SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-43659. December 21, 1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD

CARANDANG VILLALON and FEDERICO DE GUZMAN,
respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Isidro G. Arenas for respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J : p

Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari is the order rendered by Judge
Manuel Castaeda on January 28, 1976 dismissing Criminal Case No. D-868 of
the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and the order rendered in the
same case on March 22, 1976 by his successor, the herein public respondent,
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order of
dismissal.
Culled from the records, 1 it appears that complainant Mariano Carrera and his
brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barrio
Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan, registered in their names under Transfer
Certicate of Title No. 47682.
On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special power of attorney
before Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico de
Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. On February 13, 1964, private respondent
mortgaged the parcel of land with the People's Bank and Trust Company in
Dagupan City using the said special power of attorney, and was able to obtain
the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the mortgagee bank. Both the special
power of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 13, 1964. LexLib

After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage account not
having been paid, the mortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage and the land
was sold to one Ramon Seraca and Vileta Quinto who were issued Transfer
Certicate of Title No. 85181 for said property. In January, 1972, complainant
allegedly discovered that their property was already registered in the name of
said Ramon Seraca when the latter led on said date an action for the
ejectment of the former from the premises.
On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsication of a
public document was led against private respondent in the then Court of First
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 Instance of Pangasinan, the information reading as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of February, 1964, in the City of Dagupan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the abovenamed
accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, being then a private individual, after
having in his possession Transfer Certicate of Title No. 47682, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify and forge the signature
of one MARIANO F. CARRERA, in a Power of Attorney, causing and making
it appear that the said MARIANO F. CARRERA, signed and axed his
signature in the said Power of Attorney, which is a public document, when
as a matter of fact and in truth, said MARIANO F. CARRERA, did not in
anyway (sic) participate in any acts thereof, nor gave his permission, and
in order to make good the acts of falsication, with intent of gain and by
means of fraud and other deceits, the said accused FEDERICO DE
GUZMAN, thru the said falsied public document (Power of Attorney) did
succeed in securing the loan from the People's Bank and Trust Company
in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P8,500.00)
Philippine currency, without the knowledge and consent of said MARIANO
F. CARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount of
P4,250.00, and other consequential damages." 2

After arraignment where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the case
proceeded to trial and the prosecution presented complainant Mariano F. Carrera
and one Melanio Esguig from the Oce of the Register of Deeds for the Province
of Pangasinan. Another witness, Col. Jose G. Fernandez, a handwriting expert,
gave his partial testimony but the same was not continued as counsel for private
respondent moved for and was granted leave to le a motion to dismiss.
On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss 3 was led, wherein it was alleged
that the crime charged would not lie due to the partial testimony of complainant
allegedly to the eect that he authorized private respondent to mortgage the
said one-half portion of the land owned by him and his brother. Said partial
testimony of complainant was quoted, with the emphasized portions, as follows:
"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of your
property at present?

A Yes, sir, I know. LLpr

Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?

A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.

Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank. Do you know
the reason why it was foreclosed by the Bank?

A Yes, sir.

Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was foreclosed by the
Bank?

A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrera went

to Manila and he asked me to sign a document as a witness
and I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to
Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half
portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said.
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 Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrera went to
you in Manila and asked you to sign a power of attorney
authorizing de Guzman to mortgage the one-half portion of
that land owned by you and your brother. Do you have any
document to show that?

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. DIAZ:

Q Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964 if

shown to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a document which is, your

Honor, for the purpose of identication, and may we request
that it be marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution. This
document consist (sic) of two pages, your Honor, and the rst
page be marked as Exhibit B and the second page be marked
as Exhibit B-1, page two. Will you tell this Honorable Court
what is this?

A This is the document brought by my brother to Manila for me to

sign, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Emphasis supplied)" 4

Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondent contends that there is

no sucient basis for the charge and this fact warrants the dismissal of the case.
Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribed since more than ten
(10) years had elapsed from the time the crime was committed. Since the
information charges the complex crime of estafa thru falsication of a public
document, then the penalty shall be that for the more serious crime which shall
be applied in its maximum period, as provided for by Article 48 of the Penal Code.
The more serious crime in the present case is the falsication of the public
document which is punishable with prision correccional in its medium and
maximum period and a ne not exceeding P5,000.00. Prision correccional being
a correctional penalty, the same prescribes in ten (10) years.
It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information led in the case
merely alleged the date of the commission of the crime which was February 5,
1964 and the information was led only on March 29, 1974. This being the case,
private respondent claims that more than ten (10) years has passed from the
commission of the crime to the ling of the information. No other allegation
having been made as to the discovery of the alleged crime, private respondent
claimed that the period of prescription commenced on the day on which the
crime was committed. He asserts that, from the date appearing in the transfer
certicate of title covering the land mortgaged with the bank, the mortgage
documents were duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on
February 13, 1984, hence the alleged crime became public knowledge on the
same date. To support his theory, private respondent made the following citation:
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 "The period of prescription commences to run from the date of the
commission of the crime if it is known at the time of its commission.cdphil

"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be discovered,

because the entire series of transactions was by public instruments, duly
recorded, the crime of estafa committed in connection with said
transaction was known to the oended party when it was committed and
the period of prescription commenced to run from the date of its
commission. People v. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp. 50 (The Revised
Penal Code by Justice Luis B. Reyes, Revised Edition 1967, Vol. I, pp. 711-
712)." 5

The prosecution countered that the testimony of Mariano Carrera shows that
what was intended was an authority to mortgage only the one-half portion
pertaining to his brother and he was only quoting what his brother told him
when he said that ". . . this is an authority to Federico de Guzman to get a loan
from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother
said." 6
It further submitted that the information was not led out of time since the date
to be considered should not be the date of registration of the alleged power of
attorney on February 13, 1964. It argued that the crime was actually discovered
only in January, 1972 when Ramon S. Seraca led an action to eject
complainant from the premises, which fact was not alleged in the information
because it was considered by the prosecution as a mere evidentiary matter
which would not be in accord with the legal truism that an "information must
allege only ultimate facts and not evidentiary matters." 7
With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay cited by private respondent,
petitioner submits that "(t)he same has only a persuasive eect and not to be
considered as an interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code as the
same is the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court." 8
As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castaeda of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, dismissed the case on January 28, 1976 on
the ground that the crime had prescribed. The People's motion for reconsideration
was denied by the succeeding Presiding Judge Felicidad Carandang Villalon.

On March 25, 1976, the prosecution led a notice of appeal from both orders of
the trial court. In a resolution dated May 13, 1976, this Court required the
prosecution to le a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Republic
Act No. 5440. 9 Thereafter, said petition for review and the corresponding
comment and reply of the parties having been led, on February 21, 1977 the
Court resolved to treat said petition as a special civil action and required
petitioner and private respondent to submit their respective memoranda. 10
From the memoranda submitted, the Court is tasked with the resolution of the
following issues:
1. Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissal because
the private respondent would thereby be placed in double jeopardy;
2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsication of a public document
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 led against the private respondent has sucient ground to exist in law
and in fact; and,
3. Whether the oense charged in the aforementioned criminal case is
already extinguished by prescription. 11

The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As enunciated
in People vs. City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:
"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after
arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the oense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any oense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or
information (Section 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the prosecution
from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall
not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion,
or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is
not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the
merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the
appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found
incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant." 12

On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsication of a public

document has sucient basis to exist in fact and in law, we hold in the
armative. The falsication of a public document may be a means of
committing estafa because before the falsied document is actually utilized to
defraud another, the crime of falsication has already been consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsication of public, ocial or commercial documents. The damage to another is
caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsication of the document,
hence, the falsication of the public, ocial or commercial document is only a
necessary means to commit the estafa. 13
Petitioner posits that the oense charged is supported by the fact that what was
intended to be mortgaged was the one-half portion pertaining to Severo Carrera,
not the portion pertaining to complainant, otherwise complainant would not
have quoted his brother's words. The theory of petitioner and the ndings of
public respondent are substantially the same. We agree that the oense charged
does exist in fact and in law, as explained in the ndings of the court below:
"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony of
complainant Mariano Carrera and of the record, as regards the rst
ground, the court nds that the contention of the defense that the
authorization given to him to mortgage the whole property is not
sustained by the evidence because a cursory study of the answer made
by the witness complainant clearly shows that what was intended to be
mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to Severo
Carrera, excluding that portion pertaining to said complainant. (tsn. pp. 8-
10, hearing on June 18, 1974). In other words, the alleged authorization
given to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half
portion of the land referred to the share of Severo Carrera only. This
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 nding is based on the following quoted answer:
'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that this is an
authorization to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the bank
on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother
said.'
Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-quoted testimony. He
merely quoted his brother Severo Carrera to whom the half portion of the
land belongs. Severo Carrera, as quoted by Mariano Carrera, did not use
the phrase `which belongs to you.'" 14

Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the suciency of the charge of

estafa thru falsication of a public document, the resolution of the issue on
prescription is, however, determinative of the validity of the impugned orders of
public respondent. LLphil

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for a complex
crime is that for the most serious component oense, the same to be applied in
its maximum period. In the crime of estafa thru falsication of a public
document, the more serious crime is the falsication which carries with it the
correctional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and a ne not more than P5,000.00 imposed by Article 172 of the Code. Crimes
punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in ten (10) years pursuant to
Article 90 of the Code, and Article 91 thereof states that the prescriptive period
commences to run "from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
oended party, the authorities, or their agents . . ."
The document which was allegedly falsied was a notarized special power of
attorney registered in the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13,
1964 authorizing private respondent to mortgage a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certicate of Title No. 47682 in order to secure a loan of P8,500.00 from
the People's Bank and Trust Company. The information for estafa thru
falsication of a public document was led only on March 29, 1974. We reject
petitioner's claim that the ten-year period commenced when complainant
supposedly discovered the crime in January, 1972 by reason of the ejectment suit
against him.
People vs. Reyes 15 cites authorities on the well established rule that registration
in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive
notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. On these
considerations, it holds that the prior ruling in Cabral vs. Puno, etc., et al., 16 to
the eect that in the crime of falsication of a public document the prescriptive
period commences from the time the oended party had constructive notice of
the alleged forgery after the document was registered with the Register of Deeds
is not without legal basis.
It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al. , 17 in interpreting the
phrase "from the discovery" found in Article 1391 of the Civil Code which
authorizes annulment, in case of mistake or fraud, within four years from the
time of the discovery of the same, the Court also held that the discovery must be
reckoned to have taken place from the time the document was registered in the
Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice to the whole
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 world and this should apply to both criminal and civil cases. prcd

We are further in accord with the conclusion in Reyes that the application of said
rule on constructive notice in the interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code would most certainly be favorable to private respondent herein, since the
prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, that is,
from the time the questioned documents were recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
In the instant case, the special power of attorney involved was registered on
February 13, 1964. The criminal information against private respondent having
been led only on March 29, 1974, or more than ten (10) years thereafter, the
crime with which private respondent was charged has indubitably prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
challenged orders of public respondent are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Complainant's Adavit, Original Record, 4-5, 193-194; TSN June 18, 1974, 2-7; Nov.
28, 1975, 2-6.
2. Original Record, 1.
3. Rollo, 54-69.
4. Ibid., 55-56.

5. Ibid., 59.
6. Ibid., 62.
7. Ibid., 64.
8. Ibid., 65.
9. Ibid., 42.

10. Ibid., 136.

11. Ibid., 153, 165.
12. 154 SCRA 175(1987), reiterating People vs. Desalisa, et al., 125 Phil. 27 (1966).
13. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Twelfth Edition, 1981, Book II, 235.

14. Original Record, 204-205.

15. 175 SCRA 597 (1989).
16. 70 SCRA 606 (1976).
17. 18 SCRA 1253 (1966).

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