Managing New Product Development and Supply Chain Risks: The Boeing 787 Case

This paper analyzes Boeing's rationale for the 787's unconventional supply chain, describes Boeing's
challenges for managing this supply chain, and highlights some key lessons for other manufacturers to
consider when designing their supply chains for new product development.

History of Boeing

Boeing as a company was established by Mr. William Boeing in the year 1916 with its maiden flights being
launched in the same year. After undergoing a lot of structural changes owing to the change in the law in
US, the companys largest aircraft Boeing 314 Clipper was first flown in June 1938. This aircraft could carry
90 passengers on day flight and 40 during the night flight became huge success and allowed the flight all
across the world. The next model launched was of 307 Stratoliner, the worlds first pressurized-cabin
transport aircraft. The specialty of this aircraft was that it could fly at the altitude of 20,000 feet (Krugman
1986). The journey of Boeing never stopped after that. It designed bombers during the world-war. Military
aircraft became its another advanced specialty (Leary, 1995). In 1950s the company started its first jet
airliner with a design of four engines meant for the 156 passengers, making it a leader in the market. Next
came Boeing 737 with three engines followed 727 with the twin engine concept. In 1970s, the Boeing 747
was launched which had increased capacity of 450 passengers. Further versions were discovered to meet
with the increased air traffic and passengers load.

The competition was quite stiff for Boeing from the beginning. In the year 2000 the competition had
reached its pinnacle, and Boeing was feeling the heat of the competition. Airbus and Boeing were fighting
tooth and nail for the market space, and the share prices of Boeing were falling. It was at such a time
development of 787 Dreamliner was announced. The idea was to develop an aircraft which is more
comfortable as well as more economical. The company tried to reduce the overall price of the product
and at the same time tried to increase the value of the product offered. Boeing 787 offered the efficiency
of the operations, ability to take larger number of passengers, and more area for the better comfort of
the passengers. These features made the Dreamliner an apple of eye for the company as well as for the
prospective buyers.
Introduction to Operation Management for airlines

The operation management involves the management of the process through which the inputs are
converted into outputs. For airline industries, the scope of operation management can be stated as the
following:

i) Planning of the production based on the Forecasting of the different factors that affect

the aircraft production like the demand for the flight, the changing market scenarios,

the demand for the aircraft, economic conditions of the companies making the purchase

etc. The plan should include all the major estimates of timeline for the development of

the product

ii) Organizing the activities as per the plan and allocating the man and machine for the

production. This organizing involves allocating the suppliers for the different parts as

a part of the operation management..

iii) Staffing involves ensuring that there are sufficient and skilled workers for the lined up

process.

iv) Leading and controlling the activities set out in the plan so that the product is delivered

as per the schedule and with the expected quality of the product.
Start of Boeing Dreamliner 787

In 2003, Boeing decided to focus on creating additional value for its customers (airlines) and their
passengers by developing an innovative aircraft: the 787 Dreamliner. (Throughout this paper, we shall use
the term 787 Dreamliner, 787, and Dreamliner interchangeably.) First, Boeing's value-creation
strategy for the passengers was to improve their travel experience through redesigning the aircraft and
offering significant improvements in comfort. For instance, relative to other aircrafts, over 50% of the
primary structure of the 787 aircraft (including the fuselage and wing) would be made of composite
materials (Hawk, 2005).

Second, Boeing's value-creation strategy for its key immediate customers (the airlines) and its end
customers (the passengers) was to improve flight operational efficiency by providing big-jet ranges to
midsize airplanes while flying at approximately the same speed (Mach 0.85).3 This efficiency would allow
airlines to offer economical nonstop flights to and from more and smaller cities. In addition, with a
capacity between 210 and 330 passengers and a range of up to 8,500 nautical miles, the 787 Dreamliner
is designed to use 20% less fuel for comparable missions than today's similarly sized airplanes.

Due to the unique value that the 787 provides to the airlines and their passengers, the number of orders
exceeded expectations.
Besides sales, the stock market responded favorably when Boeing launched its game-changing 787
Dreamliner program in 2003.

Despite significant capital investment and management effort, Boeing is currently facing continual delays
(for more than two years) in its schedule for the maiden flight and plane delivery to customers as of this
writing (Sanders, 2009c). After numerous failed attempts to get its 787's composite rear fuselage supplier
back on track, Boeing finally decided to acquire Vought's South Carolina facility at a

In this case study, we shall examine Boeing's rationale for the 787's unconventional supply chain.

The next section presents our analysis of the underlying risks associated with its supply

chain.

Then we describe Boeing's risk mitigation strategies to expedite its development and

production processes.

We conclude with some key lessons for other manufacturers to consider when designing

their supply chains for new

product development.

The 787 Dreamliner's

The 787's supply chain was envisioned to keep manufacturing and assembly costs low, while spreading
the financial risks of development to Boeing's suppliers. Unlike the 737's supply chain, which requires
Boeing to play the traditional role of a key manufacturer who assembles different parts and subsystems
produced by thousands of suppliers, the 787's supply chain is based on a tiered structure that would allow
Boeing to foster partnerships with approximately 50 tier-1 strategic partners.
Outsource more

By outsourcing 70% of the development and production activities under the 787 program, Boeing can
shorten the development time by leveraging suppliers' ability to develop different parts at the same time.
Also, Boeing may be able to reduce the development cost of the 787 by exploiting suppliers' expertise.

Reduce direct supply base, delegate more, and focus more

To reduce development time and cost for the Dreamliner, Boeing fostered strategic partnerships with
approximately 50 tier-1 suppliers who will design and build entire sections of the plane and ship them to
Boeing.

Reduce financial risks

Under the 787 program, Boeing instituted a new risksharing contract under which no strategic suppliers
will receive payment for the development cost until Boeing delivers its first 787 to its customers (slated
to be ANA airlines).

Increase production capacity without incurring additional costs Decentralizing the manufacturing
process would allow Boeing to outsource noncritical processes. The intention is to reduce the capital
investment for the 787 development program. Also, under the 787 supply chain, Boeing needs only three
days to assemble complete sections of the Dreamliner at its plant.

The Dreamliner's supply chain risks

Composite Fuselage Safety Issues: The Dreamliner contains 50% composite material (carbon
fiberreinforced plastic), 15% aluminum, and 12% titanium. The composite material has never been used
on this scale and many fear that creating an airplane with this mixture of materials is not feasible.
 Engine Interchangeability Issues: One of the key benefits of the 787's modular design

concept was to allow airlines to use two different types of engines (Rolls-Royce and GE)

interchangeably.

Computer Network Security Issues: The current configuration of electronics on the

Dreamliner puts passenger electronic entertainment on the same computer network as the

flight control system. This raises a security concern for terrorist attacks (Zetter 2008).

Supply Risks

Boeing is relying on its tier-1 global strategic partners to develop and build entire sections

of the Dreamliner that are based on unproven technology. Any break in the supply chain

can cause significant delays of the overall production. In early September 2007, Boeing

announced a delay in the planned first flight of the Dreamliner citing ongoing challenges

including parts shortages and remaining software and systems integration activities.

Process Risks

The underlying design of the 787 supply chain is likely to cause major delays because its

efficiency depends on the synchronized just-in-time deliveries of all major sections from

Boeing's tier-1 strategic partners. If the delivery of a section is delayed, the delivery

schedule of the whole aircraft is delayed.

Management Risks As Boeing used an unconventional supply chain structure to develop

and build its Dreamliner, it is essential for Boeing to assemble a leadership team that

includes some members who have a proven supply chain management record with

expertise to prevent and anticipate certain risks as well as to develop contingency plans to

mitigate the impact of different types of risks.

concerned about their job security. Their concerns resulted in a strike by more than 25,000

Boeing employees starting in September 2008.

Demand Risks As Boeing announced a series of delays, some customers lost their

confidence in Boeing's aircraft development capability. In addition, there is a growing

concern about the fact that the first 787s are overweight by about 8%, or 2.2 metric tons,

which can lead to a 15% reduction in range (Norris, 2009). In response to Boeing's

production and delivery delays and the doubt about 787's long range capability, some

customers have begun canceling orders for the Dreamliner or migrating towards leasing

contracts instead of purchasing the airplane outright.

Boeing's reactive risk mitigation strategy

Mitigating Supply Risks

After realizing that some tier-1 strategic partners did not have the know-how to develop

different sections of the aircraft or experience in managing their tier-2 suppliers to develop

the requisite components for the sections, Boeing recognized the need to regain control of

the development process of the 787.

Mitigating Process Risks As a response to suppliers' inability to meet production

deadlines, Boeing decided that it must send key personnel to sites across the globe to fill

suppliers' management vacuum and address production issues in person. This proved to be

an expensive endeavor as personnel was pulled from responsibilities on-site at Boeing to

address supply and manufacturing issues at the sites of their outsourced partners.
Mitigating Labor Risks To bring about an end to the strike after two months of shutdown,

Boeing made concessions that would give workers a 15% wage boost over four years. On

the key issue of job security, which had been the major impediment to reaching an

agreement, Boeing agreed to limit the amount of work that outside vendors could perform.

Mitigating Demand (Customer) Risks

As customers had begun to cancel their 787 orders and as the company's capability of

developing the 787 was put into question, Boeing developed the following mitigation

strategies. First, as a way to compensate its customers' potential loss due to the late

deliveries of their orders. Second, to restore Boeing's public image, Boeing has improved

its communication by sharing its progress updates on its website.

Boeing's potential proactive risk mitigation strategies

Boeing could use the following mitigation strategies.

Improve Supply Chain Visibility:

Boeing's supply risk was caused by the lack of supply chain visibility. To improve

information accuracy, Boeing should have required that all strategic partners and suppliers

provide all information imbedded in the supply chain relationships instead of relying on

alerts generated from the program only after they were directly affected.

Improve Strategic Supplier Section Process and Relationships:

Spending more effort on evaluating each supplier's technical capability and supply chain

management expertise for developing and manufacturing a particular section of the

Dreamliner would have enabled Boeing to select more capable tier-1 strategic suppliers,

which could avoid or reduce potential delays caused by inexperienced tier-1 suppliers.
Modify the Risk-Sharing Contract:

Although the delayed payment term associated with the risk-sharing contract was intended

to reduce Boeing's financial risk, it did not provide proper incentives for tier-1 suppliers to

complete their tasks early. To properly align the incentives among all strategic partners,

Boeing should have structured the contracts with reward (penalty) for on-time (late)

delivery.

Proactive Management Team:

Boeing should have chosen the right people for the job at the outset of the program,

allowing them to anticipate and avoid the risks associated with its novel supply chain

structure. By having a leadership team with all requisite skills, Boeing would have had the

requisite expertise and authority to respond to the delay problems more effectively.

Proactive Labor Relationship Management:

Dissatisfaction among Boeing's machinists was caused by Boeing's strategy to increase its

outsourced operations to external suppliers. Had the union's general disapproval of

Boeing's outsourcing strategy been taken into account, Boeing may not have decided to

outsource 70% of its tasks. Even if this outsourcing strategy was justified financially,

Boeing could have managed its labor relationship proactively by discussing the strategy,

by offering job assurances, and by obtaining buy-in from unions.

Proactive Customer Relationship Management:

Better communication with customers throughout the development process can enable a

company to manage customers' perceptions throughout the entire product development

may have encouraged the airlines to manage their aircraft replacement schedule differently,

say order more 737s and 747s and fewer 787s.

Conclusion:

Boeing's Dreamliner program involves dramatic shifts in supply chain strategy from

traditional methods used in the aerospace industry. In addition, Boeing boasted about its

novel manufacturing techniques and its technological marvels. Such dramatic shifts from

convention involve significant potential for encountering risks throughout the process.

Boeing's ongoing issues with meeting delivery deadlines are a direct result of its decision

to make drastic changes in the design, the development process, and the supply chain

associated with the Dreamliner program. The team did not proactively assess the risks that

were later realized and did not develop coherent strategies for effectively mitigating them.