Research Proposal TI

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YOUR TRUSTED MENTOR SINC E 2001
Enforcement Mechanism for Corporate Governance in B

BRIC or BRICs - A
w aand Economics
Comparative Law mics A
Analysis
l Sample
Research Proposa
2016-2017 All Rights Reserved, No part of this document should be modified/used without prior consent
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Table of Contents
1.0 Introduction of the Study ..................................................................................................... 3
2.0 Background of the study ...................................................................................................... 4
3.0 Problem statement ................................................................................................................ 5
..................................................... 6
4.0 Previous Work .....................................................................................................................
........................... 8
5.0 Gaps Identified in the literature ...........................................................................................
6.0 Purpose of the study .............................................................................................................

................................
............................................. 8
................................................................
.............................................. 9
7.0 Aim and Objectives..............................................................................................................
8.0 Proposed Methodology ...................................................... Error!! Bookm

...................... Err Bookmark
ark not defined.
9.0 Chapterisation ......................................................................................................................

................................................................
................................ 9
10.0 Gantt chart ........................................................................................................................

................................................................ 11
References ................................................................................................................................
................................................................ 12
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1.0 Introduction of the Study
governance as a concept and as a problem area was first discussed in the United States; later,
the European debate started in the United Kingdom. From there the issue of corporate
governance began its pervasive course through all the modern industrial stat
states, including
Japan
Australia, China and Jap
ap Addams et al., 2010).
(Adams
a an (A Corporate
2010) Corpor
orporaate
orpor governance
a govovernancee is a se
sset of procedures
of pro
ocedures
and
nd policies
pol adopted
adopte company
ompanyy iin
dopted by a compa
dopted ompa order
n orde
err ttoo provide internal
pr vide intern
inter al and extern
rn external
ex
exte
xtern
terrn
r al stakeholders
al stakeholde
stak holde with
holders
of their companies. The shareholders role in governance oin

oint th
rnaan is to app
rn pp thee directors and the
oppriat ggovernance
auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate overrnance structure is in place. The
ettin the compan
responsibilities of the board include setting companys str
strategic aims, providing the
leadership to put them into effect, supervising
rvisin the management
ment of the business and reporting
rdship. The boar
to shareholders on their stewardship. boards actions are subject to laws, regulations and
eeting (S
the shareholders in general meeting czudl 2013).
(Szczudlik, 013).
Private capi
ca tal is nece
capital necessary
neces ry for economic
onomi development, but capi
ca tal does not flow to
capital
dangerous neighbourhoods.
urho In estors,
Investors,
stors, wh
whether purchasers of equityy oorr lenders, will not invest
and pprivate
ri and
nd stat
statee own
owned
d enterprises seeking to attract local or global capital must
develop a ffr
framework
worrkk that assures public investors that the assets they provide will be
ramewor
ec rities and company law is necessary, but it is not sufficient (Millstein et
protected. Strong securities
al., 2005). The prevailing reported cases of unethical practices in corpor
corporate
r ate entities,
rpor
attributable
a
able to poor governance and weak enfor
f cement led to many corpor
for
enforcement r ate fa
rpor
corporate ffailures;
ilures;
regulations and instituting more proactive steps to strengthening compliance with accounting
and governance rules (Okereke, 2009). Though countries may differ in establishing their
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corporate statutory frameworks, the general pattern has been the government regulations and
professional bodies (Ibadin & Dabor, 2015).
Steier (2009) argues that in emerging and developing mark

rket
rk et economies,
market ies, fa
ffamily
mily
in firms governance. Similarly in transition economies such as Russia, there

re remains poor
anging the law on the
definition and enforcement of ownership rights: ch he books does not
(Licht et al., 2005 in Stei
guarantee corporate governance improvement Steier, 2009). S
Steier
(2009) emphasizes the role of corruption and black or grey markets
rke and
nd family or ethn
ethnic ties
to manoeuvre through complex and corrupt institutions. Globerman
erm and Shapiro
hapiro
a
apiro (2003) argue
that the strength of governance infrastructure, such as the fu
functioning
ncti of a range
an of formal
institutions including property rights, reg
regulation,
gul
ulation,
on, tr
transpa
transparency
nsparency
nspa ncy off info
information
r
rmation and
accountability, are important in attracting fo
accountability fforeign
reeeig
iggnn dir
directt invest
investme (FDI) to developing and
investment
infrastructure for growth, invest

investm
investment
ment and
nd new fir
firm
rm eentry
nt is hence of great importance e.g.
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000; A mo lu eett al
Acemoglu al., 2001, 2002, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999;
Djankov et al., 2002).
2.0 Background of the study
The impact
pac of rul
ruless an
and norms on Corporate Governance practices is the focus of
many stud ca e off bbenefits on firm value, minority shareholders protection and
caus
studies because
eff
ffici
ff
ficiency off codes
efficiency des
es ((Dharm
Dh rmap
a ala & Khanna, 2013; Cai, 2007; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). The
ap
(Dharmapala
conclusions foundd in the rresearch of La Porta et al.
al (1998) pointed
poin out that the laws for
how much the law enforcement modifies or influences the Corporate Governance model and
disclosure in each country. Cross-countries studies, such as some related to the BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries, were realized in order to find how
the institutional setting as values, laws and recommendations of each country should
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influence the Corporate Governance practices (Majumder et al., 2012; Oliveira et al., 2014;
Salvioni et al., 2013). Over the last twenty years, the BRICS countries have undertaken
numerous economic refo
f rms. Beginning in the 1990s, each country has more or less opened
fo
reforms.
jurisdictions are also significant sources of outward investment (Wilkins & Papa,
p 2012).
Although some studies have an optimistic view, the relation betwee

between the laws
compliance and enforcement and the firm performance of these countries are still cloudy for
ountries ar
and
some investors an Corporate
nd this is why Corpo
rporate Govern
rpo Governance
rnannce ppractices
ces and
nd disclosures
isclosuress aand the
enforcement
enfo
forcement of law
fo laws
ws and norms have an wid spacee forr invest
wide spac
spa investigation
investi
igaation
igat ion
on in thesee eemerging
2012).
3.0 Problem statement
Even if there is an increasing number

increasing numbe of studies previously mentioned about
Corpor
r ate
rpor te Governance practices
Corporate ract s recom
rac rrecommended,
om nded, re
required, adopted and
requir nd disclosed
losed in emerging
e
econom
economie
onomiees, it
economies, i is releva
relevant
ant to ddev
develop
evelo
evelopp stud
studies
studie
es on B
BRICS ccountri
countries
ountries usin
ountri using as parameter
paramet
meteer of good
is complex,
ompllex, as w
omp well
el ass vvarious
arious institutions could be decisive to the establishment of the legal
and norm mewo in each nation related to the adoption and disclosure of Corporate
normative framework
Governance practices
tices (E differences
(Estrin & Prevezer, 2011). These radical diff
differences of social legal and
fe
economic context
ontext ca captured
can be captur
ca ed only by means of highly interdisciplinary tools of analysis
requires of course the contribution of many other scholarly tools within a genuine effort to
make disciplinary frontiers crumble to be replaced by a more holistic social science (Mattei &
Monti, 2003).
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The relationship between comparative law and the field of economics is increasingly
important, but controversial. Economists have drawn from comparative law scholarship to
suggest that common law systems may be more conducive to financial and economic
development than civil law systems (Garoupa & Pargendler, 2014). Comparative law and
economics, by contrast, tr
treats
tre
eats the legal aand institutional backgrounds as dyn
y amic variables
yn
dynamic a
ables
higher degree of realism to the theoretical analysis (Mattei & Monti,

i, 2003).
4.0 Previous Work
Majumder et al. (2012) conducted a comparative study on Corp

r orate Govern
rp
Corporate Gov
Governance
ed to mak
Codes in BRICS Nations. The previous work attempted make a compa
mpara
comparative analysis
me ng ec
among major corporate governance codes of five emerging onom in
economies n th
this world-Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa on 14 dif ent signific
different significant paramet
parameters of corporate
governance. The similarities and distinguishing featur
featuress oof corpor
r
rpor
corporate governance codes of
h the gro
these five nations are reviewed. With growing importance
portance of BRICS nations in the global
y be useful
economic and political map, it may eful to stu
study the corporate governance practices of
orp rate governance
these five nations. Different corporate rnan models are applicable in the BRICS
ctur model like Japanese
nations. The dual board structure panes or German model can be observed in
countries like Russ
R ia and
Russia nd C
China,
hina, wh
where the companies prefe
f r to have dual boards
fe
prefer
superviso
r
rvisory board and managerial
supervisory manager
ag riaal boar
agerial bo
boaaard.
rd. The Chines
board. Chinese
hinese Boards,
hines Boards like the German Model may
concluded
luded that aall
ll the BRICS nations have a formal written code of corporate governance.
While they cover ccommon
omm governance aspects, and are similar in many respects, each has its
own distinctt and uniqu
unique provisions.
Hopt (2011) conducted a comparative study on corporate governance policies of 33

countries. Corporate governance, i.e. the system by which companies are directed and
controlled, has become a key topic for legislation, practice and academia in all modern
industrial states. The financial crisis has highlighted the problems. Yet one goes astray if one
does not understand how the unique combination of economic, legal and social determinants
of corporate governance functions in each country. A functional comparative analysis based
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ffrom
on reports fr references
om 33 countries and with refe After
f rences to economic literature may help. Afte
fe f r
fte
dealing with the concepts,
pts, instruments (including soft law) and sources of corporate
though many path dependent differences remain.
In a similar context, Bose (2005) compared the US and Indian eexperience of

us stud
Securities Market Regulations and corporate governance. The previous study analysed
regulatory infrastructure of the Indian securities market and see whether there exist well
formulated laws with well-defined scope and powers of the regulator,
gulator capable
a
able of pres
presenting
all investors in the Indian market with a level playing field. Th
The previous study sum
revious stu summarised
some of the regulatory provisions that have evolved for tackl
tackling market miscondu
ng ma misconduct
iscondu and try to
see what comes in the way of regulatory action aimed
imed at investor pprotection
otec in India, as
compared with the US which is perceived as the wo lds most sa
worlds safe and liquid capital market.
The study also discusses the roles of the stock exchanges
nges and electronic
lectroni databases in aiding
the regulator in prevention, detection and conviction
onv of sec
securities frauds. One tends to
ecu
conclude that the scope of Indian securities laws
laws, which have gradually evolved over time, is
now quite pervasive and the problem
oblem lies mostly
tly in enforcing compliance particularly for
nipu ation and
crimes such as price manipulation nd illegal
legal insi
insider trading. The discussion suggests that
nsure that laws/r
there remains a need to ensure laws/regulations are rationalised to completely empower
SEBI to carry out its fun
ffunctions
ions as the principal regulator, while SEBI in turn needs to
drastically upgrade
pgrad its surveillanc
surveillance process enabling it to produce evidence that is credible
h to ssecuree convict
enough ion.
conviction.
Olivei et
Oliveira e al
al. ((2016) made an analysis on corpo
corporate
r rate governance disclosure which is a
rpo
study through BRICS
ICS countries. The previous study analysed the practices disclosed by a
compared the companies Corporate Governance practices disclosed against laws,

to rules
and norms that are required and/or recommended their adoption and disclosure. The study
concludes that it is really hard to trace strong conclusions in the comparison of law
enforcement in Corporate Governance among emergent countries because there is a big
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cultural difference in each BRICS country, which leads to major changes in each legal
framework.
Becht et al. (2007) conducted a survey on the main mechanisms of corporate law and
governance, discussed the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and
examined the comparative governance literature. Corporate governance is concerned with the
reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders and the
ment dilemma
resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors. A fundamental
of corporate governance emerges from this overview: large shareholder interv
intervention
nt needs to
be regulated to guarantee better small investor protection; but this may inc
increase managerial
ase manag
discretion and scope for abuse. Alternative methods of limiting buse have yet to be pproven
g abuse
effective.
5.0 Gaps Identified in the literature
This research has identified several gaps previous. Those are as follows:
ps based on the previou
Previous studies in the context of eenforcement mechanis

mechanism in corporate governance
have been conducted with the comparative context, critically analysing the various rules,
ompa ve cont
policies and regulations devised different
vised by diff
diffe
fe nations.
tions. It is in the context of comparative law,
onducted. Ho
most researches were conducted. ever, comparative
However, ompa law and economics deals with
analysing certain aspectss of la w, fo
law, fforr ins e th
instance the impact of law on a countrys economy in
terms of economicc eff
ffic
ff
fic cy. Suc
efficiency. Such stud
studies comparing economic efficiency with respect to
ng
laws are lacking.
Rese hes were focu

Researches focussed on comparatively analysing the different corporate
anc prac
governance ces of diff
practices dif
different nations and their impact on investors and shareholders.
Qualitative studiess w ere mostly conducted so as to analyse the perceptions of shareholders.
were
The analysis of enforcement mechanism in corporate governance of BRICS nations is

lacking which is also a major gap in the previous literature.
6.0 Purpose of the study
The present study aimed at performing a Comparative Law and Economics Analysis
of corporate governance enforcement mechanism in BRICS nations. The study will be an
analysis of economic as well as legal policies pertaining to the BRICS nations with respect to
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corporate governance and enforcement mechanism in the countries. The study will analyse
the various legal frameworks adopted by different regulatory bodies of the BRICS nations so
as to provide valuable insights about the topic of research. Furthermore, the study will be
based on the analysis of corporate governance in the viewpoint of comparative law and
economic analysis. The study will utilise data collected from various governmental reports
and previous literature so as to comparatively analyse the enforcement practices for corporate
governance adopted by the different BRICS nations. The role of BRICS nation in the global
scenario as emerging economies induces economic changes and hence,, these nations are
selected for the present research.
7.0 Aim and Objectives
The present research is aimed at comparatively analysing

na sing the enforcement
f r eme mechanism
nfo
fo
for Corporate Governance in BRIC or BRICS nations
ons in terms
r of la
rms law and economic analysis.
nd ec
In this regard, the following objectives are framed.
med.
To critically evaluate the different lega

legal corporate governance
ate gove nc policies and regulations
prevailing in the BRICS nations so aas to identi
identify the potential impacts of these laws
on the economic development
ment oof the nations
To identify whether diff
different enforcement
fe
different nfo
f r ment poli
fo policies of different BRICS nations play
ulating corporate
vital role in regulating orpo ate governance
ernance in these nations
isation
8.0 Chapterisation
ntrod c
ntrodu
Chapter I: Introduction: thi
this section will contain the introduction to the topic along with the
round of the study, the problem statement, research objectives, research questions,
background
pothesis, the statistic
hypothesis, statistical methods of analysis and the scope and significance of the study.
lso contain
The chapter also contains a note on the chapter divisions of the study.
Chapter II: Literature Review: the chapter discusses all the previous literature that has been
presented by different authors within the context of corporate governance and enforcement
mechanism in different countries.
Chapter III: Corporate Governance in BRICS nations: an overview: This chapter presents a
detailed overview of corporate governance and the policies and regulations adopted by
different BRICS countries.
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Chapter IV: Data and Methodology: this chapter details the research design and strategy
adopted. In addition, the research philosophy is also included through which the nature and
type of data collected are determined. The chapter also encloses the manner in which the data
is analysed and how the findings may be derived.
Chapter V: Results: This chapter very specifically encloses the results of the data collected.
The results will be presented in tabular and graphical format along with the interpretation of
data
Chapter VI: Conclusion and Recommendation: this chapter discusses the findings of the
present study in comparison with the previous studies. From the findings, conclusions are
drawn and recommendations are discerned.
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10.0 Gantt chart
Main Activities/ Stages Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6
Topic selection and its

scope
Identification of secondary
data sources
Preparation of research
proposal
Preparation of literature
review
Description of research
methodology
Collecting primary data
Analyzing data
Comparing findings
Conclusion and
recommendations
Finalizing and submission
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Research Proposa
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References
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Development: An Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review. [Online]. 91
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Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J.A. (2002). Reversal of Fortune: Geography and
Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics. [Online]. 117 (4). pp. 12311294. Available from:
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1162/003355302320935025.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. & Thaicharoen, Y. (2003). Institutional Causes,
Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises And Growth. Journal of Monetary
Economics. [Online]. 50 (1). pp. 49123. Available from:
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Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A. (2000). Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic

Development. American Economic Review. [Online]. 90 (2). pp. 126130. Available
from: http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.90.2.126.
Adams, R.B., Hermalin, B.E. & Weisbach, M.S. (2010). The Role of Boards of Directors in
Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey. Journal of Economic
Literature. 48 (1). pp. 58107.
Becht, M., Bolton, P. & Rell, A. (2007). Chapter 12 Corporate Law and Governance. In: A.
M. Polinsky & S. Shavell (eds.). Handbook of Law and Economics, Volume 2. [Online].
Elsevier B.V, pp. 829943. Available from:
https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pbolton/BBRLE.pdf.
Berglf, E. & Claessens, S. (2006). Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in

Developing Countries and Transition Economies. The World Bank Research Observer.
21 (1). pp. 123150.
Bose, S. (2005). Securities Market Regulations: Lessons from US and Indian Experience.
[Online]. Available from: http://icra.in/Files/MoneyFinance/2005-jan-june-suchismita
bose.pdf.
Cai, H. (2007). Bonding, Law Enforcement and Corporate Governance in China. Stanford
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Journal of Law, Business, and Finance. 13 (82). pp. 150.
Chen, G., Firth, M., Gao, D.N. & Rui, O.M. (2006). Ownership structure, corporate
governance, and fraud: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance. 12 (3). pp.
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Dharmapala, D. & Khanna, V. (2013). Corporate Governance, Enforcement, and Firm Value:
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Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, A. (2002). The Regulation of
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Estrin, S. & Prevezer, M. (2011). The role of informal institutions in corporate governance:
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010-9229-1.
Estrin, S. & Prevezer, M. (2010). The Role of Informal Institutions in Corporate Governance:
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Garoupa, N. & Pargendler, M. (2014). A Law and Economics Perspective on Legal Families.
European Journal of Legal Studies. [Online]. 7 (2). pp. 3660. Available from:
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Globerman, S. & Shapiro, D. (2003). Governance Infrastructure and US Foreign Direct

Investment. Journal of International Business Studies. 33 (1). pp. 1939.
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FCorpGov3.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
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institutions. Journal of Securities and Finance. 14 (2). pp. 715.
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Oliveira, M.C., Ceglia, D. & Filho, F.A. (2016). Analysis of corporate governance disclosure:
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and Corporate Governance. SSRN Electronic Journal. [Online]. Available from:
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=183908.
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Salvioni, D.M., Bosetti, L. & Almici, A. (2013). Board Independence and Internal
Committees in the BRICs. Chinese Business Review. 12 (8). pp. 521539.
Steier, L.P. (2009). Familial capitalism in global institutional contexts: Implications for
corporate governance and entrepreneurship in East Asia. Asia Pacific Journal of
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http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10490-008-9117-0.
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8683.2008.00661.x.
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YOUR TRUSTED MENTOR SINC E 2001

Enforcement Mechanism for Corporate Governance in B

YOUR TRUSTED MENTOR SINC E 2001

1.0 Introduction of the Study ..................................................................................................... 3

2.0 Background of the study ...................................................................................................... 4

3.0 Problem statement ................................................................................................................ 5

6.0 Purpose of the study .............................................................................................................

8.0 Proposed Methodology ...................................................... Error!! Bookm

9.0 Chapterisation ......................................................................................................................

10.0 Gantt chart ........................................................................................................................

YOUR TRUSTED MENTOR SINC E 2001

1.0 Introduction of the Study

of their companies. The shareholders role in governance oin

YOUR TRUSTED MENTOR SINC E 2001

Steier (2009) argues that in emerging and developing mark

in firms governance. Similarly in transition economies such as Russia, there

infrastructure for growth, invest

2.0 Background of the study

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Although some studies have an optimistic view, the relation betwee

3.0 Problem statement

Even if there is an increasing number

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higher degree of realism to the theoretical analysis (Mattei & Monti,

4.0 Previous Work

Majumder et al. (2012) conducted a comparative study on Corp

Hopt (2011) conducted a comparative study on corporate governance policies of 33

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though many path dependent differences remain.

In a similar context, Bose (2005) compared the US and Indian eexperience of

compared the companies Corporate Governance practices disclosed against laws,

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5.0 Gaps Identified in the literature

Previous studies in the context of eenforcement mechanis

Rese hes were focu

The analysis of enforcement mechanism in corporate governance of BRICS nations is

6.0 Purpose of the study

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7.0 Aim and Objectives

The present research is aimed at comparatively analysing

To critically evaluate the different lega

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10.0 Gantt chart

Main Activities/ Stages Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6

Topic selection and its

Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A. (2000). Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic

Berglf, E. & Claessens, S. (2006). Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in

Globerman, S. & Shapiro, D. (2003). Governance Infrastructure and US Foreign Direct

Okereke, O. (2009). Corporate governance and global competitiveness in financial market

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Szczudlik, K.B. (2013). Enforcement of Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Transitional

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