control was concerned than the ‘hit-and-run’ that the
Arabs usually used in combat. The linear formation ensured discipline, close
cooperation among the fighting men with firm and continuous control.

(3) By issuing a combat order that ensured control over his men in every stage of
the battle.

d. Faith in God and Conviction. Although Muslims were ill-equipped and less in
number, they had strong faith in Almighty Allah and knew it well that they were fighting for
a just cause. Quraish, on the other hand, did not have righteous cause for which they were
fighting.

e. Intelligence. Muslims had better intelligence as compared to Makkans, and knew

about the departure of Quraish from Makkah. They also knew their strength and camp
location at Badr.

f. Confidence. Muslim’s belief in the leadership of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and
the eternal life after death gave them exemplary courage and surety of security with
confidence.

g. Conduct of Advance to Contact. During the move from Madina to the battle-field,
prophet (peace be upon him) adhered to the techniques of advance to contact, which are
applied even in today’s warfare. Troops (advance guard) move ahead of the main force.
Parties were also detailed to act as flank guards.

h. Use of Code Words. First time in the history of warfare Muslims used the code word
“Ahad, Ahad” for the identification of friend and foe.

j. Correct Appreciation of Ground and weather tactical planning. As the Muslims

reached Badr before Quraish, they selected the ground of their own choice and forced
Makkans to fight from a place of disadvantage. It was the month of April and rains were
expected. The areas occupied by the Makkans was on lower ground. As expected the rains
did come and the ground became marshy, hampering the movement of Makkans when they
went for an all-out offensive. Although Makkans were superior in cavalry, the intelligent
selection and use of ground and accurate appreciation of weather by the Prophet (peace be
upon him) enabled Muslim Army to dispose of a force much superior in number and
weaponry.

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 BATTLE OF BADR

BATTLE OF BADR
Application of Principles of War in Battle of Badr

Following principles of war were applied/violated by the belligerents:-

a. Selection of Aim.
b. Offensive Action.
c. Concentration.
d. Economy of Effort.
e. Unity vs Decentralization of Command.
f. Security.
g. Surprise.
h. Simplicity.
i. Morale.
j. Administration.

a. Selection of Aim. At strategic level the Muslims aim was in consonance with the
Ummah’s ideology. When confronted with the war-like posture of the Makkans, the Prophet
(peace be upon him) accepted their challenge to fight. It was the battle for survival of the
Muslims as is clear from the prayer of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) to Allah that if
Muslims were defeated in this battle, there would be none left to praise. Allah, whereas the
Quraish aimed at total annihilation of the Muslims through the application numerically
superior of force. It was their endeavor to destroy the Muslims before the latter could gain a
firm foothold on the soil of Madina.

b. Offensive Action. For Muslims it was not an offensive war but as is the case with all
modern concepts of defense, no battle can be successfully terminated unless it is offensive in
spirit and all defensive postures must conclude in the offensive mode. When the Holy
Prophet (peace be upon him) noticed the diminishing effort of Quranish to break through the
Muslims lines, he ordered his Army to launch an all out offensive to exploit enemy’s
weaknesses and thus achieved decisive results. Even in modern tactics of the defensive
battles an offensive is launched only when sufficient attrition has been caused to the enemy.
Badre is a classical example of retaining offensive spirit in a defensive operation.

c. Concentration. Once the initial duels were over, the Quraish attacked with full force
to achieve supremacy, but their effort was not directed at a point of decision since they failed
to create any situation favourable for launching their main Effort, thus violating the principle
of concentration. As soon as the impetus of the Quraish attack died down, the Muslim Army
launched their Main Effort at a point of decision with proper evaluation of risk. The Muslim
Army applied the principle of concentration in conjunction with the other principles of war,
which permitted their numerically inferior force to achieve decisive combat superiority.

d. Economy of Effort. ‘Economy of force’ is one of the principles of war, the

application of which becomes a vital necessity in fighting against a numerically superior
enemy, as was the case with the Muslims in the Battle of Badr. Besides his firm control over
the army, the Prophet’s (peace be upon him) combat orders ensured economy of force to a
great extent through the following:-

(1) Using weapons according to their capabilities and characteristics, i.e. the
arrows (the long-range weapons) to be used first, then the swords.

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 BATTLE OF BADR

(2) Not shooting the arrows unless the enemy came very close. This had the
following advantages:-

(a) Economy in the expenditure of the then ‘ammunition’; the quantity of

which was small.

(b) Effective ’fire’ was ensured.

(c) Demoralizing the enemy as a result of surprising him by the sudden

opening of ‘fire’ in a great volume at a very short range, leaving no
chance for him to escape the ‘fire’, and inflicting heavy casualties on
him in a short time.

(d) It gives us the example of an excellent fire discipline which can only be
achieved through courage and intensive training.

e. Unity vs Decentralization of command. Unity is best achieved by empowering a

single commander with the requisite authority. The Prophet (peace be upon him) established
his headquarters over a slightly elevated ground in the middle and immediately behind the
army. With his occupation of a vantage point the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him)could
keep the battle field under his constant observation. Towards decentralization he planned to
subdivide the Army into two commands. The standard representing the force of the
‘Muhajirin’ was assigned to ‘Ali’ Bin Abu Talib, while the one representing the ‘Ansar’ was
given to Sa’ad Bin Mu’dh. Being the supreme commander, the Holy Prophet (peace be upon
him) controlled both these components of his army. Muslims fought the battle as one body
under his command,. And he, as a truly great military commander, told them when to attack
and when not to, in the decisive moment of the battle. On the contrary the Makkans had many
tribal leaders having disorganized troops with no unity of command that resulted into the
inefficient application of combat power.

f. Security. The security was achieved by effective measures taken to prevent being
surprised and by denial of information to the enemy. During the march towards Badr the
Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) issued orders that the bells tied round the necks of the
camels be removed. The order was perhaps the expression of his desire to keep the
movements of the Muslim army secret. The Prophet (peace be upon him) sent various
reconnaissance patrols to gain information about enemy’s Main Force as well as the caravan.
The capture of two slaves by one of these patrols revealed that Quraish were camping few
miles south-west of Badr. Their interrogation not only provided valuable information about
the enemy but also gave sufficient time to the Muslims for occupying a battle field of their
own choice.

g. Surprise. The Muslims achieved surprise by four distinct methods. Firstly, reaching
Badr earlier by keeping Quraish completely ignorant about their move. Secondly, the
Muslims adopted a new technique of battle, i.e. defensive posture with offensive capability.
They introduced formation of lines of troops during attack as against the jumbled formation
hitherto practiced. In this way the command and control became easier and less confusion
resulted. It also gave the elements of echeloning in attack as is also practiced in the Soviet
doctrine of attack in the modern concept. This new technique surprised the adversaries. The
Makkans were completely surprised by this technique and started showing definite cracks

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 BATTLE OF BADR

soon as the Main Battle was joined. Thirdly, when the Makkans advanced towards Muslims’
line of defense they encountered marshy areas which they never expected. Lastly, the Prophet
(peace be upon him) sited his archers on the flanks of Muslims’ Line of Defense in such a
manner that when he Makkans tried to envelope or out flank the Muslims, they were
effectively checked by the Archers placed by prophet (peace be upon him) thus completely
surprising the enemy. Fourthly, skillful use of weapons to deliver devastating fire on the
enemy and the courage and ferocities displayed by the Muslims achieved a classic surprise
over the enemy resulting into a complete rout of the enemy forces.

h. Simplicity. The plans of both the belligerents were quite simple with clear and
concise orders. Both the Armies had brought their best manpower in the battle field. As far as
standardization of organization and equipment is concerned, Muslim Army had simple
organization under a supreme commander, with same type of equipment, whereas the pagan
Army was a mixture of various tribes who were organized and equipped according to their
traditions, thus complicating the logistic requirements.

i. Morale. The Prophet (peace be upon him) gave more importance to Faith and morale,
than numerical or physical strength. There is no doubt that under the circumstances, Muslims
brought to the battle field all that was possible in men and material, but they were not relying
on either strength or armaments. Reason for the our standing courage and bravery of Muslims
was Faith in Allah, his Prophet (peace be upon him) and the Truthfulness of the new way of
life. Before start of the battle, morale of Quraish Army was equally high but during the initial
stages, when their famous warriors got killed in duels, they got demoralized. They had no
unity and were lacking strong leadership which could motivate and make them stand in the
situations of crisis.

k. Administration. The Prophet (peace be upon him) had brought his force well in
advance at Badr and selected the area for the camp and for the battle-field at a place from
where all the wells and springs could be kept under control, thus depriving the enemy of
drinking water. The supply line of the small army did not present any problem. There were no
elaborate rations to be carried. Each man carried his own rations in the form of dates. No
supply column was therefore required to be maintained, looked after or protected except the
camels that had brought the army to Badr. The soldiers were allowed adequate rest so that
they could fight effectively. The Prophet (peace be upon him) gave due importance to the
administration where as the Quraish totally ignored it.

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 BATTLE OF DITCH

BATTLE OF DITCH (KHANDAQ)

Background

After the Battle of Uhud the, Quraish had accepted the loss of trade with Syria as
inevitable. Since the Muslims remained in power at Madina, the coastal route to Syria could
not be used by the Makkans. They increased their trade with Iraq, Behrein and the Yemen
which made up for the loss suffered by them in the stoppage of their trade with Syria. After
the Battle of Uhud the Prophet Muhammad, (peace be upon him) started keeping a close
watch on the movements of the non-believers and formed small ‘reconnaissance Patrols,
which reported war preparations by the Makkans and also informed him of their intentions
about the elimination of the power of Muslim forces.

Preparations

Preparations for the battle were started by the Quraish with full speed. Abu Sufian
was determined to attack Madina. The wives of non-believers even sold their ornaments and
bought all sorts of war material for the expedition. On the other side the Muslims who, by
then had received the confirmed news of the attack, started preparations with whatever
meagre resources they could muster.
Contending Forces
Muslims Non-believers
a. Infantry 3000 10,000
b. Cavalry 36 300
c. Camels for Logistics --- 1,500

Strategical / Tactical Objectives

a. Non-believers. Abu Sufian and his other allies had become weary and
resentful of the growing influence of Muslims at Madian and had throughout
nurtured the malice of their defeat at Badr. Their economy had also been
endangered by the growth of Islam. They thought that before Islam completely
annihilated their religious and economical interest and become an
insurmountable threat to their existence, it must be wiped off.
b. Muslims. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) wanted to accomplish the
strategic objective of further consolidating Islam. Tactically, he wanted to stop
the onslaught of Kafirs and also to inflict casualties on them.
Outline Plan

a. Muslims. In this Battle the Muslims had a considerable inferiority both of men
and the war material. Though the number of Muslim Forces at Madina had
now increased to 3, 000 able bodied men, many of them were hypocrites who
could not be fully relied upon. Non Muslims in comparison, had 10,000 strong
army with sufficient cavalry, logistics support and other war material. Hazrat
Suleman Farsi suggested that in Persia when an army had to fight a defensive
battle against superior odds, it would dig a ditch in the way of enemy, too
wide and sufficiently deep to cross. To the Arabs this was an unfamiliar but
unique form of warfare but the idea being workable was accepted by the
Prophet (peace be upon him) It was decided that their Army would dig a
trench north of Madina as an obstacle to fight the enemy through a defensive
battle.

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 BATTLE OF DITCH

b. Non-believers. The non-believers had planned to converge onto Madina from

different directions ie their respective tribal regions. Quraish and some lesser
tribes assembled at Makkah, while the Ghaffan, Bani Asad and Bani Suleim,
concentrated in their tribal settlements north, northeast and east of Madina
respectively. From there, all the forces intended to march onto Madina on a go
ahead signal from Abu Sufian, who assumed the overall command of the
expedition.

Assembly of Forces/Moves

a. Muslims. Once the digging of the ditch was completed the Muslims
established their camp just ahead of the hill of ‘Silaa’ which was little south of
the centre of the ditch. Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) established his
headquarters at Jabal-e-Silaa.
b. Non-believers and Their Allies. On Monday, 24 February, 627 AD ( The First
of Shwwal, 5 Hijrai), the Allies converging from different tribal regions
arrived near Madina and established their camps. The Quraish established
themselves in area of stream junction, south of woods, west of Mount Uhud,
where they had camped for the Battle of Uhud. The Ghatfan and other tribes
went for Zanab Nagma, about 2 miles east of Mount Uhud. Having established
their camp, the Allies advanced onto Madian.

Development Plan

Muslims. The ditch ran from Sheikhen to the hill of Zabal and thence to the Jabal
Bani Ubeid. All these hills were included in the area protected by the ditch. On the west, it
turned south to cover the left flank of the wetern side of the two hills known as Jabal Bani
Ubeid south-east of Sheikhen and north-east of Jabal Bani Ubeid The ditch was so sited, that
every 40 yards area was covered by a group or squad of 10 men. Total length of the ditch was
9,000 yards with a width ranging from 8 to 15 feet. To guard against surprise, the ditch was
kept under surveillance both through pickets and patrolling. It was covered along its entire
length by 200 men, most of whom were placed as pickets on the hills commanding the ditch.
A mobile force of 500 men was employed to carry out patrolling of various settlements of
Madina so that they could keep an eye on the infiltrators and also provide some protection to
the areas not covered by the ditch. Some troops were earmarked for reconnaissance and
patrol purposes so that they could bring information and also lay ambushes.

Allies. When the Quraish advanced onto Madina and saw the ditch, they got
thoroughly bewildered. The strength with which Abu Sufian had confidently marched was so
overwhelming that to him victory seemed to be certain. They had never before come across
with this sort of a defensive technique. The Allied moved up their camp, deployed along the
ditch on the north and north-west, and settled down to a siege which was to last for 23 days.

Analysis of the Plan

In defensive warfare the initiative always lies with the adversary who strikes first.
Normally the defender shows a lower morale owing to the very reason of being on the
defensive. Hazrat Muhammad (peace be upon him) had evolved his concept of ditch defense
after lot of deliberations. In his defenses, he had fully catered for all sorts of eventualities.
The Prophet (peace be upon him) and his ‘Sahabas’ constantly visited different posts and by

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 BATTLE OF DITCH

their encouraging talks kept the morale of the Muslims sustained at its highest pitch. The
Prophet (peace be upon him) used to emphasis on the importance of steadfastness and would
always give them the assurance of success against the ‘kafirs’. The Prophet (peace be upon
him) had very rightly appreciated that since the area north of Madina was open, the Allies
were most likely to attack from that direction. That is why the bias of his defences were
placed towards the north. On the east were fields, orchards and built up areas including
houses of Jews and other tribes. Chances of attack from this direction wee comparatively less,
in view of a previous agreement according to which the tribes where to remain neutral in case
of attack by the Makkans. South-east and south were occupied by Bani Qureza Jews tribe
who also had pledged to remain neutral. The western areas was undulating and with some
minor obstacles the enemy advance could be easily stopped from this direction. In tactical
appreciation ‘weather’ was given its due importance. Winter season was soon to set in and
Hazrat Muhammad (peace be upon him) knew that Allies would not be able to maintain the
siege for a longer duration because of the rains and chilly winds. Holy Prophet (peace be
upon him) also concluded, that because of bad weather the enemy would not be able to
maintain his Line of Communication and would thus encounter serious morale and
administrative problems. Situation for the non-believers had drastically changed once they
encountered the formidable ditch and with some variations they decided to lay a siege.
Conduct of the Battle of Ditch

a. After the Allies had laid siege around the ditch, there was no material change
for over ten days. The Muslims guarded the ditch with complete vigilance.
Seeing the width of the ditch the non-believers could not dare make attempts
to undertake a crossing. A gradual discontent started emerging in the enemy
ranks because they were not used to long sieges and would prefer a quick and
decisive battle. On the night of Friday, March 7, Abu Sufian sent one of his
confident Jews, Huyayya into the settlement of Bani Qureiza. They struck a
pact amongst themselves according to which there would be a simultaneous
two pronged attack, one by the Allies from the north and other by Bani
Qureiza from the south-east. One day Hazrat Suffiya looking down from the
Fort observed that a fully armed Jew was moving stealthily beneath the wall.
Hazrat Suffiya at once concluded that the person could be an agent of the
enemy looking for an entry into the Fort. She, therefore, kept a watch on the
Jew and the moment he crossed the wall and jumped inside, Hazrat Suffiya
killed him instantaneously with a club.
b. Use of Diplomacy. Realizing the continued stalemate the Muslims thought of
using tact or diplomacy by which some headway could be made out of the
present ‘No war, No peace’ situation. A plan was chalked out to start
negotiations with a Ghatfanian leader Uyeina to break away from Quraish,
which if achieved, would weaken them considerably by drawing 2000
Ghatfanian warriors from them. Nueim Bin Masud was a prominent
Ghatfanian who was also well known to Quraish and Jews of that area. He had
inwardly become Muslim but kept his conversion secret. One night he came to
the Prophet (peace be upon him) and told him about his position offering his
services to the cause of Islam during these moments of trial. Holy Prophet
(peace be upon him) after a conference agreed upon a workable plan.
According to the plan arrived at, Nueim was to sow the seeds of discontent,
mutual disharmony, disbelief and feeling of hostility among the three main
factions of the besiegers, i.e. Quraish, Bani Qureiza and his tribe Gatfan.
According to the ‘plan’ first he went to Bani Qureiza and after highlighting the

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 BATTLE OF DITCH

gravity of the situation according to which they might face the wrath of
Prpophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) if Bani Quraish and Ghatfan could
not succeed in defeating he Muslims, he advised them not to collaborate
further unless they were given some hostages by Quraish and Ghatfan tribes as
token and assurance of good faith. Nesxt Nueim went to Quraish and informed
them that Bani Qureiza had secretly arrived at a pact with Muslims according
to which they were going to ask for hostages from Quraish and Ghatfan. He
then went to Ghatfan and painted almost a similar picture.
c. Venture Against the Defenders. Getting tired and bored of the stagnant
situation Khalid and Ikrama decided to take maters in their own hands and on
their own moved forward towards the Muslim Camp. They moved ahead
along with their cavalry squadrons to a place which was located west of Zubab
where the ditch was comparatively narrow. This point lay right in front of the
Muslim Camp, located at the Fort of Silaa. Ikrama’s squadron comprising
seven persons moved forth. They crossed the ditch with their scrambling
forces and suddenly appeared before the surprised Muslims. This column was
being headed by a huge stout man. He stepped forward and challenged the
Muslims. The challenge was received in silence. He again challenged the
Muslims and also uttered blasphemous words against Islam and the Holy
Prophet (peace be upon him) Hazrat Ali impatiently rose to meet the challenge
but was ordered to sit down and observe. Now the challenger grew bold and
threw his challenge for the third time, with more profane words against Islam.
This time Hazrat Ali got up and started moving towards the Prophet (peace be
upon him) with a countenance which Muhammad (peace be upon him) knew
fully well and was now convinced that the (Hazrat Ali) could no longer be
restrained. Hazrat Ali got up, came close to him and told him that he (Ali)
desired to kill the aggressor. With a cry of anger and rage the giant charged on
Hazrat Ali. Ali’s sword flashed and in a second the blood was gushing out of
the throat of the ‘infidel’. With the cry of ‘Allah-o-Akbar’ the Muslim group
rushed at the six remaining quraish who turned back and started jumping
across the ditch. A man called Nofal Bin Abdullah could not however cross
the ditch and was killed by Hazrat Ali.
d. Khalid’s Efforts to Break Through. Khalid tried to cross the ditch but the
Muslims repulsed the attack with one casualty one either side. Suddenly
Khaild came back again with his squadron, and before the Muslims’ guard
could redeploy, Khalid and some of his horsemen had succeeded in crossing
rthe ditch by establishing a ‘bridge head’. Very soon the Muslims formed up
and held the ‘bridge head’ fromed by Khalid’s forces. A hand to hand firght
ensued between both the forces resulting into one Muslim casualty. Realizing
the utter futility of the situation, Khalid withdrew and thus ended the last
major military action during the course of the siege.

Battle Ends with Fiasco

For the next few days there was hardly any worthwhile activity except the exchange
of a few arrows which could inflict no appreciable damage on either side. In the Allied Camp,
their morale started falling. As appreciated by Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) the weather
of Madina become cold and a storm blew on 18 March. There was chaos and confusion in the
enemy ranks since they were not prepared for this change. To add to the dismay of Abu

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 BATTLE OF DITCH

Sufian’s forces, rain and hail followed hard on the wind. Losing all hopes of success and in a
great dejection, Abu Sufian mounted his camel and ordered a retreat. Thus the great coalition
which had initially appeared to be indomitable and invincible failed miserably. The name of
Allah was once again upheld and kept high and the forces of heathenism and blasphemy
dispersed and got defeated. It was a victory of planning, sagacity, will power and courage
over the sheer power of faithless mass. In this battle only six Muslims embraced ‘shahadat’.
Analysis of the Battle of Ditch
General
a. A Decisive Battle. This battle was a decisive battle. The Jews and other non-
believers of Madina could no longer conspire against the Muslims and
surrendered completely.
b. Punishment for High Treason. Banis Qureiza who had broken their pact
with Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) were duly punished for their
act of treachery by an appointed judge Saad Inb Mauch. After thorough
investigation it was found out that Bani Qureiza had conspired against the
state especially when it was under a military siege. So Hazrat Muhammad
(peace be upon him), as chief of the city could not overlook this act of
treachery. An exemplary punishment was given to that tribe. This decision
speaks of the high regard in which the Prophet (peace be upon him) kept the
safety, security and well-being of his state.
c. Principles of defensive Battle. It is interesting to see, in this battle, the large
scale application of the principles of defence which are current in our tactics.
Following principles applied by the Prophet (peace be upon him) stand out:-
(1) All-Round Defence. An all-round defence of the Fortress had been
catered for and no part of the area was left unattended or unguarded.
(2) Use of Ground. By placing his headquarters troops at vantage points,
the Prophet (peace be upon him) ensured good observation and clear
fields of fire (then arrows etc) which is no different form the weightage
given in our present doctrine when we look for the important tactical
ground.
(3) Ground of Own Choosing. As is also emphasized today, the Prophet
(peace be upon him), instead of fighting the adversary in the open or
the ground which they wanted (site of Uhud) forced them to advance
ahead and face his forces behind the ditch which was dexterously dug
in the form of a perimeter.
(4) Maintenance of Reserves. The requirement of capability to counter-
attack is of prime importance in all the concepts of modern battles.
Reserves enable the defence to take the ultimate form of offensive
since wars are won by offensive operations alone. The Prophet (peace
be upon him) kept approximately one-fifth of his force readily
available for either strengthening the defence of a weak position or
repulsing a sudden attack launched by the enemy.
(5) Shoot to kill in the ‘Killing Zone’. Prophet Muhammad (peace be
upon him) made best use of the ground by compelling the enemy to
first come under the range of his weapons (arrows, arches, spears,
stones) and then shoot them to kill.
d. Use of Diplomacy and Tact as Integrated ‘Weapons of War’. Battle of
Ditch was unique in early Muslim military history from the view that politics
and diplomacy were blended together in war to achieve the ultimate end. It
showed that war is not fought with weapons and munitions only. Along with

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 BATTLE OF DITCH

use of force it is a battle of wits and diplomacy to attain the desired objective.
A war or battle, without proper political directives and objectives, is bound to
result into indecisiveness. The use of ‘Armed Force’ is of course an important
aspect of warfare but use in conjunction with political diplomacy and
psychological warfare which includes elements like propaganda, rumour and
panic are the factors which go hand-in-hand with actual operations. The Holy
Prophet (peace be upon him) used the instrument of diplomacy to divide, and
weaken the enemy both in respect of their numerical strength as well as in
spiritual endurance. Though initially his colleagues and friends failed to
grapple with this new technique of warfare, but with the passage of time the
intrinsic meaning of the Prophet’s (peace be upon him) often quote words i.e
‘WAR IS STRATAGEM” dawned upon them and thenceforth that triple
worded quotation was often used (both in words as well as deeds) in later
Muslim campaigns.
e. Leadership. The leadership in the lines of Quraish was by large weak and
unable to manage the crisis. Muslims leadership on the other hand was full of
courage, initiative and apt in decision making. Following points are note-
worthy.
(1) Prophet’s (peace be upon him) decision to fight the battle inside
Madina.
(2) Decision to dig the trench brought new dimension in the defensive
tactics. A leader must possess innovative ideas which contribute
towards victory.
(3) Equal distribution of work/digging while the Prophet (peace be upon
him) set a personal example in sharing the digging. This great example
will go a long way in the history of prevailing leadership. State of
discipline prevailed during the digging of trench represented the high
degree of morale.
f. Psychological Warfare. No force can achieve victory unless it possesses complete
unity amongst its ranks and file. Rumours often affect the morale adversely. Muslims
effectively used Psychological Warfare in this Battle. Account of Nueim creating a rift
amongst enemy ranks explicitly explains the judicious use of the techniques of psychological
operations analogy of which is
current even today.
Application of Principles of War in the Battle of Ditch.

Following principles of war were applied/violated by the opposing forces:-

a. Offensive Action
(1) The principle of offensive defence was strictly followed by the Holy
Prophet (peace be upon him) and for, this purpose, he formed different
parties to ambush, harass and destroy the enemy whenever possible
and also to collect information in respect of any fresh planning,
movement or action being so contemplated by the enemy.
(2) Maintenance of reserves always speaks of the offensive designs in
defensive battle. A stalemate in battle warrants an offensive action. As
the siege prolonged, the Quraish got bored of the stagnant situation.
Khalid and Ikrama decided to take matters in their own hands and
moved towards the Muslim camp along with their cavalry squadrons to
a place located west of Zubab where the ditch was narrow to attempt a

6
 BATTLE OF DITCH

crossing. The successful crossing did surprise the Muslims but the
Muslim reserves made their advance impossible.
b. Economy of Effort. Digging of ditch was an important decision made by the
Prophet (peace be upon him). Wise use of ground, natural or artificial
obstacles cater for numerical inferiority and hence helps in attainment of
economy. The ditch proved to be the single most factor in the sustenance and
perseverance of the Muslim Forces.
c. Unity of Command. Although both the belligerents applied this principle of
war, Muslims had a supremacy in this aspect. They were fighting under the
supreme command of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Enemy forces
were split in various tribes whose leaders, by virtue of their status and habits,
never desired to serve under one flag. No coordination was ever carried out
and the Quraish often attacked Muslims at their own, resulting into
disintegrated command and dissipated effort.
d. Security. The non-believers struck a pact amongst themselves according to
the terms of which, there would be simultaneous tow-pronged attack, one by
the Allies form the north and other by Bani Quraish form the south-east. But it
was not long before the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) was informed
about this plan by his intelligence sources.
e. Surprise. Non-believers encountered the formidable ditch which they never
expected and were taken by a complete surprise. The new tactics or innovation
always contemplated the element of surprise and contributed to victory.
f. Simplicity. The Muslims plan was simple and workable while the Quraish had
got involved into complexities. Their army comprised various tribes hence
their organization and training was also quite different form each other. This
complexity in man-power, training and conduct of operations affected their
adjustment to the dynamics of war.
g. Morale. Although the siege prolonged for 23 days and Muslims remained
under continuous pressure yet they stood firm on their pledge to Allah and His
Apostle. Their morale remained high throughout the siege, whereas the
Quraish could not keep up the moral of their soldiers. The hardships of a long
drawn campaign had dampened their spirits who were in no mood to continue
the battle.
h. Administration
(1) Besides the great tactical advantages gained due to proper appreciation
of weather factor by the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) it also went
a long way in catering for administrative requirements of the forces
before hand. Conversely, a failing on part of Quraish and their allies to
cater for logistic cover for cold weather and rains created immense
problems and became major factor in their lifting the siege. Similar
situations were repeated in the military history in Napoleonic and
Russo. German battles for Moscow.
(2) While selecting the suburbs of Madina as the site of defence, the Holy
Prophet (peace be upon him) kept in mind the lengthy and hazardous
line of communication and concluded that the enemy’s logistics would
be badly affected if they had to fight a prolonged battle, away from
their centre. He also kept continuous pressure on enemy’s line of
communication through offensive patrolling and ambush action.
Enemy faced great problem in obtaining their supplies of food and
other equipment. Muslims did not face such problems. Since they were

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 BATTLE OF DITCH

fighting from a well-established administration they could, therefore,

afford to remain under a prolonged siege.
Conclusion

This Battle, by all means, was a victory for the Muslims because they attained their
aim of safeguarding themselves against the Allies. The Allies miserably failed in their efforts
to crush and subdue the Muslims. Despite their gigantic preparations they failed to inflict
even a slight damage to the Muslim forces. The siege which lasted for about 23 days and
caused a considerable strain on both the sides seemed to be ended by a storm, but it was not
the real cause for lifting of the siege. It could be termed as the ‘last knell’ in the doom of the
non-believers. Spiritually and morally it was a great blow to the forces of Quraish and their
allies. Makkans and other non-believers could not venture again to fight the Muslims in their
own area nor did they dare to check the advance of Muslims to preach Islam. It spread rapidly
afterwards and every day the number of people converting to Islam recorded unprecedented
pace. In this decisive battle unity, firm faith and discipline were used in unison with the
application of progressive principles of defensive battle. Holy Prophet (peace be upon him)
supreme generalship which he exhibited during the battle, brought many a crowning glories
for his followers. It further proved the fact that apart from being supreme religious leader, the
Prophet ( peace be upon him) was a great Military Commander as well. Our present tactical
doctrines and concepts evolved through test of many a battle were so well known and
practiced by the Apostle of Allah centuries ago. His intelligence, foresightedness and marked
ability of perception, stand for us as beacon in the path of leadership. History would never be
able to give another example of a personality that had so much to give to the whole world in
general and to the followers of ‘Tauhid’ in particular.

8
 BATTLE OF KHYBER

BATTLE OF KHYBER
Background

The Jews of Madina had been a constant source of worry for the Muslims
eversince the Hijira. The main point of rivalry between the Muslims and the Jews was of
conflicting ideology.

Ever since the arrival of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) at Madina the
Jews had been engaged in working against Muslims interests. The Holy Prophet (peace
be upon him) had tried his best to pacify the Jews. He gave them a respectable place in
the city, signed a peace agreement with them, imparted full justice and looked after their
civic rights, religious and trade interests. But the Jews could not reconcile with the rising
power of Islam and created difficult situations every time they got an opportunity.

The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) showed tremendous patience and
tolerance towards the Jews. It was only when any Jewish tribe totally violated the terms
of the Pact that it was turned out of Madina. The Jews kept on concentrating in Khyber, a
formidable hilly land some distance away from the city of Madina and kept on making
their war preparations against the Muslims.

Geo-Military Situation

After the treaty of Hudeibiya between the Muslims and the Quraish it was
observed by the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) that the Jews were intensifying their
war preparations and would not come to an understanding to live peacefully with the
Muslims. There were clear indications that the Jews had been fully prepared to attack
Madina.

The main tribes of Jews were: Bani Qainka, Bani Nadir and Bani Qureiza. They
inhabited six places built in like fortresses. The group of fortresses which are collectively
referred to as Khyber were Naam, Qamoos, Nastat, Khyber, Vatee and Sulalim. The most
formidable and important were Naam and Qamoos.

As per provisions of the Treaty of Hudeibiya the Quraish were required to remain
neutral in case of any battle between the Muslims and the Jews.

Salam Bin Al-Haqique was in charge of Khyber and he had taken into alliance the
Ghatfan and other Arab tribes living in the surroundings of Khyber. An Ansar Abdullah
Bin Attique from Madina who was sent by the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), who
ultimately killed Al-Haqique and the Jewish army was temporarily dispersed. Asir Bin
Azaam then took over as the Chief of Khyber and reorganized the Jewish army with the
motive to launch an attack on Madina. Hazrat Muhammad (peace be upon him) set
Abdullah Bin Arara to call the Jewish chief for negotiations who agreed and moved with
Abdullah Bin Arara. On the way the Jewish chief tried to snatch the sword of one f the
Muslims, who in retaliation killed Asir Bin Azaam.

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 BATTLE OF KHYBER

Contending Forces

The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) finally concluded that there was no choice
but a military show down. He collected his 1400 strong Army with 200 cavalry and
advanced on Khyber in Moharram 7 AH. The Jews had collected an Army of 20,000; The
strength of Jewish cavalry is not known.

Outline Plans of the Adversaries

a. The Muslim Plan. In the previous battles with Quraish the Muslims had
more or less fought defensive battles and merely reacted to the initiatives
of the Quraish. In this case the Muslims had set out on their first offensive
to punish the intriguing Jews. The Muslim plan was to reduce each
fortress in turn. The first one to be taken was Naam followed by Qamoos.
The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) had estimated that if the Jews were
defeated at these two fortresses, they would not be able to give a stand at
the remaining four as the former contained Jewish supplies and the latter
most of the Jewish Army. Arranging objectives in order of priority based
on their tactical importance still remains one of the primary dictates of
offensive operations.

b. The Jews Plan. The Jews had the sanctuary of six fortresses available to
them. Their strength was ten times that of Muslims and they planned to
give fight form each of these fortresses, and from Qamoos and Nastat the
Jews wanted to give a decisive blow. Marhab, the most valorous general
of the Jewish Army was present in the fortress of Qamoos.

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 BATTLE OF KHYBER

CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF KHYBER

The Muslim Army reached the place called Rajee, located in between the area of
Ghatfan tribe and the bastion of Jews at Khyber. They camped there and left women and
non-essentials in this base before launching the offensive. When the Muslim Army left
for Khyber the Gharfan tribe came out with all their weapons. Seeing their own home in
danger the Gharfan decided to withdraw and went back. The Jews were thus left alone.

Seeing the Muslim Army at their doors, the Jews came out and challenged the
Muslims for individual encounters. After these individual duels and loss of two very
brave personalities, the Jews decided to take a defensive posture by staying in the
fortresses rather than fighting in the open. As per their plan the Muslims went for the
fortress of Naam first. This decision proved very beneficial because once Naam was
captured, it eased up the food grain problem of the Muslim Army denying the same to the
Jews who had stocked their supplied there. The Muslims did not find much of resistance
in Naam because the Jews were not holding that fortress in strength. The Muslim Army
had a high morale in this battle, which was further boosted with this phase of the victory.

After the capture of Naam the most important fortress, as highlighted in the
Muslims’ plan, was Qamoos because maximum Jewish Army was deployed there. The
Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) had to carry out a special planning for this objective
followed by a special execution. He nominated Hazrat Abu Bakr and gave him the banner
of Islam but it could not be conquered. Later on Hazrat Umar was assigned the mission
but the fortress could again not be conquered. While Qamoos had the pivotal importance
for the Muslim offensive, the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) kept pressing the attack.
Hazrat Ali was then handed over the command, who succeeded in captureing the fortress
after a siege of twenty days. This was the last difficult Battle of Khyber. The Jews lost
ninety-three persons while twenty Muslims attained martyrdom.

After the second phase of the operation, fortress at Nastat was captured very
easily followed by capture of Khyber itself. Vatee/Sulalim were kept under siege for ten
days. The Jewish Army/inhabitants finally gave up their resistance and offered their
surrender on the condition of providing half of their total agricultural produce. The
condition was accepted by the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and the siege was lifted.

The Fate of Jews in Arabian Peninsula

Jews in Fidak. Once the Battle of Khyber was over, Prophet (peace be upon him)
despatched a messenger to the Jews of Fidak inviting them to the fold of Islam, which
they readily accepted.

Jews in Wadi-ul-Qura. On their move back to Madina the Muslims passed

through Wadi-ul-Qura, which was a strong abode of the Jews. They retaliated by
attacking the Muslim Army but were defeated only after a few hours of the battle. Finally
they surrendered and accepted the peace on the same conditions, which were imposed on
to the Jews of Khyber.

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 BATTLE OF KHYBER

Jew of Tima. They preferred peace without any fight on the same terms and
conditions as applicable to the other Jewish communities.

Aftermaths
a. Muslims started dominating the area north of Madina.
b. Muslim ambassadors abroad on religious missions were saved from
treachery of various tribes.
c. Peaceful conditions were ensured for the spread of Islam in the Northern
Tribal Belts.

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 BATTLE OF KHYBER

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF KHYBER

General

a. Two-Front War Threat. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) showed
great insight in the study of the geopolitical environments which guided
him in his operational strategy. After the Agreement of Hudeibiya he had
succeeded in clearly dividing his two sworn enemies into two separate
camps. By virtue of this Agreement the Quraish could not come to the
rescue of the Jews. Hence he first dealt with the Quraish by keeping the
Pact of Madina with the Jews and tolerating the Jewish violations for long
time. By signing the Hudeibiya Treaty he separated the Quraish from the
Jews. The Prophet (peace be upon him) well mixed politics and diplomacy
displaying a high sense of accurate timings and priorities. The weaker
enemy was kept at bay through pacts while stronger one was neutralized
through warfare followed by a peace pact.

b. Accurate Appreciation. The Muslim Army could have moved straight on

to the fortress of Qamoos, but that would not give them any strategic or
tactical advantage. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) carried out a
classic appreciation of the enemy situation, his traits, capabilities,
limitations and likely courses of action. He correctly appreciated that the
tribe of Ghaftan would have no direct interest in the Jewish fortresses
when their own homes lying in the west of these fortresses were
threatened. This was not only instrumental in reducing the Jewish strength
but also created an adverse psychological effect on the Jews of Khyber.
The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), therefore, correctly moved
towards Rajee. This movement divided the Jewish concentration and the
homeland of Ghaftan tribe. The Ghaftan, as wisely appreciated by the
Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) returned to their homes. Thus a part of
the opponent’s army got defeated even before the battle was joined.

c. Passive Defensive Posture. The Jews had adopted a defensive posture

from the very beginning. Although their strength was more than ten times
to that of the Muslims yet they never attempted any offensive against the
Muslims. Strategy of passive defence adopted by the Jews did not help
them in averting a defeat despite their numerical superiority.

d. Role of Women in the Battle-Field. There were a number of volunteer

women who joined the Muslim Army to perform the duties of nurses.
They skillfully treated the sick and wounded soldiers and at times helped
in carriage of light equipment like arrows etc. The Muslims resolved the
problem of medical staff with employment of women to perform nursing
duties.

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 BATTLE OF KHYBER

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN THE BATTLE OF KHYBER.

a. Offensive Action. The Holy Prophet’s (peace be upon him) repeated

efforts to make peace with the Jews encouraged the infidels who had
interpreted theses good will gestures as the Muslims weakness. Once the
Muslims moved out of Madina with 1400 strong army, though much less
in number, it shocked the Jews who got on the defensive. The strategy of
passive defence adopted by the Jews led to their defeat. This battle
highlights the importance of offensive action as a principle of war and
weaknesses of a poorly conceived concept of a defensive operation.

b. Concentration. Numerical superiority is often misunderstood as a pre-

requisite to achieving this principle. Study of the Battle of Khyber shows
that it is with employment of available forces in space and time dimension
that concentration can be achieved. The Muslims planned to concentrate
their effort initially on the fortresses of Naam and Qamoos instead of a
simultaneous attack on all of them. In our modern tactics, phasing an
attack in such a situation, needs no emphasis since concentration can
better be achieve by this technique. As mentioned earlier, the Holy
Prophet (peace be upon him) had wisely appreciated to choose the
objectives in their right order of priority keeping in view their tactical
importance. The Jews defeated in Naam and Qamoos were not expected to
fight well at the other fortresses. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him)
conducted offensive fixation with rest of the four fortresses concentrating
bulk of Muslim Army on the fortresses of Naam and Qamoos. The
defensive posture of the Jews compelled them to defend each of their six
fortresses thus dissipating their strength and producing a disjointed front.

c. Economy of Effort. The Jews had organized their defences in six

fortresses available to them. As such they dissipated their resources in
simultaneous defence of all the fortresses. Troops are tasked to ground
features according to their tactical importance and correct appreciation of
ground and enemy factors. Appreciation is a logical process leading to
sound plans. Economy of effort resorted to by the Jews is an example to
show how it should not be applied.

d. Mobility. The Muslim Army had a mobile force of 200 men who were
operating in the battle-field with much more speed and greater freedom of
movement. Wherever the reinforcement was needed, this group would
switch with speed and reinforce the threatened sector. The Jews adopted
the defensive posture and with that completely ignored this principle by
tieing down their mobile troops. The Jews did not keep any mobile
reserves to influence the battle. Need for maintenance of reserves in the
defensive battle is best highlighted in the Battle of Khyber and will remain
ever applicable in modern and future warfare.

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 BATTLE OF KHYBER

e. Surprise

(1) The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) despatched a small

contingent of determined warriors to Ghatfan. As the inhabitants of
this tribe were ready to move out to reinforce the Jews at Khyber,
the Muslim soldiers caught them unaware giving a complete
surprise to the tribe. They failed to offer stiff resistance
demoralization they dropped the idea of joining the Jews camp.

(2) Main body of the Muslim Army crossed the difficult terrain with
speed and encircled the Khyber complex at night thus giving a
complete surprise to the defenders, which they were not prepared
for and it was rather too late for them to react reflectively. Use of
unexpected direction of attack often entails traversing of difficult
terrain as has been proved in numerous campaigns in the study of
military history. The famous saying that “Sweat saves Blood” will
hold good forever.

(3) The Jews also applied this principle of war but not in its classical
sense. They did prepare the terrain to retard the Muslim advance
while occupying series of fortresses. They had trained their
soldiers to withstand Muslim attacks, but they had not earmarked
any reserves to launch counter-attacks or meet other contingencies.
The factors contributing to surprise like speed, deception, effective
intelligence and counter intelligence were completely ignored by
the defenders.

f. Morale. Khyber’s is the first episode in the Early Battles of Islam where
Muslim Army move out for an offensive. Their morale was high and got
further boost with their victory in Naam. Victory has always contributed to
high morale.

g. Administration. Protection of logistic base or lines of communication

has always been significant in military planning. The Jews failed to protect
their logistic installations at Naam and Saab Bin Nafa. The Muslims kept
logistics factor in view in their operational planning and it was one of the
reasons to strike at Naam first, which eased their food situation. This
saved the Muslims from disaster, gave them additional logistic stamina; at
the same time it reduced the Jewish capability to withstand a long siege.

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 BATTLE OF MAUTA

BATTLE OF MAUTA

Background

Muslims and the Quraish had fought three battles, ie Battles of Badr, Uhud
and Khandaq, before the Treaty of Hudeibiya was signed in early April 628 AD
(Ziqad, 6 Hijra). These early battles proved that the Muslims had gained sufficient
strength to defend themselves against the aggression of the Quraish.

Treaty of Hudeibiya changed the course of the events. By signing the treaty,
the Quraish accepted the equal status of the Muslims. With the advent of this treaty
many advantages accrued to the Muslims.

The time had now come when Muslims could devote their energies to expand
their religion and sphere of their influence. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him)
now got the opportunity to explore the possibilities of bringing various tribes under
the banner of Islam.

In the period of nearly two years, between the Treaty of Hudeibiya in March
628 AD and the conquest of Makkah in January 630 AD, about seventeen Muslim
expeditions are recorded. Expedition to Mauta was also sent in September 629 AD.
The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) sent various envoys to the chiefs of different
tribes. An envoy carried a letter from the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) to the
chief of Ghassan tribe at Busra in which he had been invited to embrace Islam. On his
way to Busra the envoy was killed at Mauta by Shurahbeel Bin Amr, the local chief of
the Ghassan tribe. When the news of this murder reached Madina it caused much
anger to the Muslims. The killing of an envoy was a crime which could not go
unpunished. Envoys, as ever, enjoyed the freedom of going to any part of the Arab
land without any fear. According to the Arab traditions the envoys were to be
respected and treated as guests, even if they came from a hostile tribe. The act of
Shurahbeel Bin Amr therefore warranted an immediate reaction.

Preliminaries

An expedition was immediately prepared and sent to Mauta to take punitive

action against the persons responsible for the killing of the envoy. The objectives set
for this expedition were: -

a. To make it known to the tribes in and around the area that the Muslims
were capable of going out of their centre of power to undertake an
offensive to safeguard their interests. Had the Muslims remained quiet,
it could indicate that they were unable to look after their interests.

b. Main objective of the Muslims was to punish the tribes who had
betrayed the ambassadors of Islam.

c. To know about the livelihoods of inhabitated tribes of the area and get
information about their military strength.

1
 BATTLE OF MAUTA

d. To carry out the terrain analysis which could help in any future
operation.

Contending Forces

The expeditionary force consisting of 3000 men set off for Mauta. The
Prophet (peace be upon him) issued following instructions: -

a. No killing of women, children, disabled and the prisoners of war.

b. Avoid damage to the inhabited areas.

c. No cutting of trees.

Hazrat Zaid Bin Harris was appointed commander of the force. Besides
appointing Hazrat Zaid as Commander, the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) named
Hazrat Jafar Bin Abi Talib as second-in-command and Hazrat Abdullah Bin Rawah as
third-in-command. This is how the Prophet (peace be upon him) had fore-solved the
problem of succession in command. In case of a casualty the next man was to assume
the command without any confusion. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) said, “If
three of these are killed let the men select a commander from among themselves”.

There are variations amongst the historians on the strength of Christian Arabs.
Some give their strength as 100,000 while others record it still more. The strength as
estimated by the early historians seems to be inaccurate. The enemy probably
consisted of ten to fifteen thousand men. In this battle, Muslims failed to gain a
victory.

Plan

The battle was fought near the village of Mauta. The battle-field stretched
more than a mile to the east of the village. The ground was firm and even with slight
undulations. There was a low ridge also to the east of village Mauta which had gentle
slopes to the north. The Muslims kept this ridge at their back and deployed
themselves on the lower fringes of the ridge.

Muslims deployed their force in the normal pattern of a centre and two wings.
Hazrat Zaid himself commanded the centre. Left wing was commanded by Hazrat
Ubaya Bin Malik and right wing was put under the command of Hazrat Qutba. The
Christain Arabs were commanded by Malik Bin Zafila who deployed his forces into a
deep mass confronting the Muslims.

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 BATTLE OF MAUTA

THE CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF MUTA

Expeditionary force, consisting of 3,000 men under command of Hazrat Zaid

left Madina for Mauta. At the time of leaving Madina the Muslims had no information
about the strength of the enemy. It was only after reaching a place called Ma’an that
the Muslims got the report that Heraclius, the Eastern Roman Emperor, had reached
Jordan with 190,000 Romans. Another report indicated that about 100,000 Christian
Arabs mainly from Ghassan had joined the Romans. This was an upsetting news
which caused great worry to the Muslims. They halted at Ma’an and got busy in
working out plans for their next move. Some of the Muslims were of the opinion that
they should stay at Ma’an and ask for the reinforcements from Madina. Hazrat Zaid
Bin Harris, however, decided to continue with his advance towards the enemy. The
Muslims reached a place near the frontier of Balqa where they contacted a large force
of Christian Arabs. Hazrat Zaid found that it was not a suitable place for battle. He,
therefore, decided to fall back to Mauta which provided a better position to the
Muslims.

The battle began in the traditional pattern. This was essentially a battle of guts
and stamina rather than military skill. Hazrat Zaid, the Muslim commander, was
killed soon. The command was taken over by Hazrat Jaffar who gave a vigorous fight
but was killed bravely. The command was then taken over by Hazrat Abdullah Bin
Rawah. Soon after he also got killed. The death of the third Muslim commander
caused much confusion in the Muslim ranks. In that state of confusion they fell back
and disorder prevailed in their ranks. Had this situation been allowed to go unchecked
the Muslims would have suffered a great loss. Hazrat Sabit Bin Arqan took over the
control of the situation. He delivered a forceful speech and gathered the dispersed
Muslims. He offered the command of the Muslims to Hazrat Khalid bin Walid, who
accepted the command in the hours of crisis.

Hazrat Khalid was faced with a very grim situation. He had three options open
to him. He could continue fighting a defensive battle. But he rightly appreciated that a
defensive battle would lead to nothing other than ultimate disaster. Second option was
to withdraw from the scene of battle. That would have brought bad name to the
Muslims and to their commander. The third course available to Hazrat Khalid was to
reassemble the Muslims, re-organize them and launch an all out attack. He re-
organized his force and launched an all out attack. The enemy was completely
overtaken by this sudden surprise. The Christian commander, Malik, was killed in a
duel. The death of their commander caused confusion in the enemy ranks who pulled
back for re-organization. As the enemy did so, Hazrat Khalid restrained the Muslims
and broke contact. Hazrat Khalid rightly appreciated that with his limited force he
could not defeat the large force of the enemy. He decided to quit the battle-field and
return to Madina. Twelve Muslims embraced ‘shahadat’. Romans suffered severe
casualties which adversely affected their morale.

It is said that the Muslim Army returning to Madina, under Hazrat Khalid, was
not well received. They were accused of quitting the battle-field without having taken
revenge. The Prophet (peace be upon him) restrained them and said “They have not
fled. They shall return to fight, if Allah wills it”. Then the Prophet (peace be upon
him) raised his voice and announced, “Khalid is the Sword of Allah”.

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 BATTLE OF MAUTA

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF MAUDA

General Military Lessons

a. Conduct of Withdrawal Operation. Achieving of clean break by

Hazrat Khalid under adverse tactical environments stands as example
of successful conduct of withdrawal operation. Salient features of this
operation include his detailing of a force to act as rear guards who
stretched their battle positions fighting rear guard actions using the
slogans of “Allah-o-Akbar” giving an indication that some
reinforcements had joined the Muslim Army. This enabled the main
body to withdraw successfully. The outcome of the Battle at Mauta has
been described differently by different historians. It was not a decisive
battle. The Muslims left the field in possession of their opponents,
which gave a sign of victory to the Christians. On the other hand the
Christians suffered much greater losses as compared to the Muslims.
They also failed to pursue the withdrawing Muslim force.
b. Choice of Ground. The Muslims did not accept the battle at Balqa,
where they first contacted the enemy. Finding that Balqa was not a
suitable place to fight, the Muslims fell back to Mauta. Mauta provided
better position to fight an enemy superior in numbers.

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN THE BATTLE OF

MAUTA

Following principles of war were applied/violated by both the sides: -

a. Maintenance of Aim. The primary aim of the expedition which was

sent to Mauta, was to make it known to the tribes in and around the
area that the Muslims were capable of going far out from their centre
of power to deal with any situation. The Muslims had no intention of
capturing any territory. Their main objective was to avenge the
innocent blood of their envoy and in the process expand their sphere
of influence. The Muslims achieved their aim. Had they remained
quiet, it would have indicated their weakness and inability to look
after the Muslim interest.

b. Offensive Action. After the fall of three successive Muslim

Commanders the total destruction of Muslim Army looked imminent.
The chips were really down when Hazrat Khalid took over the
command. Had he remained on the defensive, the enemy could have
destroyed the entire Muslim force. Hazrat Khalid, after assuming the
command, launched an offensive and put the enemy on defence. This
is how he created a favourable situation for the Muslims. After having
forced the enemy to fall back Hazrat Khalid broke contact and
withdrew from the scene of battle. The action of Hazrat Khalid
highlights the importance of a bold action in the face of a superior
enemy particularly when breaking of contact is indicated.

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 BATTLE OF MAUTA

c. Concentration. The Christian Arabs had brought a superior force as

compared to the Muslims and were in a position to apply the principle
of concentration to attain decisive results but they ignored it to their
disadvantage.

d. Mobility. Mobility aids towards economy of effort, it also disposes of

a force in such a manner as to place the enemy at a relative
disadvantage and thus achieve results, which would otherwise be more
costly in men and material. The Muslim Army successfully applied
this principle by retaining the freedom of action and always moved
with speed superior to that of the enemy in time and space dimensions
during critical stages of the battle, denying the same to the Christian
Army.

e. Unity of Command. The expeditionary force consisted of 3000 men.

Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) gave clear instructions regar5ding
its command to avert any crisis in the command and thus he fore
solved the problem ensuring unity of command throughout the battle.

f. Security. Hazrat Khalid withdrew from Mauta when he was sure that
the situation was not favourable to the Muslims. It would have been
un-wise to continue fighting under adverse situation. Hazrat Khalid
rightly decided not to accept a battle under adverse conditions and
thus preserved the force to fight the enemy another day under
favourable conditions.

g. Morale. The Muslims were led better and their morale remained high.
Three successive Muslim commanders got killed, which shows that
the commanders themselves fought ahead of their troops.

Conclusion

Militarily the Battle of Mauta was not planned and conducted like other
Muslim campaigns. Politically it was however an important event in the early Muslim
history. This was for the first time that the Muslims had fought a battle outside their
limited sphere of political influence. It was also an offensive, which was undertaken
to punish the oppressors a principle to ensure military credibility.

The Battle of Mauta was a preliminary action taken by the Muslims to assess
the strength of Romans and their tactical doctrines. The Muslims benefited a lot with
the information acquired in this campaign which was utilized to their advantage in the
future battles with the Romans. This information included characteristics, strength,
organization, weapon system and battle techniques of the Roman Army. The military
gains which Muslims accrued from this battle were much more I comparison with
their losses which were meagre.

The fact that the Muslims wee capable of undertaking a long expedition and
returning safely with not too much of a disadvantage earned them more military
respect in the eyes of Arab tribes around Madina and Makkah. At home the Quraish
who themselves had never fought beyond Madina were impressed to a great degree.

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 BATTLE OF NEHAWAND

BATTLE OF NEHAWAND

Operational Environments and Geo Military situation before the Battle of

NEHAWAND.

a. By the end of 640 AD the Muslims had conquered the whole of Jordan, Syria
and most of Egypt. The Persian Army had already been defeated at Qadisiyya
and Jalaula. The Muslims had captured the persian capital of Medain
(Ctesiphon) in 638 AD and the Persian Emperor Yazdjurd had escaped to
Nehawand.
b. The rich plains of Iraq which the Muslims had conquered from the Persians
were separated from the rest of the Persian Empire by the Zagrog Mountain
which protected Muslim conquered area in the north and in the east. So far the
Muslims had invaded the Persian Empire in two pronged operations. On the
southern axis Abu Musa Ashari had conquered Ahwaz, Sus, Tuster and his
columns had also advanced into Fars with his base at Basra, a recently
established Muslim Garrison. On the north-western axis, there was Hazrat
Sa’d Bin Abi Waqqas whose forces had advanced and captured Medain,
Baghdad, Jalaula, Hulwan and Kirman-Shah. The Muslims had positioned
their forces at Kufa, Basra, Medain and Kirman-Shah. Madina and Kufa were
their major bases.
c. The theatre of operations increased in all dimensions and demanded time to
make it effectively manageable. The Persians and Romans had lost the
territories but had not been destroyed completely. Their depth, population and
potential made them strong enough to exploit any weaknesses on the part of
Muslims. Against their assessments, the Muslims had emerged as a big power
in the area which posed a constant threat to these empires. A force of 29,000
of Qadisiyya could not move fast to annex major portion of Persian Empire
and in fact it was a race between Muslims and Persians as to who could
prepare faster and muster more forces in the time frame. The stakes were
heavier for Muslims because of the limited resources of manpower and war
material.

Geo-Military Situation

a. Geographically the boundaries of Muslim Empire stretched up to Iraq and

Syria. The Muslim garrisons were stationed at Syria, Yemen, Kufa, Basra and
Kirman Shah in order to guard against any aggression from Romans and
Persians and also to look after the conquered territory. The Muslim high
command wanted to annex whole of Persia but operations had to be staggered
in point of time to suit their resources. Romans and Persians on the other hand
could not continue with the severe blow struck at them and wanted to
eliminate Muslims threat. Yazdjurd the Persian Emperor who had escaped at
Medain, made Nehawand his capital and was building up a new army. He
dispatched messengers to Governors of all the provinces to raise the greatest
possible number of troops and dispatch them to join Persian cause.
b. The reports of concentrations of the Persian forces reached Hazrat Saad Bin Ai
Waqqas the Muslim Commander in Iraq who urged the Caliph to accord
sanction to resume operations against the Persians and also requested for
reinforcements. Accordingly Hazrat Noman Bin Muqqarim was appointed as

1
 BATTLE OF NEHAWAND

c. commander of Muslim forces for the forthcoming coming campaign. Hazrat

Noman at that time was Commanding a column in Khuzistan under Hazrat
Abu Musa. He had been fighting against the Persians for a long time and had
shown distinction at the Battle of Qadisiyya. He was an intelligent and
devoted Muslim. Just before the Battle of Qadisiyya he had led the Muslim
delegation to the court of Yazdijurd of Medain.
d. Emperor Yazdjurd had appointed an old veteran General Mardan Shah as
Commander-in-Chief of the Persian Army. He was efficient and had
commanded formations on the active service for years. In the earlier years of
Muslims invasion, he defeated Muslim Army under Hazrat Abu Ubeid at the
Battle of the Bridge and had massacred Muslims. He was the top general of
Persians.
e. The Muslims had been, so far, fighting with their backs to the desert, tactics
most suited to their requirements, but now in order to secure their gains they
had to fight the enemy deep in Persian mountains and plains. However, by this
time the Muslim armies had fought both Roman and Persian armies and had
learnt the tactical doctrines.

STRATEGIC AIMS AND COMPULSIONS

a. Aims

(1) Allied. The national aims of Romans and Persians were to eliminate
the Muslim threat by destroying the Muslim forces within and beyond
their empires.
(2) Muslims. The Muslims aimed at gathering sufficient strength, so that
while controlling the conquered areas they could ward off any
aggression from the enemy side. To implement it, the areas in
sufficient depth both in Roman and Persian territory had to be annexed
so that the message of Islam could be conveyed.

b. Compulsions. The strategic compulsions were:-

(1) Tolerance. The religion was not projected beyond the capacity of
others to digest. It had to be spread progressively though gestures
rather than force.
(2) Confidence. To gain confidence of the subjects, the Muslims had to
ensure their security and prosperity by sound administrative se up. This
had to take time.
(3) Economics. To make use of fertile lands of Iraq and Suria, the
inhabitants were to be put to agricultural and industrial work in support
of the war machine. To this end, the muslims utilized the economic
resources to enhance their war production and administrative back up.
(4) Resources. Due to lack of adequate resources and unfavourable
situation of relative strength, one adversary had to be dealt with at one
time and two front war was to be avoided. Once the situation on Syrian
front stabilized in their favour, the Muslim high command was able to
shift some forces to Persian front. This was necessitated to alter the
relative strength ratio at the point of threat. For six years no major

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 BATTLE OF NEHAWAND

battle was fought on Syrian front so as to avoid any retaliation from

Romans.

War Potential

a. Additional Forces. With increased requirement of troops, the Muslims had to

establish the recruiting centers and make up the deficiency of manpower from
local population.
b. Administrative Support. The Muslims had to utilize the economic resources
of the conquered territories to support their operations with sound
administrative back up.

THE BATTLE-FIELD

The valley of Nehawand is surrounded by the ridges and mountains from all
directions. The valley itself provides a narrow opening towards Nehawand and Isbeezahan. In
the south is the Garreen Ridge, 5,000 feet high from ground level. The northern edge is
marked by Ardeshan Mountains and in the centre of the valley is the Zarrameen Ridge with
500 feet height from ground level. Towards south of this ridge flows a stream almost parallel
to Zarrameen Ridge. These ridges and mountains provide excellent observation over the
valley and towards their either side. The switching of forces from north to south and vice
versa was difficult. Move around these ridges to effect a wide manoeuvre was not only
difficult but also time consuming. The camps of opposing forces prior to the battle were at
Nehawand for the Persians and Isbeezahan for the Muslims. The terrain provided three
approaches to the Persian base at Nehawand: -
a. Left Approach. Isbeezahan over the Ardeshan Ridge on to Nehawand. This
was difficult, time consuming and provided less frontage for a sizeable force.
Base was threatened from Darizeed.
b. Centre Approach. Through the space between Brown Ridge and Ardesh
Ridge. This approach the best according to the concept of Muslims with the
limited forces which they had. Any manoeuvre along this approach would
provide the security of base at Isbeezahan.
c. Right Approach. Isbeezahan between stream and the Garreen Mountain to
Nehawand. It was difficult approach. Nehawand itself did not provide a sound
tactical position, thus the aim of destruction of Persian Army could not be
achieved.

Importance of the Battle of Nehawand

The Battle of Nehawand was the last major battle between the Muslims and the
Persian. It was fought in December 641 AD-January 642 AD in the central region of Persia.
The Persians had fielded a force of 60,000 under their famous General Mardan Shah and the
Muslim strength was 30,000 under Hazrat Noman. Both the Generals of the contending
armies were killed during the course of the battle. After defeat at Nehwand the Persian
Empire quickly collapsed and the Muslims consolidated their gains.

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 BATTLE OF NEHAWAND

ASSEMBLY OF FORCES AND PLANS

In order to achieve the object of destroying the Persian forces before they grew in
number, strength and courage, it was planned to assemble the Muslim forces initially at Kufa
and later move to Tazar before advancing on Nehawand. In Phase I the forces from Medain
and Basra were to concentrate at Kufa and in Phase II these contingents alongwith contingent
of Kufa were moved to Tazar. In the meantime the contingent from Madina was moved in
such a time frame so as to join the main force at Tazar. In Phase III, the entire force moved to
Nehawand under the command of Hazrat Noman.
Hazrat Noman arrived at Tazar first of all and was later joined by the main body of
the force. Before moving to Tazar, Hazrat Noman had despatched a flank guard under
Mjuasho Bin Masud to operate between Ghaazaush-Shajr and Marj-ul-Qala so as to provide
protection against any Persian moves from the hills in the north.
The Persian Army had in the meanwhile assembled at Nehawand. Although the
Persians had started preparations before Muslims yet they were now forced to stay at
Nehawand, for if they left Nehawand and moved southward to approach the Muslim Army
both Nehawand and Hamadan would be exposed to Muslim outflanking attack from the
north. The Muslims were not particularly interested for a battle at Nehawand as it offered
them no strategic or tactical advantage except that the battle could be joined at the earliest
without permitting the Persian to gather greater strength and also allowing the Muslims to
conclude the forthcoming campaign before the extreme cold weather of Persia reached its
peack. There were two axes of advance to Nehawand: -
a. Left Axis. Kufa –Kirmanshah –Nehawand
b. Right Axis. Kufa –Basra –Khourumabad-Hul-wan-Nehawand.
c. Hazrat Noamn adopted the Left Axis for the following reasons:-
(1) It was shortest and hence afforded minimum reaction time to Persians,
which was vital for pre-emptive action.
(2) It led to the nerve centre of Persian concentrations.
(3) The security of maneuvering force was ensured by out posts.
(4) Unlike Right Axis where the maneuvering force was exposed to the
Persian threat forward of Hulwan, the Left Axis had no such
opposition throughout its length.

On arrival at Tazar, Hazrat Noman despatched patrols to Nehwand to find out the
strength and dispositions of the Persian Army. He got the information that the Persians were
60,000 strong with as many followers and were armed to the teeth. Also that the Persians had
invented a kind of device on the analogy of present day mines known as caltrop. This would
be used in front of the Persian Army to lame the horses and the infantry.
After initial consultations amongst the Muslim generals were over, Hazrat Noman
ordered the Army to march to Nehwand. After a few days march the Muslim Army reached
Isbeezahan about 11 miles north-east of Nehawand and encamped there
Negotiations for a peaceful settlement were opened, by Muslims but their efforts
failed. So both the Armies were prepared to settle the issue by sword.

Plans and Deployment

Deployment of the Persian Army. Persian Army was already deployed when the
Muslim Army arrived at Isbeezahan. The Persian right flank rested on the lower spur of the
Ardeshan Ridge, the dispositions then extended all along the small stream or Wadi in front of

4
 BATTLE OF NEHAWAND

the Low Ridge about 500 feet higher than the Plain and reached the village of Zarrameen
where their left flank rested.
The entire Army was divided into three corps of 20,000 each without any central
reserve. Zardag, Bahman and Anushaq commanded each corps.
The stream or the Wadi had been improved to make it more effective obstacle and
after initial confirmation by the Muslim General that he would cross the Wadi and give a
battle, the Persians laid out the caltrops all along the front. They also fortified some villages
within their dispositions.
The disposition of Persian Army, the Wadi, caltrops strips, fortified villages and the
high ground that the Persians occupied made their position almost a fortress. Its right flank
was secure against Ardeshan Ridge, the left flank extended down south-west so that both the
flanks were unassailable, the right flank because it was protected and the left flank because it
would involve a move down south by the attacker thus exposing his own rear.
Deployment of the Muslim Army. With the above dispositions of Persian Army, the
Muslims were forced to deploy facing the Persians in almost same geometrical pattern, so
that there was no finesse in their dispositions. The left wing was commanded by Hazrat
Nueim a brother of Hazrat Noman, right wing was placed under Hazrat Huzeifa Bin Al
Yaman and the centre was assigned to Hazrat Qaqa Bin Amr.

Outline Plans and Initial Manoeuvres by Persian and Muslim Armies

Once the MuslimGeneral Hazrat Noman confirmed that the Persian General Mardan
Shah would cross the Wadi, it was clear that the Muslims would undertake the offensive.
This mistake was being repeated the second time in Muslim history. First time it was by
Hazrat Abu Ubeid in the Battle of Bridge. Obviously, the Persians were content to remain on
the defensive initially, cause attrition on the Muslims and then launch their counter attack,
defeat the Muslims east of Wadi and thereafter undertake a pursuit, should the battle go in
their favour.
As Muslim plan envisaged that they had decided to engage in a frontal encounter,
they attacked for the first two days but could not make any headway against the compact
defences of the Persians enjoying all the tactical advantages. For the next two days there was
complete stalemate and no engagement took place.
On 5th day, the Persians had gained enough confidence and were now ready to
undertake minor operations. They started making short and quick sallies into Muslim ranks
causing more casualties on the Muslims than what they suffered themselves. This
development was going clearly in favour of Persians who, because of their short line of
communications to Hamadan, were also receiving a steady stream of reinforcements. Their
morale was also going up due to their success in these small skirmishes.
After a week of inactivity, the Muslim High Command met in a conference and
discussed ways and means of luring the Persians into an open combat west of the Wadi. After
deliberations, a plan emerged that promised success to the Muslims.

Revised Plans

The Muslim Plan. The Crux of this plan was to simulate Muslim low morale and
withdrawal from the battle-field thereby inducing the Persian Army to come out of their
defences in a bait to destroy the Muslim forces. Once the Persian Army was out of their
defences, the Muslims would turn and fight back. In order to prevent the Persians against
retreating back to the protection of fortification a strong cavalry group was to be
propositioned on the right flank of the Persian position which would attack them from the

5
 BATTLE OF NEHAWAND

rear flank. Following measures were taken in the psychological field to achieve the required
effects: -
a. Defeat was to be simulated by withdrawing the Muslim force after two days
battle, giving the impression of the Muslims withdrawal from the battle-field.
b. Spreading the rumours of Caliph’s death, thereby further strengthening the
belief of the Muslims low morale.
c. Simulating activities of movement from camp towards Iraq.
d. Showing inactivity even after the Persian attack till the entire Persian Army
was out in the open, so as to deny them protection of the prepared defence and
obstacles. Having done so, draw the Persians from ground of their choice to
the ground of Muslims choice.

The Persian Plan. Just like Muslims the Persian had made no plan of attack initially.
However after the Muslim plan of deception went into operation, the Persian General Mardan
Shah conceived a plan of attack. The Persian plan was to cross the Wadi and concentrate in
the south of village Isbeezahan ie opposite Muslim camp with two corps. The third corps
which mostly consisted of Imperial cavalry reserve under Anushaq was to be retained in
depth. After the Army had crossed over the other bank of Wadi, caltrops were to be sown in
the rear of own Army to prevent retreat and force the troops to fight a battle on the ground
which they held. This latter element proved to be the death trap for Persians.
After crossing over, the two corps were to array for the battle and launch a general
assault on the Muslims. After a break through was made the Imperial Persians were to
surround the Muslim Army and prevent any retreat of the fugitives.

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 BATTLE OF NEHAWAND

THE CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF THE NEHAWAND

Muslim Action. Hazrat Noman ordered the cavalry reserve under Hazrat Qaqa to
move to north of and behind the Ardeshan Ridge in the darkness of night so that it was
hidden from the Persian view. The absence of cavalry from the battle-field was the first thing
noticed by the Persian Army. Next the news of death of the Caliph was spread in the Persian
camp through agents which was received with jubilation arousing great hopes in the Persian
camp. This was done in a manner that the Persians learnt of its details without loss of time.
The front line was then withdrawn and taken behind village Isbeezahan.
All these actions were assessed by Persian General Mardan Shah as of low morale in
the Muslim Army and of imminent retreat by Muslims in the wake of their Caliph’s death. He
immediately ordered the crossing of Wadi and attack on the “retreating Muslim Arm”. The
Persian Army crossed over the Wadi in early hours of the morning and deployed for battle
facing north-west. By mid-day they were disorganized, busy in deployment completely
oblivious of any chance of counter attack or interference from the Muslims. It offered a
golden chance to the Muslims who were all prepared but Hazrat Noman would not attack in
spite of great urgings by Hazrat Mugheera. Hazrat Noman wanted to stick to the same timing
of attacks as were usually adopted by the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) ie in the
afternoon.
This initial opportunity was missed by the Muslims who waited for an attack by the
Persians. The Persian Army attacked no sooner than they were ready. They kept on attacking
from mid-day to afternoon causing heavy casualties on the Muslims. The Muslim Army was
impatient to counter attack but Hazrat Noman would stick to his timing. The Muslims bore
the brunt for half a day. Eventually the third call of ‘Allah-o-Akbar’ gathered the believers to
counter attack. The Muslims launched a fierce counter attack and Persian ranks swayed under
its weight.
The Persian centre gave way and the wings also wavered. Meanwhile, Hazrat Waqas
launched his cavalry assault on the right wing of the Persians. The Persians were taken aback
by this unexpected direction of attack. Hazrat Waqas was able to create a wedge but could
proceed no more as the Persians had recovered after the initial shock. The fierce hand-to-
hand combat continued and Hazrat Qaqa made many attempts to run through the Persians
right wing to bring a collapse but the Persians would not yield their ground. Finally by the
middle of afternoon the Muslim wings and centre launched a determined and coordinated
attacks. Hazrat Qaqa made the fiercest of assaults. The Persian right wing gave in, the centre
collapsed and the Persian soldiers turned about to cross back the Wadi.
The retreat of Persian Army would have resulted in a heavy toll of rushing Persians.
Luckily for them their right wing regained the balance and held the Muslim cavalry. This
saved the Persians from worst disaster. The Persians fled from the battle-field followed by
Muslim soldiers. Commanders on both sides General Hazrat Noman and Persian General
Mardam Shah were killed and day ended with victory for the Muslims.
Next morning the Muslims pursued the enemy in the direction of Nehawand. Persian
Army gave another small battle short of Nehawand. However, Nehawand and Hamadan later
surrendered to the Muslims without any appreciable opposition.
Muslim casualties are not recorded but the Persians definitely lost over 40,000 men
out of total combat strength of 60,000. Most of the casualties took place in the relevant of the
Persian Army.

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 BATTLE OF NEHAWAND

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF NEHAWAND

Assembly of Forces. Security at the stage of assembly of forces is of prime
importance to the success of any campaign. The way Hazrat Noman collected his troops at
Kufa and then the way he moved these in phases and by columns at Tazar duly protecting the
flanks is a classical example of assembly of forces. Napoleon was to adopt these methods a
few hundred years after this classic example. The Persians on their part could not keep their
preparations secret and thus gave enough time to the Muslims for a calculated and well timed
reaction.
Protection of Manoeuvre. The Persians had initially prepared for a defensive
manoeuvre. They had built up their defences on the lines of a fortress defence by basing their
deployment on higher ground with two obstacles, the Wadi and caltrops in front.
Additionally, they had fortified the villages and established observation posts to watch the
movements of the Muslim Armies. It was an excellent arrangement. So long as the Persians
stuck to their prepared defences, they could not be defeated by the Muslims. It was only after
the Persian abandoned their fortifications that they got beaten. The lesson learnt is that
arrangements for protection of manoeuvre once made must not be discarded till a tactical
advantage had been gained over the enemy and the new arrangements are at least as good if
not better.
Maintenance of Aim. The aim of both the Armies in this battle was to destroy the
other. The Persians proposed to do it by first giving a defensive battle, wearing down the
enemy and then attacking and annihilating the adversary. The Muslims had initially planned
to attack the Persian Army and destroy them in a frontal action. Having failed in their bid, the
Muslims changed their plan but not the aim. The Persians changed their aim as well as plan.
Under the changed environment, the Persians wanted to attack and pursue the enemy and as
such fell into the trap.
Surprise and Deception. The improvised plan of Muslims is a classic example of
surprise and deception. The only comparable examples to this battle are the Trojan Horses
that preceded this battle by centuries and the German offensive in France during Second
World War that succeeded this battle after centuries. Having discovered that it was
impossible to destroy the enemy in his fortified positions, the Muslims conceived and simple
and workable deception plan. They executed it with full realism and effectiveness. The
enemy was fully convinced and walked into the trap. It was a bold plan with inherent risks
but then the initiative was with the planners and they conceived and executed it with greatest
responsibility in achieving their aim.
Flexibility of Plans. On the initial failure, the Muslims changed their plan of
manoeuvre displaying intellectual and moral strength and flexibility of heart and mind. The
Persians did the same initially but their decision to lay caltrops in the rear of their army
foredoomed chances of their making adjustments and a flexible rearrangement of line became
bleak after the initial rot had set in. A plan must be firm but flexible at the same time.
Intelligence. The Persian Army’s intelligence was the main cause of their defeat at the
Battle of Nehwand. They did feed correct information available in the enemy’s camp but the
staff failed to propertly evaluate it and draw fruitful conclusions. Had the Persian Army
discovered the location of Muslim cavalry and known the fresh arrangements and
reorganization by the Muslim Army behind the village Isbeezahan or correctly read the actual
morale conditions in the Muslim Army, then surely the Muslim plan would have only proved
to be no more than a clever ruse. Had this fact been established then the Persian commander
could have been able to conceive a better plan, particularly when the Muslims had voluntarily
separated their cavalry and infantry.
Reserves. The Persians reserve under anushaq was not used in its classic role of
reinforcing a threatened flank or restoring a lost position. Apparently the Persians were so

8
 BATTLE OF NEHAWAND

encouraged by the prospects of success against “retreating army” that they lost sight of the
basic tenets of operational strategy. They wanted to carry the day by sheer weight of
numbers. The Muslims kept their cavalry under Hazrat Waqas just for this purpose and used
it to their advantage till final success.
Economy in Political and Military. The Muslim High command chalked out well
defined political objectives which were aimed at the annexation of whole of Persia. To this
end the Caliph had correctly visualized the time frame and the military commanders were
given order to defeat the Persians at Nehawand. The decisions as flowing from the national
policy were implemented by military commanders. The military commanders were fighting
within the bounds laid down by the strategic necessity which was in complete harmony with
political and military objectives.
Dimension of time. Briefly the threat of the Persians was pre-empted before it
materialized in point of time by better intelligence network and quick assembly of forces by
the Muslims. There was race between the two in time frame and Muslims won it in point of
time and space.
Battle of Reserve Front. In destruction oriented concepts, the battle of reverse front
was as important then as it is today. Creating conditions for forcing the battle of reverse front
in modern strategy is also considered to be masterpiece manoeuvre. The way Hazrat Noman
did so, 1400 years ago was an unparalleled example at that time for non-believers.
Command and control. After the severe injury had been suffered by Hazrat Noman
which subsequently caused his death, the standard was picked up by his brother Hazrat
Nueim without giving an indication of commander’s death. There was no vacuum in the
command structure and as such the battle continued without any confusion.
Conclusion
The Battle of Newawand was the last major battle of Persians. Soon afterthis battle,
the cities of Nehawand and Hamandan fell to the Muslims and not too long afterwards the
Persian Empire disintegrated. The defeat of Persian Army opened the doors of the remaining
cities of Iran to the Arabs. Emperor Yazdjurd bolted towards ‘Jardara” and he could not dare
to take any effective action against the Arabs, in their advance towards Isphahan and
Azirbaijan which was undertaken the new commander of Mulsim Army Hazrat Nueim Bin
Muqran. In the south east, Hazrat Musa Azhaari captured the area of the Faras Province.

9
 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

BATTLE OF QADISIYYA
MUSLIM CONQUEST OF PERSIA
BACKGROUND/OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT/ EVENTS LEADING TO
THE BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

Two great Regional powers at the rise of Islam

In the first quarter of seventh century at the time of rise of Islam there were two
great regional powers existing in the neighbourhood of i.e. the Roman and the Persian
empires Arabia. The Roman Empire comprised Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon,
Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria, Italy, Southern
France and a portion of Spain. The Roman Empire was well established. It was a
Christian Empire backed up by rest of the Christian world. The Persian Empire
comprised present day Iraq, Iran, Baluchistan, Afghanistan and Southern portion of
present day Russia. The Persian Empire was established in 550 BC by Cyrus. At the time
of rise of Islam the Persian Empire had people of various races and religions comprising:
Zoarastrians, Persians, Turkish, Armenians, Kurds and Christian Arabs.

Muslims and the Roman and Persian empires

The Persian and Roman Empires had settled boundaries and were enjoying a
status-quo and policy of peaceful coexistence. The emergence of Islam almost in the
geographical centre of these two powers posed a threat which could result in their joining
hands with each other at the time of need. However, both these empires had reached a
point of stagnation and there were signs of cracks in them. Though economically sound,
the empires suffered from the internal instability because of the court politics among
feudal lords. There was an atmosphere of social injustice and discontentment in the
masses. On the other hand, the new Muslim power had a unique social economical
programme. This state was not as established as the neighbouring empires and had yet to
expand in all spheres.

Balance of Power in the Region

a. As stated earlier the Persians and Roams around the Arabian Peninsula
were well established. They had no intentions to expand their rule any
more nor did they visualize any threat from each other or from any other
power including Muslims till Romans defeats in Syria. Musana met the
forces of Hirmuz, the Persian governor of Uballa, at the Battle of Bahylon
in July 634. The details of this battle are not known but the Muslim Army
was able to blind the Persian elephants with arrows and javelin. The
defeated Persian Army made its way to Ctesiphon. After his departure
from Hira (Iraq) in June 634 AD, Hazrat Khalid had left Musana Bin
Harisa in command of 9000 Muslims at Hira. Yazdjard, the last of the
Sasanis, ascended the throne in 13 Hijri (633 AD). In the same year,

1
 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

Hazrat Abu Bakr, the first Caliph appointed Musana bin Harrisa
commander of Muslims in Hira and ordered Khalid bin Waleed to proceed
to Iraq. In the meantime, political and military changes of significance had
taken place in Persia. Persian General Rustam who had killed Queen of
Persia Azmeerdukht to avenge his father’s blood had acquired political
and military power in the Persian Region and kept a Sasani figure head
emperor Yazdjard in Ctesiphon. Rustam despatched many expeditions
against the Muslims in Iraq but eveytime they suffered defeat at the hands
of Muslims.

b. The Battle of Bridge:- On the death of Caliph Hazrat Abu Bakr in August
21, 634 AD, Hazrat Musanna was reinforced by Hazrat Abu Ubeid and the
latter was given the command. Hazrat Abu Ubeid fought many battles
with the Persians in the valleys of Rivers Euphrates and Tigris but was
finally defeated by the Persians in the battle of the Bridge on Euphrates on
November 28, 634 AD. Out of the 9000 muslims who had taken part in
this battle 4000 laid down their lives of whom a little more than half were
drowned 6000 Persians perished in this battle.

c. Battle of Buweib:- Musanna later reinforced by forces of Madina avenged

the Muslim defeat in the Battle of Bridge by his victory over the Persians
in the Battle of Buweib. This battle of Buweib also became known as the
Battle of tens because 100 Muslims killed ten Persians each in combat.
Meanwhile, Caliph Hazrat Umar sent four more expeditions to Southern
Iraq to conquer and absorb the Persian district of Furat on eastern bank of
Tigris, Abarqubaz, north of Furat, Dast Meisan east of Abarqubaz and
Meisan west of Tigris.

d. Defeat of Persians at Buweib and Muslim incursions in Southern Iraq had

much annoyed the Persian General Rustam. He therefore ordered a general
mobilization for a final showdown with the Muslims. On receipt of this
information Caliph Hazrat Umar despatched Hazrat Saad Abi Waqqas to
reinforce Hazrat Musanna, but Hazrat Musanna died before Hazrat Saad
could join him.

e. While Muslims were assembling their forces at Madina the situation in

Iraq was such that Hazrat Musanna considered it prudent to vacate Hija
and move to Sharaf. It is here that Saad arrived with his contingent and
married up with the Army of late Hazrat Musanna Bin Harisa. On the
Syrian front Muslims had gained glorious victories. The Romans had been
defeated in Ajnadein, Emessa and Yarmuk, the last being fought in August
636AD.

f. The situation in Syria was in favour of Muslims but the Roman Empire
had yet to be dealt with further blows. Therefore not many forces could be

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 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

shifted form that area to Iraq to face the Persians. The Muslims were quite
content that the two empires had not so for been allowed to put up a united
front or field an allied Army against the Muslims. This was due to the
grand strategy of the Muslims.

g. While Rustam made grand preparations to field the largest Army under his
personal command against the Muslims, Caliph Hazrat Umar did consider
postponing operation against Persians so as to fully concentrate against
Romans and then deal with the Persians. But this would have been against
the grand strategy worked out by Caliph Hazrat Abu Bakr. It would have
meant best part of Iraq, going on defensive and allowing the Persians
enough time to strengthen their preparations.

h. Caliph Hazrat Umar therefore decided that both the fronts should be kept
alive. This would be more profitable militarily as well as politically. This
assessment proved to be correct in latter analysis.

Appointment of Saad bin Abi Waqqas a Commander

i. Hazrat Umar appointed Saad bin Abi Waqqas as the Commander of war
against the Persians in Iraq. In 15 Hijri. May 636 AD Saad marched with a
small army of 4000 men. At Zarad, Saad sent couriers to all the tribes,
urging them to join the Muslim Army. As a resent of these efforts, 7000
warriors from Bani Asad and Bani Tameem tribes joined the Muslim
Army and another 4000 men where despatched to join the Army at Zarad.
Saad marched for Sharaf at the head of 15000 men where Musanna had to
join him but before the arrival of Sadd at Sharraf Musanna had died owing
to the wounds suffered by him at the battle of the Bridge. Saad arrived at
Sharaf 15 Hijri (July 636 AD) and soon after his arrival there he was
received by Mussanna’s brother Myanna, who conveyed his late brothers
assessment that the battle with the Persian shored he fought between
Qadisiyyia and Uzlib. Under the latest orders of Caliph Umar, Saad
organized the Muslim Army unto terms and was also joined by 800 strong
cavalry of Mugheera bin Shuba at Sharaf. Caliph Umar sent another letter
asking Saad to march from Sharaf towards the Persians and remain at
Qadisiyyia without bearing that place. While Saad was at Sharaf, Muslims
were fighting the battle of Yarmuk in 636 AD in which the Roman Army
was defeated and as such Caliph Umar, after the victory of at Yarmuk,
sent 1700 men from Syria to Saad under the command of Ashas bin Qeis
bringing the total strength of Saad’s Army to about 29000.

Final March to Qadisiyya

Saad conducted his final March to Qadisiyyia as a tactical movement. The forces
Bani Tameen led the advance along the main route and secured Uzeib, where a Persian
scout was captured and killed. The main body of the Army closed up under Zuhra and the

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 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

advance guard crossed the Trench of Subur and occupied Qadisiyyia. Zubra advanced
with the main Army to the bank of river Ateeq and secured the west end of the bridge.
Zubra also occupied Qudies to the south. Zubra sent a raiding party north f Hira and
captured and killed the guards of a bridal procession of the daughter of the governor of
Hira. The borty was distributed among the members of the raiding party.
The Persians on the other hand had moved no moment during a month and the
supplies brought by the Muslim Army were exhausted. Saad sent some raiding parties to
Suwad together supplies. Muanna and Asim crossed the Euphrates struck at towns and
villages in the region from Anbar to Kaskar.

STRATEGIC AIMS AND COMPULSIONS

The Persians and Romans were quite contended with what they possessed. They
had reached the climax and were enjoying the wealth of their respective empires. Their
aims were restricted to protect their geographical boundaries. Muslims aimed at
protection of the boundaries of their new state as well as extention of their ideology to the
rest of the world. The Persians and Romans had no dearth of manpower and resources
whereas the Muslims had neither enough resources nor sufficient manpower to support
their aims and objectives. The strategic compulsions of Muslims as such were: -

a. For smaller population base while preserving own strength, maximum

attrition must be caused on to the enemy and the relative strength ration
altered the enemy and the relative strength ratio altered.

b. To meet the needs of manpower, the apostates must come back in the fold
of Islam and their reliability improved.

c. The Romans and Persians had different religions and though contended in
their respective areas could unite which must be prevented. To this end,
while dealing with one, the base must be protected from the other.

d. For own resources and relative strength situation, one adversary to be dealt
at one time and two front war avoided.

e. Keeping in view the military strength of Romans and Persians the

Muslims must add to their forces to achieve 2:1 ratio, backed up by
superior strategic concept and tactical doctrine under competent
leadership.

f. The Muslims had to tolerate other religions and faiths in the conquered
territory to make use of the manpower and convert them to their faith
progressively through motivation rather than sword.

g. For the lack of economic potential of the Muslims, additional territories

must be annexed to support their economy and armed machine.

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Muslims Strategy for the Battle of Qadisiyya

Caliph Hazrat Umar spelt out Muslim strategy for the Battle of Qadsisiyya in a
letter to Saad Bin Abi Waqqas. He wrote to him:-

“March with the Muslims from Sharaf towards the Persians. Place your
faith in Allah and seek His help. And know that you are advancing against a
people who whose numbers are vast, whose equipment is superb, whose strength
great and whose land is difficult. Even its plains consist of river and heavily
watered land. When you met anyone of them, attack them fiercely, but beware of
facing them if they are all together. Let them not trick you for they are wily
plotters and their ways are not your ways. When you get to Qadisiyya, remain
their and leave not your place. They will find your continued stay intolerable and
will come against you with all their strength of cavalry and infantry. And if you
stand firm against them, you shall, overcome them and should they ever assemble
again in great numbers, they shall do so without hearts”.

“And should the result be otherwise, you will have the desert behind. You
can withdraw into a region which you know and control and of which they are
ignorant and afraid. And there you shall stay till Allah decides victor for you and
you return to battle”. (An extract from Muslim Conquest of Persia by Lt. Gen. A l
Akram.)

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 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

THE BATTLE-FIELD OF QADISIYYA

The plain of Qadisiyya was bounded on the west by trench of Sabur and on the
east by River Ateeq; the space between them being about 4 to 5 miles. The trench was
built as an obstacle but it had now been silted up. The River Ateeq which no longer exists
today, took off from somewhere west of Najaf, a region of marshes which it drained and
flowed past Khaffan into the Eupparates. It was a sizable river, though not of the size of
Eupharates.

North of plains of Qadisiyya was a large lake with two routes going along sides,
one from Qadisiya to Hira and other from Qadisiyya to Najaf. South of Qadisiyya lay a
number of lakes stretching up to Walaja. The plain was the only stretch for a large scale
battle. Beyond the trench it merged into desert.

The ground was suitable for a defensive battle but had restricted space for wide
manoeuvre. From the attacker’s point of view the restrictions posed by the terrain were: -

a. A frontal engagement.
b. Defender well protected from flanks due to marshes.
c. Restricted routes of withdrawal in case of defeat.
d. Desert located in the west would slow down the movement of heavily
equipped armies and success could not be exploited.

Considerations for Selection of Site

The Muslims could have fought this battle at sharaf, Hira or between the rivers
Euphrates and Tigiris-areas where so many earlier but smaller battles had taken place.
However the main considerations for giving a battle at Qadissiyya were correctly
assessed and given out in the strategy for the forthcoming battle by the Caliph Hazrat
Umar. Additionally the Muslims aimed at: -

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 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

a. Gaining time for preparation and shifting of forces from Syria in case of
need. Had the Muslims assembled across Ateeq, the battle would have
been forced much earlier.

b. Protection of manoeuvre by deploying advance guard etc.

c. Posing constant threat to Persia by raids etc thus drawing them to battle at
the ground their choosing.

This battle site, the Muslims visualized, would impose following disadvantages
on the Persians: -
a. Restricted space for manoeuvre thus denying them the capability of
generating full combat power.

b. River Atteq and obstacle in their rear denied them the space for re-
grouping/re-adjustment. Similarly the lakes on flanks further aggravated
the situation.

MOVE/ASSEMBLY OF FORCES AND PLANS

Muslim Army.

In Rabi-ul-Awal, 15 Hijra (May 636 AD), a force of 4,000 warriors under the
command of Hazrat Saad Bin Abi Waqqas commenced move from Madina to battle-field
of Qadisiyya. He was instructed to halt at Zarud and muster more forces. Hazrat Saad
was able to collect 7,000 people at Zarud and in the meantime a force of another 4,000
Muslims joined his army from Madina. This made the total of Muslim strength to 15,000.
Hazrat Saad was now ordered to move to Sharaf and on reaching Sharaf, 12,000 warriors
of Hazrat Musanna also joined the Muslim Army making its strength to 27,000. Here the
army was organized into its proper tactical groups based on decimal system ad then
marched to Qadisiyya as directed by the Caliph. The move from Sharaf to Qadisiyya was
conducted tactically with the advance guard moving ahead of main body. The advance

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 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

guard under Hazrat Zuhar crossed the trench of Sabur, secured the western end of the
bridge over River Ateeq and spread out along Ateeq including Qudis in the south. Prior to
the actual battle the Muslims carried out a number of raids deep in the Persian Empires,
aimed at: -

a. Maintaining an offensive spirit/posture.

b. Restoring confidence in the newly inducted apostates.
c. Forcing a battle on Persians at Qadisiyya the ground of Muslim choice.
d. Delaying the Persian Army preparations for battle by imposing caution on
them.
e. Gathering supplies badly needed to maintain Muslim Army.
f. Destroy the confidence of both the civilian population and of the Persian
forces.

Persian Army

The Persian Army comprising 60,000 warriors and 33 war elephants moved from
Ctesiphon under Rustam along the main road to Najaf. An advance guard under Jalinus
was moved towards Qadisiyya. They made first halt at Kusa. The advance guard then
crossed Euphrates and camped at Najaf. While the main body went to Burs and then
moved to Miltat, north-east of Najaf, the whole army closed up and encamped. After few
days, the advance guard with adequate gap. The advance echelons moved forward and
occupied Teeznabad (between Kharara and River Ateeq). Persian General Bahman with a
large corps Seilahun. After watching the Muslims reaction, the advance guard under
Jalinus was moved to River Ateeq, Bahman with his corps to Teeznabad and Rustam
with main body moved up to Kharara. The advance guard of Jalinus deployed along
Ateeq as covering force.

Plans and Deployment

Muslim Army

The Muslim Army was deployed in five corps with a depth of three ranks.
In each contingent the first rank was formed by the cavalry, behind it stood a line of men
armed with swords and spears or Javelins, followed by a line of archers. The commanders
of the troops and their locations were: -

a. Centre Hazrat Saad with Hmal Bin Malik as a

commander of Infantry.

b. Left Centre Hazrat Asim Bin Amr

c. Right Centre Hazrat Zuhra Bin Al Hawiyya
d. Left Wing Hazrat Shurahbeel Bin As-Samt
e. Right Wing Hazrat Abdullah Bin Al-Mu’tim
f. Reserve Hazrat Salman Bin Rabee’a

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 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

Persian Army

The Persian Army deployed in five corps with a depth of 13 ranks. The
cavalry formed the front line in all corps and behind stood the infantry. The elephants
closely supported by infantry were used as squadrons to break the strength of the Muslim
cavalry. The commanders of the corps and their locations were: -

a. Centre -Rustam
b. Left Centre -Beerzan
c. Right Centre -Jalinus
d. Left Wing -Mihran
e. Right Wing -Hormuzan
f. Reserve -Bahman

Covering Force

The Muslim as well as Persians moved into the battle-field with advance
guard protecting the main forces. In the battle-field itself both sides made the
arrangements for their flank protection. There was however, no fine manoeuvre
undertaken by either side in the conduct phase due to the restrictions imposed by the
ground. The Muslims selected the ground of Qadisiyya as a part of their strategical and
tactical design to force a battle on Persians on the ground of their choice. The Persians
accepted it out of the compulsion in a bid to finish the Muslims once for all who were
posing grave threat to the Empire by earlier battles ad subsequent raids etc.

Analysis of Plans

The Focal Point

The focal point of the Muslim plan was to contain the enemy by frontal
engagements and cause maximum attrition on him during the initial phase of the battle;
also seek an opportunity to kill enemy commander in individual combat to achieve
psychological ascendancy over the adversary. This would also amount to disturbing the
centre of gravity. After the desired attrition of Persian Army, change relative strength,
attack enemy flanks and while scaling bulk of his forces, force a central rupture for
division of his efforts and undertake subsequent destruction. This was to be followed by
exploitation/pursuit east of River Ateeq. The Persian Army planned to contain the centre,
defeat the two wings and then envelop the centre. Thereafter they would use elephants to
break the strength of Muslim cavalry thus divorcing the cavalry from infantry. After the
desired effects, they would attack with rest of the army and subsequently destroy the
adversary by an all out attack.

The Selection of Objective

The Muslim political high command as well as military command selected

well defined objectives that would help in destruction of enemy forces at Qadisiyya. The
Muslims planned to force a battle of reverse front on Persians by drawing them away

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from their cantonments across Rive Ateeq. The Persian objectives were to destroy the
Muslim raiders in major battle. The Persian political high command and military
commander wee not in line with the selection of objectives. The Persian commander
Rustam wanted to avoid a major head on clash with Muslims at the ground of Muslims
choice but he was compelled by the Emperor to do so.

THE CONDUCT OF BATTLE OF QDDISIYYA

First Day

a. Persian Attack. After individual combats, Persians launched the attack

with heavy shower of arrows which were comparatively heavier with
bows having longer range. They did gain an upper edge over the Muslims.
Rustam then ordered the attack on Muslims “Right”, while rest of the
Muslims front was kept engage by the archers. The attack was led by
elephants. The Muslims right was pushed back a little due to frightening
effect of the elephants on the horses. Immediately Hazrat Saad ordered
centre and right wings to attack Persian left while making necessary
readjustments in his position to eliminate the threat. He did not think it
proper to commit his reserve at this state. The elephants enjoyed the
protections. Each elephant was mounted by several men armed with
javelin and bows. The Muslims picked off the Persians on the elephants
and then slipped in and cut the firth of the howdahs. Some of the elephant
riders were killed while the rest beat a hasty retreat with their elephants.
After a fierce fighting the Persians were pushed back from the Muslim
position.

b. Rustam then launched his reserve under Bahman against Muslim

contingent which had repulsed the first Persian attack considering it to be
the Muslim reserve. He launched his right wing and right centre forward
to achieve decisive break through and later to hold and engage the Muslim
centre. The attack was again led by the elephants. There was some distress
in the Muslim ranks because of the elephants but their commanders like
Hazrat Asim Bin Amr and Hazrat Amr Bin Madi Karib rose to the
occasion and severed the elephants and their rides by skilful use of sword,
javelin and arrows. The Persians were again pushed back to their position.

c. Muslim Counter Attack. Hazrat Saad after re-establishing the front gave
fourth call which meant general attack. It was in the late afternoon. A
fierce fighting ensued with several wedges created in the Persian front.

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 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

Shortly before sunset a group of Muslims tried to penetrate deep to kill

Rustam and finish the battle once for all but the attack was repulsed by
Rustam along with his headquarters personnel. By sunset the Persians
were able to re-establish their front, the fighting for the day ended and
both the armies returned to their camps.

Second Day

Second day, the fighting resumed on the orders of Muslim Commander-in-Chief

following the same pattern ie duels preceding the general engagement. A large number of
duels took place. Just before noon, Muslim reinforcements from Syria started arriving. It
was force of 1,000 men commanded by Hazra Hashim Rin Utba. He sent Hazrat Quqa
Bin Amr with 700 men ahead of the rest. Hazrat Qaqa with 100 of his fastest horses and
100 of his bravest men, set off for Qadisiyya, instructing the remainders to follow on ad
make the best men into tens, giving instructions that each group of ten should move after
a short interval so as to arrive on the battlefield separately to create psychological effects.
The reinforcements, despite fatigue of journey did not wait but immediately joined the
battle. This immensely boosted the Muslims morale and unnerved Persians. At this
critical time Hazrat Saad Was in a position to change the relative strength comparatively
in his favour avoiding a major reverse. The reinforcements were briefed short of
battlefield for their positions. Hazrat Qaqa-challenged Persians for individual combats
and killed Persian Generals Bahmand and Beerzan. Following are major accounts of the
day: -

a. The First Muslim Attack. At about noon, Hazrat Saad gave the orders for
general attack. The Muslim regiment again swept forward but the Persians
stood like a rock in the path of Muslims attack. The most significant
resistance was from the Persian heavy cavalry which stood ahead of the
Persian Army, intimately supported by the heavily armed infantry.
Fighting increased in intensity and casualties began to mount on both
sided but the Persians could not be shaken. After an hour or two, the
Muslims pulled back to their own positions and both sides got a little
respite. During this lull Hazrat Qaqa, with Hazrat Saad’s permission, put
into effect an extremely ingenious tactical innovation. Collecting a number
of camels, their faces were covered and by the use of props of various
kinds, the shape of camels heads was distorted to make them look like
wild monsters. The Persian horses standing in the path of on-coming super
beasts turned and fled, knocking down Persian infantry men on the way
and nothing but the River Ateeq could arrest their flight. As the remaining
Persians on this part of the front re-established, Hazrat Qaqa moved the
camels in the direction of Persian and no sooner did they get near the
Persians front when the Persian horses turned and bolted.

b. Second Muslim Attack. A little before sunset the Persians, abandoned by

their cavalry, disorganized by the gaps which had suddenly appeared in
their midst due to the flight of the cavalry, were extremely vulnerable.

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 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

With clear judgment, Hazrat Saad seized the opportunity and ordered
resumption of the attack. He Muslim Army again went into action. The
mounted groups made for gaps left by the departed Persian cavalry.
Through the gaps the Muslim groups penetrated deep towards the rear of
the Persian Army. At this juncture, Hazrat Qaqa made a determined bid
for the Persian Commander-in-Chief, so that if he could get him, all
resistance would collapse but his attack was repulsed by a counter-attack
personally led by Rustam. Muslims fully realised that centre of gravity
laid in Rustm.

c. As he night fell slowly and steadily the fighting for the day stopped. The
Muslims had so far lost 2500 men and the Persians 10,000.

Third Day

On the third day of the battle the Persian elephants again joined the battle after
necessary treatment of their wounds. This tiem they used the new technique of protection
for these elephants but it was effectively countered by Muslims. The Persian attack began
at mid-morning. Their first action was a storm of arrows let loose against the Muslims.
The elephants moved forward surrounded by infantry and protected by cavalry on the
flanks. The effect on the Arab horses was again frightening and many of them broke out
of control and panicked. Most riders, however, were able to control their mounts and
either pulled back a short distance or move aside to avoid the elephants. The result was
great deal of confused fighting along the whole front with the elephants charging the
Muslim cavalry and infantry: -

a. Muslim Action with Elephants. The position of the Muslim Army

continued to weaken under the attacks of Persians, particularly of the
elephants. The main problem was the elephants, and the two leaders which
stood in the Persian centre. Persian officers who had joined the Muslim
Army during the preceding month were consretted about the technique
and method to neutralize the elephants. Accordingly two pairs of selected
officers were ordered to move with a group of people each and blind the
leaders of the elephants and cut off their trunks.

b. Accordingly a plan was made by those officers to tackle the elephants. A

strong group of riders and foot soldiers moved forward with these officers.
The mounted and foot soldiers surrounded the entire group around the
white elephant. They shouted and engaged the elephant riders, some of
them closed in on the Persian group with the swords from the flanks and
rear to draw the attention of the Persian Army from the front and create as
much confusion as possible. The plan was aimed at separating the
elephants from the soldiers, isolate them ad then deal with them.

c. The plan was effectively executed and within a few minutes all the
Persians had concentrated on the flanks and the rear of the elephants to

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 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

meet the attack of the Muslims and the front was left completely open.
The officers advanced upon the champion beasts which had played, such
as havoc with the Muslim Army. They blinded the beasts with accurate
javelin attack and severed their trunks. Across the Muslims left and centre
other Muslim officer employed the same tactics and achieved similar
success.

d. After this encounter the Muslims left, attacked the elephants which by
now, had lost the protective screen. The blinding and mutilation of the
elephants took the sting out of the Persian attack. The elephants rushed
wherever their instincts led or misled them. They plunged into the river
and vanished, quite a few Persians joined their retreat and jumped into the
river. The bulk of the Persian Army, however remained on the battle-field
an saw with sorrow the fight of its most powerful weapon of war.

e. Arrival of Reminder of Reinforcements. In the meantime remained of

the reinforcement also joined and were deployed on the Muslim right. The
Persian soldier after the loss of the elephants turned to fight the Muslim
Army to a draw if not to a victory.
f. Muslims Counter-Attack. The Persian were engaged but gave a tough
resistance. Eventually, in the late afternoon the Muslim Army pulled back
to repost the stratagem of camels but this time it failed. Hazrat Saad again
put his warriors into motion to attack but the day ended without any
visible results.

g. Night of Qadisiyya. Unlike other days of the battle, the fighting continued
throughout the night. Hazrat Saad planned, however, to launch his attack
according to a proper design, but this was not to be. The Muslim
contingents went into the assault at their own, without waiting to the
orders of their Commander-in-Chief or even his permission. This was not
so much a lull in the fighting as a lowering of frequency and it had not
lasted long before Muslims launched a fresh attack under their respective
commanders.

h. At sunrise the fighting ceases and the belligerent found that for all their
efforts and sufferings, neither side had gained or lost a yard of ground.
Meanwhile the Muslim Commander-in-Chief re-established a degree of
control over his corps and planned his next attack. The Persians went on to
a defensive posture.
Fourth Day

a. Hazrat Saad control over the army was not sufficiently strong for him to
give detailed orders. All he could do was to lay down directions of attacks
and this he did as follows: -

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 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

“The strongest contingents in the Muslims right centre and right

wing respectively would attack from the right and break through
the left flanks, the rest of the army would attack frontally, the
Muslims wing and centre would meet behind the Persian centre in
a converging movement. The aim of the Muslim High Command
was to seal off enemy rear and them destroy the enemy forces”.

b. In the middle of the morning, the Muslims resumed their attack. For
sometime the battle again degenerated into a butchery and there were
signs that it would be fought to a stand still with heavy losses to both side,
but for the first time in the past 24 hours, sighs of weakness appeared in
the Persian front. Their right under Harmuzan and the left centre were
pushed back as a result of the flanking movement, but after withdrawing a
short distance they reformed ranks and stood firm. So the situation
remained till about noon when Hazrat Qaqa pierced with a regiment and
made a dash for the Persians Headquarters. The Persian Commander-in-
Chief Rustam was caught and killed.

c. Last Phase. Early in the afternoon the Muslims launched another attack
with Hazrat Qaqa already at the Persians Headquarters, and the Persian
wings having been pressed back. The Army of Islam attacked as one body
and the fighting reached its climax along the semi circle in which the
Persian Army had been forced. After a fierce fighting, the Persian front
broke down. The Persian centre collapsed and the men fled in panic
towards the rive. The 15,000 chained men were cut into pieces. Many
Persian drowned in the rive and a few escaped to safety.

Persian Withdrawal and Muslim Pursuit

Jalinus, noticing the absence of orders from Rustam at once assumed the
command of the Persian Army and ordered a general withdrawal towards the Dam. He
picked up strong group of warriors, and rushed for the Dam to drive away the Muslims
who were there and threw a defensive are around its western end to keep it safe for use.
Towards this perimeter, Persian units began to withdraw and through it they crossed to
safety. Troops of several Muslim contingents launched attacks to dislodge, but the
Persian rear guard held firm and repulsed al attacks. Meanwhile other Persian units were
fleeing in other directions.

Hazrat Saad now brought up his last reserve of strength and put in a last ferocious
attack with sword and dagger to destroy the enemy forces and exploit the situation. He
also sent immediate order of Hazrat Zuhra to move after the withdrawing Persians and
pursue them on the road to Najaf. Hazrat Zuhra picked up three hundred of his toughest
horsemen and made for the Dam. Hazrat Saad sent two other columns towards north and
south to destroy the withdrawing enemy.

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 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

Meanwhile Jalinus had done a commendable job under extremely adverse

conditions, getting the remnants of the Persians across the Dam to safety. And all this
time Hormuzan had stood at he bridge over the main road to Najaf, supervising
withdrawal. Not too many Persians came to the Dam, but those who did, safely got
across; and when no Persians remained in sight, Jalinus destroyed the Dam and moved
upstream along the east bank of Areeq. Arriving at the bridge, he took charge of
operations from Hormuzan.

Hazrat Zuhra got to the Dam and found it destroyed. There was no trace of any
organized Persian force across the river. Intending to give Jalinus no time to reorganize
his army for another battle Hazrat Zuhra jumped his horse into the rive and followed by
his three hundred riders, swam across to the east bank thus denying enemy a clean break.
He caught up with Jalinus at the bridge. Here a short action was fought in which Jalinus
repulsed the Muslim attack. The bulk of the Persian survivors had already gone up
towards Najaf and Jalinus kept with him a body of cavalry, to deter and delay pursuit by
the Muslims. After a short while he broke contact and retreated northwards leaving the
bridge intact. Hazrat Zuhra followed and Jalinus was again caught up near Kharara and
was killed. As Jalinus fell, the Persians turned and fled, closely followed by the Muslims.
The pursuit continued up to Najaf, and all the way large number of straggle were killed
by Hazrat Zuhra’s riders. Najaf was reached after sunset and little later as nigh fell,
Hazrat Zuhra turned about and led his column back, marching all the night and arriving at
Qadisiyya shortly before dawn.

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

General

a. The Preparatory Manoeuvre, its Strategic Direction and Effects. The

Muslims were committed on Syrian front against Romans when the
Muslim High Command got the information of Persian preparation for
battle in Iraq. The Muslim High Command was badly in need of time to
gather a sizable force for battle with Persians. As such they withdrew their
contingents from Suwad to Sharaf and started mustering forces for the
forthcoming operation. Progressively a force of 28,000 men was gathered
and placed at Qadisiyya near Persian border which posed a direct threat to
Iraq-the territory then under Persian Empire. The time was so fixed to
suite Muslim offensive as also shifting of forces from Syrian front because
it was assessed that by then the major battle or battles will be over against
Romans in Syria. The Muslim force on Persian border alongwith raids in
the Persian territory forced the Persians to come out from the security of
their cantonment and fight the battle at Qadisiyya- the ground of Muslims
choice. The bait was swallowed by the Persians and Muslims achieved the
desired effects of their preparatory manoeuvre. They gained the required
time as well as forced the adversary to girth the battle in the restricted
space at Qadisiyya. The Persians moved a force of 60,000 to be positioned
on the borders to serve as deterrent to Muslims as a part for their

15
 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

preparatory manoeuvre. Their aim was generally a show of strength so that

Muslim forces move away from their borders but they failed to achieve the
desired effects.

b. The Main Strategic Manoeuvre, Its Strategic Direction and Effects

Achieved. The main strategic manoeuvre of Muslims was directed against
the fertile land of milk and honev to boost up their economy and was
potential. The strategic direction of the manoeuvre was towards Persian
Capital Median (Then known as Ctesiphon). The Persians failed to
establish the Muslim intentions and moved out their forces where Muslims
wanted to defeat them. The Persians had no sound plan of a fine strategic
manoeuvre. In fact, they moved in haste without a definite aim. In the
conduct of the battle, the Muslim correctly appreciated the Persians main
stay and centre of gravity which was in elephants and Persian commander
Rustam respectively. The Muslims were able to destroy both which caused
much imbalance to their adversary. The main stay of the Muslims was in
strong reserve of cavalry and their centre of gravity was a faith in Allah
and able leadership of their Commander Hazrat Saad Bin Abi Waqqas.
The Persians tried for Muslim Commander but failed.

c. Speed and Scale of the Offensive. The Muslims were in no hurry. In fact
they wanted to gain time so that the battles in Syria could reach to a
decision before a major battle against Persians. They however, remained
mentally and physically alert to check Persian movement and even posed
caution on them by raids to delay their preparations. Despite lack of
resources the Muslims were able to must a large Army at Qadisiyya in an
unexpected time. The Persians on the other hand, were not quite clear in
their aim, numbering 60,000 moved out half heartedly and encamped in
the valley of Euphrates and Tigris waiting for the next Muslim movement.
Their speed of movement, construction of Dam over River Ateeq and
subsequent conduct of withdrawal was however marvelous keeping in
view the size of the army and its heavier equipment. In the conduct phase,
the speed of movement on either side was excellent but Muslim Army
which was lightly equipped cold move much faster than Persians. As a
matter of fact, the Muslim High Command conceived the battle in its
totality right from the start.

d. Manoeuvre Related to Ground. The manoeuvre of the Muslim Army

was in relation to the space provided by the plan of Qadisiyya. The space
available was just enough for any army numbering 29,000. The Persians
were dragged to the restricted space not enough for 60,000 men and 33
war elephants. The area of battle-field supported the Muslim strategic
concept. As mentioned earlier Qadisiyya was selected by the Caliph
himself and as per his strategic point, the Muslims had the desert at their
back thus they could not only preserve their strength but also avoid any

16
 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

serious reverses. The Persian Army in the desert warfare did not equal the
Muslims. This also compensated for disparity in relative strength situation.

e. Strategic Dimensions of the Manoeuvre. The Muslim commitments in

Syria and disparity of resources directed minimum delay of two months
before Persian front could be opened. To this end the battle ground was
selected at Qadisiyya which did not suit the Persian strategic view point.
The Muslims resorted to raids on settlements east of Ateeq, which not
only imposed caution on the Persians vis-à-vis establishing the need to
beef up their preparations but also forced them to attack west of Ateeq.

f. Concept and Identification of Centre of Gravity. Both sides had

correctly identified each others centre of gravity. For the error in the initial
assembly and selection of battle-field, the Persians failed to compensate.
The Muslims on the other hand realized the relative strength disparity.
Thus as per their plans the tactical skill and competent leadership were
able to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. On the second day, the
enemy had suffered 10,000 casualties as opposed to 2500 amongst the
Muslims. Subsequently the casualties increased. With this changed state of
relative strength on the 4th day they were able to achieve victory over the
non-believers-thus they won the battle of frontiers to take on deeper
manoeuvres. During the conduct, realizing the centre f gravity at various
stages f battle, the Muslims not losing in point of time undertook
immediate measures to overwhelm the adversary. On the first day in a
matter of minute, it was clear to the Muslims that the elephants were the
main stay of Persians and they must be removed from the scene of the
battle-field. They also discovered that the protecting infantry could be
separated and after having done that they could demolish ‘HOEDAS’ on
the beasts. This, they did heroically and thus forcing Rustam to withdraw
his elephants. On the third day when elephants came again, Persians
provided a strong and closer infantry protection which demanded new
technique to again remove the elephants from the battle-field. To remove
the devil from the scene, selected officers were employed to blind and cut
off the trunks of the controlling elephants and through the velour of junior
leaders Hazrat Saad again snatching the initiative. Here, it is needless to
say that there is no substitute for personal example and this equally hold
good today.

g. Motivation. To Muslims religion was a strong motivating force. While

Muslim is promised Paradise in case of death in the holy war, the victory
gives him just share of booty and rich spoils of the conquered territory.
These two elements had far-reaching effects of the Muslim soldiers. At the
end of this battle alone 7,000 dirhams were given to each infantry soldier
and 14,000 dirhams to each cavalry man.

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 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

h. Effects on Future Operations. Battle of Qadisiyya was a major episode

in the history of early battles of Islam between Persians and Muslims.
With the victory in the Muslims favour on the frontiers, conditions were
created to undertake the manoeuvre deep in Persia. The booty captured in
the battle was immense which boosted up Muslim was potential and
economy. The myth of Persian Army was shattered and confidence of
Muslims got an added stimulus. The Persians suffered 40,000 casualties as
against 6,000 in Muslim Army.

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR

BATTLE OF QADISYYIA

Following principles of war were applied/violate by the contestants: -

a. Maintenance of Aim. Starting from the assembly of forces, raids east of

River Ateeq, conduct of the battle itself including the method of induction
of the reinforcements, their launching in the battle and subsequent
exploitation by pushing columns across the river is a clear indication of
maintenance of aim.

b. Economy of Effort. Both the Muslims as well as the Persian Army kept
strong reserves initially to exploit the success achieved. The Persian
commander Rustam employed the reserves prematurely on the very first
day of the battle and thereby he was left with nothing in hand on the
subsequent days. The Muslim Commander Hazrat Saad Bin Abi Waqqas,
despite shortage of manpower, kept his reserves intact and used them
during the exploitation phase. There were some critical moments in the
battle where reinforcements were required by the Muslim Army
commander evaluated the risk in an economical way by readjustment of
positions keeping his reserves intact for the decisive punch.

c. Mobility. The speed of movement by construction of dam over River

Ateeq and subsequent crossing was marvelous keeping in view the size of
the Persian Army and its heavier equipment. In the execution phase, the
speed of movement on either side was excellent but Muslim Army which
was lightly equipped could move much faster than Persians.

d. Unity of Command. The Persian political and military high commands

were not in line with the section of objective. The Persian commander

18
 BATTLE OF QADISIYYA

Rustam wanted to avoid a major head on clash with Muslims at the ground
of Muslims choice but he was compelled by the Emperor in ding so.

e. Security. Both the sides applied this principle of war to suite their
operational plans. They adopted the measures to prevent surprise and deny
information to each other. The Muslim Army’s move form Sharaf to
Qadisiyya was conducted tactically with advance guards operating ahead
of the Main Body to prevent surprise by the enemy; and like-wise Rustam
also moved his advance guard under Jalinus operating ahead of the Main
Body towards Qadisiyya which later on was ordered to act as covering
force when deployed along River Ateeq. Both the sides enhanced their
security by seizure of important tactical grounds retaining initiative thus
depriving each other an opportunity to interfere.

f. Surprise. Surprise and deception were masterly planned and efficiently

executed at all levels. It is evident from Hazrat Qaqa’s deception plan of
bringing the reinforcements in smaller groups at intervals and cutting
down the battle procedure by Hazrat Saad, who briefed these
reinforcements on the move committing them in battle without much loss
of time. The use of camels with super structures deceived the Persians and
created the desired impact. Removal of elephants from the scene through
innovative tactics brought surprise for Rustam.

Conclusion

The victory at Qadisiyya opened the doors for Muslim conquests deep into
Persian Empire and within a decade, whole of Persia was captured by the Muslims. It
gave a severe shock to the Persians which they could not recover, though they put up
resistance at Jalula and Nehawand but it was possible only due to their strategic depth
and unlimited resources. They however, could not stop the deep Muslim offensive inside
their territory after this first major setback. Within few years the grand Persian Empire
was broken for ever and from Persia Islam started spreading rapidly in East and toward
Central Asia. Muslims occupied the important cities like Medain, Jalula, Basra and
Halman. Thus the prophesy of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) regarding the
Sultanates of Qaisro-Kisra was fulfilled.

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 BATTLE OF UHAD

BATTLE OF UHAD

Objectives:

a. Quraish. The main objective of the Quraish, as before, was to eliminate the
Muslims and knock out their base at Madina.
b. Muslims. For Muslims, it was the battle of their survival. At this stage they
could not hope to eliminate their enemies at Makkah. They however wanted to
establish their military reputation and consolidate the gains of the Battle of
Badr.
Contending Forces

Quraish Muslims

a. Commander Abu Sufian Muhammad (peace

be upon him)
b. Infantry 3000 650
c. Armoured men 700 100
d. Horse Cavalry 200 50
e. Camels 3000 Not known

Assembly of Forces and Move

a. Quraish. The Quraish started war preparations from the day they arrived in
Makkah after their defeat at Badr. Abu Sufian wished to attack with a much
larger force to ensure complete victory but he was constrained due to superior
Muslim strategy.
b. Muslims. The Muslims had been receiving the news of war preparations by
Makkans but could not do much due to their limited resources. They were still
very weak in manpower, war material, horses and camels, but their unshakable
faith in Islam had given them a complete psychological ascendancy over
Quraish. They signed pacts with Jews of Madina and went about spreading the
word of Allah as best as they could.
Plans

The Battle Field. Uhud is a massive feature lying four miles north of Madina (the
reference point being the ‘Masjid-e-Nabvi’). It is 1000 feet high and 5 miles long. In the
western part of Uhud, a large spur descends steeply to the ground and to the right of this spur,
as seen from the direction of Madina, a valley rises gently and goes up and away as it
narrows at a defile about 1000 yards from the foot of the spur. Beyond this defile it shrinks
into nothingness as it meets the main wall of the ridge.

The Muslim Plan. On receipt of information of departure of Quraish Army from

Makkah, the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) assembled his advisers and discussed the
courses open t him for fighting a battle. One was to fight a defensive battle from inside
Madina and the second to encounter the enemy outside the town. Following were major
considerations for choosing Uhud as a battle ground in favour of Madina:-

a. Non_existence of a parameter wall around Madina and lack of adequate

manpower to organize a proper fortress defence.

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 BATTLE OF UHAD

b. Lack of trust in Jews who were expected to betray Muslims from inside
Madina at any crucial moment.
c. Fear of treachery from a group of so-called Muslims later termed as
‘Munafeqeen’ (hypocrites).
d. Uhud provided tactically better position since an attack on Madina from the
most expected direction of north would expose the enemy’s rear and flanks to
Muslims occupying Uhud.
As soon as the Muslim Army moved out of Madina Abdullah Bin Abayy left the
Muslim camp as the head of 300 strong contingent on the plea that fighting the Quraish
outside Madina had no prospects of success. Thus the Holy Prophet’s (peace be upon him)
fear of ‘Munafeqeen’ came to be true. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) reached the
foot of Mount Uhud and deployed his 700 men strong Army for battle. The salient features of
the deployment were:-
a. Muslim forces were organized as a compact formation with a frontage of 1000
yards.
b. The right wing of Muslim forces was to rest at the foot of the spur and left one
at the foot of a feature called Einein which is a low hill about 400 feet high
and 500 feet long.
c. 50 archers were to be placed on Einein to command approaches along which
the Quraish could maneuver to the Muslims rear. Hazrat Abdullah Bin Jubair
was appointed as a commander of the archers. So long as the Muslims held
Einein the Quraish would not be able to manouvre to the Muslims left flank.
Hence the orders given to the commander of Einein Force were not to quit the
position in any event without personal orders from the Holy Prophet (peace be
upon him).
d. Behind Muslim lines were 14 women whose task was to give water to thirsty,
carry the wounded out of the battle and to dress their wounds. Among the
women was Hazrat Fatima, daughter of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and
wife of Hazrat Ali.
e. The Prophet’s (peace be upon him) position was to be on the left wing of his
army.
The Quraish Plan. The Quraish established the battle camp a mile south of Uhud.
Salient features of the Quraish plan were:-

a. The main body of infantry in the centre with two mobile wings.
b. The right mobile wing was to be commanded by Khalid Bin Waleed and the
left by Ikrama Bin Abu Jahl, each with a cavalry squadron of 100 horsemen.
Amr Bin Al-Aus was to be the overall commander of the cavalry but his main
task was coordination between the two wings.
c. Immediately behind the Quraish main body stood their women led by Hinda
wife of Abu Suffian. Their main task was to urge their men to chivalry-
through taunts and battle-field music.
Analysis of Plans

a. The Muslims plan was simple and well coordinated. The disadvantage in
inferiority of numbers was made up by presenting a narrow front with the
flanks and rears protected against any possible envelopment.
b. Einein occupied by Muslim archers enjoyed the importance of critical terrain
which the defender must hold and the attacker must acquire.
c. So long as Einein remained in Muslim hands the Quraish Army had to attack
frontally.

2
 BATTLE OF UHAD

d. The Quraish had also realized the importance of Einein and thus they
positioned Khalid bin Waleed’s force on the right flank to capture Einein and
exploit the success from the right, approaching the Muslim Army from the
rear. Ikrama was given a similar task the left flank.

BATTLE OF UHUD
Conduct of the Battle of Uhud

Both the forces were deployed according to their plans. It was the morning of
Saturday, 22 March 625 AD (The 7th of Shawal, 3 Hijra) exactly a year and a week after
Badr. Both the armies were deployed in orderly ranks, 700 Muslims against 3000 non-
believers. The battle was essentially fought in two clear phases:-

a. Phase I. In which the Muslims defeated the Quraish.

b. Phase II. In which the Quraish counter attacked and inflicted heavy losses on
the Muslims Army.

Attempt of Abu Amir to Subvert Aus. Abu Amir was a popular personality from
the tribeof Aus at Madina because of his piety and nobility before the advent of Islam. He had
migrated from Madina to Makkah in opposition of the Prophet (peace be upon him). He was
accompanied by 150 of his men who came to Quraish Camp to fight against the Muslims. He
thought that he would be able to subvert his tribe thus weakening the Muslim ranks but failed
in his attempt. Response from the Aus was negative followed by shower of stones at this
group. Amir along with his men hastily withdrew.

The Battle of Archers. After the encounter with Abu Amir, the archers opened up
from both sides. This was kind of artillery duel between the 100 archers of the Quraish and
the Muslim archers who were either in the group on Einein or dispersed along the front rank
of the Muslims. Under the cover of the Quraish archers, khalid advanced with his squadron to
attack the left wing of the Muslims. He could not succeed due to accurate engagement by the
Muslim archers.

Duels of the Champions. Talha son of Abu Talha, the standard bearer of Quraish,
came forward from the rank of non-believers and challenged the Muslims. Hazrat Ali came
out and before Talha could deliver a single blow, Hazrat Ali struck him with his sword and
Talha fell. On the fall of Talha another infidel came forward and picked up the Quraish
standard. He was killed by Hazrat Hamza. The duel became mor general and most of the
standard bearers were killed by Hazrat Ali. Hanzala struck the foreleg of Abu Sufian’s horse
and brought it down. One of Abu Sufian’s companions assisted him, who engaged and killed
Hanzala. Abu Sufian withdrew to the safety of the Quraish ranks.

The General Battle- Phase 1

a. After duels, the fighting became general and both armies got locked into fierce
hand-to-hand fight. As this general engagement of the main body progressed.
Khalid made another effort towards the left wing of the Muslims but was
driven back by the Muslim archers at Einein.
b. Hazrat Hamza was killed by a savage slave who had been promised heavy
reward for this by his master Jubier Bin Mutim and Hinda, wife of Abu
Sufian.
c. Soon after this, the Quraish army began to waver as the Muslims pressed
harder their assault. Most of the Quraish standard bearers had either been

3
 BATTLE OF UHAD

killed or wounded and as their standard fell, they broke off and fled in
disorder. There was complete panic in the ranks of the Quraish. Most of the
Muslim Army got to the Quraish camp and began to plunder it. A complete
confusion prevailed in the enemy camp. There was no order, no discipline, no
control, and the Muslims felt that the battle had been won.

Quraish Counter Attack-Phase 2

a. Both Khalid and Ikrama saw the retreat of the Quraish and the Muslims
plundering their camp. During all this, the two mobile wings of the Quraish
stood firm. Both Khalid and Ikrama kept complete control over their men.
Khalid watched the archers on Einein. With patience and waited for an
opportunity for action.
b. When the archers at Einein saw defeat of the Quraish and plunder of Quraish
camp by the Muslims, they became impatient to join in the plunder. Their
commander Abdullah Bin Jubai refused to grant them permission to join in the
plunder. He reminded the archers of the orders of the Prophet (peace be upon
him), ie not to leave their position in any case whether defeat or victory. In
spite of this, most of the archers left their position and Hazrat Abdullah was
left only with nine archers. This movement was observed by Khalid who
waited till the archers had reached the Quraish camp.
c. Seeing the archers leave their position at Einein, Khalid launched a cavalry
assault against the few who were still holding on along with their commander
Hazrat Abdullah. Once the position was captured, Khalid could have enough
room for manoeuvre to strike the Muslims in the rear form their left flank.
Seeing this Ikrama also came forward to help Khalid with his squadron.
d. The faithful archers resisted gallantly but some were killed or wounded and
others were driven off the hill by Khalid’s assault. Hazrat Abdullah was killed
during assault. Khalid’s squadron followed by Ikrama came forward and got
behind the line that had been held by Muslims an hour ago. The two
squadrons wheeled left and charged the Muslims from the rear. Ikrama with a
part of his squadron assaulted the group which stood with the Prophet (peace
upon him) while Khalid’s squadron and remainder of Ikrama’s squadron
attacked the Muslims in the Quraish camp.
e. Amara, one of the Quraish ladies who had not joined in the retreat picked up
the Quraish standard. Abu Sufian also regained the control of his infantry and
got his men back into action. Fierce fighting began and the Muslims started
fighting in small groups to repulse the attack. Muslims were faced with two
pronged attack, the Quraish cavalry attacking from the rear and the bulk of the
Quraish infantry attacking from the front.
f. The battle got divided into tow separate actions. There was the main body of
the Muslims holding against main assault of the Quraish Army. Second group
with the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) held part of Ikrama’s squadron
and some of the Quraish infantry. The Prophet (peace be upon him) was
wounded and fell into a ditch from where he was later lifted by Hazrat Ali and
Hazrat Talha. Ibu Qami having killed Musaab Bin Umair who resembled the
Prophet (peace be upon him) shouted that he had killed the Prophet (peace be
upon him). The rumour broke the spirit of the Muslims and most of them fled
towards Mount Uhud. The Quraish started looting the dead Muslims. The
Prophet (peace be upon him) along with few of his comrades withdrew
towards defile in the valley. The Quraish who followed them were beaten
back.

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 BATTLE OF UHAD

The Last Manoeuvre. Khalid knew that his cavalry would be of little use in the
Valley, where the Prophet (peace be upon him) had withdrawn. However, hoping for some
opportunity he moved his squadron towards the spur. Seeing the Muslims on the high ground
Khalid realized that they were better placed and situation was not favourable and ordered
withdrawal. This was his last tactical manoeuvre in the battle. Both the armies had suffered
heavy casualties. The Muslims suffered seventy casualties and the Quraish twenty two. The
Quraish were happy that they had won the battle, the Muslims were content that they had
saved the situation.

BATTLE OF UHUD
Analysis of Battle of Uhud

General. In pursuance of their policy of safe guarding their economic interest and
taking revenge by destroying the Muslim community in Madina, once and for all, the Quraish
launched an invasion of Madina a year later. It culminated in the Battle of Uhud, where the
Muslims suffered a local military defeat but the Quraish failed to pursue their victory to force
a military decision upon the Muslims to achieve their political aim. Nonetheless, the debacle
at Uhud was one of the gravest crises suffered by the Muslims during the life-time of the
Holy Prophet (peace be upon him). A battle of great events and decisions, Uhud has many a
valuable lesson to teach. Particular interest are the causes which led to the crisis and the
manner in which it was controlled and managed both during and after the battle. Salient
features and summarized below:-

a. The Quraish War Aim. Aim of the invasion by Quraish was to avenge the
defeat of Badr in the old Pagans’ way. As a consequence it meant restoration
of their “lost prestige” and intimidation of Muslims.
b. The Choice of the Battle-Field. On hearing the news of Makkah advance, a
discussion ensued amongst the Muslims about the choice of their battle-field.
The ‘Ansars’ and some other elders were in favour of accepting a siege and
fighting from within the city, while the other group wanted to fight from
outside the city. Being in majority, the latter won the issue and it was decided
to face the Quraish at Uhud, three miles north of Madina.
c. Disposition of Forces. Both the forces were very wisely disposed on ground.
The Prophet (peace be upon him) placed archers at Einein to defend his left
flank and the approaches leading into the rear of the Muslims. Abu Sufian had
placed bulk of his infantry in the centre and his cavalry on the flanks for flank
protection and exploiting any situation favourable to them which Khalid
successfully did, thus ultimately turning an adverse situation in favour of the
Quraish.
d. The Treachery of the Jews. The Madinite Jews, who were under obligations
of treaty to flight shoulder-to-shoulder with the Muslims against an enemy
invading Madina, deserted them on the morning of the battle. This reduced the
Muslim camp from 1, 000 to 700 besides causing them a great deal of anguish
and anxiety.
e. The Contemplated Desertion of the Muslim Tribes. Seeing the Jew desert, the
Muslim tribes of Banu Salma and Banu Haritha also showed cowardice and
threatened desertion. On persuasion by the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him)
however, they later gave up the idea.
f. The Disobedience of the Archers. Prior to the battle, the Holy Prophet (peace
be upon him) placed a band of 50 Archers on the Mound Einein that
overlooked an exposed flank, and ordered them not to vacate their post under

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 BATTLE OF UHAD

any situation. As the Muslims routed the Quraish in the initial assault and
started collecting booty, the Archers disobeyed the Prophet’s (peace be upon
him) orders and left their post to take their own share. This factor alone turned
the table against Muslims.
g. Khalid’s Counter-Attack. Khalid, the Quraish cavalry commander, seizing the
opportunity captured Mounted Einein after which he launched a counter-attack
against the Muslims’ vacated rear, causing great confusion in their ranks as a
result of which the retreating Quraish also returned to the battle-filed and
subjected the Muslims to a two-pronged attack.
h. The Rumours about the Prophet’s (peace be upon him) Death. As mentioned
earlier in the confusion caused by the Quraish counter-attack, a rumour about
Prophet’s (peace be upon him) death had spread. It had a real demoralizing
effect but the Prophet (peace be upon him) having learnt about the rumour
effectively countered it. He had, in fact, been only wounded. He made himself
visible to the Muslim Army by standing at a vantage point in the middle of
Uhud and announced that he was alive. He thus restored their sagging morale.
i. The Quraish Festivity. The Quraish began to rejoice their victory and wind up
their camp. Apprehending that the enemy might exploit its success to invade
Madina, the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) alerted his followers to prepare
themselves to face the impending threat but it did not ultimately materialize.
The Quraish dismantled their camp and took the route to Makkah.
j. The Match on Hamra-al-Assad. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him)
apprehended that the Quraish might return to invade Madina on the following
day. Accordingly, he established contact with them at Hamra-al-Assad the
next day and forced them to disperse in all directions.
k. The Quraish did win a local military victory over the Muslims but failed to
achieve anything concrete. They left the battle-field without pursuing their
victory and forcing a decision on the Muslims.

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 BATTLE OF UHAD

BATTLE OF UHUD

Application of Principles of War

a. Offensive Action. The decision of the Prophet (peace be upon him) to meet the
non-believers at Uhud and leave Madina open to the Quraish assault was
based on sound military reasons. While Madina was the firm base of the
Muslims, Uhud provided them tactically better dispositions. Any attack from
the north (which in this case was expected) onto Madina exposed the rear and
flanks of the enemy to a force occupying locality Uhud which also had the
advantage of being a high ground. As per Prophet’s (peace be upon him)
appreciation, the attack did come from the north and got into the fields of
observation and fire form the Muslims occupying Uhud. A force may
therefore not be required to defend its base by sitting at it to face a frontal
attack but may threaten the enemy movement towards that base luring him
into a ground of its own choice. This is classic example of a defensive battle
with offensive designs. This tactics still remain an order of the day.
b. Concentration. Like the Battle of Badr, once the duels were over, the Quraish
went for an all-out offensive but without any purpose. When their momentum
faded, the Muslims Army launched a determined and full-blooded attacks on
the Quraish with proper evaluation of risk. They had concentrated their effort
against the Quraish’s standard, because man of the standard bearers had
already fallen and once the Quraish standard fell in Phase 1, their Army also
fled.
c. Economy of Effort. The Muslim plan was simple and well-coordinated. The
disadvantage of inferiority in numbers was made up by presenting a narrow
front with the flanks and rears protected against any possible envelopment.
Einein occupied by Muslim Archers enjoyed the importance of critical terrain
which the defenders should have held at all cost. Orders were issued to
maintain strict discipline to make the best use of manpower and the available
weapons. The principle followed by the Muslims was that every arrow shot
must find its target and every time a sword or a lance was lifted, it must draw
blood.
d. Mobility. Mobility implies speed, versatility and freedom of movement
superior to that of enemy in the time and space dimensions relevant to the war,
campaign or battle in hand. The Quraish Army was superior in mobility, ie
they had 200 horses and 3000 camels. Khalid made best use of this superiority
to strike at an appropriate time. The Muslims were initially denied this but
when they vacated their critical ground, the Quraish made full use of their
mobility. Though it is very rare that mobile wings of any force remain intact
while his main force had been routed, yet Khalid, appreciating the situation,
waited for an opportunity. He got it when the Archers left Einein to join in the
plunder of the Quraish camp.
e. Security. Before the battle, Prophet (peace be upon him) received a letter form
Makkah that a force of 3000 men was poised to set out for attack on Madina.
The Prophet (peace be upon him) kept this information restricted to only few
essential individuals like Hazrat Ubbayad Kaab, who had read out the letter to
him and to some of his leading companions. The news thus remained a well-
guarded secret within the trusted circle. The Quraish had adopted no security
measures and ignored this aspect completely.
f. Administration. The Muslims established their camp between the two right
wings of the Uhud. This place was safe and out of Makkahs’ sight. The

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 BATTLE OF UHAD

Muslims had placed their administrative camp on the Main Supply Route. The
turn round distance from the Badr Madina was just four miles whereas the
Makkans’ line of communication was stretched too far from their base.
Moreover their trade route to Suria had been blocked by Muslims which posed
a serious economic threat to the Makkans. The Muslims paid particular
attention to the evacuation of casualties. Behind the Muslims lines were 14
women whose task was to give water to thirsty, carry the wounded out of the
battle and to give them the field dressing. Leading woman in this noble cause
was Hazrat Fatima, the daughter of Prophet (peace be upon him) and the wife
of Hazrat Ali.
Lessons
Uhud is a battle of many splendid lessons. The lessons mainly pertain to the nature
and dimensions of war and its conduct. It is generally said that the Muslims lost the battle
because the Archers vacated their station of duty. Khalid took control of the Mound and
launched a flanking attack against them that took them by surprise and caused great
confusion in their ranks. To add to their woes, the main Quraish Army also returned to the
battle-field and attacked them, forcing them to fight on two opposite fronts. This dislocated
the Muslims and resulted in their defeat. It is, therefore, usually inferred from this battle that
an army should always guard its flanks. A surprise flanking attack can cause a great deal of
confusion in the opposing camp and a body of troops that is forced to fight in two different
directions suffers a great disadvantage.

The above deductions are no doubt correct but are not conclusive in themselves. To
identify the real cause of the Muslims defeat, we must probe deeper to find out as to why the
Archers disobeyed the orders and left the Mound. To do so, we have to go back to the Battle
of Badr. It was the love of booty that had caused resentment in the Muslim Army after that
battle. As a result, the Holy Book bade them to give themselves into the temptation of the
spoils of war and ransom for the prisoners. Again at Uhud, they disobeyed the orders of the
Prophet (peace be upon him) to grab their share of booty. It thus follows that the love of
booty which the Holy Quran wanted them to ignore while fighting for the cause of Allah had
not yet left them. The basic cause of the Muslim defeat at Uhud, therefore, was in a sense
weak Faith and not an exposed flank which, in effect, was a manifestation of that weakness.

The Muslim defeat at Uhud induced the neighbouring Pagan tribe into believing that
days of Islam were numbered. In the hope of administering the final blow upon it, they
organized several expeditions against the Muslims. Each enemy attempt was, however,
destroyed by the Muslims inside their own land. But the Muslims, in retaliation, launched
successful raids against the eastern caravan route as well and rendered it unsafe for the
Quraish. The mission to Zat-al-Raqq, Domatual Jandal and Banu Mustaliq were undertaken
with these objective in view. It is significant to note that, during this period, the Muslims did
not surrender themselves to inactivity but retained tactical initiative through bold and daring
actions.

It did not, however, take the Makkans long to realize that they had filed to pursue
their military victory at Uhud to force even a military decision upon the Muslims. They were
shocked to find that the Muslim community in Madina was still intact and very much in
control of the city. Disgusted and dismayed, they started making fresh efforts to raise a huge
army to invade Madina. At that point in time, they were fortunate to find such wiling and
powerful confederates as the Ghatfans and the Jews. The stage was set for the siege of
Madina.

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 BATTLE OF YARMUK

BATTLE OF YARMUK

Background

The battle of Yarmuk was fought between the Muslims and the Christians of
Byzantine Empire, in 636 AD, 15the of Hijra. The crushing defeat of the Christians, sealed
the fate of Roman Eastern Empire in Syria and also opened the gateway for the Muslims to
spread the message of Islam to Africa and Europe.
Operational Environments

a. At the dawn of Islam, the world was dominated mostly by two mighty
Empires – the Persian and the Byzantine, dominating East and West
respectively with their civilizations.

b. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), despite heavy odds successfully
spread the message of Allah and many a tribe in Arbian Peninsula embraced
Islam. The non-believers and the reactionaries had nonetheless launched an
anti Islamic campaign.

c. Although the apostasy movement had been countered during the life time of
the Prophet (peace be upon him), it regained momentum after his death,
affecting every tribe in Arabia excepting the true believers in Makkah, Madina
and Taif. The people at large defected the faith and a major threat to Islam was
posed again.

d. Hazrat Abu Bakr (RAA) the first Caliph, therefore, had to crush the forces of
evil. He planned to clear first the Central and finally the Northern Arabia.
From August to December 632 AD. Various battles were fought and apostasy
movement was fully crushed.

Invasion of Iraq

Once the situation at home was fully under control, the Caliph planned to spread
Islam to other parts of the world. He first selected a semi-independent Arab Kingdom of Hira,
forming part of Iraq, as his objective. It was then dominated by the Persian Empire. During
invasion of Iraq, Roman Syria was fully contained by limited offensive. In March 633 AD,
Hazrat Khalid moved to Iraq and through a series of fifteen battles, he defeated the Persians
and Hira was secured by June 633 AD.

The Background to the Conquest of Syria

At that time Syria was divided into four military districts of Damascus, Hems, Al-
Urdan (Jordan) and Palestine. Arabs had lived in Syria since pre-Roman days. When
Christinaity was made the state religion of the Empire in the fourth century AD, these Arabs
also embraced Christianity. Syrian Arabs, however, were no good warriors. Meanwhile
powerful Ghassan tribe migrated from Yemen. This tribe fought out Romans who finally
made agreement with them and Ghassan Dynasty became one of the honored princely states
with Ghassan king ruling Jordan and Southern Syria from his capital at Basra.

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 BATTLE OF YARMUK

Directives Given to Muslim Commanders

Hazrat Abu Bakr (RAA) after unqualified success of Muslims in Iraq ordered
invasion of the rich land of Syria. He organized his forces into four corps, each of about
7,000 men. The commanders of these corps and the objectives given to them were:-

A. Amr Bin Al-Aas – Palestine.

B. Shurahbeel Bin Hassana – Jordan.
C. Yazeed Bin Abi Sufyan – Damascus.
D. Abu Ubeida Bin-Al-Jarrah – Emessa.

When Heraclius learnt of Muslims’ invasion of Syria he concentrated a force of

90,000 men at Ajnadein to crush the Muslims. Hazrat Abu Ubeida was alarmed and ordered
concentration of all corps at Basra which were not too far. Meanwhile, Hazrat Abu Ubeida
asked Hazrat Khalid to reach Syria with half of his army, about 9,000 men to strengthen the
Muslims and to assume command of the Muslim Army in Syria, which he did in July. After
fierce fighting Hazrat Khalid inflicted crushing defeat on Romans at Ajnadein. He thereafter
captured Damascus by 1 Octobber 634 AD. After fall of Damascus, Hazrat Abu Ubeida who
had regained command, sent other corps back to their objectives. He along with Hazrat
Khalid marched forward and captured Emessa in March 636 AD. After Emessa they
advanced towards Allepo and Antioch and having reached Sheihzar learnt about Roman
preparations of a crusade, stopping Muslims in their tracks.

Hazrat Khalid’s Removal and appointment of Hazrat Abu Ubeida.

On 22 Agust 634 AD, Hazrat Abu Bakr (RAA) expired and Hazrat Umar (RAA) who
succeeded him as Caliph removed Hazrat Khalid from command of the Muslim Army
appointing Hazrat Abu Ubeida as its new commander. Hazrat Khalid willingly continued to
serve under Hazrat Abu Ubeida as an ordinary soldier in the subsequent battles.

PLANS OF THE CONTENDING ARMIES

Roman Plan

In late 635 AD, while Emessa was under siege, Heraclius perceiving the great threat
of Muslim invasion began brisk preparations for a great manoeuvre to finally crush the
Muslim forces. By May 636 AD a heterogeneous force of 150,000 men had been
concentrated in the areas of Antioch and in parts of Northern Syria. The cross section of
people (Russians, Slavs, Franks, Greeks, Georgians, Armenans and Christian Arabs) had sent
their warriors to the new army to fight the invaders in the spirit of a Christian crusade.

When the Roman concentration had completed the Muslim Army was disposed as
under:-

A. Hazrat Amr – Palestine.

B. Hazrat Shurahbeel – Jordan.
C. Hazrat Yazeed – Ceasarea.
D. Hazrat Abu Ubeida – Emessa.

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 BATTLE OF YARMUK

Directive given to Roman Commanders

Heraclius, a seasoned strategist found the Muslims highly imbalanced, widely spread
in time and space. He therefore planned immediate manoeuvre to attack each corps in turn
and destroy them piecemeal before they could concentrate to put up a united front. He
accordingly made his plan an issued the following directives:-

a. Ceasarea. To be reinforced by sea and strengthened to 40,000 men so as to

engage and isolate the corps of Yazeed.
b. Qanateer. To move along the coastal route up to Beirut, then approach
Damascus from the west and cut off Hazrat Abu Ubeida.

c. Jabla. To march from Aleppo on the direct route to Emessa via hama, and
hold the Muslims frontally in the Emessa region. The Christian Arabs were
first to contact the Muslim Arabs;since Heraclius believed, “Everything is
destroyed by its won kind, and nothing cuts steel but steel”.

d. Deirjan. To move between the coast and the Aleppo road and approach
Emmessa from the west, thus striking the Muslims in their flak while they
were held frontally by Jabla.

e. Gregory. Was to advance on Emessa from the nothe-east and attack the
Muslims in their right flank simultaneously with Deirjan.

f. Mahan. Mahan was to move behind Christian Arabs and was to act as reserve.

g. After annihilation of Muslim Army at Emessa, the Roman Army would

advance southwards and the garrison of Ceasarea would advance from the
coast to destroy all the Muslim forces in the process.

Muslims Plan

On this master plan the Roman Army was launched in the middle of June 636 AD.
When the leading elements of Jabla’s Army arrived at Emessa they found no Muslims.
Similarly when the army of Qanateer rushed to Damascus to encircle the Muslims, he was
equally disappointed.
Muslims had been fore-warned about the plans of Heraclius. Nothing went un-noticed
about enemy’s activities as the Muslims had established an excellent intelligence system
within the Roman Army and remained posted with all their moves. Hazrat Khalid with
unerring sense of strategy at once realized Muslims’ vulnerability at Emessa and Sheihzar.
He advised Hazrat Abu Ubeida to pull back from north and central Syria as well as from
Palestine and to concentrate all his forces close to desert. Hazrat Abu Ubeida accepted the
propsal and ordered an immediate withdrawal to Jabiya, a communication centre and junction
point of routes from Syra, Jordan and Palestine. He also ordered other three corps
commanders to join him at jabiya. Thus before the Romans could reach Emessa and
Damascus the Muslims had safely extricated themselves from the jaws of death.

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 BATTLE OF YARMUK

Courses Open

During the advance of Roman Army in July 636, Muslims faced the greatest threat
posed by the massive Roman Army which was in motion to destroy them. To deal with the
imminent threat Hazrat Abu Ubeida called a war council to discuss the measures of defence.
The following courses were discussed:-

a. Withdraw into Arabian Desert. The first course open was to withdraw into
desert till the Romans had gone past but this would amount to abandoning the
conquered territories and acceptance of Roman’s hegemony.

b. Fight a Battle at jabiya. In this course the Muslims would fight on two fronts
simultaneously; one facing the main Roman force while being threatened in
the rear by the force from Ceasarea.

c. Fight a Battle at Yarmuk. This course was suggested by Hazrat Khalid Bin
Waleed who had the following considerations:-

(1) Constriction of Space. Constrict the space by concentrating widely

spread Muslim corps in the plains of Yarmuk while denying to enemy
the freedom of movement and making him unable to generate his full
combat power in the limited space.

(2) Gain Time for Concentration. Hazrat Khalid was always times ahead
of his adversaries having tremendous mental flexibility and
forethought to read the enemy’s mind and forestall him in time and
space. As the Muslim forces were to be regrouped, he thought of
concentrating them at Yarmuk while keeping the enemy at bay with his
mobile guards thus gaining sufficient time.

(3) Gain Initiative. The enemy would be left with no choice but to react
to his manoeuvre. The initiative would thus rest with the Muslims.

(4) Protection of Lines of Communication. Should the Romans follow

the Muslims to Yarmuk, they would extend their lines of
communication while the Muslims would have shorter lines of
communication facilitating necessary reinforcement and would be
closer to the desert wherein the Arabs were the masters.

Hazrat Khalid Resumes Command

The plan being militarily sound was accepted and adopted. Hazrat Abu Ubeida at this
stage appointed Hazrat Khalid the commander for the ensuing operation against the Romans.
Hazrat Khalid however stayed back to check the advance of the Romans with his mobile
guards while rest of the army moved out to Yarmuk. The Romans were not able to interfere
with the retrograde move of the Muslims.

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 BATTLE OF YARMUK

SALIENT FEATURES OF THE ZONE OF BATTLE

The battle-field consisted of the plan of Yarmuk which was enclosed on its western
and southern sides by deep ravines of Wadi-ur-Raqqad and Yarmuk River respectively
joining near Yaqusa (Wakusa). The stream of Wadi-ur-Raqqad ran north-east to south-west
for 11 miles through a deep ravine with very steep banks. The raivine was 1,000 feet deep,
with one main crossing at a ford. In the south of the battle-field ran the canyon of the Uarmuk
River, starting at Jallan and joining with Wadi-ur-Raqqad 15 miles down stream beyond
which it continued to join Jordan River south of lake Tiberius (sea of Galilee). This too was
about 1,000 feet deep. At Jaleen a stream called Hareer, running from north-east flowed into
and became Yarmuk River. On the north, the plain continued beyond the battle-field while to
the east it stretched for a distance of about 30 miles form Wadi-ur-Raqqad to the foot of Azra
hills. The western and central part of this plain was the battle-field. The only dominating
tactical feature on the plain of Yarmuk was the hill of Samein about 300 Feet high. There was
also the hill of Jabiya outside the battle field. One stream which formed an important tactical
feature was Allan. The battle field was ideal for the manoeuvre of infantry and cavalry and
except for the southern portion of Allan, offered no impediment to movement.

Organization – Roman Army

a. Roman regular forces consisted of approximately 120,000 men including

heavy cavalry of 40,000. this force was organized into 4 armies with almost
equal strength.

b. In addition it had under command, 30,000 men of the army of Jabla. Mounted
on horses and camels.
c. These armies were organized on regional bases with Mahan as the C-in-C:-

C-in-C

Mahan

Russians/ Europeans Europeans Christian

Slavs Army Army Arabs Army
Armenian Army (Deirjan) (Gregory) (Jabla)
Army (Qanateer)
(Mahan)
Total. 150,000
Organization – Muslim Army

a. Muslims had a force of about 34,000 to start with but later increased to
40,000, when 6,000 reinforcement was added just before the main battle.
30,000
Infantry Cavalry
b. This force had 10,000 horses including 4,000 mobile guards ofCamel/Horse
Hazrat Khalid.
20,000 10,000 mounted
c. The army was organized into four corps:-

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 BATTLE OF YARMUK

Commander

Hazrat Khalid Bin Waleed

Corps Corps Corps Mobile

(Yazeed) (Shurahbeel) (Amr Bin Guards 4,000
Corps No Cavalry Al-Aas) (Khalid)
9 x Infantry
Regiments(Abu
Ubeida)
(7 to 8,000)

Total 40,000
1 x Cavalry Regiment
30,000
Relative 1Strength
x Cavalry (Central Reserve)
Camel/Horse
Regiment Romans Muslims Ratio
mounted
Infantry (2,000) 80,000 30,000 3:1
Heavy Cavalry 40000
Light Cavalry 30000 10000 3:1
Cavalry 70000 10000 7:1
Grand Total: 150000 40000 4:1

Dispositions

Mahan deployed the imperial army forward of Allan. He used his four regular armies
to form the line of battle which was 12 miles long extending from Yarmuk to the south of hill
at Jabya. The Roman cavalry was distributed equally among the four armies and was held in
reserve. Ahead of infantry was a mounted screen. Army of Gregory was on the right flank,
Qanateer on the left, Deirjan on right center and Armenians on left center under the latter.
The army of Gregory used chains as a proof of stood. The Roman ranks stood 30 deep.

Hazrat Khalid deployed his army on a front corresponding roughly to that of the
Roman Army. Army’s left rested on Yarmuk River, a mile forward of where the ravine
began, while its right lay on Jabiya road. On the left stood the corps of Hazrat Yazeed, on the
right the corps of Hazrat Amr Bin Al-Aas, with a cavalry regiment under command each. The
center was held by Hazrat Abu Ubeida and Hazrat Shurahbeel. A cavalry regiment and a
mobile guard was kept with Romans, the Muslim Army was only 3 deep but there were no
gaps in the ranks. Spears and arches were kept in front rank.

Southern flank of each army rested on Yarmuk River which could not be turned.
Northern flanks of both the armies were open and exposed. The frontage of both the armies
was corresponding; constricting the space for Romans, denying them space for
manoeuvrability while the Muslims deployed on shorter front, thus gaining tactical balance.
In the rear of the Muslims stretched Azra hills where they could withdraw to safety in case of
a reverse and be invulnerable. Their line of communication was shorter from the base
ensuring speedy reinforcements. Romans rear was mostly restricted by deep ravines in the

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 BATTLE OF YARMUK

south and east. Their rearward movements were restricted to the north-east, which if blocked,
could proved disastrous.

Concept of Opposing Commanders

Hazrat Khalid had conceived the battle in its entirety well before it was joined. He
concentrated his forces to put up a formidable resistance at a place which would give him
freedom of movement and deny the enemy space of manoeuvre. With these dimensions of
time and space the selected the plain of Yarmuk as the battle field. Hazrat khalid’s plan was
tactically defensive and strategically offensive. He gained defensive superiority by
concentrating his force at a shorter front and at a place which secured his rear and southern
flanks. In his scheme of manoeuvre he had designed to cause maximum attrition on enemy by
adopting offensive defence till enemy lost his impetus. Having weakened the enemy’s
resistance he would mount an offensive to destroy him in bulk.

Mahan who had originally set out to destroy the Muslims piecemeal was out
manoeuvred by them. Having suffered initial set back, he pursued the Muslims and joined
them at Yarmuk. His plan was to initially attempt an offensive on a broad front and possibly
achieve a breakthrough. In case of stiff resistance, fix the Muslims frontally, turn their flanks
and encircle them to ultimate destruction.

Both the plans were destruction oriented and objective point of manoeuvre was the
flanks, particularly the northern flank which could be easily turned.

Hazrat Khalid had wanted to utilize the time and space to achieve superiority of
relative strength by concentrating forces, wearing out the enemy and out manoeuvring him by
his mobile guards in the place of his choosing. Mahan who failed to read Hazrat Khalid’s
mind was out rightly outwitted by conforming to Hazrat Khalid’s design. He obliged him by
deploying his forces in the desired zone. Mahan failed to read the correct time and space
dimensions of the battle field, lost tactical initiative and balance by deploying on a
constricted space. Conceptually, Mahan had lost the battle before the battle had started.
THE CONDUCT OF BATTLE OF YARMUK

Before the start of hostilities, the Romans made futile attempts to persuade the
Muslims, through peaceful negotiations to retire to Arabia. When the battle became
inevitable, the Romans put in a probing attack, which was more like a reconnaissance in force
to test the Muslim strength, but were repulsed by Hazrat Khalid’s cavalry. Thereafter almost
a month passed without any major activity.

Romans’ offensive

First day. In the third week of August 636 AD, the Romans commenced their
offensive. The battle started with duels in which the Muslims had an upper hand. By mid-day
Mahan decided to commence general battle in which the sheer weight of numbers would
favour his army. However he was somewhat cautious, only attempted a limited offensive on a
broad front in which ten forward ranks of Roman Armies advanced to battle. Having covered
nearly one mile distance struck the Muslims front rank. The attack was repulsed and the
action ended in a stalemate. By sunset both armies separated and returned to their camps.

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 BATTLE OF YARMUK

Second Day. Mahan, to achieve surprise, launched a predawn attack while the
Muslims were at prayers. The Muslims were certainly caught unaware, but for the out posts,
which Hazrat khalid had placed during the night, who imposed sufficient delay on the
Romans enabling Muslims to get into battle order. While the battle of the central corps
continued steadily where the Romans had intended to achieve only fixation effect, the
flanking corps received heaviest blows of the Roman Army. On the Muslims right, the army
of Qanateer comprising mainly Slavs attacked the corps of Hazrat Amir Bin Qanateer
attacked the corps of Hazrat Amr Bin. Hazarat Amr put in a counter attack with his cavalry
regiment but was unable to hold on the Roman advance for every long. It was repulsed by the
Romans. Hazarat Amr now launched his second counter attack with the bulk of his corps.

The situation on Muslims left was equally serious. Here too the Romans broke
through the corps of Hazarat Yazeed in a second attack. Hazrat Yazeed too used his cavalry
regiment to counter-attack. But it was repulsed, and after a period of stiff resistance the
warriors of Hazrat Yazeed fell back.

It was now about mid-day. While the Muslims flanking corps were fighting their
battles, Hazrat khalid had refused to be drawn into the battle with his central reserve before it
was absolutely necessary. As both the corps returned to the battle after initial retreat , Hazarat
khalid decided to launch his cavalry reserves to assist them and to reestablish the Muslims
positions. He first turned to the right wing and with his Mobile Guards and on cavalry
regiment struck at the flank of the army of Qanateer, at the same time Hazrat Amr couter-
attacked form the front. Soon as this position was restored, Hazrat khalid turned to the left
wing. By now Hazrat Yazeed had begun a major counter attack from the front.

Hazrat Khalid detached one cavalry regiment under Hazrat Zarrar and ordered him to
attack the front of the army of Beirjan in order to create a diversion and threaten the
withdrawal of the Roman right wing from its advance position. Withrest of the army reserves
he attacked the flank of Gregory. In the meantime Hazrat Zarrar broke through the army of
Beirgan and killed him but was forced to retire. By evening the original positions were
restored and the day’s fighting ended with the Muslims winning the bout on points.

Third Day. The army of Qureen (BeirJans’ replacement) made a limited diversionary
effort to draw Muslim reserves. The Armenians and the left wing of Roman Army both then
attacked the Muslims right at the junction point of the corps of Hazrat Shurahbeel and Hazrat
Amr. The initial attack was again repulsed by Hazrat Amr but shortly before mid-day,
Qanateer broke through in several places. The corps of Hazrat Amr fell back to the camp. The
right flank of Hazrat Shurahbeel’s front was also pushed back. Hazrat Amr struck Romans
with his cavalry reserves against the flank of Qanateer. At the same time Hazrat Khalid’s
cavalry reserves manoeuvred from the righ and struck Qanateer on thi left flank while
infantry of Hazrat shurahbeel and Hazrat Amr counter-attacked frontally. The situation was
restored by last light but with heavy casualties. The overall losses of Romans far
outnumbered those of the Muslims.

Fourth Day. This day of the battle dawned with an atmosphere tense with
expectations. The Romans knew that this day would prove decisive, for now they were going
to make their greatest effort to shatter the Muslim Army which had so far withstood all their
prospects of further offensive. Hazrat khalid also knew that battle had reached its critical
stage. Thousands of Romans had been killed so far and if on this day also the Romans were

8
 BATTLE OF YARMUK

repulsed with heavy losses they would be unlikely to retain initiative, therefore the counter
offensive could be launched.

Mahan decided to start the day’s operation with an attack on the right half of Muslim
reserves. With this plan of battle two armies of Qanateer were set in motion. Hazrat Amr was
pushed back again but not far back as on the previous day. In Hazrat Shurahbeel’s sector
however the Armenians broke through and pushed the Muslims back towards their camp.
Soon it was clear that the corps would not be able to hold out for very long.

What Hazrat Khalid feared most was an attack in strength on broad front. In case the
enemy broke through at several places there would be no way of expelling him as the army
reserves could not be everywhere. He ordered Hazrat Abu Ubeida and Hazrat Yazeed to
attack on their fronts and on their left. This was to be a spoiling attack. Thus by mid-morning
the corps of Hazrat Abu Ubeida and Hazrat Yazeed had enaged the armied of Qureen and
Gregory and were pressing hard when Hazrat Shurahbeel’s position became delicate.

Hazrat Khalid feeling more assured of his left decided to strike against the Armenians.
He divided the army reserves into two equal groups and put in two pronged attack with Qeis
from left and he himself from the right while Hzrat Shurahbeel attacked from the center.
After several hours of struggle the Armenians pulled back. Subsequently the Slavs, denied of
the support of Armenians also retired under renewed pressure from Hazrat Amr. While this
action was in progress an equally critical and more fierce betle was being fought on the left.
The Muslims had not proceeded far when they were subjected to a barrage of archery in
which 700 Muslims lost an eye each. The day was thus known as the DAY OF LOST EYES.
The Muslims of the left now fell back, their own bows being ineffective because of shorter
range. The Romans exploited their success and pushed back the Muslims. By dusk, the day’s
action was over and both armies stood once again on their original lines. It had been a
terrible day. The most crippling losses were suffered more than the previous day but Hazrat
khalid knew that the tide had turned.

Fifth Day. Early on the fifth day of the battle two sides again formed up but Romans
did not attack. Mahan sent a proposal for truce which Hazrat Abu Ubeida nearly accepted but
was restrained by Hazrat khalid. The rest of the day passed uneventfully. Hazrat khalid
remained busy in reorganizing his cavalry into one powerful force and issuing of orders for
counter offensive for the following day.

I. Challenge to Gregory who was killed, and soon on return of Hazrat Abu Ubeida,
Hazrat khalid gave signal for the planned offensive. Hazrat khalid’s plan was to hold
Roman center and right, cut enemy’s left flank. This operation was completed in six
distinct phases:-

a. Phase 1. The entire Muslims Army moved forward with determination .

Centre and left did not press the attack vigorously to remain fresh for the last
phase. Hazrat khalid manoeuvred around the Roman left blank and split his
cavalry into two. One group was sent to hold the left flank of Slavs combined
with frontal attack by Hazrat Amr. The Slavs gave away and fell back on the
centre of Armenians(Map 17)

b. Phase 2. After Slavs were pushed back, Hazrat Shurabeel started his attack
on the Armenians. At the same time Hazrat khalid joined his second half of

9
 BATTLE OF YARMUK

cavalry group and drove the left cavalry regiment away to the north which
never came back.

c. Phase 3. During operations of phase 2 Mahan concentrated whole of this

remaining cavalry for a counter-attack, but before he could organize, he was
assailed by Hazrat khalid. Roman cavalry was no match to cavalry of
Muslims and soon fled to the north. About 40000 horsemen fled away. This
broke the back of Roman and their collapse started.

d. Pahse 5. After separating the Roman cavalry Hazrat khalid charged

Armenians in their rear while Hazrat Amr and Hazrat Shurahbeel attacked
from their flank and front. Armenians could not face the three pronged attack
and fled to the south-west, the only direction open to them. Under pressure of
Hazrat Abu Ubeida and Hazra Yazeed and with their left flank exposed,
armies of Qureen and Gregory also started withdrawing westward thinking it
to be a safe route not realizing, that is what Hazrat Khalid had wanted.

e. Phase 6. By mid-day the Romans were in full retreat. Hazrat khalid moved
his cavalry to the north, forcing Romans to the direction of ford, the only
route available to cross the wadi-ur-Raqqad, but many thousands had escaped
before the route was blocked. With northern route bocked, and the Muslims
infantry behind them, a mad rush stared to be the first to cross the narrow ford
to safety. When the leading men reached the top of western bank of ravine
they noticed a group of Muslims on top with swords drawn led by a young
warrior, Hazrat Zarrar. Hazrat khalid had sent him with a force of 500
horsemen during the previous night to block the ford. The Romans who
reached the top were down and those who stopped on the eastern side were
thrown in the ravine.

f. Last phase. Hazrat Zarrar and his men could not be dislodged because the
ford could not withstand the orderly advance of Muslim Army, now in the
high spirits. The Romans broke contact for the last time and started fleeing
towards the ford, and wave after wave fell in the revine, crashing against the
jutting rocks and were almost dead by the time they hit the bottom. By the
right fall, every Roman caught in this noose had perished or was killed and
the Muslim Army had won a decisive victory.

Roman causalities during this war have been estimated to be 70000 dead Muslims lost
about 4000 but many more were injured and disabled.
Relative Strength Superiority

Selection of the Zone of Operation. To off-set the Roman numerical superiority of 4

to 1 and to achieve victory, Hazrat Khalid’s selection of the battle-field played a decisive role
by inherent tactical advantages. The Romans, well equipped, heavily armoured; fought set
piece defensive battle whereas, Arabs lightly equipped, and with fast-moving force could out-
manoeuvre in the north and rear.

Optimum Utilizaion of Resources. Hazrat Khalid skillfully employed his resources

to their optimum utilization. He was master of tactical monoeuvers and would always strike

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 BATTLE OF YARMUK

the enemy at the right time and at the right point to inflict attrition by design to reduce the
enemy’s numerical superiority.

Constriction of Space. Mahan obliged Hazrat khalid by deploying in the jaws of

Yarmuk revine which constricted the space for manoeurability . The Romans could not fully
generate their combat power particularly of their cavalry. Conversely Hazrat Khalid having
fixed his adversary in the south and west capitalized on space by manoeuvre of his Mobile
Guards.
ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF YARMUK AND APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES
OF WAR

General Analysis. The Battle of Yarmuk though fought about more than 1400 years ago,
embodied in itself many a valuable strategic and tactical lessons so well applicable in the
modern warfare. The lessons drawn from the battle are:-

a) Tactical Balance. Hazrat khalid always read the enemy’s mind well ahead of
time and thus would out-manoeuvre him both in time and space. H skillfully
employed his reserve at the critical juncture during the battle so as to retain
tactical balance throughout the battle. Mahan who was outwitted by Hazrat
Khalid’s plan of action which tactically imbalanced him both in his concept
and in execution. Had he not reacted to Hazrat Kahlid’s scheme of manoeuvre
and retained initiative the outcome of the battle could have been otherwise.

b) Time and Space. Hazrat Khalid very intelligently concentrated his forces
deployed on a much wider front. In the scheme he gained sufficient time to
organize his force and deploy at the place of his choice while extending
enemy’s line of communication by forcing him to fight away from his base.

Application of Principle of war . Following principles of war were applied/violated by the

two adversaries:-

a) Maintenance Of Aim. Hazrat Khalid had aimed at destruction of the

Roman Army which he pursued relentlessly. Evidently, on the sixth and
the final day while chasing Mahan’s cavalry Hazrat Khalid could have
well followed the lucrative target but having separated and chased out
cavalry, Hazrat khalid turned to destroy the major portion of the encircled
Roman Army thus maintaining the aim.

b) Offensive Action. Despite being militarily weak, the Muslims remained

aggressive in the overall defensive posture. By launching counter attacks
on the fourth day, the Muslims restored original positions and the tables
thus turned in favour of Muslims. Hazrat Khalid who always thought
offensively would fiercely react to enemy’s attempt to create tactical
imbalance.

c) Concentration. The relative strength superiority was achieved by Hazrat

Khalid’s superior strategy in trading space for time. Before the main
battle was joined, Hazrat khalid concentrated the Muslims split into four
different groups, wide apart in time and space, inheriting tactical
imbalance and high vulnerability. Hazrat khalid having concentrated his

11
 BATTLE OF YARMUK

force fought a defensive battle to weaken his resistance, making

conditions favourable to launch a counter offensive.

d) Mobility. Romans though well trained and well organized were impeded
in mobility due to their heavy armoury and equally heavy weapons . To
accentuate their misery, Gregory’s army was chained thus making them
vulnerable to most mobile Arabs who were well mounted and were very
light. The mobility helped Muslims to outflank the Romans at numerous
occasions resulting in decisive victory. Mobility in fact was the
foundation and the key element of Hazrat Khalid’s plan and the design of
his manoeurvre.
e) Security. The Muslims had established an excellent intelligence system
within the Roman Army which was feeding valuable information about
the Roman’s activities. Hazrat Khalid’s selection of battle-field at
Yarmuk is classical example of adherence to this principle of war. He
retained the initiative through his bold manoeuvres while denying the
same to the enemy and restricting this movement to generate full combat
power.

f) Surprise. Hazrat Khalid achieved complete surprise on Romans to their

peril by establishing a blocking position at the only ford available the
wadi-ur-Raqqad. Mahan also achieved surprise by launching a pre-dawn
attack while the Muslims were offering their prayers. Although he
managed to catch the Muslims unaware, yet he could not exploit the
opportunity.

g) Morale. Hazrat Khalid’s courage, military competence and skill were

universally accepted. Muslims had complete faith in his generalship and
would follow him over to the peril of their lives. His high and
unparalleled leadership traits infused confidence in his command.

h) Administration. Roman Army had made an elaborate administrative

arrangements but they extended their line of communication by selecting
the battlefield at Yarmuk. The Muslims had an advantage of fighting
closer to their bases which gave them maximum freedom of action in
execution of their plans.
Conclusion
To conclude, the Battle of Yarmuk was one of the greatest and the most decisive
battles ever fought so successfully, by so few against so many. The Muslims’ victory thus
provides a classic example of a small and an ill-quipped army faced with one of the most
powerful military mights of the world outnumbering four times. This indeed was a military
feat. The battle provides valuable strategic and tactical lessons even in the era of modern
warfare. The victory though and outcome of superior generalship, skilful conduct of battle,
superior use of strategy, unstinted courage and faith, was won also due to divine blessings,
the help of ALMIGHTY ALLAH.

12
 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF ISLAMIC BATTLES

With the advent of Islam, the Muslims established their military schools. The
achievements of these schools in history are establishment of an Islamic state with security
and defeat of two great powers of their time, persians and the Byzantine. In these schools also
developed the following essential features of the Islamic Military theories.

I. Military doctrine of Jehad.

II. The theory of deterrence.
III. The theory of combat readiness.
IV. Association of strategy with enemy.
V. Developing competence in military commanders.
VI. Military discipline.
VII. Psychological warfare.
VIII. Counter psychological warfare

I. Military doctrine of Jehad:- Military doctrine essentially encompasses the following

important subjects of rules of armed conflict, the nature of war, purpose of war, method of
directing the war and the art of preparing the country and the armed forces for the war.
Islamic military doctrine and its essential features are sumned in the concept of “Jehad for
Allah”. The Holy Quran has laid down the following objective of Jehad in clear terms.

(a) It is waged only for Allah and for upholding the words of Allah.
(b) It is waged for the defence of the country, honor and dignity and for
the preservation of cardinal values of Islam.
(c) It cannot be waged for aggression and usurpation.

II. The theory of deterrence:- The strategy in Islam is to provide deterrence by means
of raising a deterrent force. The purpose of this strategy is to dismay the enemy and strike far
in his heart. The Holy Prophet Muhammad(peace be upon him) applied this strategy in the
nine battles of Badr, Uhad, Khandaq, Bani Quraitha, Bani Mustaliq, Khyber, Conquest of
Makkah, Hunain and Taif that were fought under his command. The enemy in these battles
fled from the field. This strategy has become the key contemporary strategy in the world.
This strategy is developed by mastering the following important elements of power that are
co-ordinated by a joint machinery and a council in a harmonious manner.

a. Political
b. Economic
c. Social
d. Ethical
e. Moral
f. Psychological
g. Military

III. The theory of Combat readiness. The verse Al-Anfal-60 of the Holy Quran testifies
to conspicuous emphasis on the theory of combat readiness by prescribing a direct link
between power and combat readiness through deployment. The definition of the word
deployment in modern times has become a brand one and includes the following:-

(a) Entire territory of the state

1
 (b) Air space
(c) Territorial waters
(d) Battlefield
(e) Vital installations
(f) Industries
(g) Dams
(h) Railways
(i) Airfields
(j) Urban areas

IV. Association of Strategy and Economy. Islam essentially associates strategy with
economy as their isolation does not create a harmonious war effort. The role of economy is of
great importance while dealing with strategic readiness that requires money for expenditure.
This association requires that joint councils at the highest level be created to coordinate
economic development plans with the requirements of defence. Self sufficiency is a vital
factor for such an effort otherwise dependence on other countries may not be in line with the
fulfillment of these objectives of Islamic military power.

V. Developing competence in Military Commanders. Islam places great emphasis on

the development of competence in military commanders as incompetent commanders cannot
lead the forces to victory. Islam has laid down the following principles for this purpose.

a. Muslim soldiers are inspired to inculcate the courage to face the enemy by the
noble examples set by the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) as a commander
and a teacher. No one was ever close to the enemy than he. Hazrat Ali has said
‘whenever the heat of battle intensified and the pupils of eyes grew red, we
took cover behind the messenger of Allah”.
b. Evaluation of performance based on objective criticism of performance with a
view to rectifying weaknesses and shortenings has been advocated by Islam so
that soldiers and commanders alike are motivated towards highest professional
competence.
c. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) laid the foundation of mutual
consultation for planning and executive of war. He encouraged others to
express their views and took decisions by consensus.

VI. Military discipline. Islam has inculcated the highest spirit of commitment to duty
through discipline by laying its foundation on rational basis. Muslims are to be trained on the
practical aspects of discipline. It has laid emphasis on the following:-

a. Military traditions should be observed for the development of character and

obedience for the sake of discipline. Obedience in Islam is not mere
submission to authority but also functional imperative for any community as a
social obligation.
b. Islam has for the sake of discipline laid emphasis on clean and tidy appearance
by integrating these requirements with the rules of worship.

VII. Psychological warfare. Islamic military doctrine has placed great emphasis on
the desirability and efficiency of the psychological warfare. Following examples would
illustrate this principle:-

2
 a. Muslims adopted mottos and slogans in battles for mutual identification and
for inciting emotions of bravery and zeal among them with a view to
disheartening and frightening the enemy. The Muslims shouted the battle cries
of Ahad, Ahad(Allah is one) in the battle of Badr; ‘Amat, Amat’ in battle of
Uhud and Allah-o-Akbar became the motto of every muslim in other battles.
b. The conquest of Macca is a striking example of a brilliant psychological
warfare planning made by the Holy Prophet as a result of which Abu Suffian
was driven to tell his people that the Muslims had come with a force to which
the Quraish were not equal. This psychological achievement played a
significant part in the conquest of Macca.

VII. Counter psychological warfare. It is equally important to counter the psychological

warfare measures adopted by the enemy. Islam has laid great emphasis in raising the morale
of the forces by countering such measures through the following means:-

a. Clearing peoples hearts of emotional torment and restoring their morale.

b. Giving them the proven facts so that they are not misled by the false
propaganda.
c. Removing the ill effects of warfare by means of military action.

3
 Battle of Chhamb

THE BATTLE OF CHHAMB

Background

During the middle of the year 1971, the situation in East Pakistan, remained uncertain
and confused. Mukti Bahini’s activities supported and coordinated by the Indian Army had
suddenly gathered momentum.. By mid October war appeared inevitable.

Organization and Planning

23 Division, was organized into a fighting force in June 1971 with Major General
Mohammad Bashir Khan as General Officer Commanding. Being a young formation this
Division suffered from numerous imbalances, particularly those of services and support units.
As the formation did not have its own engineer battalion, 105 Engineer Battalion was placed
under its command. 46 supply and Transport Battalion was ordered to be raised. AK
Battalions were reorganized into mountain infantry. 66 Brigade was also placed under
command and joined it in October. It was soon followed by 11 Cavalry and 5 Field
Ambulance. Towards late October, the newly raised Headquarters 2 Armoured Brigade was
also placed under command. Orders were issued for the raising of 12 Independent Armoured
Squadron. At about the same time Artillery 17 Division was also placed at its disposal for
operational use. Activation of Mujahid Force and induction of Civil Armed Forces troops
created new logistic problems which were solved with patience and perseverance.

In September, Pakistan intelligence reported large scale Indian convoy movements

from Akhnur to Jaurian and Chhamb. In one night alone the Indians moved some 800
vehicles from Jammu to Jaurian. One squadron of tanks was also spotted in Chhamb-Sakrana
area. Eenemy was obviously concentrating his forces close to the border. Consequently, 111
Bridge was moved from Rawalpindi to Pero Shah in the last week of September. 66 Brigade
and 11 Cavalry were ordered to the field and concentrated in general area Daulat Nagar in the
first week of October. More news of Indian concentrations came which called for more
effective defensive measures. Mines were laid and the Division took up proper defensive
positions at the borders. The Divisional Headquarters moved out and established itself in the
already prepared positions at Kotla on 23 October 1970.

New GOC takes over

Major General Eftikhar Khan, HJ, took over command of the Division on 23
September 1971. He concentrated on the preparation of big events which were to come.
Headquarters Staff was committed in briefings, revision of plans, planning for all possible
contingencies, attending to numerous logistic problems, working out procedures and doing
scores other things, with the singular object of brining the Division to a very high level of
operational efficiency. Nothing of significance, even of minor importance, seemed to escape
his notice. Nothing was left to chance. In the beginning of November, defensive plans were
eventually finalized. A new set of comprehensive operational instructions were issued
covering almost every contingency. A war game exercise was held from 8 to 15 November
which led to the formulation of offensive plans. The Division confidently waited for the final
word, ‘go’. Which was on the evening of 3rd December 1971.

1
 Battle of Chhamb

Battle Field and the Indian Posture

Chhamb salient is an area bounded by Ikahni Nala in the north, Cease-Fire Line in the
west, Kashmir/Gujrat border in the south and river Tawi in the east. This area has a great
strategic significance both for India and for Pakistan. On the southern approaches Gujrat, the
soft underbelly of Pakistan, and GT road, the main life line, lie only 22 miles away from the
border over a perfectly tankable terrain with no natural obstacles whatsoever. GT road is
nearest to the border at this point than any other throughout its entire length. On the western
approaches Gujrat, Lalamusa and Kharin lie on the GT road approximately 35, 40 and 38
miles respectively. There is no intervening water obstacle enroute. Marala Barrage, the most
important headworks for the canal system of the border region in Punjab, which also provides
the vital water obstacles for the defence of the country, is barely 10 miles away from the
border. Capture of Marala Headworks would have meant rapping of all our forces in Sialkot
area and upto Sulemanki. In Other words, Chhamb Salient was a spring board for an Indian
offensive which offered a multiple choice for equally important strategic military objectives
i.e. Lalamusa, Kharian, Gujrat and Marala Barrage, a situation creating chaotic problems for
the defenders. It was therefore important for Pakistan to pre-empt the Indian move. Basically
23 Division was in the holding role and had, the mission to defend the area of its
responsibility against Indian attack which extended from Churoi Valley to river Chenab. The
secondary mission given to 23 Division was to capture Chamb salient clearing the area upto
river Tawi. This would secure our vital GT road and precious Marala Headworks.

Indian Position

191 Indian Infantry Brigade was responsible for the defence of Chhamb salient. It had
deployed a Border Security Force (BSF) battalion all along the Cease-Fire Line as the first
line of defence in companies and platoons. 5 Sikh held Mandiala- Sakrana high ground and
Phagla ridge. 5 Assam occupied the remaining of the Phagla ridge. From Barsala to Jhanda.
4/1 Gurkha in position at Manawar- Chimreal looked after the southern approaches from
Matewala. 10 Garhwal was deployed on east bank of river Tawi. Indians had allowed the
wild shrubbery to grow unchecked which made direct observation very difficult. Most of the
area was covered with 8 to 10 feet of high grass.
THE BALANCE OF FORCES

Indian Forces

Although 10 Indian Infantry Division was, our principal foe, it was also supplemented
by a part of 25 Indian Infantry Division, 89 Indian Infantry Brigade consisting of eight mixed
BSF and regular infantry battalions was deployed from Chhumb valley to river Tawi. 28
Infantry Brigade of 10 Indian Division, occupied area from Tawi Bend to Laleal, 191 Infantry
Brigade consisting of four regular and two BSF battalions occupied the Chhamb salient itself
and was responsible for its defence. The BSF battalions were deployed along the Cease Fire
Line and river Chenab whilce the regular Infantry battalions occupied the main defences on
tactical features further in depth. 52 Indian Infantry Brigade held ground from Tam Ka Tilla,
including Troti plateau covering Jaurian and came right down to Nawab Hamirpur in the
south. Far into the rear, 68 Indian Infantry Brigade was deployed at Akhnur. It defended
Akhnur area with two battalions. The third battalion along with 72 armoured Regiment was
located in Troti area to provide immediate reserves to 10 Division. In addition, 10 Infantry
Division also had 19 Infantry Brigade under its command. This brigade appears to have been

2
 Battle of Chhamb

given to the Division as reserve to boost up its offensive capability or for offensive in
Phuklean salient (chicken neck as called by the Indian) as it later turned out to be.

10 Infantry Division had 9 horse as its integral armoured regiment. 72 Armoured

Regiment, was detached and given over to 10 Division. In addition to these two regiments 10
Indian Division also had a light armoured squadron grouped with 19 Brigade. In artillery, the
Indians had two medium regiments; one was equipped with long rang 130 mm Russian guns
and the other with American 155 mm guns. They also had three to four field regiments, a
light regiment (120 mm Mortars) and an antiaircraft battery. This artillery was deployed
exclusively for Chhamb battle. 80 Brigade had its own artillery to support them in their area.
Indians also had a Para Commando Company and an Anti –Tank Guided Missile Company
carrying the deadly French ENTAC missiles. Apart from the usual compliment of support
units 10 Indian Division also had two engineer battalions.

Pakistan Forces

On our side, 23 division consisted of two Azad Kashmir Brigades and three Infantry
Brigades, each comprising the normal three infantry battalions. The two Azad Kashmir
brigades, i.e. 4AK Brigade and 7 AK Brigade, were originally deployed over a very wide
frontage on the hilly terrain of Bhimbar and Mirpur sectors respectively. As a war expedient,
the responsibility to look after a major portion of these two sectors was given to Commander
7 AK Brigade. The Headquarters 4 AK Brigade was brought down in area Padhar and the
brigade defended a portion of Chhamb sector from Uparla Batala to Bakan with a battalion of
its own and one each of 66 and 111 Brigades which were placed under its command. 20
Brigade was primarily deployed along with 4 AK Brigade to defend the Chhamb Sector and
hold ground from Baken to Mattewala including Nadala enclave. 66 Brigade less one
battalion was located in area Daulat Nagar as divisional reserve. 111 Brigade located in
Jalalpur Jattan was also in divisional reserve, but presently had only one battalion because
one of its battalions occupied defensive positions under 4 AK Brigade in Kotli area and the
other, 8 Punjab, had left in the last week of October for East Pakistan. 25 Punjab which was
to come in its place from East Pakistan had not yet arrived. This brigade therefore remained
with only one battalion for about a month until 10 Baluch was ordered to join the Brigade on
30 November.
26 Cavalry was the Division’s integral armoured regiment. In October, 11 Cavalry
was also placed under command. Soon after, orders for raising an armoured squadron were
issued. Towards the end of October, Headquarters 2 Armoured Brigade arrived and took over
all the armoured elements in the Division. It was on 3 December, the day war began, that 28
Cavalry was also palced at the Division’s disposal but, initially with a lot of restrictions in
regard to its employment in offensive operations. The earliest this regiment could be brought
in battle was 5 December. It, therefore, could not be included in the offensive plans and did
not add to the Division’s offensive capability initially for the reason that it was given too late.

In artillery, it was one field regiment supporting each infantry beigade and only one
medium regiment organic to the Division. In addition, artillery of 17 Division was also had
been made available for operational use. Much later, when the battle in Chhamb had entered
the final phases of war a heavy mortar battery was also given to the formation.

With this tally of the opposing forces it is obvious that Indians had a preponderance in
infantry by a clear margin of three to four battalions. In artillery the two forces had a near
parity. In armour we had a slight superiority in number but qualitatively Indian armour was

3
 Battle of Chhamb

better. Air Force plays a vital role in modern role without which no mobile war can be fought
effectively. We had been assured of air superiority over the battle zone for the first three days
of the war. On 4 December our air completely dominated the skies. On 5 December enemy
sent more sorties than we did. After 5 December we mostly saw Indian planes in the air.
PAKISTANI AND INDIAN PLANS

Pakistan Plan

In the initial phase of the offensive, which was to commence at 2100 hours on 3
December, 66 Brigade was to attack and secure a lodgement in enemy territory between Pir
Maungowali and south of Pir Jamal. The Brigade was to go upto line Khalabat Jhil-Shekhsar.
In conjunction with 66 Brigade, 111 Brigade was to attack astride road Moel-Chhamb and
secure area upto line Nala (east of Uparli Banian) and Barsala. The two brigades were to
accomplish this task by first light 4 December. At the day break on 4 December, 11 Cavalry
Group operating under 66 Brigade was to break out from Munnawali, cut road Dewa-
Mandiala at Kumauli Chhapar and was to secure home bank of river Tawi in vicinity of
Mandiala. The task was to be completed by 66 Brigade by the evening of 4 December. In
support of 66 Brigade’s 11 Cavalry Group 111 Brigade was given the task to offensively
probe forward towards the sensitive area of Chhamb and Chak Pundit in order to draw and
attract the enemy reserves towards itself. After 66 Brigae and 11 Cavalry Group had secured
the home bank of river Tawi in Maadiala area on night 4/5 December, 111 Brigade was to
advance and capture Chhamb. Further operations across river Tawi were to develop
thereafter.

20 Brigade operating in the south was to make attack demonstrations in area Burejal,
Manawar and Nadala enclave to hold ground against a possible counter-offensive of the
enemy in the southern half of the Salient. In its primary defensive role, it had to remain in a
position where it could take on the enemy if he tried a counteroffensive from Jhands,
Manawar and Chimrial area. Once the main attack in the north had got going the brigade was
then to advance as far forward as possible capturing Jhanda, Mangotian, and Manawar etc.

Grouping

The entire force was grouped for the initial attacks as under: -
Armoured Brigade, Divisional reserve
12 Independent Squadron
13 Azad Kahmir Battalion
28 Cavalry (after last night 4 December)
Company Reconnaissance and Support

20 Brigade
Squadron 26 Cavalry
14 Punjab
17 Frontier Force
Company ex 47 Punjab
Company reconnaissance and Support

66 Brigade
11 Cavalry
Squadron 26 Cavalry

11 Cavalry Group
4
 Battle of Chhamb

4 Punjab
Company Reconnaissance and Support
47 Punjab (less company)
23 Baluch
33 Frontier Force
Two Field Companies Engineers

111 Brigade
Squadron 26 Cavalry
42 Punjab
10 Baluch
3 Frontier Force
Company reconnaissance and Support

4 Azad Kashmir Brigade

2 Azad Kashmir Battalion
6 Azad Kashmir Battalion

7 Azad Kashmir Brigade

1 Azad Kashmir Battalion
4 Azad Kashmir Battalion
8 Azad Kashmir Battalion

Tactical Headquarters of the force were established in the area of Divisional Artillery
Headquarters near Padhar. Communications had been already established there. Kotla had
been selected Divisional Headquarters due to its central location in relation to Mirpur,
Bhimbar and Manawar Sectors.
Analysis of the Plan

Tactically the plan was sound and it clearly showed flexibility by rapidly crossing the
river Tawi when the enemy had still not determined the direction or the main objective of the
attackers and was probably bringing reinforcements. The plan was bold and had great
potential for victory and annihilation of the sizeable part of the enemy Division. The attack
was subtlety aimed at enemy’s communications in vital areas of Palanwala and Juarian.

Indian Plan

Indians did have offensive plans against 23 Division in what is commonly known as
‘Manawar Gap’. Initially they had 19 Brigade, 52 Brigade and 68 Brigade for this offensive
action to be reinforced by 191 Brigade which was already in the holding role in the Salient.
Then they had 3 Independent Armoured Brigade and enough artillery to back up this
offensive. Their objective was not necessarily Gujrat or the strategic GT Road but they, with
limited offensive, did aim to capture Marala and reach the general line Karianwala tanda.
With the forces available to the Division they were confident that they could achieve this.

On the other hand, the Indians had never doubted the possibility of a pre emptive
attack by Pakistan in Chhamb sector and were prepared for this. They had managed to
acquire detailed intelligence of our units and our defences through the defecting Bengali
officers and were quite confident to ward it off easily if it did come. They did not expect a
Pakistani attack from the area north of Road Moel Chhamb. They believed the terrain in that

5
 Battle of Chhamb

areas was too rugged for any major offensive. They had appreciated the possibility of an
attack from south, roughly through the corridor of Moel Manawar. The terrain there was open
and flat and facilitated major armour manoeuvre. River Tawi afforded good crossing places
in southern sector and they thought Pakistanis would launch subsequent operations across the
river astride Nageal crossing. They were therefore completely surprised when our attack
came from the northern half of the Salient and for a moment did not believe it.
CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF CHHAMB

Sword of Allah was the code name for the lunching of the offensive operation which began
on 3rd December 1971.

Review of the two Days’ Fighting

66 Brigade had been able to do their job well on the evening of 3 December when the
offensive was launched. It won an easy victory as if faced little opposition. However, on 4
December, the crucial day of the battle, when 11 Cavalry Group moved out to capture
Mandiala the Brigade could not come to the help of 11 Cavalry which had to fight the battle
alone. If the 11 Cavalry Group battle had been controlled by the Brigade with a well
coordinated effort of its units following the armour, the entire advance would have been
swifter Capture of Chhamb at that time would have had a paralyzing effect on the enemy who
was threatened to be trapped in the salient.

Even on 4 December, 111 Brigade failed to show any appreciable progress. On he

evening of 3 December they had failed to clear Moel Post which cost them their advance on
4th. Next morning they tried to take Banian Barsala with 42 Punjab. It was not a well
coordinated attack. 42 Punjab after their initial attack the previous evening was in position
now on the ground. It would have been better if the reserve battalion had been used with the
armour to capture the position while 42 Punjab assisted them with direct fire to keep the
enemy heads down. In actual fact, the Brigade was never used as a whole to generate
maximum combat power at the point of attack to burst through the enemy resistance. Both the
leading battalions had fought their own battles, almost independently with no coordination at
all. Besides, the enemy resistance south of Chhamb road was also much stronger.

The armour was not well used by us. We had two armoured regiments and an
independent armoured squadron. The resources given to the Brigade were rather modest for
this task. A squadron of Shermans which was allocated to the Brigade could not have taken
them very far. Then a squadron of 26 Cavalry was given to 11 Cavalry Group. Which with
their superior and powerful tanks, perhaps did not need an extra complement of this
squadron.

Army placed 28 Cavalry under command on the evening of 3 December. The

regiment was to come from Gujranwala, Initially GHO had laid some restrictions on its use.
If this regiment had been given well in time it would have given a tremendous boost and
flexibility to the attacking force. The task of breaking out on 4 December would have
logically gone to 2 Armoured Brigade instead of 11 Cavalry Group. There could have been a
number of other options and combinations available to the GOC to use this Regiment.
Obviously the GOC had never included this new element in his planning.

6
 Battle of Chhamb

The day of changing fortunes

The Indians were completely surprised when we crossed the river on the night of 4/5
December. Some Pakistani armour had broken through the rugged country up North and
some infantry had managed to perch itself on Mandiala North, but the key position of
Mandiala South was still held by Indians. No damage worth the mention had been caused to
the big 191 Indian Infantry Brigade, which now had been reinforced.

On the night of 4/5 December, only one tiny Indian platoon held the big Bachohe
Mandi feature. A company of 5 Sikh which withdrew form Mandiala North held the far bank
of Tawi.

Many factors contributed towards our failure that day. 66 Brigade failed to secure the
home bank of Tawi which included Mandiala South. Which had for reaching effect on the
operations of 5 December.

6 AK battalion which was to go into attack with 13 AK had failed to join them-an
absolutely unpardonable military sin which did an incalculable harn to the Division’s
offensive that day. Equally surprising is the fact that the staff of 4 AK Brigade, which ought
to have kept a minute to minute tally of progress of the attack, failed to locate 6 AK.

111 Brigade had made no progress on that day either. This Brigade steadily creeping
forward would have kept the enemy in a terrible state of anxiety at Mandiala.

Terrain at that particular point at Mandiala area was not favourable to attack across
Tawi with tanks. Mandiala High ground situated at the edge of the River was restricting
approaches to Tawi where the banks were high and steep. One approach was provided by
Sukh Tao Nullah but that was very well covered by the Indians. The other approach was
along the road over Mandiala bridge guarded by Mandiala concealed and well protected the
dug in enemy tanks, missiles and recoilless rifles. In actual fact ground between Sukh Tao
Nala and Mandiala South was too narrow for the deployment of armour unless one found
open spaces across Tawi.
THE FALL OF CHHAMB

Changing the Direction

The new plan was to pull out the bulk of armour from the present location at Kumauli
Chhapar, concentrate it over night between Dahu Sirihali and Barila in the South under 2
Armoured Brigade. 4 AK Brigade was also reinforced with 33 FF which was given under its
command. 111 Brigade, as before, retained the task of capturing Chhamb with one change-
Brigader Babar as its new commander was to lead the Brigade, 20 Brigade, in a discretionary
effort was to simulate attack preparations from Nadala Enclave.

2 Armoured Brigade attack plan was a simple one. In order to acquire a jumping off
space Lt Col Tressler with a company of 42 Punjab (111 Brigade) had already cleared Bakan
on the evening of 5 December. 2 Armoured Brigade moving on two axes planned to dash
across to Chak Pandit and secure the home bank of the river Tawi. The Brigade was grouped
in two columns. The northern column comprised 4 Punjab and a squadron of 26 Cavalry. Its
task was to capture Barsala and then advance towards Chak Pandit in conjunction with the
main southern column.

7
 Battle of Chhamb

23 Baluch operating on the southern axis was immediately launched on arrival at

about 0600 hours to enlarge the firm base established by the Lt Col Tressler. They advanced
towards Paur, a village about 2000yards East of Bakan, and captured it without any
resistance.

On the northern axis 4 Punjab advanced towards Barsala, hit the minefield in front of
the village and came under a heavy fire. Quickly they lost a tank. There too the advance was
halted. Enemy held the high ground from Barsala to Jhanda 28 Cavalry was still trailing
slowly along the minefield and was now roughly opposite Jhanda. 23 Baluch finding a lane
through minefield north the Point 951 advanced straight to Singri vi Panj Garan. This
advance continued now in the north-easterly direction. The enemy was on the run firing
recklessly in all directions Chak Pandit HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY THE Pakistani forces.

On the northern axis the enemy began to withdraw as soon as Pakistani armour
managed to break through the minefield in the south. 4 Punjab marched into Barsala soon
after.

In the North, 4 AK Brigade attacked Mandiala South at 1400 hours with 6 AK

Battalion and a squadron of 11 Cavalry. Earlier that day in the morning, en enemy tank
squadron had come out of its sanctuary of Mandiala South and cautiously sniffed its way
towards Kumauli Chhappar. The tanks of 11 Cavalry took up firing positions and supported
the attack as 6 AK moved towards their objective. The battalion moved in a perfect line and
charged the ridge. Being hard pressed, 6 AK reluctantly pulled back and the position was
retaken by the enemy. If only one squadron of 11 Cavalry had been quickly sent up as soon
as the objective had been taken there was little chance for the enemy to succeed in throwing 6
AK back form Mandiala South.

In the north on the extreme left shoulder of the salient, a gruesome battle was going
on at Laleal Hill. 2 AK Regiment holding Uparal Batala, Ban Chiran and Purani Tgakhri area
with two companies (remaining two companies were spread over further north) was ordered
to take Laleal. First attempt to take Mandiala Feature on 3 December by the same battalion
had failed. The leading line wavered once as some men fell wounded, but it soon steadied
itself. The climb continued through a hail of bullets and men kept dropping now in large
number. It was clear the Laleal was held with much more than a platoon and had been
reinforced by the enemy. Amongst the many who did not come back was the gallant company
commander Major Faruq, his body riddled with several bullets holes. Of a company of about
110 which went into this attack only 57 returned uninjured, 24 lay dead, some as close as 75
yards from the crest of the hill, and 29 were wounded. Major Faruq was awarded Sitara-e-
Jurrat for this very plucky, though a hapless, fight posthumously.

On 7th morning 2 Armoured Brigade received clearance to take Chhamb. At day break
111 Brigade and 2 Armoured Brigade, still without much of their infantry, started converging
on Chhamb. Enemy artillery fired madly that morning. As the day advanced the enemy air
became increasingly active. At about 0830 hours the leading elements of 2 Armoured Brigade
having met no opposition reached the outskirts of Chhamb. The town had been vacated by the
enemy on night 6/7 December. Both the Brigades arrived almost simultaneously in Chhamb
which had already been vacated by the enemy. 4 AK Brigade captured Mandiala South and
with the occupation of Jhanda and Mangotian by 20 Brigade the same day, victory in the
Salient was complete.

8
 Battle of Chhamb

Analysis of the attack on Chhamb

(a) On 4 December when 11 Cavalry Group operation was progressing

satisfactorily the task to capture Chhamb could have been given to 66 Brigade who alongwith
11 Cavalry Group and 111 Brigade were in a favourable position to do so. Instead, the orders
given to the Division on 4 December were to cross the Tawi at night and go for the enemy’s
vitals. Again, on 5 December, when the operation across the Tawi had failed, he could have
shifted the entire weight to take Chhamb which was only 4000 yards away from Gura and in
all probability, would have taken it too by the sheer weight of armour. In fact, he was
strongly suggested this course but he had refused. Fighting in Chhamb, he thought, would
have meant waste of time and loss of surprise across Tawi. After the fall of Chamb enemy
would have logically expected crossing of the river by us and would have strengthened areas
east of Tawi. As long as the pivotal point of Chhamb stayed with the enemy his attention
would always rest on this side of the river in defending Chhamb and while doing so would
induct all troops into the salient. On 6 December again, when 2 Armoured Brigade was
launched, the orders were not to capture Chhamb but to cross Tawi.

Although 111 Brigade continued to have the task to capture Chhamb after 4
December but their task had always remained subservient to the main operation elsewhere in
order to keep the enemy tied down on Chhamb Axis.
THE RIVER TAWI AND THE FATEFUL HOURS

After the fall of Chhanab the General gave his orders for the capture of Palanwala at
1430 hours. 2 Armoured Brigade was ordered to make the crossing east of nageal and capture
Palanwalaa soon after dark. 111 Brigade in conjunction with 2 Armoured Brigade was to
attack further south. 23 Baluch was to make firm base across the Tawi east of nageal in the
first phase but the second in command had not shown up for the orders. The attack was
postponed and the valuable time was lost.

The enemy opened up a barrage of artillerty on and around the town. Enemy was
trying his best to buy time.

42 Punjab formed up for an attack along the western bank of the river Tawi on the
night of 7/8 December. Led by Colonel Tressler 42 Punjab entered the river. Initially they
encountered little opposition. When they reached Chhatti Tahli, enemy resistance intensified.
After hand to hand fight in which they inflicted casualties on the enemy, they evicted the
enemy and knocked out a tank. Enemy began to give way. It was now getting day light and
time for the remaining two companies of 42 Punjab to come up. The whole Brigade was then
to follow up. It was then that the news of cancellation of 2 Armoured Brigade attack reached
commander 111 Brigade, he immediately halted the brigade and with that two follow up
companies of 42 Punjab were also stopped. Soon after, the enemy counter attacked with tanks
and threw back Tressler from Chhatti Tahli.

9
 Battle of Chhamb

THE LAST STRUGGLE

On the fateful day of December 9, behind the forward lines of the Pakistani forces
along river Tawi, there occurred an air accident in which the bravest sons of the nation, the
finest soldier of the Pakistan Army Major General Eftikhar Khan, the Commanding General
died. With his death the fate of the final struggle was pre-doomed to failure.

Brig Abdullah’s Commander 111 Brigade plan was to secure a firm base across Tawi
with a battalion each astride Nageal and Bahleal crossing at night and then push the armour
through to capture Palanwala and Lam. After an intense artillery fire 42 Punjab and 10
Baluch left their start line and entered the river at two in the morning. They resolutely moved
towards their objectives. 4 Punjab on the right crossed three channels of the river and despite
intense enemy fire made good progress. They broke through the enemy defences along the
river and advanced nearly 1500 yards into the rear, in the depth position where a company of
10 Garhwalis was in position. After a brief engagement the Garhwalis also broke and ran.
The whole battle field was soon littered with dead bodies. By now 42 Punjab had carried out
their task commendably well. Their casualties had been heavy too but the enemy was already
being seen moving past Palanwala towards the east.

On their left, 10 Baluch ran into trouble as soon as they crossed the river. First they
were caught up in their forming up place by the enemy artillery shelling which put their
commanding officer out of the battle. Apparently the place was a registered target for
defensive fire. The battalion then came under heavy enemy fire from across the river as they
approached the far bank but the attack continued.
It was broad day light when 28 Cavalry stated crossing the river. The tall grass
prevented their battle deployment. Their movement was very sluggish and unnecessarily too
cautious when, in fact, it should have been like lightening.

At 1400 hours the force across Tawi started withdrawing with artillery giving full
cover. By evening the entire force was back at the home bank. This was the Division’s last
major operation of the war and the last struggle for Jaurian.

ANALYSIS OF BATTLE OF CHHAMB

(a) Proper threat appreciation. The situation in East Pakistan was fast
deteriorating. Mukti Bahini, supported by the Indian Army was making raids
inside East Pakistan. The threat arising from this situation in East Pakistan was
properly appreciated as war in the near future between Pakistan and India.
This proper appreciation of the threat perception led to the timely preparation
for the Pakistan armed forces against the impending Indian threat.

(b) Timely organization and deployment of forces: - In the wake of the proper
threat appreciation, 23 Division was organized into a fighting force in June
1971. The raising of this new Division created new logistic problems which
were solved with patience and perseverance.

(c) Intelligence: -Intelligence gathering led to new adjustments in the deployment

of forces. In September 1971, Pakistan Intelligence reported large scale Indian
Convoy movements from Akhnur to Jaurian and Chhamb. The intelligence
sources revealed that in one night the Indians had moved some 800 tanks from
Jammu to Jaurain Since the enemy was concentrating forces close to the

10
 Battle of Chhamb

border, 111 Brigade was moved from Rawalpindi to Pero Shah and 66 Brigade
and 11 cavalry were concentrated in the general area of Daulatnagar in
October 1971.

(d) AIM: In view of the threat perception, the Pakistan army carved out its clear
aim of defending the area of its responsibility against Indian attack which
extended from Churrfi valley to river Chanab. The secrondry mission was to
captur CHHAMB area salient clearing the area uptl river Tawi. This would
secure our G.T. Road and the precious headworks of Marala. 23 Division
continued to maintain its aim despite difficulties faced and set backs suffered.
It ultimately captured Chhamb and reached the river Tawi.

(e) Plans: The new GOC since his taking over the command of 23 Division
concentrated on the preparation of plans for big events. He held briefings, re-
assessed plans, made adjustments in them for all possible contingencies. He
attended to numerous logistic problems with the objective of bringing the new
Division to a very high level of operational efficiency. A war exercise was
also held from 8 to 15 November 1971 that led to the formulation of offensive
plans.

(f) Flexibility of plans: Although the plan was bold but it clearly showed
flesibility. No hard and fast plan was made in advance for action after crossing
the river Tawi. This plans were to be made taking into consideration the
direction and the main objective of the enemy in changed circumstances. The
flexibility in the plan brought a bold element for victory as it aimed at
annihilating the sizeable part of the enemy’s division by destroying enemy’s
communication in the vital areas of Palanwala and Jaurian.

(g) Fight against numerical superiority: The Indian forces had a clear numerical
superiority in infantry by a clear margin of three to four battalions although in
artillery the two forces had parity and in armour Pakistan forces had slight
superiority. Qualitatively, the Indian armour was better of the two. Pakistani
forces also fought against the dominance of the skies which the Indian airforce
had assumed after December 5, 1971. The battle of Chhamb is one of the
examples of fight against forces that were numerically superior to ours.

(h) Capture of Chhamb a subservient aim: Although Pakistan forces aimed at

capturing the Chhamb salient, the capture of Chhamb Town was a subservient
aim in the plans. It is argued that on December 4 when the operation was
progressing satisfactorily, the task of capturing Chhamb town could have been
givent to 66 and 111 Brigades. The GOC refused to take this course of action
because he thought that fighting in Chhamb town would have meant waste of
time and loss of surprise across Tawi. Conversely it has been argued that had
the two Brigades captured Chhamb in the beginning, the attention of the
enemy would not have rested on this side of the river Tawi and the enemy
would not have been able to induct reinforcements into the salient.

(i) Lack of co-ordination: The battle of the 11 Cavalry group was not properly
controlled by the 111 Brigade. On December 4, when the 11 Cavalry moved
out to capture Mandiala, the 111 Brigade could not come to the help of 11

11
 Battle of Chhamb

Cavalry which had to fight the battle alone. If this battle had been controlled
by the Brigade with a well co-ordinated effort, the entire advance would have
resulted in capture of Chhamb. It would have had a paralyzing effect on the
enemy who would have been trapped in the salient.

(j) Reserve battalion not used with Armour: 111 Brigade failed to show any
appreciable progress as it failed to clear Moel post on the evening of
December 3, 1971. Next morning it again failed to capture Banian Barsala
with 42 Punjab. It was not a well coordinated attack as the reserve battalion
had not been used with the Armour.

(k) Late addition of 28 Cavalry: 28 cavalry was placed under the command of
23 Division rather late on the evening of December 3, 1971. Since the
regiment had to come from Gujranwala it had not been included in the original
plans, thus depriving a number of other options and available combination. If
this regiment had been given well in time, it would have given a tremendous
boost and flexibility to the attacking force.

(l) Failure to act on time: On December 4 and 5, 66 Brigade failed to secure the
home bank of river Tawi. Moreover, 6 AK battalion which was to go into
attack with 13 AK failed to join them. It was a great military blunder which
did incalculable harm to the offensive.

(m) Death of the Commander: Leadership in battles performs a major role on the
morale of the forces. General Iftikhar Janjua was performing this role of
leadership exceedingly well in very trying circumstances. His sudden death on
December 9, behind the forward lined of Pakistan forces along the river Tawi
in an aricrash constituted a heavy blow to the morale of the attacking forces.
With the death of this one of the finest soldiers of the Pakistan Army, the fate
of the final struggle across river Tawi was fore-doomed to failure.

(n) ILL-planned crossing of Tawi: 10 Baluch made the ill planed crossing of
Tawi and came under heavy fire of the enemy on December 9,1971 in broad
day light. Tall grass prevented their battle deployment. They could not hold
ground and started withdrawing to the home bank of the river. Thus the last
struggle for Juarian came to an end in unfavorable circumstances.

12
 BATTLE OF JALUALA

THE BATTLE OF JALUALA

Background.

After their victory at Qadisiyyia, the Muslim Army advanced towards Ctesiphon, to
which the defeated Persian army had retreated. The Muslim Army conquered Ctesiphon in
637 AD (15 Hijri). Having abandoned Ctesiplion to the Muslims, the Persion Army retreated
northwards. Yazdjurd had established a temporary headquarters at Hulwan (the present day
Pul-e-Zohab) but thePersian army stopped and faced at Jaluala.
The Battlefield
Jaluala was a place of strategical importance situated on the east bank of the River
Diyala, a few miles above Ctesiphon. It was a kind of bottleneck confining the movements of
armies to a narrow gap. Movement was possible over the broken ground but not any major
military movement could be undertaken. The western edge of this broken ground was 2 to 3
miles from Diyala and the space in between was the gap. So long as the Persians held this
gap, north Persia was safe from any invader from central Iraq. Moreover, the territory of
Suwad, a fertile area between the two great rivers of Iraq, was safe in case the entire region
fell to the Muslim Army. The Persians were determined to keep at least the northern Suwad
in their hands and with this in view, they selected Jaluala as the point for the battle against the
Muslims.

Persian plan.

Yazdjurd at Hulwan appointed Mihran as the commander for the defence of Jaluala
while Khurrazad was appointed as his deputy and the commander of the cavalry. The two
generals made immediate preparations and undertook the following measures:-
a. The entire town of Jaluala was converted into a fortress. A deep ditch was dug
about three miles to the south. In front of the ditch, wooden caltrops were
strewn in large numbers. Caltrop was a cavalry obstacle, designed to wound
the horses in their hooves and thus put them out of action. The belt of caltrops
corresponds to the minefields of today.
b. The families and the heavy baggage of the Army was sent back to Khaniqueen
and Qasr-e-Shireen. The troops took oath by the sacred fire that they would
die fighting rather than retreat.
c. Adequate provisions were stocked in the town that could last in case the siege
prolonged.
d. The preparations were so through that any attacker would think twice before
launching attacks on the such formidable positions.

Muslim Plan.

Saad, the commander of the Muslim Army had received the reports of the Persian
plan. Their plan included the following:-
a. Muslim Army was to concentrate on taking over northern Suwad, which the
Persian Army was keen to defend.
b. It was imperative for the Muslims to capture Jaluala and Khaniqeen because
the permanent occupation of Ctesiphon could only be assured if the Persians
were driven out of the northern plans.

1
 BATTLE OF JALUALA

c. After Qadisiyyia the number of the Persian soldiers who had accepted Islam
increased. Saad utilized them as part of the great brotherhood of Islam and not
as foreign troops.

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 BATTLE OF JALUALA

THE CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF JALAULA

Initial moves by the Muslim Army:- Hashim Bin Utba, nephew of Saad arrived at
Jaluala from Ctesipion with an army of 12000 men. The entire perimeter of the town was
strongly held by the Persians. Hasim established his camp and deployed his army along the
southern area of the perimeter. This siege lasted for 8 months and whole affair was a
stalemate. Persian reinforcements arrived from Hulwan and the Muslim Army became
alarmed. Hashim made several attempts to storm the positions of the Persians but his attacks
were repulsed. Mihran the Persian General, thought that the Muslim resolve had dwindled
and began to send detachments out of their positions to raid the Muslims. He made altogether
80 sallies retiring after each engagement to the safety of their fortifications. Hashim asked for
reinforcements and Saad sent him 600 infantry and 400 cavalry from Ctesiplion. A little later
Saad sent another 500 cavalry.

Initial Moves by the Persian Army

No accurate knowledge exists about the strength of the Persian at Jaluala. The
Persians had by now become tired of operating from the besieged town and as such Mihran
made preparations for a major attack.

The Battle

Hashim who had by now full knowledge of the Persian plan pulled back his Army at a
short distance from the ditch to allow the Persians some room to form up for a battle and re
arranged regiments in the camp to correspond to the new position. The battle of Jabaula was
fought in Zuqad 16 Hijri (November 637). The Persian army rushed out of the town, crossed
the ditch and began to deploy between the Caltrops and the Muslims. Hashim made no
response as he wanted the Persians to drawn their entire force from the town. Consequently
the Persians launched the attack. A few Muslim units were pushed back a short distance.
Hashim was deliberately remaining on the defensive so enabling Persians to advance further
away from Jalaula. The fighting gradually assumed intensity and the battle become more
violent. Both sides exhansted their arrows and Javelins and fighting was carried out with
swords. The Muslim regiment gave way at about noon. Qaqa addressed the retreating
requirement saying “I am attacking them again until Allah decides between us.” These words
of Qaqa electfified the retreating Muslim regiment which showed no further weakness. Both
sides for the time being disengaged from the battle. In this phase of the battle, Hashim had
remained on the defensive with the objective of tiring the Persians down. In the second phase
he counter attacked to drive the enemy forces into the ditch. The two forces were again
locked in a combat. At sun set a storm blew from the south which was welcomed by Hashim
as a welcome blessing. The Muslims attached with the wind behind them. The Muslims
attacked even with graterzeal and the Persians began to loose cohesion. Helped by the storm,
Qaqa moved form the left and worked his way behind the Persian Army. His army attacked
the Persian flank and got the crossing. The Persians did not collapse and the battle became
more furious. At sunset the Persian resistance broke. Finally driven by the army of Hashim
they fell into the ditch where large numbers perished. The remaining Persian army fought
tenaciously, but Qaqa and his men held firmly. From the south the Muslim army attacked and
the battle field became a slaughter house. The defenders in the town marched out towards
Halwan. By the morning, no Persian soldier was left in the town of Jalula except the prisoners
in Muslim hands. Tabari has put the Persian casualties in this battle as 100,000 killed which
is an exaggeration. On both sides, the casualties cannot be assessed correctly.

3
 BATTLE OF JALUALA

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF JALAULA

General

The battle of Jalaula was the last battle of Saad in Iraq and it resulted in winning for
the Muslims a large portion of the territory of Suwad. The power of the Persian Army
suffered and it was not in a position to dispute with the Muslims the occupation of Suwad or
threaten their hold on Ctesiplion. The Persian Army from now onward could only hope to
hold what remained in their hands the lesson drawn from the battle on the basis of the
application/variation of the principles of war are as follows:-

Security: Security of plans in a battle is of paramount importance. The Persians could

not keep their plans of a defensive warfare secret as the intelligence of the Muslim Army had
knowledge of these plans and Hazrat Saad, the Commander of the Muslim Army prepared the
plan of the battle on the basis of this knowledge in which all foreseeable eventualities had
been catered for.

Maintenance of aim: The Persians in so far as they maintained their aim of fighting a
defensive battle behind the ditch and the fortress, the Muslim Army, despite their attacks
could not penetrate the Persians defences. It was only when their commanders changed their
aim of the defensive battle and, crossing the ditch, attacked the Muslim Army, they suffered
beyond recovery. In the case of their retreat, after their failure to repulse the Muslim Army,
the very obstacles of the ditch and the caltrop, which they had designed against the Muslim
onslaught worked against them. Majority of the Persian soldiers fell in the ditch and suffered
from the caltrop and either perished or became incapacitated. The Muslims on the other hand
maintained their aim of offensive attacks throughout the battle which ultimately resulted in
their victory.
Protection of manoeuvre: The Persians had prepared for the defensive
manoeuvre. They had dug the ditch and used caltrops for that purpose. It was a good
arrangement. So long as the Persians stuck to the defences prepared by them they could not
be defeated by the Muslims. It was only after the Persians abandoned their defences that they
got beaten. The tactical and strategic lesson learnt from the battle of Jalaula is that the
arrangement for the protection of manoeuvre, once carefully made, must not be discarded till
a clear tactical advantage has been gained over the enemy and the new arrangements ensure
commendable success and safety.

Surprise and deception: The improvised plan of Muslims is a classic example of

deception at the level of the theatre of war. Having found out that it was not possible to
conquer the enemy in its well defended fortification, the Muslim commanders simulated their
withdrawal, thereby giving the impression of retreat whereas they were actually managing for
a battle outside the Persian fortifications. The false signal of retreat was not properly read by
the Persians as a deception. They were deceived to abandon their fortified position. It was a
bold plan on the part of the Muslim commanders and they executed it with greatest success
by organizing a brilliant and successful counter attack.

Flexibility of Plans: Having failed initially in their plan of attack on the defences of
the Persians, the Muslims showed flexibility in their plan by pulling their army back at a
short distance from the ditch allowing the Persians some room to form up a battle and re-
arranged their plans for a determined counter attack in the open.

4
 BATTLE OF JALUALA

Arrangement for reinforcements: Having drawn the Persian army out of the
fortifications across the ditch, the Muslim commander Hashim felt the need of re-
inforcements in accordance with flexibility and the changed plan of the counter attack in the
open. Saad, the commander-in-chief of the Musim Army, had arrangements ready for sending
the reinforcements on demand by the local commander of 600 infantry and 400 cavalry from
Ctesiphon. A little later Saad also dispatched another 500 strong contingent of 500 cavalry.

Morale and leadership: The Muslim regiment under the Muslim commander
Qaqa gave way at noon on the day of the battle of Jalaula. The commander felt the immediate
need of addressing his troop under these unfavourable circumstances to raise the morale of
his troops because once the morale goes down even the best Army cannot fight with
determination and resolve. Qaqa told his soldiers, “ I am attacking them again and Allah
decides between us”. These words of the commander electrified the retreating Muslims and
they showed no further weakness. They counter attacked and pushed the Persian forces into
the ditch.

Conclusion

The battle of Jalaula, like the battle of Qadsiyyia, was fought to a conclusion. It was
the last major battle in Saads’ compaign in Iraq and won for the Muslims a large portion of
Suwad. It broke the power of the Imperial Persian Army to dispute with the Muslims either
the occupation of Suwad or to threaten their hold upon Ctesiphon. The physical strength of
the Persian was practically shattered at this battle and Persian forces were driven into the
foothills of Kirman shah.

5
 CONQUEST OF MAKKAH

THE CONQUEST OF MAKKAH

Background

Two of the tribes of Makkah had entered the Truce of Hudeibiya: the Khuzas on the
side of the Muslims and the Bani Bakr from the Quraish. They had an old feud dating back to
pre-Islamic days which remained dormant during the past few years. Although it was
expected that peace would prevail now that they had joined the truce, it did not happen so.
The Bani Bakr once again took up the thread of the rivalry and organized a night raid on the
Khuzas. In this raid they were secretly assisted by the Quraish, who not only gave them the
weapons but also a few warriors, among whom were Ikrama and Sufwan Bin Ummaya. In
this raid twenty men of the Khuzas were killed. A delegation of the Khuzas at one rode to
Madina and informed the Prophet (peace be upon him) of this flagrant breach of the truce.
The visitors invoked the alliance between their tribe and the Muslims and asked for help.

Topography

Makkah lies in the valley of Abraham, is surrounded and dominated by black, rugged
hills which rise in places upto over 1,000 feet above the valley floor. The town was then
approached over four routes, each one going through a pass in the hills. These routes came in
from the north-west (almost north), the south-west, the south and the north-east.

Move and Assembly of Muslim Forces

The Prophet (peace be upon him) ordered immediate preparations for a large-scale
operation. His operational concept was based on assembly and move with such speed and
strict secrecy as to attain a complete surprise by not allowing the Quraish to know about the
Muslims until they were virtually knocking at the doors of the enemy. This also would not
give time to Quraish to organize another alliance with their neighboring tribes to face the
Muslims. Meanwhile the Prophet (peace be upon him) learnt that a woman was on her way to
Makkah with a letter warning the Makkans of the Muslims preparations. He sent Hazrat Ali
and Hazrat Zubeir in haste after her who caught up with the woman, found the message and
brought both the message and messenger back to Madina.

The move of the Muslim Army started from Madina on January 1, 630 (the 10 th of
Ramazan, 8 Hijra). Many contingents from Muslims joined the Prophet at Madina, while
others stepped in enroute to Makkah. The Muslim Army soon swelled to a high figure of
10,000 warriors. With this force, the Prophet (peace be upon him) arrived at Marr-uz-Zahran,
10 miles north-west of Makkah, without the Quraish having any knowledge of the movement.
It was by far the fastest move taken by Muslims ever before.

Reactions of Enemy

When the Muslims got to Marr-uz-Zahran, Hazrat Abbas, who had embraced Islam
became deeply concerned aaboutthe fate of the Makkans. He was afraid that if the Muslims
took Makkah by force, the operation would result in the destruction of the Quraish. He,
therefore, set out on the Prophet’s (peace be upon him) mule, with the Prophet’s (peace be
upon him) permission, to warn the Quraish of the serious consequences of resistance and
persuade them to send envoys of peace to the Muslims. At about this time Abu Sufian had
come out of Makkah to carry out a personal reconnaissance. Abbas and Abu Sufian met while

1
 CONQUEST OF MAKKAH

the former was half way to Makkah. Abbbas informed Abu Sufian that the Messenger of
Allah had come with an army of 10,000 men and suggested that Abu Sufian should submit.
Abu Sufian mounted the mule behind Abbas and they rode to the Muslim Camp.
Abu sufian now returned to Makkah where the people had gathered, awaiting news of
their fate. Abu Sufian addressed the crowd: ‘ O Quraish: Muhammad (peace be upon him)has
come with power that you cannot match. Submit to him and the be safe’. This led to an
uproar in the crowd. “ And how many do you think could fit into your house?” the people
asked with sarcasm. Abu Sufian then added, “whoever remains in the mosque shall be safe”.

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 CONQUEST OF MAKKAH

OPERATIONAL PLAN OF THE CONQUEST OF MAKKAH

The Muslims expected that there would be some opposition to their entry into
Makkah. They could not assume that it would be an entirely peaceful operaion although the
Prophet (peace be upon him) wanted and hoped that blood would not be shed. The plan of the
Prophet (peace be upon him) was however designed to conquer Makkah as a military
operation. The prophet (peace be upon him) divided his army into four columns, one to
advance on each route. The main column, which was commanded by Hazrat Abu Ubeida and
with which the Prophet (peace be upon him) traveled in person, would enter Makkah along
the main Madina route, from the north-west, via Azakhir. The second column, under Hazrat
Zubeir, would enter from the south-west, through a pass west of the Hill of Kuda. The third
column, under Hazrat Ali, would enter from the south, via Kudei; and the fourth, under
Hazrat Khalid, would enter from the north-east, via Leit and Khandama. The Prophet (peace
be upon him) emphasized that there must be no fighting unless there was armed resistance by
the Quraish. He also ordered that there would be no killing of the wounded, no pursuit of
fugitives and no slaying of captives.

Analysis of the Plan

The advance plan envisaged convergent thrusts aimed at a single central objective
which would have the effect of chopping up the enemy into small portions and also force
dispersion on him, so that he would be unable to concentrate for battle on any one axis of
advance. Moreover, even if the enemy succeeded in holding up the advance on some axes,
the attackers would have other axes on which to breakthrough and enjoy better prospects of
success. All approaches were used to meet this requirement of military tactics. This was also
done to prevent the escape of Quraish.
Occupation of Makkah

The entry into Makkah took plac eon January 11,630 (the 20th of Ramazan, 8 Hijra). It
proved a peaceful and bloodless operation except in the sector of Hazrat Khalid. Ikrama and
Sufwan had got together a band of dissidents from the Quraish and other tribes and decided to
make the Muslims fight for victory. They met Khalid’s column at Khandama. The Quraish
opened up with their bows and drew their swords and this was all that Khalid was waiting for.
He charged the Quraish position, and after short and sharp clash, the Quraish were driven
back. Twelve of the Quraish were killed at a loss of only two Muslims. Ikrama and Sufwan
fled from the scene of the encounter. There was no opposition on other axis and the entry to
Makkah was peaceful.

As soon as Makkah was occupied by the Muslims, the Prophet (peace be upon him)
went to Kaaba and circumambulated the House of Allah seven times. This was great moment
in the life of Muhammad (peace be upon him). It was was more than seven years since he had
migrated from Makkah with the Quraish thirsting for his blood. Muhammad (peace be upon
him) was no longer an emigrant. He was no longer a voice in the wilderness. Muhammad
(peace be upon him) had returned, and he had returned as a victor. The Quraish trembled as
they waited in the mosque, for they knew the savage nature of Arab vengeance. The Quraish
were treated with magnanimity and forgiveness by the Prophet (peace be upon him).

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 CONQUEST OF MAKKAH

ANALYSIS OF THE CONQUEST OF MAKKAH

Maintenance of Aim. The aim selected by the Prophet (peace be upon him) was to
conquer Makkah peacefully and win the hearts of the non-believers to embrace Islam. To
maintain his aim, following measures were adopted:-

a. A show of force was displayed by lighting a huge fire around Makkah which
demonstrated a large Muslim strength. It was designed to subdue the Quraish’s
will to fight and make them surrender without any blood shed.

b. Show of force to Abu Sufian was designed to make him psychologically weak
and compel him to avoid any conflict.

Surprise. The Prophet (peace be upon him) took strict security measures to conceal
the movement of his Army from Madina to Makkah. He kept his intentions hidden and
warning order for move was issued only to the concerned individuals. His intentions were
only disclosed once the Muslim Army left Madina. The Prophet (peace be upon him)
dispatched mobile guards well ahead of the Main Body along the main axis of advance to
obtain early warning about the enemy. When the Muslims reached the suburbs of Makkah,
the enemy was caught unaware. Their encirclement came to them as a complete surprise. The
Quraish were not prepared for this move and preferred to surrender rather than fighting a
disastrous battle.

Intelligence. Before formulating any plan, a commander would like to know about
enemy’s intentions, composition and his tactical doctrines. This information enables him to
formulate a detailed operational plan. The Muslims had organized a sound intelligence
network both in and out of Madina. The valuable information was obtained before hand and
was always denied to the Quraish. The Quraish had no such system in their organization
which resulted in their subsequent fall as the Muslims reached Makkah without being
detected.

Moral. As the Muslim Army set off towards Makkah nobody stayed behind at
Madina except those who were disabled. This speaks of their high morale. The wide spread
of Islam in every house of Makkah lowered the morale of Quraish. The conquest of Makkah
was not a battle with tactical manoeuvres but a battle of wits, determination and high morale.

Administration. There was no dearth of food, clothing or equipment with Muslims in

this campaign. They had sufficient number of camels and horses for transportation of their
heavy baggage. It was in fact the first campaign in which Muslims were economically sound
and could afford to make good administrative arrangements.

Foresight. Foresight has always been essential ingredient of success. Any commander
with this quality can handle the crisis without much loss of time and effort. The Prophet
(peace be upon him) took following steps before the conquest of Makkah:-

a. Although the Prophet (peace be upon him) knew that Quraish were not in a
position to lift the arms for their defence yet he encircled Makkah with
adequate strength posing a serious threat to the security of non-believers.

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 CONQUEST OF MAKKAH

b. Reaching the outskirts of Makkah, the Prophet (peace be upon him) instructed
that Abu Sufian should be made to view the strength and movement of the
Muslim Army which would demoralize him. This was a step in the dimension
of psychological operations since Abu Sufian once demoralized was expected
(which in fact he later did) to discourage rest of the Quraish leaders from
fighting the Muslims. This ensured smooth victory.

Friendship and Sacrifice. Some of the Ansars thought that Prophet (peace be upon
him) would stay at Makkah after its fall since it was his ancestral abode and the fact that he
had every right as a victor to choose the place the liked to be his capital. To offset this
thought, the Prophet (peace be upon him) clarified their doubts announcing, “May life and
death is with you”. Amongst other reasons for choosing Madina as his capital, Prophet (peace
be upon him) refused to stay at Makkah since he never wanted to depart from Ansars and this
left an example of friendship and sacrifice in the Muslim community.

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 TAIF

THE SIEGE OF TAIF

Background
Makkah had fallen to the Muslims without any fighting. The magnanimity of the Holy
Prophet (peace be upon him) and the truth of religion of Islam had brought another 2000 non-
believers to the fold of Islam without a single blow of the sword.
Having consolidated his gains at Makkah, the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) sent
a deputation to the adjoining tribes to accept the word of Allah, but these tribes were already
annoyed and perturbed on the quiet fall of Makkah and hence were in no mood to accept
Islam.. they started immense war preparations against Muslims.
These tribes formed considerable strength and enjoyed an established military
reputation. The main tribe being Banu Thaqif (of Taif) and Hawazan whereas the minor
tribes were Nasr, Jasham and Saad Bin. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) had a great
military sense of timing and knew that at a proper time, these tribes would be able to gather
strength, organize themselves and then pose a serious threat to the Muslims. The Holy
Prophet (peace be upon him) thought it appropriate to deal with this new anti-Islamic alliance
before returning to Madina.
The 10,000 strong Muslim Army with antoher 2000 newly converts moved out of Makkah on
27 January, 630 AD (6 of Shawwal, 8 Hijra). Malik Bin Auf, who was the commander of
non-believers laid a successful abush to the Msulim Army at the defile of Hunain about
eleven miles from Makkah and inflicted much loss to the Muslims. In a counter action,
however, the Muslims were able to overcome they ugly situation causing heavy losses on the
opponent in a short encounter at Otas. Malik Bin Auf broke contact and withdrew from the
battle field. It was well under stood and later confirmed by intelligence reports that Malik Bin
Auf intended to give the next battle at the city of Taif, where an old formidable fort existed.
Prevailing Military Doctrine
The Arbas of those times were expert at single combat. They were also good in open
hand –to –hand fighting but had no idea of siege warfare. Therefore, as soon as the Holy
Prophet (peace be upon him) learnt of impending siege battle he immediately dispatched two
intelligent Muslim warriors to Jurash, another distant friendly tribe who had the reputation of
fighting siege battles. Hazrat Salman Farsi who had introduced the concept of Ditch at the
Battle of Khandaq was available to render some advice.
Contending Forces
The Muslim Strength 10,000 strong with additional 2000 new converts who had yet to
give their best in the cause of Islam. The non-believers were almost at par with Muslims but
they had the advantage of a walled city and local resources. They also lacked in know how of
conduct of effective siege operation, whether offensive or defensive.

Taif

Taif was located in hilly terrain and enjoyed the status of an old fort. The battlements
and walls were renovated and repaired in right earnest and hillocks within the city were
prepared for observations and show of force. From base of the city walls the ground sloped
outward running into an open valley without any cover or protection in the immediate
vicinity. The area had some fruit orchards located at odd distances.
The Plans

Malik Bin Auf’s Plan. Malik Bin Auf after breaking contact with the Muslim Army
at Hunain marched day and night through the shortest route reaching the city of Taif, after
which he soon began his efforts to fight a prolonged siege battle. He speedily stocked food

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 TAIF

and ammunitions. He aimed at fighting a patient and long drawn battle with the Muslims
from within the city. He appreciated that the Muslims who were not trained to fight this type
of warfare, could not be expected to keep the siege for a long time. The plan was, however,
subject to amendment considering it to be profitable only after seeing the expected retreat of
the Muslim Army.

Muslims’ Plan. The Mulsim forces set out from Otas on 2 February 630 AD (12th
Shawal 8 Hijra). After crossing the valley of Nakhala, they turned towards south and crossed
the valley of Al-Qarn reaching a flat ground 7 miles north-west of Taif. So far the Muslims
had encountered no opposition and the scouts had reported no sign of Thaqif outside Taif.
But hoping to surprise Malik, the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shifted his axisw of
advance, cutting across the difficult terrain in the town, between Nakhab and Sadira. From
here he reached Taif, coming n from the rear. Throughout this march, Khalid Bin Waleed led
the Army with the Bau Suleim acting as advance guard.

The Mulims got to Taif on February 5, 630 AD (then 15the Shawwal 8 Hijra) and
started laying the siege which was then scheduled to last for about 18 days. On arrival at Taif,
the camp was set up too close to the wall of the town. This mistake was soon punished by the
Thaqif archers who showered the camp with arrows. A few Muslims were killed before the
camp was moved away and established in the area where the mosque of Ibn-I-Abbas stands
today.

To stop any reinforcements or fleeing of the enemy, the Holy Prophet (peace be upon
him) appointed groups of warriors around the city walls. Hazrat Abu Bakar Siddique was
given the responsibility for the actions of the siege.

THE CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF TAIF

Most of the time fighting between the two armies consisted of exchange of archery.
The Muslims would close up to the town and try to pick off the Thaqif archers on the wall but
the Thaqif had the odds in their favour enjoying cover from fire and view, while the Muslims
were in the open. The Muslims thus got the worst of these engagements and many got
wounded.

Numerous days passed without any worthwhile encounter or semblance of success to

either of the contenders. Thus the Muslims were undergoing a futile exercise of exchanging
arrows and making movements which did not bear much fruits. However on the advice of
Hazrat Salman Farsi a catapult or MANJNIQUE was constructed to shower stones and other
missiles on the city walls. The poor quality of craftsmanship and lack of technical know-how
were the main disadvantages and the contraption did not help. Another gadget testudo or
DABABA was also constructed. This contraption was made of cow-hide and wood. It was to
be used as a large shield by few men who could advance under its cover and approach the
city’s wooden gates to set them under fire. As the men did so, the defenders poured hot
scraps of iron on the testudo which burnt and injured the men attacking under its cover. The
untrained men returned to camp leaving some casualties behind.

Two weeks had passed and the end was not in sight. The Thaqif would not come out
to fight and the Muslims could not get into the fort. Every time they attempted to approach
the objective, they were driven back with arrows. The Muslims tried to force the Thaqif out
to five battle by destroying some vine yards near Raif. Malik was much too clever a general

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 TAIF

to risk a battle under conditions which would favour his opponent. Finally the Holy Prophet
(peace be upon him) called the conference of his officers. Hazrat Abu Bakr advised a return
to Makkah and Hazrat Umar concurred with him. Hence it was decided that the siege be
lifted and the army should return to Makkah. Another school of thought insisted on one last
attempt. The Prophet (peace be upon him0 allowed them to attack the next day. A renewed
assault was launched to scale the walls but it could not progress much under the heavy
showers of arrows and other was materials by the defenders.
Casualties
The siege was lifted after 13 days, on February 23, 630 Ad (the 4th of Zeeqaad, 8
Hijra). The Muslims had lost twelve men and a large number had been wounded. The non-
believers suffered crippling losses in men and material. Following were captured as spoils of
war: -

a. Camels ---24,000
b. Goats ---40,000
c. Silver ---4,000 Okia ‘One Oka=Weigh of 40
Dirhams)
d. Prisoners of war ---6,000

The Thaqif could not be defeated. The Muslims reached back to Al-Jarara on 26th
February, 630 AD, where the Prophet (peace be upon him) distributed the spoils, taken at
Otas, as a result of the Battle of Hunain.

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF TAIF

Reasons to Lift the Siege. Some of the causes to lift the siege are as under; -

a. The strong fortress defences and gallant actions of Banu Thaqif.

b. Muslims had been out of Madina for a long time even before the siege of Taif.
The new converts in the Muslim ranks had no past experience of Islamic
battles. As the siege prolonged they started showing signs of fatigue and
requested for leave.

c. Islam was being propagated in Banu Thaqif and to grow its roots deeper it
required time. The Prophet (peace be upon him) decided to consolidate the
Muslim gains in occupied territories and this was the most opportune time.

d. The sacred month of ‘Zeeqaad’ was about to set, in which blood-shed was
then disallowed, which however was permitted thereafter.

Surprise. Banu Thaqif and Banu Hawazan achieved surprise against the Muslims
through successful conduct of ambush in Hunain. Had the Prophet (peace be upon him) and
some of his followers not shown determination, the Muslims would have suffered a crippling
blow. The Prophet (peace be upon him) has thus set for us an example by which surprise, a
crucial factor in war, can be offset by determination of a force to retaliate even under adverse
battle conditions.

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 TAIF

Leadership
The Muslims virtually had not met defeat right at the outset, ie the first action at
Hunain. Leadership of the Prophet (peace be upon him) saved the situation. He stood firm in
the battle-field with ten of his followers. Afterwards he managed to gather a small force of
hundred men which through a successful counterattack uprooted the enemy forcing him to
withdraw. Through the commander of the non-believers was brave, and could lay effective
ambushes, he lacked other qualities, eg the ineptness to chalk out a sound tactical plan. He
also failed to earmark a force to girth a rear guard action which, it appears, could have
certainly made a successful withdrawal of his main body possible.
Intelligence
Both the contending sides had established an effective intelligence network for
obtaining timely information about each other’ activities. The non-believers also launched
their reconnaissance patrols to get early warning about the quantum and direction of
movement of the Muslim Army. Based on the information obtained through their patrols, the
non-believers decided to trap the Muslim Army in the defile of Hunain which indeed was a
successful operation. Main cause of Muslims’ setback during the initial stages of Hunain, was
the carelessness of their vanguard. This force which moved ahead of the main body was
assigned with the most crucial role of getting information about enemy’s composition, his
disposition and to prevent own main body form blindly running into the enemy’s trap.
Morale
Morale of non-believers was quite low right form the beginning. Some of the tribes
who had good military reputation did not join hands with the enemy forces. Bringing of their
women, children and animals in the battle-field clearly indicates that the enemy Commander
was not too sure of the fighting spirit of his men and thus through this device he attempted to
prevent his forces defection/withdrawal.
Respect of Women and Children
During one of the actions a woman from the non-believers camp got killed by Khalid. The
Prophet (peace be upon him) prohibited killing of women and children, as this was against
the norm of fighting in Islam which preaches respect and soft heartedness for women,
children, old and disabled individuals of enemy camp.
Administration
The inhabitant of Taif had stocked sufficient food, clothing and equipment in the fortress
which enabled them to conduct a prolonged battle and compelling the Muslims to lift the
siege. This tactics has also been well witnessed even in World War Two in the battle of
Leningrad.
Importance of Pursuit
Having suffered initial losses at the defile of Hunain, the Muslim managed to inflict partial
defeat on their opponent at Otas. However they failed to maintain contact with the enemy and
Malik Bin Auf made his way for the safety of walled city of Taif. The importance of a hot
pursuit and not allowing the enemy to achieve a clean break and then fight another defensive
battle has been highlighted many a time in the history. However, the main disadvantage to the
Muslim Army was that they had no previous experience of a hot pursuit nor did they know its
techniques. Their march from Hunain to Taif was not a tactical advance but it was a simple
movement from one place to another. The enemy not only reached the city unmolested but
also gained some valuable time to prepare and fortify his defences.
Current Tactical Doctrine
Besides their ignorance of the pursuit tactics, the Muslims were unaware of the
technique of siege warfare. Banu Thaqif had lived in a walled city for years and were well
aware of fighting defensive battle from within the city. In this type of warfare they then had a
definite edge over the Muslims. The Muslims did try to learn the methods for battering the

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walls and storming the city gates but such difficult tactics and techniques could not be
mastered in a short span of 13 days-particularly when an Army is engaged in active
operations and is also without experts trained in such ventures. Thus it is imperative that an
Army must train in advance for a particular type of operation before embarking upon the
expedition.
Conclusion
The Muslim Army had absorbed 2,000 new converts form Makkah into their Army of
10,000. These new Muslims, although old warriors of Quraish, had yet to learn the Muslim
style of warfare and their undiminishing spirit. The fiasco at Humain was primarily due to
this imperfect induction. An army has not only to expand but it must also ensure proper
quality and perfect induction of new recruits. A poor quality of induction mars the overall
efficiency of the Army.