BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC., petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF MAGDALENO VALDEZ

Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein private respondents Sergio Valdez, Angelina Valdez-Novabos, Teresita
Argawanon-Mangubat and Daylinda Argawanon-Melendres (hereafter the heirs), purchased from Feliciana
Santillan, on December 9, 1935, a parcel of unregistered land covered by Tax Declaration No. 3935 with an
area of one hectare, 34 ares and 16 centares, located in Barrio Dayhagon, Medellin, Cebu.[3] He took
possession of the property and declared it for tax purposes in his name.[4]
Prior to the sale, however, the entire length of the land from north to south was already traversed in the
middle by railroad tracks owned by petitioner Bomedco used for hauling sugar cane from the fields to
petitioners sugar mill and unknown to Valdez heirs Bomedco was able to have the disputed middle lot placed
in its name in the Cadastral Survey and was claimed by Bomedco as its own and was declared for tax purposes
in its name. It was not until 1989 when private respondents discovered the aforementioned claim of Bomedco
on inquiry with the Bureau of Lands. Through their lawyer, they immediately demanded the legal basis for
Bomedco's claim over Cadastral Lot No. 954 but their letter of inquiry addressed to petitioner went unheeded,
as was their subsequent demand for payment of compensation for the use of the land.
Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription Under Art. 1137 of the Civil Code - No extraordinary acquisitive
prescription because petitioner unequivocally declared the property to be a central railroad right of way or
sugar central railroad right of way in its real estate tax until 1963. Art. 1137 does not apply to easement. The
mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not convert petitioners possession into an adverse
one. Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to
vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner.[27] There should be a
hostile use of such a nature and exercised under such circumstances as to manifest and give notice that the
possession is under a claim of right. Legal position was assumed in 1965 complaint filed in 1989.
Laches No laches. Records show that respondent heirs only learned about petitioners claim on their
property when they discovered the inscription for the cadastral survey in the records of the Bureau of Lands in
1989. Respondents lost no time in demanding an explanation for said claim in their letters to the petitioner
dated March 1, 1989 and April 6, 1989. When petitioner ignored them, they instituted their complaint before
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City on June 8, 1989.
Acquisition of Easement of Right of Way By Prescription Under Art. 620 of the Civil Code
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years. In
this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioners trains denotes the existence of an
apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous
easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never
acquired any title over the use of the railroad right of way whether by law, donation, testamentary succession
or contract. Its use of the right of way, however long, never resulted in its acquisition of the easement
because, under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be acquired by
title and not by prescription.To be sure, beginning 1959 when the original 30-year grant of right of way given
to petitioner Bomedco expired, its occupation and use of Cadastral Lot No. 954 came to be by mere tolerance
of the respondent heirs.

Obra v. Padua
In their complaint, respondents alleged that their residential houses, erected on a lot commonly owned by
them and were located west of the properties of the Obras, Bucasases, and Baduas. Their only access to the
national highway was a pathway established in 1955 traversed the northern portion of petitioners property
and the southern portion of the properties of the Bucasases and Baduas. However, petitioner Obra
constructed a fence on the northern boundary of their property; thus, blocking respondents access to the
national highway. Respondents demanded the demolition of the fence, but petitioner refused. Petitioner
claimed that no easement of right of way was established either by law or agreement thus articles 649 and
650 was not complied with. The spouses Badua and Bucasas failed to file an answer; consequently, they were
declared in default and thus a new pathway was used which however, traversed the southern portion of
petitioners property. Sometime in 2001, petitioner constructed a fence on this portion of her lot, which again
restricted the use of respondents new pathway. Aggrieved and prejudiced by petitioners action,
respondents filed on March 6, 2001 a Motion to Enforce the July 7, 2000 Decision of the RTC. They alleged
that the Decision of the RTC dismissing the case was based on the existence of a new pathway which they had
been using since 1995. Thus, they asserted that petitioner was prohibited from closing said passage.
It was held that since the respondents failed to comply with Art. 649 and 650, the case was dismissed and such
dismissal cannot be construed to encompass any grant of right-of-way to respondents relating to the southern
portion owned by petitioner.
No voluntary easement was established between the parties. Glaring is the fact that the terms of the
arrangement were not agreed upon by the parties, more particularly, the payment of the proper
indemnity. The evidence is not ample enough to support the conclusion that there was a verbal agreement on
the right-of-way over the southern portion, More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any
agreement creating it should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed to a real estate, and
ordinarily must be in writing. No written instrument on this agreement was adduced by respondents.

NPC v. Tiangco
Tiangcos are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 152,187 square. On the other hand, petitioner NPC is a
government-owned and controlled corporation created for the purpose of undertaking the development and
generation of power from whatever source and under their charter they can acquire private property and exercise
the right of eminent domain. NPC requires 19,423 square meters of the respondents aforementioned property,
across which its Transmission Line Project will traverse and within which the portion sought to be expropriated
stand fruit-bearing tress, such as mango, avocado, jackfruit, casuy, santol, calamansi, sintones and coconut trees.
NPC made it clear that it is interested only in acquiring an easement of right-of-way over the respondents
property and that ownership of the area over which the right-of-way will be established shall remain with the
respondents. For this reason, NPC claims that it should pay, in addition to the agreed or adjudged value of the
improvements on the area, only an easement fee in an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the market
value of the property as declared by the respondents or by the Municipal Assessor, whichever is lower, as provided
for under Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree 938.6
Should NPC pay for the value of the land being taken, or should it be limited to what is provided for under P.D.
938, that is, ten per cent (10%) of its market value as declared by the owner or the assessor (whichever is lower),

considering that the purpose for which the property is being taken is merely for the establishment of a safe and
free passage for its overhead transmission lines?
In several cases, the Court struck down NPCs consistent reliance on Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as
amended by Presidential Decree 938.18 True, an easement of a right-of-way transmits no rights except the
easement itself, and the respondents would retain full ownership of the property taken. Nonetheless, the
acquisition of such easement is not gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an indefinite period
would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land taken. As correctly
observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use
of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. Finally, if NPC were to
have its way, respondents will continue to pay the realty taxes due on the affected portion of their property, an
imposition that, among others, merits the rejection of NPCs thesis of payment of a mere percentage of the
propertys actual value.For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be
neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.
NPC v. Suares
In issue in the present petition is whether petitioner, the National Power Corporation, in its acquisition of an
easement of right of way (aerial) over a parcel of land, only a fee, not the full value of the land, must be paid.
In accordance with Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 42, petitioner deposited with the Philippine National
Bank, Legazpi City Branch the amount of P7,465.71representing the provisional value of the
property,[3] alleged to cover an area of 24,350 square meters. Respondents filed on May 5, 1997 their
Answer with Counterclaim, alleging that the property covers an area of 34,950, not 24,350 square meters, and
that petitioner had already constructed two transmission towers in the middle of the property, cut
down more or less 737 trees of different varieties (169 fruit bearing coconut trees, 11 coconut trees seven
years old and below, 36 various species of fruit trees, 89 bamboo trees, 77 banana trees, 39 shade trees and
50 madre de cacao trees)[4] and an estimated 562.86 board feet of hardwood trees and 706.80 board feet of
softwood trees.[5] They thus moved for the determination of just compensation which was granted by the
court which appointed commissioners for the purpose and the amount of P783,860.46. Petitioner contends
that since it merely seeks an aerial easement over the property, the decision of the appellate court affirming
the trial courts order for the payment of just compensation in the amount of P783, 860.46 representing the
total value of the property and excluding the application of Section 3A (b) of RA 6395 is erroneous. Petitioners
plea for the application of Section 3A(b) of RA 6395 which directs the payment of an amount equivalent to
only 10% of the market value of the property as just compensation for an easement of right of way does not
lie. True, an easement of right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains
full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly
observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation of power lines, the limitations on
the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this
reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the
monetary equivalent of the land. Petitioners assertion that respondents can still make use of the property by
planting corn, rice, root crops and similar plants[11] fails to consider that the property was originally tilled and
suited for, as reflected in the Commissioners Report, 234 fruit bearing coconut trees, 617 abaca plants,
50 madre de cacao and 23 jackfruit trees.[12] That petitioner prohibited respondents from planting trees
higher than three meters clearly shows that the easement had impaired respondents beneficial enjoyment of
their property to warrant the imposition of payment of its full value.

Goldcrest v. Cypress
Petitioner Goldcrest is the developer of Cypress Gardens, a ten-storey building located at Herrera Street, Legaspi
Village, Makati City. On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions which
constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and incorporated respondent Cypress to manage the
condominium project and to hold title to all the common areas. Title to the land on which the condominium stands
was transferred to Cypress but Goldcrest retained ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth
floors of the condominium registered under Condominium Certificate of Title. Goldcrest and its directors, officers,
and assigns likewise controlled the management and administration of the Condominium until 1995. Following the
turnover of the administration and management of the Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it
was discovered that certain common areas pertaining to Cypress were being occupied and encroached upon by
Goldcrest. Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages against Goldcrest before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking to compel the latter to vacate the common areas it allegedly encroached on and
to remove the structures it built thereon. WON GOLDCREST BUILT AN OFFICE STRUCTURE ON A SUPPOSED
ENCROACHED AREA IN THE OPEN SPACE OF THE ROOF DECK and WON THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT PETITIONER IMPAIRED THE EASEMENT ON THE PORTION OF THE ROOF DECK DESIGNATED AS A LIMITED
COMMON AREA. That Goldcrest built an office structure on the roof decks limited common area is supported by
substantial evidence and established facts, to wit: (1) the ocular inspection reports submitted by HLURB Inspector
Edwin D. Aquino; (2) the fact that the second ocular inspection of the roof deck was intended to measure the actual
area encroached upon by Goldcrest; (3) the fact that Goldcrest had been fined for building a structure on the limited
common area; and (4) the fact that Goldcrest neither denied the structures existence nor its encroachment on the
roof decks limited common area. On the second issue, Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on the
limited common area despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note that not only did Goldcrests act impair the
easement, it also illegally altered the condominium plan, in violation of Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 957.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the
servient estate, to wit: Art. 626 and 627 (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the easement;20 (2) it
cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally contemplated;21 (3) it cannot exercise
the easement in any other manner than that previously established;22 (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is
not necessary for the use and preservation of the easement;23 (5) it cannot alter or make the easement more
burdensome;24 (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on the servient
estate;25 and (7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least
convenience to the owner of the servient estate.26 Any violation of the above constitutes impairment of the
easement.

Privatization v. Legaspi
Caruff owned several parcels of land along Roxas Boulevard and to finance their construction of Legaspi Tower
they obtained a loan from PNB accommodated by a real estate mortgage where they planned to build the said
Tower. However, Caruff failed to pay its loan with PNB, the latter foreclosed the mortgage and acquired some
of the properties of Caruff at the sheriffs auction sale. Thereafter, Proclamation No. 50 was issued and Asset
Privatization Trust (APT) became the assignee and transferee of all its rights and titles to and interests in its
receivables with Caruff, including the properties it acquired from the foreclosure of Caruffs mortgage. Caruff
filed a case against PNB before the RTC of Manila, Branch 2, whereby Caruff sought the nullification of PNBs
foreclosure of its properties. A Compromise Agreement was later entered into by Caruff, PNB, and the
National Government thru APT wherein they agreed that Caruff would transfer and convey in favor of the
National Government, thru the APT, the lot covered by TCT No. 127649 (now TCT No. 200760), where it built
the generating set and sump pumps. Legaspi filed a case for Declaration of the existence of an easement and
alleged that the act of Caruff of constructing the powerhouse and sump pumps on its property constituted a
voluntary easement in favor of the respondent. It prayed, among other things, that judgment be rendered
declaring the existence of an easement over the portion of the property. WON THE PRESENCE OF THE
GENERATOR SET (GENERATING SET) AND SUMP PUMPS CONSTITUES AN EASEMENT. An easement or
servitude is a real right constituted on anothers property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the
owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for
the benefit of another thing or person. The statutory basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil Code, which
provides: Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit
of another immovable belonging to a different owner. The immovable in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate. There are two
sources of easements: by law or by the will of the owners. Article 619 of the Civil Code states: Art.
619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the
latter voluntary easements. In the present case, neither type of easement was constituted over the subject
property. Moreover, Article 613 of the Civil Code does not apply, since no true easement was constituted or
existed, because both properties were owned then by Caruff. Art. 624 applies : The existence of an apparent
sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered,
should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively,
unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This
provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons. From
the foregoing, it can be inferred that when the owner of two properties alienates one of them and an
apparent sign of easement exists between the two estates, entitlement to it continues, unless there is a
contrary agreement, or the indication that the easement exists is removed before the execution of the deed.
In relation thereto, the Compromise Agreement, as approved by the court, clearly states, among other things,
that: Caruff, pledged that it was assigning, transferring, and conveying the subject property in favor of the
National Government thru the APT free from any and all liens and encumbrances.

Salimbango v. Tan
Ceniza siblings inherited several lots from their mother. Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But
Lots D and E were not, they being interior lots. Victoria became the owner of Lot A, one of the three lots
adjacent to the city street. Victoria and her husband (the Salimbangons) constructed a residential house on
this lot and built two garages on it. One garage abutted the street while the other, located in the interior
of Lot A, used the alley or easement of right of way existing on Lot B to get to the street. Victoria had this alley
cemented and gated. Subsequently, however, respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought
Lots B, C, D, and E from all their owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement
area. They also closed the gate that the Salimbangons built. Unable to use the old right of way, the
Salimbangons lodged a complaint with the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans. As originally
constituted in that agreement, each of Lots A and B was to contribute a strip of 1.5 meters between them that
when combined formed a 3-meter wide alley leading from Lots D and E to the street. To the extent that Lots A
and B retained the right to use the 1.5-meter portion that they contributed to the establishment of the
easement, the agreement gave their owners the right to use the common alley as well. As Eduardo testified,
however, the true intent of the heirs was to give Lots D and E access to the street. Lots A and B did not need
this alley since they were facing the street. Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the
owner of Lot B, the easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law. The existence of a
dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates belong to the same
person.

Quintanilla v. Abangon
Sometime in the 1960s, Perfecta bought Lot No. 3771-B-1-A, with an area of 2,244 square meters, located at
Inayawan, Cebu City (the dominant estate) from one Dionisio Abasolo, who formerly owned all the properties
therein. Thereafter, Perfecta donated the dominant estate to Apolinardito, who is now the registered
owner thereof.[4] Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and
export of rattan-made furniture. In the conduct of their business, they use vans to haul and transport raw
materials and finished products. As they wanted to expand their business and construct a warehouse on their
property (the dominant estate), they asked for a right of way from Pedro sometime in April 1994. However,
Pedro sold the subject property to Daryl who constructed a warehouse over the servient estate, enclosing the
same with a concrete fence. Petitioners, thus, sought the imposition of an easement of right of way but RTC
dismissed the case for lack of merit because petitioners failed to establish that the imposition of the right of
way was the least prejudicial to the servient estate. Moreover, the RTC observed that petitioners' insistence
on passing through the servient estate would make for easy and convenient access to the main thoroughfare
for their vans. On this premise, the RTC opined that mere convenience to the dominant estate was not
necessarily the basis for setting up a compulsory easement of right of way. Aggrieved, petitioners went to the
CA on appeal but RTC decision was affirmed thus this petition. a) IN A COMPULSORY EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF
WAY, AS SET FORTH IN THE PRECONDITIONS UNDER ARTICLES 649 AND 650 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, THE
DETERMINATION OF THE LEAST PREJUDICIAL OR LEAST DAMAGE TO THE SERVIENT ESTATE SHOULD BE AT THE
TIME OF THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND NOT AFTER THE FILING, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE
OWNER OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE IS GUILTY OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS CONSIDERED AS THE GREATEST OF ALL

POSSIBLE WRONGS OR BAD FAITH BY CONSTRUCTING A CONCRETE FENCE AND WAREHOUSE THEREON
THROUGH MISREPRESENTATION TO THE OFFICE OF THE CEBU CITY BUILDING OFFICIAL THAT
IT HAD GRANTED A RIGHT OF WAY OF SIX (6) METERS TO PETITIONERS; AND b) WHETHER OR NOT
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRECONDITIONS SET FORTH IN ARTICLES 649 AND 650 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
IS SUPERIOR TO THE MERE CONVENIENCE RULE AGAINST THE OWNER OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE. We hold
that Apolinardito as owner of the dominant estate together with Perfecta failed to discharge the burden of
proving the existence and concurrence of all the requisites in order to validly claim a compulsory right of way
against respondents. It should be remembered that to be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the
following requisites must be satisfied: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts
of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate. The fourth requisite is absent. As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of
strong materials to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way which although
longer will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be preferred. Mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory
easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should
not be imposed. Finally, worthy of note, is the undisputed fact that there is already a newly opened public
road barely fifty (50) meters away from the property of appellants, which only shows that another
requirement of the law, that is, there is no adequate outlet, has not been met to establish a compulsory right
of way.
Velasco v. Meralco
Velasco was the owner of 3 adjoining lots. He then sold two of these to Meralco who later constructed a substation. It
was only separated from the house of petitioner by a wire fence.
HELD:
General rule is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary inconveniences that result from the proximity
of others, and so long as this level is not surpassed, he may not complain against them. But if the prejudice exceeds the
inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the neighbor who causes such disturbance is held responsible for
the resulting damage, being guilty of causing nuisance.
The test is whether the rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question
that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of
living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although
ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds.

Estate of Francisco v. CA
Francisco owned a Quonset constructed on a lot owned by Philippine Ports Authority by virtue of the authority
given by the later. The Quonset was used for the storage of copra. Due to Zoning ordinance no. 157 which
campaigns against illegal squatters and unsanitary surroundings, the Mayor ordered the removal or relocation of
the building. Since the notifications remained unheeded by petitioner, Respondent Mayor ordered the demolition
on 24 May 1989. Aggrieved, petitioner sought a Writ of Prohibition with Injunction and Damages before the
Regional Trial Court. On 7 August 1989, the Trial Court 1 denied the Writ of Prohibition and upheld the power of
respondent Mayor to order the demolition without judicial authority, adverting to Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the
Municipality of Isabela, Basilan. Petitioner duly interposed an appeal. On 6 September 1989, petitioner's quonset
building was completely demolished (Rollo, p. 49). In its place sprang shanties and nipa huts, photographs of which
have been attached to petitioner's Memorandum.
The focal issue for determination is whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial process,
order the demolition of petitioner's quonset building.
Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate safety of persons
and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. The storage of copra in the
quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it cannot be said to be injurious to rights of property, of
health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted
for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. While
the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance, it cannot declare a particular thing as a
nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.
[Municipal councils] do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is
not a nuisance per se nor can they authorize the extra judicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance
which, in its nature, situation or use is not such. These things must be determined in the ordinary courts of law. In
the present case, . . . the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry . . . . If it be in
fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the
board. The petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial heating before a judicial tribunal. Petitioner was in lawful
possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of
Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property was not of trifling
value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building
did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that
respondent public officials of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily
petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of law. The fact that
petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the
Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without
a judicial order being a prejudicial issue. For the precipitate demolition, therefore, petitioner should be entitled to
just compensation, the amount of which is for the Trial Court to determine. We are not inclined to grant petitioner
damages, however, as it simply ignored the demand to remove or relocate its quonset building.

CAPILI vs. CARDAA

G.R. No. 157906
November 2, 2006
FACTS:
Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located within
the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death. The Cardaas filed a case for damages averring that petitioners gross
negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.
Petitioner denied the accusation. Petitioner contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and rotting tree and no one informed her of its
condition and that the tree was an imminent danger to anyone. She argues that she could not see the immediate danger posed by the tree by its
mere sighting even as she and the other teachers conducted ground inspections. She further argues that, even if she should have been aware of
the danger, she exercised her duty by assigning the disposition of the tree to another teacher.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to establish negligence on the part of the petitioner. CA reversed the
decision.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin Cardaa?
HELD:
Yes.
RULING:
The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the school
principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises.
That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the
responsibility of her position.
The fact, however, that respondents daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the schools premises shows that the
tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not
have happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within
the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and
rotting tree which caused the death of respondents daughter was a result of petitioners negligence, being in charge of the school.
Petitioners explanation is wanting. As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the schools premises. The fact that she
failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position.
Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee.
1 wphi1

Gancayco v. City Govt

In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located at 746 Epifanio delos
Santos Avenue (EDSA),[3] Quezon City with an area of 375 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. RT114558.
On 27 March 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled An Ordinance Requiring the
Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in
the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof.[4]
An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the
first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.[5]
Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters
and height of 5.00 meters along EDSA, from the north side ofSantolan Road to one lot after Liberty Avenue,
and from one lot before Central Boulevard to the Botocan transmission line.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was
yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of
buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council
required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few
meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the
edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners
relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.
The ordinance was amended several times. On 8 August 1960, properties located at the Quezon City-San Juan
boundary were exempted by Ordinance No. 60-4477 from the construction of arcades. This ordinance was
further amended by Ordinance No. 60-4513, extending the exemption to commercial buildings from Balete
Street to Seattle Street. Ordinance No. 6603 dated 1 March 1966 meanwhile reduced the width of the arcades
to three meters for buildings along V. Luna Road, Central District, Quezon City.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco
sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of
Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request and issued Resolution No.
7161, S-66, subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable
time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands.[6]
Decades after, in March 2003, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) conducted
operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila Councils
(MMC) Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002.[7] The resolution authorized the MMDA and local government
units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of
all illegal structures and obstructions.[8]

On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his
building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines(Building Code)[9] in relation to Ordinance No.
2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco fifteen (15) days to clear the portion of the building that was
supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.[10]
Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days, the MMDA
proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the wing walls, of the ground floor
structure. The records of the present case are not entirely clear on the extent of the demolition; nevertheless,
the fact of demolition was not disputed. At the time of the demolition, the affected portion of the building
was being used as a restaurant.
On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a Petition[11] with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q03-49693, seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City from demolishing his
property. In his Petition,[12] he alleged that the ordinance authorized the taking of private property without
due process of law and just compensation, because the construction of an arcade will require 67.5 square
meters from the 375 square meter property. In addition, he claimed that the ordinance was selective and
discriminatory in its scope and application when it allowed the owners of the buildings located in the Quezon
City-San Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle Streets to construct arcades at their option.
He thus sought the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 2904 and the payment of damages. Alternately, he
prayed for the payment of just compensation should the court hold the ordinance valid.
The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power,
regulating the use of property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco was already
barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an ordinance that he had
already violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. It further stated that
the questioned property was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA
claimed that it was merely implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904.[13]
The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September 2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco.[14] It held that the
questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancaycos 375
square meters of property were being taken without compensation for the publics benefit, the ordinance was
confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that the ordinance violated owners right to equal protection of
laws. The dispositive portion thus states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the Court hereby declares Quezon City Ordinance No.
2094,[15] Series of 1956 to be unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. The respondents are hereby
permanently enjoined from enforcing and implementing the said ordinance, and the respondent MMDA is
hereby directed to immediately restore the portion of the party wall or wing wall of the building of the
petitioner it destroyed to its original condition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
The MMDA thereafter appealed from the Decision of the trial court. On 18 July 2006, the Court of Appeals
(CA) partly granted the appeal.[16] The CA upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction
against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the ordinance was a
valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents
pursuant to its police powers. The CA also ruled that the ordinance established a valid classification of
property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in their respective properties depending on the
location. The CA further stated that there was no taking of private property, since the owner still enjoyed the
beneficial ownership of the property, to wit:
Even with the requirement of the construction of arcaded sidewalks within his commercial lot, appellee still
retains the beneficial ownership of the said property. Thus, there is no taking for public use which must be
subject to just compensation. While the arcaded sidewalks contribute to the public good, for providing safety
and comfort to passersby, the ultimate benefit from the same still redounds to appellee, his commercial
establishment being at the forefront of a busy thoroughfare like EDSA. The arcaded sidewalks, by their nature,
assure clients of the commercial establishments thereat some kind of protection from accidents and other
hazards. Without doubt, this sense of protection can be a boon to the business activity therein engaged. [17]

Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It
further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and
other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancaycos private property. Lastly, the CA stated
that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances. Thus, the dispositive
portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the appeals are PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 224, Quezon City, is MODIFIED, as follows:
1) The validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 2094,[18] Series of 1956, issued by the City Council of
Quezon City, is UPHELD; and
2)

The injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the said Ordinance is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

This ruling prompted the MMDA and Justice Gancayco to file their respective Motions for Partial
Reconsideration.[19]
On 10 May 2007, the CA denied the motions stating that the parties did not present new issues nor offer
grounds that would merit the reconsideration of the Court.[20]
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the CA, Justice Gancayco and the MMDA filed their respective Petitions for
Review before this Court. The issues raised by the parties are summarized as follows:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF
ORDINANCE NO. 2904.
II.

WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCOS BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.

The Courts Ruling

Estoppel

The MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City both claim that Justice Gancayco was estopped
from challenging the ordinance, because, in 1965, he asked for an exemption from the application of the
ordinance. According to them, Justice Gancayco thereby recognized the power of the city government to
regulate the construction of buildings.
To recall, Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance on two grounds: (1) whether the
ordinance takes private property without due process of law and just compensation; and (2) whether the
ordinance violates the equal protection of rights because it allowed exemptions from its application.
On the first ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the ordinance to
determine whether or not the ordinance constitutes a taking of private property without due process of law
and just compensation. It was only in 2003 when he was allegedly deprived of his property when the MMDA
demolished a portion of the building. Because he was granted an exemption in 1966, there was no taking
yet to speak of.
Moreover, in Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[21] we held:
It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact that petitioner acquiesced in the
special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging
the said imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra
vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority are null and void and cannot be given
any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void
or ultra vires. (Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in British American Tobacco v. Camacho,[22] we likewise held:
We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to comply with all issuances
of the BIR, which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or
misleading act. Indeed, petitioner cannot be faulted for initially undertaking to comply with, and subjecting
itself to the operation of Section 145(C), and only later on filing the subject case praying for the declaration of
its unconstitutionality when the circumstances change and the law results in what it perceives to be unlawful

discrimination. The mere fact that a law has been relied upon in the past and all that time has not been
attacked as unconstitutional is not a ground for considering petitioner estopped from assailing its validity. For
courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to
allow it to be raised later. (Emphasis supplied.)

Anent the second ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of
equal protection when he also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself
requested for an exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one.
Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition as there was yet no valid notice
from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different treatment of
properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do so.
Zoning and the regulation of the
construction of buildings are valid
exercises of police power

In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association,[23] we discussed the nature of police powers exercised by local
government units, to wit:
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is
plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety,
public morals, and the general welfare.

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by
any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers
as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first determine whether there was a
valid delegation of police power. Then we can determine whether the City Government of Quezon City acted
within the limits of the delegation.
It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city council, police power by virtue
of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of Quezon City,[24] which states:

To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein;
and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the
provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.

Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings, the Charter also
expressly provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures
that may be erected within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them.[25]
With regard meanwhile to the power of the local government units to issue zoning ordinances, we apply Social
Justice Society v. Atienza.[26] In that case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila City enacted an ordinance
on 28 November 2001 reclassifying certain areas of the city from industrial to commercial. As a result of the
zoning ordinance, the oil terminals located in those areas were no longer allowed. Though the oil companies
contended that they stood to lose billions of pesos, this Court upheld the power of the city government to
pass the assailed ordinance, stating:
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfil the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the
methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to
the end in view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the area
where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or
municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision
into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued
operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer be permitted. The
power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself
and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of
Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting
burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust... (Emphasis supplied)

In Carlos Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,[27] we also held:

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to
the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare.

Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea
of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.
Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in
question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its
favor. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the
questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its
inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for
commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More especially so because the contested
portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA.
Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code,[28] which was passed after the Quezon City Ordinance, supports
the purpose for the enactment of Ordinance No. 2904. The Building Code states:

Section 102. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health,
property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control;
and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of
minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design quality of materials,
construction, occupancy, and maintenance.

Section 1004 likewise requires the construction of arcades whenever existing or zoning ordinances require it.
Apparently, the law allows the local government units to determine whether arcades are necessary within
their respective jurisdictions.
Justice Gancayco argues that there is a three-meter sidewalk in front of his property line, and the arcade
should be constructed above that sidewalk rather than within his property line. We do not need to address
this argument inasmuch as it raises the issue of the wisdom of the city ordinance, a matter we will not and
need not delve into.
To reiterate, at the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced to guide
the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city council from regulating
the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction.
The wing walls of the building are not
nuisances per se.

The MMDA claims that the portion of the building in question is a nuisance per se.

We disagree.
The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an
indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisancesper se. The wing walls do not per
se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may
declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance.

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or
property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends
the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free
passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A
nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of
persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity.[29]
Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city
engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and
property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to
determine whether a thing is a nuisance. In AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp.,[30] we held:
We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring,
preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang
Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the
power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or
use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in
fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution
of the Sangguniang Bayan. (Emphasis supplied.)

MMDA illegally demolished

the property of Justice Gancayco.

MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is empowered to demolish
Justice Gancaycos property. It insists that the Metro Manila Council authorized the MMDA and the local
government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in

Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. It further alleges that it demolished the property
pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904 as amended.
However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be demolished. The
authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official. The pertinent provisions of
the Building Code provide:
SECTION 205.
Building Officials. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Building Official shall be
responsible for carrying out the provisions of this Code in the field as well as the enforcement of orders and
decisions made pursuant thereto.

Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent Public Works District Engineers,
City Engineers and Municipal Engineers act as Building Officials in their respective areas of jurisdiction.
The designation made by the Secretary under this Section shall continue until regular positions of Building
Official are provided or unless sooner terminated for causes provided by law or decree.

xxx

xxx

xxx

SECTION 207.
Duties of a Building Official. In his respective territorial jurisdiction, the Building Official
shall be primarily responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of this Code as well as of the
implementing rules and regulations issued therefor. He is the official charged with the duties of issuing
building permits.

In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its premises at all reasonable
times to inspect and determine compliance with the requirements of this Code, and the terms and conditions
provided for in the building permit as issued.

When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this Code, the Building Official may order
the work stopped and prescribe the terms and/or conditions when the work will be allowed to resume.
Likewise, the Building Official is authorized to order the discontinuance of the occupancy or use of any
building or structure or portion thereof found to be occupied or used contrary to the provisions of this Code.

xxx

xxx

xxx

SECTION 215.
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. When any building or structure is found or declared
to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon
the degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken
under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)

MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.[31] is applicable to the case at
bar. In that case, MMDA, invoking its charter and the Building Code, summarily dismantled the advertising
media installed on the Metro Rail Transit (MRT) 3. This Court held:
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks' billboards,
signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or
destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks.
In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA's powers were limited to the formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and
administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.

Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:

...The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority". It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these
are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

Sec.2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.- xxx.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise
regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without
diminution of the autonomy of local government units concerning purely local matters.

The Court also agrees with the CA's ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular
No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition
against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to
public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and
MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC Memorandum Circular
No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media in MRT3, because it

did not specifically cover MRT3, and because it was issued a year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the
center island of EDSA. Clearly, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have included MRT3 in its
prohibition.

MMDA's insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096 (Building Code) and its
implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive. The power to enforce the provisions of the Building
Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, considering the
law's following provision, thus:

Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement. The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including the imposition of penalties for
administrative violations thereof is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary."

There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to implement the Building
Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of illegally
constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos (P200.00) or by imprisonment of not more than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court, Provided, that if the violation is committed by a corporation,
partnership, or any juridical entity, the Manager, managing partner, or any person charged with the
management thereof shall be held responsible therefor. The ordinance itself also clearly states that it is the
regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance.

As pointed out in Trackworks, the MMDA does not have the power to enact ordinances. Thus, it cannot
supplement the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 2904 merely through its Resolution No. 02-28.
Lastly, the MMDA claims that the City Government of Quezon City may be considered to have approved the
demolition of the structure, simply because then Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R. Belmonte signed MMDA
Resolution No. 02-28. In effect, the city government delegated these powers to the MMDA. The powers
referred to are those that include the power to declare, prevent and abate a nuisance[32] and to further
impose the penalty of removal or demolition of the building or structure by the owner or by the city at the
expense of the owner.[33]
MMDAs argument does not hold water. There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA. Contrary to
the claim of the MMDA, the City Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the acts of the former. In its

Answer,[34] the city government stated that the demolition was undertaken by the MMDA only, without the
participation and/or consent of Quezon City. Therefore, the MMDA acted on its own and should be held
solely liable for the destruction of the portion of Justice Gancaycos building.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648
is AFFIRMED.