Policy Research in the Context of Diffuse Decision Making

Author(s): Carol H. Weiss

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 53, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1982), pp. 619-639
Published by: Ohio State University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1981522 .
Accessed: 11/10/2012 17:46

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Ohio State University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal
of Higher Education.

http://www.jstor.org
 tE CarolH. Weiss

PolicyResearchin theContextof
DiffuseDecisionMaking

A distinctivecharacteristicof educational policies

in the United States in the past fifteenyears has been the mandate for
evaluation thathas accompanied them. Most major policy initiativesin
education, as in healthand social services, have been attendedby formal
systematicevaluationof theeffectsof thepolicy forits intendedbenefici-
aries. Over all, the federal governmenthas been spendinghundredsof
millionsof dollars annuallyto learn how well humanservice policies are
achieving the ends for which theywere designed.
The upsurgein evaluation activityand expenditureshas a rationalcast.
The presumedpurpose of all thisanalysis is to improvethe effectiveness
of policy. Evaluation, the rhetoricgoes, will identifythe programsand
policies thatare workingwell so thattheycan be expanded, and locate the
programsand policies thatare workingpoorly so thattheycan be termi-
nated or modified. Evaluations that analyze the effectsof component
strategiesof intervention-thatindicatewhichcomponentsof policies are
successful for which types of clientele under which conditions-will
provide the basis for modifyingpolicies and attuningthemto the needs
and life conditionsof the participants.The enterprise,in short,is meant
to use the methods and techniques of social science in the service of
rationalallocation of resources and the improvementof welfarepolicy.
American social scientistsby the thousands have been attractedto
A revisedversionof a paperpresented
at theWorkshopon EducationalResearchand
Public Policy Making,sponsoredby the FoundationforEducationalResearchin the
Netherlands,theHague, May 20-22, 1981.
Carol H. Weissis seniorresearchassociateand seniorlecturer,GraduateSchoolof
Education,HarvardUniversity.
0022-1546/82/1182-0619$01.00/0 ? 1982 Carol H. Weiss
JournalofHigherEducation,1982, Vol. 53, No. 6
620 Journalof HigherEducation

evaluationand associatedpolicystudies.Not onlydo theyfindresearch

fundsavailable for the studyof important and interestingsocial and
economicphenomena, butthesocialconsequencesoftheworkalso look
evaluationresultswillbe putto workto improvethelotofthe
attractive:
needy.Despitereservationsamonga fewsocialscientists aboutbecoming
techniciansforthebureaucratic welfarestate[8, 6], policystudieslook
to combineresearchpracticewithsocial con-
like an ideal opportunity
science.Researchersare able to do good whiletheyare doingwell.

The Uses ofEvaluationand PolicyResearch

Yet bytheearly1970s,afteraboutfiveor six yearsofrelatively large-
scale evaluationand policystudies,it was becomingobviousthatstudy
resultswerenothavingvisibleimpactson policydecisions.Programs that
evaluators hadfoundrelatively ineffective,liketheHead Startpre-school
program, werecontinued-andevenexpanded.Programs thatevaluators
had foundeffective, likedirectfederalloansto low-income collegestu-
dents,werecutback. And muchof thedetailedadvicecontainedin the
"Recommendations"sectionsof policystudyreportssimplywentun-
heeded. Social scientistswho had expectedtheirworkto shape future
government policybecamedisillusioned. Notonlyweretheynot"coun-
selors to the Prince," they were not even influentialadvisorsto the
bureauofvocationaleducation.Giventheirgeneraltendency toturntheir
experiences into "findings,"theybegan to contribute articles to the
scholarly journals about the nonuse and abuse of policy studies. During
the1970stherewas a persistent recitationof thenonutilization tale-the
resistanceof self-serving government agenciesto the lessonsfromre-
search,the ignoranceor inattention of legislators,the wasteof social
science wisdom,and the triumphof bureaucratic routineand special-
interest politics.
Recentinvestigations, however,providea different interpretation of
events.It is truethatcases of immediate and directinfluence ofresearch
findings on specificpolicydecisionsare notfrequent. Examplescan be
found, and may even be but
increasing, they remain relatively uncom-
mon. But to acknowledgethisis notthe same as sayingthatresearch
findings have littleinfluenceon policy.On thecontrary, evidencesug-
gests that evaluation and policy studies have had significant conse-
quences, but not necessarily on discrete provisionsnor in thelinear se-
quencethatsocial scientists expected[19].
Rarelydoes researchsupplyan "answer" thatpolicyactorsemployto
 Policy Research 621

solvea policyproblem.Rather,researchprovidesa background of data,

empiricalgeneralizations, and ideasthat affect the way that policymakers
thinkaboutproblems.It influences theirconceptualization of theissues
withwhichtheydeal; affectsthose facetsof the issue theyconsider
inevitableand unchangeableand those theyperceiveas amenableto
policyaction;widenstherangeof optionsthattheyconsider;and chal-
lengessome taken-for-granted assumptions aboutappropriate goals and
appropriate activities.
Often it helps them make sense of what theyhave
beendoingafterthefact,so thattheycometo understand whichcourses
of actionhave gone by default.Sometimesit makesthemawareof the
over-optimisticgrandiosity of theirobjectivesin lightof themeagerness
of program resources.At timesit helpsthemreconsider entirestrategies
of actionforachievingwantedends (e.g., investment in compensatory
educationas a meansforalteringthe distribution of income).In sum,
policy studies-and social science research more generally-have made
significantcontributions by altering the terms of policy discussion.
Thiskindofindirect conceptualcontribution is noteasyto see. It is not
visibleto thenakedeye. Sometimesit is manifested onlyoverlengthy
periodsof timeand afternumbersof studieshave yieldedconvergent
results.For example,scoresof evaluationsweredone in rehabilitation
programs forprisoninmates,mostof whichconcludedthatcounseling,
education,andassociatedserviceshadlittleeffect inreducing subsequent
recidivism. Correctionalauthorities paidlittleattention, andefforts at in-
prisonrehabilitationwent on relatively unchanged fora long while.How-
ever,theresearchresultspercolatedthrough relevantbureaus,agencies,
and legislativechambers,and in thepastfewyearssignificant changes
havebeenmade.Notonlycorrectional practicebutalso sentencing codes
andjudicialacts have been affected.
The stateof California,forexample,usedto viewcorrectional institu-
tionsas agenciesof rehabilitation. Judges sentenced convicted offenders
to indeterminate termsof imprisonment, leavingthedateof a prisoner's
releaseup to thedecisionof prisonauthorities on thebasis of thepris-
oner'sprogresstowardrehabilitation. In 1976 theCalifornialegislature
gave up on rehabilitation.
officially It changedtheindeterminate sentenc-
inglaw, andprovidedinsteadforrelatively fixedtermsof sentence.The
newlaw beganwitha statement of changeof goals. The preamble,in a
markedshift,statedthatthe purposeof imprisonment is punishment.
Prisonprogramsaimingat rehabilitation continue,althoughmoreand
moreon a voluntary ratherthancompulsory basis [14], butthestatehas
absorbedthelessonsofevaluation.It has scaleddownitsexpectations of
622 Journalof HigherEducation

rehabilitation and shiftedto a different rationaleforincarceration. Re-

searchresultsplayeda largepartin thechange[11].'
In similarways,social scienceresultsandsocialscienceconceptshave
hadeffects in manyfields.It is notusuallya singlefinding ortherecom-
mendationderivedfroma singlestudythatis adoptedin executiveor
legislativeaction(althoughthisoccasionallyhappens).Moreoften,it is
the ideas and generalnotionscomingfromresearchthathave had an
impact.Nor is it usuallytheparticular"decisionmaker"forwhomthe
studywas donewhousesthefindings. Sincefewdecisionsingovernment
are made by a singledecisionmakeror even a smallgroupof decision
makers,and almostno decisionsof sufficient scope to qualifyforthe
of
category policy, this is notthe usual route to influence. Instead,what
seemstohappenis thatgeneralizations andideasfromnumbers ofstudies
comeintocurrency indirectly-through articlesin academic journalsand
journalsofopinion,storiesinthemedia,theadviceofconsultants, lobby-
ingby special interestgroups, conversation of colleagues, attendance at
conferences or training programs, and other uncatalogued sources. Ideas
fromresearchare pickedup in diverseways and percolatethrough to
officeholders in manyofficeswho deal withtheissues.
As theideas fromresearchfilter through, officialstestthemagainstthe
standards oftheirownknowledgeandjudgment.Theydo notuncritically
accepteveryset of conclusionstheyhearabout,eveniftheconclusions
beartheimprimatur of social science.Theyhavemanysourcesof infor-
mationotherthansocial science,ranging fromtheirownfirsthand experi-
ence to systematic and unsystematic reports from the field.The extentto
whichtheyaccepta researchidea, or giveitat leastprovisional hearing,
dependson thedegreetowhichitresonateswiththeirpriorknowledge.If
it "makes sense," ifit helpsto organizeand makesenseof theirearlier
knowledgeand impressions, theytendto incorporate itintotheirstockof
knowledge[20].
This prevalent processof mergingresearchresultswithothersources
ofinformation and ideashas twocuriousconsequences.First,themerger
oftengivesresearchresultsextraleverageas theyshapeofficials'under-
standingof issues. Because researchprovidespowerfullabels forpre-
viouslyinchoateand unorganized experience,it helpsto moldofficials'
thinking intocategoriesderivedfromsocial science.Thinkofthepolicy
effects ofsuchcategory labelsas "exteralities," "aptitudetestscores,"

theevaluationstudiesthatprovidedmuch
continuetodebatewhether
ISocial scientists
of theimpetusforthechangewerevalidenoughto supporttheconclusionthatin prison
programs"nothingworks."
 Policy Research 623

"deinstitutionalization," "whiteflight,"and "'intergenerational depen-

dency."
Second,because social scienceis mergedwithotherknowledge,offi-
cials arelargelyunawareofwhenandhowtheyuse research.An investi-
gatorgoingoutto studytheuses ofpolicyresearchquicklyfindsoutthat
respondents have greatdifficulty disentangling the lessons theyhave
learnedfromresearchfromtheirwholeconfiguration ofknowledge.They
do not catalogresearchseparately;theydo notremember sourcesand
citations.Withthebestwillintheworld,all theycan usuallysayis thatin
thecourseof theirworktheyhear abouta greatdeal of researchand
they'resureit affectswhattheythinkand do. Theycan't give specific
illustrationsof theiruse of a specificstudy,becausethatis nothowthey
work[3, 18].
So if recentinvestigations of theconsequencesof researchforpolicy
leave us withgreaterrespectfortheinfluence of research,theinfluence
appearsto lie in affecting theshapeandcontent ofpolicydiscourserather
thanconcretechoices. The natureof the effecthas been called "en-
lightenment" [10, 4]. Researchmodifiesthedefinition of problemsthat
policymakersaddress,how theythinkaboutthem,whichoptionsthey
discardand whichtheypursue,and how theyconceptualizetheirpur-
poses. Forthosewhohad hopedforgreaterdirectinfluence on policy,it
is a limitedvictory.
ElsewhereI havenotedthatevenin theprovisionally optimistic imag-
eryof enlightenment, therelurksome dangers.For one thing,there-
searchthatpolicyactorshearaboutandcometo acceptis notnecessarily
thebest,mostcomprehensive, or mostup-to-date research.Sometimes
they become aware of shoddystudies, outmoded ideas, and biasedfind-
ings.No qualitycontrolmechanisms screenthegood and relevantfrom
thepartialand sensational.The phenomenon thathas beendiscussedas
enlightenment may turn out to be, in fact,"endarkenment" [19].
Another limitation is thatforall thepotential powerof shiftsin policy
makers'awarenessand attention, thinking differentlyis notthesameas
acting differently. While changed discourse is likely to result-
eventually-innew modes of action,the processmay be agonizingly
slow and inexact.The policyactionthatfinallyemergescannotbe ex-
pectedto correspond closelywiththepreferred stateenvisionedby the
social scientist.
So muchis prologue.The questionto whichI'd liketo turnis whythe
use of evaluationand othersocial scienceresearchgoes throughsuch
tortuous processes.Whyisn't theremoreimmediateand directuse of
researchresultsin themakingof policy?Giventhefactthatgovernment
624 Journalof HigherEducation

agencies responsiblefor particularpolicies sponsorstudieswiththe

avowedintentof improving thosepolicies,howcometheydon'tputthe
resultsto use directly?
Obviouslythe answersto this questionare multipleand complex.
Some of themhave to do withthe inconclusiveness of the research.
Many,probablymost,studiesarefragileguidesto action,eitherbecause
of limitationsin theresearch, or the ambiguousnatureof thefindings,
or-often mostserious-the problematic relationshipbetweenthefind-
ingsandanyclear-cut policyrecommendations. To move fromdataabout
whatis to recommendations aboutwhatshouldbe (andhowto getthere)
usuallyrequires an extensiveleap. Researchers who have done a pain-
fullycareful evaluation study have been known to throwcautionto the
windswhentheycome to drawingimplications foractionand leap to
unanalyzed,untested, and perhapsunworkable recommendations. Other
reasonsforthelack of immediate adoptionhaveto do withthenatureof
government agencies(e.g., theirlimitedrepertoire of availablepolicy
responses) and the of
imperative policy decisions(e.g., theoverriding
needto reconcilediverseinterests as wellas toreach"right"decisions).
Butone important reasonhas receivedlittleattention,anditis thisreason
that I want to talk about-the natureof political decision-making
processes.

TheNatureofPolicyDecisionMaking
Boththepopularand theacademic literature picturedecisionmaking
as an event;a groupofauthorizeddecisionmakersassembleat particular
timesandplaces,theyreviewa problem(oropportunity), theyconsidera
number ofalternative
coursesofactionwithmoreorlessexplicitcalcula-
tionof theadvantagesand disadvantages of each option,theyweighthe
alternatives or
againsttheirgoals preferences, and thentheyselectan
alternative
thatseemswell suitedforachievingtheirpurposes.The result
is a decision.2
Thereare fivemajorconstructs in thisimageryof decisionmaking.
The firstis boundedness.Decisionmakingis, in effect,setofffromthe

2Therewas a timewhenthe characterization of decisionmakingwas considerably

crisperthanthis.In whatis commonly referredtoas therationalmodel,severaladditional
assumptions were made (e.g., explicitgoals consensuallyweighted,generation of all
explicitcalculationof all costsand benefitsforeach option,and
possiblealternatives,
selectionof the optimaloption). Scholarsfromthe severaldisciplinesengagedwith
decisionmakinghavebeenchippingawayattheformulation inlight
forovera generation
behavior.The statement
of actualorganizational above is whatgenerallyremains.
 Policy Research 625

ongoingstreamof organizational activity.It involvesa discreteset of

actorswho occupyauthoritative positions,peoplewho are officially re-
sponsible for,and empowered to make, decisions for the organization.
Decisionmakingis boundedin time,takingplace overa relatively short
period.It is usuallyboundedin location, with the relevant actors in
contactwitheach other,or able to be in contactwitheach other,to
negotiatethedecision.The customary conceptualization ofdecisionmak-
ing thus has much in common with the three unities of Greekdrama.
A second constructis purposiveness.It is commonlyassumedthat
decisionmakershave relatively clear goals in view; theywantto bring
about a desiredend-stateor avoid an undesiredstate.Since Simon's
seminalwork[17], ithas becomeacceptedthatdecisionmakersdo nottry
to optimizedecisions,butrather"satisfice" (i.e., settleforsomething
"good enough"). Nevertheless, theyare expectedto have overtcriteria
forwhatis good enoughand to seek a decisionthatpromisesprogress
towardattaining theirpurposes.
The thirdconstruct is calculation.Decision makersare expectedto
generate(or have generatedforthem)a set of alternatives. In thepast
decades,scholarshave recognizedthatno comprehensive setof alterna-
tivesis developed;limitson humanabilitiesof cognitiveprocessing pre-
cludea completecanvassof options.But in thegoingimagery, decision
makersconsiderthecosts and benefitsof a varietyof responses.Their
calculationwilloftenbe informal and intuitive rather thansystematic, as
theyproceed on the basis of experience, informed judgment, or gut
feeling.Theirgoals need notrepresent onlyproperly respectable public
objectives,butwillusuallyincludesuchunexpressed aimsas bureaucrat-
ic advantage,careerinterests, and thefurtherance of electoralchances.
Buthowevermixedtheobjectivesand howeverinformal theassessment
procedures may be, it is assumed thatdecision makers weightherelative
advantagesof several alternatives against their goals and theirformula-
tionof desiredend-states.The alternative thatregistersan acceptable
balanceofcostsandbenefits willbe selected.Scholarshaveloweredtheir
expectationsfortherationality of thecalculusemployed,and theyhave
tempered their of
assumptions systematic and methodical assessmentof
buttheyretainbeliefthata process
trade-offs, of calculation takesplace.
Fourth,implicitin theconceptof decisionmakingis a construct of
perceivedsignificance. A decision marks a step of some moment. People
who makethedecisionperceivethe act as consequential(i.e., having
consequences).Whenthedecisioninvolves"policy," whichever of the
manymeanings areinvestedintheterm"policy" [9], theconnotations of
far-reachingimportance are underscored, and a "policy decision" is
626 Journalof HigherEducation

doublyendowedwithintimations of significance.
People who makea
policy decision are viewed as aware
self-consciously of registering
a
decisivecommitment to an important courseof action.Scholarshave
notedthatsome decisionsinvolvea choice to do nothing,to leave the
unchanged(e.g., [2]). Yet evenwhenthisis thecase, thechoice
situation
is expectedto representa matterof consequenceto thosewhomakethe
decision.
Finally,thereis an assumption of sequentialorder.The sequenceis
regardedas beginning withrecognition of a problem.It proceedsto the
development and consideration of alternativemeansforcopingwiththe
problem,3 goes next to assessment of therelativeadvantages ofthealter-
natives,and ends withselectionof a decision.
These fiveconstructs-boundedness, purposiveness,calculation,per-
ceivedsignificance, and sequentialorder-underliemostimagesofdeci-
sionmaking.Andtheycaptureessentialelements ofmuchofthedecision
on and
makingthatgoes at bureau,division, department levels,inexecu-
tiveagenciesand legislatures, and in privateand publicorganizations.
Allison's[1] accountofthe"essenceofdecision"byPresident Kennedy
andhis smallgroupofadvisersconsidering theAmericanresponseto the
Cubanmissilecrisisis an archetypical decisionof thiskind.Similarly, a
universitydecidingwhether or notto constructa newbuilding,theU.S.
Congressdebatingpassage oftax-cutting an executiveagency
legislation,
for in
developingproposals change eligibility requirements forfederal
aid-all go througha processthatmay be well represented by these
constructs.
Yet manypolicydecisionsemergethrough processesthatbear little
relationshipto these descriptors.Much decision makingdiffers fromthe
modelbecauseone ormoreofthefivecharacteristics
traditional is low or
even absent. Policies, even policies of fatefulmagnitude,oftentake
shapethrough jumbledanddiffuse processesthatdifferinvitalwaysfrom
theconventional imagery.
Government is a continuousbustleof activity,withpeople in many
officesbumpingup againstproblems,new conditions, discrepant rules,
unprecedented requestsforservice,and thepromulgations of otherof-
fices.In copingwiththeirdailywork,peoplein manyplacestakesmall
3Despitetheubiquityof thephrase"problemsolving,"mostpeopleunderstand that
current-daygovernment problemsarerarely"solved" once and forall, or evenforlong
periodsof time.Any solutionis temporary, as likelyto generatenew problemsas to
removethecondition thatitis intendedto solve. Andmanyproblems,suchas poverty or
oil resources,areso deep-rooted
insufficient andintractablethatgovernment actioncan at
bestmake modestinroads.Therefore, I have selectedthe word "coping" ratherthan
"solving" to characterizethekindsof alternatives thatofficialsconsider.
 Policy Research 627

steps,withoutconsciousawarenessthattheiractionsare pushingpolicy
downcertainpathsand foreclosing otherresponses.Theydo notneces-
sarilyperceivethemselves as making-oreveninfluencing-policy, but
theirmanysmall steps (writingpositionpapers,drafting regulations,
answeringinquiries,makingplans,releasingnewsbulletins)mayfuse,
coalesce, and harden.Overtime,thecongeriesof smallactscan setthe
direction,and the limits,of governmentpolicy.Only in retrospect do
peoplebecomeawarethatpolicywas made.
Whilethepeoplewhoengagein incremental adaptationsarenotneces-
sarilyconscious of in
participating policymaking, officials
at the top
echelonmaybe equallyconvincedthattheyare notmakingdecisions.
Fromthe top, it oftenlooks as thoughtheyare presentedwitha fait
accompli. Accommodationshave been reached and a decision negotiated
bypeopleinthewarrenofofficesbelow,andtheyhavelittleoptionbutto
acceptit. Onlyrarely,andwiththeexpenditure ofa considerableamount
of theirpoliticalcapital,can theychangeor rejecttheadvice theyare
offered.To them,thejob oftenlooks like rubberstampingdecisions
alreadymade.
Even in legislatures, locusofdecisionmaking,indi-
thequintessential
viduallegislators have limitedoptions.In theUnitedStates,committees
receivedraftsof complexlegislativebills fromtheexecutiveagencies.
Committee staffsmayidentify controversialpointsin thelightoflegisla-
tors' generalpreferences and workout accommodations withagency
staffs.Fromtimeto time,particularly interested and influential
legisla-
torsgetparticular provisionsadded,amended,or deleted.Butwhenthe
lengthy bills come up forvote,no individuallegislatorcan be familiar
withmorethana handfulof provisions.By and large,he or she must
eithervoteagainsttheentirebill or acceptit. To theparticipants, their
own influenceon policyoftenlooks marginal.
Giventhefragmentation of authorityacrossmultiplebureaus,depart-
ments, and legislativecommittees, the disjointedstagesby which
and
actionscoalesce intodecisions,thetraditional modelof decisionmaking
is a highlystylizedrendition of reality.Identificationof any clear-cut
group of decision makers can be difficult.(Sometimes a middle-level
bureaucrat has takenthekeyaction,although unawarethattheactionwas
goingto be-or was-decisive.) The goals of policyare oftenequally
diffuse, exceptin termsof "takingcareof" someundesirable situation.
Whichoptionsare considered,and whichsetsof advantagesand disad-
vantagesareassessed,maybe impossibleto tellin theinteractive, multi-
participative, diffuse of
processes formulating policy.The complexity of
government policymakingoftendefiesneatcompartmentalization.
628 Journalof HigherEducation

Routesto Policy
Alternative

Yet policiesdo get made. If governmentoftenproceedsto decisions

withoutbounded,purposeful, acts
sequential of perceivedsignificance,
howdo decisionsemerge?Some oftheundirected appearto be
strategies
these:

a. Relianceon customand implicit rules.Officialsdo whattheagency

has traditionallydone. Even if a situationis unprecedented, offi-
cials mayinterpret itto fallwithincustomary procedures. In doing
so, theyin effectmakenew policyby subsuming thenovelcon-
tingency withina familiarrubric.
b. Improvisation. Anothertacticis to improvise.Confronted withan
unanticipatedsituation,officialsmay exercise theiringenuity,
stretching a pointhere,combining a fewtriedand trueprocedures
there,addinga dashofnovelty,muchlikea chefconcocting a new
recipe.Throughimpromptu an
accommodation, agencymaybegin
to fashionnew policy.
c. Mutualadjustment. As Lindblom[12] has indicated,officeholders
wholack anysenseofcommonpurpose("partisans,"inhis term)
mayreachdecisionsby simplyadaptingto decisionsmadearound
them.Ifone officehas invokedconvention ormadeimprovisations,
otherofficescan adjust theiractions to accommodateto the
situation.
d. Accretion.Once officialshave extemporized underthe press of
or
events, adapted to actionstaken in otheroffices,theymayrepeat
the procedureswhen similar-or even not so similar-situations
recur.The firstresponsesprovidea precedent, and iftheyseemto
work,theywill be followedagain. Over time,whennumbersof
cases have been handledin likefashion,or whenseveraldifferent
contingencies have been adoptedto deal withan arrayof excep-
tionalcircumstances, theymay coalesce and rigidify. Like skel-
etonsof millionsof tinysea creatures buildingup into giantcoral
reefs, theresult can become fixed.
e. Negotiation. Whenauthority is fragmented andagencieshaveover-
lappingand discrepant mandates,overtconflicts mayarise.Many
aresettledbydirectnegotiation amongtheinterested units.Threats
and promises,discussionand debateon the issues, trade-offs of
advantage and obligation-these are the of
currency bargaining.
The aimis less toreacha rationaldecisionintheusualsensethanto
workoutan arrangement thatwillat leastminimally thekey
satisfy
 PolicyResearch 629

interests of each of theparties.Throughprocesseslongfamiliar in

theCongress(logrolling,horsetrading),a bargainis arranged.
f. Moveand countermove. Ifbargaining breaksdown,an agencymay
takea unilateral moveto advanceitsposition.Otheraffected agen-
cies counterwithmoves of theirown. This kindof antagonistic
adjustment is particularlylikelywhenpresentpoliciesleave some
newpolicyterritory unclaimed(cf. agencies'scrambletomoveinto
theturfof "children'spolicy" duringtheCarteradministration).
The seriesof competitive movesmaycontinueuntilmutualadjust-
mentreachesstalemate,or untilresolution is shiftedup to higher
levels. Move and countermove is an accustomedmodeof decision
in international relations.
g. A window for solutions.Notinfrequently, thesolutionprecedesthe
identification oftheproblem.In fact,itcan be arguedthatunlessa
plausiblesolutionis envisioned,theissuewillnotbe identified as a
problem. It will be considered a "condition" that has to be en-
dured, like the and
death, weather, (formanycenturies)poverty.
Officialsoftenbecomeweddedto petremediesand theyseek op-
portunities to implement theseremedies.One groupmaywantto
installa computersystem,and theyengagein a searchforplaces
and occasionsthatwouldjustifyits introduction. Anothergroup
maybe weddedto theidea of deregulation as an all-purpose pan-
acea and scourthefederalsystemforareasamenableto regulatory
rollback.These are cases wherethesolutionis in hand,and par-
tisansactivelyseek a "window" thatwillprovidean openingfor
theirready-made nostrum.
h. Indirection.Anotherrouteby whichpolicyemergesis as a by-
productof otherdecisions.In thiscase, policyoutcomesare unin-
tended,but because of decisionsmade to achieve otherdesired
ends,theynevertheless come about. Federalguaranteesof home
mortgages, undertaken afterWorldWarII tohelpfamiliespurchase
theirownhomes,led to an exodusfromcentralcitiesand massive
growthof suburbs.Federalaid to education,designedto improve
the qualityof educationparticularly fordisadvantaged and low-
achievingstudents, has led to some shiftof authority overeduca-
tionalpracticefromlocal to stateand federaleducationagencies.
No decisionswereconsciouslymadeto createsuchshifts, butthey
emergedby indirection.

This listof nondecisional

processesthatproducepolicyoutcomesis
probably notexhaustive. it indicatesa varietyof waysin
Nevertheless,
630 Journalof HigherEducation

whichmajoroutputscan issue fromgovernment withoutconsideredre-

viewor rationalassessment.In time,ad hoc agencyactionsmayhaveto
be formalizedbylegislation.Butoftentheearlyresponseis decisive,and
action
legislative merelyratifiesthedecisionsthathavealreadyemerged.
At someperiodsand in someareasit is onlya slightexaggerationto say
thatratification
ofthestatusquo, andallocationoffundstosupportit,is a
mainfunction of legislation.

The Place ofResearch

If government policycan "happen" withouttheset piece of formal
decisionmaking,how does policyresearchget a hearing?Whendeci-
sions take shape over long periodsof time,throughthe incremental
actionsof multipleactors,and oftenwithout awarenessthat
participants'
theyare shapingdecisions,theopportunity forformalconsideration of
researchinformation looksdistinctly limited.In suchsituations, research
data on constituents' needs,thebenefitsand costs of policies,and the
effectiveness andshortcomings ofprograms seemtohavelittlechancefor
impact.
Yet one oftheinteresting facetsofthesituation, verifiedrepeatedlyin
empiricalinvestigation and borne out by the record,is that
United States
officialsvalue social scienceresearch.Theysay thatit is important and
useful,and theysponsorlargenumbers of studies.If opportunities
to use
researchresultsas a guidetopolicyarelimitedbythediffuse processesof
government decisionmaking,theremustbe otherpurposesthatresearch
serves.It seemsimportant to identify them.
One possiblereasonforofficials'allegianceto research,we can con-
jecture,is thatresearchservesas a deviceofcontrol.In a federalsystem,
federalagenciessetpolicyandallocateresources butlocalagenciesdeliv-
er directservices.Withday-to-day controlofeducation,healthservices,
andwelfarein local hands,therecan be a widegapbetweenfederalintent
and local performance. Onlywhenthefederalagencyhas good informa-
tionaboutwhatlocal servicesaredoing-theirstructure, theprocessesof
servicedelivery,and theoutcomesforclients-can it beginto exercise
theauthority thatrulemakingand resourceallocationallow. Evaluation
andpolicystudiescan becomethemechanism by whichfederalagencies
keep informed.
Federaleducationofficials,intent on ensuring compliancewithfederal
purpose, can findout whether local school districts
areactuallyspending
fundsprovidedunderTitleI oftheElementary and SecondaryEducation
Act to enricheducationalopportunities forlow-incomeand low-achiev-
 Policy Research 631

ing students.Federalhealthofficialscan findout the extentto which

neighborhood healthcentersimprovethe healthstatusof low-income
clienteles.If local agenciesarefoundtobe performing poorly,thefederal
agency can institutestrictercontrolsover recipientagencies,tightening
up rulesand even terminating particularlocal grants.Researchresults
maybecomethebasis forcontrol,and themeredecisionto undertake
researchcan serveas an implicitthreat thatstricter
controlis impending.
The UnitedStatesCongresssometimesseemsto writeevaluationprovi-
sions intolegislationforjust thiskindof purpose-to servenoticeon
agenciesthatitwillhavethecapability toreviewtheeffectiveness oftheir
operations-evenif it neverdoes.
Anotherpossiblepurposethatpolicyresearchcan serveis to provide
support andvindication forcurrentpolicies.Federalofficials oftenexpect
researchto justifyat least some of theirclaims-thatlargenumbersof
peopleareinneedoftheirservices,thatprograms do somegood,andthat
constituents like the attention and wantservicesto continue.Even an
evaluationshowinglittledirectbenefitto clientswill oftenyieldsome
positiveevidenceofthiskind.The agencycan use findings to
selectively
buttressits case forlegislativereauthorization and additionalfunding.
A thirdpossibility is thatdecisionmakerssupport research becausethe
use of objectiveinformation is one of thehallmarks of rationality.
They
go through themotionsof commissioning studiesand searching forevi-
dencein orderto lay claimto themantleof intelligent choice.In effect,
theyseektodemonstrate thequalityoftheirdecisions,insituations where
criteriafor"quality" arehighlyambiguous,byappropriate performance
of theritualsof information processing.As Feldmanand Marchnote:
"Commandof information and information sourcesenhancesperceived
competenceand inspiresconfidence . . . A good decision makeris one
whomakesdecisionsin theway a good decisionmakerdoes, and deci-
sion makersand organizations establishtheirlegitimacyby theiruse of
information" [7, pp. 177-78].
Theremaybe highsymbolicvalueinrequesting researchandjustifying
decisionson evidentialgrounds.Even whentheactuallinkagebetween
researchinputandpolicyoutputis weak,politicalactorscan signaltheir
commitment to theideologyof rationalchoiceby takingan appropriate
postureregarding research.In thisway,theyseekto bolstertheirreputa-
tionforintelligent and unbiaseddecisionmaking.
If thesereasonsforcontinuedsponsorship of policyresearchseem
undulyskeptical, a fourth basis can be advanced.It is possiblethat
federalofficialssupportresearchbecausetheyrecognizethateveryagen-
cy, eventhemostprogressive, tendsto growmustyand stale.It settles
632 Journalof HigherEducation

intoa rut,takingold assumptions forgranted,substituting routinefor

thought, tinkering at bestwithpolicyminutiaeratherthanventuring in
new directions.To overcomehardening of organizationalarteries,they
maywelcomethe freshinsightsand criticalperspectives thatgood re-
searchbrings.By subjectingconventional practiceto evaluation,they
may seek to help the agencyrenewits sense of missionand adaptto
changingconditions.
One mayhopethatsomepartof thereasonforhighlevelsofresearch
supportcomesfrommotivesof thislattersort.Butevenifthethrust for
evaluationand policy studiesspringsfromless high-minded sources,
evenifitis theresultant ofadversarial forces(department headschecking
up on theperformance of bureaus,theCongresscheckingup on depart-
ments,agenciesseekinglegitimation fortheirprograms), evenifitrepre-
sentsonly rhetorical commitment to the normsof accountability and
rationalprocedure, eventhenithas consequences.The regularized prac-
tice of evaluationand analysishas become embeddedin government
structures.Officesof researchand evaluationexistat thebureau,divi-
sion,and department level in manyfederalagencies.Theirprofessional
staffsdo whatevaluationand analysisstaffsknowhow to do-continue
and expandthe flow of researchinformation to the agency.Even the
UnitedStatesGeneralAccounting Office, which used to servetheCon-
gressonly as financial auditor,now has itsInstituteof ProgramEvalua-
tion. As proceduresdevelop to transmit the resultsof policy studies
routinely to officialsthroughout government, an important mechanism
forlearningbecomesinstitutionalized.
The importance of the inclusionof evaluationand analysisunitsin
departmental structures shouldnotbe underestimated. Theyare institu-
tionalizedmechanisms forcollecting,sponsoring, synthesizing,and dis-
seminating research and evaluation information. The informational func-
tionthattheyrepresent is embeddednotonlyin theagency'stableof
organization butalso in procedures, theflowof paper,and thedivision
and coordination of work.Membersof evaluationand analysisunitssit
on agencycommittees thatdiscusspresentprograms and futurepolicy;
theypreparepositionpapers and optionstatements, marshalling theevi-
denceforand againstspecificproposals;theirreports analysescircu-
and
lateto keyofficialsandarediscussedin meetings; andtheircomments-
and in some cases, theirapprovaland sign-off-arebuiltintothepro-
cesses of agencywork.
In manyways,theincorporation of evaluationand analysisunitsinto
agencystructures represents an organizationalcommitment to theuse of
information. The knowledgethattheyprovidegoes beyondthelevel of
 Policy Research 633

individual
learning.It is notonlyindividuals
hereandthereintheagency
whobecomeenlightened bytheresultsofevaluationstudies.The evalua-
tionprocessis embeddedin theprocedures androutines,inthedailiness,
of agencywork.It represents a mechanismfororganizational learning.

The ViewfromOutside
Outsideresearchers who engagein policy-oriented studiesundergov-
ernment sponsorshipare oftendisillusionedby theirexperience.They
rarelysee theslow and indirectuses of theirresearchthatI have been
describing, or the learningsthataccrueto government agenciesas re-
searchfindings wendtheirway through bureaucratic channels.Theyare
muchmoreawareof theabsenceof dramatic responsein theshortterm.
This is probablyparticularly trueforresearchers in universities
whoun-
dertakeevaluationand policystudieswiththeexpectation of makingan
immediate contribution to policymaking,as well as fortheuniversity
administrators who encouragecontractresearchin theirinstitutions not
onlyforthefiscalattractiveness of overhead-cost recovery butalso with
theaimofrendering "public service." They see that theresearchis done
and thennothingmuchseemsto change.
The messageofthispaperis: Don't leap totheconclusionthatresearch
is ignored.The expectation of directand immediate policyeffectsfrom
researchis frequently unrealistic.Since policydecisionsoftenaccrete
through multipledisjointedsteps(and forotherreasonsas well), looking
forblockbuster impactfromresearchresultsrepresents a misreading of
thenatureof policymaking.If you stayaroundlongenough-andclose
enoughto thedecisionapparatus-youare betterable to gaugethereal
consequences.It maystillturnout thatresearchleaves fewripplesbe-
hind,butit is premature to makethatjudgmentwithout a long-term and
close-upview of theissue arena.
Are theresome thingsthatresearchers can do to facilitate theuse of
theirresearch?Afterall, shouldn'tthepolicyprocess,howeverdiffuse,
accommodatethe moreaccuratedescription of conditionsand incisive
analysis of events that research at its best provides?Those of us who
hankerforrationality look forstrategems thatwillenhancethepowerof
researchas a basis forpolicydecisions.
In thelocal case, thereare undoubtedly actsthatcan lead participants
in decisionmakingto paygreater attentiontoresearchresults.The litera-
tureis repletewithadmonitions: locatethepotential usersof researchin
advance,understand whichpolicyvariablestheyhave the authority to
change, concentrate the study on the feasible(manipulable) variables,
634 Journalof HigherEducation

involvethepotential usersintheresearchprocess,establisha relationship

oftrust,demonstrate awarenessoftheconstraints thatlimittheiroptions,
reportpromptly, providepractical recommendations, writeresultsclearly
andsimply,andcommunicate resultsinperson.All oftheseprescriptions
are directedat influencing one decisionmaker,or a smallgroupof deci-
sion makers,to use researchin makinga direct,concrete,immediate
choice.
Whileone or anotherof theseprecepts,or all ofthemcombined,may
indeedpay offin increasedconsideration of researchconclusions,they
provideno guaranteethateven in a smallhierarchical organization re-
searchwillcarrytheday. Officialsarenotblankpagesto whichresearch
transferstruth.Officialshavetheirownbodyofinformation, theircareer
interestsat stake,theirpatterned and
assumptions ideologicalpositions
growingoutof thesumof theirlifeexperiences.Whiletheycan usually
be induced-through thenurturance ofgoodrelationships andthelogicof
scientificallyreputableanalysis-to attend to the evidence thatresearch
produces,they will not automatically cast aside all other influencesand
embracetheresearchers' conclusions.
Nordo researchers alwayswantto abideby therestrictions embedded
inthetraditional prescriptions forinfluence. To accept officials'formula-
tionoftheproblemor to limitthestudyto alternatives thatarepolitically
and organizationally feasibleoftenrepresents undueconstraint on the
scopeandfocusofinvestigation. Studiestootightly tiedtocurrent operat-
ing "realities" rapidlybecomeobsolete.If theylose theirone shotat
immediate application,theyhave littleleftto say.
Finally,itis well to acknowledge thelimitsof social scienceresearch.
Policystudiesaddressa smallsubsetof theissuesinvolvedin anydeci-
sionofmoment.Theyinevitably omita variety offactors thatresponsible
officialshave to takeintoaccount,suchas thereactionof constituency
groups,budgetary implications, and contestsoverprogramturf.Policy
studies,too, are shaped by implicitvalue assumptions.They do not
represent mirror imagesof somereality"out there";as Merton[15] has
noted,dataarenot"given" butcreated.Whichvariablesareconsidered,
how theyare conceptualized and measured,and thecompleteness of the
explanatory model,all influencethenatureof theresults.
Moreover,different investigatorsstudying thesamephenomena often
comeup withdivergent-evenconflicting-conclusions, andevenwell-
acceptedresearchgeneralizations can be undermined over timeas the
sweepofcontemporary eventsovertakes anddiscredits them.The claims
of social sciencestudiesto thestatusof eternaltruth aretenuousindeed.
Participants in decisionmakingview studyresultscritically notonlybe-
 Policy Research 635

causetheyareself-seeking, orpreytopressure
orpoorlyinformed, groups
(althoughtheymaysometimesbe all of thesethings),butalso because
is a responsibleact.
carefulscrutiny

DecisionAccretionand KnowledgeCreep
Ifall ofthesefactors can limittheinfluence ofpolicystudiesina small
localizedagency,thedistractions arefargreater at morerarified levelsof
A
policymaking. significant feature thepolicyprocess, we have
of as
noted,is the diffusemannerin whichdecisionsoftenaccrete.When
policyseemsto "happen" withoutsynoptic reviewand rationalchoice,
fewoccasionsexistforcarefulreviewof relevantpolicyresearch.Offi-
cialsrespondto situations byhunchandexperience, drawing on whatever
mix of knowledge-andof coursemuchelse besidesknowledge-that
theyhave on hand.
Butthereare waysotherthanformalreviewof studyreports bywhich
researchgetsa hearing.Officialsabsorba greatdeal of researchknowl-
edgethrough informal routes.Theyreadwidely,go tomeetings, listento
people,discusswithcolleagues-all without necessarilyhavinga particu-
lar decisionin mind. Researchinformation and ideas filterintotheir
awareness, whether or not they label it research as theyabsorbit. This
diffuseprocessofenlightenment contributes to theirstockofknowledge.
Whentheyengagein thestreamof activitiesthataggregateintopolicy,
theydrawupontheknowledgethattheyhave gathered froma variety of
and
sources,includingresearch, apply it to their work.
The diffuseprocessof researchuse thatwe are calling "enlighten-
ment"is highlycompatiblewiththediffuse processesofpolicymaking.
It informs the workof manypolicyactorsin manylocationsas they
perform theirbitsandpiecesofpolicywork.Unliketheusualnotionofa
singleresearchsponsorwho acquiresa directedset of findingsfora
particulardecisionalpurpose,itdoes notsuggesta monopoly on research
knowledgeby thebureaucreat who funds the study.Many different peo-
ple, withdifferent interests and ideologies,insideand outsidegovern-
ment,can be enlightened byresearch,andtheycan exercisetheirknowl-
edge at manypoints,cooperatively or adversarially, as policy takes
shape.
Of course,theenlightenment imagerepresents no ideal model.When
researchcomes to people's attention haphazardly, theprocessis unor-
ganized,slow,wasteful, and sloppy.Some policyactorsmayfailtohear
aboutrelevantresearch;othersmayfail to taketheresearchtheyhear
aboutseriously.Some people maybecomeenchanted withcatchy,fad-
636 Journalof HigherEducation

dish,irrelevant, obsolete,partial,or invalidfindings, or latchon to only

thesubsetof findingsthatsupportstheirpredispositions and policyin-
terests.The whole processreeksof oversimplification. People tendto
the
forget complexities and qualifications and remember the slogans
("the povertyprogramfailed," or "a guaranteed incomeleads to little
reductionin workeffort").Diffuseenlightenment is no substitute for
careful,directedanalysisof thepolicyimplications of research.Ways
stillhave to be found-and used-to improvetargetedapplicationsof
targetedresearchas well.
Nevertheless, thefitbetweenthediffuseprocessesof policymaking
and officials'diffuseabsorption of researchis noteworthy. It seemsto
represent one of the most important contributions that social science
researchmakesto publicpolicy.The ideasderivedfromresearch provide
organizing perspectives thathelppeoplemakesenseofexperience. These
ideasofferframeworks withinwhichproblemsareinterpreted andpolicy
actionsconsidered.Retrospectively, theyhelp people understand what
government has been doing and what the consequences have been. Pro-
spectively,theyhelpraisethepossibility ofalternative of
courses action.
Perhapsmostvaluableof all, researchcan be a mediumof criticism.
Subjectingold assumptions to empiricaltestsand introducing alternative
perspectives are vitalcontributions. Even when officialsthemselves have
or
suspectedpolicyshortcomings negative side effects,research crystal-
lizes the suspicionsand makes themvisible to others;the reviewof
researchresultsprovidesan occasion formappingnew responses.Of
course,specificfindingsmay be questioned,and the implications that
researchers singleout forattention may not be accepted. Research cannot
be expectedto prevailoverall contending influences. Yet evenin cases
whereofficialsdisputetheparticulars, theyoftenfindthemselves using
theconceptsand frameworks of theresearchto reconsider accustomed
practice.
To theextentthatsuchcontributions to thepublicarenaareimportant,
theysuggestdifferent lessonsto policyresearchers fromthoseassociated
withdirectresearchapplication.Concernabout pleasing-or at least
satisfying-the immediateclientis secondarywhendozensof otherac-
torswillaffecttheshapeofpolicy.Beingpracticalandtimelyandkeep-
ing the studywithinfeasibleboundariesmaybe unimportant, or even
counterproductive. If theresearch is not completed in time forthis year's
budgetcycle,it is probablyno greatloss. The same issues,if theyare
important, will come up again and again. Keepingthestudywithinthe
acceptedconstraints of one set of actorswill oftenimplyirrelevance to
theconcernsofothersetsofpolicyactors.In theenlightenment tradition,
 PolicyResearch 637

theresearcher is well advisedto broadenthescope of thequestionand

taketimeto do qualityresearch.
Otherscholarshave notedthatresearchcontributes to thepolicypro-
cess in waysfardifferent fromthetraditional "rational"image,andthey
have urgedthatits realisticpotentialforinfluenceshouldbe exploited.
Lindblomwroteyearsago abouttheuse ofpolicyanalysisingovernment:
"Policy is analyzednot in an unrealisticattemptto reachconclusive
determinations of correctpolicy,butsimplyto persuade"[13, p. 117].
Morerecently, Cronbachand associateswroteaboutprogram evalua-
tions:"insteadof promoting singledefinitive studies thatpromiseun-
questionable guidanceon a narrowissueofpolicy,evaluationsshouldbe
contributingtheslow,continuous,
to cumulative understanding ofa prob-
lem or an intervention" [5, p. 47]. And further: "what is needed is
information thatwill facilitatenegotiation of a compromise ratherthan
information thatcan be crankedintoa decisionrule" [5, p. 116].
In fact,thislesson maybe the mostimportant implication fromthe
recentstudiesof theuses of social scienceresearchin decisionmaking.
Researchersneed to be aware thatthe worktheydo, no matterhow
appliedin intentand how practicalin orientation, is notlikelyto have
majorinfluenceon the policy decisionat whichit is purportedly di-
rected-at least not if policy actors' interestsand ideologiesare not
engaged.Adherenceto all thetraditional strictures-acceptance of deci-
sion makers'constraints, focus on manipulablevariables,timeliness,
jargon-free communication, and the like-seems to increasetheactual
application of research results onlymarginally. Of course,improvement
at themargincan sometimesbe significant. But whencompetingwith
otherpowerful factors,suchas officials'concernwithpoliticalorbureau-
craticadvantage,one limitedstudy(and all studiesare limitedin some
way) is likelyto have limitedimpact.
On theotherhand,the streamof social scienceresearchhas conse-
quences.The generalizations, theideas, thatemergefromsocial science
researchhelp to shape the assumptions on whichpolicyis based. Ill-
conceivedand slipshodresearchwill yieldconclusionsof questionable
value;quickand dirtyad hoc studies,whichcutmethodological corners
in orderto meetan arbitrary deadlineor satisfyan impatient client,are
morelikelyto muddythanto clarifytheissues.To servethelonger-term
policyneedsof officials,researchshouldbe grounded in relevant theory
and existingknowledge;it shouldlook at issuescomprehensively in all
theirmultivariate complexity; it shouldbe done with the greatest meth-
odologicalskillthatadvancesin researchand analytictechniqueshave
made possible.
638 Journalof HigherEducation

Thisis nota call forretreatto theivorytower.Researchers needto be

sophisticatedabouttheshapeandcontourofpolicyissuesiftheirworkis
to be relevantto current debates.Theyneed to recognizethatdecision
makerscannotwaitforcertainty and authoritativeness
(whichsocial sci-
encemayin factneverbe able toprovide),butmustproceedon thebasis
of the best knowledgeavailableat thetime.As social scientists, their
responsibilityis to convincegovernment agenciesto allow themtheop-
portunityto do thebestsocial scienceof whichtheyare capable.
The criticalingredients will be independenceof thought, conceptual
sophistication, methodological rigor,and-when the researchhas pro-
ducedsomething worthsaying-seriouseffortsthrough manychannelsto
its
get message heard by the in
multipleparticipants policymaking.

References
1. Allison,G. T. Essence ofDecision: ExplainingtheCuban MissileCrisis. Boston:
Little,Brown,1971.
2. Bachrach,P., andM. S. Baratz. "Decisions andNondecisions: An AnalyticFrame-
work." AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,57 (1963), 632r-42.
3. Caplan, N., A. Morrison,and R. J. Stambaugh.The Use ofSocial ScienceKnowl-
edge in Policy Decisions at theNationalLevel. Ann Arbor:Institute forSocial
Research,University of Michigan,1975.
4. Crawford,E. T., and A. D. Biderman(eds.). Social Scientistsand International
Affairs.New York:Wiley, 1969.
5. Cronbach,L. J. and Associates.TowardReformof ProgramEvaluation:Aims,
Methods,and InstitutionalArrangements. San Francisco:Jossey-Bass,1980.
6. Dye, T. R. "Policy AnalysisandPoliticalScience:SomeProblemsattheInterface."
PolicyStudiesJournal,1 (1972), 103-7.
7. Feldman,M. S., and J. G. March. "Information in Organizations
as Signal and
Symbol." Administrative ScienceQuarterly, 26 (1981), 171-86.
8. Gouldner,A. W. TheComingCrisisin Western Sociology,New York:Basic Books,
1970.
9. Heclo, H. H. "Review Article:PolicyAnalysis."BritishJournalofPoliticalSci-
ence, 2 (1972), 83-108.
10. Janowitz, M. "SociologicalModelsandSocial Policy." In PoliticalConflict:Essays
in PoliticalSociology,by M. Janowitz,pp. 243-59. Chicago:Quadrangle,1970.
11. Knott,J., and A. Wildavsky."If Dissemination is theSolution,Whatis theProb-
lem?" Knowledge:Creation,Diffusion,Utilization,1 (June1980), 537-78.
12. Lindblom,C. E. TheIntelligence ofDemocracy.New York:FreePress, 1965.
13. . The Policy-MakingProcess. EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.
14. Lipson,A., and M. Peterson.CaliforniaJusticeUnderDeterminate Sentencing:A
Reviewand AgendaforResearch.SantaMonica: RandCorporation, 1980.
15. Merton,R. K. Social Theoryand Social Structure. New York: Free Press, 1968.
 PolicyResearch 639

16. Schick,A. "From Analysisto Evaluation."Annalsof theAmericanAcademyof

Politicaland Social Science,394 (1971), 57-71.
17. Simon,H. A. Administrative Behavior.New York:Free Press, 1947.
18. Weiss,C. H. "KnowledgeCreepand DecisionAccretion."Knowledge:Creation,
Diffusion,Utilization,1 (March 1980), 381-404.
19. Weiss,C. H. "TruthTestsandUtility Tests:DecisionMakers'FramesofReference
for Social Science Research." AmericanSociological Review,45 (April 1980),
302-13.
20. Weiss,C. H., withM. J.Bucuvalas.Social ScienceResearchandDecision-Making.
New York:ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1980.