SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 156273. October 15, 2003]

HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO and MARIA ROTEA, namely: ESPERANZA R. EDJEC, BERNARDA R. SUELA, RUBY C.
ROTEA, BERNARDA R. ROTEA, ELIA R. VDA. DE LIMBAGA, VIRGINIA R. ARBON, ROSALINDA R. ARQUISOLA,
CORAZON ROTEA, FE R. EBORA, CARIDAD ROTEA, ANGELES VDA. DE RENACIA, JORGE ROTEA, MARIA
LUISA ROTEA-VILLEGAS, ALFREDO R. ROTEA, represented by his heirs LIZBETH ROTEA and ELEPETH
ROTEA; LUIS ROTEA, represented by his heir JENNIFER ROTEA; and ROLANDO R. ROTEA, represented by his
heir ROLANDO R. ROTEA JR., petitioners, vs. MACTAN - CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, respondent.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

THE HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO AND MARIA ROTEA, petitioners herein, are the successors-in-interest of the former
registered owners of two (2) parcels of land situated in Lahug, Cebu City, designated as Lot No. 916 with an area of 2,355 square
meters under TCT No. RT-7543 (106) T-13694, and Lot No. 920 consisting of 3,097 square meters under TCT No. RT-7544 (107)
T-13695.[1]
In 1949 the National Airport Corporation as the predecessor agency of respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA) wanted to acquire Lots Nos. 916 and 920 above described among other parcels of land for the proposed
expansion of Lahug Airport.[2] To entice the landowners to cede their properties, the government assured them that they could
repurchase their lands once Lahug Airport was closed or its operations transferred to Mactan Airport.[3] Some of the landowners
executed deeds of sale with right of repurchase in favor of the government but many others, including the owners of Lots Nos. 916
and 920 herein mentioned, refused the offer because the payment was perceived to be way below the market price.[4]
On 16 April 1952, as the negotiations for the purchase of the lots necessary for the expansion and improvement
of Lahug Airport irredeemably broke down, the Civil Aeronautics Administration as the successor agency of the National Airport
Corporation filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, for the expropriation of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and other
subject realties, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881.
On 29 December 1961 the trial court promulgated its Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 condemning Lots Nos. 916 and 920
and other lots for public use upon payment of just compensation. [5] Petitioners predecessors were paid P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916
and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with consequential damages by way of legal interest from 16 November 1947. No appeal was
taken from the Decision on Lots Nos. 916 and 920, and the judgment of condemnation became final and executory.[6] Thereafter,
the certificates of title for these parcels of land were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. 58691
for Lot No. 916 and TCT No. 58692 for Lot No. 920, which under RA 6958 (1990) were subsequently transferred in favor of
respondent MCIAA.[7]
At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to MCIAA, Lahug Airport ceased operations as
the MactanAirport was opened for incoming and outgoing flights.[8] Lots Nos. 916 and 920 which had been expropriated for the
extension of LahugAirport were not utilized.[9] In fact, no expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its
predecessors-in-interest.[10] Hence, petitioners wrote then President Fidel V. Ramos and the airport manager begging them for the
exercise of their alleged right to repurchase Lots Nos. 916 and 920. [11] Their pleas were not heeded.[12]
On 11 March 1997 petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages with RTC of Cebu City against respondent
MCIAA to compel the repurchase of Lots Nos. 916 and 920, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-20015. In the main, petitioners
averred that they had been convinced by the officers of the predecessor agency of respondent MCIAA not to oppose the
expropriation proceedings since in the future they could repurchase the properties if the airport expansion would not push
through. MCIAA did not object to petitioners evidence establishing these allegations.
When the civil case was pending, one Richard E. Enchuan filed a Motion for Transfer of Interest alleging that he acquired
through deeds of assignment the rights of some of herein petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920. [13] The Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) also sought to intervene in the civil case claiming that it leased in good faith Lot No. 920 from the
predecessor agencies of respondent MCIAA and that it built thereon its Regional Equipment Services and its Region 7 Office.[14]
On 12 April 1999 the trial court found merit in the claims of petitioners and granted them the right to repurchase the
properties at the amount pegged as just compensation in Civil Case No. R-1881 but subject to the alleged property rights of
Richard E. Enchuan and the leasehold of DPWH.[15] The trial court opined that the expropriation became illegal
or functus officio when the purpose for which it was intended was no longer there. [16]
Respondent MCIAA appealed the Decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64456.
On 20 December 2001 the Court of Appeals reversed the assailed Decision on the ground that the judgment of
condemnation in Civil Case No. R-1881 was unconditional so that the rights gained therefrom by respondent MCIAA were
indicative of ownership in fee simple.[17]The appellate court cited Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan[18] which held that mere
deviation from the public purpose for which the power of eminent domain was exercised does not justify the reversion of the
property to its former owners, and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals [19] which is
allegedly stare decisis to the instant case to prevent the exercise of the right of repurchase as the former dealt with a parcel of
land similarly expropriated under Civil Case No. R-1881.[20]
On 28 November 2002 reconsideration of the Decision was denied. [21] Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners argue that Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan does not apply to the case at bar since what was involved therein
was the right of reversion and not the right of repurchase which they are invoking. They also differentiate Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals[22] from the instant case in that the landowners in the MCIAA case offered
inadmissible evidence to show their entitlement to a right of repurchase, while petitioners herein offered evidence based on
personal knowledge for which reason MCIAA did not object and thus waived whatever objection it might have had to the
admissibility thereof. Finally, petitioners allege that their right to equal protection of the laws would be infringed if some landowners
are given the right to repurchase their former properties even as they are denied the exercise of such prerogative.
On the other hand, respondent MCIAA clings to our decisions in Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan and Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals. According to respondent MCIAA there is only one instance when
expropriated land may be repurchased by its previous owners, and that is, if the decision of expropriation itself provides [the]
condition for such repurchase. Respondent asserts that the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 is absolute and without conditions,
thus, no repurchase could be validly exercised.
This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin with, there exists an undeniable historical narrative that
the predecessors of respondent MCIAA had suggested to the landowners of the properties covered by
the Lahug Airport expansion scheme that they could repurchase their properties at the termination of the airports venture.[23] Some
acted on this assurance and sold their properties;[24] other landowners held out and waited for the exercise of eminent domain to
take its course until finally coming to terms with respondents predecessors that they would not appeal nor block further the
judgment of condemnation if the same right of repurchase was extended to them. [25] A handful failed to prove that they acted on
such assurance when they parted with the ownership of their lands.[26]
In resolving this dispute, we must reckon with the rulings of this Court in Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan and Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, which define the rights and obligations of landowners whose properties
were expropriated when the public purpose for which eminent domain was exercised no longer subsists. In Fery, which was cited
in the recent case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[27] we declared that the government acquires only such rights in expropriated
parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties -

If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return
to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If
x x x land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then,
of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the
contrary x x x x If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land
becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not
have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings x x x x When land has been acquired for public use in fee
simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public
use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to
the former owner x x x x[28]

In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, respondent Chiongbian sought to enforce an alleged right of repurchase over
her properties that had been expropriated in Civil Case No. R-1881. This Court did not allow her to adduce evidence of her claim,
for to do so would unsettle as to her properties the judgment of condemnation in the eminent domain proceedings. We also held
therein that Chiongbians evidence was both inadmissible and lacking in probative value -

The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was
no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the
purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport. CHIONGBIAN
cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan-Cebu International Airport vs. Court of Appeals wherein the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to
prove the existence of a written agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation proceedings but a
contract of sale x x x x To permit CHIONGBIAN to prove the existence of a compromise settlement which she claims to have entered into with
the Republic of the Philippines prior to the rendition of judgment in the expropriation case would result in a modification of the judgment of a
court which has long become final and executory x x xx And even assuming for the sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN could prove the
existence of the alleged written agreement acknowledging her right to repurchase Lot No. 941 through parol evidence, the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the evidence presented by CHIONGBIAN was admissible x x xx Aside from being inadmissible under the provisions of
the Statute of Frauds, [the] testimonies are also inadmissible for being hearsay in nature x x xx[29]

We adhere to the principles enunciated in Fery and in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, and do not overrule
them.Nonetheless the weight of their import, particularly our ruling as regards the properties of respondent Chiongbian in Mactan-
CebuInternational Airport Authority, must be commensurate to the facts that were established therein as distinguished from those
extant in the case at bar. Chiongbian put forth inadmissible and inconclusive evidence, while in the instant case we have
preponderant proof as found by the trial court of the existence of the right of repurchase in favor of petitioners.
Moreover, respondent MCIAA has brought to our attention a significant and telling portion in the Decision in Civil Case No. R-
1881 validating our discernment that the expropriation by the predecessors of respondent was ordered under the running
impression that LahugAirport would continue in operation -

As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be doubted. Although Mactan Airport is being constructed, it does not
take away the actual usefulness and importance of the Lahug Airport: it is handling the air traffic both civilian and military. From it aircrafts fly
to Mindanao and Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to the North and Manila. Then, no evidence was adduced to show how soon is
the Mactan Airport to be placed in operation and whether the Lahug Airport will be closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the other
departments of the Government to determine said matters. The Court cannot substitute its judgment for those of the said departments or
agencies. In the absence of such showing, the Court will presume that the Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation (emphasis
supplied).[30]

While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the presence of public purpose for the
exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead
prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation. Verily, these
meaningful statements in the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties would remain to be so
until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer in operation. This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after
the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated lots were not being used for any airport expansion project,
the rights vis--vis the expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as between the State and their former owners, petitioners herein, must
be equitably adjusted; and, (b) the foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of the Decision should merge with and
become an intrinsic part of the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in
accord with the findings as contained in the body thereof.[31]
Significantly, in light of the discussion above, the admission of petitioners during the pre-trial of Civil Case No. CEB-20015
for reconveyance and damages that respondent MCIAA was the absolute owner of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 does not prejudice
petitioners interests. This is as it should be not only because the admission concerns a legal conclusion fiercely debated by the
parties[32] but more so since respondent was truly the absolute owner of the realties until it was apparent that Lahug Airport had
stopped doing business.
To sum up what we have said so far, the attendance in the case at bar of standing admissible evidence validating the claim
of petitioners as well as the portions above-quoted of the Decision in the expropriation case volunteered no less than by
respondent itself, takes this case away from the ambit of Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals [33] but
within the principles enunciated in Fery as mentioned earlier. In addition, there should be no doubt that our present reading of
the fallo of the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 so as to include the statements in the body thereof afore-quoted is sanctioned
by the rule that a final and executoryjudgment may nonetheless be clarified by reference to other portions of the decision of which
it forms a part. In Republic v. De Los Angeles[34] we ruled -

This Court has promulgated many cases x x x wherein it was held that a judgment must not be read separately but in connection with the other
portions of the decision of which it forms a part. Hence x x x the decision of the court below should be taken as a whole and considered in its
entirety to get the true meaning and intent of any particular portion thereof x x x x Neither is this Court inclined to confine itself to a reading of
the said fallo literally. On the contrary, the judgment portion of a decision should be interpreted and construed in harmony with
the ratio decidendi thereof x x x x As stated in the case of Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans Board, et al., supra, to get the true intent and
meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or
ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallothereof x x x x The foregoing pronouncements find support
in the case of Locsin, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 63 Phil., 87, 91-92, wherein this Court allowed a judgment that had become final
and executory to be clarified by supplying a word which had been inadvertently omitted and which, when supplied, in effect changed the literal
import of the original phraseology x x x x This is so because, in the first place, if an already final judgment can still be amended to supply an
omission committed through oversight, this simply means that in the construction or interpretation of an already final decision,
the fallo or dispositive portion thereof must be correlated with the body of such final decision x x x x [I]f an amendment may be allowed after a
decision has already become final x x x such amendment may consist x x x either in the x x x interpretation of an ambiguous phrase therein in
relation to the body of the decision which gives it life. [35]

We now resolve to harmonize the respective rights of the State and petitioners to the expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920.
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority[36] is correct in stating that one would not find an express statement in the
Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 to the effect that the [condemned] lot would return to [the landowner] or that [the landowner]
had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be
used other than as the Lahug Airport.This omission notwithstanding, and while the inclusion of this pronouncement in the
judgment of condemnation would have been ideal, such precision is not absolutely necessary nor is it fatal to the cause of
petitioners herein. No doubt, the return or repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could be readily justified as the
manifest legal effect or consequence of the trial courts underlying presumption that Lahug Airport will continue to be in
operation when it granted the complaint for eminent domain and the airport discontinued its activities.
The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust, one that is akin [37] to the implied trust referred to in Art. 1454 of
the Civil Code, If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor
toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it
becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him. In the case at bar, petitioners conveyed Lots Nos. 916
and 920 to the government with the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its
bargain, the government can be compelled by petitioners to reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, petitioners would be
denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was
authorized.
Although the symmetry between the instant case and the situation contemplated by Art. 1454 is not perfect, the provision is
undoubtedly applicable. For, as explained by an expert on the law of trusts: The only problem of great importance in the field of
constructive trusts is to decide whether in the numerous and varying fact situations presented to the courts there is a wrongful
holding of property and hence a threatened unjust enrichment of the defendant.[38] Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which
are bound by no unyielding formula when they are used by courts as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of the
legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest.[39]
In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustees sole duty is to transfer the title and
possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary.[40] Of course, the wronged party seeking the aid of a court of equity in
establishing a constructive trust must himself do equity.[41] Accordingly, the court will exercise its discretion in deciding what acts
are required of the plaintiff-beneficiary as conditions precedent to obtaining such decree and has the obligation to reimburse the
trustee the consideration received from the latter just as the plaintiff-beneficiary would if he proceeded on the theory of
rescission.[42] In the good judgment of the court, the trustee may also be paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in
sustaining the property, his fixed costs for improvements thereon, and the monetary value of his services in managing the property
to the extent that plaintiff-beneficiary will secure a benefit from his acts.[43]
The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in this case, respondent MCIAA and
petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190 of the Civil Code, When the conditions have for their purpose the
extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they
have received x x x x In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to the
debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who is bound to return x x x x
Hence, respondent MCIAA as representative of the State is obliged to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to petitioners who
shall hold the same subject to existing liens thereon, i.e., leasehold right of DPWH. In return, petitioners as if they were plaintiff-
beneficiaries of a constructive trust must restore to respondent MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the
expropriation of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 in Civil Case No. R-1881, i.e., P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920
with consequential damages by way of legal interest from 16 November 1947. Petitioners must likewise pay respondent MCIAA
the necessary expenses it may have incurred in sustaining the properties and the monetary value of its services in managing them
to the extent that petitioners will be benefited thereby.The government however may keep whatever income or fruits it may have
obtained from the parcels of land, in the same way that petitioners need not account for the interests that the amounts they
received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime. As a matter of justice and convenience, the law considers the
fruits and interests as the equivalent of each other.[44]
Under Art. 1189 of the Civil Code, If the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit
of the creditor x x x, the creditor being the person who stands to receive something as a result of the process of
restitution. Consequently, petitioners as creditors do not have to settle as part of the process of restitution the appreciation in
value of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 which is the natural consequence of nature and time.
Petitioners need not also pay for improvements introduced by third parties, i.e., DPWH, as the disposition of these properties
is governed by existing contracts and relevant provisions of law. As for the improvements that respondent MCIAA may have made
on Lots Nos. 916 and 920, if any, petitioners must pay respondent their prevailing free market price in case petitioners opt to buy
them and respondent decides to sell. In other words, if petitioners do not want to appropriate such improvements or respondent
does not choose to sell them, the improvements would have to be removed without any obligation on the part of petitioners to pay
any compensation to respondent MCIAA for whatever it may have tangibly introduced therein. [45]
The medium of compensation for the restitution shall be ready money or cash payable within a period of three hundred sixty
five (365) days from the date that the amount to be returned by petitioners is determined with finality, unless the parties herein
stipulate and agree upon a different scheme, medium or schedule of payment. If after the period of three hundred sixty five (365)
days or the lapse of the compromise scheme or schedule of payment such amount owed is not settled, the right of repurchase of
petitioners and the obligation of respondent MCIAA to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and/or the latters improvements as set
forth herein shall be deemed forfeited and the ownership of those parcels of land shall vest absolutely upon respondent MCIAA.
Finally, we delete the award of P60,000.00 for attorneys fees and P15,000.00 for litigation expenses in favor of petitioners as
decreed in the assailed Decision of 12 April 1999 of the trial court. It is not sound public policy to set a premium upon the right to
litigate where such right is exercised in good faith, as in the present case, albeit the decision to resist the claim is erroneous.[46]
The rule on awards of attorneys fees and litigation expenses is found in Art. 2208 of the Civil Code -

In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interests;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's valid and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
As noted in Mirasol v. De la Cruz,[47] Art. 2208 intends to retain the award of attorneys fees as the exception in our law and the
general rule remains that attorneys fees are not recoverable in the absence of a stipulation thereto.
In the case at bar, considering the established absence of any stipulation regarding attorneys fees, the trial court cannot base
its award on any of the exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208. The records of the instant case do not disclose any proof presented
by petitioners to substantiate that the actuations of respondent MCIAA were clearly unfounded or purely for the purpose of
harassment; neither does the trial court make any finding to that effect in its appealed Decision.
While Art. 2208, par. (4), allows attorneys fees in cases of clearly unfounded civil actions, this exception must be understood
to mean those where the defenses are so untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith. Evidence must be presented to
the court as to the facts and circumstances constituting the alleged bad faith, otherwise, the award of attorneys fees is not justified
where there is no proof other than the bare statement of harassment that a party to be so adjudged had acted in bad faith. The
exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorneys fees under Art. 2208, par. (11), demands a factual, legal or equitable
justification that would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of such award.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64456
dated 20 December 2001 and its Resolution of 28 November 2002 denying reconsideration of the Decision are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
The Decision of RTC-Br. 19 of Cebu City dated 12 April 1999 in Civil Case No. CEB-20015 is MODIFIED IN PART by -
(a) ORDERING respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) TO RECONVEY to petitioner Heirs
of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea, namely: Esperanza R. Edjec, Bernarda R. Suela, Ruby
C. Rotea, Bernarda R. Rotea, Elia R. Vda De Limbaga, Virginia R. Arbon, Rosalinda R. Arquisola, Corazon Rotea, Fe
R. Ebora, Caridad Rotea, Angeles Vda. De Renacia, Jorge Rotea, Maria Luisa Rotea-Villegas, Alfredo R. Rotea, represented by
his heirs, namely: Lizbeth Rotea and Elepeth Rotea; Luis Rotea, represented by his heir Jennifer Rotea; and Rolando R. Rotea,
represented by his heir Rolando R. Rotea Jr., Lot No. 916 with an area of 2,355 square meters and Lot No. 920 consisting of
3,097 square meters in Lahug, Cebu City, with all the improvements thereon evolving through nature or time, but excluding those
that were introduced by third parties, i.e., DPWH, which shall be governed by existing contracts and relevant provisions of law;
(b) ORDERING petitioner Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea TO PAY respondent MCIAA what the former received
as just compensation for the expropriation of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 in Civil Case No. R-1881, i.e., P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916
and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with consequential damages by way of legal interest from 16 November 1947. Petitioners must
likewise PAY respondent MCIAA the necessary expenses that the latter may have incurred in sustaining the properties and the
monetary value of its services in managing the properties to the extent that petitioners will secure a benefit from such
acts. Respondent MCIAA however may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land, in the same
way that petitioners need not account for the interests that the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in
the meantime;
(c) ORDERING respondent MCIAA TO CONVEY to petitioners the improvements it may have built on Lots Nos. 916 and
920, if any, in which case petitioners SHALL PAY for these improvements at the prevailing free market price, otherwise, if
petitioners do not want to appropriate such improvements, or if respondent does not choose to sell them, respondent
MCIAA SHALL REMOVE these improvements WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION on the part of petitioners to pay any compensation
to respondent MCIAA for them;
(d) ORDERING petitioners TO PAY the amount so determined under letter (b) of this dispositive portion as consideration for
the reconveyance of Lots Nos. 916 and 920, as well as the prevailing free market price of the improvements built thereon by
respondent MCIAA, if any and desired to be bought and sold by the parties, in ready money or cash PAYABLE within a period of
three hundred sixty five (365) days from the date that the amount under letter (b) above is determined with finality, unless the
parties herein stipulate a different scheme or schedule of payment, otherwise, after the period of three hundred sixty five (365)
days or the lapse of the compromise scheme or schedule of payment and the amount so payable is not settled, the right of
repurchase of petitioners and the obligation of respondent MCIAA to so reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and/or the improvements
shall be DEEMED FORFEITED and the ownership of those parcels of land shall VEST ABSOLUTELY upon respondent MCIAA;
(e) REMANDING the instant case to RTC-Br. 19 of Cebu City for purposes of determining the amount of compensation for
Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to be paid by petitioners as mandated in letter (b) hereof, and the value of the prevailing free market price
of the improvements built thereon by respondent MCIAA, if any and desired to be bought and sold by the parties, and in general,
securing the immediate execution of this Decision under the premises;
(f) ORDERING petitioners to respect the right of the Department of Public Works and Highways to its lease contract until the
expiration of the lease period; and
(g) DELETING the award of P60,000.00 for attorneys fees and P15,000.00 for litigation expenses against respondent MCIAA
and in favor of petitioners.
This Decision is without prejudice to the claim of intervenor one Richard E. Enchuan on his allegation that he acquired
through deeds of assignment the rights of some of herein petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.