THIRD DIVISION

AAA,* G.R. No. 171465

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario, and
Nachura, JJ.
HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Promulgated:
San Fernando City, La Union and
ENGR. JAIME O. ARZADON,
Respondents. June 8, 2007

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for certiorari[1] assails the December 16, 2005[2] Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San
Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 6983, dismissing the rape case filed against private respondent Jaime
O. Arzadon for lack of probable cause; and its February 3, 2006 [3] Order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center from February 28,
2001 to August 16, 2001. On May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m., Arzadon asked her to deliver a book to an office
located at another building but when she returned to their office, the lights had been turned off and the gate was
closed. Nevertheless, she went inside to get her handbag.

On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He told her to go near
him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe and forced her to lie on the pavement. He
removed her pants and underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She wept and cried out for help but to
no avail because there was nobody else in the premises.

Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her family. But when
she discovered that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape, she narrated the incident to her
parents. On July 24, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for rape against Arzadon.
On September 16, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Imelda Cosalan issued a Resolution [4] finding probable cause
and recommending the filing of an information for rape. Arzadon moved for reconsideration and during the
clarificatory hearing held on October 11, 2002, petitioner testified before the investigating prosecutor. However,
she failed to attend the next hearing hence, the case was provisionally dismissed.

On March 5, 2003, petitioner filed another Affidavit-Complaint[5] with a comprehensive account of the
alleged rape incident. The case was assigned to 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo. During
the preliminary investigation, petitioner appeared for clarificatory questioning. On June 11, 2003, the
investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution[6] finding that a prima facie case of rape exists and recommending
the filing of the information.

Arzadon moved for reconsideration and requested that a panel of prosecutors be constituted to review the
case. Thus, a panel of prosecutors was created and after the clarificatory questioning, the panel issued
on October 13, 2003 a Resolution[7] finding probable cause and denying Arzadons motion for reconsideration.

An Information[8] for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union
on February 6, 2004, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6415. Thereafter, Arzadon filed a Motion to Hold in
Abeyance All Court Proceedings Including the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and to Determine Probable
Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest.[9] On March 18, 2004, respondent Judge Antonio A.
Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand for
determination of probable cause.
Arzadon also appealed the Resolution of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause before the
Department of Justice. On July 9, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas Gutierrez found no
probable cause and directed the withdrawal of the Information in Criminal Case No. 6415.[10]

Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner, however, Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales reversed
the July 9, 2004 Resolution and issued another Resolution[11] finding that probable cause exists. Thus, a new
Information[12] for rape was filed against Arzadon docketed as Criminal Case No. 6983.

Consequently, Arzadon filed an Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause for the Purpose of
Issuing a Warrant of Arrest.[13] In an Order dated August 11, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell granted the
motion and directed petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand.

Instead of taking the witness stand, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the
documentary evidence sufficiently established the existence of probable cause. Pending resolution thereof, she
likewise filed a petition[14] with this Court for the transfer of venue of Criminal Case No. 6983. The case was
docketed as Administrative Matter No. 05-12-756-RTC and entitled Re: Transfer of Venue of Criminal Case No.
6983, formerly Criminal Case No. 6415, from the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando City,
La Union, to any Court in Metro Manila.
 In a Resolution[15] dated January 18, 2006, the Court granted petitioners request for transfer of
venue. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and docketed as Criminal Case
No. 06-242289. However, the proceedings have been suspended pending the resolution of this petition.

Meanwhile, on December 16, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed Order dismissing
Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied hence,
this petition.

Petitioner raises the following issues:

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND
THE SUBSEQUENT DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

II

RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED FURTHER ACTS CONSTITUTING GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
ORDERED THE COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES TO TAKE THE STAND FOR THE
PURPOSE OF DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE

III

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE

REFUSED TO INHIBIT FROM FURTHER HANDLING THE CASE DESPITE WHISPERS
OF DOUBT ON HIS BIAS AND PARTIALITY
IV

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT

ISSUED THE ORDER OF FEBRUARY 3, 2006, DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, DESPITE THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 18,
2006, GRANTING THE TRANSFER OF VENUE
Petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses in
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. She argues that
respondent Judge Carbonell should have taken into consideration the documentary evidence as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes which sufficiently established the existence of probable cause.

Arzadon claims that the petition should be dismissed outright for being the wrong mode of appeal, it appearing
that the issues raised by petitioner properly fall under an action for certiorari under Rule 65, and not Rule 45, of
the Rules of Court.
 Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment[17] that the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor is not binding or obligatory, and that he was justified in requiring petitioner and her
witnesses to take the witness stand in order to determine probable cause.

The issues for resolution are 1) whether the petition should be dismissed for being the wrong mode of
appeal; and 2) whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal
Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.

The petition has merit.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is distinct from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
in that the former brings up for review errors of judgment while the latter concerns errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an
allowable ground under Rule 45. However, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be considered
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where it is alleged that the respondents abused their discretion in their
questioned actions, as in the instant case.[18] While petitioner claims to have brought the instant action under
Rule 45, the grounds raised herein involve an alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge
Carbonell. Accordingly, the Court shall treat the same as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

However, we must point out the procedural error committed by petitioner in directly filing the instant
petition before this Court instead of the Court of Appeals, thereby violating the principle of judicial hierarchy of
courts. It is well-settled that although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [19] In
this case, however, the gravity of the offense charged and the length of time that has passed since the filing of
the complaint for rape, compel us to resolve the present controversy in order to avoid further delay.[20]

We thus proceed to the issue of whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.

We rule in the affirmative.

Respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the
ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply with his orders to take the witness stand. Thus

In RESUME therefore, as indubitably borne out by the case record and considering that
the Private Prosecutor, despite several admonitions contumaciously nay contemptuously refused
to comply/obey this Courts Orders of March 18, 2004, August 11, 2005 and eight (8) other
similar Orders issued in open Court that directed the complainant/witnesses to take the witness
stand to be asked probing/clarificatory questions consonant with cited jurisprudential rulings of
the Supreme Court, this Court in the exercise of its discretion and sound judgment finds and so
 holds that NO probable cause was established to warrant the issuance of an arrest order and the
further prosecution of the instant case.

Record also shows in no unclear terms that in all the scheduled hearings of the case, the
accused had always been present. A contrario, the private complainant failed to appear during the
last four (4) consecutive settings despite due notice without giving any explanation, which to the
mind of the Court may indicate an apparent lack of interest in the further prosecution of this
case. That failure may even be construed as a confirmation of the Defenses contention reflected
in the case record, that the only party interested in this case is the Private prosecutor, prodded by
the accuseds alleged hostile siblings to continue with the case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for utter lack of probable cause, the instant case is
hereby ordered DISMISSED.[21]
He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

However, in the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar,[22] the Court explained that this constitutional
provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses. Thus:

The addition of the word personally after the word determined and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to other responsible officers as may
be authorized by law, has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination
of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant
of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.[23]

We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon,[24] where we held that before issuing
warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. In doing
so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.[25]

It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of
issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged is the function of the investigating
prosecutor.[26]

True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judges personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal examination is not mandatory and
indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity
arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause.
[27]
Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise
evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.

Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should not
rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez,[28] we stressed that the judge
should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary
evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating
prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.[29] If the report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is
sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses be conducted.

In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 without taking into
consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo, the
October 13, 2003 Resolution of the panel of prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005 Resolution of the Department
of Justice, all of which sustain a finding of probable cause against Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to evaluate
the evidence in support thereof. Respondent judges finding of lack of probable cause was premised only on the
complainants and her witnesses absence during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial
determination of probable cause.

Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her Sinumpaang Salaysay[30] dated July 24,
2002 and Complaint-Affidavit[31] dated March 5, 2003. She attended several clarificatory hearings that were
conducted in the instant case. The transcript of stenographic notes[32] of the hearing held on October 11,
2002 shows that she positively identified Arzadon as her assailant, and the specific time and place of the
incident. She also claimed that she bore a child as a result of the rape and, in support of her contentions,
presented the child and her birth certificate as evidence. In contrast, Arzadon merely relied on the defense of
alibi which is the weakest of all defenses.

After a careful examination of the records, we find that there is sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause. The gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private complainant under any of the
circumstances provided in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. [33] Petitioner has categorically
stated that Arzadon raped her, recounting her ordeal in detail during the preliminary investigations. Taken with
the other evidence presented before the investigating prosecutors, such is sufficient for purposes of establishing
probable cause. It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Probable cause is that which engenders a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not
require that the evidence would justify conviction. [34]

It is clear therefore that respondent Judge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in dismissing Criminal
Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to take the
witness stand. Considering there is ample evidence and sufficient basis on record to support a finding of
probable cause, it was unnecessary for him to take the further step of examining the petitioner and her
witnesses. Moreover, he erred in holding that petitioners absences in the scheduled hearings were indicative of a
lack of interest in prosecuting the case. In fact, the records show that she has relentlessly pursued the same.

Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth. [35] As it were, the incidents of
this case have been pending for almost five years without having even passed the preliminary investigation
stage. Suffice to say that the credibility of petitioner may be tested during the trial where the respective
allegations and defenses of the complainant and the accused are properly ventilated. It is only then that the truth
as to Arzadons innocence or guilt can be determined.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San
Fernando, La Union dated December 16, 2005, and February 3, 2006 dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for
lack of probable cause are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Information in the said case is
hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila is DIRECTED to take cognizance of the
case and let the records thereof be REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.