FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 167333, January 11, 2016

PEDRO LADINES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND EDWIN DE RAMON, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

To impose the highest within a period of the imposable penalty without specifying the justification for doing
so is an error on the part of the trial court that should be corrected on appeal. In default of such
justification, the penalty to be imposed is the lowest of the period.

The Case

The petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on October 22, 2004,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed his conviction for homicide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53, in Sorsogon City under
the judgment rendered on February 10, 2003.2

Antecedents

On August 12, 1993, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner and one Herman Licup with
homicide, allegedly committed as follows: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

That on or about the 12th day of June 1993, in the Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, armed with bladed weapons did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab one Erwin de Ramon, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and mortal wounds which resulted to his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of his legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
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ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

The factual background of the charge follows.

While Prosecution witnesses Philip de Ramon and Mario Lasala, along with victim Erwin de Ramon (Erwin),
were watching the dance held during the June 12, 1993 Grand Alumni Homecoming of the Bulabog
Elementary School in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, the petitioner and Licup appeared and passed by them. The
petitioner suddenly and without warning approached and stabbed Erwin below the navel with a machete.
The petitioner then left after delivering the blow. At that juncture, Licup also mounted his attack against
Erwin but the latter evaded the blow by stepping back. Erwin pulled out the machete from his body and
wielded it against Licup, whom he hit in the chest. Licup pursued but could not catch up with Erwin because
they both eventually fell down. Erwin was rushed to the hospital where he succumbed.4

Dr. Myrna Listanco, who performed the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Erwin, attested that the
victim had sustained two stab wounds on the body, one in the chest and the other in the abdomen. She
opined that one or two assailants had probably inflicted the injuries with the use of two distinct weapons;
and that the chest wound could have been caused by a sharp instrument, like a sharpened screwdriver,
while the abdominal injury could have been from a sharp bladed instrument like a knife.5

In his defense, the petitioner tendered alibi and denial. He recounted that at the time in question, he was in
the Bulabog Elementary School compound along with his wife and their minor child; that they did not enter
the dance hall because there was trouble that had caused the people to scamper; that they had then gone
home; that he had learned about the stabbing incident involving Erwin on their way home from Barangay
Tanod Virgilio de Ramon who informed him that Licup and Erwin had stabbed each other; and that
Prosecution witnesses Philip and Lasala harbored ill-will towards him by reason of his having lodged a
complaint in the barangay against them for stealing coconuts from his property.

The petitioner presented Angeles Jasareno and Arnulfo Palencia to corroborate his denial. Jasareno and
Palencia testified that at the time in question they were in the Bulabog Elementary School, together with the
petitioner, the latter's wife and their minor daughter; that while they were watching the dance, a quarrel
had transpired but they did not know who had been involved; that they had remained in the dance hall with
the petitioner and his family during the quarrel; and that it was impossible for the petitioner to be have
stabbed Erwin. Palencia added that after the dance he and the petitioner and the latter's wife and child had
gone home together.6

Judgment of the RTC

On February 10, 2003, the RTC pronounced the petitioner guilty as charged, decreeing: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Pedro Ladines guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, sans any
mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused Pedro Ladines is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity without subsidiary imprisonment [in] case of insolvency and [to] pay the costs.

Meanwhile, accused Herman Licup is acquitted of the offense charge[d] for insufficiency of evidence. The
bond posted for his liberty is cancelled and discharged.

SO ORDERED.7
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Decision of the CA

The petitioner appealed, contending that: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF HOMIdDE DESPITE
THE PRESENCE OF A REASONABLE DOUBT IN LIGHT OF THE DECLARATION OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS THAT ACCUSED HERMAN LICUP WHO WAS ALSO INJURED DURING THE INCIDENT HAD
ATTACKED THE VICTIM ERWIN DE RAMON.8
cralawlawl ibra ry
ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

As stated, the CA affirmed the conviction, decreeing: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
appealed Decision dated 10 December 2003 of the Regional Trial Court Branch 53, Sorsogon City, Sorsogon
in Criminal Case No. 93-3400 finding appellant guilty of Homicide is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellant.

SO ORDERED.9
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Issues

Hence, this appeal, with the petitioner insisting that the CA committed reversible error in affirming his
conviction despite the admission of Licup immediately after the incident that he had stabbed the victim; and
that the res gestae statement of Licup constituted newly-discovered evidence that created a reasonable
doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.10

The State countered11 that the insistence by Ladines raised factual questions that were improper for
consideration in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; that the CA did not err in
affirming the conviction; and that the evidence to be adduced by the petitioner was not in the nature of
newly-discovered evidence.
 Ruling of the Court

The appeal is without merit.

First of all, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the petition for review
on certiorari shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question, to be one of
law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
any of them. There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of alleged facts.12 In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised,
because the Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of facts, does not normally undertake the re-examination
of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial.

The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are received with
respect and are binding on the Court subject to certain exceptions, including: (a) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its
findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (k) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.13

There is no question that none of the foregoing exceptions applies in order to warrant the review of the
unanimous factual findings of the RTC and the CA. Hence, the Court upholds the CA's affirmance of the
conviction of the petitioner.

Secondly, the res gestae statement of Licup did not constitute newly-discovered evidence that created a
reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. We point out that the concept of newly-discovered evidence is
applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the re-opening of the case in the trial court. Seldom is
the concept appropriate on appeal, particularly one before the Court. The absence of a specific rule on the
introduction of newly-discovered evidence at this late stage of the proceedings is not without reason. The
Court would be compelled, despite its not being a trier of facts, to receive and consider the evidence for
purposes of its appellate adjudication.

Of necessity, the Court would remand the case to the lower courts for that purpose. But the propriety of
remanding for the purpose of enabling the lower court to receive the newly-discovered evidence would inflict
some degree of inefficiency on the administration of justice, because doing so would effectively undo or
reopen the decision that is already on appeal.14 That is a result that is not desirable. Hence, the Court has
issued guidelines designed to balance the need of persons charged with crimes to afford to them the fullest
opportunity to establish their defenses, on the one hand, and the public interest in ensuring a smooth,
efficient and fair administration of criminal justice, on the other. The first guideline is to restrict the concept
of newly-discovered evidence to only such evidence that can satisfy the following requisites, namely: (1) the
evidence was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the
judgment if admitted.15

We agree with the State that the proposed evidence of the petitioner was not newly-discovered because the
first two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable diligence, could have
sooner discovered and easily produced the proposed evidence during the trial by obtaining a certified copy
of the police blotter that contained the alleged res gestae declaration of Licup and the relevant documents
and testimonies of other key witnesses to substantiate his denial of criminal responsibility.

Thirdly, homicide is punished with reclusion temporal.16 Taking the absence of any modifying circumstances
into consideration, the RTC fixed the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 17 years and four months of the medium period of reclusion temporal,as maximum. The CA
affirmed the penalty fixed by the RTC.
We declare that the lower courts could not impose 17 years and four months of the medium period
of reclusion temporal, which was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as the maximum of
the indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for so imposing. They thereby ignored that
although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has set the rules "for the application of penalties which
contain three periods," requires under its first rule that the courts should impose the penalty prescribed by
law in the medium period should there be neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, its seventh rule
expressly demands that "[w]ithin the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the
penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and. the
greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime." By not specifying the justification for imposing
the ceiling of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the indeterminate sentence became arbitrary,
or whimsical, or capricious. In the absence of the specification, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence
for the petitioner should be the lowest of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight
months and one day of reclusion temporal.

Lastly, the lower courts limited the civil liability to civil indemnity of P50,000.00. The limitation was a plain
error that we must correct. Moral damages and civil indemnity are always granted in homicide, it being
assumed by the law that the loss of human life absolutely brings moral and spiritual losses as well as a
definite loss. Moral damages and civil indemnity require neither pleading nor evidence simply because death
through crime always occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victim's heirs.17 As the Court said
in People v. Panad:18 chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary

x x x a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victim's family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes
the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of
the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves
them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. cralawlawlib rary

The civil indemnity and moral damages are fixed at P75,000.00 each because homicide was a gross crime.

Considering that the decisions of the lower courts contained no treatment of the actual damages, the Court
is in no position to dwell on this. The lack of such treatment notwithstanding, the Court holds that temperate
damages of P25,000.00 should be allowed to the heirs of the victim. Article 2224 of the Civil
Code authorizes temperate damages to be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty. There is no longer any doubt that when actual damages for burial
and related expenses are not substantiated with receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are
warranted, for it is certainly unfair to deny to the surviving heirs of the victim the compensation for such
expenses as actual damages.19 This pronouncement proceeds from the sound reasoning that it would be
anomalous that the heirs of the victim who tried and succeeded in proving actual damages of less than
P25,000.00 would only be put in a worse situation than others who might have presented no receipts at all
but would still be entitled to P25,000.00 as temperate damages.20 In addition, in line with recent
jurisprudence,21 all the items of civil liability shall earn interest of 6% per annum, computed from the date of
the finality of this judgment until the items are fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 22, 2004 subject to
the MODIFICATION that: (a) the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE of petitioner PEDRO LADINES is 10
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (b) the petitioner shall pay to the heirs of the victim Erwin
de Ramon: (1) civil indemnity and moral damages of P75,000.00 each; (2) temperate damages of
P25,000.00; (c) interest of 6% per annum on all items of the civil liability computed from the date of the
finality of this judgment until they are fully paid; and (d) the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

[G.R. No. 130492. January 31, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SALVADOR ARROJADO, accused-appellant.
Facts:
On June 1, 1996 the accused stabbed one Mary Ann Arrojado with a knife with treachery and
evident premeditation on the different parts of her body inflicting serious and mortal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of her death.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentenced him to imprisonment of 30 years of reclusion perpetua.
The trial court held that there was a circumstantial evidence to convict accused-appellant for the
death of the victim.
Appelant argued that the victim committed suicide. He claimed that most of the victims wounds
were inflicted after she committed suicide to make it appear that she was murdered. He also stated that he
only saw one wound in the victims stomach.

Issue:

Whether or not the victim was murdered by the accused-appellant

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence can appreciated and
would elevate the penalty of murder from reclusion perpetua to death eventhough it was not alleged
in the said information.

Ruling:
Yes.
In sum, the following circumstances point to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime:
. Accused-appellant, the victim, and the latters father were the only ones living in the house in
which the crime was committed in the evening of May 31, 1996.
2. No one from the outside can gain entry since all doors of the house were locked and the
windows had grills.
3. Accused-appellant had access to the victims bedroom because the bedroom doors were left
unlocked so that the victim could check on her fathers condition during the night. Accused-
appellant sleeps in the same bedroom as the victims father.
4. The murder weapon was a kitchen knife readily accessible to the occupants of the house . As
the Solicitor General observed, common sense dictates that if an outsider entered the house with
the intent to kill the victim, he would have brought his own weapon to ensure the execution of his
purpose
5. None of the victims belongings was missing or disturbed, indicating that the motive for the
crime was not gain but revenge.
6. Judging from the number and severity of the wounds (10 stab wounds, half of which were
fatal), the killer felt deep-seated resentment and anger toward the victim. Accused-appellant had
admitted those feelings to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and Thelma Arrojado.
 7. Aside from accused-appellant, no one was known to harbor a grudge against the victim.
8. As the Solicitor General also pointed out, accused-appellants behavior in the morning of June
1, 1996 was inconsistent with someone who had just found his cousin and employer, a person
he claims to get along with, dead.[59] By his testimony, he did not even go inside the room to check
on her condition on the lame excuse that he was afraid. He also did not inform his neighbors
about the incident for the equally flimsy reason that he did not know them nor did he go to the
police.
The supreme court held that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence is present in this
case. For this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence between the
parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier
for him to commit the criminal act. The confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the
crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended partys belief that the former would not abuse said
confidence.[68] In this case, while the victim may have intimated her fear for her safety for which reason she
entrusted her jewelry and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, her fears were subsequently allayed
as shown by the fact that she took back her personal effects from Erlinda. [69] Thinking that accused-
appellant would not do her any harm, because he was after all her first cousin, the victim allowed accused-
appellant to sleep in the same room with her father and left the bedroom doors unlocked.
No. Eventhough, the murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on
December 31, 1993 which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death
to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence and in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have
imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant.
However,The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000, requiring
that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances.
This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule that statutes regulating the
procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
In this case, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence was not alleged in the said
information the information, thus the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence cannot be
appreciated to raise the penalty to death.

People vs. Lucas

G.R. No. 80102. January 22, 1990

Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

Accused-appellant: Jovencio Lucas
Ponente: J. Cortes

FACTS:
Mauricia Lucas was then thirteen years old and working as a housemaid in
Sampaloc, Manila. Sometime in September 1985, she was fetched by her father,
herein accused Jovencio Lucas, from her place of work. They boarded a jeepney
and alighted in a place which Mauricia found unfamiliar. She was thereafter
brought to a dark room where the accused tied both her hands and feet to a bed,
undressed her, burnt her face with a lighted cigarette, kissed her, fondled her
private parts, pointed a knife at her neck, and laughed while consummating the
sexual act. The physical and genital examination supported the fact of defloration
and further testified that the findings were consonant to that of a woman who had
several experience with sexual intercourse. Nonetheless, as the examinations
were conducted about six months after the alleged rape took place, evidence of
violence can no longer be established.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty in the case.
2) Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of relationship in the case.

HELD:
1) Yes. The Court held that there is cruelty when the offender enjoys and delights
in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing unnecessary physical
pain in the consummation of the offense. Moreover, the absence of any evidence
of force does not negate a finding that forcible sexual intercourse actually took
place. The trial court, having had the opportunity of hearing the witnesses of both
prosecution and defense, gave weight to the sincerity and conviction of the victim.
The appellant tied the victim to a bed, burnt her face with a lighted cigarette, and
laughed while consummating the crime. Undeniably, cruelty is present in this
case.

2) Yes. Article 15 of the Revised Penal code provides that, in the case of rape, the
alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when
the victim is the descendant of the offender. The Court found that in order for the
appellant to carry out the crime to his advantage, the filial trust reposed in him by
his daughter was undeniable abused. He personally fetched his daughter, at her
place of work, took her to the scene of the crime, and forced himself sexually.
The aggravating circumstance of relationship in the case was correctly applied in
the case.

Vasquez v People
GR No. 159255, Jan. 28, 2008
TINGA, J.:

FACTS:
The trial court finds the accused Rodolfo Vasquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
estafa penalized by an indeterminate prison term of from [sic] seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum and indemnification to Gemma Argoso.

Upon appeal, CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty imposed to an indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua
as maximum with same indemnification.

ISSUE:
W/O the court erroneously relied on the case of People v. Hernando in stating that the maximum
period of indeterminate penalty imposable on Vasquez should not exceed thirty years.

HELD:
Yes. Although the court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions at law in the decision of the
Court of Appeals finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and it
affirmed said Decision but with the modification that petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prisin correccional, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusin temporal, as maximum.

RULING:
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.

In the case at bar, CA relied on People v. Hernandez in modifying the penalty imposed to
Vasquez. The accused spouses in People v. Hernando were charged with estafa under Article
315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818 (PD 818),
which increased the penalty only for estafa committed by issuing a check dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds. Under PD 818, if the amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty
of reclusion temporal is imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
P10,000.00, but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years which shall be termed as
reclusion perpetua. Thus, the Court sentenced the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum.

The amendment to the imposable penalty introduced by PDssss 818 clearly does not apply to the
present case as it does not involve bouncing checks. The fact that the amount involved exceeds
P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty, but
should be regarded as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum
term of the full indeterminate sentence.

ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CORTES, J.

June 30, 1987

Subject Matter:

Application and Computation of Penalties: Service of Sentence (Specific Rules)

FACTS:

Arturo Mejorada was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(E) of
RA. 3019, aka Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Mejorada was a right-away agent
whose duty was to process the claims for compensation of damages of property owners
affected by highway construction and improvements. He required the claimants to sign
blank copies of Sworn Statements and Agreements to Demolish, where it appeared that
the properties of the claimants have higher values than the actual value being claimed
by them. However, the claimants did not bother reading through the paper because
they very much interested in the compensation of damages. After processing the claims,
instead of giving to the claimants the proper amount, Mejorada gave one of them Php
5,000 and the rest, Php 1,000 each, saying that there are many who would share in said
amounts. The claimants werent able to complain because they were afraid of the
accused and his armed companion. The Sandiganbayan sentenced Mejorada 56 years
and 8 years of imprisonment which is equivalent to the eight (8) penalties for the eight (8)
informations filed against him.
Contention of the State: Section 3 of RA 3019 states that Mejorada should be punished
with imprisonment for not less than 1 year nor more than 10 years as stated in Sec 9 of
the same Act. In this case, there are 8 charges against him and each charge should be
served with the penalty prescribed by the law.

Contention of the Accused: Mejorada states that the penalty imposed upon him is
contrary to the three-fold rule and states that the duration should not exceed 40 years.
This is in accordance to Article 70 of the RPC.

ISSUE: WON the penalty imposed upon him violates the three-fold rule under Article 70
of the RPC.

RULING:

The Court favors the State. Article 70 of the RPC does not state anything about the
imposition of penalty. It only explains the service of sentence, duration of penalty
and penalty to be inflicted. It should be interpreted that the accused cannot be made
to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which
is forty (40) years. As stated in a previous case, The courts can still impose as many
penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since for every
individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. With these
reasons, Mejorada cannot correctly contend that his penalty is excessive. There are eight
charges against him and each has an equivalent penalty as prescribed by RA 3019, thus,
Sandiganbayan has imposed the correct penalty.

Almero vs People

MTR: denied Probation

RTC: sets aside MTC ruling and remands it back to MTC

CA: RTC should confine itself on probation question (not entitled to probation)

SC: denied probation

FACTS: Petitioner is the accused in a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
multiple physical injuries. Trial ensued and the MTC found petitioner guilty and sentenced him
to suffer prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
 Petitioner filed an Application for Probation, reasoning that he was informed of his conviction
only upon being served the warrant for his arrest. Prosecutor Analie Velarde opposed his
application on the ground that he was known to be uncooperative, habitually absent, and had
even neglected to inform the court of his change of address. MTC denied his application.

The RTC sets aside MTC ruling and remands it back to MTC. The CA ruled that the RTC should
have confined itself to determining whether or not the MTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners application for probation.

ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to probation?

HELD: NO. Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the
State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of
probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the
benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.

In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained: Probation is a special privilege granted by
the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an
otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and
expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accused to wager on the result of his appeal that when his
conviction is finally affirmed on appeal he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus
rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction.

Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the
treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on
diametrically opposed legal positions. An accused applying for probation is deemed to have
accepted the judgment. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an
accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction. This was the reason why the
Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from
judgments of conviction even if the sentence is probationable for the purpose of securing an
acquittal and applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.

Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the
judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal.
While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the
conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he
attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal
and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

Petitioner applied for probation beyond the reglementary period, yet the trial court still allowed
the filing before ultimately denying it for lack of merit. Regarding this delay and the other
defects imputed by petitioner to the RTC, the SC concur with the findings of the CA:

(x x x. (T)he application has been filed out of time as accused himself admitted in the motion. He
blames Atty. Evan D. Dizon, his former counsel, for not notifying the court of his change of
address but Atty. Dizon himself had been trying to contact accused since 2001 even before he
 filed his formal offer of evidence since all notices sent to the accuseds given address have been
returned to this court since 2001. If it is true that he moved to Cavite only in 2003, why were
said notices returned with notations unknown, unclaimed, or moved?

Colinares
vs.
People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011 ABAD, J.:
Facts:
Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide by the RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment from two years and four months of prison correccional, as
minimum, to six years and one day of prison mayor, as maximum. Since the
maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years,
Arnel did not qualify for probation. On appeal by Colinares, the Court of
Appeals sustained the RTCs decision. Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeals
decision, petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court and took the position
that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a
new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable, which was strongly
opposed by the Solicitor General reiterating that under the Probation Law, no
application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected
his appeal from the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court, however,
found that Colinares is guilty of attempted homicide and not of frustrated
homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the
case to the trial court

Ruling:
Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon
remand of his case to the RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be
entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the
RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But in this case the Supreme
Court ruled to set aside the judgment of the RTC and found him only liable for
attempted homicide, if the Supreme Court follows the established rule that no
accused can apply for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from the
erroneous judgment of the RTC with no fault of his own, therefore defying
fairness and equity.
GR No. 200302, April 20, 2016
People of the Phils (Appellee) v Gerry Lipata (Appellant)
Second Division
Ponente: Carpio, J.

Nature of Action: Enforcement of civil liability of the accused who died pending appeal of his case.

FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder and subsequently found guilty as charged and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs
of the victim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appellants appeal and affirmed the RTCs
decision. The PAO filed a notice of appeal on behalf of appellant. During the pendency of the appeal to the
Supreme Court, the appellant dies. In view of appellants death prior to the promulgation of the CAs
decision the Supreme Court issued a Resolution which ordered the PAO "to SUBSTITUTE the legal
representatives of the estate of the deceased appellant as party; and to COMMENT on the civil liability of
appellant. In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that: Considering that the civil liability in the instant case
arose from and is based solely on the act complained of, the same does not survive the death of the deceased
appellant. Thus, the death of the latter pending appeal of his conviction extinguished his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon and this being so, it respectfully submitted that the necessity
to substitute the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased as party does not arise.

ISSUE:
Whether the civil liability ex delicto adjudged by the lower courts, upon death of the accused
pending appeal, can be enforced upon the estate of the accused.

RULING:
No. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi delict leads us to the
conclusion that, a decade after Cuenos death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts
awarded by the CA.
At the outset, we declare that because of appellants death prior to the promulgation of the CAs
decision, there is no further need to determine appellants criminal liability. Appellants death has the effect
of extinguishing his criminal liability. What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellants death
with regard to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court, in People v. Bayotas, reconciled the differing doctrines
on the issue of whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil
liability. We concluded that "upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action
is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal."
We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to
recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 [of
the then applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation
upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced."
 Contrary to the PAOs Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased
Appellant, Cueno died because of appellants fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through deliberate
acts. Appellants civil liability ex quasi delicto may now be pursued because appellants death on 13
February 2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal liability and civil
liability ex delicto.
Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both jurisprudence and the
Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate of the deceased
[appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case," the current Rules, pursuant
to our pronouncement in Bayotas, require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute a
separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent
civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict,
are not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even
without reservation. The separate civil action proceeds independently of the criminal proceedings and
requires only a preponderance of evidence.36 The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against the
estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule 3 in
relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate civil case
instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case for the
cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate
civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause
of action arising from quasi delict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cuenos death, his heirs
cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.
The criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are declared
EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment.

G.R. No. 206666 Case Digest

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, Alfredo Lim
vs COMELEC and Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Ponente: Leonardo-de Castro

Facts:
September 2007, Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada for the crime of
plunder with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and accessory penalties
of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual
absolute disqualification.

October 2007, President Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way

of pardon to Estrada with "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or
office,IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon
me by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and
imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights." Which Estrada received and accepted by
affixing his signature.

November 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of candidacy for the

position of President and has earned 3 oppositions in the COMELEC.
In 2012, Estrada filed a COC vying for the position of Manila City
Mayor. Then, Risos-Vidal filed a petition for disqualification
against Estrada.

COMELEC: petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Risos-Vidal failed

to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse Estrada's right to seek
public office as effectively restored by the pardon vested by Arroyo.

Risos-Vidal then invoked the Court's jurisdiction saying that the

COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
disqualify Estrada for having been convicted of plunder, an offense
involving moral turpitude. And for failing to consider the perpetual
disqualification of Estrada.

Issue: whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former
President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public
office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President
Arroyo.

Ruling:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. A pardon shall not work the restoration
of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal Their accessory

penalties. The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life
or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer
even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his
civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to
seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause

of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither
makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion
that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly

impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of
the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence
educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is
an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for
the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas
clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking,
they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this
case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the
decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate
to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent
upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the
scope of the pardon.

Yapdiangco v. Buencamino [ GR No. L-28841, Jun 24, 1983 ] GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On February 1, 1965, the fiscal filed information for slight physical injuries allegedly
committed by the petitioner on December 2, 1964. Since the information was filed after
the prescribed 60-day period, petitioner moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the
ground of prescription. Respondent contended that it was filed within the prescriptive
period since the last day fell on a Sunday or legal Holiday, therefore, should not be
counted.
ISSUE:
Whether period of prescription is interrupted by Sundays or Legal Holidays.
HELD:
No. A Sunday or legal holiday does not interrupt nor stop the running of the prescriptive
period as a matter of statutory articulation. According to Article 91, the only exception is
the offenders physical absence and no other cause can be sufficient to interrupt
prescription.
The Court ruled that Where the sixtieth and last day to file information falls on a
Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the next working
day. Prescription has automatically set in. The fiscal cannot file the information
on the next following working day as it would tantamount to extending the prescriptive
period fixed by law.
Therefore, the motion to quash the criminal prosecution was granted on the valid
ground of prescription.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation

Facts:

- The Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with GHB (Ganda Holdings
Berhad). Under said memorandum of agreement, IRC acquired 100% of the entire capital stock of
GEHI (Ganda Energy Holdings Inc.) which would own and operate a 102 megawatt gas turbine power
generating barge. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC. On
the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital of PRCI (Philippine Racing Club).

- It is alleged herein that a press release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent to the
Philippine Stock Exchange through facsimile and the SEC, but the facsimile machine of the SEC could
not receive it. However, the SEC received reports that the IRC failed to make timely public
disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors, heavily traded IRC shares
utilizing this material insider information. For this reason, the SEC required the directors to appear
before the SEC to explain the alleged failure to disclose material information as required by the Rules on
Disclosure of Material Facts. Unsatisfied with the explanation, the SEC issued an order finding that the
IRC violated the Rules in connection with the then Old Securities Act when it failed to make timely
disclosures of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC found that the directors of IRC
entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of the Revised Securities Act.

- Respondents, however, questioned the authority of the SEC to investigate on said matter since
according to PD 902-A, jurisdiction upon the matter was conferred upon the PED (Prosecution and
Enforcement Department) of the SEC however, this issue is already moot since pending the disposition
of the case, the Securities Regulation Code was passed thereby effectively repealing PD 902-A and
abolishing the PED. They also contended that their right to due process was violated when the SEC
required them to appear before the SEC to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed upon them
since such requirement shifted the burden of proof to respondents.

The case reached the CA and said court ruled in favor of the respondents and effectively enjoined the
SEC from filing any criminal, civil or administrative cases against respondents. In its resolution, the CA
stated that since there are no rules and regulations implementing the rules regarding
DISCLOSURE, INSIDER TRADING OR ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED SECURITIES
ACT, the SEC has no statutory authority to file any suit against respondents. The CA, therefore,
prohibited the SEC from taking cognizance or initiating any action against the respondents for the alleged
violations of the Revised Securities Act.
Issue:

1.) Whether or not the SEC has authority to file suit against respondents for violations of the RSA.

2.) Whether or not their right to due process was violated when the SEC denied the parties of their right to
cross examination.

Ratio:

- The Revised Securities Act does not require the enactment of implementing rules to make it
binding and effective. The provisions of the RSA are sufficiently clear and complete by
themselves. The requirements are specifically set out and the acts which are enjoined are
determinable. To tule that absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress
would empower administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the implementing rules.
Where the statute contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent (as in this case, the RSA)
there should be no impediment as to its implementation.

- The court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in the RSA such that the acts proscribed and/or
required would not be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence. The provision explains in simple
terms that the insider's misuse of nonpublic and undisclosed information is the gravamen of
illegal conduct and that the intent of the law is the protection of investors against fraud committed
when an insider, using secret information, takes advantage of an uninformed investor. Insiders are
obligatd to disclose material information to the other party or abstain from trading the shares of his
corporation. This duty to disclose or abstain is based n 2 factors: 1) the existence of a relationship giving
access, directly or indirectly to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone and 2) the inherent unfairness involved when a party takes advantage
of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.

- This obligation to disclose is imposed upon "insiders" which are particularly officers, directors or
controlling stockholders but that definition has already been expanded and not includes those persons
whose relationship of former relationship to the issuer or the security that is not generally available and
the one who learns such a fact from an insider knowing that the person from whom he learns such fact is
an insider. In some case, however, there may be valid corporate reasons for the nondisclosure of material
information but it should not be used for non-corporate purposes.

- Respondent contends that the terms "material fact", "reasonable person", "nature and reliability"
and "generally available" are vaguely used in the RSA because under the provision of the said law what
is required to be disclosed is a fact of special significance, meaning:

1. a material fact which would be likely to affect the market price of a security or;
2. one which a reasonable person would consider especially important in determining his
course of action with regard to the shares of stock.

- But the court dismissed said contention and stated that material fact is already defined and explained
as one which induces or tends to induce or otherwise affect the sale or purchase of securities. On
the other hand, "reasonable person" has already been used many times in jurisprudence and in law
since it is a standard on which most of legal doctrines stand (even the doctrine on negligence uses such
standard) and it has been held to mean "a man who relies on the calculus of common sense of which
all reasonable men have in abundance"

- As to "nature and reliability" the proper adjudicative body would be able to determine if facts of a
certain nature and reliability can influence a reasonable person's decision to retain, buy or sell securities
and thereafter explain and justify its factual findings in its decision since the same must be viewed in
connection with the particular circumstances of a case.

As to "generally available", the court held also that such is a matter which may be adjudged given the
particular circumstances of the case. The standards of which cannot remain at a standstill.

- There is no violation of due process in this case since the proceedings before the PED are
summary in nature. The hearing officer may require the parties to submit their respective verified
position papers together will all supporting documents and affidavits of witnesses. A formal hearing is
not mandatory and it is within the discretion of the hearing officer to determine whether or not there is a
need for a formal hearing.

- Moreover, the law creating the PED empowers it to investigate violations of the rules and
regulations and to file and prosecute such cases. It does not have an adjudicatory powers. Thus, the
PED need not comply with the provisions of the Administrative Code on adjudication.

- The SEC retained jurisdiction to investigate violations of the RSA, reenacted in the Securities
Regulations Code despite the abolition of the PED. In this case, the SEC already commenced
investigating the respondents for violations of the RSA but during the pendency of the case the Securities
and Regulations Code was passed thereby repealing the RSA. However, the repeal cannot deprive the
SEC of its jurisdiction to continue investigating the case.

- Investigations by the SEC is a requisite before a criminal case may be referred to the DOJ since the
SEC is an administrative agency with the special competence to do so. According to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, the courts will not determine a controversy involving a question within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.

JUDICIAL PROCEEDING THAT INTERRUPTS THE PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME

PEOPLE V. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012
Perez, J:

FACTS:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount
of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor
of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
Consequently the case was modified, and only on February 3, 2000 that two counts for violation of BP Blg.
22 were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability
has been extinguished by reason of prescription.

In defense of her claim, Pangilinan said that the prevailing law that governs the prescription of special
penal law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of Act No. 3326 (An Act To Establish Periods Of Prescription For Violations
Penalized By Special Acts) where the right to file an action to a proper court and not to merely to
prosecution office for B.P. 22, prescribes four (4) years from the commission of the crime. The imputed
violation occurred sometime in 1995, and only on February 3, 2000 that a case was formally filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore the action already prescribes. RTC granted the motion.

On the other hand, the complainant argued that the filing with the office of city prosecutor constitutes an
interruption to the prescription.

ISSUE:

Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considered a judicial proceeding that can interrupt
prescription of crime under B.P. 22?

HELD:

YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that, there is no more distinction between cases under
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the
period of prescription; that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation in the office of
prosecutor against accused interrupts the period of prescription.

Following the factual finding the crime was committed sometime in 1995, the filing of complaint on
September 1997, two (2) years from the commission of the crime validly interrupts the running of
prescription. Therefore the action against the respondent Pangilinan did not prescribe.

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATIONvs. HON. JUDGE NELSON F.

LIDUA, SR.,Presiding, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, JOHN DOES and PETER
DOES, respondents. G.R. No. 169588. October 7, 2013.
NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court ofBaguio City
FACTS: Jadewell, pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000, was authorized to render any motorvehicle immobilized by
placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.Balajadia and the other respondents dismantled, took and
carried away the clampsattached to the wheel of the vehicles, which took place on May 7, 2003. Jadewell filed acomplaint
for robbery against the respondents with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,2003. However, the Informations
were filed with the MTC on October 2, 2003. Balajadia filed amotion to quash.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE: The MTC granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case and Jadewells subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Jadewells petition for certiorari with RTC was likewise denied. Their motion for
reconsideration was also denied.

CONTENTION OF JADEWELL: They argued that the filing of the criminal complaint withthe Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information beforeCourt, is the reckoning point in determining
whether or not the criminal action had prescribed.

CONTENTION OF BALAJADIA: Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the proceedings mentioned in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings.Thus, the SC, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of
the Complaint with the Office of the ProvincialProsecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period
commenced from the allegeddate of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July
7, 2003.

ISSUE: Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,2003 tolled the
prescription period of the commission of the offense

HELD: No. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of anInformation tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.The respondent judge was correct when he
applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), the violation of a municipal ordinance in
Rodriguez, Rizal alsofeatured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed
onMay 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed withthe Metropolitan
Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.

When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the
prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file
the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The
failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case
against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription
period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this
to say concerning the effects of its ruling: The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe
even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutors office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of
the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the
applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a
distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.

romualdez vs Marcelo
G.R. Nos. 166510-33
July 28, 2006 ynares-santiago, j.:

Facts:

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the
filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which
were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense
of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the
presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss
Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-
23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos.
13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new
informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its
preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted
the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also
interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No.
6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new
docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that
considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For
Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from
the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.

Issues:

(a) Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 was a nullity?

(b) Whether the offenses for which petitioners are being charged with have already prescribed?

Held:

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the
filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which
were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense
of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the
presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss
Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-
23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

Wala pang pp v slim skip mo muna

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONIE DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 185843 March 3, 2010

Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C

 FACTS Appellant was indicted before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig City, for two counts of
rape. He pled "not guilty" when arraigned. After pretrial and trial, the trial court found him guilty as
charged and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The trial court further
ordered him to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 in each case or a total amount of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed appellants conviction, but modified it with an
additional award of P50,000.00 for each case, or an aggregate amount of P100,000.00, as moral
damages.

ISSUE Can a subsequent marriage of the offended party exculpate the perpetrator?

RULING Yes. In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads ART. 89. How
criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished: x x x x 7. By the
marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code. Article 344 of the same Code
also provides ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction,
rape, and acts of lasciviousness. x x x. Based on the documents, including copies of pictures taken after
the ceremony and attached to the motion, the marriage between appellant and private complainant
have been contracted validly, legally, and in good faith, as an expression of their mutual love for each
other and their desire to establish a family of their own. Given public policy considerations of respect for
the sanctity of marriage and the highest regard for the solidarity of the family, appellant is accorded the
full benefits of Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C of the RPC. Appellant was absolved
of the two (2) counts of rape against private complainant Juvilyn Velasco, on account of their
subsequent marriage, and is ordered released from imprisonment.