Singer et al.

- Neuronal assemblies

63 Spams, 0.. Tononi, G and Edelman. G.M. (1991) Modeling perceptual between processing streams with differential sensitivity for colour and
grouping and figure-ground segregation by means of active reentrant luminance contrast Vision Res. 37, 1129-l 140
connections Pm. Natl. Acad. SC;.U. 5. A. 88. 129-133 67 Leonards, U. and Singer, W. Two segmentation mechanisms with
64 Tononi, G., Sporns, 0. and Edelman, G.M. (1992) Reentry and the differential sensitivity for colour and luminance contrast Vmon Res. (I”
problem of integrating multiple cortical areas-simulation of dynamic press)
integration in the visual system Cereb. Cortex 2, 310-335 68 Kiper, D.C., Gegenfurtner, K.R. and Movshon, J.A. (1996) Cortical
65 Leonards. U., Smger, W. and Fable, M. (1996) The Influence of oscillatory responses do not affect visual segment&on Vision Res. 36,
temporal phase differences on texture segmentation Vision Res. 36, 539-544
2689-2697 69 Frewald, W.A.. Kreiter, A.K. and Singer, W. (1997) in Gattingen
66 Leonards. U. and Singer, W. (1997) Selective temporal interactions NeumbkhgyReport 1997(Elmer. N. and W%sle, H., eds), p 550, Thieme

Change blindness
Daniel J. Simons and Daniel T. Levin

Although at any instant we experience a rich, detailed visual would, we de nti use such
visual details to form a stable representation across views. Over the past five ye-
researchers have focused increasingly on ‘change blindness’ (the inability to de$ect
changesto an object or scene) as a means to examine the nature of our representations,
Experiments using a diverse range of methods and displays have produced strikingiy
similar results: unless a change to a visual scene produces a localizable change or
transient at a specific position on the retina, generally, people will not detect it. We
review theory and research motivating work on change blindness and discuss recent
evidence that people are blind to changes occurring in photographs, in motion
pictures and even in real-world interactions. These findings suggest that relatively
little visual information is preserved from one view to the next, and question a
fundamental assumption that has underlain perception research for centuries: namely,
that we need to store a detailed visual representation in the mind/brain from one view
to the next.

s incc
cise, veridical
antiquity, scholars
representations
have assumed
of our visual
the need for pre-
world’. Modern
rcccnt
our visual
findings
world
and their
are the primary
implications
focus
for how
of this review.
WC rcprcscnt

researchers recognize that the two-dimensional retinal

image cannot fully and unambiguously represent a three- Evidence for change blindness
dimensional world, and since Descartes, they have posited Although change detection has only recently become a topic
adjustments to the retinal image to compensate for distortions of intense inquiry, research spanning many areas of cogni-
and ambiguities. In order to form an accurate, stable repre- tive psychology has hinted at current findings. At times,
sentation, we must somehow extract the invariant structure research on visual integration of information across eye
of the world from our ever-changing sensory experience. movements has revealed striking examples of our inability
For example, as we view scenes in the real world, we move our to detect changes (see Box 1). Research on recognition
eyes (saccade) three to four times each second. Across fix.ations, memory for large numbers of photographs also suggested
objects in the world are projected onto different parts of the the possibility of change blindness. The primary purpose of
retina. Somehow, we integrate information across these fix- such studies was to demonstrate an impressive capacity to
ations to achieve a stable representation: we must recognize remember photographs from a single presentation, but they
that two consecutive views are, in fact, of the same scene even also revealed a lack ofspecificity in representations (see Box 2).
when the viewpoint or viewing angle differs. Recently, research Perhaps the most intriguing precursor to contemporary studies
on how we integrate visual information across fixations has of change blindness comes from the informal observations
spawned a new series of studies focusing on our ability to of film rrrakers and editors (see Box 3; several recent studies
detect changes from one view of a scene to the next. These are described in the text).
studies have produced a set of results that, consistent with Over the past ten years, a number of studies have begun
earlier evidence for memory distorrions, suggest a high to address our inability to detect changes to objects and
degree of ‘change blindness’; observers do not appear to scenes from one view to the next (see Box 4). Some experi-
retain many visual details from one view to the next. These ments changed images during saccades. Others made changes

Copyright 8 1997, Elssvier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 1364.6613/97/$17.00 PII: 51364.6613(97)01080-Z
Trends in Cognitave Sciences - Vol. 1. No. 7. October 1997
Simons and Levin - Change blindness

During the 197Os, evidence for visual masking and for the in- latencies”. The visual form was not sufficiently represented m
tegration of visual information at a single retinal location’,b, allow detection of rhe change.
together with the general acceptance of the construct of iconic In a sense, studies of visual integration and studies of change
memory (a short-term sensory memory rhat retains a detailed detection address the same issues using complementary method-
picture-like representation of a scene)‘, inspired a model ologies. Studies of visual integration focus on the ability co com-
for achieving a continuous experience”. This model suggested bine two distinct images, essentially adding their contents. Studies
that visual images from consecutive views are combined in a of change detection focus on the ability to subtracr one image
visual buffer, much as two overhead transparencies can be from another, thereby finding rhe difference. Both approaches
superimposed. allow an exploration of the specificity of scene representations.
Although this model seems plausible, it cannot account for
continuity under natural viewing conditions. Somehow, visual References
integration in the real world must accommodate changes m our a Di Lollo, V. (1980) Temporal integration in visual memory 1. Exp.

eye, head and body positions. In order for the visually integra- Psycho/. Ge”. 109, 75-97
b Kahneman. D. (1968) Method, findings, and theory in studier of
tive buffer model to work, stimuli presented on two different
visual masking Psycho/. Bull. 70, 404425
fixations or at two different retinal locations musr be inregrated
E Neisser, U. (1967) Cognitive psychology, Appleton-Century-Crofts
visually. That is, our visual system must determine that an ob-
d McConkie, G.W. and Rayner, K. (1976) identifying the span of the
ject is the same even when it srimulates different areas of rhe
effective stimulus in reading: Literature review and theories of
retina on consecutive fixarions. In one test of this hypothesis, reading, in Theoretical Models and Processes of Reading (2nd edn)
subjects fixated a point in the center of a display and a 12-dot (Singer, H. and Ruddell. R.B.. eds). pp. 137-162, International
pattern was presented briefly to parafoveal vision. Shortly there- Reading Association
after, subjects moved their eyes to the parafoveal location and a e Jonides. J., Irwin, D.E. and Yantis, 5. (1982) Integrating visual
second 12-dot partern was presented. When the two patterns information from successive fixations Science, 215, ‘192-194

were combined, one dot was missing, and subjects were asked to f Bridgeman. 8. and Mayer, M. (1983) Failure to integrate visual
information from successive fixations Bull. Psychwomic Sot. 21.
determine the location of the missing dot. Although initial
285-286
studies supported the notion of a visually integrative buffef, later
9 Irwin, D.E.. Brown, J.S. and Sun, J-5. (1988) Visual masking and
studies controlling for methodological and display artifacts have
visual integration across saccadic eye movements :. Exp. Psycho/.
failed co replicate the inirial findir@ (for recent reviews, see Refs
Gen. 117. 27E-287
I and m). Therefore, rhis research fails to support the hypothesis h Irwin, D.E., Yantis, 5. and Jonides, J. (1983) Evidenu! against visual
that we form an accurafe representation by storing and inte- integration across saccadic eye movements Percept. Psychophysiol.
grating precise visual information from one fixation co the next. 34,49-57
Additional evidence for rhe absence of integrated visual rep- i Jonides, J., Irwin, D.E. and Yantis, 5. (1983) Failure to integrate

resentarion across eye movemems comes from rhe study of information from successive fixations Science 222, 188

preview effects in reading. One particularly dramatic example j Rayner, K. and Pollatsek, A. (1983) Is visual informat.ion integrated
across raccades? Percept. Psychophysiol. 34, 39-48
comes from a task in which observers read lines of text chat al-
k Sun, J-5. and Irwin, D.E. (1987) Retinal masking during pursuit eye
ternated case with each letter (e.g. AlTtRnAtEd Case)“. During
movements: Implications for spatiotopic visual persistence J. Exp.
some saccades, every letter in the sentence changed case, so that
Psycho/. Hum. Percept. Perform. 13, 140-145
the visual form of every word was different. Surprisingly, when I Irwin, D.E. (1991) Information integration across saccadic eye
rhe changes occurred during an eye movement, subjects almost movements Cognit. Psycho/. 23,421X456
never noticed. Thar is, subjects not only failed m integrate the m Pollatsek, A. and Rayner, K. (1992) What is integrated across
visual form of the letters from one instant to the next, they fixations? in Eye Movements and Visual Cognition: Scene Perception
could not even tell rhat the visul form was changing. and Reading (Rayner, K.. ed.). pp. 166-191, Springer-Verlag

Apparenrly, the information integrated across fixations during n McConkie, G.W. and Zola, D. (1979) Is visuial mformation
integrated across successive fixations in reading? Percept.
reading is not contingent on the precise visual form of the word.
Psychophysiol. 25. 221-224
More recently, studies of reading have inspired a series of
o Henderson, J.M. (1997) Transsaccadic memory and integration
studies of integration of pictorial information across eye move-
during real-world object perception Psycho/. Sci. 8, 51-55
ments. These studies have focused on rhe benefits of a
p Pollatsek, A., Rayner, K. and Collins, W.E. (1984) Integrating
parafoveal preview on processing during a subsequent fix- pictorial information across eye movements J. Exp. Psycho/. Gen.
ation”,“+q. One recent study showed fhaf when complementary 113,426-442
sets of conmurs from an object were shown before and after q Pollatsek, A., Rayner, K. and Henderson. J.M. (19901 Role of spatial
an eye movement, in general, observers were unable to detect location in integration of pictorial information scross saccades
the change and the contour change had no effect on naming 1. Exp. Psycho/. Hum. Percept. Perform. 16, 199-21CI

during blinks or during a blank interval between two pic- Saccade-contingent changes
tures. Still others made changes to scenes while observers Imagine viewing a set of photographs for an upcoming
viewed a motion picture cut or a real-world occlusion event. recognition test. As you study the photogzaphs, you shift
What is striking about this diversity of approaches is the your attention among the objects in the image and you scan
similarity of the results. In all of these experiments, ob- the image with your eyes. Periodically, while your eyes are
servers fail to notice dramatic changes to displays. We will moving rapidly from one object to the next, something in
now turn to evidence for and mechanisms underlying change the scene is changed. The experimenters mention that the
blindness across saccades. scenes may change at times and that you :jhould let them

Trends in Cognitive Sciences - Vol. 1, NO. 7. October 1997

 Simon5 and Levin - Change blindness

know if you see something change. Sounds easy, right? You .( :

:.,.
are studying the photographs intently for a test, so you
should have a fairly complete representation.
Surprisingly, observers failed to notice when rwo men
in a photograph exchanged different colored hats and only In typical studies of scene memory, observers viewed hun-
50% noticed when two people exchanged head2. In all, dreds and sometimes thousands of photographs of natural
subjects missed nearly 70% of the changes that occurred scenes. Later, they tried to identify which photographs they
during an eye movement. Subsequent studies3,4 have con- had studied and which they had never viewed beforez.b.C,d.
Although the larger conclusion of these studies was that ob-
firmed the basic pattern described by Grimes. During an
servers can recognize previously viewed photographs at sur-
eye movement, we apparently lose, or at least lose access to,
prisingly high rates (sometimes exceeding 95% recognition
many of the visual details of the previous view. But is
after extended delays), several studies noted that memory
change blindness limited to cases in which information for the images was not tied to the precise visual form of the
must be integrated across eye movements? These dramatic image’,‘. When previously viewed photographs were mirror-
findings, accompanied by theoretical predictions of sparse reversed during a test, observers did not detect the change
visual representationss-‘, spurred a flurry of investigations and reported them as previously viewed’. These findings
into the mechanisms underlying change blindness, suggest not only that we fail to detect changes to the exact
visual form of a scene but, also, that we can extract the gist
Change blindness across simulated snccades or meaning of a scene and use it for recognition”.
One aspect of eye movements that might account for change
References
blindness is the existence of motion transients across the retina.
a Nickerson, R.S. (1965) Short-term memory for complex
In a sense, the target change cannot be identified because the meaningful visual configurations: A demonstration of capacity ,;
eye is processing change signals from every location. IF global Can. J. Psycho/. 19, 155-160

transients effectively mask the ability to localize an i.ndivid- b Shepard, R.N. (1967) Recognition memory for words,
sentences. and pictures J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 6, 156-163
ual transient or change, then any display that creates global
c Standing, L., Conezio, 1. and Haber, R.N. (1970) Perception and
transients should make change detection difficult. In order memory for pictures: Single-trial learning of 2500 visual stimuli
to examine this possibility, several laboratories indepen- Psychonomic SC;. 19. 73-74
dently developed a technique designed to mimic eye move- d Standing, L. (1973) Learning 10,000 pictures. 9. J. Exp. fsychol.

ments without changing the fixation locations3 (see Fig. 1). 25. 207-222
B Pedzek, K. et al. (1988) Picture memory: Recognizing added
Experiments using the flicker paradigm found that al-
and deleted details J. Exp. Psycho/. Learn. Mem. Cognit. 14.
most none of the changes were detected during the first cycle 468-476
of alternation, and many changes were not detected even :

afrer nearly one minute ofalternationy. When the blankscreen

was removed, eliminating the disruption caused by the The role of attention and expectations
global transient, the changes were detected easilyy, ‘. The The relatively long detection latencies in these studies of
change blindness caused by a flashed blank screen suggests change blindness suggest that change detection is an active
the possibility that other forms ofglobal transient should be searching process in which individual objects are encoded
equally successful in hiding changes. In fact, another recent and compared sequentially across views. Although the data
study has demonstrated comparable results when changes do not speak directly to the nature of the search for changes,
are made contingent on blinks”. one particular result reinforces this possibility. Changes to
All of these findings illustrate the absence of a precise vis- objects in the ‘.center of interest’ of a scene (according to in-
ual representation that survives global transients, yet they all dependent ratings) are detected more readily, even when the
suffer from one potential criticism. In all of these experiments, physical magnitude of the change is comparable to that of a
the global transient effectively covers the location of the non-central change”,rO. This finding suggests that attention
change. Perhaps the blank screen, eye movement or blink is focused on central objects either more rapidly or more
actually serves as a mask, interrupting processing at that lo- often, thereby allowing faster change detection. The notion
cation. Another recent series ofstudies eliminates the masking of a center of interest has important implications for ho&
explanation using the same alternating images used in the we encode our environment. Given the results of the mud
flicker studies. Rather than interspersing a blank screen, ex- splash and flicker experiments, we know that changes will
perimenters flashed a set of dot patterns at arbitrary positions not be encoded automatically and that some effort is needed
on the image simultaneously with the image change’*. These to detect changes even with a localized transient. Apparently.
dots created several additional local transients, giving the the center of interest benefit derives not from the automatic
appearance of a mud splash hitting the windscreen of a car. representation of a precise visual image but from the ab-
However, they did not mask the image change. Even so, straction of a scene’s contents.
these additional local transients had an effect similar to an eye If abstraction plays a central role in our representation
movement or a flashed blank screen: observers could not of scenes from one view to the next, then broad expectations
detect changes immediately, even though the chang,es pro- about a scene may influence how we encode objects in that
duced local retinal transients. Although the degree of change scene and, consequently, how we represent those objects.
blindness was somewhat attenuated relative to performance Interestingly, some of the early work on scene context and
in the flicker paradigm (R.A. Rensink, pers. commun.), expectations found similar change blindness and center of
change detection still required substantial time and effort. interest effects’3,‘4. For example, in one experiment, observers

Trends in Cognitive Sciences - Vol. 1, No. 7. October 1997

Simonr and Levin - Change blindness

Box 3. Insights from film makers

In the movie Ace Ventura: When Nature Calis, the pieces on a audiences to move their eyes or blink, thereby allowing a cut to
chess board disappear completely from one shot to the next. In go unnoticed”. This process of constructing a continuous visual
Goodfeplkzs, a child is playing with blocks that appear and disap- scene has taught film makers that the visual details are not cen-
pear across shots. One inevitable consequence of film produc- tral to our understanding of a scene, but it has also given them
tion is the need to shoot scenes out of order, and often to shoot intuitions about what is central. For example, film makers track
components of the same scene at different times. As a result, un- the gaze direction of actors in each shot and are c.areful not to
intentionally, many details within .ascene may change from one violate the relative spatial locations of gaze targets. Ongoing
view to the next. Although film makers go to considerable effort empirical studies of the importance ofcues such as gaze direction
to eliminate such errors, almost every movie - in fact, almost and motion in motion pictures may provide a better understand-
every cut - has some continuity mistake. Yet, most of the time, ing of how we perceive the layout of scenes in the I-eal world.
people are blind to these changes. (Film makers are. of course,
References
justified in trying to ehminare glaring errors given the potential
a Dmytryk, E (1984) On Film Editing: An introduction to the Art of
costs of some audience members noticing the change. If just
Film Construction, Focal Press
one viewer notices such a change, the popular media and the In-
b Kuleshov, L. (1987) Selected Works: Fifty Years in F;l,ns (Agrachev,
ternet community will publicize the change and inspire people
D. and Elelenkaya, N., translators). Raduga Publisher;
to look for the editing mistake rather than focusing on the movie.) c Hochberg, I. (1986) Representation of motion and !,pace in video
Film makers have long had the intuition that changes to the and cmematic displays, in Handbook of Perception and Human
visual details of a scene across cuts are not detected by audiences, Performance (Vol. 1) @off, K.R., Kaufman, L.K. and Thomas, J.P..
particularly when editing allows for smooth transitions”. For eds). pp. 22.1-22.64, John Wiley and Sons
example, the film maker Lev Kuleshovh notes that:
‘convincing montage makes the audience over-
look...minor defects (for example when the actor’s
costume changes between shots), though I repeat
that this is only possible if the scene is edited cor-
rectly (in cse of bad montage the blunder will
leap to the eye).’ Dmytvk” notes that change
blindness is evident when mistakes occur: ‘far from
the viewer’s center of interest. If he is watching the
actor’s eyes, a mismatch of an arm or hand will be
ignored nine times out of ten.’ Such intuitions
underlie Hochberg’s more recent speculations
about the ‘sketchiness’ of visual memoq and
clearly predict the center of interest effects de-
scribed in the text.
The craft of film editing constitutes a rich body
of knowledge about vision. Film makers must do
explicitly what our visual rystem does utomati-
ally: they must combine a series of p;trrial views
Fig. Person change in a motion picture. This figure depict! four frames
(individual shots) into a coherent whole (a contin-
from a motion picture in which one actor is replaced by a different actor dur-
uous scene) without audiences noticing the trans- Ing a change in camera angle (B and C). Even though the actor was clearly the
itions. Some editors even suggest ways to cause central object of the scene. many observers failed to detect this :hange.

viewed scenes that included both consistent and inconsist- likely to notice changes to the schema-inconsistent objects
ent objects in preparation for an upcoming recognition than the schema-consistent ones (also see Ref. IS). Unex-
task’“. During the testing phase, observers were asked to petted objects are more likely to garner attentional resources,
discriminate previously viewed images from similar images and attended objects are more likely to be retained from one
in which an object had been changed. Observers were more view to the next. More recently, superior recognition of

Box 4. What is in a view

The word ‘view’ has a number of distinct meanings in perception research. A view can refer to a single fixation, a Gngle viewing
position or angle, or even a photograph of a scene. Here we take a view to be an unchanging image, essentially a snapshot of a scene.
For studies of visual integration across eye movements (see Box l), views are equivalent to fixations; observers fixate .I single image
and after they move their eyes, the scene has been changed, producing a different view. In studies of change detection across simu-
lated saccades, each time the image changes observers experience a different view. In motion pictures, each change in camera angle
produces a new view of the scene even though the content of the scene itself may be unchanged. Across a cut. a view change occurs
between the final frame of the first shot and the initial frame of the second shot. Using this definition, all of the work we discuss in-
volves changes across views, even when the changes occur across long delay intervals.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences - Vol. 1, No. 7. October 1997

 Simon5 and Leun - Change blindness

inconsistent objects has been shown in recognition ofobjects

from real rooms16 (but see Ref. 13 for evidence that schema-
consistent objects are better retained). Friedman anticipated
many current claims of change blindness when she noted
that for expected objects: ‘local visual details of objects., .are
thus not generally encoded”*. She also made the prediction
that any change not altering the abstract description of a
scene substantially is unlikely to be detected.
If scene schemas help determine which changes will be
noticed, then models proposing precise representations of
the visual details of our environment may still prevail.
Perhaps change blindness only applies to peripheral and un-
attended objects. Even if the visual details of peripheral ob-
jects are not represented precisely, the details of centrally at-
tended objects may be. Several laboratories have tesred this
possibility.

Changes to attended objects

One test of the detectability of changes to attended objects
comes from a task in which participants duplicate a pattern
Fig. 1 The flicker technique. An original image and a modifiecl image of a natural scene
of colored blocks” (see Fig. 2). Participants were observing
are presented in rapid alternation with a blank gray screen interoosed between them, giv-
the display carefully, in order to perform an action. so the ing the display a flickering appearance (this method is often call,ed the ‘flicker paradigm’).
model must be considered the center of interest of the scene. The cycle of alternation repeats until observers report the charlge, and response latency
Yet, they failed to notice a change to the model pattern is used as a dependent measure of change blindness. If change blindness is caused by mask-
ing local transients with global ones, then the flashed blank screen should decrease change
when it occurred during an eye movement.
detection. This figure was modeled on a figure appearing in a recent paper by Rensink
In another series of studies18, observers viewed an array et a1.9.
of five objects on a computer monitor. After two seconds,
the array was replaced with a blank screen, followed shortly
by another array of five objects. The second array was either
identical to the first or was different in one of three ways: Model Stockpile

n mT’
(a) one of the objects was moved to a previously empty
location, (b) one object was replaced by an object that was
not in the original array, or (c) two objects in the original
array
whether
for earlier
switched places.
or not any change
work using
Observers

a similar
had occurred
were

method).
asked to determine
(see Refs 19 and 20
As in the flicker
n n n
paradigm, observers missed changes when an object was
replaced
switched
clearly focused
with
places.
a different
As
attention
in the
object
block-copying
on the objects
or when
task,
in each display.
two objects
observers
The
4. 3
n
primary goal of the task was change detection, so they knew

.I
that they should encode the objects. In recent pilot studies
using the same paradigm coupled with eye tracking
(D.J. Simons and M. Spivey-Knowlton, unpublished), we
found that, typically, observers look at all of the objects in
the display. Thus, change blindness does not appear to re-
sult from a failure to focus attention on the target object Workspace
during the trial.
Although these two studies using different methods
converge on the conclusion that even attended objects may
not be encoded sufficiently to allow change detection, both
involved displays in which the observer’s attention shifts Fig. 2 Change blindness in a block copying task. This figure is a replication of the sort
from object to object during encoding. Perhaps our visual of display used by Ballard et al.“. In this task, observers use a mouse to select and move
colored blocks from the ‘stockpile’ to reproduce the ‘model’ in th,e ‘workspace’. Participants
system can only tolerate one central object at a time.
often produce a revealing sequence of eye-movements during this task: (1) after examining
Successful change detection may only occur when the target the model, they saccade to the stockpile to select an appropriately colored block, (2) after
object is the central object immediately before and after the selecting a block, sometimes they saccade back to the model, presumably to double check

change. To examine this possibility, we used motion pic- the location or color of the block, and (3) they saccade to the workspace and place the
selected block. During the second saccade. sometimes the experimenters changed the color
tures to change an object that remained central throughout
of one of the model blocks. Even though the model was a center of interest in the scene,
the
performed
scene” (see Box
a simple
3).
action
In these
such
films,
as rising
a single
from a chair
character
and 1
observers noticed the change only rarely”.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences - Vol. 1, No. 7. October 199;’

 gist of the scene (in this case, the specific action and a few
Outstanding questions
characteristics of the actor) and ignore the vi:,ual details. As
l Evidence reviewed in the text suggests that scene-inconsistent objects long as the gist remains the same, change detection is un-
are coded more thoroughly than scene-consistent objects14,16J9. How do likely because observers have not expended the effort to en-
we form expectations for a scene and to what extent do they influence code more details. This encoding strategy makes sense given
our coding of objects and our ability to detect changes? If expectations
the innumerable perceptual features in a natural scene
influence what we attend to in a scene, then an instructional
or event, but it also illustrates the degree to which we lack a
manipulation might lead to a radical difference in change blindness.
Specifically, we would predict that a single change occurring in an detailed representation of our world.
ambiguous scene might be noticed for one interpretation but not Although these findings of change blind:less, taken to-
another. More specifically, would changes only be detected when they gether, support the conclusion that we lack a precise repre-
violate expectations about a scene? sentation of our visual world from one view to the next,
l When observers are not searching actively for a change, in general, they
none of them focused on the representation of real objects
do not detect changes, even to the central object in a scene. When our
behavioral goal is not change detection, we tend to encode the gist of a in our environment. All of them presented scenes and ob-
scene without explicitly coding the details that would allow change jects on computer monitors and television displays which
detection. In such cases, we are attending to objects and scenes, but we clearly lack many of the properties of real objects. One final
do not appear to encode the details necessary for change detection.
series of studies examined the possibility that computer dis-
What then does it mean to ‘attend to’ an object? Are there different
plays and motion pictures do not reflect how we process ob-
kinds of attention that might influence change detection? How does the
attention that leads to successful change detection differ from the kind jects in the real world. In these studies, we extended the per-
of attention that makes an object the center of interest? son change video studies” to the real world. Imagine that a
l What sorts of changes are likely to be noticed and what differentiates person approaches you and asks for directiors. Kindly, you
those from unnoticed ones? We have some evidence that changes to oblige and begin describing the route. Whil’: you are talk-
spatial layout are detected more readily than changes to object
ing, two people interrupt you rudely by carrying a door
properties’*, but a simple thought experiment shows that some property
changes should be easy to notice. For example, if one of the actors in a right between you and rhe person you were talking to.
video were replaced with a skunk, people would certainly notice the Surely you would notice if the person you were talking to
change. What aspect of this change would make it noticed more easily? was rhen replaced by a completely different person. When
l Does change blindness indicate the absence of representations? we actually conducted this study, only 509/o of observers
Although this conclusion may be appealing, the possibility remains that
noriced the change (D.J. Simons and D.T. Levin, unpub-
more sensitive measures than change detection would reveal some
underlying representation. Recent work on inattentional blindness lished). The two experimenters wore different clothing,
shows that background objects in the visual field can influence were different heights and builds, had different haircuts and
judgments even if observers are unaware of their existence30. If so, what had noticeably different voices.
is the nature of these representations (for example, how precise and Interestingly, those who did norice the change were stu-
detailed are they) and in what ways do they influence our behavior? If
dents of roughly the same age as the experimenters and those
such ‘implicit’ representations are precise and detailed, why do they not
allow us to detect changes? who failed to notice it were older than the experimenters.
l How can we reconcile evidence for form-specific visual memory in We theorized that this age difference may reflect a difference
priming studies3’,32 with change blindness? in how people abstracted the gist of the scene. Older partici-
pants would be more likely to encode rhe event as ‘some scu-
dent asking directions’; younger participants would be more
answering a telephone or entering through a doorway and likely to individuate the features of a person in their own
sitting in a chair. During the action sequence, we cut from social group and, thereby, would be more likely co encode
one camera angle to another, and during that cut, the orig- those features chat would discriminate the two experi-
inal actor in the scene was replaced by a different person menterF. To examine rhis possibility, we replicated the
who then completed the action. The changes in camera door event with the same two experimenters dressed as con-
angle followed conventional editing techniques by cutting struction workers (again with different clothing) under the
in the middle of the action”. Even though the character was assumption that these costumes would place the experi-
clearly the central object in the scene, 67% of observers menters in a social group distinct from the students. Under
failed to detect the change from one actor to another. these conditions, fewer than half of the students noticed the
Despite their change blindness, observers could describe change. These studies demonstrate convincingly that pay-
the action sequence accurately and sometimes described ing attention to an object by no means guzrantees change
properties of one or both actors. The actors were clearly dis- detection. The central object in a scene and the focus of a
criminable; when given a set of films, half of which had social interaction changed without observers noticing. As in
changes to the actor and half of which did not, observers studies of recognition memory for objects In phorographs
who had been instructed to look for changes had Me and rooms’4.16, observers were unlikely co notice changes
trouble detecting them (see Box 3). that did nor violate the gist of the scene. In this case, as long
Although these findings demonstrate that changes to as the rough description of the scene was the same before
objects in the center of interest are nor necessarily noticed, and after the change, observers did not notice.
they support the claim thar attention and abstract encoding
are necessary for change detection. When observers search Summary and fuuture directions
for and encode the features that individuate people, they Taken as a whole, these findings provide a striking picture
can detect the change. Yet, under natural viewing condi- of our ability to perceive and represent scenes. Although the
tions, they are unlikely to do so. Instead, they encode the ability to discriminate and recognize phorographs of scenes

..
@ Trends in Cognitive Sciences - Vol. 1. No. 7. October 1997
 Simons and Levln - Change bllndnesr

can be exceptionally good’“-‘*, memory for the properties 6 O’Regan. J.K. (1992) Solving the ‘Real’ mysteries of visual perception:
The world as an outside memory Can. J. Psycho/. 46, 461-488
and features of objects in scenes is surprisingly transitory.
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Findings from research on perception for action, change de-
Information Theory in Psychology: Problems and Methods (Quastler,
tection, motion picture perception and real world inter- H., ed.), pp. 174-207, Free Press
actions all suggest that the visual details of object properties 8 Blackmore, 5.1. et al. (1995) Is the richness of our visual world a”

are not retained automatically from one view to the next. illusion? Transsaccadic memory for complex scenes Perception 24,
1075-1081
We fail to notice changes to scenes when they do not produce
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a motion on our retina that attracts attention. Although
The need for attention to perceive changes in scenes Psycho/. SC;. 8.
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they are not detected automatically. Therefore, attention is 10 Tarr, M.J. and Aginsky, V. (1996) From objects to scenes: Speculations

necessary, but not sufficient, for change detection. on similarities and differences. Paper presented at the Scene
Recognition Workshop, Max-Plank-lnstitut fiir Siologische Kybernetik,
Given failures of change detection, we must question
Ttibingen, Germany.
the assumption that we have a detailed representation of our 11 D’Regan. J.K. et a/. (1997) Picture changes during blinks: Not seeing
visual world. And, given our success in interacting and be- where you look and seeing where you don’t look Invest Ophthalmol.
having in our environment, we must ask whether such de- Vis. SC;. 38, 5707

tailed representations are even necessary. Although change 12 O’Regan, J.K., Rensink, R.A. and Clark, J.J. (1996) “Mud splashes”
render picture changes invisible /west Ophthalmol. Vis. Sci. 37,
blindness might appear to contradict our phenomenal experi-
$213
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we again have a rich visual experience, and if the gist is the
15 Henderson, J.M.. Hollingworth, A. and Weeks, P.A.J. (1996) The
same, our perceptual system assumes the details are the influence of scene context on object perception. Paper presented at
same. Consider, for example, a busy city street. In this kind the Scene Recognition Workshop, Max-Plank-lnstitut fijr Blologische
of scene, a variety of property changes occur during th.e nor- Kybernetik, Ttibingen, Germany

mal course of events. People are occluded by walking be- 16 Pedzek, K. et al. (1989) Memory for real-world scenes: The role of
consistency with schema expectation 1. Exp. Psycho/. Learn. Mem.
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details would, in the words of William James, present a
Psychophyziol. 44, 369-378
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direction) from one view to the next would give the irnpres- objects in motion pictures Psychonomic Bull. Rev. (in press)
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604610
25 Nickerson. R.S. (1965) Short-term memory for complex meaningful
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Acknowledgements 155-160
The author thanks John Henderson and Ron Rensink for their comments 26 Potter. M.C. (1976) Short-term conceptual memory for pictures. 1. Exp.
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27 Shepard. R.N. (1967) Recognition memory for words, sentences, and
.,....,...........................,.........,............................................ . . . . .. . . .. . pictures J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 6, 156-163
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Trends in Cognitive Sciences - Vol. 1, No. 7, October 1997