PROP DOCTRINES RDEIPARINE

1. Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs City of Zamboanga

a. Facts: Prior to the incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga was
the provincial capital of Zamboanga Province. By virtue of Sec. 50 of CA 39, the buildings
and other properties that the Province will abandon in view of its conversion as
Zamboanga City shall be paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the
Auditor General.
In June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved and it amended Sec. 50 of the CA 39 providing
that all buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the Province of Zamboanga and
located in the City of Zamboanga are transferred free of charge in favor of the City. The
Province of Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
preliminary injunction contending that the RA 3039 is unconstitutional as it deprives the
Province of its properties without just compensation and due process.
b. Held: The properties that are devoted for public purpose are owned by the province in
its governmental capacity. Those that are not devoted for public use remain as
patrimonial property of the Province. The RA 3039 is held valid in so far as the
properties that are devoted for public use or owned by the province in its governmental
capacity and thus must retain its public purpose. Hence these governmental properties
need not be paid by the City of Zamboanga.
With respect to the patrimonial properties from the 50 lots in dispute, the RA 3039
cannot be applied in order to deprive the province of its own patrimonial properties
that are not devoted for public use. Hence the City of Zamboanga shall pay just
compensation to the Province of Zamboanga for these patrimonial properties.
2. Salas vs Jarencio
a. Facts: On various dates in 1927, City of Manila sold portions of the parcel of land. When
the last sale was effected, TCT 22547 was issued in the name of City of Manila.
In 1960, Municipal Board of Manila requested the President to consider the feasibility of
declaring the land under TCT 25545-25547 as patrimonial property of Manila. A bill was
then passed and became RA 4118, converting the land from communal property to
disposable and alienable land of State.
To implement RA 4118, Land Authority requested City of Manila to deliver TCT 22547 in
order to obtain title thereto in the name of Land Authority. The request was granted
and issuing TCT 80876 in the name of Land Authority.
City of Manila, for some reasons, brought an action to restrain, prohibit, and enjoin Land
Authority and Register of Deeds from implementing RA 4118, and praying for the
declaration of RA 4118 as unconstitutional. Trial court declared RA 4118 to be
unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it deprived City of its property without
due process of law and payment of just compensation.
b. Held: The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its
private or proprietary capacity. The land was part of the territory of City of Manila
granted by sovereign in its creation. Furthermore, City expressly recognized the
 paramount title of the State over its land when it requested the President to consider
the feasibility of declaring the lot as patrimonial property for selling.
There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the
State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes.
But since the City did not actually use said land for any recognized public purpose and
allowed it to remain idle and unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by
squatters, no presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City of Manila may
be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own private or patrimonial property.
3. Cebu Oxygen vs Bercilles
a. Facts: The City Council of Cebu, in 1968, considered as an abandoned road, the terminal
portion of one of its streets. Later it authorized the sale through public bidding of the
property. The Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. was able to purchase the same. It then
petitioned the RTC of Cebu for the registration of the land. The petition was opposed by
the Provincial Fiscal (Prosecutor) who argued that the lot is still part of the public
domain, and cannot therefore be registered.
b. Held: The land can be registered in the name of the buyer, because the street in
question has already been withdrawn from public use, and accordingly has become
patrimonial property. The sale of the lot was therefore valid.
4. Hilario vs Salvador
a. Facts: Hilario filed a complaint with the RTC against Salvador alleging that they were the
co-owners of the parcel of land where Salvador constructed his house without their
knowledge and refused to vacate despite their demands. Salvador filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, contending that the
complaint did not state the assessed value of the property, which determines the
jurisdiction of the court.
Hilario maintained that the RTC had jurisdiction since their action was an accion
reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the
assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction fell within the said court.
Moreover, they maintained that their action was also one for damages exceeding
P20,000.00, over which the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction.
b. Held: The action filed by Hilario prayed that Salvador vacate the property and restore
possession to them. Hence, it was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of
possession of the real property. It was not an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit for the
recovery of possession over the real property as owner.
The nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by
the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.
The complaint did not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property.
Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it could
not thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the action. The law also explicitly excluded from the determination of
 the jurisdictional amount the demand for interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs.
5. Sampayan vs CA
a. Facts: A complaint for forcible entry was filed by siblings Crispulo and Florencia Vasquez
against Cesar Sampayan before the MCTC of Agusan del Sur, for allegedly having
entered and occupied a parcel of land through strategy and stealth, and built a house
thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority.
The private respondents, alleged that their mother Cristita Quita was the owner and
actual possessor of Lot No. 1959; that after their mothers death in 1984, they became
co-owners and lawful possessors of the same lot; that in 1992, while they were
temporarily absent from the lot, petitioner Cesar Sampayan, through strategy and
stealth, entered the lot and built a house thereon; and that, despite their repeated
demands for Sampayan to vacate the lot and surrender the possession thereof to them,
the latter failed and refused to do so.
Defendant Sampayan denied the allegations and moved for the dismissal of the
complaint. He averred the following:
that neither the plaintiffs nor their mother have ever been in possession of the
land and that he does not even know plaintiffs identities or their places of
residence.
he did not enter the subject lot by stealth or strategy because he was given
permission by Maria Ybaez, the overseer of the lots true owners, spouses
Terrado who were then temporarily residing in Cebu City.
plaintiff s claim has long prescribed for the reason that the lot in dispute had
been possessed and declared for taxation purposes by the spouses Oriol in
1960, and that in 1978, the Oriol spouses sold 1/2 of the lot to the spouses
Terrado, while the other half, to spouses Occida in 1979. Both vendees have
actually possessed the respective portions purchased by them up to the
present.
In 1996, while the case was pending with the MCTC, the presiding judge conducted an
ocular inspection of the contested lot in the presence of the parties and/or their
counsels. Among those found in the area during the inspection are: the house of
petitioner Sampayan; the dilapidated house of a certain Siscon; and a portion of the
house of Noynay, one of Sampayan's witnesses. Based on his ocular findings, the judge
concluded that the improvements he saw in the premises could never have been
introduced by the plaintiffs nor by their mother Cristita Quita but by the vendees of the
same lot.
The MTC concluded that, from the appearance of the improvements introduced by the
predecessors-in-interest of the now petitioner, it is showed that they have been in
possession of the land for more than one (1) year. Hence, the action of the private
respondents, if any, is accion publiciana or plenaria de possession.
The MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the compliant for lack of merit. Therefrom,
the private respondents appealed to the RTC, which reversed that of the MCTC, taking
note of the fact that Cristita Quita was among the expositors in Cadastral Case No. 149
 and that she filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the lot. On the basis of such
finding, the RTC concluded that it was Cristita Quita who was in actual prior physical
possession of the land. Sampayan went to the CA on a petition for review which was
denied. His motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied. Sampayan now
files a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
b. Held: To begin with, we are at once confronted by the uncontested findings of the MCTC
judge himself during his ocular inspection of the premises in dispute that what he saw
thereat confirmed the allegations of Sampayan that his predecessors-in-interest have
introduced improvements, adding that nothing can be seen on the land that plaintiff
had once upon a time been in possession of the land, and categorically stating that the
allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in
possession of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively, continuously, adversely
and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence.
Then, too, there is the sworn affidavit of Noynay that she had been residing since 1960
on a lot adjacent to the contended lot and that neither the private respondents nor
their mother had ever possessed Lot No. 1959. Coming as it does from an immediate
neighbor, Noynays statement commands great weight and respect. Incidentally, the
MCTC judge himself found during the ocular inspection that a portion of the house of
Noynays husband protruded on Lot No. 1959.
We note that in the herein assailed decision, the Court of Appeals attached much
significance to the fact that private respondents mother Cristita Quita was an oppositor
in Cadastral Case No. 149. We rule and so hold that the mothers being an oppositor in
said cadastral case does not, by itself, establish prior physical possession because not all
oppositors in cadastral cases are actual possessors of the lots or lands subject thereof.
6. Santos vs Ayon
a. Facts: Santos was the registered owner of three lots while the spouses Ayon were the
registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land. The previous occupant of this property
built a building which straddled both the lots of Santos and the Ayons. The Ayons had
been using the building as a warehouse.
When Santos bought the three lots, he informed the Ayons that the building occupies a
portion of his land. However, he allowed them to continue using the building. However,
later he demanded that the Ayons demolish and remove the part of the building
encroaching his property. They refused, continuing to occupy the contested portion.
Santos filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Ayons. The MTCC found in
favor of Santos. On appeal, the RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that the Ayons'
occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance. Hence, when Santos
needed the same, he had the right to eject them through court action. The CA reversed
and held that the proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the RTC,
not an action for unlawful detainer.
b. Held: Prior physical possession of the property by tolerance does not preclude an action
for unlawful detainer. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the
withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily
employing the terminology of the law. Here, there is an allegation in the complaint that
 respondents' occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance.
Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the
possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Thus, a
person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without
any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him.
7. Ganila vs CA
a. Facts: Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment complaints alleging that she owns Lot 1227 of
Jordan, Guimaras and that she tolerated Ganila et al (18 persons and the Baptist
Christian Learning Center) to construct residential houses or other improvements on
certain portions of the lot without rental. When she asked Ganila et al to vacate, they
refused. Barangay conciliation failed; hence, she filed the complaints.
8 claimed that Lot 1227 was formerly a shoreline. 8 maintained that their houses stood
on Lot 1229. 3 asserted that Lot 1227 is a social forest area. Geodetic engineers
surveyed the area and reported that all the houses were inside Lot 1227. MCTC
rendered decision in favor of Herrera and ordered Ganila et al to vacate. RTC dismissed
the appeal and the CA affirmed the denial.
b. Held: While petitioners assert that this case involves only deprivation of possession,
they confuse the remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful detainer.
In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is
enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual, prior physical possession of
a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. Also, the defendant is
necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually
becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess. Thus, the fact
that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically entitle them to
remain in possession. And the issue of prior lawful possession by the defendants does
not arise at all in a suit for unlawful detainer, simply because prior lawful possession by
virtue of contract or other reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in forcible entry where
defendants, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the plaintiff or the
prior physical possessor of possession. Here there is no evidence to show that
petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts.
An unlawful detainer is different from a possessory action and from a reinvidicatory
action in that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Aside from the
summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the
right of possession and accion reinvidicatoria or the action to recover ownership which
includes recovery of possession, make up three kinds of actions to judicially recover
possession.
8. Ross Rica Sales vs Sps Ong
a. Facts: The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by RRSC & JKI against
SPOUSES ONG, before the MTC of Mandaue City. In the complaint, RRSC & JKI alleged
the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 36466,
36467 and 36468.
 RRSC & JKI likewise acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ongs ownership of the lots
previous to theirs.
26Jan1995: Atty. Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote
SPOUSES ONG informing them of its intent to use the lots and asking them to vacate
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But SPOUSES ONG allegedly refused to
vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots.
RRSC & JKI had acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale
made on 23 March 1995. In turn, it appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had
acquired the properties from the SPOUSES ONG through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
14 July 1994.
However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers of title consequential thereto were
subsequently sought to be annulled by SPOUSES ONG in a complaint filed on 13
February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. Per
record, this case is still pending resolution.
MTC RULING: Ordering SPOUSES ONG to vacate the premises in question and to
peacefully turn over possession thereof to RRSC & JKI.
RTC RULING: affirming the MTCs decision in its entirety.
SPOUSES ONGs MR was denied. Hence, appeal to CA.
CA RULING: that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as there was no contract
between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful
detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside.
Hence the present petition- RRSC & JKI then took this recourse via Petition for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
b. Held: The presence of a contract is not a requisite for unlawful detainer case. The
allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is
sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an action
for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law.
Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part
of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract,
express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by
defendant.
In the subject complaint, RRSC & JKI alleged that they are the registered owners of the
lots covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they have
allowed SPOUSES ONG, the former owners of the properties, to remain therein.
Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to SPOUSES ONG asking that the latter vacate
the said lots. SPOUSES ONG refused, thereby depriving RRSC & JKI of possession of the
lots. Clearly, the complaint establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case,
certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
9. Peralta-Labrador vs Bugarin
a. Facts: On January 18, 1996, petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for Recovery
of Possession and Ownership, with the MTC of San Felipe, Zambales against
respondent Silverio Bugarin alleging the following:
She is the owner of the land, with an area of 400 sq. m. located at San Felipe,
Zambales, having purchased the same from spouses Artemio and Angela Pronto
and that she was issued Tax Declaration and paid the taxes due thereon.
DPWH constructed a road that traversed the land thereby separating 108 sq.
m. from the rest of petitioners lot, for which she was issued Tax Declaration.
Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the
108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate the same despite the pleas of petitioner.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The area claimed by petitioner is included in the 4,473
square meter lot, covered by the OCT No. P-13011; and that he has been in continuous
possession and occupation thereof since 1955; that MTC has no jurisdiction since the
action has already prescribed.
In his Amended Answer with Counterclaim, however, respondent failed to allege that
the questioned lot is covered by the OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted that he
planted fruit bearing trees in the property.
The court a quo ruled in favor of respondent declaring him as the owner of the
controverted lot on the basis of the OCT No. P-13011. The complaint was dismissed for
failure of petitioner to prove prior physical possession and ownership thereof. The RTC
affirmed MTC. Hence, petitioner filed petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
CA denied petition for insufficiency of evidence to prove ownership or prior actual
physical possession. MR likewise denied. Hence, this petition.
b. Held: Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred
two years prior to the filing of the complaint, the cause of action for forcible entry has
prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or
cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. Hence, the failure of
respondent to insist on the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription stated in
his Amended Answer with Counterclaim will not vest the MTC with jurisdiction over the
case.
An action for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one year time bar for filing a
suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. Thus, we have nullified
proceedings in the MTCs when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in which the
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had exceeded one year.
After the lapse of the one year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an
accion publicana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.
It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual
of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty
independently of title. Likewise, the case may be instituted before the same court as an
accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.
 Corrollarily, jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
Thus, in ascertaining whether or not the action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are to be examined.
It is clear that petitioners averment make out a case for forcible entry because she
alleged prior physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible
entry thereon by respondent. Petitioners complaint therefore should have been filed
with the proper RTC.
Moreover, even if the MTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the complaint
should still be dismissed because petitioner failed to prove that the controverted 108
sq. m. lot is part of Cadastral Lot No. 2650. Failing to discharge this burden, the dismissal
of the complaint is proper.
10. Serina vs Caballero
a. Facts: Sps Seria filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession and
damages against Caballero and his tenants Sps. Donela (Cagayan de Oro City). Petitioner
alleged that they are the absolute owners and have been in actual possession for 35
years of a parcel of land. Sometime in 1982, they allegedly discovered that Caballero
was claiming ownership over the land and offering it for sale or mortgage.
b. Held: In order that an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is indispensable
that he who brings the action fully proves not only his ownership but also the identity of
the property claimed, by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.
Boundaries set forth in complaint not the same as in the Deed of Sale.