United Nations

Office of the Special Adviser on Africa

(OSAA)

Government
of the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC)

Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa

Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo
12-14 June 20071

Issue Paper

Linkage between DDR and SSR

Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in
Africa2

This Conference is organized with the generous support of the Governments of Belgium and Sweden

This document was prepared by Alan Bryden, Deputy Head or Research, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces (DCAF), engaged by UN/OSAA.
The opinions contained in this document do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

Table of Contents
1.

Introduction 3

2.

Linking DDR and SSR 5

3.

DDR and SSR: Activities and Actors..... 8

4.

DDR and SSR: the Evolving Policy Discourse......... 11

5.
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6

Key Challenges to Operationalising the DDR-SSR Nexus...... 13

Linking DDR and SSR.. 13
Peace Agreements..... 15
Sequencing.... 18
Local Ownership and Participation.... 20
Capacity and Coordination..... 24
Funding Arrangements... 25

6.

Conclusion & Recommendations

26

Boxes and Tables

Box 1.
Box 2.
Box 3.
Box 4.
Box 5.
Box 6.
Box 7.
Box 8.

Why are DDR and SSR Linked? 6

A Security Governance Approach to Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 7
Local Ownership 8
Broad and Narrow Understandings of SSR.... 10
Outsourcing SSR in Liberia. 15
Comparing Peace Agreements in Sierra Leone and Liberia 17
(Mis)perceptions and DDR in DRC 20
Human Security, Participation and the Transformation of the
South African Security Sector 23

Table 1. Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration 9

Table 2. The Security Sector 11

Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable

Peace in Africa
Alan Bryden

Executive Summary
There is a growing awareness among policy-makers, analysts and practitioners of the
strong interrelationships between different elements of post-conflict peacebuilding and
the consequent need for conceptual clarity as a precondition for coordinated, coherent
and comprehensive interventions. The close links between DDR and SSR have been
acknowledged by experts in both fields. However, more work is needed to understand
and operationalise these linkages.
This paper attempts to map some of the key linkages between DDR and SSR that should
be taken into account in developing policy frameworks as well as approaches to
supporting these activities in a given post-conflict context. In particular, it argues that
supporting security sector governance institutions provides an important,
underacknowledged means to link DDR and SSR concerns. Some of the key challenges
to achieving better synergies in practice between DDR and SSR are identified and related
to post-conflict peacebuilding experience in Africa. Finally, the paper proposes a number
of policy recommendations while pointing to areas where further work is required that
must be grounded in the practical experience of how these issues play out on the ground
in order to more effectively operationalise the linkages between DDR and SSR.
1. Introduction3
Since the end of the Cold War, a steady rise in interventions by the international
community in states emerging from conflict has given increasing prominence to the
significance of post-conflict peacebuilding. The importance of such interventions is
demonstrated by both the positive message that armed conflicts and the numbers of
people killed in them have declined during this period and the more cautionary statistic
that around half of all post-conflict states fall back into political violence within a few
years4. Maximising the potential synergies between linked post-conflict peacebuilding
issues such as DDR and SSR is essential if peace, stability and development are to be
achieved in fragile states.

Alan Bryden is Deputy Head of Research at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
Comments on this paper are most welcome and may be addressed to: [email protected]
3
I am indebted to a number of people for their valuable contributions to earlier drafts of this paper. DCAF
colleagues Megan Bastick, Andr Drr, Adedeji Ebo, Heiner Hnggi, Fairlie Jensen, David Nosworthy
andVincenza Scherrer provided incisive comments as did Michael Brzoska, Head of the Institute for
PeaceResearch and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. Particular thanks also go to Kelvin
Ong,Acting Chief of the DDR Unit, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, DPKO, as well as Paul Eavis, Francis
James and Luc Lafreniere, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, for their very helpful comments
and advice.
4
The Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia (2005), The Human Security Report 2005 (Oxford
University Press).

Africa has suffered disproportionately as a result of such conflicts and so has been the
major theatre of engagement for peacebuilding activities by the United Nations (UN) as
well as a host of other bi- and multilateral actors. It therefore merits special attention in
terms of the benefits to be accrued from improving the record of post-conflict
peacebuilding. In order to understand the relationship between DDR and SSR in Africa it
is essential to draw on experience from a range of different contexts with states in
different phases of their transition from war to peace. Examples highlighted in this paper
include Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone and
South Africa. Some represent mature peacebuilding processes; others remain in the early
stages of this challenge. There is a clear need to draw lessons from such interventions in
order to shape future policy and practice.
In the early 1990s, a major emphasis of peacebuilding activities was directed towards
economic and social reconstruction. The broader and more sensitive task of facilitating
the building of domestic capacities to provide security was often neglected. Security
governance issues such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR),
security sector reform (SSR) and reinforcing the rule of law are now increasingly
recognised as priority peacebuilding tasks. This was highlighted by the Presidential
Statement emerging from the 20 February 2007 Open Debate in the UN Security Council
which stresses the importance that the Security Council recognises the interlinkages
between security sector reform and other important factors of stabilisation and
reconstruction, such as transitional justice, disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation,
reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants, small arms and light weapons
control, as well as gender equality, children and armed conflict and human rights issues5.
There is therefore a growing awareness among policy-makers, analysts and practitioners
of the strong interrelationships between different elements of post-conflict peacebuilding
and the consequent need for conceptual clarity as a precondition for coordinated,
coherent and comprehensive interventions.
From the early 1990s, there has been strong international involvement in and support for
DDR programmes in a wide range of different contexts. More recently, processes such as
the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration6 and, in
particular, the development of the United Nations Integrated Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)7 have sought to learn from this
practical experience in order to better understand challenges, identify good practice, and
make a positive contribution to developing more coherent, effective DDR programmes.
By comparison, although becoming highly visible with actors in a range of different
policy fora, the SSR discourse is relatively young. Its profile has not been matched to
date by significant, sustained experience on the ground from which to distil guidelines for
policy makers and practitioners. Unlike DDR, whose component activities are well
recognised, the SSR agenda is extremely broad and very different understandings exist of
activities and actors caught within it (see Box 4 below). The SIDDR and IDDRS, as well

Statement by the President of the Security Council at the 5632nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 20
February 2007; S/PRST/2007/3 (21 February 2007).
6
Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (2006) Final Report (Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, Sweden).
7
Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (2006) Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards,
(United Nations).

as the new OECDDAC Handbook on Security System Reform8 acknowledge the close
links between DDR and SSR. More work is required to understand and build on these
linkages in ways that are useful for policy makers and practitioners.
There are no miracle solutions for these complex, sensitive and highly political issues that
sit at the nexus between security and development. The purpose of this paper is therefore
both modest and practical. It attempts to map some of the key linkages between DDR and
SSR that should be taken into account in developing policy frameworks as well as
approaches to supporting these activities in a given post-conflict context. The paper then
identifies some of the key challenges to achieving better synergies in practice between
DDR and SSR and relates this to post-conflict peacebuilding experience in Africa.
Finally, the paper proposes a number of policy recommendations while pointing to areas
where further work is required to be derived from assessing at ground level the
practical experience of the UN and other actors in order to more effectively
operationalise the linkages between DDR and SSR.
2. Linking DDR and SSR
Within the framework of post-conflict peacebuilding, strong linkages are particularly
apparent between DDR and SSR because both activities concern the military, the security
sector more broadly, as well as overlapping groups responsible for their management and
oversight. Addressing the needs of former combatants is directly linked to opportunities
to reform (or transform) the security sector both immediately following conflict and as a
contribution to longer term security and development. This is acknowledged in the
Brahimi Report which makes a clear case for the impact of DDR on SSR as an area in
which peacebuilding makes a direct contribution to public security and law and order.9 It
is also a finding of the OECD-DAC Handbook which affirms that the two issues are
often best considered together as part of a comprehensive security and justice
development programe.108 If issues must be understood in terms of how they relate to
each other then this is all the more true for the stakeholders that are (or should) be
involved in these processes. Increased coordination and cooperation are crucial to
operationalising the DDR-SSR nexus on a number of levels:
At the strategic policy level to ensure coherence of actors within the UN system
(or within a donor government/multilateral organisation);
In the interface between headquarters and field operations to provide adequate
support to the latter;
Across the range of external actors operating in a given theatre to ensure effective
mechanisms for effective policy and operational coordination;
Between different strands of a UN field mission (or different parts of a donor
government/multilateral organisation) to ensure coherence across its post-conflict
peacebuilding commitments in a given theatre;
8

OECD DAC (2007) OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform; (OECD DAC). Available online at:
www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/if-ssr
9
United Nations Report of the Panel on Peacekeeping Operations. UN doc. A/55/305.5/2000/809 (2000),
para 42.
10
OECD DAC (2007): p.105.

At the points of interaction between external actors and national authorities to

develop meaningful political and operational coordination.

Box 1

Why are DDR and SSR linked?

DDR and SSR are both recognised as key elements of post-conflict peacebuilding.
DDR has a direct impact on the prospects for SSR since Disarmament and
Demobilisation often conducted before SSR is addressed set the terrain for future
reform efforts by establishing the numbers and nature of the security sector. A
successful DDR programme may also free up much needed resources for SSR.
Decisions on the mandate, structure and composition of security services can impact
on the numbers of personnel that will need to be demobilised and reintegrated into
society. It can also be argued that DDR is SSR to the extent that demobilisation is a
form of defence reform, albeit ad hoc in nature: decisions are often made by former
warring parties and reflect concerns such as rewarding loyalty or removing
troublemakers. This may result in performance improvements (depending on who is
demobilised or retained) but may also run counter to the central goal of developing
effective or accountable armed and security forces loyal to the state and its citizens (as
opposed to the regime in power). If former soldiers are employed in other parts of the
security sector as a reintegration measure, DDR can also contribute directly to SSR.
However, if not done selectively and according to clear criteria, this may only fuel
insecurity if individuals with inappropriate backgrounds and inadequate training are
simply re-deployed within the security sector. Finally, failed reintegration places
significant strain on SSR by increasing the pressure on police, courts and prisons.11
A common feature connecting the UN with other intergovernmental organisations such as
NATO, the OSCE and the EU is the absence of a specific doctrine to underpin SSR and
link it to broader peacebuilding work. The general principles guiding the UNs approach
to DDR are12:

People-centred and rights-based

Flexible
Transparent and accountable
Nationally owned
Integrated
Well planned.

These points could equally apply to an overarching UN approach to SSR, thus offering a
potentially valuable bridge between DDR and SSR in terms of first principles. The
OECD-DAC Handbook would seem to provide such a base-line understanding for SSR;
the EU has said that the DAC guidelines and good practices provide an important basis
for EC engagement in this area in terms of norms, principles and operational guidance.13

For a comprehensive discussion of the linkages between DDR and SSR see: Brzoska, M. Embedding DDR
Programmes in Security Sector Reconstruction; in Bryden, A. and Hnggi, H. (2005) Security Governance in PostConflict Peacebuilding (Lit Verlag: Munster): pp. 95-113.
12 UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the IDDRS, p.4.
13
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform (Brussels, 24 May 2006): p.6.
11

Although in substance there is much to be drawn from the DAC work, it represents a
guide for donors developed by an organisation perceived as an exclusive Western club
and as such is regarded suspiciously by some states from the developing world. The
Security Council debate on SSR was revealing in that it reflected both a widespread
awareness of the need for more holistic approaches that integrate DDR and SSR but also
a suspicion which needs to be addressed that SSR implies the imposition of Western
methods and approaches. As the global body playing a role in peace and security, at a
time of international interventions that are contested to varying degrees, a key challenge
for the UN is to build on existing good practice and better integrate its activities with
those of other actors while preserving this legitimacy.
It is fundamentally important that externally assisted DDR and SSR reflect the realities of
individual post-conflict contexts in their design, implementation and evaluation. Yet, in
practice, both policy-making and operational activities are often conducted in parallel
rather than in ways that promote mutually reinforcing synergies and are not adequately
tailored to highly specific security, political and socio-economic framing conditions.14
There is therefore a compelling argument to identify and better understand the potential
synergies and the countervailing forces that impact on these interrelated but disconnected
activities.
A security governance approach must lie at the heart of efforts to address the challenges
of DDR and SSR because it provides a means to integrate activities and actors, formal
and informal, at international, state and sub-state levels based on common understandings
and core principles. This perspective goes beyond state-centric approaches to emphasise
the human security of individuals and communities as the key criterion for success. In
this regard, due attention must be paid not just to enhancing the performance of security
and justice providers but to national capacities to manage reform processes and to ensure
democratic control and oversight of the security sector by parliaments as well as civil
society. Particular onus must be placed on under-represented groups such as women and
children.
Box 2

A Security Governance Approach to Post-conflict Peacebuilding

Security governance combines two concepts that have evolved significantly in recent
years. Our understanding of security has expanded to comprise political, economic,
societal and environmental as well as military threats. Alongside this securitisation
there is a growing recognition that security issues should be addressed not only at
national and international levels but should focus on the human security concerns of
communities and individuals. The concept of governance has emerged in the context
of globalisation to reflect the fragmentation of political authority among public and
private actors on multiple levels as well as the emergence of formal and informal
cooperative problem solving arrangements. The governance discourse attempts to
understand the multiplicity of actors beyond the state and how they interact. Security
governance thus considers complex governing mechanisms in the broad security field.
A security governance approach therefore allows disparate activities, policies and
programmes to be treated coherently. Security governance is a particularly useful
analytical perspective in the context of post-conflict states characterised by weak
14

Bryden, A. & Hnggi, H., Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector; in Bryden & Hnggi (2005):
pp.34-35.

central authority, as well as the privatisation and internationalisation of the use of

force.
A key yardstick for success in both DDR and SSR is the attention given to the needs and
priorities of local and national actors. Assisting national authorities in building effective,
legitimate and sustainable security institutions is a key element of both immediate
postconflict stabilisation and longer-term recovery and development. Emphasising the
building of national capacities in these areas also offers a means to judge the right time
for a transfer of responsibilities from external to national actors. Ensuring that DDR and
SSR processes take root at local levels is essential to their legitimacy and sustainability.
Local ownership requires that external actors accept and internalise the premise that they
are only facilitators for a peacebuilding process designed, implemented and managed at
the national level. It is the only way to ensure that reforms are grounded in the specific
contexts in which they take place. It is also the key to building trust in sensitive
postconflict contexts.
The principle of local ownership is firmly enshrined in the IDDRS which states that the
primary responsibility for DDR programmes rests with national actors.(G)enuine
national ownership requires the participation of a wide range of state and non-state actors
at the national, regional and local levels.15 Indeed, this principle can be found across the
spectrum of post-conflict peacebuilding activities. Mine action is one other area where
national ownership and responsibility are strongly emphasised; yet, in many cases, the
reality is less impressive than the rhetoric.16
Box 3

Local Ownership17
A genuine commitment to the principle of local ownership in DDR and SSR requires
an approach to policy making and programming that is firmly grounded in local
contexts with external actors facilitating the design, management and implementation
of reforms rather than imposing their own models and expertise. Local ownership is a
process characterised by participation, communication, humility and long-termism. It
requires building the capacities of national and local actors to take responsibility for
their own security and its governance, thus providing a genuine prospect for a
meaningful transfer of responsibility. Local ownership requires a long-term approach
that recognises the need for national will and commitment to societal re-positioning
rather than just institutional change as a precondition for sustainable peace and
development.
In practice, a strong case can also be made in the context of SSR that local ownership is
a rhetorical device than a guide to donor officials.18 In part, this reflects the difficulty
(particularly if underestimated) of applying such an approach at a time when national
capacities are at their weakest and local actors lack both expertise and legitimacy. The
conflicting interests of different domestic constituencies and the presence of spoilers are
United Nations (2006) Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards
(United Nations): p.29.
16 See: Bryden, A. Optimising Mine Action Policies and Practice; in Bryden & Hnggi (2005): pp. 159-184.
17 For a state of the art guide on operationalising the concept of local ownership see: Nathan, L. (2007) No
Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform (University of Birmingham).
18 Scheye, E. & Peake, G. Unknotting Local Ownership, in Ebnother, A. and Fluri, P. (Eds.) After Intervention:
Public Sector Management in Post-Conflict Societies From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership, PfP Consortium
Working Group on SSR (2005): p.240.
15

also particularly relevant. Yet, as with any other part of the peacebuilding agenda, the
challenging framing conditions that shape any post-conflict intervention should not mask
shortcomings in policy and practice that ignore local actors, demonstrate a lack of
flexibility in programmes and their financing, or political agendas and timeframes which
may be inimical to local realities, interests and priorities.
3. DDR and SSR: Activities and Actors
A DDR process aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when
combatants are left without livelihoods and support networks during the vital period
stretching from conflict to peace, recovery and development.19 The official UN
definition of DDR set out in Table 1 below focuses on four stages: disarmament,
demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration.
Table 120
Disarmament
Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition,
explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population.
Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.
Demobilization
Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or
other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of
individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this
purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of
demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called
reinsertion.
Reinsertion
Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the
longerterm process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover
the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances,
food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools.
While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development,
reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can
last up to one year.
Reintegration
Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable
employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open
time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general
development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external
assistance.

By contrast, there is no generally accepted definition of what the security sector

comprises or what security sector reform entails with different actors embracing broader
or narrower understandings of the concept (see Box 4). Nonetheless, there appears to be
some convergence around the definitions put forward by the OECDs Development
Assistance Committee (DAC).21 Donor countries such as the OECD DAC member states
and international organisations such as the EU tend to base their SSR strategies on the
DAC guidelines and definitions. SSR means according to the DAC definition
transforming the security sector/system, which includes all the actors, their roles,
responsibilities and actions working together to manage and operate the system in a
IDDRS Operational Guide p.24.
Note of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the
financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, A/C.5/59/31, 24 May 2005.
21 See, for example, OECD DAC (2007); OECD DAC (2004) Security System Reform and Governance, DAC
Guidelines and Reference Series.
19
20

manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good
governance and thus contributing to a well functioning security framework.22
Box 4

Broad and Narrow Understandings of SSR23

The scope of activities and actors covered by the SSR agenda remains contested.
Narrow understandings reflect state-centric approaches to security, focussing on those
public sector institutions responsible for the provision of external and internal
security, as well as the civilian bodies relevant for their management, oversight and
control. Some narrower interpretations of SSR also include justice institutions in
recognition of the complementary relationship between security and justice. Although
it could be argued that an even narrower understanding of SSR would focus solely on
reform of security forces as well as the applicable power ministries, the absence of
any emphasis on democratic governance means that such activities should not be
termed SSR. Broader understandings of SSR emphasise the influential role of nonstate actors in delivering security and justices services, taking into account further
categories such as customary justice providers, armed non-state actors, private
security companies and civil society.
A broad understanding of SSR is particularly relevant in post-conflict contexts, favouring
a holistic approach that well reflects the complex and fragmented nature of security
governance. This emphasises the need to integrate partial reforms such as defence,
intelligence, police and judicial reform which in the past were generally seen and
conducted as separate efforts. It also links measures aimed at increasing the efficiency
and effectiveness of security forces, to overriding concerns of democratic governance.
And finally, adhering to a broad governance-oriented understanding of SSR
recognises the reality that non-state actors, whether non-statutory security forces or civil
society actors, are highly relevant for security sector reform.
Notwithstanding different understandings of SSR, its purpose creating effective and
accountable security forces in order to improve human security is clearly defined
whereas DDR can be motivated by anything from a desire to downsize as a cost reduction
exercise to forming a central pillar of a peacebuilding strategy. By contrast, in practice
the activities comprising DDR, although context-specific, are relatively standardised
whereas the SSR agenda is exceptionally broad.24 A further distinction is that DDR
programmes have been conducted over a number of years in many countries while SSR is
relatively new and, as already discussed, policy guidelines heavily outweigh lessons
learned drawn from concrete SSR programming.
The scope of DDR and SSR activities is reflected by the key actors that participate in
them. For DDR, once the political decision-making process has been conducted, a
distinction can be made in practice between the predominantly technical defence and
security related expertise involved in the two Ds and the development related
experience directed towards Reintegration-focused activities. Actors involved in SSR
come from a much broader pool of both domestic political actors and specialists in
different parts of the SSR agenda, as set out in Table 2 below:

OECD DAC (2004), p. 20.

See: Hnggi, H. Security Sector Reform; in A Peacebuilding Lexicon (forthcoming, 2007).
24 Brzoska in Bryden & Hnggi (2005): p.96.
22
23

10

Table 225
Core security actors including law enforcement institutions
Armed forces, police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security
services, coast guards, border guards, customs authorities and reserve and local security units.
Security management and oversight bodies
Parliament/legislature and its relevant legislative committees; government/the executive, including
ministries of defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs; national security advisory bodies;
customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies; and civil society actors,
including the media, academia and NGOs.
Justice institutions
Justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; the judiciary (courts and
tribunals); implementation justice services (bailiffs and ushers); other customary and traditional
justice systems; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; etc.
Non-statutory security forces
Liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private security companies; political
party militias.

A focus on security sector governance provides a means to better understand how DDR
and SSR influence each other. Security-related issues in post-conflict contexts cannot be
seen in isolation from each other and promoting democratic governance of the security
sector is a way to address DDR challenges within this broader framework. The two
activities are related in both supply and demand terms. On the supply side, DDR
provides the basis for SSR by shaping the size and nature of the post-conflict security
sector. In this regard, demobilised soldiers often find employment in other areas of the
formal and informal security sector. On the demand side, how DDR is conducted
influences the security situation on the ground and therefore the prospects for SSR.
Differences in concept and practice between DDR and SSR can lead to an artificial
delinking of related issues, creating tensions in policy and programming and thus a loss
of potential synergies.26 This ignores the reality that DDR decision-making, no less than
SSR, is highly political and may have serious consequences for future SSR. While asking
applicants to link DDR funding requests to SSR commitments, the World Bank led
MDRP the largest current post-conflict DDR programme at one time maintained on
its website that the MDRP is not an SSR programme. Yet as Brzoska asks, if that is so,
how has the World Bank arrived at the numbers of ex-combatants to be demobilised, and,
in consequence, to be kept in the armed forces of the African Great Lakes area?27
Security sector governance institutions should therefore be the focus of efforts to link
these activities since they contain stakeholders in both DDR and SSR. These institutions
are well placed, as part of efforts to promote a transparent and participative
decisionmaking process, to address the question of who should be demobilised, how
reintegration should be conducted and what should be the shape and size of the reformed
security sector.

OECD DAC (2005), pp. 20-21.

Brzoska in Bryden & Hnggi (2005): p.97.
27 Brzoska, in Bryden & Hnggi (2005): p.107.
25
26

11

4. DDR and SSR: the Evolving Policy Discourse

The creation of the Peacebuilding Commission in December 2005 as one of the key
decisions emerging from the 2005 World Summit28 represents a recognition by the UN
system of the need to develop more comprehensive, coordinated and coherent approaches
to post-conflict peacebuilding. The intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission, the
Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund are tools geared towards
developing integrated strategies, mobilising predictable and sustained financing as well
as ensuring effective sequencing in the UNs support to post-conflict states. It is too early
to judge the effectiveness of these new mechanisms in achieving their stated objectives.
The first two countries taken up by the Peacebuilding Commission Burundi and Sierra
Leone should provide early clues as to its value-added.
Concrete efforts to ensure more effective UN engagement in these areas has already
been seen in practice. The cumulative experience, lessons learned and good practice
developed within the UN system on DDR has been consolidated into the IDDRS. These
standards, developed in a two year process involving a range of stakeholders, are
intended to provide direction and guidance to those preparing, implementing and
supporting DDR programmes. The IDDRS recognises that DDR should be adequately
linked to other security-related interventions, such as mine action, SALW control and
reduction, and security sector reform.29 The IDDRS therefore acknowledges the DDR
SSR link and highlights some issues that relate to both. However, these linkages are
partial and have not yet been operationalised in the Standards. There is therefore a strong
need to integrate SSR concerns, set within a framework of democratic security sector
governance, in the IDDRS. This work should bring policy and practice closer together by
addressing the need to embed recommendations within institutional policy and practice.
The SSR discourse is currently going through a much needed phase of consolidation in
terms of policy formulation and its relationship to SSR programming. The European
Union has established new policy frameworks for SSR and with the European Advisory
and Assistance Mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo)
launched its first bespoke SSR Mission. The OECD DAC Handbook was developed in
order to translate SSR guidelines into more operational guidance for practitioners.
Leading donor countries, the UN as well as a number of SSR policy specialists and
practitioners have contributed to the development of this handbook which provides
guidance on how to assess, design, support, monitor and evaluate SSR programmes. In
part as a consequence of work in the DAC, bilateral donors are following the lead of the
United Kingdom and improving coordination through developing whole of government
approaches to SSR which seek to align the contributions of the 3 Ds: diplomacy,
development and defence. In 2006, the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supported a study
from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) looking
at SSR in post-conflict peacebuilding as conducted in UN Integrated Missions.30
Political consensus-building on the need for more integrated approaches to DDR and
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/180; Security Council Resolution 1645 (2005).
IDDRS Operational Guide, p.39.
30 The UN Approach to Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Review of Recent Experience
of UN Integrated Missions in SSR Activities. A project conducted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in conjunction with DPKO and UNDP. Funding for the project was
provided by Canada.
28
29

12

SSR has been furthered by Slovakias initiative as a non-permanent Security Council

Member to launch a debate on the UNs role in post-conflict SSR.31 A process beginning
with workshops in Bratislava in July and New York in November and December 2006
culminated in an Open Debate in the Security Council on 20 February 2007 on the UNs
role in supporting post-conflict SSR.32 The call emanating from the Security Council
debate for the Secretary-General to prepare a report on UN approaches to SSR will itself
result in valuable lessons learned for the UN system.
Awareness within the international community of the need to include SSR concerns in
DDR programmes is part of a broader recognition that different elements of the
postconflict peacebuilding agenda should be better linked. An open question at present is
how far a raised profile, coupled with a raft of policy analysis, translates into tangible
achievements on the ground in terms of operationalising these linkages.
5. Key Challenges to Operationalising the DDR-SSR Nexus
This section discusses some of the key issues and challenges identified in the policy
literature that must be addressed in order to better link DDR and SSR concerns.
Although a number of other issues are also relevant, those considered seem to offer the
most promising avenues for influencing policy and practice. Experience drawn from
Africa is used to ground these issues in practical experience. It begins by considering
some of the tensions inherent in linking DDR and SSR before assessing the specific
entry point of peace negotiations. Questions of sequencing are examined before focusing
on the cross-cutting imperative of infusing programmes with local ownership. Finally,
coordination as well as funding issues are discussed.
5.1 Linking DDR and SSR
The international community at least in policy statements pays close attention in
DDR programmes to categories of particular concern for reintegration such as former
child soldiers and female combatants. However, beyond this, parties that negotiate peace
settlements are frequently left to decide on who is demobilised or retained. This can
represent a point of tension between the interests of peacebuilding which might make
the case for former warring parties being best placed to make such judgements and
with SSR which would require certain types of individuals to populate effective and
accountable security services.
As well as focusing on the obligations of security personnel, a security governance-based
approach should also focus on their rights. Ensuring a well managed transition to civilian
status is therefore an SSR goal that exactly mirrors a central DDR priority. As Brzoska
argues, assisting the armed forces and their institutions to play this role can make good
The Slovak Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York has set up a sub-page on its website
documenting this process:
http://www.mzv.sk/servlet/newyorkosn?MT=/App/WCM/ZU/NewYorkOSN/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_62
1F5291AE4A5FD4C125715B004FFE51_EN&OpenDocument=Y&LANG=EN&HM=50aktualtemy&NCH=Y&OB=0&DS=Y&TG=BlankMaster&URL=http://www.mzv.sk/App/WCM/Aktualne
Temy.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_C7C29B5D0679D7F7C125727C002D8E7A

31

Security Council, 5632nd Meeting, The Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Role of the Security
Council in Supporting Security Sector Reform; S/PV.5632.

32

13

sense because it is practical: the soldiers are already well known within the system; it
demonstrates a duty of care and therefore has a positive effect on morale; and, most
importantly, unsuccessful reintegration would have a negative effect on security and the
security sector.33 Existing records held by the armed forces also provide an entry point
for the census and identification programmes necessary to rebuild security governance
institutions.
Reintegrating former soldiers into different parts of the security sector may meet the
needs of both DDR and SSR while building on the existing skills sets of those concerned.
Gender balance and ethnic diversity should underpin such approaches. However, using
former soldiers in policing roles has seen negative results in cases where candidates have
not been properly screened or adequately trained. Problems have included applying
military approaches to policing challenges that require sensitivity and communication
rather than direct force, or employing police officers with a prior history of war crimes.
This is not only unfortunate on an individual level but undermines in the public eye
nascent, reconstructed, security forces as well as the governance institutions responsible
for their oversight. Greater coherence between DDR, SSR and transitional justice is
therefore essential. In particular, vetting conducted as part of a transitional justice process
needs to feed into efforts to integrate former combatants into state military and security
forces. On a related point, having former combatants who have committed war crimes
and/or sexual violence against women and children being released back into their
community for reintegration seriously affects community perceptions of safety, and
undermines the legitimacy of the justice system. DDR therefore needs to be linked with
justice mechanisms that ensure accountability for war crimes and human rights
violations.
The private security sector also offers an avenue for reintegrating former soldiers. In
some cases, private security actors provide security to communities and individuals when
the state is unwilling or unable to fulfill this role. However, private security providers
tend to be subject to even less oversight than state actors so the risks of their contributing
to insecurity may be significant. A merging of public and private roles is perhaps best
exemplified by the sobel (soldier and rebel) phenomenon combining a role in the state
security sector with engagement in criminal activities for profit.34 A telling example of
privatisation and its impact on DDR and SSR is found in South Africa. Although there
are many positives to be drawn from its transformation, the consequences of the postApartheid downsizing and reform of the South African security sector still play out today.
The same resource pool of ex-South African National Defence Force (SANDF) personnel
fuels both private military and security companies and mercenary activities in third
countries.35
If the roles of different security actors have become blurred during conflict then an
important part of the link between DDR and SSR programes is to clearly distinguish
these roles, codify the distinction in legislation, and raise awareness on this issue.36 SSR
considerations in the shape of clear criteria for entry into the security sector should
Brzoska in Bryden & Hnggi (2005): pp. 100-101
Schneckener, U. Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance; in Bryden, A. &
Caparini, M. (Eds.) Private Actors and Security Governance (Lit Verlag): p.27.
35 Taljaard, R. Implementing South Africas Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act in Bryden and
Caparini (2006)pp.167-186.
36 OECD DAC (2007): p.105.
33
34

14

therefore come first in such arrangements. If the requirements of reintegration can be met
then that is a bonus but they should not be a driver of policy. If it is a stated goal to place
former soldiers in other parts of the security sector then this needs to be linked to the
capacity of the security sector to absorb them.37
Box 5

Outsourcing SSR in Liberia

After 14 years of civil war, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),
signed in August 2003, provided an opening for post-conflict peacebuilding that
placed clear emphasis on timely, effective DDR and SSR. Although the United
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was responsible for the DDR process in Liberia,
its responsibility for SSR centres on police reform while a US firm,38 Dyncorp
International, has been contracted to restructure and train the military the first time
in African history that such a task has been given to a private company.39
Significantly, there appears to be little relationship between the DDR process
and the framework for the restructuring of the armed forces. Nor does the
restructuring process reflect broader security sector governance concerns. Size
estimates for the restructured armed forces veered from 6500 (proposed by the
Liberian MOD) to the current figure of 2000 soldiers identified through a US-funded
technical review. The CPA provides explicitly for the reform of the security forces but
does not explicitly demand the reform of oversight institutions, nor does it propose the
development of a coherent national vision of security that will allow for effective
governance of the security sector. Such an approach reflects neither the ownership nor
the input of a wide section of Liberian stakeholders. The Liberian Parliament does not
have any genuine oversight of Dyncorps activities and there is limited civil society
involvement in the reform process, highlighting an inherently asymmetrical
relationship between donors and locals.40 It is therefore unsurprising that these
omissions remain in the current US-funded restructuring programme.
The Governance Reform Commission (GRC), headed by former Liberian
President Amos Sawyer, was created under the CPA to promote good governance in
the public sector. The GRC is seeking to inject local transparency and accountability
into the SSR process in order to ensure as far as possible that decisions on the reform
of the security sector, its management and oversight, are grounded in Liberian
authority and realities. However, fragmented approaches by different actors coupled
with a lack of transparency, oversight and democratic control inherent to the
outsourcing of significant aspects of this process, pose significant challenges to the
legitimacy and sustainability of current SSR efforts. Addressing these deficits is
essential if the security sector is to shake off its historical legacy as a tool for
repression and win the trust of the communities and individuals they are mandated to
protect.
5.2 Peace Agreements

Ginifer, J. (2004) Support for DDR and SSR after Conflicts in Africa: Lessons-Learnt and New Agendas in
Africa, p. 17. Available at: www.upi-fiia.fi/document.php?DOC_ID=166
38 Article VII of the Liberian Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) gives a leading role to the USA in
reforming the Liberian armed forces. The US Government decided to outsource this role to a private company.
39 Ebo, A. The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia; DCAF
Occasional Paper No. 9 (December 2005): p.24.
40 Ebo, A. Liberia Case Study: Outsourcing SSR to Foreign Companies; in Nathan (2007): pp.78-85.
37

15

DDR decisions often form part of peace negotiations. Yet agreements on the numbers and
type of soldiers retained or demobilised that may be beneficial from a peacebuilding
perspective can actually be counter-productive in terms of SSR. It is self-evident that
decisions as to the size and nature of post-conflict security forces are inherently
interestdriven and if left to former warring parties will reflect the need to maintain a
power base and reward allies. But as Brzoska points out, satisfying the security concerns
of former foes is not the only security concern that should inform decision-making even
early in a post-war situation.41 This argues for careful consideration of how DDR
decisions taken in Peace Agreements can and do shape opportunities for SSR.
The immediate pressures of post-conflict stabilisation mean that SSR is often considered
as a later priority that comes after DDR. Indeed, this is of necessity a lengthy and
unpredictable process that will take place well after peace negotiations have concluded.
This argues for flexibility to ensure that agreements do not bind parties too tightly to
unrealistic figures that will later have to be adjusted. Reflecting the DDR-SSR link in
peace agreements can provide a valuable entry point to shape the framework for SSR42
(as opposed to simply enduring the consequences of a laissez-faire approach). The final
report of the SIDDR supports a DDR framework in peace agreements that takes into
account the needs of the future security sector and includes broad participation by
national actors, supported by the international community.43
Broadening the range of actors involved in peace negotiations is one way to invest
negotiations with security governance concerns by enlarging the expertise base of
participants and ensuring that under-represented parts of society are provided with
opportunities to participate and input their views and perspectives. In particular, this
addresses the long-term risks posed by marginalising groups from the peace process. On
one level, this can reduce the risk of politically-marginalised ex-combatants renewing
tensions in order to achieve their aims.44 Giving a prominent role to women, as called for
in UN Security Council Resolution 1325, is one obvious step. But civil society more
broadly as well as lawmakers are also important. Functionally, developing consultation
mechanisms represents a process-based approach to decision-making that is deliberative,
may contribute to taking some heat out of highly sensitive political issues, and will
provide locally generated understandings of security needs that should inform longer
term reform processes. International support for peace processes can include the
provision of impartial security advisers. Drawing such expertise from regional
organisations such as ECOWAS or the African Union has the added benefit of contextual
awareness and legitimacy in the eyes of negotiating parties.45

Box 6

Comparing Peace Agreements in Sierra Leone and Liberia

Brzoska in Bryden & Hnggi (2005): p.98.
OECD DAC (2007): p.101.
43 SIDDR Final Report (2006): p.18.
44 Pouligny, B. The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration Programs; Centre dEtudes et de Recherche Internationales Sciences Po/CNRS, Scretariat
Gnrale de la Dfense Nationale, Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, (September
2004): pp.17-18.
45 OECD DAC (2007): p.102.
41
42

16

The framing conditions in Sierra Leone and Liberia that led to and shaped the
conflicts in both countries also reflect the opportunities and constraints on sustainable
SSR. Both states suffered from internal conflicts during the 1990s between
government forces and armed non-state groups in which civilians bore a particularly
heavy burden. Both also demonstrated the inherently regional nature of conflict in
West Africa with interventions by external political actors as well as combatants as
was the case with former combatants from Liberia being recruited to fight in Cote
dIvoire46. Trafficking in weapons and natural resources as well as massive, conflictdriven migration flows also rendered national borders meaningless. This has posed
particular challenges for DDR with some former combatants in the absence of
effective registration procedures doubledipping between reintegration programmes
within the region in order to accrue their material benefits. Addressing these
challenges through DDR processes that contribute to the development of effective and
accountable armed and security forces was therefore essential to peace negotiations in
both countries.
The peace agreement in Liberia reflects learning from its antecedent in Sierra
Leone.47 The Lom Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999 which provided the basis for
reconstruction in Sierra Leone was limited to the major parties to the civil war (the
Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)). This
resulted in an agreement that narrowly focussed on addressing the needs of the
majority groupings of ex-combatants rather than the broader range of stakeholders
affected by conflict. The sidelining of certain groups of ex-combatants such as the
pro-government Civil Defence Force (CDF) and the Kamajors has fostered
resentment that still lingers.48 By contrast, the August 2003 Accra Peace Agreement
for Liberia was a multi-stakeholder process with civil society and political parties
having a full place at the table as well as being actively represented in the powersharing arrangements. The Lom Agreement included a general amnesty provision for
offenders prompting the UN to withdraw its backing for the agreement while the
Accra Agreement did not, demonstrating an increased awareness of the sensitivity of
this issue. The Accra Agreement also reflected a much more process-based approach
through setting out benchmarks for progress on issues such as DDR, elections, armed
forces reform and institution building.
Fayemi attributes these developments to the Liberian-driven nature of the
peace process and the influential role of ECOWAS as opposed to foreign-brokered
approaches.49 This points to the broader lesson that agreements must be participative
and flexible rather than generic and embody long-term objectives in a process-driven
approach that includes both DDR and SSR. If processes are not steeped in local
contexts nor driven by local actors they are unlikely to shape sustainable
reconstruction outcomes.
Lom Agreement (Sierra Leone, 1999)
1. Signed between GoSL & Revolutionary
United Front.
2. Power sharing agreement between major
parties to conflict 4 Cabinet positions, 4 noncabinet positions to each and Chairmanship of

Accra Agreement (Liberia, 2003)

1. Signed between GoL, LURD, MODEL, Political
Parties & Civil Society representatives.
2. Power sharing agreement 5 cabinet positions
each to GoL, LURD & MODEL and 6 cabinet
positions to political parties and civil society.

Paes, W-C., The Challenges of DDR in Liberia; International Peacekeeping Vol. 12 No. 2 (2005): pp.253-261.
This analysis is based on Fayemi, K. Governing Insecurity in Post-Conflict States: the Case of Sierra Leone
and Liberia; in Bryden, A. and Hnggi, H. Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector (2004): pp.185-188).
48 Ginifer, J. The Challenges of the Security Sector and Security Reform Processes in Democratic Transitions:
The Case of Sierra Leone; Democratisation Vol. 13 No. 5 (December 2006): p.797.
49 Fayemi in Bryden & Hnggi (2004): p.187.
46
47

17

Strategic Minerals Commission to RUF.

3. Elected President continues in office with
vice-presidency to Rebel Leader, Foday
Sankoh.
4. Existing Legislature remains in office.
5. Amnesty provision
6. Sketchy SSR agenda
7. Transitional justice provisions
8. No implementation timetable

3. Elected president replaced with an Independent

Chairman of Transitional Government and no key
position for rebel leaders.
4. New Transitional Legislative Assembly with 76
members with 12 each for the factions and 18 seats to
political parties and civil society.
5. No amnesty provision.
6. Detailed SSR provisions
7. Similar transitional justice provisions
8. Timetable for implementation

5.3 Sequencing
A realistic assessment of political, security and socio-economic framing conditions must
form the basis for decision-making on the nature of DDR and SSR. The UNDP Practice
Note on DDR emphasises that the specific sequencing of activities depends on the
particular circumstances of each country and that careful timing is essential in order to
achieve complementarity.50 Ideally, decisions on DDR should follow a broad-based SSR
assessment process that involves a wide range of national stakeholders facilitated by the
international community in defining their own security needs as a point of departure to
determine the size and nature of the security sector. Developing a national security
strategy can be an important process in helping to define a states security needs and
therefore the type of security sector most suited to it. The development of Sierra Leones
Defence White Paper provides a positive example of such a process. Specific reforms are
framed by a strategic-level appreciation of the countrys security context including
threats, priorities and, in particular, the values that should underpin such a process.51
DDR can also be an entry point for SSR. Given the often highly sensitive nature of SSR,
discussion on demobilisation issues can serve as a catalyst for national-level discussion
in a broader range of security concerns as was the case in DRC (see Box 7).
It is an important sequencing issue to consider how best to achieve mutually reinforcing
efforts across the range of DDR and SSR-related issues. How this plays out in practice is
highly context-specific. Processes may be parallel with little direct relationship between
the two. In some cases DDR provides an entry point for SSR. In others, DDR can be
considered as an integral part of a broader SSR programme. The bottom line is to avoid
situations where efforts in one area have ripple effects that adversely affect broader
peacebuilding. For example, misunderstandings surrounding disarmament measures in
Monrovia led to riots that raised wider security concerns.52 This highlights the potential
dangers of pursuing DDR programmes in isolation from broader SSR concerns. A lack of
explicit awareness in programming between DDR, SSR and transitional justice can lead
to imbalances that, for example, might seem to favour former combatants over other parts
of society. There is therefore a need to share information between efforts that link DDR
and SSR such as using former combatants in other parts of the security sector with
information gathered for prosecutions or truth-telling that details the human rights or war
crimes histories of former combatants. Greater focus on assessment, monitoring and
evaluation of these interrelated activities would be an important way to build synergies
and avoid conflicting approaches. The OECD DAC general criteria for evaluating

UNDP Practice Note: DDR of Ex-combatants. Available at:

www.undp.org/bcpr/whats_new/ddr_practice_note.pdf
51
Available at: www.statehouse-sl.org/policies/defence-white-paper.html
52 OECD DAC (2007): p.108.
50

18

development programmes should offer useful insights for evaluating the relevance,
effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of DDR and SSR programmes.53
This paper has already emphasised the importance of promoting measures to enhance
national capacities for the democratic control and civilian oversight of the security sector
from the earliest stages of post-conflict peacebuilding. The role of legislatures in the
development of security policy and oversight of the security sector is a particular gap in
support for SSR programmes.54 Not only will this build trust through promoting
transparency and accountability, it will enable actors at different levels of society to
contribute to defining their own security needs. The OECD DAC handbook reinforces
this point by stressing that failure to take into account democratic governance of the
security sector may have serious long term effects on the development of the security
sector.55
Sequencing also includes the difficult question of when to hand over responsibility to
local actors. There is no simple answer to this question and it must be based on a careful
consideration of the specific context. However, Rees warns of the tendency in the context
of peace support operations for this to be done too early because SSR is all too often
viewed as part of a peace operations exit strategy rather than an entrance strategy.56 It is
therefore important to understand ownership transfers as a process, with decision-making
based on an assessment of the development of national capacities. This reinforces the
importance of building such capacities as a key focus of donor assistance.

Box 7

OECD (1991) DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance, www.oecd/dac/evaluation; OECD
(1986), Glossary of Terms Used in Evaluation, in Methods and procedures in Aid Evaluation, and OECD (2000), Glossary
of Evaluation and Results Based Management (RBM) Terms.
54 Rees, E., (2006) Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: "Improvisation and Confusion" from
the Field; (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations) p.21.
55 OECD DAC (2007): p.102.
56 Rees (2006): p.10.
53

19

(Mis)perceptions and DDR in DRC

DDR and integration of the different state and non-state armed forces under a unified
command structure have been recognised as key elements of the post-conflict
peacebuilding challenge in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Indeed, DDR
as provided an entry point for SSR. The first multi-partner talks on army restructuring
occurred with the context of DDR (the Comit Technique de Planification et
Coordination) while some of the first documents on SSR in the DRC were drafted
from a DDR starting point.57
Due to resource shortages and other challenges, the ongoing DDR process in DRC has
suffered delays, in particular in implementing reinsertion and reintegration aspects of
the process. This has led to suffering for civilian populations in areas containing excombatants with no legitimate means to support themselves. In some cases, where
reinsertion support has been provided, it has not been appropriate to local conditions.
A report by ActionAid58 describes how focusing on the social and economic
reintegration of ex-combatants has been at the expense of preparing civil society for
their reinsertion. The absence of such measures risks problems including retribution
from civilian populations, non-employment of former combatants and fear among
victims of human rights abuses that perpetrators are being freely released among
them. Women, as a particularly vulnerable group to depradations both during and
after conflict, face significant trauma if unprepared for the reinsertion of excombatants into their communities.
This example illustrates the interconnected nature of DDR and SSR in DRC. It also
highlights the risk of contradiction between a numerically successful DDR
programme that in reality may work counter to the overarching SSR goal of
delivering increased security to individuals and communities. Finally, it demonstrates
the importance of public perception and thus the need for effective communications
strategies in DDR and SSR programmes. In DRC, where the security sector has been
an instrument of repression throughout the countrys history, it is essential to involve
communities in order to ensure engagement, support, and the building of trust in these
processes following the countrys successful elections.

5.4 Local Ownership and Participation

Beyond their specific linkages, DDR and SSR share a tension that is inherent to the
postconflict peacebuilding agenda: the difficult balance between the predominantly
externally assisted nature of such endeavours, and the need to foster local and national
ownership. Achieving such a balance is essential if there is to be a shift from short-term
security to longer-term development involving the timely handover of responsibilities to
national actors. In the context of peace support operations (PSOs), the OECD DAC
Handbook finds that PSOs are most effective at supporting SSR when they do not focus
too narrowly on their own role of service provision. Building the capacity of local
security and justice institutions to play that role is vital for sustainable progress.59 In
reality, the distinction between local and external actors may be an unhelpful one since it
See: UNDP, (2003) Rethinking DDR. MDRP, (2004) Security Sector Reform and DDR.
Mobekk, E. MONUC: DDRRR, DDR, Military and Rule of Law Reform Reducing Violence Against
Women; ActionAid (October 2006).
59 OECD DAC (2007): p.102.
57
58

20

is exactly the interplay of assistance from international actors to national processes

shaped by local contextual appreciation and priorities that will ensure that who is
recruited, how they are trained and where they are deployed contributes to peace and
security rather than its reverse. The IDDRS proposes that a letter of agreement be drafted
jointly by national stakeholders and the UN to outline respective roles and
responsibilities.60 Such a mechanism can be used to hold all sides accountable and may
be a means of operationalising DDR-SSR linkages.
Fundamentally, local ownership must extend beyond central government to include broad
civil society participation at national and local levels. Without underestimating the
difficulties of achieving a degree of consensus, involving local authorities and
communities in planning, implementation and monitoring is the only way to ensure that
programmes respond to local needs. A recent report by International Alert emphasises
that the crucial point is that communities need to be involved in decisions on the
provision of security as they should be on the process of DDR.if communities are not
given the chance to voice their concerns, needs and expectations around the role of the
new security sector then they are unlikely to support or accept the changes and may well
continue to resort to making their own provisions.61 Ultimately, therefore, it is at the
community level that DDR and SSR processes succeed or fail, with a direct bearing on
prospects for SSR. For this reason the Final Report of the SIDDR recommends parallel
DDR programmes that mirror measures in favour of ex-combatants with support for the
communities that receive them.62 The need for locally-driven approaches is therefore
evident. Human security concerns will only be met through effective DDR as part of the
broader goal of providing security and justice to individuals and their communities.
Encouraging dialogue, for example on DDR and transitional justice, is one way to
address local security concerns and inform decision-making on the timing of
disarmament and or reintegration measures.63 It is important to counter perceptions that
DDR processes reward former combatants at the expense of civilian populations or,
worse, have committed crimes against them. Dialogue is also essential if reformed
security forces are to gain acceptance and trust. This calls for public consultation and
information programmes to build support for the DDR process and openly address
concerns of accountability and legitimacy. Field research in Burundi as part of the DCAF
Integrated Missions Study showed that the DDR and SSR programmes have not been the
subject of public information campaigns.64 Such a gap must be addressed in the future to
facilitate the further disarmament of the civilian population as well as to support civil
society oversight of the security sector.
Gender concerns are a key dimension of encouraging more participative approaches to
DDR and SSR. On the one hand, programmes should take into account the special needs
and vulnerabilities of marginalised men, women, boys and girls.65 A specific focus on
IDDRS, Chapter 3.
International Alert (2006) Supporting Security and Development the EUs Value Added (International Alert): p.19.
62 SIDDR Final Report (2006): pp.27-28.
63 OECD DAC (2007): p.105.
64 Banal, L. & Scherrer, V. Recent Experience of UN Integrated Missions in SSR: The Case of Burundi; Draft
Case Study Report, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (February 2007).
65 According to the IDDRS, it is important to distinguish the special requirements of child DDR as an attempt
to prevent or redress a violation of childrens human rights. Child DDR requires that the demobilisation (or
release) of children, especially girls, be actively carried out at all times and that action to prevent child
recruitment should be continuous. IDDRS Module 5.30.
60
61

21

female combatants, supporters and dependants in DDR processes as well as ensuring

equality of opportunities and conditions in the reconstituted security sector is essential
but its omission has been a criticism levelled at some DDR processes such as in Sierra
Leone.66 On the other hand, in Burundi there has been a regular exchange of information
between the gender unit and the DDR/SSR unit of the United Nations Operation in
Burundi (ONUB). This has resulted in concrete activities that have successfully
contributed to the DDR and SSR process. For example, during the DDR process,
ONUBs gender unit, with the support of the United Nations Development Fund for
Women (UNIFEM), planned a workshop on gender issues with the National DDR
Commission to ensure that female ex-combatants in the Assembly Areas were properly
dealt with. Support was also provided to the National Burundian Police whereby two
specific units (Units de Protection de LEnfant et des Mres) were set up in Bujumbura
with dedicated staff trained for treating victims of sexual violence.67 Sensitive
programming also requires better harnessing the capacities of women as a resource base
for building peace.68 Womens groups play a powerful role in peacebuilding and this
should be further developed in contributing to peace agreements, DDR processes as well
as in providing a strong voice in the oversight of the security sector as members of the
executive, legislative and civil society more broadly.
If accusations that local ownership is more rhetoric than reality are to be addressed, it is
wrong-headed to consider the issue in unitary terms without regard to the political
sensitivities of specific reform processes. The nuanced reality is that local actors have
conflicting interests which are not necessarily aligned with those that underpin the DDR
and SSR processes. Spoilers may be opposed to the peace process per se but may also, in
order to safeguard influence and position, work against measures that seem threatening.
Processes must therefore take into account these challenges. In recognising this dilemma,
Scheye and Peake suggest that it may be possible to negotiate a middle ground that
privileges local knowledge, traditions and capacities, and, only when necessary, is
tempered by external intercession.69 Such a middle ground can only be developed
through deconstructing ownership in ways that link DDR and SSR programming to the
realities and limitations of the specific post-conflict settings in which they are situated.
Box 8

Ginifer (2006): p.798.

Banal and Scherrer (2007).
68 IDDRS, Chapter 5.10. p.3.
69 Scheye, E. & Peake, G. Unknotting Local Ownership, in Ebnother, A. and Fluri, P. (Eds.) After Intervention:
Public Sector Management in Post-Conflict Societies From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership, PfP Consortium
Working Group on SSR (2005): p.255.
66
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22

Human Security, Participation and the Transformation of the South African

Security Sector70
After the collapse of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, the African National
Congress (ANC) government that came into power following the countrys first
democratic, fully participative elections in 1994 enacted a paradigm shift in policy
and practice at the national level. Reforming the security sector, as the central
instrument of repression during the Apartheid era, represents a central element of
South Africas transformation from a state embodying regime security as its raison
detre to one founded on the human security of its citizens.
The principles characterising South Africas Defence Review process and the
White Paper that underpinned it included: respect for national and international law;
transparency; subordination to parliament and the executive; political neutrality and
nondiscrimination; promotion of regional and international security; and respect for
the human rights of armed forces personnel. National security was defined as a means
to secure the rights and needs of South Africas people. But of greater significance
than these principles is the process that ensured they were embedded in an MOD and
national defence forces integrated and cohesive at cultural, poitical and organisational
levels.
The South African defence review process began in 1994 and produced a
White Paper (1996), Defence Review (1998) and Defence Act (2002). The process
was marked throughout by a strong commitment to consultation within government
and the security community and, in particular, across a broad range of civil society
actors including NGOs, academics, businesses and communities. The drafting
committee for the development of the White Paper, led by a well-known researcher
and activist, included senior members of the South African National Defence Force
(SANDF) and the civilian Defence Secretariat. Hotly-debated rounds of drafting saw
disputes resolved through discussion and, where necessary, reference to international
expert opinion. The draft revised as a result of public consultations was presented to
the Parliamentary Defence Committee where a commitment to consensus proved
decisive in shaping a final version that secured a delicate balance between technical
realism, constitutionality, core values and priorities. The Defence White Paper
provided a vital launch pad for subsequent elements of the defence review process.
South Africas transformation, which has included both DDR and SSR as core
components, provides a powerful example for other states undergoing or in need of
root and branch reform. This in no way implies a mission accomplished perspective.
The shortcomings in South Africas DDR process are illustrated today by the
numerous violence entrepreneurs working (contrary to South African law) as part of
private military and security companies in areas such as Iraq or by the continued
involvement of former apartheid era security actors in mercenary-related activities.
Moreover, the particular framing conditions, including South Africas relative
economic might, means that the wholly locally-driven nature of the process is
unlikely to be replicated in other African contexts. Yet a process-driven approach,
based on inclusivity, political nonpartisanship, flexibility, transparency and longtermism, provide important guiding principles that are relevant regardless of the
reform context.
70

This section draws heavily on two sources : Nathan, L. (2007) No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local
Ownership of Security Sector Reform, (University of Birmingham); and Williams, R. Human Security and the
Transformation of the South African National Security Environment from 1990-2004, Journal of Security Sector
Management, March 2005 (GFN-SSR, Shrivenham).

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5.5 Capacity and Coordination

UN support for DDR has shown a high level of coordination as demonstrated by the
creation of an Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (IAWG-DDR) as well as the
development of the IDDRS. Joint planning by DPKO and UNDP of missions in Haiti and
Sudan are a further concrete example of increased coordination. However, a recent
inventory of UN peacebuilding capacities identifies that coordination between UN
entities and with external actors in the SSR field is often lacking or carried out in an ad
hoc manner.71 This may be as much due to an absence of political will as to the lack of
coordination measures, thus raising the question of whether coordination on the ground
has improved where such mechanisms exist. A recent decision to establish an InterAgency Working Group on SSR (IAWG-SSR) co-chaired by DPKO and UNDP (now
known as the SSR Task Force) should constitute a first step in providing an overall
strategy for the UN system that makes more coherent its contribution to SSR and links
this more explicitly to related areas.
A pre-condition for effective coordination is that all actors share the same understanding
of DDR and SSR. The relative novelty of the SSR concept and its varying interpretations
represent an obstacle in this respect that argues for commonly applied definitions.
Bringing more clarity at the policy level would have a consequent effect in programming
terms, particularly in avoiding duplication of efforts. In the case of Burundi, regular
meetings between the UN peacekeeping mission and other international actors took place
within the framework of the International Coordination Group for SSR. Moreover, the
DDR/SSR unit of ONUB instituted a system which mapped the SSR activities carried out
by the different international actors engaged on the ground. This mapping was divided
into the categories of support provided by different countries and organisations to the
Police Nationale du Burundi, the Forces de Dfense Nationale, and to the Service
Nationale de Renseignement; and it contained the relevant timelines of support. This was
considered by international stakeholders to have been a very useful tool for the
coordination of SSR in Burundi. However, DDR did not figure explicitly as a category of
support.72 Putting forward one potential coordination measure, the OECD DAC
Handbook suggests that the inclusion of security concerns in post-conflict needs
assessments could improve coordination at the strategic level and in programme
planning.73
The Statement by the President of the Security Council at the February 2007 Open
Debate on SSR encouraged the drafting of a comprehensive report by the UN Secretary
General that, inter alia, should identify core security sector reform functions that the
United Nations system can perform, roles and responsibilities of UN system entities, and
how best to coordinate UN support for security sector reform with national and
international activities in this field, as well as interaction with regional and sub-regional
Inventory: United Nations Peacebuilding Capacities, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, United Nations,
June 2006: p.28.
72 Banal and Scherrer (2007).
73 OECD DAC (2007): p.103.
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actors.74 The UN Peacebuilding Inventory notes that, with few exceptions, the overall
UN capacity in SSR, understood both as support to governance and to the development of
national capacities in core security operational tasks remains limited, when not practically
non-existent, as in the case of specialist defence reform capacity. What capacity exists is
dispersed and poorly coordinated.75 This statement reinforces the point that neither
external actors who support SSR nor national actors who own and implement it have
adequate capacities to address the range of issues on the SSR agenda. It is important not
to try and do everything but to identify gaps in capacity, understand where comparative
advantage lies, and seek complementary approaches with other actors on the ground.
5.6 Funding Arrangements
The UN Secretary-Generals 2006 report on DDR recognises the problems posed by the
absence of adequate, timely and sustained funding. This has frequently resulted in a gap
between disarmament and demobilisation activities on the one hand, which are relatively
easy to fund, plan and implement, and reintegration on the other, which is dependant on
voluntary contributions and on expertise and conditions that are not always present in a
timely manner in a post-conflict environment.76 Different funding streams address the
two Ds and reintegration. Disarmament and demobilisation are met by assessed UN
contributions, predominantly from the peacekeeping assessed budget, while the main
source of reintegration funding is through bilateral channels. The SIDDR emphasises the
importance of assessed funds in covering security-related expenditures that would not be
met through development funding. Yet it suggests that the management of such
contributions exclusively by DPKO precludes opportunities for national ownership.77
Reintegration funding comes from development assistance budgets which may suffer
from slow disbursement. This has created an artificial distinction between different parts
of the DDR process. Ball and Hendrickson concur with one of the findings of the SIDDR
Final Report78 in identifying the growing use of multi-donor trust funds, pooled resource
funds as in the UK and Netherlands and whole of government approaches as a positive
development that demonstrates a growing awareness of the need for coordinating
financing as a key part of overall coordination.79
The OECD-DAC guidelines on official development assistance (ODA) for the
promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries reflect
development donors reluctance to fund armed forces professionalisation by excluding
support for military training, the supply or financing of military equipent or services. An
18-month process ending in 2005 clarified the definition of ODA to include management
of security expenditure, enhancing the role of civil society in the security sector,
supporting legislation to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers, SSR, civilian
peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution activities and measures to curb
small arms and light weapons (SALW).80 A wider spectrum of SSR activities can
United Nations Security Council, (21 February 2007) Statement by the President of the Security Council,
S/PRST/2007/3.
75 The Peacebuilding Inventory (2006): p.22.
76 United Nations, (2006) United Nations Secretary General Report on DDR
77 SIDDR Final Report (2006): p.34.
78 SIDDR Final Report (2006): pp.35-36.
79 Ball, N. and Hendrickson, D. (2005) Review of International Financing Arrangements for Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration. Para 76.Available at:
www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/06/54/02/95d6618c.pdf
80 OECD DAC Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: What Counts as ODA? (2005)
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therefore be funded through ODA than had previously been the case. This is significant
as DDR funding may be more attractive than SSR to some donors because it is more
measurable (numbers of arms handed over, soldiers demobilised etc.). However, donors
that support SSR frequently do so in an ad hoc manner with short budget cycles for
individual projects rather than sustained support for long-term programmes. Addressing
this gap was one of the key arguments behind the development of the OECD DAC
Handbook.81 Effecting change requires a shift in donor thinking that moves away from
achieving more visible outputs to influencing longer-term if less marketable outcomes
that influence prospects for security and development.
From an SSR perspective, funding for the reform and reconstruction of the security sector
represents a significant potential source of political leverage for the international
community since they provide much of the financial support for these activities. Such
measures need to be deployed carefully. Limiting military expenditures under pressure of
losing development assistance has proved a blunt instrument in this regard, leading in
some cases to creative accounting and a lack of transparency in security budgetting. The
World Bank led Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) in
the Great Lakes area asks governments seeking funding to submit a letter demonstrating
how demobilisation is linked to SSR. This is an example of the leverage that can be
applied to link DDR and SSR. However, it has been observed that there appears to have
been very little follow up to the letters of demobilisation policy such that SSR is reduced
to a means of supporting former combatants that have become part of the national armed
forces.rather than as a catalyst for a strategic review of force requirements and
structures which could lead to more appropriately sized, affordable and better-managed
armies.82 Challenging the arguments and figures provided by national governments
would seem to be a vital element of responsible donoring. However, even if observed,
such approaches fail the test of democratic governance since policies drawn up by
governments absent discussion with other stakeholders will be neither realistic nor
legitimate.
Resources provided to support DDR and SSR processes have not in the past been tailored
to the budget limitations of national authorities. The IDDRS reinforces this point by
stressing tht while taking ex-combatants into public service may be an important part of
overall reconciliation and political integration strategies, especially as part of SSR, it can
be sustainable only when economic circumstances allow for the expansion of public
services.83 The OECD DAC Handbook stresses the importance of sustained financial
support if reforms are to be sustainable and that great care should be taken to ensure that
such assistance is eventually assimilated into government budgets and revenue streams so
as to minimise the risk of creating fiscally unsustainable services.84 A commitment to
local ownership in support for DDR and SSR therefore imposes an obligation on donors
to ensure that programmes are sustainable and that financing is accompanied by capacity
building in the institutions that must manage and process such support.

Ministerial Statement, Key Policy and Operational Commitments from the Implementation Framework for
Security System Reform; Signed by OECD DAC Ministers and Heads of Agency, Paris 4 April 207.
82 Ball and Hendrickson (2005): para 74.
83 IDDRS, Chapter 4.30.
84 OECD DAC (2007): p.105.
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6. Conclusion
DDR processes are often judged by the numbers of former combatants that are disarmed,
demobilised and successfully reintegrated. By contrast, there is significant debate on how
to measure success in SSR programmes where the object is understood not just to effect
institutional change but to reform or even transform a dysfunctional relationship between
the security sector, elected authorities and society. Injecting such broader considerations
may seem to muddy the waters in terms of evaluating DDR programmes. But
understanding and operationalising this linkage is essential if the contribution of DDR in
shaping broader security and development outcomes is to be optimised.
The need to understand and operationalise the linkages between DDR and SSR is
increasingly recognised. It forms part of a growing awareness of the imperative to
provide more coherent and coordinated support from the international community across
the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda. Greater clarity on roles and capabilities of
different actors and how they have been deployed in specific contexts is an essential
precursor to meaningful policy frameworks for the UN, but also for other bi-and
multilateral actors engaged in these fields. In order to operationalise such a linkage there
is a need to marry findings drawn from the policy literature with a clear picture of how
engagements have been planned and implemented at headquarters and in the field. These
are highly sensitive and political issues. The size, shape and orientation of the security
sector reflect the interests of local political actors and other interest groups. Focussing on
the security governance dimensions of DDR and SSR can take into account some of these
sensitivities through fostering participation, increasing oversight and building trust.
Supporting security sector governance institutions provides a concrete means to further
these goals. This requires much greater commitment to enhancing national capacities to
manage DDR and SSR processes and to ensure their democratic control and oversight by
parliament and civil society. Participation by under-represented groups increases the
legitimacy of such processes, provides a valuable source of expertise and builds trust in
peacebuilding efforts. This should not be regarded only as a longer term goal but is
equally relevant as part of both immediate post-conflict stabilisation as well as longer
term recovery and development.
This paper has scoped out a number of issues and challenges that surround the DDR/SSR
nexus. Further work, firmly grounded in an analysis of the assessment, design,
implementation and evaluation of specific DDR and SSR interventions, will be necessary
in order to operationalise the crucial linkages between DDR and SSR. In particular, these
issues merit further discussion among the policy makers and practitioners national and
international who are immersed in this work on a day to day basis. The number and
scope of DDR and SSR interventions in Africa make clear that this work is both
necessary and urgent.
The following recommendations are put forward as a contribution to the debate on
linking DDR and SSR:
Recommendations

Concepts count. In particular, conceptual clarity on what constitutes SSR both

within the UN family and across the range of relevant actors will provide a frame

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of reference for coordination. The definitions contained in the OECD Guidelines

on SSR form a useful basis given their emphasis on a comprehensive approach to
security and justice development.

A specific chapter should be developed in the IDDRS to address the DDR-SSR

nexus. This will facilitate the integration of these concerns into institutional policy
and practice. Further consideration should also be given to developing synergies
between other related activities such as mine action, small arms and light weapons
programmes or transitional justice. An increased emphasis on assessment,
monitoring and evaluation of DDR and SSR programmes should be pursued with
the specific goal of facilitating harmonisation and alignment.

It is important to be realistic about the level of coordination that can be achieved

in terms of policy and programming between actors with different roles,
objectives and structures. Better coordination between DDR and SSR
stakeholders at headquarters and in the field can be achieved through mechanisms
that provide for structured information sharing that prioritises a division of labour
based on comparative advantage. At the strategic level, including security
concerns in post-conflict needs assessments may facilitate coordination.
Fundamentally, coordination between international actors involved in DDR and
SSR will be of limited value unless national actors play a central role in these
processes.

Coordination will only be meaningful if appropriate human and material resources

are deployed to implement DDR and SSR programmes. This calls for a multidisciplinary approach that utilises a wide range of skills sets from military and
police professionals to legal, financial management and human resource experts.
If DDR is to make a direct contribution to SSR e.g. through providing a resource
pool for reformed police forces, then expertise in this field needs to be reflected
within the DDR programme. Equally, SSR practitioners need to understand
expertise in DDR processes and their relationships to SSR.

DDR and SSR programes require timely and sustained funding. This has often
been absent in the past with negative consequences for the broader security and
development outcomes that DDR and SSR seek to influence. Slowly disbursed
funding for reintegration frequently causes broader security problems while short
budget cycles and individual project funding for SSR lack the sustainability
necessary to shape outcomes in long term reform processes. The increased use of
multi-donor funding arrangements for DDR and SSR is recommended as a
potentially significant mechanism to address these shortcomings.

Reintegration of former combatants into other parts of the security sector is a

concrete way that DDR can contribute to SSR. This should not be an ad hoc
process based on the preferences of political leaders or individual choice but
should reflect clear SSR-driven criteria. Candidates must be vetted for war crimes
or human rights abuses and tailored training must be provided (e.g. for former
soldiers assuming policing roles). The numbers involved in such processes must
be a reflection of the needs and absorptive capacity of the security sector.

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The international community has significant leverage often not effectively

deployed to influence the shape of peace processes. To integrate DDR and SSR
concerns, strong efforts must be made to ensure that peace agreements reflect the
needs of the future security sector rather than simply the preferences of former
conflict parties. DDR provisions should be flexible and process-based to meet
shifting perceptions of threat and need. Support for the provision of impartial
security advisors, ideally drawn from the same region, is a useful way to support
such processes. Broad participation by national and local stakeholders should be
encouraged to avoid the risk of marginalisation.

DDR and SSR programmes will be best linked if they reflect an expression of
national priorities and will. Local actors need to be intimately involved in DDR
and SSR activities from their inception. The recommendation in the IDDRS that
DDR obligations on all parties be set out in a jointly drafted letter of agreement
should be extended to SSR commitments. Building trust through participative,
transparent processes is key to successful outcomes. Unsustainable Rolls Royce
programmes that are not viable through national financial means and mechanisms
must be avoided.

Programmes must be designed to have a positive impact at the community level.

Giving a voice to local stakeholders will build trust as an enabler for effective
DDR and SSR. Programming must be accompanied by media and
communications strategies that promote transparency and accountability as well
as contributing to the avoidance of potentially dangerous misconceptions.

A security governance approach provides the right optic to link DDR and SSR.
Fostering national capacities in security sector governance institutions provides a
key means of linking DDR and SSR through supporting those best placed to
design and implement these programmes. This area should be a central focus of
donor support. This will promote local ownership and thus sustainability and
legitimacy, creating a process that will lead towards an gradual transfer of
responsibility to local actors.

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