Minimum Standards

regarding Staff Security

in Humanitarian Aid
 1

Contents

Foreword ..................................................................................................... 2

1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 3

2. Overview of the level of debate on the topic ................................................. 5

2.1 The position of the UN and international aid organisations ............................. 5
2.2 The status of debate in Germany.................................................................... 5

3. Improving security management in an organisation..................................... 7

3.1 Mainstreaming the topic within an organisation ............................................. 7
3.2 Working out a security policy tailored to a specific organisation ................... 8
The organisations values regarding staff security and risk management .. 8
Striking a balance between the possible risks for the staff
and the desired benefit for the population .............................................. 8
The preferable security strategy.............................................................. 8
The local staff and the staff of partner organisations................................ 9
3.3 Security planning at local level....................................................................... 10
Risk analysis.......................................................................................... 10
What a security plan should contain ....................................................... 11
What the organisations expect of their staffs behaviour .......................... 15
Co-operation with other actors............................................................... 16
3.4 The organisations obligations towards its employees..................................... 18

4. Further training in security awareness and management ............................. 20

5. Summary ........................................................................................................ 21
The most important recommendations at a glance .................................. 21

Annex ................................................................................................................. 22
Annex 1: Reference documents ............................................................................ 22
A) Documents and material used .......................................................... 22
B) Documents and material used provided by aid organisations .............. 22
Annex 2: Internet sources..................................................................................... 23

Annex 3: Organisations and institutions that have been consulted ......................... 23

2 Foreword

Foreword

The raising of awareness regarding staff security has discussed in the framework of the Co-ordinating
gained considerable momentum over the last few Committee on Humanitarian Aid. The foundations
years. In the Anglo-Saxon region, a rather lively debate for the statements in terms of contents are a survey
is underway1, and increasing attention is being given among member organisations with reference to their
to the topic in Germany as well. While the importance documents, guidelines, curricula, etc. as well as an
of this issue is undisputed in German humanitarian evaluation of existing literature on the topic (best
organisations, it is addressed in very different ways in practices). Around ten aid organisations were in-
practice. In some organisations, the standards are al- volved and provided their material (see list in Annex
ready very high, i.e. documents have been compiled as 3). In a workshop organised by VENRO in Bonn in
well as curricula for further training, and correspond- November 2002, this document was discussed with
ing resources to support staff have been established. the organisations involved, and it was subsequently
In other institutions however, these elements of secu- revised.
rity management are not in place yet. Some organisa- The recommendations refer to the field of security,
tions have formulated manuals and guidelines for ac- i.e. to issues regarding protection against violent
tion, while others merely refer to documents that are attacks. The field of safety, i.e. issues relating to
available, e. g. the guidelines of the International protection from accidents, disease, etc., is excluded.
Committee of the Red Cross. In the interest of quality Although stress management is an important aspect
assurance in humanitarian aid and a harmonisation of of staff deployment abroad, it would exceed the vol-
approaches, reducing this discrepancy by setting min- ume of this publication.
imum standards is an appropriate measure. The document expresses recommendations but
This document shows what minimum standards does not intend to have them understood as impera-
should look like and gives recommendations on how tive or as a blue print. Given the plurality of German
they ought to be set. It was initiated by VENRO and has humanitarian organisations it goes without saying
been prepared with the financial support of the Ger- that it is impossible to include all suggestions from all
man Foreign Office. The project was presented and organisations to an equal degree.

Jrgen Lieser
Member of the VENRO Board /
Humanitarian Aid Department

1 E.g. in the Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas

Development Institute in London, in the periodical Forced
Migration Review, in the ICRC and UNHCR journals and on
special Internet pages of the Relieweb.
 3

1. Introduction

Since the beginning of the nineties, humanitarian aid there are indications that the fatalities among the staff
and development organisations have been confronted of non-governmental organisations have risen in par-
with armed conflicts to an ever-increasing degree. In ticular.6 According to the ICRC targeting of its staff
past years, the International Committee of the Red currently represents the greatest threat the organisa-
Cross (ICRC) was the only organisation maintaining a tion faces.
presence with expatriate staff to carry on with human- What are the reasons for these developments? Var-
itarian activities during an acute armed conflict. This ious aspects have to be mentioned here that relate on
was possible because the Red Cross emblem was the one hand to the environment of humanitarian aid
known throughout the world and, thanks to its unique and on the other to humanitarian aid itself or the aid
status in international law, the ICRC was accepted and organisations involved:
respected by the conflict parties as a neutral body. To-
day, a multitude of actors are present in large-scale The number of violent, almost always inner-state,
crises and disasters. In addition to the wide variety of conflicts has constantly been growing, and there-
governmental organisations, hundreds of non-gov- fore, so has the number of aid missions. The UN
ernmental organisations are often working at local has recorded a dramatic increase in the number of
level as well. its peace missions, which are almost always ac-
The worsening of the security situation for aid staff companied by humanitarian aid. In parallel to the
is reflected in the statistics of reported incidents.2 The UN activities, a large number of humanitarian or-
ICRC has reported a significant increase in the number ganisations always commence activities to support
of so-called security incidents per year.3 the population in crisis-shaken countries as well.
The United Nations refers to similar develop- This coincides with an increase in the number of
ments. From January 1992 to August 1998, 153 staff aid workers in action.
working for the UN lost their lives, and 43 were ab-
ducted. By May 2002, this figure had grown to 214 A second reason is that non-compliance of the civ-
dead and 258 abducted persons.4 In 1992, the UN sta- il war parties with international humanitarian law
tistics referred to one fatality a month among their is on the increase. They do not observe the inter-
staff, one fatality every two weeks in 1993 and more nationally agreed rules on the protection of the
than one a week in 1994.5 In spite of a number of im- civilian population in wars. On the contrary, the ci-
provements in the meantime, violence prevails, and vilian population become a target of attacks and
destabilisation policies. Whereas 90 per cent of the
fatalities in the First World War were still soldiers,
today, 90 percent are civilians. Some observers
160 even claim that a soldier has a better chance of sur-
140 vival in many wars nowadays.7

120
100 2 While the statistics regarding these incidents are not stand-
80 ardised and no generally valid figures therefore exist, similar
trends can be observed in the statistics of individual organi-
60 sations.
3 Personal statement by the head of the ICRC security depart-
40 ment.
4 United Nations 2002, p. 2.
20
5 Greenaway / Harris 1998, p. 4.
0 6 Sheik et al. 2000, p. 167.
1990 1993 1996 2001 7 Slim 1996, p. 5.
4 Introduction

A growing culture of impunity is coinciding with tween humanitarian and military missions is now
non-compliance with international law. Aid organ- becoming blurred, which in turn is making it more
isations are seen as simple targets that can be difficult for aid organisations to maintain their
attacked without this having major consequences neutrality.
for those responsible. The UN reports that people
responsible for staff being killed on missions have Nowadays, there is stiff competition among the aid
been held to account in just 7 per cent of these organisations for financial support for humanitar-
cases.8 ian missions and the attention of the media that
these missions attract. This can result in security
In parallel to the attacks on the civilian population, interests being subordinated to the marketing
aid organisations are also being attacked. As sup- strategies of organisations, with humanitarian aid
porters of the victims of wars and disasters, they also being provided in countries or situations in
are no longer regarded as neutral parties to the which the wellbeing and lives of staff are put at
conflict. Moreover, since they transfer resources considerable risk.
that are important for the warring parties, their aid
to the suffering population gains a strategic role in If one examines the fatalities in humanitarian
warring. missions between 1985 and 1998, one arrives at the
following results. Contrary to widespread opinion, ac-
At the beginning of the 21st century, new problems cidents and diseases no longer constitute the chief
are arising for aid organisations in several coun- reasons for these fatalities. In 68 per cent of the cases
tries. On the one hand, there are more and more examined, intentional violence against members of
so-called failed states, i.e. states in which a gen- aid organisations was the cause of deaths. This tallies
erally accepted central government with a monop- with the figures of the ICRC, which reports of 77 per
oly of power no longer exists. There, the above- cent of fatalities resulting from violence. In contrast,
mentioned developments have a particularly grave car accidents accounted for just 17 per cent of fatali-
impact. On the other hand, international terrorism ties, and non-intentional violence for 7 per cent. More
and attempts to fight it bear risks that also affect accurate analyses of targeted murders of aid workers
the options for the deployment of aid organisa- show that in 47 per cent of incidents, they were victims
tions. of raids on cars or convoys. While the statistics point
in the same direction in assigning the murders to the
But in addition to the environment aid measures origin of the victims, the overall picture tends to be
are being carried out in, aid itself is changing. The in- less coherent. The various surveys report that between
ternational discussion focuses on two aspects9: 58 per cent and 74 per cent of the victims were local
staff.10
Politicisation of humanitarian aid and its being It has already been mentioned that these statistics
used as a substitute for unsuccessful political do bear weaknesses. They nevertheless demonstrate
action or as a means of covering up or justifying very clearly that the threat to staff of aid organisations
military incursions in crisis areas. It is observed is a problem that humanitarian organisations really
that what used to be a clear demarcation line be- need to address.

8 United Nations 2002, p. 2.

9 See Politics and Humaniatarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and
Dissension, in: Disasters 2001. and Eberwein/Runge 2002.
10 For all figures see Brabant 2000, Annex 1, Sheik et al. 2000
and King 2002, which refers to the data bank The Chronol-
ogy of Humanitarian Aid Workers killed: 19972001 of the
Reliefweb.
 5

2. Overview of the level of debate on the topic

2.1 The position of the UN lines). Although the emphasis is on giving instruc-
and international aid organisations tions for action among other organisations (what
ought to or ought not to be done in certain crisis situ-
ations), a holistic approach to the issue of security
The UN and non-governmental aid organisations have is generally adopted whenever appropriate (e.g. in
already responded to this new threat. Some UN organ- the guidelines of German Agro Action and in ICRC
isations are providing their entire staff with further policy).
training in the field of security (e.g. World Food Pro- This approach goes beyond mere issues of the
gramme, WFP), while others are offering optional technical equipment required and the most adequate
training measures. In December 1999, the UN Gen- mode of response in hazardous situations, and it is
eral Assembly called on the UN Secretary-General for based on the assumption of a mutual relationship be-
the first time to revise the existing security concept tween security and security measures on the one hand
and make proposals for improvements. The subse- and good programme planning and implementation
quent report11 recommends a significant upgrading of on the other. The most comprehensive account of this
this topic and demands that appropriate financing be topic is given by Koenraad van Brabant in the Good
provided. So far, only a handful of countries have par- Practice Review series issued by the Overseas Devel-
ticipated in financing security measures, while some opment Institute.12 In the field of training material,
others have announced that they will make financial the British non-governmental organisation RedR has
contributions to this end. In this report, just like in the distinguished itself with its Security Training Guide,
follow-up ones, the UN Secretary-General points out which is freely accessible.13 Further basic documents
again and again that efforts made to ensure staff secu- on the topic are referred to in the list of further read-
rity represent neither a luxury nor a personal advan- ing in the Annex.
tage, but that they are simply the price that the global
community has to pay nowadays for the implementa-
tion of the UN mandate.
A similar state of affairs holds for the non-govern- 2.2 The status of debate in Germany
mental aid organisations. If they wish to continue to
provide aid in the context of violent conflicts, they In nearly all German organisations, awareness now
have to improve security management within their seems to be firmly established that security or threats
organisation, upgrade their staff and make adequate to it constitute an important topic for aid organisa-
arrangements for activities at local level. Different tions. In the framework of the VENRO Working Group
institutions approach this task in very different ways. on Humanitarian Aid, the issue was debated in sev-
In the case of American organisations and those eral sessions and adopted in several VENRO publica-
whose documents come from an American sister or- tions.14 In various German aid organisations, there are
ganisation, it is conspicuous that, in particular, the sets of guidelines that have either been compiled by
guidelines for staff are strongly shaped by American the organisations themselves or by their international
jurisdiction regarding liability (see e.g. the World networks. Here, particular mention must be made of
Vision International and Care International guide- the guidelines of World Vision International (WVI),
Care International, German Agro Action, German
Red Cross/ICRC, Mdecins Sans Frontires (MSF) and
Caritas International/Catholic Relief Services (CRS).
11 United Nations 2000.
However, few organisations have already devel-
12 Brabant 2000.
13 Registered Engineers in Disaster Relief, seated in London. oped a proper security culture and integrated the
The Training Guide can be looked at at www.redr.org issue into all aspects of planning and implementation
14 VENRO 2002. (annually revised); VENRO 2000. of aid measures. Also, there are considerable gaps in
6 Overview of the level of debate on the topic

terms of reporting security incidents. Here, hardly any mation on courses in the field of staff security. How-
of the organisations have a sophisticated, structured ever, the programmes run in Germany cannot be
system. Some organisations, such as the Malteser For- compared with what is run by the organisation RedR
eign Department, Caritas International and German in the Anglo-Saxon region and by Bioforce in the Fran-
Agro Action, are currently in the process of working cophone region16. Nevertheless, German aid organi-
security aspects into project and human resource sations have signalled a considerable demand for ap-
management. propriate further training programmes. They would
Another field that has hardly been developed in like to have a range of training courses with sufficient
Germany is security training. The annually updated flexibility in terms of time both with regard to the fre-
VENRO publication15 provides an overview of training quency of the programmes and the length of the train-
courses in humanitarian aid and also contains infor- ing courses.

15 VENRO 2002.
16 Seated near Lyon.
 7

3. Improving security management in an organisation

Improving security management within an organisa- straightforward division of labour, definition of

tion involves a number of aspects. It is important that responsibilities and decision-making powers,
the topic is mainstreamed throughout the organisa- schedules
tion. A coherent security policy has to be in place as provision of human resources, labour time and
well as detailed regulations on implementation at the operational means to support the mainstreaming
level of local operations and straightforward state- process.
ments of the organisation on what it expects of its
staff. The organisations obligations towards its staff Whenever possible, the following steps ought to be
should be clearly set out in writing, too. Last but not taken or conditions be created at local level:
least, a management approach of this kind also ad-
dresses the issue of financing security measures. conducting a risk analysis for the field of deploy-
ment
drawing up a security plan
regulating the distribution of activities, responsi-
3.1 Mainstreaming the topic bilities and decision-making powers
within an organisation guidelines for incident reporting and analysis
further training programmes
There are different reasons for the discrepancy in enough financial means to remedy identified weak-
organisations between being aware that the issue of nesses.
security is important and insufficiently integrating
this aspect into their activities. The arguments most It will be easier to accomplish the necessary organ-
frequently referred to are a lack of time and money isational changes if the organisations executive staff
and a general attitude of resignation that one has to are clearly dedicated to coping with this task. The staff
reckon with such threats in project work and that not dealing with security management ought to have
much can be done about it. Often, an increase in secu- enough time and scope for activities concerning this
rity management is also confused with less freedom task. Also, experience has shown that necessary
of action at local level. In contrast, a holistic view of changes are accelerated by incidents the staff of ones
the subject stresses that it is precisely appropriate own organisation have been involved in or by pressure
security management that enables operations to be from outside, e.g. by potential donors. For example,
carried out in dangerous areas in the first place. the EU Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) enquires
In order to be able to establish these issues in an about the security plan of all organisations filing
organisation, the following management instruments project proposals. And in the case of Afghanistan, the
ought to be in place at the head office, tailored to the British government is even going as far as to have the
existing scope an organisation has and to its size: security management of the recipients of funds
checked locally by the embassys security officer.
a forum that corresponding steps can be discussed The United Nations has already introduced its sys-
and planned in tem of minimum operating security standards (MOSS)
a review of the procedures and regulations within covering the fields of security planning, training,
the organisation from the angle of staff security telecommunications and equipment. All locations of
(project planning, staff recruitment and second- assignment are obliged to fulfil these minimum
ment, finance administration, reporting and infor- standards by the 1st January 2003 or to at least submit
mation processing) an implementation plan showing by when the stand-
active involvement of and support by the organisa- ards are going to be fulfilled.
tions management staff
8 Improving security management in an organisation

3.2 Working out a security policy the need of the population and the organisations
tailored to a specific organisation mandate and portfolio
the benefit and the positive impact of an assign-
ment and the existence of a humanitarian
Every organisation ought to define a general security space17
policy for itself in which fundamental values and prin- options to reduce vulnerability to existing risks and
ciples are represented. One statement here could be improve security management in general.
e.g. that the lives of the staff always take precedence
over the protection of material values. This policy Aid organisations are in a position to reduce their
serves the purpose of arriving at a common under- vulnerability by pursuing an appropriate security
standing of the topic, defining a uniform practice of strategy.
action and actively involving the staff in implementing
the objectives. Examples of this are the chapter on
Werte und Prinzipien (values and principles) in the The preferable security strategiy
guidelines of German Agro Action or the section on
Mandate (mandates) in the MSF guidelines. The security of aid organisations must not be con-
Since the size, mandate, working context, activi- ceived and treated in purely military terms, which are
ties, etc. of the various aid organisations differ consid- frequently mainly oriented on equipment, tactics and
erably, no generalised recommendation can be given rules of behaviour. Since the work of aid organisations
here on the contents a policy of this kind should have. differs considerably from that of the military, its prob-
However, it is advisable to cover the following top- lems and options for action in the field of security are
ics: more complex. Generally, it can dispose of three strat-
egies for action. The first one aims at deterrence, the
second at protection and the third at acceptance and
The organisations values recognition.
regarding staff security and risk management A deterrence strategy aims at raising the risk of an
attacker by threatening with counterviolence and in-
What is our mission and vision for activities in the hibiting potential enemies. This includes political or
context of violent conflicts? What is our mandate and economic sanctions as well as the exercising of diplo-
remit, and from what do we deduce the legitimacy of matic pressure. Armed escorts for aid shipments are
our assignment? What has priority in all circumstanc- also an element of this category. While this deterrence
es and in every situation? What is our position on po- strategy is not particularly suitable for aid organi-
litical and ethical or moral challenges that working in sations, it does appear to be indispensable in some
such a context entails? cases. However, the issue of armed protection for
houses, convoys, etc. in particular requires that the
head office clearly orients the staff at local level.18 Even
Striking a balance between the possible risks for if the decision usually has to be taken locally in a con-
the staff and the desired benefit for the population crete situation, clear statements ought to be made for
the benefit of this strategy for ones own activities and
The decision whether an assignment is justified and regulations ought to be in place on how a choice be-
legitimate has to be taken anew in each individual
situation. Here the issue that is always at stake is how
a balance can be achieved between the possible risk 17 This term is frequently used without any exact definition be-
ing given. It is based on the assumption that there has to be
for the staff and the desired benefit for the target a minimum consensus between the conflict parties that hu-
group. In this context, the following questions can be manitarian aid is important and ought to be provided. This
helpful, and should be discussed in a participatory consensus should also include the security of the staff work-
process whenever possible: ing for the humanitarian organisations.
18 OCHA has issued recommendations referring to this in the
framework of the UN Inter-Agency Security Management
the risks the concrete assignment entails and the Network in collaboration with the Inter-Agency Standing
organisations general readiness to take risks Committee: Inter-Agency Security Management Network
2002.
 9

tween conflicting objectives should be made and how Often, there is a considerable discrepancy between
the decision should be documented. how an organisation sees itself and how it is perceived
The second strategy is aimed at ones own protec- by the local population in terms of how well it is
tion and serves the purpose of making a potential at- known, its mandate, its work and, in particular, to
tack more difficult. The possible protective measures what degree it is accepted.
fall into three categories. First of all there is protective Transparency in the criteria for the allocation of
equipment, second organisational rules and provi- aid, continuous communication, how the staff behave
sions and third co-ordination with other actors. Ex- and correct project planning are important elements.
amples are burgler bars, bullet-proof vests, controlled This is why all approaches towards conflict-sensi-
access to offices and housing and other measures tive project planning19 are immediately relevant to se-
making attacks more difficult. Aid organisations curity. An existing source of tension in society may be
almost always use this strategy too, especially as a pro- heated up by the way that aid is distributed or by im-
tection against attacks by criminals. While such a plicit ethical messages, e.g. by giving preference to an
response is understandable, it can result in a reactive ethnic group in recruiting local staff. Thanks to failed
bunker mentality. Dug in behind walls and barbed project planning, they will be perceived as biased, or
wire, one perceives the surroundings as a threat and their operations may interfere with the activities of the
loses contact with the people to the wellbeing of warring parties. Thus they get into the field of fire and
whom one really wishes to contribute. become targets of attacks. This also applies to activi-
This is why aid organisations primarily opt for the ties that are explicitly aimed at resolving conflicts
approach to gain protection by acceptance and recog- peacefully and may therefore be detrimental to the in-
nition among the civilian population in project activi- terests of war-profiteers. But if aid is planned and
ties and in working with the target groups. This strat- implemented with a view to reducing the existing
egy is also referred to as an anthropological approach sources of tension and promoting local capacities for
to security issues, or it is termed as software-oriented, peace, the framework conditions for the project activ-
as opposed to focusing on equipment and technology ities will also frequently improve. And then the staff
(hardware). Involving the people and the local author- of aid organisations can be part of the solution rather
ities in the planning and implementation of measures than part of the conflict.
is to help achieve their feeling responsible for the pro- Since there are always different actors and different
tection of the aid workers. Fear among the population forms of threats in conflict-affected countries, a flex-
of the aid organisations being withdrawn and a loss of ible mixture of the various strategy elements has to be
international support is an important protective ele- found. Regular checks have to be made on whether the
ment. The effectiveness of this strategy was demon- measures taken really correspond to the existing
strated, for example, in the case of the abduction of needs or whether they have to be adapted. Security
staff belonging to a German aid organisation in problems will always arise if the chosen strategy does
Tadzhikistan. However, it is sometimes restricted by not correspond to the existing risks (anymore).
the civilian population being inhibited by the warring
factions by threats of violence who then have to decide
whether they want to be the victims of punitive The local staff and the staff of partner organisations
campaigns or lose aid from outside. Moreover, the
warring parties always have a perception of an aid or- An aid organisations security policy should not be
ganisation differing from that of the people benefiting geared exclusively to the requirements and security
from it. problems of expatriate staff but should also consider
Nevertheless, the civilian population remains an the local staff.
aid organisations most important ally. However, rec- An organisations own local staff or that of partner
ognition of the organisations activities on the part organisations has a different vulnerability to security
of the population cannot simply be presumed but has
to be earned. It is recommendable to again and again
19 E.g. the approach that has become well-known under the
explicitly check the local rate of acceptance when a
headword Do no harm emphasises that aid needs to be de-
project commences and at regular intervals during its signed and implemented in a way that it does not aggravate
implementation. Here, local staff can contribute valu- existing conflicts. Other PCIA methods (peace and conflict
able services as a mediating and communicating body. impact assessment) have the same objective.
10 Improving security management in an organisation

problems owing to its status in society. Since they are of various organisations, including the Arbeiter-
part of the social environment these people enjoy a Samariter-Bund, oblige their employees to be neutral,
certain level of protection, although working for an to observe local law, customs and religion in given
aid organisation means that they are also threatened. countries and explicitly forbid them to bear weap-
While protective measures have already been taken for ons.
expatriate staff in several aid organisations, local staff Security planning at local level includes a risk
are often excluded from such measures. This state of analysis, working out or drafting a security plan
affairs becomes particularly apparent in an evacua- (which also makes provisions for reporting on inci-
tion, although it is not restricted to such an event. And dents), a code of conduct for the staff in everyday
given the general trend towards less foreign and more project activities and guidelines for co-operation with
national staff, this gap is increasingly gaining signifi- other actors.
cance and should therefore be bridged.
In their security policy, organisations should make
clear statements on how far their obligation or readi- Risk analysis
ness to provide for the welfare of their employees
goes, what provisions are made, and where the limits Before a security plan is compiled at local level, a risk
of such provisions are. One of the issues at stake here analysis ought to be conducted in a similar way to the
is whether local staff can also be evacuated, whether assessment of the needs a target group of a planned
wages continue to be paid for a certain period when project has. Here, potential threats are analysed on the
international staff have been withdrawn, what is paid one hand, and on the other, the vulnerability of the in-
in the event of an accident and other aspects. Clearly dividuals working in the project is assessed. A risk
communicated and transparently implemented regu- analysis of this kind follows the equation risk = threat
lations prevent nasty surprises when an emergency x vulnerability. Although the threat itself can only be
occurs. Often enough, security problems only emerge influenced minimally in most cases, aid organisations
through local staff having different expectations re- can reduce their vulnerability by opting for an appro-
garding the organisations conduct or making de- priate security strategy. Local or international staff are
mands that the latter is not prepared to fulfil. vulnerable to certain threats to a varying extent. Age
plays a role, as do nationality and, in several countries,
ethnicity as well as, for example, ones status within
an organisation or the profile of the organisation it-
3.3 Security planning at local level self.
Particular attention ought to be given to differenc-
An organisations security policy, which has been es in vulnerability between men and women. Sexually
worked out at its headquarters, is put into concrete motivated assaults almost exclusively affect women,
terms and regulations at local level. Staff require clear which is why special precautions ought to be taken to
orientations as to how they are to respond to crisis protect female staff in countries in which such threats
situations and who can or has to make what decisions. are very likely to occur. On the other hand, the situa-
Reporting on and analysis of incidents are also impor- tion should not be used as an excuse not to employ any
tant issues that require guidelines. In addition to in- women right from the start. In some countries and
structions for action, the imparting of methods with situations, men are in more jeopardy than women, es-
which the security situation can be assessed and ade- pecially if the attackers main aim is to demonstrate
quate responses to it can be initiated is also recom- their power and strength. And if media coverage is of
mended. In order to avoid disagreement and misun- special importance, for example in the case of an ab-
derstandings, it is helpful if the headquarters makes duction, woman hostages and children are frequently
binding statements in a document for its staff on what released at an early stage to gain a better public im-
its expectations of behaviour are in the country of as- age.
signment and what sanctions will be taken if these The following questions are asked in analysing
rules are not complied with. Explicit statements on threats: Who represents a threat? Why? What are the
this are, for example, contained in the guidelines of possible targets for attacks? How and where could
MSF, IFRC, GOAL, Handicap International Belgium attacks be launched? Checklists can be drawn up for
and Care International. The contracts of employment these considerations, and security levels can be de-
 11

fined to classify certain situations. The UN has a five- ment, this strategy will assume different forms, but it
phase model, while various aid organisations work will be formulated in concrete terms in the security
with four-phase models (e.g. MSF, WVI, Care Interna- plan for the respective country and translated into
tional, Caritas International Afghanistan). Phasing instructions for action to be taken for the staff. One
offers the advantage of a certain degree of standardi- example to be mentioned here is the security plan of
sation of responses and a guarantee that certain pro- Caritas International Afghanistan, which specifies the
visional measures are taken without having to spend general provisions made in the CRS guidelines.
much time on planning and co-ordinating in an acute
situation. Moreover, the events or threat scenarios re-
sulting in a certain phase are defined right from the What a security plan should contain
onset. This prevents staff from gradually getting used
to a deterioration of their situation and only becoming The central element of an organisations security ar-
aware of this when it would have been better to leave chitecture is the definition of responsibilities and
the region or the country when it is already too late. (decision-making) powers. On the one hand, they
The disadvantage of phasing is that the system is ought to be included in the job descriptions for the
rather rigid. Often, the local situation changes very staff, and on the other, the security plan should con-
quickly, and there is not enough time to determine the tain clear statements on the employees authority to
transition from phase x to phase y. Furthermore, there give directions and the duty to comply with instruc-
is a danger that staff may have a false sense of secu- tions.
rity if the country of assignment has been graded The process of compiling a security plan20 is just as
as relatively unproblematic. In these countries too, important as the plan itself. General Eisenhower is
security problems can arise almost overnight, or indi- quoted in this context as having said: A plan is noth-
vidual persons or organisations can become a target ing. Planning is everything. But a security plan will
for certain reasons, even if the general situation only improve an organisations security management
appears to be relatively stable. if it meets certain quality standards and is integrated
So an ongoing monitoring of the surroundings into all aspects of project management. If an organi-
with regard to security issues is always recommend- sation expects its employees whether it be local or
able. As an alternative to the security levels, risk anal- expatriate staff to comply with the plan, they have to
ysis can be adopted as an integral element of day-to- be involved in compiling and updating it. The local
day project management. Gathering information staff in particular has information and insights that
from different sources and continuous dialogue with are of considerable value in correctly assessing the sit-
as many people involved as possible are important uation. Once an initial draft has been completed, the
ways of always ensuring an optimum up-to-date plan should be tested, and it always ought to be up-
assessment of the situation. Information can be dated when the threatening situation or the vulnera-
processed with the aid of a matrix on the horizontal bility of the organisation or the staff has changed.
axis of which the probability of the occurrence of a Most commonly, instructions for action in various
threat is entered while the vertical axis shows the im- situations or threatening scenarios form a key ele-
pact. This matrix can be used to determine how seri- ment of security plans. Depending on an organisa-
ous a risk is. Consideration should subsequently be tions culture of security or the legal situation in its
given to how the risk can be reduced. Is it possible to home country, this will frequently result in these plans
lower the probability of its occurrence? Is it possible degenerating into bulky compendia containing long
to reduce the impact on individual project staff or the lists of what to do or not to do in any conceivable
programme as a whole? Can the predictability of the event. There are serious doubts as to whether the staff
risk be improved? Are there opportunities for the or- a) read these thick books, b) can memorise the count-
ganisation or the staff to reduce the level of exposure less recommendations and c) such shopping lists
to the risk?
On the basis of such a risk analysis, the security
strategy is chosen that is most suited to the concrete
20 InterAction provides its member organisations with an ex-
situation in the project area. As already explained, it cellent, concise summary of the most important aspects in
should be a mix of the different approaches. Depend- compiling a security plan. They can be looked at at
ing on the organisation and the country of assign- www.interaction.org.
12 Improving security management in an organisation

do not tend to result in weariness and an attitude that guidelines called Staying Alive or the WVI manual.
it is all so complicated that I prefer to rely on my own This is what a model for a security plan could look
common sense. Objections of this kind are justified, like: At the beginning, statements are recommenda-
so it ought to be assessed locally what concrete threat- ble on the objective of the plan, the compilation proc-
ening scenarios instructions are given for. Attention ess, implementation and updating as well as on the
should be given to a user-friendly format and layout. circle of people who are to observe it. A second chap-
Good examples of this are the ICRCs handy set of ter could provide background information on the or-
ganisation (mandate, principles, security policy), on
the local situation (political, economic, historical,
Typical table of contents of a security plan:
military, etc.) and on the results of the risk analysis.
The aim of such a chapter is to provide newcomers
Introduction and visitors with an overview of the situation as it is so
Date and author that they can gain a better understanding of the sub-
Objective sequent instructions for action.
Elaboration process Many security plans offer extensive instructions on
Intended users how to act in concrete situations, which are referred
to as standard operating procedures (SOP). These
Background information instructions refer to recurrent events or pre-defined
Mission statement hazard situations. They should always answer the fol-
Context analysis lowing questions: What should be done or not done?
Mandate of the organisation How is a procedure carried out? Who implements it
Risk analysis and together with whom? When and where is it imple-
Security strategy mented (frequency and sequence)?
This is why most security plans contain SOPs on
Standard Operating Procedures the following topics observing the following ques-
Transport of personnel and material tions:
Site security
Communications
Handling money Organisational measures
Incident reporting
Landmines (if applicable) What information has to be available? At which loca-
tions? Who has access, and how is it secured? How is
Contingency Plans it kept up-to-date? What maps or other documents are
Evacuation required? Which forms have to be used?
Medical evacuation
Kidnapping The following is of special importance:
Death of staff
Natural disasters (if applicable) Information regarding passports and visas
(Passport numbers, visa numbers, expiry
Supporting Documents dates)
List of staff, addresses, telephone numbers, Information regarding contact persons
passport details, blood group, family contact (Names and telephone numbers)
details Medical information
List of international organisations, contact per- (blood group, special medication)
sons, contact details including radio frequen- Contact details of doctors, ambulance etc.
cies (Name and telephone numbers)
Resource people (medical personnel, UN Secu-
rity Officer, immigration and travel agencies)
Maps indicating assembly points, evacuation
routes and preferred route
 13

Transporting staff and materials

The following is of special importance:

How are travels outside the location of assignment to Choosing telecommunications

be dealt with? What measures are to be taken regard- (HF-radio, VHF-radio, mobile telephones, satel-
ing the roadworthiness of vehicles? What mainte- lite telephones and email)
nance work is to be carried out before a trip commenc- Setting up the equipement
es? What equipment for emergencies should always (Operational requirements, vulnerability for
be included in the luggage? How is travelling in con- failure and sabotage, prices, maintenance, net-
voys organised and carried out? How is the transport work compatibility, administrative permissions
of materials controlled? What should be observed in and licensing)
the event of an accident? How should one respond to Operating the equipment
traffic checks or roadblocks? (Installation of the base station and mobile
units, power supply, safety)
The following is of special importance:
Training the users
(Technical details, rules and regulations for
Vehicle choice calls, discipline, distress and security calls)
(4-wheel drive: yes or no, label and model, new Regulations on communication
or second-hand cars, own fleet or rental cars) (Tasks and competence, frequence, regulation
Vehicle safety in case of an incident, operating hours)
(Equipment, maintenance, training the person-
nel in repairs) For more extensive information see Brabant 2000, Chapter 17.
Style of driving and behaviour
(Speed limits, seat belts, recruitment and train-
ing of drivers, policy regarding driving at night,
behaviour if causing an accident) Protection of premises
Approaches to passengers
(Policy regarding lifts for armed personnel and Where and how are offices and residences or ware-
the police) houses selected? How are they protected? Who are
Journey planning they guarded by? Where are the emergency exits, and
(Team briefing and debriefing, collection of in- what are the vulnerable points? Who keeps which
formation, maintaining contact with the base keys? What means of communication are there? Who
station) has access, and how is it controlled?
Checkpoints
(Preparations before reaching the checkpoint, The following is of special importance:
behaviour at the checkpoint, policy regarding
handling over documents) Site selection
Convoys (Neighbourhood, proximity to strategic infra-
(Planning, constituting and leading a convoy, structure, compound, landlord)
behaviour and discipline) Physical criteria
(Site, acess and ways out, parking, illumination,
For more extensive information see Brabant 2000, Chapter 8. burgler bars, power supply)
Managing access
(Visitors, keys)
Guarding
Communication (Own guards or security firms, police patrolling,
equipment of the guards, magament of shifts
Who communicates when, how, how often and with and duty)
whom? What means of communication are there?
How are they used? How are staff trained to use them? For more extensive information see Brabant 2000, Chapter 9.
What rules are to be observed regarding the form and
contents of communication? Which rules apply in an
emergency?
14 Improving security management in an organisation

Handling money In parallel to organising staff reporting at local lev-

el on incidents, arrangements should also be made on
How is cash transported and kept? Who has access to who the reports are submitted to at the headquarters.
the cashbox and the safe? Who has been informed How are they analysed, and who should initiate what
about forthcoming money transfers? How can modes subsequent steps if required? A careful analysis of the
of payment be arranged so as to minimise security reports can give valuable clues on how to avoid a sim-
risks? ilar event in future.
In addition to the instructions regarding recurrent
The following is of special importance:
events or procedures it is also recommendable to
make contingency plans for special cases, in particu-
Using different ways of payments lar for the event of an evacuation (for security reasons
(Reducing the use of cash, spreading the risk) or owing to medical problems), for the event of an ab-
Frequency and responsibility duction, a fatality and also for other high and at the
(Reduce the numbers of transfers, just-in-time same time probable risks.
payments, transferring the risk to banks and
contractors)
Discretion and predictability Evacuating staff for security reasons
(Choice of personnel, limiting knowledge,
avoid payment routine) Generally, the problem always exists in the case of an
evacuation or relocation of staff that such a situation
For more extensive information see Brabant 2000, Chapter 11. can only be planned in advance to a limited degree. It
is nevertheless advisable to make some general pre-
liminary considerations in order to at least reduce the
hassle and turmoil of an emergency and create aware-
Reporting ness of various aspects among the staff.
In planning an evacuation, the decision-making
When should a report be written? Who reports how powers have to be settled first of all. Who decides
and to whom? What is reported? Who has access to whether an evacuation should be carried out? If there
this information? What format should the reports are different opinions, is it the view of the headquar-
have? ters that is decisive or the assessment made by the
staff in the country? What is the procedure if staff wish
The following is of special importance:
to leave in advance or want to stay? If it is government
organisations, the authority to give directions among
Type and frequency of reporting the organisation and the German Embassy or the Fed-
(Regular reports and incident reports, format, eral Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
content) ment (BMZ) and the Foreign Office should be referred
Responsibility to in the plan, and the consequences for the staff
(Responsibility for reporting and analysis both should be clarified. In particular, the role and tasks of
locally and in head office, information sharing) the Crisis Response Centre (KRZ) of the German For-
Incident analysis eign Office have to be observed (see Co-operation
(Motive, reason for choosing the victim, conse- with other actors, pp. 16).
quences and follow-up) The decision in favour of or against an evacuation
Information management ought to strike a balance between the threats to the
(Confidentiality, perceived intellingence gath- staff and the benefit of the activities for the population
ering) and other possibilities to minimise risks. Further-
more, the response of other organisations, possible
For more extensive information see Brabant 2000, Chapter 16. recommendations by the German or other govern-
ments to leave the country, the impact of the expatriate
staff s departure on the security of the local staff and
the possibility of returning after an evacuation in
 15

order to carry on the project activities should all be Abduction

considered in the decision.
Various organisations have also developed a phase In the event of a staff member being abducted, a crisis
model for evacuations (e.g. Care, WVI, CRS), while management team ought be appointed immediately
others merely restrict themselves to clarifying the fol- that decides on the following issues: Which official
lowing aspects in advance: Who is evacuated when bodies in the country of assignment and in Germany
and where to? How are the staff contacted? What es- have to be informed? Who should not be informed (for
cape routes are there? Where are the meeting points, the time being)? Who negotiates with whom at what
and what form of transport can be used? What per- level? Where is the information gathered, and how is
sonal data and documents are required? What provi- it processed? How are the next of kin informed and
sions are to be made regarding personal security and cared for? How are press relations dealt with? What
safeguarding of material for the local staff ? What offers are there for a victim of an abduction after the
should be done with equipment, warehouse stores abduction is over?
and office buildings and residences? In such a serious case, the Foreign Office Crisis Re-
Planning these aspects in advance helps to reduce sponse Centre (KRZ) is the most important body to
possible confusion in an emergency and settles right contact in Germany, and as a rule, it assumes control
from the start what the staff can expect of the organi- of the entire crisis management process. So in making
sation in the case of project activities being suspend- preparations, the aid organisations ought to concen-
ed. Provisions for the security of those who are not to trate on what internal organisation policy they wish to
be evacuated must also be considered. This is particu- pursue with regard to the above-mentioned questions
larly important for the local staff in order to avoid mis- and how they wish to regulate decision-making pow-
understandings and disappointment. The fact that it ers.
is almost always only the foreigners and, frequently,
computers and, sometimes, cars that are evacuated
while the local staff are abandoned to their fate is a Fatality
highly sensitive problem. Even if there is probably no
general solution to it and an ethical dilemma will al- Straightforward regulations referring to the following
ways arise, transparency and consistency in treating aspects ought to be in place for the event of a local staff
these issues can contribute considerably to reducing member being killed while working for the organisa-
the severity and volatility of the topic. What is also tion: informing the next of kin and the authorities,
important is discussing these issues while they are paying for funeral costs and compensation payments
still at a hypothetical level. Such difficult aspects can for the bereaved. Here, it is particularly important to
no longer be dealt with and communicated appropri- observe local laws and customs to avoid causing the
ately under strain and at the moment the emergency family additional hardship and, on the other hand,
arises. prevent possible misconduct from turning into a fur-
ther security problem.
In the event of the death of an expatriate team
Evacuating for medical reasons member in the country of assignment, plans are re-
quired for notifying the next of kin, the transfer of the
Here too, the decision-making powers have to be set- mortal remains, sending the belongings of the de-
tled clearly, while the aspect of bearing the costs also ceased person home and, possibly, dealing with insur-
plays a role. It has to be clarified who informs whom ance issues (necessary documents, schedules to be
about evacuation, where staff are evacuated to (to a observed, etc.).
neighbouring country or to Germany), which formal-
ities have to be observed in the country (e.g. landing
permits for the aeroplane), who accompanies the What the organisations expect
journey, what accompanying documents are required of their staffs behaviour
and who receives the evacuees in the target country
and continues to look after them. Setting out from the insight that the security of aid
organisations is not merely a question of equipment
and technology but crucially depends on peoples be-
16 Improving security management in an organisation

Security training of the Alliance 2015 in Kabul / Afghanistan, November 2002

haviour and the way that projects are implemented, in tation and the personal behaviour of the staff on the
addition to regulations on action to be taken in the one hand and the threat scenarios on the other.
event of a concrete threat, expectations also have to be Employees are thus supposed to understand that they
clarified that an organisation has of its staff in its day- have concrete options in everyday life and work to re-
to-day operations. These issues can be covered in a duce their vulnerability to certain threats. Additional
special chapter of the security plan or in a separate important aspects such a document should contain
document that ought to be referred to in the labour include teamwork, each individuals responsibility for
contracts. Some organisations have developed forms his or her security and that of the colleagues and, in
with which employees commit themselves to observ- particular, sensitivity towards other cultures (issues
ing certain regulations, as is the case with the Malteser regarding clothing, alcohol consumption, the status
Foreign Department and Caritas International, or they of religion, relations between men and women).
issue instructions, like the Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Statements on sanctions applied in the case of non-
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) or German Agro compliance with guidelines on behaviour should
Action. either be contained in such a document or directly in
General issues of good project implementation the labour contracts. The disciplinary or legal conse-
(involving the population and the local authorities, quences employees have to reckon with depend on the
transparency and consistency of activities, communi- organisation itself. The consequences that may result
cating with the beneficiaries and groups that do not from breaching regulations once again show the em-
benefit from the project, etc.) ought to be an integral ployees their status in the organisation.
part of project management and be imparted in train-
ing courses rather than by written documents.
The code of conduct staff members have commit- Co-operation with other actors
ted themselves to comply with (e.g. referred to explic-
itly in the documents of Handicap International Bel- In many countries of assignment that aid organisa-
gium and GOAL) aims at promoting an understanding tions operate in, so many actors are often represented
of the relation between the type of project implemen- that neither the civilian population nor the military
 17

can distinguish them from one another. This is why In Afghanistan, a number of NGOs jointly re-
action or failure to act on the part of one organisation cruited an NGO Security Advisor. He is the focal
will almost always have repercussions on others. point for security matters for contacts with the UN
While close co-ordination is already taking place in and plays a coordinating role in the NGO commu-
various fields, it could certainly be intensified and is nity. He informs the organisations, participates in
also of importance from a security angle. The UN ad- security meetings of the UN and the international
dressed this with guidelines early in 2002 that are military force and advises on the development of
aimed at regulating collaboration between UN agen- security plans.
cies and aid organisations.21
With the Office for the Coordination of Humani-
tarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN has created a coordinat-
ing body for issues related to contents, while UNSE- in return contains the obligation to comply with all
COORD (Office of the United Nations Security Coor- UN security regulations.
dinator) deals with security issues.22 The head of the Sharing information on the situation in the country
latter is appointed by the Secretary General and has and on possible incidents is of considerable im-
the task of formulating the UN security policy for all portance for an up-to-date and comprehensive risk
UN agencies and programmes. In each country in analysis. However, it always has to be borne in mind
which UN staff are active, the Security Coordinator ap- that information is frequently second or third-hand,
points a Designated Official (DO) for the topic of se- and that things are often distorted by informers
curity. Often, he or she is the Resident Humanitarian depending on the way they see them. Moreover, an
Coodinator. He or she appoints a security manage- incident that may seem acceptable to one person can
ment team in which the responsible officials of the already represent a harbinger of disaster to another.
various UN agencies operating at local level deal with Frequently, organisations avoid sharing information
security issues. In many countries, UNSECOORD is about incidents they have been involved in for fear of
represented by Field Advisors, sometimes also outside their being partly blamed for the event or its coming
the capital. As a rule, the DO announces weekly secu- about being interpreted as a weakness on their part.
rity meetings of all humanitarian organisations that Organisations that are members of an internation-
above all serve the purpose of sharing information. al network frequently co-operate very closely with
Frequently, the UN also offers its services to aid organ- these partners in a country of assignment. This creates
isations, such as a radio station that is manned round an improvement in the flow of information on a con-
the clock or daily information on whether certain fidential basis and enables resources both human
trunk roads are passable. In the case of non-govern- resources and equipment to be concentrated.
mental organisations, co-operation is on a voluntary In any country in which security problems arise,
basis, but it is urgently advised. To facilitate co-opera- the German Embassy takes precautions. It works out
tion, the UN recommends the designation of a focal crisis plans in which the governmental organisations
point for security issues among the aid organisa- are integrated on a mandatory basis and the non-gov-
tions. ernmental organisations on a voluntary basis. Staff of
An evacuation with the aid of UN aeroplanes will government organisations are accordingly required to
also be co-ordinated by UNSECOORD should the need comply with the Embassys instructions. In particular,
arise. If possible, all foreigners registered at the UN as they have to observe recommendations to leave a
well as non-residential local staff are evacuated. Every country.
organisation ought to take note of the fact that the The German Embassys protective measures may
most up-to-date information on the staff to be evacu- be:
ated is available at the UN. However, only those organ-
isations have a right to be evacuated that have signed a general warning to the people under its custody
a memorandum of understanding with the UN, which issuing protection certificates and protection
badges for houses and road motor vehicles
transmitting news or reports on the security status
in the project region to the Foreign Office
21 United Nations Security Coordinator February 2002. evacuating.
22 For more details on this, see Brabant 2000, Annex 3.
18 Improving security management in an organisation

Contact: form an embassy crisis committee that is in close con-

tact with the KRZ and co-ordinates crisis response
Tel.: +49-30-50 00-29 11 measures at local level.
Fax: +49-30-50 00-44 98 The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation
E-Mail: [email protected] oder and Development monitors the security status in the
[email protected] individual developing countries and projects on the
basis of embassy reports, the representatives of
governmental aid organisations and other suitable in-
formation sources. As soon as there are any signs of
The Foreign Offices Crisis Response Centre (KRZ) the security status deteriorating in a country of assign-
in Berlin can be called on round the clock and is the ment, as in acute cases of tension and crisis, the Min-
contact for emergencies abroad occurring outside istrys crisis committee initiates protective measures
service hours. Its tasks include the early recognition that are binding or, in individual cases, may be recom-
of crises, precautionary measures and crisis manage- mendations in the interest of the security of expatriate
ment. As soon as a critical situation abroad has been staff and their next of kin.
defined as a crisis, overall control of subsequent
handling of the crisis is transferred to the KRZ. In cri-
sis management, the KRZ provides its experience and
personal and technical resources, and it also assumes 3.4 The organisations obligations
a co-ordinating role vis--vis other operational units towards its employees
of the Foreign Office that are consulted in the context.
In order to be able to perform this co-ordinating role, In assignments in countries with security problems,
and in order to ensure that information and decision- the employing organisation has a special obligation to
making routes to the Foreign Offices executive level provide welfare services for its employees. In the
are as short as possible, the KRZ is located at the latter framework of the People in Aid network (The People
level. In a crisis event, a crisis committee is as a rule in Aid Code of Best Practice), the signatory aid organ-
appointed on the secretary of states instructions. It is isations commit themselves in principle 7 to pay par-
the Federal Governments crisis committee at the For- ticular attention to the issue: We take all reasonable
eign Office. It takes all decisions on crisis response in steps to ensure staff security and well-being. We
a swift, unbureaucratic manner and assigns corre- recognize that the work of relief and development
sponding tasks to the individual actors to be dealt with agencies often places great demands on staff in con-
immediately. This crisis committee has a core team of ditions of complexity and risk. We take all reasonable
members comprising the KRZ, the ministers office, steps to ensure the security and well-being of staff and
secretaries of state, the respective country depart- their families.23
ment, and in addition, in the framework of a modular Here, the establishment and continuous updating
concept, other operational units of the Foreign Office of important personal data is referred to in the admin-
and the Federal ministries and subordinate authori- istrative sector. Up-to-date data of every staff member
ties that are required for crisis management, e.g. the such as address, telephone numbers, number, age
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop- and sex of next of kin living in the country, pass and
ment, the Ministry of Defence, the Federal Chancel- visa numbers as well as dates of expiry and contact ad-
lors Office, the Ministry of the Interior, the Federal dresses of next of kin in Germany should be available
Intelligence Service and the Federal Office of Criminal at the headquarters and, if it exists, at the country of-
Investigation. Regarding the staff of aid organisa- fice. In addition, necessary medical information
tions, the crisis committee takes the necessary deci- should be provided (blood group, permanent medica-
sions in co-operation with the Ministry for Economic tion, other important information). If possible, this
Cooperation and Development. The KRZ also seeks should be kept separately and be protected from un-
close contact with the decision-makers of immediate- authorised access.
ly affected organisations in Germany. In the event of a
crisis, these organisations should get in touch with
the committee as early as possible. The embassies al- 23 For the code text, look at www.peopleinaid.org.uk/code/
ways play an important role in crisis management and code13.htm
 19

It is now undisputed among aid organisations that clearly communicate to its staff what equipment they
staff working in crisis situations are subject to special can reckon with. If an organisation requires its staff
stress that may result in security aspects no longer to be available round the clock, it has to provide the
being given adequate consideration or staff being so equipment needed to this end. It is also important to
overworked that their behaviour becomes a security demonstrate sensitivity in handling requests from the
risk. This is why staff in crisis regions ought to be projects regarding new communications equipment
given a regular opportunity to leave their country of since turning down procurements in this field for
assignment for rest and recreation (R&R). The UNs budgetary reasons can frequently result in frustration.
R&R system entitles staff to a weeks special leave eve- Staff at local level can then get the feeling that concern
ry three months. Several aid organisations offer their about security is not taken seriously enough. Once
employees similar options. Staff do not always take again, the treatment of local staff is a difficult and
advantage of this offer since the impression frequent- sensitive aspect. For example, if expatriate staff are
ly arises that it is impossible to interrupt activities. In provided with cars with Codan radios but local staff
such cases, it can be useful for the head office to keep do not even get handheld sets, the impression can eas-
an eye on whether these staff members are still fit for ily arise that peoples lives are valued differently. So
service or whether there are clear signs of a burn-out. here too, a transparent, consistent and well-commu-
In addition to this offer of breaks, some organisations nicated approach is crucial.
provide supervision programmes, i.e. psychological Financial bottlenecks should only play a role in de-
counselling and care during and/or after assignment cisions relating to security aspects in exceptional situ-
to a crisis region. ations. Either a separate budget item should be con-
Insurance cover is of particular importance in cri- tained in an organisations overall budget (economic
sis countries. The recommendations compiled by plan) or a certain percentage of every project budget
VENRO referring to this issue provide an important should be earmarked for this purpose. Wherever it has
orientation.24 It is advisable to check the policies that not yet evolved, an appreciation of the need for such
have been signed on a routine basis twice a year: Are expenditures should be actively promoted among the
the persons referred to the right ones? Are all current donors. Funds of this kind can be used for training
countries of assignment covered? Do exclusory claus- measures and/or equipment. In the case of project
es apply owing to new assignments? In addition to budgets, it ought to be made clear to the donors as
insurance cover for expatriate staff, it ought to be well that this financial effort is the precondition for
checked whether local staff can be insured as well. If the implementation of the project. It is also advisable
this is not possible in Germany, policies on the inter- to adopt references in every application for funding to
national market or at local level can be considered. the degree to which the success of the measure would
Particularly in the case of high-risk assignments, such be jeopardised in the event of security problems and
as mine clearance, sufficient insurance cover ought to the organisation gives priority to staff security. The
be a precondition for the commencement of activities, readiness to spend money on staff security is an indi-
also to protect the organisation against possible high cator that is clearly visible to others of the effort an
claims for damages, the rejection of which could in organisation is making in this field of its human re-
turn result in threats. The organisation should also source management.

24 VENRO 2000, also see Brabant 2000, Annex 6.

20 Further training in security awareness and management

4. Further training in security awareness

and management

I am instructing the senior officials that security information can also be passed on in a very intimate
training and security awareness must be provided to framework and delicate issues can also be addressed.
every staff member. This is the single most effective The disadvantage is that staff members are left to stew
means of minimizing risk. in their own juice and that there is a lack of informa-
tion and experience from other organisations. Here
UN-Secretary General Kofi Annan too, it is recommendable to work in the context of an
NGO network or together with a small number of se-
Training and further training for staff in security lected organisations with which an institutional con-
awareness and management is a central aspect of fidential relationship has been established.
making concrete improvements to the local working It is also important to involve local staff in the
conditions. Not only do the staff acquire know-how running of further training measures. For one thing,
and methods, but they also develop a different aware- this is fair and complies with a caring approach. But
ness of the situation and are more self-confident in it makes sense in terms of transparency and with a
widening their scope of activity. If staff are committed view to complementing perspectives and experience
in their job descriptions to take security measures, as well. For example, a comprehensive risk analysis
conduct analyses, compile security plans, etc., it is can only be carried out in a workshop if various staff
important in recruiting them to settle whether they groups are represented that contribute their perspec-
dispose of the appropriate know-how. If not, they tives, resulting in the different threats and vulnera-
should be given the opportunity to acquire it. bilities of all employees being considered. Some
Before they go abroad, all employees ought to be of- particularly sensitive issues, such as money transfer,
fered the opportunity to take part in security training should not be discussed in a larger group, but for
themselves. Up-to-date information on training meas- other topics, such as reporting an incident, it is of
ures can be provided. Organisations running their crucial importance that everyone is aware of the
own preparatory courses can adopt modules on staff respective regulations.
security in their syllabus. In addition, these courses So far, the range of further training measures has
can also include concrete exercises on how to respond reflected the importance of the topic and the demand
to an attack, etc. However, the exercises should be ap- to be reckoned with neither in terms of its contents
propriately backed up psychologically, and partici- nor of its volume. In the European context, there are
pants should be given due attention. The advantage of two organisations that have specialised in the field of
training during the preparatory period is above all that security training for aid organisation staff: the organ-
it can be fitted into schedules more conveniently and isation RedR in the English-speaking region, and
that the participants are not yet subject to the immedi- Bioforce in the French-speaking region. However, the
ate pressure and stress of an assignment. However, latter only run their courses in France. They are par-
this can also be a disadvantage because the training ticularly suitable for the preparation of missions and
contents will of course then be more abstract and can- focus more strongly on the personal security of the
not be tailored so specifically to the assignment situa- individual. For example, concrete behaviour training
tion the individual will be facing. Training courses run is carried out in role plays. There are different course
during an assignment and specially for the staff work- modules that can also be offered separately for indi-
ing in it can elucidate the concrete conflict and inte- vidual organisations. RedR runs its courses both in
grate the immediate experience of the participants to the United Kingdom and in developing countries,
show how the security management approach can be about two to three times a year in the UK and about
established in the concrete project. four times in conflict countries. RedR has various
For reasons of confidentiality, some organisations modules as well, e.g. for employees who are on a con-
prefer to only have their own staff admitted to a train- crete assignment, for executive staff, for the logistic
ing course. The advantage of this is that very sensitive
 21

field and also training for trainers. As a rule, the cours- is seated in Berlin, prepares people for assignments in
es last three to five days and cost about 400 US $. UN and OSCE missions and also addresses security as-
In Germany, there are hardly any further training pects in its courses. From 2003 on, the Academy for
measures that focus specifically on the topic. But var- Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil
ious courses are run that do at least address certain Defence (AKNZ) also wants to run such courses.
aspects of staff security.25 Elements are contained in For organisations wishing to run their own semi-
Practice-Oriented Training Humanitarian Aid, at the nars, support is being offered by a number of donors.
Association for Development Cooperation (AGEH) The EU Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) has already
and InWent and within individual organisations (Ger- explicitly called for proposals for its grant facility for
man Agro Action, World Vision). And the German courses in field of staff security, and OFDA (Office for
Red Cross offers all those who are interested (also Disaster Assistance, part of USAID) has made a call for
non-staff members) a training course in addition to proposals, too. In the framework of the Co-ordinating
the further training offers of the ICRC or the Red Cross Committee on Humanitarian Aid, the actual demand
Federation. The newly founded Centre for Peace As- for further training should therefore be established
signments (Zentrum fr Friedenseinstze/ZIF), which and financing options should be explored.

5. Summary

The most important recommendations At local level, the following steps ought to be taken
at a glance or the following respective conditions ought to be
created:
At an organisations headquarters, the following settling the allocation of tasks, responsibilities
steps ought to be initiated: and decision-making powers;
working out a general security policy at the carrying out a risk analysis for the field of as-
headquarters; signment;
settling responsibilities and decision-making compiling a security plan;
powers and including them in job descriptions regulations on reporting and analysing inci-
and work routines; dents;
clarifying what behaviour the organisation ex- regulations on collaborating with other actors
pects of its employees; at local level.
establishing what the expatriate and the local
staff may expect of the organisation; To finance security measures:
providing information on or creating access to lobbying activities so that costs in the field of
further training measures; security can be included in the aid agencies
providing financial means for training and project proposals;
equipment. providing budgets for training and equipment,
either in the general budget of the organisation
or as a flat rate of project proposals or as a sep-
arate budget line.

25 See the annual brochure issued by VENRO and titled Quali-

fizierungsangebote in der Humanitren Hilfe as well as the
data bank HATI (Humanitarian Assistance Training Inven-
tory) on training offers in the Reliefweb www.reliefweb.int/
training
22 Annex

Annex

Annex 1: Reference documents Martin, Randolph, NGO Field Security, in: Forced Mi-
gration Review 4, April 1999. (www.nrc.no/global_idp_
survey/FMR/99-4/Martin.htm)

A) Documents and material used Politics and Humaniatarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and
(important documents are in bold print) Dissension, in: Disasters, 2001, Nr. 25, S. 269372.

Bettati, Mario, Protection for non-governmental organi- Sheik, Mani et al., Deaths among humanitarian work-
sations on hazardous duties. Report on the results of a ers, in: British Medical Journal 321, July 2000.
UIA survey, 1999. (www.uia.org/surveys/batreng.htm) (www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/Deaths_
Among_Humanitarian_Workers.pdf )
Brabant, Koenraad van, Operational Security Manage-
ment in Violent Environments A Field Manual for Aid Slim, Hugo, Planning between danger and opportunity:
Agencies, Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN), Over- NGO situation analysis in conflict related emergencies,
seas Development Institute, London 2000. January 1996. (www.jha.ac/Ref/r013.htm)

Brabant, Koenraad van, Mainstreaming Safety and Secu- United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the
rity Management in Aid Agencies. Overseas Develop- Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel, October
ment Institute / Humanitarian Policy Group Briefing 2000. (www. reliefweb.int/library/documents/ SG_Re-
Number 2, March 2001. (www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/ port_A_55_494.htm)
hpgbrief2.pdf ) United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the
Brabant, Koenraad van, Security Training: where are we Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Pro-
now? In: Forced Migration Review 4, April 1999. tection of United Nations Personnel, August 2002.
(www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR04/fmr402.pdf ) United Nations Security Coordinator, Guidelines for UN/
Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter und Runge, Peter (Eds.), Politik NGO/INGO Security Collaboration, February 2002.
oder Hilfe? Neue Herausforderungen fr ein altes Poli-
tikfeld, Mnster 2002.
Greenaway, Sean / Harris, Andrew J., Humanitarian Se-
curity: Challenges and Responses. Paper presented to B) Documents and material
the Forging Peace Conference, Harvard University, used provided by aid organisations
March 1998. (www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/
echoanser.html) Arbeitsgemeinschaft fr Entwicklungshilfe (AGEH),
Wichtige Hinweise fr AGEH-Fachkrfte: Verhalten in
InterAction, The Security of National Staff: Toward Good
Krisenfllen.
Practices, July 2001. (www.interaction.org/iles.cgi/531_
sec_nationals_staff_final_doc.doc) Care International, Safety & Security Handbook.
Inter-Agency Security Management Network, Use of Mil- Caritas International, Security Guidelines Kabul, August
itary or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, Con- 2002.
ference Room Paper 13 (prepared by OCHA), Vienna May
Caritas International, Sicherheitsleitfaden.
2002.
Catholic Relief Services, CRS Personal Security Guide.
King, Dennis, Paying the Ultimate Price: Analysis of the
deaths of humanitarian aid workers (19972001), Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (German Agro Action),
OCHA, January 2002. (www.odihpn.org/report.asp? Sicherheitsleitfaden, Bonn 2002.
ReportID=2454)
GOAL, Goal Security Policy, August 2002.
Kreidler, Corinna, Die gefhrdeten Helfer. Nothilfe
Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit
braucht neue Sicherheitskonzepte, in: Entwicklung +
(GTZ), Merkblatt Nr. 9: Krisenbereitschaft, Spannungs-
Zusammenarbeit 11, November 2001.
und Krisenflle, Eschborn 1998.
(www.dse.dezeitschr/ez1101-3.htm)
 23

Handicap International Belgium, Security Guidelines. Bioforce security training programme:

www.bioforce.asso.fr
Handicap International France, Security Guidelines
Sierra Leone. CINFO training programme on security and stress, pre-
paring for an assignment abraod:
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Stay-
www.cinfo.ch
ing Alive. Safety and Security Guidelines for Humanitarian
Volunteers in Conflict Areas, Geneva 1999. Red Cross information on international humanitarian
law
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Head
www.drk.de/voelkerrecht/index.htm und www.icrc.org
of Delegation Security Package.
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Cres-
cent Societies (IFRC), Basic Security Awareness.
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Cres- Annex 3: Organisations and institutions
cent Societies (IFRC), Security Guidelines. that have been consulted
InterAction, InterAction Security Planning Guidelines.
ADRA
International Rescue Committee, Security Management
Plan Workbook, October 2000. Mdecins du Monde
Mdecins sans Frontires (MSF)
Malteser Hilfsdienst, Work Regulation: Use of Malteser
Vehicles, Kampala 2000. Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund
AT-Verband
Mdecins Sans Frontires, General Security Framework,
Amsterdam 1994. Cap Anamur
CARE Deutschland / CARE International
United Nations, Security in the field: Information for
staff members of the United Nations System, New York Caritas International
1998. Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe
VENRO, Empfehlungen fr den Versicherungsschutz Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
von Auslandsmitarbeitern/innen in der humanitren opment (BMZ)
Hilfe, Bonn 2000. Federal Ministry of Defence
World Vision International, World Vision Security Man- Foreign Office
ual, Geneva 1999. German Agro Action / Deutsche Welthungerhilfe
(DWHH)
German Foreign Office
GOAL Ireland
Annex 2: Internet sources Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ)
Website of the Reliefweb on the safety of staff working
Handicap International
for humanitarian organisations:
www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/civilians/security_ HELP
personnel/index.html InterAction
Website of the Reliefweb on training programmes in the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
emergency aid sector: Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe
www.reliefweb.int/training Malteser Foreign Department / Malteser Auslandsdienst
Bibliography on the topic of staff security: medico international
www.uia.org/surveys/ngohaz/ngosecbi.htm terre des hommes
Website of the Overseas Development Institutes Technisches Hilfswerk (THW)
Humanitarian Practice Network: World Vision Deutschland / World Vision International
www.odihpn.org.uk (WVI)
RedR training programme on security, staff and project
management in humanitarian assignments:
www.redr.org