Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC

THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING,
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES,
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO,
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR.,
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES,
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
- versus -

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD

TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents. October 8, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775
WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF
BORACAY SIMILARLY
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,
Petitioners,

- versus -

THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants

of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition
for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
that[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the
petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et
al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No.
173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation
No. 1064[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into
reserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white
sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist
destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants[4] who live in the bone-
shaped islands three barangays.[5]

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named
persons.[7]

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued

Proclamation No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded
them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap
filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-
in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.[10]

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its

implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since
the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their
names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed
the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code,[11] as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. SinceBoracay Island had not
been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the

following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels
of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees
and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less
twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4)
respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.[12]

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely
legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to
the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to
submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.[13]

The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land

in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of
Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed
before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15] The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-

claimants, with a fallo reading:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the
petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in
accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to
have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical
Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the
land.

SO ORDERED.[17]

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands

titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular
No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the
subject of disposition.[18] The Circular itself recognized private ownership of
lands.[19] The trial court cited Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as
basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those
forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.[22]

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[23] The
Republic then appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby

rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the
decision of the lower court.[24]

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a

declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a
forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly

denied.[25] Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island
into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and
six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter
buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-
way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection
purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo

Gelito,[28] and other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
1064.[30] They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights
over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions
of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class
resorts on their lots.[31]

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation

reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor
timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not

have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being
public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the
subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive
department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land classification
of Boracay Island.[33]

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

 The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those
similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in BoracayIsland.[34]

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN
CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY,
SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR
TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC
AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS
DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT
OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS
OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT
APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC6, CA 141 [AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN
TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006,
VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS
PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF
RA 6657.

V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE
SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF
 THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN
BORACAY?[35] (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-

claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have
a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions
pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other
pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902[36] in
relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA
No. 141;[37] (b) Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President Marcos; and (c)
Proclamation No. 1064[39] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall
proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber.[40]Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following
divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by
law,[41] giving the government great leeway for classification.[42] Then the 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks.[43] Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.[44] Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony. [45] The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.[46]

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if
lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the
placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.[49]

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and
possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian
doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and
the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain.[51]

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or

the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as
the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions
which were set forth in said decree.[54] Under Section 393 of the Maura Law,
an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,[55] when duly inscribed in
the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse
of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and
adverse,[56] from the date of its inscription.[57] However, possessory information
title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or
until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.[58]

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or
royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3)composicion con el
estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.[59]

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in

the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill
of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were
classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or
forest lands.[61] The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands
by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).[62] It
also provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural public
lands.[63]Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of
1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]

x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands. x x x[65] (Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496,

otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of
registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and
imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.[66]

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act

No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead
system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of
imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations
regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or
purchase lands of the public domain.[67]Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10)
years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title.[68]

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874,
otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive
law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial
confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]
 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No.
2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the
existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain other than timber and mineral lands,[70] and privately owned lands
which reverted to the State.[71]

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874
of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial
or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act
(RA) No. 1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No.
1073,[73] which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied
for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]

The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.[76] Under the decree, all
holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under
Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February
16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed
by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529,
known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various
laws relative to registration of property.[78] It governs registration of lands under
the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.[79]

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In

keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,such as an official
proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable
or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and
classified.[82]

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of

the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.[83] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.[84] There must still be a positive act declaring land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.[85] The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for
the required number of years is alienable and disposable.[86]

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative

action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are
bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the
Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.[87]

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or
portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already
an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government
(1909).[89] These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown.[90]

Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These

cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions
of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration
courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be
classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each
case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.[91] This was the Courts ruling
in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De
Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be

formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to
private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.

Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission
on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with
implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.[93]

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it
was then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved
the dictum in Ankron that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown.[94]

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to

an argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified
as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902

and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines,
except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable
lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be
utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian
doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land

registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more
specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of
imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or
administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly
cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-
interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them,
their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued
to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not

absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was
proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts
could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron,
this Court stated:

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-

General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to
one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has
trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is
forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent
and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have
just said, many definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, and mineral
lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in
order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable
for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes.
(Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees
upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or
mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid
growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as
agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be
decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present
or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the
lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore,
be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a
question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that
the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide
whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to
one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance,
under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what
portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests
have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the
 land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private
interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No.
1148), may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set aside
and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.
175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)[95] (Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of

lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became private
lands.[96] Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA
No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority,
whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public
domain.[97]

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued
their title in 1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land
registration court of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are
now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act
No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been
filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no
longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private
claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko
v. Register of Deeds of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141,
vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain
was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,[101]De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.[103]

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally

different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were
included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an
alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko
was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land,
which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the
public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.
 Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned
in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874,
including Ankron and De Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases
cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the
authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.

Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create
a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten
(10) years under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the island into private
ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court

of Appeals.[107] Collado,citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law
governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and
leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands,
and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to
perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for
the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the
completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands. In
short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to
public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government;
and that the governments title to public land sprung from the
Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term public land referred to all lands of the
public domain whose title still remained in the government and are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded
the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an

unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The
DENR[109] and the National Mapping and Resource Information
[110]
Authority certify that BoracayIsland is an unclassified land of the public
domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands

of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public
forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for
forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No.
705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD
No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the
island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the
way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and
foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a
forest land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso

beach resorts on the island;[111]that the island has already been stripped of its forest
cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution[112] classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of
wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.[113] The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry[114] is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered
by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water
may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
 proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.[115] (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or

timber land as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our
statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal
status, a classification for legal purposes.[116] At any rate, the Court is tasked to
determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for

judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert
Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that
Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay,
among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist
spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole
of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular
which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-
82 to private lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and disposable[118] does not
by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes
reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule
VIII, Section 3 provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant
to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the
then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as
alienable and disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the

Bureau of Forest Development.
 Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed
to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos
intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale
behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and
private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard
for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is
aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does
not address the areas alienability.[119]

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island,
but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as
Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao
and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding
areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to
name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable
and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned
would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have
been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of

Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7
of CA No. 141[120] provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation
of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.[121]

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public
domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands
is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the
President. Courts have no authority to do so.[122] Absent such classification, the
land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.[123]
 Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved
forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise
provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and
trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or
irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification
of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was
within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates
the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No.
6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that
since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer
convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No.
6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall

cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted
to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or
mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after
the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall
have determined by law, the specific limits of the public
domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did
not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural
land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain
despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.

Republic,[124] the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
 While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified
lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or
timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.[125](Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification

of land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay,
there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with
the opinion of the Department of Justice[126] on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in

Section 4(a) is the word reclassification. Where there has been no previous
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for
purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not]
into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the
Revised Forestry Code, there can be no reclassification of forest lands to speak of
within the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting
the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the
public domain, denominated as public forest under the Revised Forestry Code,
which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.[127]

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of

imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the
occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification
of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.[128]

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation
No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The
island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the
Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
 Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on
the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail
because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable
land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and
disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.[129] Where the land is
not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.[130]

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect

title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were
classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for

declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period of
possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to

prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax
declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent
dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period
of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been
in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants

do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a
right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the
laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are
ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions
in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in
the island.
 One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international
tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of
people have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with
private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and
judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat
umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be
eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of
CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the
residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their
occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to
possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders
of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of
title, such as by homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed
by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to

acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements
under the present land laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for
Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step
necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be
sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the island
partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by
trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover
and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological
conservation is as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their

promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and
activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our
environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice
Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:[134]

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public
policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written
much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for
forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not
without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's
natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the
necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of
serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which
they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas
become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants.
With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With
erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property
crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human
lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans
decalogue.[135]

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No part)
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

*
On official leave per Special Order No. 520 dated September 19, 2008.
**
No part. Justice Nachura participated in the present case as Solicitor General.
[1]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), pp. 37-43. CA-G.R. CV No. 71118, promulgated on December 9, 2004. Penned by
Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.,
concurring.
[2]
Id. at 47-54; Annex C. Spl. Civil Case No. 5403. Penned by Judge Niovady M. Marin, RTC, Kalibo, Branch 5.
[3]
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), pp. 101-114. Annex F. Classifying Boracay Island Situated in the Municipality of
Malay, Province of Aklan Into Forestland (Protection Purposes) and Into Agricultural Land (Alienable and
Disposable) Pursuant to Presidential Decreee No. 705 (Revised Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines). Issued
on May 22, 2006.
[4]
As of the year 2000. http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru6/boracay.htm.
[5]
Manoc-Manoc, Balabag, and Yapak. http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru6/boracay.htm.
[6]
Under Survey Plan No. NR-06-000001.
[7]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 49.
[8]
Id. at 21-23; Annex B. Declaring Certain Islands, Coves, and Peninsulas in the Philippines as Tourist Zones and
Marine Reserves Under the Administration and Control of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
[9]
Id. at 24-27. Rules and Regulations Governing Activities at Boracay Island Tourist Zone.
[10]
Records, pp. 13-32; Annexes A to A-18.
[11]
Issued on May 19, 1975.
[12]
Records, p. 148.
[13]
Id.
[14]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 2.
[15]
Records, p. 148.
[16]
Id. at 177, 178.
[17]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 54.
[18]
Id. at 51.
[19]
Id.; PTA Circular No. 3-82, Rule VIII, Sec. 1(3) states:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in
public lands are declared forest reserves.
[20]
Sec. 87. If all the lands included in the proclamation of the President are not registered under the Land
Registration Act, the Solicitor-General, if requested to do so by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of section fifty-three of this Act.
[21]
Sec. 53. It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands, whenever in the opinion of the President the public interests
shall require it, to cause to be filed in the proper Court of First Instance, through the Solicitor General or the officer
acting in his stead, a petition against the holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant of any land who shall not have
voluntarily come in under the provisions of this chapter or of the Land Registration Act, stating in substance that the
title of such holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant is open to discussion; or that the boundaries of any such land
which has not been brought into court as aforesaid are open to question; or that it is advisable that the title to such
land be settled and adjudicated, and praying that the title to any such land or the boundaries thereof or the right to
occupancy thereof be settled and adjudicated. The judicial proceedings under this section shall be in accordance with
the laws on adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.
[22]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 51.
[23]
Id. at 211-121.
[24]
Id. at 42.
[25]
Id. at 45-46.
[26]
Supra note 3.
[27]
Owner of Waling-Waling Beach Resort and Chairman of the Board of Boracay Foundation, Inc.
[28]
Owner of Willys Beach Resort.
[29]
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), p. 20; Annex A.
[30]
Petitioners in G.R. No. 173775 claim that they are also petitioners in the declaratory case filed in November 1997
before the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan, docketed as Sp. Civil Case No. 5403 and now before this Court as G.R. No.
167707.
[31]
Rollo (G.R No. 173775), pp. 4-5.
[32]
Id. at 4.
[33]
Id. at 143.
[34]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 26.
[35]
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), pp. 280-281.
[36]
An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government in the
Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes. Issued on July 1, 1902.
[37]
An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relative to Lands of the Public Domain. Approved on December 1,
1936.
[38]
See note 8.
[39]
See note 3.
[40]
CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
[41]
CONSTITUTION (1973), Art. XIV, Sec. 10.
[42]
Bernas, S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 830.
[43]
CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. XII, Sec. 3.
[44]
Id.
[45]
Zarate v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 131501, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 322; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 356
Phil. 606, 624 (1998).
[46]
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152.
[47]
Zarate v. Director of Lands, supra; Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA
343; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73246, March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339.
[48]
Republic v. Estonilo, G.R. No. 157306, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 265; Zarate v. Director of Lands, supra.
[49]
De los Reyes v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-47331, June 21, 1983, 122 SCRA 652, citing Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-27455, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 381.
[50]
Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra.
[51]
Id., citing separate opinion of then Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128, and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note
46.
[52]
Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47.
[53]
Effective February 13, 1894.
[54]
De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government, 13 Phil. 159 (1909).
[55]
A valid title based upon adverse possession or a valid title based upon prescription. Noblejas, A.H. and Noblejas,
E.H., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1986 ed., p. 39, citing Cruz v. De Leon, 21 Phil. 199 (1912).
[56]
Ten (10) years, according to Archbishop of Manila v. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593 (1915).
[57]
Noblejas, A.H. and Noblejas, E.H., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, supra at 8.
[58]
Id. at 9; Director of Forest Administration v. Fernandez, G.R. Nos. 36827, 56622 & 70076, December 10, 1990,
192 SCRA 121, 137.
[59]
Id. at 5-11.
[60]
See note 36.
[61]
Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. L-32266, February 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598, 601.
[62]
Noblejas, A.H. and Noblejas, E.H., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, supra note 55, at 347.
[63]
The provisions relevant to the definition are:
Sec. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this Act and except
as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall
immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other
than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations shall not go into effect or have the force of
law until they have received the approval of the President, and when approved by the President they shall
be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless
disapproved or amended by Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force
and effect of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed
sixteen hectares in extent.
Sec. 14. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered to enact
rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public
lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had
fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of
Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine
Commission is authorized to issue patents, without compensation, to any native of said Islands,
conveying title to any tract of land not more than sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and
had been actually occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
Sec. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered, on such
terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to
actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public
domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not
exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of not more than one
thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided, That the grant
or sale of such lands, whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be
conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for
a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or
encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights and title of
inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents.
[64]
10 Phil. 175 (1908).
[65]
Id. at 182.
[66]
Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47.
[67]
Noblejas, A.H. and Noblejas, E.H., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, supra note 55.
[68]
Sec. 54, par. 6.
[69]
Sec. 45(b); Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112172, November 20, 2000, 345 SCRA
96; Director of Lands v. Buyco, G.R. No. 91189, November 27, 1992, 216 SCRA 78.
[70]
Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47, see separate opinion of Justice Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 51, and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note 46.
[71]
Sec. 2.
[72]
An Act to Amend Subsection (b) of Section Forty-Eight of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty-
One, Otherwise Known as the Public LandAct. Approved on June 22, 1957.
[73]
Extending the Period of Filing Applications for Administrative Legislation (Free Patent) and Judicial
Confirmation of Imperfect and Incomplete Titles to Alienable and Disposable Lands in the Public Domain Under
Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, As Amended, For Eleven (11) Years
Commencing January 1, 1977. Approved on January 25, 1977.
[74]
Republic v. Doldol, G.R. No. 132963, September 10, 1998, 295 SCRA 359.
[75]
Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in
Land Registration Proceedings (IssuedFebruary 16, 1976).
[76]
Director of Forest Administration v. Fernandez, supra note 58, citing Director of Lands v. Rivas, G.R. No. L-
61539, February 14, 1986, 141 SCRA 329.
[77]
Lands which were not recorded under the Maura Law and were not yet covered by Torrens titles.
[78]
Presidential Decree No. 1529, Preamble; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47.
[79]
Pea, N. and Pea, Jr., N., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 ed., p. 9.
[80]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48227, August 21, 1991, 201 SCRA 1; Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 83609, October 26, 1989, 178 SCRA 708.
[81]
Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic, G.R. No.
151312, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 209; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47,
citing Director of Lands v. Aquino, G.R. No. 31688, December 17, 1990, 192 SCRA 296.
[82]
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note 46.
[83]
Republic v. Lao, G.R. No. 150413, July 1, 2003; 405 SCRA 291; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, supra note 47, citing Director of Lands v. Aquino, supra.
[84]
Republic v. Lao, supra; Pagkatipunan v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 377, 389-390 (2002).
[85]
Republic of the Philippines v. Muoz, G.R. No. 151910, October 15, 2007.
[86]
Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v.
Republic, supra; Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 54472-77, September 28, 1989, 178 SCRA 37.
[87]
Republic v. Naguiat, G.R. No. 134209, January 24, 2006, 479 SCRA 585.
[88]
40 Phil. 10 (1919).
[89]
Supra note 54.
[90]
Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, supra at 16.
[91]
Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic, supra note 81.
[92]
Id. at 76.
[93]
Id. at 219-223.
[94]
Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, supra note 88, at 16.
[95]
Id. at 15-16.
[96]
Act No. 2874, Sec. 8; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155450, August 6, 2008; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 127245, January 30, 2001.
96-a
Bureau of Forestry v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-37995, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 351, 357.
[97]
Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic, supra note 81.
[98]
The records do not show the manner in which title was issued to the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol.
[99]
Records, p. 179.
[100]
79 Phil. 461 (1947).
[101]
Supra note 64.
[102]
Supra note 54.
[103]
Supra note 88.
[104]
Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
[105]
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, supra note 100, at 468-469.
[106]
Act No. 926, Sec. 54, par. 6 states:
SEC. 54. The following described persons or their legal successors in right, occupying lands in the
Philippines, or claiming to own any such land or interest therein but whose titles to such land have not
been perfected may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit
xxxx
(6) All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against
the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this act, except when
prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
 essential to a Government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
[107]
Supra note 47.
107-a
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128.
[108]
Collado v. Court of Appeals, id. at 356.
[109]
Records, p. 101; Annex A.
[110]
Id. at 106; Exhibit 1-a.
[111]
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), p. 5.
[112]
CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. XII, Sec. 3; CONSTITUTION (1973), Art. XIV, Sec. 10, as amended;
and CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
[113]
Republic v. Naguiat, supra note 87.
[114]
G.R. No. L-27873, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69.
[115]
Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, id. at 75.
[116]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-56948, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 476, 482-483.
[117]
Sec. 3 provides:
Establishment of or low-density human settlements in private lands, or subdivisions, if any, subject to
prior approval by the Ministry of Human Settlements, PTA and local building officials; Provided, that no
structures shall be constructed within 30 meters from the shorelines.
[118]
Sec. 5 states:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.
[119]
Pars. 3-4.
[120]
SEC. 6. The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources), shall from time to time classify lands of the public
domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
And may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the President,
upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources), shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.
[121]
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47; Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 64753, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 795.
[122]
Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon, G.R. No. 73974, May 31, 1995, 244 SCRA 537; Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47.
[123]
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47, citing Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-36847, July 20, 1983, 123 SCRA 441; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
45202, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 742.
[124]
Supra note 81.
[125]
Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic, id. at 222-223.
[126]
Reconsideration of DOJ Opinion No. 169, s. 1993, on the DOJ affirmative stand on whether the prohibition
against the reclassification of forest lands applies to unclassified public forest.
[127]
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), p. 139.
[128]
Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, G.R. No. 158449, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 188; Republic v. Lao, supra
note 83.
[129]
Public Land Act, Sec. 48(b).
[130]
Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, supra note 69.
[131]
Commonwealth Act No. 141, Chapter IV.
[132]
Id., Chapter V.
[133]
House Bill No. 1109. Declaring Certain Parcels of the Public Domain Within Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan as
Agricultural Land Open to Disposition.
[134]
G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, cited in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v.
Dumyung, G.R. Nos. L-31666-68, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 532.
[135]
Director of Forestry v. Muoz, id. at 1214.