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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin
F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them
prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was
declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated
without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the
processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement
of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182
was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to
Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that
the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted
by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order
her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E.
Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they
discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their
marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro
Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO
who were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as
said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to
apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the
marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the
alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the
parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the
certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the
marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that
the certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record
adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court
for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she
had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the
certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the
legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent
appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar,
regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no.
3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to
Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a
record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not
adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having
custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to
be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications
for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued
and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently
proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in
itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her
testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the
subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is
one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily
used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and
Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against
her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of
the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was
properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to
participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was
collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that
indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have
been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage
license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
1 Filed on February 19, 1987 and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50117.
2 Decision dated June 30, 1987, issued by Presiding Judge Antonio P. Solano, Quezon
City RTC, Branch LXXXVI; Rollo, pp. 46-48.
3 Sixteenth Division, penned by Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, with Mr. Justices Ricardo J.
Francisco and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, concurring; Decision dated November 27,
1991, Rollo, pp. 38-42.
4 Articles 53 (4) and 58, New Civil Code.
5 Article 80 (3), New Civil Code.
6 Article 70, New Civil Code.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000]
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO
SY, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision[1] dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144,
which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the
petition[3] for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15,
1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.[4] Both were then 22 years old. Their
union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and
February 14, 1978,respectively.[5]
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and
later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga.[6]
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived
separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick
transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and from then on,
lived with his father.[7]
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900
before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the
action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband
abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for more than one year; and
that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing
the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. [8] Judgment was rendered
dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties
based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. [9] The trial court also granted
custody of the children to Filipina.[10]
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the
afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her
husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga.
While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family computer.
Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance,
Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body.
Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released
her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different
parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate
issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her.[11]
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision[12] dated April 26, 1990, convicted
Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment. Edpmis
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 8273,on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3)
attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable
cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its
decision[13] dated December 4,1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical
violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their
daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition[14] for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered
by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal
separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her
husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as
manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2)
refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3)
refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina
alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of
their marriage and became manifest thereafter. [15]
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision[16] dated December 9, 1993,
denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It
stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological
incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Lexjuris
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the
decision[17] of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner
concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence
required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover,
the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of
respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding
of the trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the
date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living
together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it
found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on record. [18]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution
dated November 21, 1996.[20]
Hence, this appeal by certiorari[21] wherein petitioner now raises the following issues: Jurismis
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY

OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT
FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON
BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO
APPELLEE [herein respondent];

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW
THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED
OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN
1973;Jjjuris

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF
THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE
COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND
ALSO BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A
REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA

20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.[22]
In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning
for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage
license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage
license are different and incongruous. Jksm
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as
this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, [23] in a number of instances, we have
relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist
to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be
applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would be
defeated.[24] Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the
operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil. [25] In our view, the case at bar requires that
we address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and Fernando which petitioner
claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of
a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts
are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage
before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of
the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the
beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted
before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17,
1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A"
in the course of the trial.[26] The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta.
Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as
stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it.[27] This fact was also affirmed by
petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination, [28] as follows: Es m
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November
15,1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and
daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B"
and "C" in the course of the trial.[29] These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show
that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a
formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract
shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither
petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.[30]
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not
expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the
actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the
documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year
after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage
was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying
these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code[31] is clearly applicable in this case. There being no
claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent
could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79[32] of the Civil Code. We thus
conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning. Es msc
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth
certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were
marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined
and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due
execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she
affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are
of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely
object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. [33]
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain us.
It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of
a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized. Esmm is
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the
Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside.
The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private
respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of
celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,

vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19
May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N.
Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the
Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain
Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of
Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the
Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were
married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969 5 at the Most
Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of
Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license
after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the
city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain
Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied
them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That
although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969
was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any
marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose
M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E")
was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage
license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were
again wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage
contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated.
Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his
and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at
Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents
continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his
medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for
him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but
they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this
time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff
obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a
judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was
engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he
made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage
license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the
religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh.
"J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were
all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued
Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September
20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office."
Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of the
marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April
11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been
civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792
issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael
Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic
relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she
was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who
was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff,
she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back
to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's
mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the
elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of everything, and promised
to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to
marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98,
p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After
the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they
had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since
defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding
preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual consummation during their
honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr.
Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing
psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem
compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his
obsession over her knees of which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff
preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while
real sex between them was far and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their
marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug
addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks
things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like,
"speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take barbiturates or downers, like
"mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has
become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in
Spain for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send
some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who
was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff
physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she
learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his
daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they
returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons
practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's
expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's
family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her
sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to
the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff
inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable
differences with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce
each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on
June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact
authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his
adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE")
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the
same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus
appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial
court made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence
of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications
(Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no.
2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on
May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value under the
rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and
Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May
19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B.
Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the
requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-
69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the
Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information. 7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the
Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome
by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is
rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said testimony
We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage
contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San
Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such
marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage
license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny,
there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no.
2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential
requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts
on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in
a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of
regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from
the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage
license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a
marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the
marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and
void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the
parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of
marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local
Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cario v. Cario13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record
of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar
should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it
was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor
was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required
to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date
the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite
diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or
entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan
in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and
deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11
March 1994. It reads:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic)
to Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with
regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.
September 20, 1994

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application
was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by
this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil
Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal
intent it may serve.
July 25, 2000

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work
cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said
statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both
certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to
the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the
said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of
the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the
claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other
things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the
:Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did
you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your
office maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number
issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him
how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this
2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the
books? Which is which now, was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to
locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of
regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is
effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted
and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or
one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption
is that an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x. 21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by
other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the
tenor of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License
No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be
found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily
accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. 23 The courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. 24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years
producing two offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the
petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991. 27 We
are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. 29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio Always presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest
sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like
this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.
Footnotes
1
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74416, penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with
Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Rollo, pp. 20-31.
2 Rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.
3 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-4.
4 Id. at 5.
5 Id. at 232.
6 Rollo, pp. 47-50.
7 Id. at 50-52.
8 Id. at 29-31.
9
Id. at 80-81.
10 ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

11 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title,
but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides.
12 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

charater.
13 G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133-134.
14 G.R. No. 103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.
15 Records, Vol. I, p. 103.
16Atty. Josa Ma. Abola, counsel for Jaime Sevilla testified before the trial court that in his letter
requesting for the issuance of a certification, addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, he mistakenly read the Marriage License No. as 2880792 instead of 2770792. (Records,
Vol. II, pp. 725-726.)
17
Id. at 228.
18 Records, Vol. II, p. 888.
19 Id. at 735-737.
20 Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
xxxx
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence;
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

21 People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, 9 February 1994, 229 SCRA 795, 798-799.
22 Mabsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224 (2003).
23 Article 220 Civil Code, Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648, 655 (2000).
24 Ricardo J. Francisco, BASIC EVIDENCE (2nd ed., 1999), p. 77.
25 Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 735, 740.
26 Records, Vol. II, p. 413, TSN, 11 April 1996.
27 Id. at p. 414.
28 Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 663 (2000).
29Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180-181 (1996) cited in Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R.
No. 145370, 4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740.
30 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 709 (1999).
31 Id.
32 G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 439.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex?
May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines
Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts
as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a
mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always
felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners
misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or
the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of
their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition
despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit
to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender
from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or
sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of
Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As
found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to
the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of
RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the
civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was
not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong
venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate
is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice
him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far
as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108
now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of

clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the
like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected
or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as
a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor
even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities
and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate
or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status include such
matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn
child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall
be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later
than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by
either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date
and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e)
place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations
to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in
the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female is "the sex that
produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless
the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used
then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through
the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry
for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries
in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground
of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This
is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners
petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what
proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer
on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a
law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only
apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people
whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of
social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies
petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as well as his Bachelor of Science in
Statistics and Master of Arts, in the University of the Philippines. He took up Population
Studies Program, Master of Arts in Sociology and Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology at the
University of Hawaii, in Manoa, Hawaii, U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.
2 This consisted of "penectomy [surgical removal of penis] bilateral oschiectomy [or

orchiectomy which is the surgical excision of the testes] penile skin inversion vaginoplasty
[plastic surgery of the vagina] clitoral hood reconstruction and augmentation mammoplasty
[surgical enhancement of the size and shape of the breasts]." Id.
3 On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February 6, 2003.
4 Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-53.
5 Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).

6 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.
7 Special Sixth Division.
8Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices Marina
L. Buzon and Aurora Santiago-Lagman concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.
9 Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.

10An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a
Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the
Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for the Purpose Articles 376 and
412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
11 Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March 2005, 454 SCRA 155.
12 Id.
13 K v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560 P.2d 1070 (1977).
14Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name" refers to a name or nickname given to a person
which may consist of one or more names in addition to the middle names and last names.
Thus, the term "first name" will be used here to refer both to first name and nickname.
15 The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. xxx xxx xxx
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general,
the petitioner may either appeal the decision to the civil registrar general or file the
appropriate petition with the proper court.
16 SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. Any person having direct and personal
interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first
name or nickname in the civil register may file, in person, a verified petition with the local civil
registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or
changed is kept.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not be
practical for such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in
person before the local civil registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or changed, the
petition may be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the place where the interested
party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then
communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may file
their petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be
processed in accordance with this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames
may be availed of only once.
17 SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. The petition shall be in the form of an
affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by the law to administer oaths.
The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of the petition and shall
show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify to the matters stated. The petitioner
shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or
the change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book
containing the entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed;
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries
upon which the correction or change shall be based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the
consul general may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be supported with the
documents mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall
be published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification from the appropriate law
enforcement agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record.
18 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA 189.
19 Supra note 11.
20 Id.
21 In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).
22 Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).
23 Id.
24 Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 420.
25
Id.
26 Id.
27 Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
28 Salonga, Jovito, Private International Law, 1995 Edition, Rex Bookstore, p. 238.
29 This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407 and 412 of the Civil Code
which authorizes the recording of acts, events and judicial decrees or the correction or change
of errors including those that occur after birth. Nonetheless, in such cases, the entries in the
certificates of birth are not be corrected or changed. The decision of the court granting the
petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the civil register in
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil Register of Manila, supra note 24)
30 The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes "male" or "female" but the genitals
of the child are that of the opposite sex.
31Moreover, petitioners female anatomy is all man-made. The body that he inhabits is a male
body in all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied.
32 Blacks Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.1406.
33 Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p. 106.
34In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221 (No. 2002-T-0149, slip op.,
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist., December 31, 2003), citing
Websters II New College Dictionary (1999).
35 Id.
36
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619.
37
Article 1, Family Code.
38
Article 2(1), Id.
39These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include nightwork prohibition,
facilities for women, prohibition on discrimination and stipulation against marriage, among
others.
40These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on qualified seduction, simple
seduction and acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party and Articles 342
and 343 on forcible and consented abduction, among others.
41
Section 3(jj)(4).
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.

VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of
Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are
Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-
Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992,
herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of
marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an
appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the
custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply
to Answers of Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to
Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and
recommendation. The case was however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N.
Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent
Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative matter,
as culled from the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage
license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P.
Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer,
Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A,
respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign
their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several
days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil
registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of
respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter
opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the
court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was
filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that
the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to
furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar;
and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case.
Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by
respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by
the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly
Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license
requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the
marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order
to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage
license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that
the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized
because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and place
of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that
the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor,
Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not
celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license; that the
marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due
to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate,
he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages
solemnized and the number of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the
month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void;
that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July,
1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which
were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for
each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the
difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated by
respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon
Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for the entries made therein; that
the reported marriages are merely based on the payments made as solemnization fees which are in
the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of
the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in
the notarial fees because she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself;
that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is
remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to
the general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated
by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly
report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was
intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be
based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized in
the same month. He claims that there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the month of
July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who
should be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he is the one in
charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation
for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is
not the one supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to
sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded
to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog.
However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October
21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a
brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning unit
but when she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer
needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The installation and
use thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court to
the Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in
the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been
appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item
which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman
Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that
she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear
in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never
returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money was turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court, then
turned over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the
cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same,
she should follow the proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman
to deliver the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the
payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his house,
one of whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former escaped
and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an
order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners and
that he has adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had
been pending for more than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that
while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the
Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because respondent
judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank;
that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to
encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same in any bank account for clearing;
that respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after the check was cleared, she
remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of
Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared
and submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the
administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably impressed
by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report.
We commend the investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said
report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical illations, we hereby
approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge
Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized without a marriage license the marriage
of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh.
B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma
Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to
show the number of the marriage was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the
Family Code were not filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed
their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage
contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their
marriage certificate as he claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the contracting parties were not
furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent
either a copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge
Palaypayon without a marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo
Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the
photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-
9) sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya
declared that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after
their marriage was solemnized and bring with them their marriage license. In the
meantime, they already started living together as husband and wife believing that the
formal requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte
because the parties allegedly did not have a marriage license. He declared that in fact
he did not sign the marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the
parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya
and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he was
solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not
a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the
contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show that as if he was
solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was
already prepared, visitors were already invited and the place of the parties where the
reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion
of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did
not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the
parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage
certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His
uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who
also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge
Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their marriage license and whose
credibility had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the
marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-
3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to show
a simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may convince a person of
the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows
himself to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of
a person whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly
improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit
by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and
in fact he did not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon
admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of
the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here
executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for
almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it
was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7)
days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost six
(6) years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano
must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as
his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this
when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an
instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married
again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation
given by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the
second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34
of the Family Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not
follow his instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show
when he solemnized the marriage and that the contracting parties were not furnished a
copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for
the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the
first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized
under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon
had already signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first
marriage under exceptional character where a marriage license was not required, why
did he already require the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized their
marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin
was not a marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the date when the
marriage was solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of
their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds under
Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the
beginning. Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the
marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot
just absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the
guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty
to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and
Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and
Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their
marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents
that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a
marriage license. On cross-examination, however, both admitted that they did not know
who prepared their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito
Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal
building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their
marriage contract was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso
and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages,
the solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and
signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga
allegedly because there was no marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first
denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she
sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the marriage
was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the
marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she
wanted to give the impression that she did not even know that the marriage was
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of
Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed
the marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly
did not solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon
submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his
testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has
no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the
contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he
already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of preparing
the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage
contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among
others. His purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing
marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not
illegal, because the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the
solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other as husband and wife before
the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are
supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice

and procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken
during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of
respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s)
been to let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only
after Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really
solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report
of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases
and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly
report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only four (4)
marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge

Palaypayon has presented and marked in evidence several marriage contracts of other
persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs.
12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this
case. Besides, the marriage contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial as
Judge Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also.
He is not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly
report of cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report the
actual number of documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the
notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the monthly
report of cases for July and September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992
both signed by the respondents, show that for said month there were six (6) documents
notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to
H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows
that there were actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge
Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of cases
for July, 1992 because there were only six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for)
as shown by official receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged
official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid.
Besides, the monthly report of cases with respect to the number of documents notarized
should not be based on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees,
but the number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking anymore
the correctness of the monthly reports because he relies on his co-respondent who is
the Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the records.
He merely signs the monthly report when it is already signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have
close supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he certifies
as to their correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper discharge
of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In
Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind
the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the monthly
report of cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not
only the monthly report of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage contracts,
notarized documents and the notarial register. By her own admission she has assigned
to complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to perform, yet according to her she
never bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out the number of
documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of
cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he claims that he only typed the
monthly report based on the data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and
check whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage
contracts, notarized documents and notarial register, among other things, is not
acceptable not only because as clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody,
control and supervision of all court records including documents and other properties of
the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from January,
1992 she was already in full control of all the records of the court including receipts
(TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification,
however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not account for what happened to the
notarial fees received for those documents notarized during the month of July and
September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that she
received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or to the Municipal
Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by
Judge Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said month were actually one
hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there
were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month, though the notarial
register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for
each document notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent
Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually being charged was P20.00.
Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was
being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the
Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document notarized and to the
Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted
for considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were allowed by her
at her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been
accounted for by Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances
where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage license the
solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the contracting parties made a
demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any
instance when solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not solemnized
due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of the
notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only because Sambo vehemently
denied it, but the minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac
dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the personnel of the
court that she was taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the
collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn
over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already.
Besides there never was any demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial
fees supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on
this matter, in spite of the fact that she has been holding meetings and issuing
memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A
(supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a
certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to
her after she assumed office and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt
(Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer.
She just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case
where the cash bond was deposited informed her that they would settle the case
amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in
February, 1993, after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-
93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened an account with the
LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of Two
Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand
(P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true, it
was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for
around one year and five months when she finally deposited it because of the filing of
this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank
without any authority or order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after
almost three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond
(TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993 respondent
Baroy received also a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain
Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent
Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just
kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit
it either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the
parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle the case amicably. It
was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an
order for the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991
she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments
and collections she received. She further admitted that some of these temporary
receipts she issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that receipt
marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know that she
had to use the official receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993,
after this case was already filed, when she only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of Court,
Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with
respect to this charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for
the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1).
The same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air
conditioner was brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of Judge
Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was bought and was not used
yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand
(P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt
dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents and by the
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy
at a time when she was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she
was eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air
conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it
was not used yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere
typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt
could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in the
receipt as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court
and the Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at
least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would subject (them) to suspicion
and (their) conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs.
Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara
executed an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a
receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has
no probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way
into the hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this
has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to work
in his house and one of them escaped while in his custody and was never found again.
To hide this fact, the case against said accused was ordered archived by Judge
Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this particular charge, show that in
Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe,
accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the
municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The
evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal
jail where said accused was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge
Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker
of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have
presented records from the police of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out
from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said accused
escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047
archiving said case appears to be without basis. The order states: "this case was filed
on April 12, 1991 and the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against
the accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for the warrant of arrest
issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said case, however, show that
in fact there was a return of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991
showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No.
5047 referred only to one of the accused who remained at large. The explanation
cannot be accepted because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested.
Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly
jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is
true that he did not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was
because he heard from the police that Alano escaped. This explanation is not
acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to court
Alano, the former should have been required to explain in writing why Alano was not
brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he should have
issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on when he could not be arrested when the
case should have been ordered archived. The order archiving this case for the reason
that he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which gave rise to a
suspicion that Alano might have really escaped while in his custody only that the
complainants could not present records or other documentary evidence to prove the
same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection
cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to be
exempted in paying filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was
deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The evidence
presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil
cases for collection against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section 14 of Republic
Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on
collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of the
Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received them and besides,
on February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid
voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a
letter to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank
would not pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment
by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was
really exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as
amended, instead of threatening the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in
order to have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on
February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in
complying with her obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants
sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized
marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage
license, and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty in closely
supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report of cases being
submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July and September,
1992 where it has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were falsified
with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended that
he be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the
same or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of
those marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates placed
in the marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties
were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being
sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By
solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is
the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of
marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty
of closely supervising his clerk of court in the performance of the latter's duties and
functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs.
Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of cases
only when his clerk of court already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty
to closely supervise her, to check and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared
by his clerk of court do not contain false statements. It was held that "A judge cannot
take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs.
Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of
court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have
falsified the monthly report of cases for the months of July and September, 1992 with
respect to the number of documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the
notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period; for having failed to account
(for) the solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the
solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts,
some of which were issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on
October 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she
issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the
Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one year and five months in her possession
and after this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court order or authority and
redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X
and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was
ordered released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay
filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount
of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal
Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said respondent
clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who shall
issue official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount
withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ."
(Revised Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual
for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall immediately
issue an official receipt upon receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter
deposit intact the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their
deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the Court (DOJ
Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court
Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all collections of
funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be deposited immediately by
the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial
Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits
shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or
deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she
demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her duties
and functions as a clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her
duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her removal
from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC,
Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk
of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies received by him/her
shall be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or
Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A
dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail bonds and
fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and her misappropriation of said funds
constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and
serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and (the Court) ordered
her immediate dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected
with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not
only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every
employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is
more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the
judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and
morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites
shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages,
and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without
prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers
of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This
is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent judge
should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of
marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for
the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable
participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such
serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to
ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future
will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch,
agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman
for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., took no part.
Bidin, J., is on leave.
#Footnotes
1 Original Record, 1.
2 Ibid., 9 and 23.
3 Ibid., 86.
4 Ibid., 134.
5 Annong vs. Vda. de Blas, A.M. No. P-91-602, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 635.
6 Capuno, et al. vs. Jaramillo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, July 20, 1994.
7 Article 3(2), Executive Order No. 209, as amended.
8 Article 4, id.
9 Article 352, Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 39, Act No. 3613.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a
sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license
and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed
away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by
Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired
Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and
sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain
Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having
been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February
2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling
to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if
respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the
requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another
date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He
also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and
admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia
assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day.
When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him
the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid
despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by
the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the
Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her
marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and
reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative
case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall
be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no
record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot
issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of
her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a
letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their
office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of
his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000,
found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and
for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on
respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court
judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as
defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge held office
and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte
which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held
that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to
do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a
Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of
the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed
to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability. [2] (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held
that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles
like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.[3]
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an
iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in
gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This
Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the
prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They
can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another,
condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which
involves the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to
naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court
as a disciplining authority.[6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment[2] dated August 5, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a
prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution[3] of the appellate court,
dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada,
they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada.
Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacionalat Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February
17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago [4] at the Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among
others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information [5] filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. [6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was
granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned
in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years
and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to
Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that want
of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should
not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held
that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses
may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the
matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition
anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court
stressed that following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one
does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences
thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate
court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio
and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this
decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The
reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 [12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of
contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the
fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian
court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 [13] of the Civil Code and
given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 [14] of the Civil Code,
a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign
jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the doctrine
in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign
divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. [16] However, the
denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No.
20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis.
The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no
first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and
since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT
IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN
INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN
HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN
PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT
EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST
BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.[17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,
whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree
of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly,
which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of
criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like
other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack
of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between
the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow
that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant
case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis
v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur,
stressing that under Article 40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a
party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as
everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in
good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing
Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first
determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we
laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the
marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol
and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage
contract.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by
the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is
void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with;
and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all
intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to
the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never
married.[24] The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married.
But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no
first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio,
the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at
the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce
be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter
case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained afterthe second
marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as void.[26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once,
but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months
later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired,
although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor
of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that
justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed
bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good
faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated
September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground
that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate
Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz.
[2]
Records, pp. 114-119.
[3] Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia
and Marina L. Buzon, concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis,
dissenting.
[4] Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for emphasis). See Exh. B, the copy of their
marriage contract. Records, p. 10.
[5]The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1, reads:
That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being previously united in lawful
marriage with Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the
amount to be proved during trial.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
[6] Rollo, pp. 38-40.
[7] Records, p. 119.
[8] G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.
[9] 42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918).
[10] 58 Phil. 817 (1933).
[11] Rollo, p. 43.
[12] ART. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
[13] Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
[14] Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed
in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
[15] G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85.
[16] Rollo, p. 51.
[17] Id. at 20-21.
[18] G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.
[19]
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
[20] Supra.
[21] CA Rollo, p. 38.
[22] Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
[23] Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
[24] Rollo, p. 54.
[25] G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.
[26] Id. at 124.
THIRD DIVISION
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, G.R. No. 167746

Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. Promulgated:

COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents. August 28, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing
the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying
petitioners appeal and affirming the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of
marriage.
The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage [3] was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita
A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange
a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain
Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. [4] They got married on the
same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at
the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured
in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident
of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the
said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they
parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued
declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage
contract[5] and its entry on file.[6]
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from
the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners representation, respondent
gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter
named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.[7] Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three
children.[8]Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution
for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.[10] Respondent prays that the petition for
annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos

(P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of
each month; and
3. To pay the costs.[11]
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioners appeal. His
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April
2005.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued
and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption.Moreover, the parties
marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under
Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [13]
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the
Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on
record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the
solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to
the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified
and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number
appearing on the face of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply
the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of
Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the
observance of procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the
party litigants.[14]
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there
was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the ManilaCity Hall and dealt with a
fixer who arranged everything for them.[15] The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and
not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev.Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.[16] He and
respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage
license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the
place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight
because the certification states that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their marriage contract bears the number
7054033 for their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in relation to Article 58 of the same
Code.[19]
Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties
states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. [21]
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The
cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the
marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of
due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was
issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or
entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of
a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage
license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held
that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the
marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the
petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year
after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is
that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage
void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the
petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also
issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25] The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact
issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage
License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss
Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for
whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.[26]
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. [27] The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of
doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.[28]Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license
was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither
he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient
basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license
despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. [30] An irregularity in any of
the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. [31]
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No.
7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number
7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a
mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the
numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore
does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to
the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, [32] petitioner cannot
pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took
place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place
because he initiated it.[33] Petitioner is an educated person.He is a mechanical engineer by
profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to
extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable
to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a
mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.[34]
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year
utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding
ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a
whimper on the part of the petitioner.
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose
de Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before
the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as follows
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the
wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San
Jose de Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I dont remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and
I dont know if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with
you already a Marriage Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the
Marriage Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.[35]
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at
that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing
whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. [36]
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a fixer who arranged everything
for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. AquilinoNavarro, a Minister of the
Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or
clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any
showing to the contrary.[37] Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether
or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it
may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. [38]
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
marriage.[39] Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The
Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., G.R. No. 191425

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus - PERALTA,*
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA,** JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent. September 7, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009
as well as the Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals (appellate
court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision4 of
Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused
Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Facts
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an
Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) and Rowena P. Geraldino (Geraldino) for the
crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one
JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and
still subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO,
who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O.
NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the
said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA.
Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his
plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other
hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial
conference was held and both the prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation of facts:
1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena
P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted

the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of

Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in
her Counter-Affidavit.
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTCs resolution is whether or not the second
marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was set for initial
hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution

As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses were
as follows:
xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was working there as a
Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her
and on April 6, 1999, they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit A). While working in said hospital, she heard
rumors that her husband has another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress,
she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10).
Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private complainant learned that
indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena
P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit B) when she secured a certification as to
the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit C) from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) sometime in November 2003.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena

P. Geraldino at the latters workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of
the first marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena
P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still
married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and because they were
neighbors and childhood friends. Private complainant also knew that Rowena
P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she
(private complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latters residence
in Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.s parents, Rowena
P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a friend and she heard everything
that they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work
as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in the amount of P34,000.00 a
month, more or less. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared
that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of
committing suicide. She added that because of what happened to her, her mother died
and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in
Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her
sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount
of P50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the
private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in
said wedding. Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private complainant
to accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in
FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the private complainant and Rowena
P. Geraldino had a confrontation and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that
she (Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private
complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him
very much (TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:
Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first
with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He,
however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even
before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a
[M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the
Muslim or Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private
complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August
2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim
A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a
Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit 2, 3 and 4). Aside from said certificate, he also
presented a Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the
same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one KhadIbrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit
7).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their
marriage because she [sic] told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and
the reason why said private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having
learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that
Rowena P. Geraldinowas not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant
and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does
not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was
a Catholic Pentecostal but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said
contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion Catholic was
also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society
does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was single despite his
first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified that he is the founder and
president of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as
such president, he has the power and authority to convert any applicant to the Muslim
religion. He alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
in Mabini (Manila) who was then going abroad. AtilanoO. Nollora, Jr. applied to become
a Muslim (Exhibit 14) and after receiving the application, said accused was
indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January 10,
1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He was then directed to report
every Sunday to monitor his development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification because
of the filing of the instant case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of
Conversion wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since
January 10, 1992. Apart from the above-mentioned document, their Imam also issued a
Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit 7). He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more
than one according to the Holy Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and
fourth wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if
the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October
9, 2006, pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in
accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim
faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them
equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the
second. Since his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance
with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena
P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be
considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of
bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know the private
complainant Jesusa Pinat Nolloraand only came to know her when this case was filed.
She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been
married to the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted a first marriage with the private complainant, she confronted the former who
admitted the said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if
he was single and the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her
husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage but after she learned of the first marriage
of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after
learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also
got married in accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the
private complainant that she was sought by the private complainant and that they had a
confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married
to the private complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him
because she loved him very much. She insisted that she only came to know the private
complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007,
pages 2-8).5
The Trial Courts Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 41 7 of the
Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 1808 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the qualifications for allowing Muslim men to
have more than one wife: [N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with
them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional
cases.
In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet
urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second wife
subject to certain requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not
encouraged, under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the Philippines
by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is
necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall
notify the Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a
copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall
be constituted. If said council fails to secure the wifes consent to the proposed marriage, the Court
shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not
comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a
Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith,
said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the
private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just
marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that the Sharia law imposes,
that is, he should have notified the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice
should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she
is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon
accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Sharia law. It is the Sharia Court that has
this authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in
accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has
already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is
no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented
by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage between private
complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations. Private
complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latters house in Taguig,
Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their conversation.
From this incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she
and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not be
reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands what was going on between her
and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that (E)verycircumstance favoring accuseds innocence must be
taken into account, proof against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion
must not be permitted to sway judgment (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore,
has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders judgment
imposing upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of the prosecution
to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under the same
bail bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nolloras motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the
prosecutions failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 10
The Appellate Courts Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nolloras appeal and affirmed the trial courts
decision.11
The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful
exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Quran. The appellate court
denied Nolloras invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim
women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws. Nolloras two marriages were not conducted
in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines
should apply. Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent
in protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nolloras motion for
reconsideration. The allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash
of Nolloras earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to modify its 30
September 2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
The Courts Ruling
Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally
married to Pinat;14 (2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of
the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino; 15 and
(4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of
capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.16
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinats marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were married
at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April 1999. Rev.
Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony. The marriage
certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldinos marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino were married at
Maxs Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December 2001.
Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22, 1968
from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices of
Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following information:
Date of Marriage Place of Marriage

a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE,
BULACAN
a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO
MANILA (2nd District)19
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He
alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed
of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, 20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage
ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or
Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences
and incidents are governed by this Code and the Sharia and not subject to stipulation, except that the
marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential
requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the
proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any
Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the
provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to have attained puberty upon
reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and
the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in
triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person
solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties and another sent to the
Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to
solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court or Sharia Circuit Court or any person designated by the
judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of
the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other
suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting
parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the
value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife, be
determined by the court according to the social standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that [i]n case of a marriage between
a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family
Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall
apply. Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nolloras marriages
were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot
claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy. 21
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is single. Moreover, both
of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage,
such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nolloras liability for bigamy. Nolloras false declaration about
his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion,
Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a
[M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim convert since January 10,
1992. However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you have
indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didnt know why they did not place any
Catholic there.
xxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage contract with
your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Witness,
considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in the
marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my being
my Balik-Islam, thats why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society doesnt approve a
Catholic to marry another, thats why I placed there Catholic as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, civil status, why did you indicate there that youre single, Mr.
Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married. 22 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as Catholic
when in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract?
xxx
[A:] I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under the
Catholic rights [sic] because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your
Honor.
xxx
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to secure
the permission of your first wife to get married?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the start, she
was always very mad, maam.23
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage
to Geraldino. Nollora may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from
criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple
flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability
for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory,
and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and
to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February 2010
are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in
Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with a term of
two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day
of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties
provided by law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September
29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April
25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel
Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I.
Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage
with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in
jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed
a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence
to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her
to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion
for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only
as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract
and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was
primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the
consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS
DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly
and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by
it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being
inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The
parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment 9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the
purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the
time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they
were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage
was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The
focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely
for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a
marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that
a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage
only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they
will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to
be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not
ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as
valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a
valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, 21 further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld
such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for
a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not
be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the
RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give
their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to
be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent. Under
Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence
of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such
as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary
to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding
that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a
purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no
intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages
in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete
absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of
being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them
to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to
create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance
with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. 28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate
on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. 29 The right to
marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to
live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause
for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues
to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the
wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit
shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the
sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to
enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot
declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they
have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals
cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already
misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to
again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence
of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued
at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this
information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at
his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law
arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one
of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony.
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to
Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of
2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage
license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license
number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license
issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. 6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No.
9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on
January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS
GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may
serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and
2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on
whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are
issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed
by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993,
and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to
any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines. 12 He testified that he
solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on
January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and
Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is
familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage
license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that
office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria
Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. 18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to
secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the
same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage
contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola. 21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and
that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She testified
that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and
that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the
application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz,
the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage
license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She also
testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the
sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the
wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony
corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing
a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house
and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with
the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she
did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese. 31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued
by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License
No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and
Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack
of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent
declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent
even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office,
are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE

PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A
MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID

MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE
CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS
THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES
ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT
BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license
of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded
probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that
Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also
considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy. 38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005
and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case
No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas
contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41

Grounds in Support of Petition
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN

CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND

SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or
the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to
this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal
requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is
the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2,
Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage
license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been
issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification
that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such certification was
allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to
be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications
for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued
and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value,
as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed
was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was
presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not
appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply
with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and
since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent
search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting
that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage
license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a
diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar
was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not
correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar
conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed
to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly,
neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to
testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented
prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona,
Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and
Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the
license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could
have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin,
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license
issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove
the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of the
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a
valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is
that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy
of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were
validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and
appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the
Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows
appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea
Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before
he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only
after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We
are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code
also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1wphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are
less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up
for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of
evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as
it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license,
a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of
petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March
2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-
existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on
10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three
children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a
customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981,
Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as
husband and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease
her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage contract
would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of
their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married
to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in
the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice
and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents
against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice
and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the
partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his
petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied.
Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence
before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court
gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4
September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008.
Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting
the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave
weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was
confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for
the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to
Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamins
subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court
ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and
Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for spousal
support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice
and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in
her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not
legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by
Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to
Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under
TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own
money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their
purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos.
61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units
were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under
TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal
partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamins right to dispute his conjugal
state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married
to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sallys share in the
properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while
Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982
at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
NONEXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos.
17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949,
188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627,
194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638,
194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan
and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these
thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties
acquired from petitioners money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of
the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five
(5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from these
five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722,
respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender
control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership
of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in
favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to
his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2)
properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10.
Respondents claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack
of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General
and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order
dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial courts decision
before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted
that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of
evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would
be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her
evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite
the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins action was based on his
prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved
before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial
court committed no error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article
148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37
properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamins actual contribution
in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the
share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena
while Sallys share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that
would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the
case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification
declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely
owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and
common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal
partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The
rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts
ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts
decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-
existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the
trial courts decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that she waived her
right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and
Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 9 In this case, Sallys presentation of evidence was
scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4
and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at
Sallys instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that
in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date
of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on
presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the trial
court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial courts prior
warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had been
deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and
she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to
present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed
to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys continued
failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of
interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she
was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial courts denial
of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary
restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect
marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial
proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin
because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally
further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage
to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring
real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin
was the informant in their childrens birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that
Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was
no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that
Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial
court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally
entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena
was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II
of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to
Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series
issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance,
the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. 11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and
Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was
certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records
Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts; 14 and Lourdes J.
Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office. 15 The documentary
and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed
out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" 16 and "a
simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation
coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese
conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a
proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant
in Bernices birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March
198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and
Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March
1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void
from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of
Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 20 which
made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the
beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all
aspects the trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of
Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
courts discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1wphi1 The trial
court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be
null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid,
there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of
their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the
first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In
People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting
marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal
Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no
marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to
petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the
marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a
prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena. 23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. 24 In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license.
The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to
the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted
in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided
in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamins
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that "Benjamins late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their
respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more
in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in
the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to
Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of
Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a
spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. 29 Such words do not prove
co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-
ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code. 30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing
the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence.
She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision,
showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence
to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be
inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge
Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sallys continued refusal to
present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against
Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary
inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016 - RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND VERONICA B. KHO, Respondents.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016
RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B.

KHO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-
GR. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in
petitioner's favor in an action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private respondent,
while the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein
petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio
Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to
arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the intended marriage between
petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to
exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;
4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which
actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a
public dance held in the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of
the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning of June 1,
1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and
had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a
marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office
was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the purpose
of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of
June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the
marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most essential requisite;
7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated was
solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning and neither
was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of such marriage license;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after
due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at
Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect;
x x x x4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with
respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.
Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of
action because there is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was celebrated
without the requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and respondent
personally appeared before the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license which they
presented before their marriage was solemnized.
Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted their respective pleadings as well
as affidavits of witnesses.
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive portion
of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between
Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of
the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the
application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar for
proper registration of this decree of nullity of marriage.
SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite
marriage license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such, the
RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence
of the said marriage license rendered the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void ab initio.
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated
its assailed Decision, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage
between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all
intents and purposes.
SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a
presumption that a marriage license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to
overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any indication in the marriage
certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law
which does not invalidate the parties' marriage.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January 14,
2009.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-
CALLED "ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED
LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING

AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING
TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER

DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES
OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED
PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and
4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR

REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE
LICENSE.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due
credence to petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at the
time that petitioner and respondent's marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in
deciding the case not on the basis of law and evidence but rather on the ground of what the appellate
court calls as ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural
question by arguing that the issues presented by petitioner in the present petition are factual in nature
and it is not proper for this Court to delve into these issues in a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court does not agree.
The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and prevailing
jurisprudence. However, intertwined with these issues is the question of the existence of the subject
marriage license, which is a question of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not without
exceptions, viz.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a
marriage license obtained by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this
Court to review these findings.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil
Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. 13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under
Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title
111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point
of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification
of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan
marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of
these exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. 15 The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by
the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.16Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license
is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance
of which the general public is interested.17
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage license
which they presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage and
that any doubt should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this
principle as well as of the Constitutional policy which protects and strengthens the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to
prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his
favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario.18 There, it was held that the certification of the
Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the
non-issuance of said license.19 It was further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the
parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. 20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor
copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M.
Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972." 21 Thus, on the basis of such
Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome
and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges
such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge that burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage 22 issued by the officiating priest does not contain any
entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage
contract from the National Archives and Records Section, where information regarding the marriage
license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to do
so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation that the
statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a
marriage ceremony was conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was
issued in favor of petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she
and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to present evidence to prove such
allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.23
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled
with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to
show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was
a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the validity
of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license
was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the corresponding
marriage license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court's
ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to the
absence in its records of a marriage license, must categorically state that the document does not
exist in the said office despite diligent search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered the certification
issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and inability to find the record or
entry sought by the parties despite the absence of a categorical statement that "such document does
not exist in their records despite diligent search." The Court, citing Section 28, 26 Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the
purported marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would
render the marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,27 this Court
considered the marriage of the petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. The
court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the
marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in
the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v.
CA30 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court
relied on the Certification issued by the local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage
license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner's
asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court does not require a categorical statement to this effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court
ruled that:
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar
was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. x x x31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of the
subject marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties.32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.33 As
cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79
of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be characterized
as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit
affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the
respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil
Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A.

RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January
7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties. [3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian
Citizenship issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. [7] In
their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. [8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on
May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. [9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage [10] in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha
Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration
of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down. [13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no
cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. [15] The court marked and
admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. [16] After they submitted their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. [17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any
defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to
remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal
capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the
respondent
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the
Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the
judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal
ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether
respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these
two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other
foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1)
the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of
the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. [21] A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of
Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce
is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[26] A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. [28] Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with
the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as
follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a
sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article,
the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the
judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall
not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document --
a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity
and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. [30] A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court.[35] However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. [38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship
in 1992.[39]Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil
rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied
with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she
had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is
allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise
of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden
of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. [43] Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. [44] The power of judicial notice
must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution
of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic
ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The
first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. [46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices,
still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the
guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying
again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. [47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy. [48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for
the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained
under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was
not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof
that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of
the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate
of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January
12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.
Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d)
Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment
between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended
Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court
of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; [59] and Exhibit 5 --
Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio
since October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity
to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the
ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry
petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is
to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity
to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on
the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case
to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of
bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 152577

PHILIPPINES,
Present:
Petitioner,
PUNO,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
- versus-
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 21, 2005

CRASUS L. IYOY,
R e s p o n d e n t.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
dated 30 October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint [3] for declaration of nullity
of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City.
As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who
are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that
Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old,
to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus
received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said
request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their
children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely
came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear
the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in
1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth
child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in
New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the
Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which
she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years
since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation
between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein
that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus.
While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him,
Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that
she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at
respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing,
and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household.
She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs.
Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was
then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family.
Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial
support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children
to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file
for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus
requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent
Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that
her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status
shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus
himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent
Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain
operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare
her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to
Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both
parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own
testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the
recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus. [9]
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the deposition of witnesses, namely,
Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers
of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the
Orders[12] and Commissions[13]issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California,
U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition
was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent
Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the
RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14] considering Fely to have waived her right to present
her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable

consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that
defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply
with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love,
respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established
that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the
United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic] another family
of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is
already married to another man in another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the
marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided
that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this
instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very
low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of
human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft
of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was
already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude
towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological

incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the
time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein
case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the
defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things
over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of
the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to
plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff
Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and
evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated
30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even
offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null
and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is

now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this
as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A

FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE
CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE
SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE
LAW.
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to

avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her
alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he
or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has
undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus has become an alien
as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be
extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and
thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would
still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital
covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in
truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to
discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual
disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates
that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.[16]
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, [17] denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the
following arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per

se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law
and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law
in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at
bar.[18]
In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological incapacity
was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because
the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner
Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because
Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court
finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this
Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)

incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated [21]
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.[22]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which,
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to

71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[24]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a

condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such
psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during
the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that
the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,
such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering
the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the
RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness
that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. [26] Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. [27]
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to be confused with
a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It
is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent
Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and
her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her
marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the
incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration
of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent
Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. [31] No less than the
Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family. [32]
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case
at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for
the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same
Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for
divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine
laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus,
Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings
for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor
General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,

the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the
principal law officer and legal defender of the Government. [33] His Office is tasked to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of lawyers.[34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State
is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing
in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent,
rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions
on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court
or the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on
behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals
or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when
circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still
being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and
control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the
protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several
cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized
as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down
the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of
which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated
its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State[37]
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel
any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene
and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the
RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor,
within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service
within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor,
in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda
in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may
require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without
leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered
submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be
served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent
summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision
shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to
the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial,
or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from
the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the
motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of
appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely.
At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus
for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those
situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem. [39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil
Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380

Petitioner,
Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J.,

- versus - (Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent. Promulgated:
October 5, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002
denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano
Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the
petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566
A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant
case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for
legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation.
The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. [6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when
his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief
has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. [8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried
while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the
case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place,
and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.

or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage
was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are
Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be
able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for
Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will
also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that
this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph
2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee,
is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita,
the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according
to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. [12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or

her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites
for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and
tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the
parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse
would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. [13]
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. [15] Furthermore, respondent
must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in
Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter
into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O.
No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, G.R. No. 186571
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - *ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
August 11, 2010
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS
and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondents. -- -
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari[2]under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005
to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another
man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8,
2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to
love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law;
to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. [6]
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered
no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was
prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a
party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, [8] in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
36, 37 and 38.

Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. [11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing
to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party,
vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates,
involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void[15] and
voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws
do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. [18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
36, 37 and 38.

Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases,
the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce
had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be
just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one
of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. [22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse,
by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of
the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides
that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to
the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a

right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according
to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or
final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment
or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or

final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national
law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as
a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country.[28] This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1)
official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at
the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition
of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves
as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce

decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their
offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized
but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization

register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission
of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be
read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be
given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing
the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No.
181, series of 1982[37] both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A
petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the
Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition
must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; [38] that the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish
the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as
the appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition
and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the
wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and
not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. 12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to
realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate
the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when,
on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which
allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that
the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e.
lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in
the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,]
it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized that the
"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the
"immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and
Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of
a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during
the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not
be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in
the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x x x."38 The
Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should
therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-
Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as
a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted
in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1)
an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may
be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents
of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of
pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case
on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule
of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment
or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection
of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary
trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a
Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove
the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule
108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State pursuant to
the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz
v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in
a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry,
which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouses right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In
any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a
"trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can
be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing
the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for
an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based
on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution
of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized
the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose
laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle
in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after
the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her
country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a
foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment
on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or
on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving
a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent
with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove
an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the
foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition
of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and
fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between
the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1wphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
"[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated
2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.
2 In Pasay City, Metro Manila.
3See rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009, Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage between Maria Paz Galela Marinay and Shinichi Maekara dated 18 August 2010.
Translated by Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyers Office (see rollo, p. 89).
4 Id.
5 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as amended):
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
xxxx
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
6
Rollo, pp. 79-80.
7
The dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED and WITHDRAWN from the
active civil docket of this Court. The RTC-OCC, Quezon City is directed to refund to the
petitioner the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to be taken from the Sheriffs Trust
Fund.
8Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides:
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts
constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify
the regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the

petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of
common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property,
and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The
verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition may
be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum
shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy
or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the
Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within
five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within
the same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition.
9
RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See rollo, pp. 55-56 (Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration).
10 RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).
11 FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
xxxx
xxxx
12
Rollo, p. 56.
13 FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
14 Rollo, p. 68.
15 Enacted 26 November 1930.

16
CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
17Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage. - All civil officers and priests or ministers
authorized to solemnize marriages shall send a copy of each marriage contract solemnized by
them to the local civil registrar within the time limit specified in the existing Marriage Law.
In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty of the successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local civil registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized.
In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and address of each of the
contracting parties, their ages, the place and date of the solemnization of the marriage,
the names and addresses of the witnesses, the full name, address, and relationship of
the minor contracting party or parties or the person or persons who gave their consent
to the marriage, and the full name, title, and address of the person who solemnized the
marriage.
In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be recorded the names of the
parties divorced or whose marriage was annulled, the date of the decree of the court,
and such other details as the regulations to be issued may require.
18 RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon
good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
19 273 Phil. 1 (1991).
20 Id. at 7. See rollo, pp. 65 and 67.
21 Rollo, p. 47.
22 Id. at 46.
23 Id. at 48.
24
Id.
25 G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638.
26 Id. at 641.
27 Id. at 643.
28 See rollo, p. 49.
29 Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:
Contents and form of petition. x x x
xxxx
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The
verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition may
be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum
shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy
or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
xxxx
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition.
30 Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105.
31 Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.

32Rollo, p. 137. The "Conclusion and Prayer" of the "Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of
Comment)" of the Solicitor General stated:
In fine, the court a quos pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with the
requirements provided in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should accordingly be set aside. It is, thus,
respectfully prayed that Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 be reinstated for further proceedings.
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
33 G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637.
34 Id. at 656. Quoted in the Manifestation and Motion of the Solicitor General, pp. 8-9. See
rollo, pp. 132-133.
35
Rollo, p. 133.
36
G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.
37 Id. at 287.
38 Rollo, p. 133.
39 G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 162.

40 384 Phil. 661 (2000).
41 De Castro v. De Castro, supra note 39 at 169.
42 Supra note 30.

43 See rollo, p. 120.
44 Id.
45
See rollo, p. 146.
46 Id.
47 Supra note 33.
48 Supra note 33 at 655.
49RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record
is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any,
or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment
or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment
or final order, is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
50See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, supra
note 36 at 282.
51 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.
52 Id., Sec. 6.
53 Id., Sec. 9.
54 Id., Sec. 11-15.
55 Id., Sec. 17-18.
56 Id., Sec. 19 and 22-23.
57Mijares v. Raada, 495 Phil. 372, 386 (2005) citing Eugene Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of
Laws 916 (2nd ed., 1982).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 386.
60 Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x
xxxx
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
61 Mijares v. Raada, supra note 57 at 386. "Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it
seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the
harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending
litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in the
Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest and quietness." (Citations omitted)
62Mijares v. Raada, supra note 57 at 382. "The rules of comity, utility and convenience of
nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign
courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries." (Citations omitted)
63 43 Phil. 43 (1922).
64Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266, 280; Garcia v.
Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001); Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, supra.
65 FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
66Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil
status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d)
annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h) acknowledgment of
natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of name.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes
of name.
67 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at 287.
68 FAMILY CODE, Art. 35-67.

70 FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.
71 See supra note 69.
72CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law x x x."
74 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. x x x
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
75
Emphasis supplied.
76Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of prisin
mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
77 See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997), 518.
78 RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
xxxx
79Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
80 Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.
81 Supra note 25.

82 Supra note 25.
83 See supra note 68.
84 FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate
provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support
of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give
paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of
the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for
appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.

85 FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article
43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab
initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision. (1) If the court renders a decision granting
the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of
annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
xxxx
86FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. (1) Within
one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8
above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the
parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in
his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion
within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report The court shall set the report for
hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case
for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the
pre-trial.
87 RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 1.
88 509 Phil. 108 (2005).
89 Id. at 114.
90 223 Phil. 357 (1985).
91 Id. at 363.
92 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c).
93See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. x x x
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the
court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced
in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action
without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and
decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL,
ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage
of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case
was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed
the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is
null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second
marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death. [1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their
fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners averment that
the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which
produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3]However, upon motion of
petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. [4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the
Civil Code,[6] the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initiopursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in
relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration
of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public
is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and
is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. [11] This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just
an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, [14] referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage
due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. [15] To preserve peace in
the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." [16] The only issue that needs to be
resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to
warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five
years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage
to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement
and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local
civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x
x"Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge
of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his
findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised
Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having
of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law
sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at
the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to
the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their
fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code [20] cannot be applied even by
analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at
any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods
and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code
is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages
are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place[21] and cannot be the
source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription
while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a
direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages
can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. [22] That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to
a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void
marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, [23] and its effect on
the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as
well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing
voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment
are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged marital bond
between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that
there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage
was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to
their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned,
it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far
as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken
place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and
the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect. [28] For the same reason, the law makes either the action
or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. [29] Corollarily, if the death
of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot
be considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said
case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc juris
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,

Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque
R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-
Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to
him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. [1] Four children
were born out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized
said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was
that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit
of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. [4] According to him, had he known that the late
Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano)
could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for
being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member
of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that
since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families
and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges
that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance
with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time
of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. [6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. [7] In fact, in his Comment, he
stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos
subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long
time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree
of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case
at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation,
free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who
are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It
could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by
the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to
judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law
and basic legal principles.[9] And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with
the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 160172
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
February 13, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
69166,[2] declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2)
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court
in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September
1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless,
after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the
childs birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist
and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.[3] In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is
married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support
her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.[4]
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents
before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he
has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,[5] the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when,
on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter
is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to
be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the
child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as
well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying
that petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward
him of his being irresponsible.[6] Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April
1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for
the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same
case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that
there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of
nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it
is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of
petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily
entered into by petitioner and respondent. [7] The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC
No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De
Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the
marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly
annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against
the appellant.[8]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals.[9] Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without
a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained
a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and
wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a
marriage license.[10]Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the appearance of a
prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial
court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an
affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several authorities,[11] petitioner claims that
a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another
independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling
of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be
presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties,
and would increase the burden of the courts.[12] Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his
marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs paternity and filiation, the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition. [13]
In her Comment,[14] respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart
the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate
court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be
repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation
of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was
uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds
that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being
subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation. [15]
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial
court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing
the case of Nial v. Bayadog,[16] it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action
for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid
marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their
affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it
concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not vali
d.[17] In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child
of petitioner and thus entitled to support.[18]
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second,
whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.[19] Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that
may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. [20]
Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,[21] the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to
pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death
benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. [22]
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable.[23] In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an
affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. [24] However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife
for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.[25]
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage
license.[26] In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all.The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push
through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders
their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled
to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence
as legitimate children.[27] Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.[28]
The Certificate of Live Birth[29] of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the
child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born

on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila;[30]
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only
by the testimony of the latter, but also by respondents own admission in the course of his
testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were
sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At times, they would
go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant
which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent
claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken
of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. B, B-1, to B-3, C, C-1 and C-2, D, D-1 and D-2, E,
E-1 and E-2, F, F-1 and F-2, G, G-1 and G-2 and H, H-1 to H-3). In one of the pictures
(Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners finger
and in another picture (Exhs. E, E-1 and E-2) respondent is seen in the act of kissing the
petitioner.[31]
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 175581

PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
JOSE A. DAYOT, G.R. No. 179474

Respondent.
x------------------x Present:
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT,
Petitioner, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,** and
REYES, JJ.
- versus -
Promulgated:
March 28, 2008
JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot
(Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City
Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and
Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with
Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not
execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live
as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested
him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by
her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the
papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa
cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned
about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who
immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with
Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas
house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with
Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality
of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account
of their age difference.[5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was
subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August
1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. [6] The Ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without emolument. [7]
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented

by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a
favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make
him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something
was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it
[was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said
package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that,
by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign
the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to discover that the pieces of
paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem
to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly
notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after
he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose],
again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in
case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was
written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a
lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would
have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that
she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate
(T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he
voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29,
1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa
Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes.The testimony of his sister
all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud. [10]
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It cited Article
87[11]
of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by
[Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he
discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action
to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.[12]
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. [13]

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil
Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties.Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of
marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of
Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in

giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already
prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment
of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or
intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of
the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then
he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of
marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment
of his marriage to Felisa.[15]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article
76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of
marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa
had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity
of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In
this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer
over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit
of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their
marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a
member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals,
Article 56[17] of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage
must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was established only
in Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His
central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage
license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose
cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and
another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson
void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City. [19]
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v.
Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without

a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority,
that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they
desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is

counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5
years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should
not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the
same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required
in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall
make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the
beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because
of the absence of a marriage license.[21]
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for
Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1
August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the
Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.[23]
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF

HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD
NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE

FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.[25] She
differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior
marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces
that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an
administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the
declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of
the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez
v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose
and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics position that the
falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and
formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to
whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license
is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they
cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties
marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also
bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Joses
notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as
his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District
24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said
barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of
the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis

ours.)
Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides,
save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article
75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.[30] This is in stark contrast
to the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage
void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is
the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. [32]
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages inarticulo mortis or at the point
of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, [33] (3) ratification
of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan
marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.[34]
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending
a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.[36]
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of maturity;
that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that
because of this union, they desire to marry each other. [37] One of the central issues in the Petition at
bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack
of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly[38] but reasonably construed.[39] They extend only so far
as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
rather than the exception.[40] Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court
will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. [41] For the exception in Article 76 to apply,
it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and
that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The
Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state
the requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that
the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her
neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. [44] The
appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced
to live in her house.[45]
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts.[46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts
review.[47] It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this
Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court,
or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the
exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on
substantial evidence.[48]
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did
Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds
no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married.[50] The present case does not involve an apparent marriage
to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually
entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect
of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage
license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional
circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties,
which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a
valid marriage.[52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a
true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. [53] To permit a false affidavit to take
the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect
the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal
measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage
license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity
of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot
be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is
but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity,
Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application
where there is a law.[54] There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise
terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration
of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.[55]
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa
had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual
on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence,
estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. [56] Jose and Felisas
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is
void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised
any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that
is unbroken.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa
Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO,
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ.
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated:
CARLOS II,
Respondents. December 16, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during
the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum
of money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described
as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court
of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of
Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-
subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa
Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on
the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an
area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28,
Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa
Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West.,
along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area
of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el
NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por
el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual
se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon
de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA
(150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el
NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el
SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se
halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon
de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA
(150) METROS CUADRADOS.[3]
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement
was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and
turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of
Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their
son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name
of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered
by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval
of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective
shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining
6,691-square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing
the remaining land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331 square meters of the second
parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion
was later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August

17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise
agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts,
the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of
marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and
damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise
maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent
Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent
Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the
certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such
certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to
him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments
of petitioners complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite
marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II
was the illegitimate child of the deceased TeofiloCarlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the
marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the
certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of
irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own
motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of
Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony, respondent
Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.[5]
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its
report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents) Motion for

Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo

Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage
Certificate submitted inthis case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage
license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,
illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum
of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of
the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the
portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of
the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said
title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant

Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to
cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and

defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant

Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant

Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs evidence on his claim
for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, appearance fees, and litigation
expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that
the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the
marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo,
Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a
quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact
that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not
justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action to recover upon a claim
or to obtain a declaratory relief, the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to
annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to
expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first
paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of
decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to
these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing safeguards have
traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of
marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved
the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellees own brother and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that
the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be
deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more
thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary
nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect
that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always
be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to

tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved. (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary

judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the
court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded
that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58
of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the
marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to
be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandovals
affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following
statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued

at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract
executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said
marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for
the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the
Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same.
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the
considered view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the
motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on
the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary evidence of marriage

is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants non-presentation
of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the
plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the
legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial courts rejection of the
relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the
inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandovals statements. Although it had effectively
disavowed appellants prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II,
the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellees brother, to Our
mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellants illegitimate filiation,
his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellees
bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent
couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could
well be a minors total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent
though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration
regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in
the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said
appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial
court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be
able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos
II.[8]
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision,
Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners Motion for reconsideration under the
Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage,
petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the
circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or
has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme
Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of
Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary
Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of speculations,
surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a
judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other
procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of
marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment
on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19[10] of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an

issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment,
instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on
judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions
on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary

judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the
court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x[11]
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the application of summary
judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been
stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March
15, 2003[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the
case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters
involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must
be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We

excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or

declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all
kinds of actions.[14](Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and
duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the
public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. [15]
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to
appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is
no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public
prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not
fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene
for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of
evidence.(Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages
by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence. [16]
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to
seek its dissolution.[17] (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy,
loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the
foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are
simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can
and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends
only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.[18]
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks
the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage
case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate
heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right,
for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.[19]
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This
is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003[20] is prospective in its
application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.[22] (Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when
the marriage took place.[23]
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.[24] But the Civil Code is
silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can
bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed
as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.[25] Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural
law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.[26]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case
is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. [27]
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,[28] where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the
respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no
specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare
the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial
v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects
their successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law
allowing it.Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce
decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not
allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages
from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to
declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.[29] (Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest
to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving
compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession,
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs
are called to succeed by operation of law. [30]
Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and
Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. [31]
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative,
such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he
still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes

collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives.[32] Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. [33]
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a
brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and
without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other
siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half
being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-
party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to
the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage
case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate
son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then
petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and
respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected,
hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be
void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate,[34] or even an adopted child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the
decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or
nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of
marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and
in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action
before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case
concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter
hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the
parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. [36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioners
bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support
a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its
pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent
Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167
of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion
by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or
conceived within a valid marriage.[37]
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab
initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and
filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between
respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the
late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of
marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET
ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give
this case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed
the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her
of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded not guilty, while her putative
husband escaped the criminal suit.5redarclaw
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June
1974,6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos
on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to
remarry, she should choose someone who was without responsibility. 7redarclaw
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime
of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married.
She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be
proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the
lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation
and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already
married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his
marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced
herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative
defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for
a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8redarclaw
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an
admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage. 9 Thus, the
trial court convicted petitioner as follows:10redarclaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G.
Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab
initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides
an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case,
petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five years
prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered
their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11redarclaw
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court
to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court can not do.
The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment
of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these
proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known
of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply
stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12redarclaw
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because
she was not aware of Santoss previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence
of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages
exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as
husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married
Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year
requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.
In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the
argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her
husbands subsequent marriage. As regards petitioners denial of any knowledge of Santoss first
marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the
courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
In Montaez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as

follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would
be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno,
Jr.16instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v.
Archilla17likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouses existing
prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes
her responsible as an accomplice.
The Ruling of the Court
The penalty for bigamy and petitioners

knowledge of Santoss first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other
while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained
in Nepomuceno:18redarclaw
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on
the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of
the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioners knowledge of Santoss marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of
the following circumstances:19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her
in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like
petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she
had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the
RTC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial
courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important
opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the
trial.20redarclaw
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly
charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts imposition of the principal penalty
on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range
of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla21 holds that the second spouse, if
indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B.
Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that a person, whether man or woman, who
knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an
accomplice in the crime of bigamy.22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice
to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the
criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree,23prision correccional, which has a duration of six months and one day to
six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed
in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two months
of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a
duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner

resulting from her marriage to
Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise
the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of
evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner has
consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages
celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.28redarclaw
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass
judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union
with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given
that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to
correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their
Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The provision reads as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a marriage license
had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years before their
marriage.31redarclaw
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and
that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the
prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior
to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-
laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross-examination, respondent
did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who
sold her piglets.36redarclaw
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only
less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five
years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the
records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented
that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately,
subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing
officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case

of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an
anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of
(1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the
cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an
effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the
States penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals to deliberately
ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences
of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment.
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioners illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in
the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of
the sanctity of marriage.40redarclaw
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded.41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42As a result, litigants shall
be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43redarclaw
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage.
In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing fully well
that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the
Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use
her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground
that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that
when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil
Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was
celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a
second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage,
and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike
our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the
crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.45 It must be safeguarded from the whims
and caprices of the contracting parties.46|||In keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court
affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago
is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family
Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings
into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the
court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army,
first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September
1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City,
followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the
J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was
christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen,
Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family
affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when
and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would
express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's
pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration
of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States,
where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with,
Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code"
(docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and
denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible
and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by
the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which
requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for
more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to
enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does
not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more
or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide
an insight on the import of the provision.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes
suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa
preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes
proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in
the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage
voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious
than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and
void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be
modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental
incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or
nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of
consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while
subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be
deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain
the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence.

Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the
Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which
describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added
that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no
voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should
make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there
are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does
not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely,
he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for
voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the
consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating
the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean
Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of
defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent
and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason
that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He
emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not
consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really
removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of
consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the
validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is
eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however,
felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be
classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be
convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect
has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has
been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the
action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one
might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no
longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In
response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should
not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree.
Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this
matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a
defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity,
there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences
of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the
grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the
impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect
to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice
Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in
medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so
that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage
is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological
incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later
becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the
marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured.
Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him
to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning
even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other
hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes
manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other
provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are
lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental
and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a
species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9,
1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological
or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological
or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it
from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of
understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to
go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate
on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of
marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with
Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in
Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that
marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological
incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or

prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the
problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On
the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of
cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were
for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within
which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The
Committee approved the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the
provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee,
has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila

matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or
secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation
or construction of the codal provision.
10
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, giving an account on how the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator
intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because

of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon
297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .

(cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982,
canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term
anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier
Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality
can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding
contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education
of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological
disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address
to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological
defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of
the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases
of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may
have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case,
be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that
innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the
Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman

entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and
the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved,
even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide
all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But,
after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the
majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to
comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her
husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve
to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in
definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for
nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate
opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples
who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards
against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor,
to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her
husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she
never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he
exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of
Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia
indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is
the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in
marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable
contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There
may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live
separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for
each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the
other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention
of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently
show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any
intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of

psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications
were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not,
in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one
forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship
and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I
submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one
like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason
of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel
Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of
the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter
on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it
had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members
of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then
requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the
spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a
married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later,
even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice
Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law
Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New
Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman

entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage
of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon
which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that
any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the
Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and
instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only
be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State.
Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action
for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions
on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice
Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon
Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a
New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with
the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void
marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded

only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of
a marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of
nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for
causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or
premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with
her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee
that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee
referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds
for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the
provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of
nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and
an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be
manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to
abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on
a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our society
will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an
abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus,
the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-
accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to
render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the
lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the provision.
These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But,
after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the
majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to
comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her
husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve
to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in
definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for
nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate
opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples
who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards
against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor,
to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her
husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she
never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he
exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of
Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia
indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is
the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in
marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable
contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There
may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live
separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for
each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the
other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention
of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently
show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any
intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of

psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications
were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not,
in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one
forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship
and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel
Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of
the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter
on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it
had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members
of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then
requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the
spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a
married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later,
even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice
Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law
Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New
Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman

entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage
of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon
which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that
any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the
Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and
instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only
be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State.
Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action
for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions
on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice
Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon
Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a
New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with
the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void
marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded

only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of
a marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already
University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with
her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee
that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee
referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds
for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the
provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of
nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and
an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be
manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to
abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on
a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our society
will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an
abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus,
the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-
accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to
render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the
lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the provision.
These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.
Footnotes
1 Per Judge Enrique Garovillo.
2 Penned by Justice Jainal Rasul, concurred in by Justice Pedro Ramirez and Ramon
Mabutas, Jr.
3 Rollo, 37-42.
4 Rollo, 13-18.
5 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, July 26, 1986.
6 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 2, 1986.
7 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 9, 1986.
8 In her "Handbook on the Family Code."
9 Marriage in Canon Law, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1986, 129-130.
C 1095 Sunt incapaces matrimonii contrahendi:
1. qui sufficiente rationis usu carent;
2. qui laborant gravi defectu discretionis iudicii circa iura et official matrimonialia
essentialia mutuo tradenda et acceptanda;
3. qui ob causas naturae psychicae obligationes matrimonii essentiales assumere non

valent.
10 Ibid., 131-132.
11 Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.
1 Written pursuant to the request of Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro

during the March 23, 1985 joint meeting of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee at the UP Law Center for comments on P.B. 3149 (Pacificador Bill) on
Divorce, P.B. No. 1986 (Monfort and Collantes Bill) on Recognition of Church
Annulments of Marriages, P.B. No. 2347 (Sitoy Bill) on Additional Grounds for
Annulment of Marriage and Legal Separation and P.B. 1350 (Kalaw Bill) on Equal
Rights of Filipino Women which were pending before her Sub-Committee.
2 FAMILY CODE, Art. 48.
3 J.A. v. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

37 (1988).
4 As quoted in the majority opinion.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of
the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29,
1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14,
1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals 1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they
went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married
life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant
just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was
no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the
second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with
her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to
join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no
sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But
during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that
she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was
also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the
doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his
penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes
the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a
Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by
reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz:
(1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if
either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He
further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according
to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she
always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his
hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did
not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against
him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry
of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young
and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof,
Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has
an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is
capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by
the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.
Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between
the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial
is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came
incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988,
until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code
provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment
without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This
only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his
wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only
telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of
facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a
basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial
evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical
disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates
an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019,
January 4, 1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity
of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the
alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may
not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons,
i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, why private respondent
would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of
10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical
disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to
find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not
want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent,
but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March
15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings,
he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked
(Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it
were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to
court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife
whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would
expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were
not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness
or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which
can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the
admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance
to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality
disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants
within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order,
it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a
long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated
in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the
Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in
the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in
applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure
in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs
of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time
with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the
couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself
as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from
the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live
together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels
were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and
(3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on
July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr.
Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which
is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's
findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family
rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad

range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he
or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse,
as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then
there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing
and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences"
and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical)
illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along
with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your

findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-
visexisting law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the
difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo
C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to
thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it
"as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence
may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the
peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts
of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019,
4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological
incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the
present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a prioriassumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to
its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite
to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court
ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders
them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so
much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to
insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to
exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on
psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to
"mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There
being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is
the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense,
insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of
some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art.
36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how
they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the
possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested
that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage
which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are
void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now
open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time,
took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage:
"3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process
which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as
to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite
a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo freed from the marriage bonds in the
eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws.
Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Code and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in
existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly
for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old
canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required
in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external
freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct
but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack
of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person
was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding
ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first
time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not
present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this
change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan
Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves
shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about
a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of
new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made
in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to
that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that
a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person;
that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving
love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is
more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship
to the other spouse. 3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children
and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability
to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead
to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with

the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or
her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with
its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia,
where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or
she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into
any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their
use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations
as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and
breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered
equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia,
the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her
husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the
marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity
on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife
never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical
disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn
refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent
psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the
spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I
find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper
appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The
term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus
solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted
the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those)
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential

obligations of marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation
and construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must
be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds
enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons,
render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation.
Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if
the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological
incapacity. 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand,
assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt
manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few
observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to
be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to
carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were
otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The
fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the
State should regard marriage and the family, thus
Section 2, Article XV:

shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
(The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific
issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional provisions
are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such
that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear
to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply
directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful,
not half-hearted, respect.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the
peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts
of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019,
4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological
incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the
present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a prioriassumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to
to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court
ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders
them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so
much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to
insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to
exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on
psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.
celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to
"mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There
being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is
the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense,
insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of
some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art.
36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how
they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the
possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested
that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage
which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are
void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now
open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time,
took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage:
"3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process
which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as
to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite
a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo freed from the marriage bonds in the
eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws.
Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Code and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in
existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly
for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old
canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required
in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external
freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct
but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack
of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person
was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding
ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first
time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not
present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this
change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan
Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves
shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about
a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. 2
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong
that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving
obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
to the other spouse. 3
relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children
and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability
to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with

the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or
her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with
its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia,
where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or
she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into
any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their
use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations
as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and
breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered
equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia,
the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her
husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the
marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity
on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife
never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical
disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn
refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent
psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the
spouses.
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I
find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper
appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The
term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus
solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted
the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those)
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential

obligations of marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation
and construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must
be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds
enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons,
render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation.
Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if
the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
psychological
incapacity. 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand,
assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt
manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few
observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to
be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to
carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were
otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The
fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the
State should regard marriage and the family, thus
Section 12, Article II:
the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
(The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific
issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional provisions
are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such
that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear
to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply
directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful,
not half-hearted, respect.
Footnotes
1 Rollo pp. 25-33.
2 Sixteenth Division composed of J., Segundino G. Chua, ponente and chairman JJ.,
Serafin V.C. Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.
3 Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps.
4 Solemnized by Fr. Jesus C. Encinas.
5 The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of the RTC
Decision is follows:
"To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
marital obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature, irresponsible, dependent,
disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an infidel. These characteristics of
respondent are based on petitioner's testimony that the former failed to be gainfully
employed after he was relieved from the office of the Government Corporate Counsel
sometime in February, 1986. leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the family.
Also when they were separated in fact, respondent practically abandoned both
petitioner-mother and son except during the first few months of separation when
respondent regularly visited his son and gave him a monthly allowance of P1,000.00 for
about two to four months. Respondent is likewise dependent on his parents for financial
aid and support as he has no savings, preferring to spend his money with his friends
and peers. A year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he bought a
house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque for about a million pesos. They then transferred
there only for the petitioner to discover a few months later that they were actually
renting the house with the respondent's parents responsible for the payment of the
rentals. Aside from this. respondent would also lie about his salary and ability. And that
at present, respondent is living with his mistress and their child. which fact he does not
deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned sour if we
look at the background of their relationship. During their college days, when they were
still going steady, respondent observed petitioner to be conservative, homely, and
intelligent causing him to believe then that she would make an ideal wife and mother.
Likewise, petitioner fell in love with respondent because of his thoughtfulness and
gentleness. After a year, however, they decided to break their relationship because of
some differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later, while they were
working in Manila, petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair. They became
very close and petitioner was glad to observe a more mature respondent. Believing that
they know each other much better after two years of going steady, they decided to settle
down and get married. It would seem. therefore, that petitioner and respondent knew
each other well and were then prepared for married life.
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-up and
dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner and
respondent failed to respond properly to the situation. This failure resulted in their
frequent arguments and fighting's. In fact, even with the intervention and help of their
parents who arranged for their possible reconciliation, the parties could not come to
terms.
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up because of
their opposing and conflicting personalities (sic). Neither of them can accept and
understand the weakness of the other. No one gives in and instead, blame each other
for whatever problem or misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine, respondent cannot
be solely responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this resulted
because both parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife which is unique
and requisite in marriage.
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman with
the basic objective of establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family Code).
The unique element of permanency of union signifies a continuing, developing, and
lifelong relationship between the parties. Towards this end, the parties must fully
understand and accept the (implications and consequences of being permanently)
united in marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the parties,
among others, determination to succeed in their marriage as well as heartfelt
understanding, acceptance, cooperation, and support for each other. Thus, the Family
Code requires them to live together, to observe mutual (love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support. Failure to observe) and perform these fundamental
roles of a husband and a wife will most likely lead to the break-up of the marriage. Such
is the unfortunate situation in this case. (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records, pp. 70-73).
6 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.
7 Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition,
1988.
8 TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.
9 The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of the marriage
tribunals of each archdiocese in the country. Aside from heading the Appellate Tribunal,
Most. Rev. Cruz is also incumbent president of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the
Philippines, Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and holds the degrees of Doctor of
Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also Secretary-General of the
Second Plenary Council of the Philippines PCP II held from January 20, 1991 to
February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent of a parliament or a constitutional
convention in the Philippine Church, and where the ponente, who was a Council
member, had the privilege of being overwhelmed by his keen mind and prayerful
discernments.
10 Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired Minister of
Justice, author, noted civil law professor and the law practitioner.
Article XV
THE FAMILY
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation.
shall be protected by the state.
Sec. 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious connections
and the demands of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty. exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state may also do
so through just programs of social security.
Art. 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
limits provided by this Code.
13 Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.
14 This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the other hand, the
text used in Santos v. CA reads:
"Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruz's Memorandum is due to
the fact that the original Canon is written in Latin and both versions are differently-
worded English translations.
1 Justice Caguioa's explanation in the Minutes of July 26, 1986 of the Civil Code
Revision Committee of the U.P. Law Center.
2 Zwack , Joseph P. Annulment, A Step-by-Step Guide.
3 The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The Canon Law Society of
America, Paulist Press, New York, 1985.
4 Zwack, ibid., p. 47.

5 G.R. No. 112019, 240 SCRA 20 (1995).
6 G.R. No. 119190 (1997).
1 Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, quoting Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, In Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100.
2 In Santos vs. Court Appeals, 240 SCRA 20.
3 Supra.
4 At pages 34-35.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by
the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby
declared valid."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G.
Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to
Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with
Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of
the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their
custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City
where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the
Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982
which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2)
on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the
Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage,
five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was
transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee
Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air
Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as
an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through
telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she
was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good
provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe
in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she
was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacaang.When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her
business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to
put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development
Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter
quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted
him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her
aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in
her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical
Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit
in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing
the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her
driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella,
Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as
cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological
evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towardsappellee and their children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the
totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological
incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must
also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of
marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-
complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and
explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric
evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were
based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was
mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or
as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to
show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was
not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently
proven by an expert.Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was
suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he
could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d]
preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional
Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses
should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition." [7]
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is
not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the
evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to
determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have
been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests
himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no
choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation
of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court
as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees
marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos
v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity(b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case --
including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker --
was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not
gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of
the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially
now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. [12] At best, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed
them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion
requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Justice Bernardo LL Salas with the concurrence of Justices Fermin A. Martin Jr. (Division
chairman) and Candido V. Rivera (member).
[2] CA Decision, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 38-39.
[5]This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of
respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Virgilio V. Macaraig. Petitioner's Memorandum,
signed by Atty. Rita Linda V. Jimeno, had been filed earlier on November 5, 1999.
[6] Rollo, p. 70; original in upper case.
[7] Memorandum for petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 70.
[8] 268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
[9]
"Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
"The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article shall prescribe in ten years after
its celebration."
[10]
Supra, pp. 209-213.
[11] 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995, per Vitug, J.
[12] "Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner,
to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by nature or by adoption."
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004]
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a.
JANE IBRAHIM, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the
advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations,
culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28,
1966.[1] The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967. [2]
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968; [3] Stephanie
Janice born on September 9, 1969;[4] Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;[5] and Ingrid born on
October 20, 1976.[6] The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature
wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical
psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with
the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two
children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along
her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate
children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in
Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition
seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined
in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons
was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the
country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines. [7]
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological
evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who
wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he
does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had
no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with
petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of
infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting
to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. [8]
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL
and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the
essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu
thereof a regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously
acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance
with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE
OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A
CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED
IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal
of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. [10]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002. [11] Hence,
the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in its
conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her
marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner
falls short to prove psychological incapacity suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the
aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term psychological
incapacity?
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled:
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however,
do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may
have some bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case,
be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. [13]
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex
and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondents sexual
infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have
known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption
thereof.[14] It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later
affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity [16] or
sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article
55[17] of the Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos[18] that Article 36 is not to be
equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but
on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the
church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the
Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We cannot deny the
grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are
circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.[19] While we sympathize with petitioners marital predicament, our first and foremost
duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be. [20]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.
[1] Exhibits F and F-3.
[2] Exhibit F.
[3] Exhibit H.
[4] Exhibit I.
[5] Exhibit J.
[6] Exhibit K.
[7] Exhibits D to D-3.
[8] Exhibit L; Records pp. 57-78.
[9] Rollo, p. 49; penned by Presiding Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga (now an Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals).
[10] Rollo, pp. 33-44; per Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. and Eliezer R. Delos Santos, concurring.
[11] Rollo, p. 45.
[12]
310 Phil. 21 (1995).
[13] Id., at 40-41.
[14]
Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.
[15] Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588, 594.
[16] Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 87-88.
[17] ART. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner,
to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years even if pardoned;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage in the Philippines, whether in
the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion.
For purposes of this Article, the term child shall include a child by nature or by adoption.
[18] G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 765.
[19] Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 36.
[20] Pesca v. Pesca, supra.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an
individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally
liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the
latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain
Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract
between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. 1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. 2 When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed
married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, 3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro,
was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with
Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which
second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not
for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he
sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other,
claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. 7 He alleged that he signed a
marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work
as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in
Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of
said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. 10 On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS

CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND
WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed
judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 12
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence
of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage
was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are
absent, and prays for his acquittal.14
Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the
existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented
was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated
November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before
Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing
Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. 16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the
National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; 17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. 18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing
offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes
on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage
contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court
provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract,
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody
thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates
that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it
should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office
on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would
plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated
between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents
merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary
evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the
absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence
of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than
documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that
there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the
civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony
of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that
petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which
would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first
marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is
significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil
Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents,
therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the
first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of
the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently
declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed. 21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is
that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage
to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless
of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se
an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of
the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or
a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our
mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and
void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is
concerned. The States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the
sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate
disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential
(legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage
ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing
officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). 24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by
petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the
second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses
is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these
effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall
be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States
penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case,
and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third
time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is
irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the
accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look
kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its
permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the
States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is
prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the
trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of
the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.
SEPARATE OPINION>
VITUG, J.:
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being married to Hilda
Villareyes, a second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his
second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab initio on the ground of the latters
psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". 1 Bigamy
presupposes a valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of
the prior union, which would have been binding were it not for its being bigamous.
Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as
being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both
parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained), the answer
must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial
decree is required to establish their nullity.2 As early as the case of People vs. Aragon3 this Court has
underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in
Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way
of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an
express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its
absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a
voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a
bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment) 4 the
complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally
inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted of bigamy
although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage is
contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage. 5 I maintain strong
reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads:
"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of the
previous marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the
Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the
spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a
judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been
abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals, 7 the Family Code, however
has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the
subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the
Family Code has amended or intended to amend the Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled
and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.8
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has been from
Canon law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those of
church laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential marital obligations of the
spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or
formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting
parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto may
be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it
is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code considers children conceived
or born of such a void marriage before its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the
rule on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the spouses
rights and obligations, property regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it
were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically two
reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under the
Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a valid marriages; 10 and
second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of the parties, lack
of license, mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively easy demonstration,
psychological incapacity, however, being a mental state, may not so readily be as evident. 11 It would
have been logical for the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void
if it were not for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and
nomenclature.
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a voidable
marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It might
be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the Family Code, an action or
defense of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article 36, celebrated before the effectivity of the
Code, could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision of
the ten-year period of prescription seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers that
marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage due to
psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until
judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise
dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity
of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing
a prior "voidable" marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the
prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.
In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage,
this Court has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed. 12 The Court has
explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be shown that
the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the
subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the second marriage has been contracted
without the necessary license and thus void,13 or that the accused is merely forced to enter into the
second (voidable) marriage,14 no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like
instances, however, the lapses refers to the elements required for contracting a valid marriage. If,
then, all the requisites for the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into,
are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can unassailably arise.
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the elements,
either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the
bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge
for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of
the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses
but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court
is no defense on the part of the offender who had entered into it.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.
Footnotes
1 TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 4-11.
2 Record, p. 78.
3 Record, p. 84.
4 TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 11-12; TSN, 13 September 1995, pp. 6-9.
5 Record, pp. 1-2.
6 Id., p. 66.
7 TSN, 11 December 1996, p. 6.
8 Id., pp. 6-7.
9 Id., pp. 7-8.
10 Penned by Judge Rumoldo F. Fernandez, Rollo, pp. 156-162.
11 Rollo, p. 7.
12 Reyes, L.B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE. Book Two, 14th ed., 1998, p. 907.
13
Rollo, pp. 7-16.
14 Id., pp. 16-18.
15 Record, p. 85.
16 Record, p. 84.
17 Record, p. 148.
18 Record, p. 149.
19 Mariategui v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57062, 24 January 1992, 205 SCRA 337, 343,
citing People v. Borromeo, 218 Phil. 122, 126.
20Decision dated November 20, 1995, penned by Judge Epifanio C. Llano of the Regional
Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. AV-885 (Annex "C", Rollo, p. 43).
21
Record, pp. 16-18.
22 Family Code, Art. 41.
24Family Code, Art. 3; Vitug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, pp. 119-120, citing
the Family Code, Articles 2 and 3.
25Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning,
whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
26 Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth
civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and stepchildren;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other
persons spouse or his or her own spouse.
27 Valdez v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996.
VITUG,
1 Article 349, Revised Penal Code.
2 Odayat vs. Amante, 77 SCRA 338; see also People vs Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033.
3 100 Phil 1033.
4 See People vs. Mendoza, 50 O.G. 4767.
5 Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122; Te vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 327.
6 143 SCRA 499.
7 145 SCRA 229.
8 I might add, parenthetically, that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage even for purposes of remarriage should refer merely to cases when it can be said
that the marriage, at least ostensibly, has taken place. For instance, no such judicial
declaration of nullity would yet be required when either or both parties have not at all given
consent thereto that verily results in a "no" marriage situation or when the prior "marriage" is
between persons of the same sex.
9 Deliberations of the family Code Revision Committee, 9 August 1996.
10 Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. (n)
11One might observe that insanity, which could be worse than psychological incapacity merely
renders a marriage voidable, not void.
12
De la cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, G.R. No. L-40895, 6 November 1975, 68 SCRA 1; Merced vs.
Hon. Diez, et. Al., 109 Phil 155; Zapanta vs. hon. Montessa, et. al., 144 Phil. 1227; People vs.
Mora Dumpo, 62 Phil 246; People vs. Lara, 51 O. G. 4079.
13 People vs. Lara, supra.
14 De la Cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, supra; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, supra.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution 2 dated July 8,
2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being
previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1,
H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding
ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated
November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on
October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos
Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26,
1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in
Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x
x x.
xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS
of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accuseds
bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is being
determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2
August 2001.3
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and
void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the
celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a
valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to
Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003,
the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos
Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by
the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the
time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners
contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of
her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003,
declaring petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of
Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of
her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals,4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of
the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not
without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy." 5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where
petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE
CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF
THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE

CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING
PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN
DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING

THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.

THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID
MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE
AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that
right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the
proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners
marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also
asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a
ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA
struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the Court categorically stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in
such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case
for declaration of nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal
backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is
not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x
x7
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to
the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion
would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting
at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 9
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioners conviction of the crime
of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two
marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment
petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null
and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the
second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a
court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration
of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference. 10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A
plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage."11
Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is
classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that
"[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91
states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence,
prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense
has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of
its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.12 Thus, for petitioners
defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the
year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient
evidence to support her allegation. Petitioners testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that
she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any
corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who allegedly actually told Uy
about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of
her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay. 13
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be
counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the
bigamous marriage.15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription
began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi1
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised
Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate
Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum
penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to
the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. 16
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next
lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty
of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration of prision
correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the
prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years
and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioners marriage to Alocillo has after
all been declared by final judgment17 to be void ab initio on account of the latters psychological
incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it
proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the
penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio,
Jr. and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; rollo, pp. 8-21.
2Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Mariano C. del
Castillo and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; rollo, pp. 22-23.
3 Rollo, pp. 9-10.
4 467 Phil. 723 (2004).
5 CA rollo, p. 404.
6
391 Phil. 648 (2000).
7 Id. at 655-657. (Emphasis supplied.)
8 G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 562.
9 Id. at 567-568. (Emphasis supplied.)
10 Abunado v. People, supra note 8; Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, supra note 4, at 752.
11 Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 742.
12Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No.
151890, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 411, 433.
13 Records, p. 383.
14 G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994, 233 SCRA 155.
15 Id. at 161.
16 Abunado v. People, supra note 8, at 568.
17See Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 00-1217, CA rollo,
pp. 343-347.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004

vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch
72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-
Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in
Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal
Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One
month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to
see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given
address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect
service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August
1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general
circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive
pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5,
1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on
November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion
existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial
court granted respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-

Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make
proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the
Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity, the trial
court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as
husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the
Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to
respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life. 5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on
the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal.
The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration
of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make
them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated
with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to
see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court
rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and
creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in
a marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping
them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina8and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos
while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological
incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents failure to
comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did
not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed
to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the
guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 11 Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios psychological

incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He
abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but
he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.
After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented
showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no
need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. 16 There was no showing
that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We
cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that
a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because
the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree.
In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino
spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State
cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her
husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of
the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Acting Chief Justice
1Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, and concurred in by Associate Justices Cancio
C. Garcia and Hilarion Aquino; Rollo, pp. 24-31.
2 Second Division.
3 Penned by Judge Rogelio Angeles; Rollo, pp. 32-33.
4 Rollo, p. 33.
5 Rollo, p. 52.
6 Rollo, p. 30.
7 Rollo, p. 29.
8 268 SCRA 198 [1997].
9 240 SCRA 20 [1995].
10 Rollo, p. 14.
11 Article II, Section 12; and, Article XV, Sections 1 & 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
12Republic of the Philippines vs. Dagdag, 351 SCRA 425 [2001] citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Hernandez, 320 SCRA 76 [1999].
13 Supra, Note 8, pp. 209-212.
14
Supra, Note 9, p. 33.
15 Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, 764 [2000].
16 Article 55 (10) of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more

than one year.
17 Supra Note 8, p. 210.
18
Ibid., pp. 211-212.
19 356 SCRA 588, 594 [2001].

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love
transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always
disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in
the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital
obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment 3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and
Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm
instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was
36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the
Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding 5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima
Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their union, a child was born
on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and
void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the
present.8
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that

respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about
the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage. 11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in
fact, no such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told
some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither. 13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the
Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect 14 but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken
place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent
lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent
herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their
quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her
imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary
items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. 20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her
in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally
left her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist,
and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that
petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based
on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that
petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending
to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she
fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. 24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent
from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot. 26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the
Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she
had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson
& Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist
although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after
office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village
Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were
not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while
Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked
the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to
monitor her husbands whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her
monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the
other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that
the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her
part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the
allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by
his assistant,33 together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological
Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that
regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as
(i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and
(ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can
fake the results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents
propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among othershad been duly established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe.
This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the
part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan
Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the
appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been
completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity. It declared
that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court.
He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by
the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. 41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the
conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from
the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is likewise guided
by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by
petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the
crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets
the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited
the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar. 46 Since Molina was decided in 1997,
the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming
Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by
Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet
what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly
onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity
under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article
36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel
in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full
enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage." 51 Marriages with such persons were
ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already
married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law
of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was
cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce on the ground of a
spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of
"unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The
mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a
marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of
the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind. 58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity
impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial
common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did
not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the
Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is
not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a
marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the
marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code
committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage
only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for
annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were
psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would
amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning
with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in
the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed
that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the
thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal
wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently
recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision
committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." 70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the
revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case,
current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices
of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have
been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary
framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the
same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-
case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of
Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case
shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered
opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable,
considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of
psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, 73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a
solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under
civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged
that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still, it must be emphasized that
the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even
though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code
and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church
thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this
Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever
socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such
legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it
also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and
the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations
that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and
those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is.
Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically

incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection
of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family,
which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36
do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of
petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation
in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095
of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law
on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification
stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. 78 This requirement however was
dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still, Article 48 of the
Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering
the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event,
the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the
great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of
Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had
consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity,
consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on
his wifes behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel
Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also
presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant
behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below
considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner. 80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able
to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot
be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest,
the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney,
fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among
the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited
unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and
inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of
lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among
others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical
causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses
in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two
(2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a
couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems
(sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and
repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the
lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see,
relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are
our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected
to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this
relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on
love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying
and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the
petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him
(sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is
specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this,
Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no
actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to
the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as
we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another
woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then
that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to

perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of
respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record,
particularly the trial transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held
in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the
spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the methodology utilized by
petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and
Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself
accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of
psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making
her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented
by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological
incapacity.87
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of
and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious
characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her
natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their
marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared
only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that
respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order
to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent
to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court
were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her
mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy
and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less
its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting.
One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage
hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at
best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth,
her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may
be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation
or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46.
The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to
vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her
own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article
36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial
court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed
this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision
despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88 Such deliberate ignorance is in
contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the
marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the
part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondents psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically
defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and
employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the
practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of
the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the
depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert
Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts
that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant,
and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative
component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete
judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was
impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the
Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner. 94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also
by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the
marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial
court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents
version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic
Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of
the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition
by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear
certain that respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect. 95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From
this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is
incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses characterized
respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision
on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made
explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other
provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by
first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, 96 then the opinion of canonical
scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological
incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized
"by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal
rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a
characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its
own ruling that remained silent on whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the
time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision that required
a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this
case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument

that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a
part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted. 103 Yet we approach this present case from
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert
opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal
necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly
propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to
those cases tried before Molinaor Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where
presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to
adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily
on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert
medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to
present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years
ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of
respondents psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts
are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider
incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that
respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having
been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state,
remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In
fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to remain in
the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality.
Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live
together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family
Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
ATTESTATION
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Attestation by the Divisions Chairman,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C.
Dacudao and Mariano C. Del Castillo; See rollo, pp. 67-84.
2 Rollo, p. 86.
3Penned by Judge (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Josefina Guevara-
Salonga.
4 Solemnized by Rev. Victor M. Navarro, Minister of the PCCC, Las Pias, Metro Manila.
5 Solemnized by the Parish Priest, Rev. Fr. Rodolfo Aguirre Gallardo.
6 Rollo, pp. 69, 91.
7
Records, pp. 1-5.
8 Id. at 1-2.
9 Id. at 2-3. See also rollo, pp. 69, 91.
10 Named Tito F. Reyes II, born on 21 January 1982.
11 Supra note 8.
12 Rollo, pp. 69, 92.
13 Id. at 70, 92.
14
Id. at 95.
15 Supra note 13.

16 Id. at 70, 92.
17 TSN, 8 September 1993, p. 12.

18 Id. at 12-13. See also records, p. 91.
19 Rollo, pp. 71, 92.
20 Id.; records, p. 3.
21 Rollo, pp. 71, 92.

22 Id. at 71-72, 92-93.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 93.
25 Id. at 74, 94.
26
Id.
27 Id. at 73, 93.
28 Id.
29
Id.
30 Id. at 74, 94.
31 Id. at 73, 94.
32 Id. at 77-78.
33 Miss Francianina Sanches.

34 Rollo, p. 94.
35 Id. at 72, 93; TSN, 23 March 1995, pp. 15-17.
36 Rollo, pp. 95-96.
37 Id. at 97-98.
38 Id. at pp. 99-100.
39 Id. at 101-103.
40 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
41 Rollo, p. 95.
42Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 105, 126 (1995), citing Serrano v.
Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 107 (1991).
43 Rollo, p. 82.
44 Supra note 40.
45 The petitioning spouse and co-respondent in the case being Roridel O. Molina. Id.
46 Rollo, p. 78.
47
There were two cases since 1997 wherein the Court did let stand a lower court order
declaring as a nullity a marriage on the basis of Article 36. These cases are Sy v. Court of
Appeals, 386 Phil. 760 (2000), and Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 127358 &
127449, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 261. However, in Sy, the Court found that the marriage
was void ab initio due to the lack of a marriage license at the time the marriage was
solemnized, and thus declined to pass upon the question of psychological incapacity.
In Buenaventura, since the parties chose not to challenge the trial courts conclusion of
psychological incapacity and instead raised questions on the award of damages and support,
the Court did not review the finding of psychological incapacity.
48
334 Phil. 294 (1997).
49It does not escape this Courts attention that many lower courts do grant petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36, and that these decisions are not elevated for review to
the Supreme Court.
50 See Family Code, Art. 36.
51 Translated from the original Spanish by Justice F.C. Fisher. See F.C. Fisher, The Civil Code
of Spain with Philippine Notes and References 45 (Fifth Ed., 1947). The original text of Article
83 (2) of the Spanish Civil Code reads: "No pueden contraer matrimonio: x x x (2) Los que no
estuvieren en el pleno ejercicio du su razon al tiempo de contraer matrimonio."
52 See Spanish Civil Code. (1889) Art. 101.

53 Act No. 2710 (1917).
54 See Act No. 3613 (1929), Sec. 30 (c)
55 See Executive Order No. 141 (1943), Sec. 2 (5).
56Unless the party of unsound mind, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband or wife. See Civil Code, Art. 85 (3).
57 See Civil Code, Art. 80.
58 Subject to the same qualifications under Article 85 (3) of the Civil Code. See note 56.
59 See Civil Code, Art. 1327 (2) in relation to Art. 1318 (1).
60See Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 32-33 (1995). See also A. Sempio Diy,
Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines 37 (1988). A contrary view though was
expressed by Justice Ricardo Puno, also a member of the Family Code commission. See
Santos v. Court of Appeals, ibid.
61I A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence 274-275
(1990 ed.).
62 Id.
63
Id. at 274.
64
Supra note 60.
65 Id. at 40, emphasis supplied. The Court further added, "[t]here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to marriage." Id.
66Supra note 40.
67 Id. at 677.
68 Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).
69It may be noted that a previous incarnation of Article 36, subsequently rejected by the Family
Code Commission, stated that among those void ab initio marriages are those "contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration." See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 30.
70Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108; citing A.
Sempio-Diy, supra note 60, at 37, emphasis supplied. See also Santos v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 60, at 36; Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 677.
71 G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.
72Id. at 431; citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997), Padilla, J.,
Separate Statement.
73 See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 32-39.
74 See Sempio-Diy, supra note 60, at 36.
75 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 678.
76Thus, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48, wherein the psychological
incapacity of the petitioner was recognized by the Court from the fact that he did not engage in
sexual relations with his wife during their ten (10) month marital cohabitation, remains a
binding precedent, even though it was decided shortly before the Molina case.
77 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 676-680.

78 Id. at 680.
79See Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422,
435.
80 Rollo, p. 82.
81
Records, pp. 2-3.
82 University of Santo Tomas Hospital and UERM Memorial Medical Center. Dr. Abcede
likewise was the past president of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association. TSN, February 23,
1994, p. 6.
83 TSN, 23 February 1994, pp. 7-9, 11-12.
84 TSN, 23 March 1995, p. 12.
85397 Phil. 840 (2000).
86
Id. at 850.
87 Rollo, pp. 95-96.
88As shown by the Motion(s) for Early Resolution of the Case filed by petitioner with the
canonical declarations attached as annexes.
89 Id. at 97-98.
90The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila based the decree of invalidity on the
ground of lack of due discretion on the part of both parties. On appeal, however, the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal modified the judgment by holding that lack of due discretion
applied to respondent but there was no sufficient evidence to prove lack of due discretion on
the part of petitioner. See also note 38.
91 Rollo, pp. 99-100.
92 Id. at 101-103.
93 "A restrictive clause is herewith attached to this sentence of nullity to the effect that the
respondent may not enter into another marriage without the express consent of this Tribunal,
in deference to the sanctity and dignity of the sacrament of matrimony, as well as for the
protection of the intended spouse."; rollo, p. 97.
94 Rollo, p. 99. Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.
95 Rollo, p. 82.
96 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 30-36.
97 Id. at 37-39.
98 Id. at 39-40.
99 Id. at 33.
100 Id. at 39.
101 "It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the
phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited
in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in
Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases").
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of
the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of
the void marriage to be "legitimate."
"The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
psychological incapacity.
"Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions
of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable." Santos v. Court of Appeals, id. at 39-41.
102 G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588.
103 Id. at 593.
THIRD DIVISION
DIGNA A. NAJERA, G.R. No. 164817

Petitioner, Present:
- versus - Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
EDUARDO J. NAJERA, VELASCO, JR.,
Respondent. NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 3, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A. Najera and respondent
Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal separation, but not annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The facts are as follows:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as
Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.[1]
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but
respondent is presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January
31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon,
Pangasinan.[2] They are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity
became manifest only after marriage as shown by the following facts:
(a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the Special
Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did
not exert enough effort to find a job and was dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of
petitioners elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a seaman in 1988
through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.
(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial
support and she had to rely on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.
(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months each
year. In May 1989, when he came home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and
falsely accused her of having an affair with another man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to
force petitioner into it. When she refused, he insulted her and uttered unprintable words against her. He
would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he was always drunk.
(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994, as had been
happening every year, he quarreled with petitioner. He continued to be jealous, he arrived home drunk
and he smoked marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation,
he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was able to parry his
attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her body. She was
treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was reported at the Bugallon Police Station.
(e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings. He lived
with his mother at Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.
Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored in Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her as the sole
administrator of their conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered (1)
declaring their marriage void ab initio in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the
alternative, decreeing legal separation of petitioner and respondent pursuant to Title II of the Family
Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of petitioner and respondent and the
forfeiture in
favor of petitioner of respondents share in the said properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of
the Family Code; and (4) granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.
On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of petitioner to effect service
by publication as provided under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer[3] wherein he denied the material allegations in
the petition and averred that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low
morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the subject house and lot were acquired through his
sole effort and money. As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award of P200,000.00 as moral
damages, P45,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P1,000.00 as appearance fee for every scheduled
hearing.
On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order[4] terminating the pre-trial conference after the
parties signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their
conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties.
On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a Compliance

manifesting that after conducting an investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the
parties.[5] The initial hearing of the case was held on November 23, 1998.
Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia
Aldana; psychologist Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Bugallon, Pangasinan.
Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an accounting clerk
in a government agency in Manila. She and respondent married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by
their marriage contract.[6] At the time of their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was
employed as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a
monthly salary of P5,000.00. It was petitioners brother who helped respondent find a job as a seaman
at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent was employed as a seaman,
and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment of P1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went home in
1989 and then returned to work after three months. Every time respondent was home, he quarreled
with petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another man. Petitioner noticed that respondent
also smoked marijuana and every time he went out of the house and returned home, he was
drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that respondent was involved in drugs.[7]
In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their earnings. In 1991,
they constructed a house on the lot.[8]
On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the boyfriend of petitioners
sister. Respondent, however, did not allow petitioner to go with him.When respondent arrived home at
around midnight, petitioner asked him about the party, the persons who attended it, and the ladies he
danced with, but he did not answer her. Instead, respondent went to the kitchen. She asked him again
about what happened at the party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that she was the one having
an affair and suddenly slapped and boxed her, causing her eyes to be bloodied. When she opened her
eyes, she saw respondent holding a bolo, and he attempted to kill her. However, she was able to parry
his attack with her left arm, causing her to sustain injuries on different parts of her body. When
respondent saw that she was bloodied, he got nervous and went out.After 10 minutes, he turned on
the light in the kitchen, but he could not find her because she had gone out and was hiding from him.
When she heard respondent start the motorcycle, she left her hiding place and proceeded to Gomez
Street toward the highway. At the highway, she boarded a bus and asked the conductor to stop at a
clinic or hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and proceeded to the clinic of one Dr.
Padlan, who sutured her wounds. After a few hours, she went home.[9]
When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her parents who were
residing about 300 meters away. She then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in
order to open the door. She found that their personal belongings were gone, including her Automated
Teller Machine card and jewelry.[10]
Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan. [11]
Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in Banaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. Petitioner learned that he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment
from him.[12]
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while respondents parents were
separated. Respondents brothers were also separated from their respective wives. [13]
Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological incapacity
of respondent.[14]
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who
was abroad. She confirmed her Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:
It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups
which are rooted in the kind of family background he has. His mother had an extramarital
affair and separated from Respondents father. This turn of events left an irreparable mark
upon Respondent, gauging from his alcoholic and marijuana habit. In time, he seemed
steep in a kind of a double bind where he both deeply loved and resented his mother.
His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her appears to
be an offshoot of deep-seated feelings and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother.
Unable to resolve his childhood conflicts and anger, he turned to his wife as
the scapegoat for all his troubles.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted with a
Borderline Personality Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal
relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable
impulses. Eduardo Najeras psychological impairment as traced to his parents separation,
aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his
marriage to Petitioner Digna Aldana.
Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to

cause irreparable damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and
abusive behavior across time render his impairment grave and irreversible. In the light of
these findings, it is recommended that parties marriage be annulled on grounds of
psychological incapacity on the part of Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his
marital duties and responsibilities to Digna Aldana-Najera.[15]
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondents psychological
disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal --
referring to the malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and
marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable
impulses.[16]
Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on
July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the
influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to
kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter. [17]
On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the
petitioner and respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna Najera and

respondent/defendant Eduardo Najera;
2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the petitioner/plaintiff

and respondent/defendant, and to divide the same equally between
themselves pursuant to their Joint Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998. [18]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[19] dated May 2, 2000.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and judgment

of the Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.[20]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
August 5, 2004.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198.
2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
respondent Eduardo Najera.
3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is
practically the same set of facts established by petitioners evidence submitted before
the trial court and therefore the same conclusion ought to be rendered by the Court.
4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as
an expert in Psychology.[21]
The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.[22]
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological incapacity
of respondent which is his dysfunctional family background. With such background, respondent could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the obligations
The Court is not persuaded.
Republic v. Court of Appeals[23] laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation
of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.
xxxx
must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
psychologists.
exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities,
difficulty, much less ill will.In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -- what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church -- while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other -- shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of
protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos
v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."[24] The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.[25] In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified."[26] What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.[27]
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted
by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged psychological
incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates conclusion that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on
her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and
unreliable.[28] Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that
the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may be gleaned from Psychologist
Cristina Gates testimony:
Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a borderline personality
disorder. [D]id you find any organic cause?
A No, sir.
Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time of the marriage of the
respondent?
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondents family] background, there
was strong basis that respondent developed mal-adoptive pattern.
Q Did you interview the respondents family?

A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).
xxxx
Q Have you [seen] the respondent?
A He is not in the country, sir.
Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report which the respondent is
allegedly affected, is this curable?
A The chances are nil.
Q But it is curable?
A It depends actually if the established organic damage is minimal.
Q What is this organic damage?

A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.
Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not seen him (respondent)?
A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted the respondent with
borderline personality disorder. This [is] based on his interpersonal relationships,
his marred self-image and self-destructive tendencies, and his uncontrollable
impulses.
Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?

A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard. [29]
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard
to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and
respondents abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds
for legal separation[30] only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal which her counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on
February 11, 2004, twelve days before the decision was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She
contended that the Court of Appeals failed to follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v. Court of
Appeals, thus:

Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon law, which became effective in
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of
protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
Petitioners argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the
opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated
August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court
of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held
that petitioners motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002,
which was forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons
from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in
effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed)
corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty
required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon
contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment,
thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was
dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his
own parents; his own two siblings have broken marriages; Second, he
therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and
on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends,
already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of
bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later
hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother
who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally,
into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time
he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo
that wounded her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance,

having invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law
and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims,
declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo
in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon
1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than
herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit:
Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellants mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP,
Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses
testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent
allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding
before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the
opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity
of the latters testimonies, this Court is without any clue.
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the
Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as
follows:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed
civilly void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose of which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give

credence to the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently,
it was made on a different set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their
truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the

evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And
based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the
judgment of the Trial Court.[31]
Santos v. Santos[32] cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family
Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code
of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes
of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer
from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to
be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-
in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not
appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia
followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty
required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering
nugatory his marital contract x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having

invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant
Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the
confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the
ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by
the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred
in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of
respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68053, dated February 23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Records, p. 1.
[2] Marriage Contract, Exhibit A, records, p. 192.
[3]
Records, p. 34.
[4]
Id. at 98.
[5] Id. at 125.
[6] Exhibit A, records, p. 192.
[7] TSN, November 23, 1998, pp. 4-8, 22.
[8] Id. at 9-11.
[9] TSN, November 23, 1998, pp. 12-16.
[10] Id. at 16-17.
[11] Id. at 17-18. See Exhibit F, records, p. 197.
[12] TSN, November 23, 1998, p. 19.
[13] Id. at 19-20.
[14] Id. at 20.
15 Records, p. 201.
[16] TSN, April 14, 1999, pp. 7-8.
[17] Exhibit F, records, p. 197.
[18]
Rollo, p. 65.
[19] Id. at 66-67.
[20] Id. at 38.

[21] Id. at 16, 18, 20, 21.
[22]
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
[23] 335 Phil. 664, 676-680 (1997).
[24] Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] See Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 191 (2002).
[29] TSN, April 14, 1999, pp. 6-8. (Emphasis supplied.)
[30] The Family Code, Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
Philippines or abroad;
[31] Rollo, pp. 41-43. (Emphasis supplied.)

[32] G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,

vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the
Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for
failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a
Decision1 denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The
trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court
reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent
that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It
held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of
the marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the
substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the
conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly
demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the
essential marital obligations.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for failure of
petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. 7 The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to
file comment8but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment.
Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's
motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of
marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. 9 Such factual
issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. 10 It
is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on this Court,11 save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the
findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the
parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, 12 which are unavailing in the instant
case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. 13 As all people may have certain
quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders,
there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 14 It is for this reason
that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality.
However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
must be fully explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is
the presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological condition.
Here, appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence
on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological
incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's
alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of
some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the
couple's relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a
year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and
contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning,
respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when
petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about
the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to
perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of
trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could
not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a
mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type."
In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is
dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of
theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital affairs
was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and
inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She
stated that there was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship.
But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came from
petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening
disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent's
character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the
essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that respondent's
supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these
omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus
of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever
they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are
not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his
friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the
psychological defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void
based on psychological incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.19 No
less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would
likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make
the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must
be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law
were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. 27 Neither it is to be equated with
legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June
9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that
the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 96-99. Penned by Judge Franchito N. Diamante.
2 Id. at 101.
3Id. at 9-19. Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in by Associate
Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Danilo B. Pine.
4 Id. at 17.
5 Id. at 18.
6 Id. at 7.
7 Id. at 208-227.
8 Id. at 228.
9Concurring Opinion of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil.
664, 680 (1997).
10Abacus Real Estate Development Center, Inc. v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No.
162270, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 97, 106.
11 Domingo v. Robles, G.R. No. 153743, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 812, 817.
12
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 141856, February 11, 2005, 451
SCRA 63, 69.
13
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).
14 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 40 (1995).
15 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9 at 677.
16 Rollo, pp. 111-113.
17 Supra note 9 at 669 & 674.

18 377 Phil. 919, 931 (1999).
19 Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 439.
20 Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508, 522.
21 Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of
parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless
such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that
the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding
Chapter;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the
other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
22Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning,
whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
23 Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth
civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other
person's spouse or his or her own spouse.
24Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
25Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of
the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such
party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards,
with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the
other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was inflicted with a sexually-transmitted disease found to be
serious and appears to be incurable.
26Concurring Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9 at
690.
27 Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra note 19 at 439.
28 Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 13.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007
ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Courts ruling that the Guidelines set forth in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ronidel Olaviano Molina1 "do not require that a physician should
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition."2
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, are the (a) Decision3 dated December 8, 2000 and (b) Resolution4 dated April 5, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915, entitled "Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs.
Justo J. Paras, Defendant-Appellee."
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.
Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under
Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the
following circumstances:
(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;
(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;
(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and
(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.
To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial evidence.
This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos University,
Cebu City.5 He courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica." 6 Eventually, in 1964, convinced
that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most
celebrated" marriages in Bindoy.7
After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for their honeymoon. 8 Upon returning
to Bindoy, they resided at her parents house. It was their residence for three (3) years until they were
able to build a house of their own.9 For the first five (5) years of their marriage, Justo did not support
her and their children because he shouldered his sisters schooling.10 Consequently, she was the one
who spent for all their family needs, using the income from her "Botica" and store. 11
Justo lived the life of a bachelor.12 His usual routine was to spend time with his "barkadas" until the
wee hours of the morning. Oftentimes, he would scold her when she sent for him during
lunchtime.13 He also failed to provide for their childrens well-being.14 Sometime in 1975, their
daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also,
in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He
did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing
the rooftop.15
To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United States. Her sisters
supported them throughout their two-year stay there. However, after three months, Justo abandoned
them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her
"Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt. She then realized Justo was a profligate. At one time,
he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land.16 At other times, he permitted the municipal
government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge.
She endured all of Justos shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress and siring an
illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that after
leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the
birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased daughter
Cindy Rose Paras.17
As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.
He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar examinations in Manila. 18 He frequently
spent time in her store.19 Believing he loved her, he courted her and later on, they became
sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get married. However, it was postponed because her family
demanded a dowry. Their marriage took place in 1964 upon his mothers signing a deed of
conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut land in favor of Rosa. 20
He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the slump of the price of sugar and not to
his alleged profligacy.21 Due to his business ventures, he and Rosa were able to acquire a 10-room
family house, expand their store, establish their gasoline station, and purchase several properties. He
also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose
of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop
loan before the banks authorized employee.22
As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosas attitude after her return from the
United States. She became detached, cold, uncaring, and overly focused on the familys
businesses.23 He tried to reach her but Rosa was steadfast in her "new attitudinal outlook." Before
other people, he merely pretended that their relationship was blissful. 24
He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened that they only had tourist visas. When
they were there, their childrens tourist visas were converted into study visas, permitting them to stay
longer. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus,
he immediately returned to the Philippines. 25
He spent for his childrens education. At first, he resented supporting them because he was just
starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their
needs. He admitted though that there were times he failed to give them financial support because of
his lack of income.26
What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosas act of embarrassing him during his birthday
celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she
has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. 27 This was further
aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous
and NPA-infested area.28
As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary
in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose
Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the
marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after
Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house; 29 (b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to support
the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary; 30 and (c) the charge
of infidelity is unsubstantiated.31 The RTC observed that the relationship between the parties started
well, negating the existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration
of their marriage.32 And lastly, it ruled that there appeared to be a collusion between them as both
sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage. 33
Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment against Justo, docketed as A.C. No.
5333, premised on the same charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosas signature
in bank documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He was suspended from the practice
of law, thus:
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for SIX (6) MONTHSon the charge of falsifying his wifes signature in bank documents and
other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges
of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously.
Let notice of this Decision be spread in respondents record as an attorney, and notice of the
same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court promulgated the Decision in A.C. No.
5333, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence
of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It
ruled that Justos alleged defects or idiosyncracies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence," thus:
Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record first, the income which supported
their children came from the earnings of their conjugal properties and not singularly from
Rosas industry; second, Justo gave his share of the support to his children in the form of
allowances, albeit smaller than that derived from the conjugal property; third, he was booted
out from their conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid for re-election and as such did not
voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth, although unjustifiable in the eyes of the law and
morality, Justos alleged infidelity came after he was driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.
The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosas inability to offer the testimony of a psychologist is fatal
to her case, being in violation of the tenets laid down by this Court in Molina. 34 Thus, she failed to
substantiate her allegation that Justo is psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage.35
Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari.
Rosa contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the
present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also,
she argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993, well before this Courts
pronouncement in Molina relied upon by the Court of Appeals. She states that she could have
presented an expert to prove the root cause of Justos psychological incapacity had she been
required to do so. For relief, she prays that her marriage with Justo be annulled on the bases of the
Courts conclusive factual findings in A.C. No. 5333; or in the alternative, remand this case to the
court a quo for reception of expert testimony in the interest of due process.
In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case is a "new matter completely
foreign and removed" from A.C. No. 5333; hence, the factual findings of this Court therein are not
conclusive on this case. Besides, no hearing was conducted in A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided
merely on the bases of pleadings and documents.
The parties opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3) vital issues:
first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present
case;
second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root
cause of Justos alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and
third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of
Justo.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Whether the factual findings of this Court in

A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.
Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading of the Court of Appeals Decision
shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her
charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground
of psychological incapacity. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads:
Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find that even if we assume Justos alleged
infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true, such
traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by
themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable
psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person.
While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily
show incurability, such that while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily
show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents
him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future. 36
The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying Rosas motion for reconsideration,
thus:
Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme Court in the disbarment case
appellant filed against her husband, namely, appellees falsification of documents to obtain
loans and his infidelity, these facts, by themselves, do not conclusively establish appellees
psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, we
already went as far as to presume the existence of such seeming depravities in appellees
character in our earlier judgment. However, as we emphasized in our Decision, the existence
of such eventualities is not necessarily conclusive of an inherent incapacity on the part of
appellee to discern and perform the rudiments of marital obligations as required under Article
36.37
Clearly, Rosas insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 be considered "conclusive" on the
present case is unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals already "went as far as to presume the
existence" of Justos depravities, however, even doing so could not bring about her (Rosas) desired
result. As Rosas prayer for relief suggests, what she wants is for this Court to annul her marriage on
the bases of its findings in A.C. No. 5333.38 Obviously, she is of the impression that since her charges
in A.C. No. 5333 were found to be true, justifying the suspension of Justo from the practice of law, the
same charges are also sufficient to prove his psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
Her premise is of course non-sequitur.
Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They
are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic premise is that
criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition
in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.39 The Courts exposition in In re
Almacen40 is instructive, thus:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are]
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Accordingly, ones unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean ones unfitness as
a husband or vice versa.41 The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the
disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. While Rosas charges sufficiently proved Justos unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may
not establish that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the
disbarment case, "the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether
the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders him truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party from a
meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the following discussion, Justos acts are not
sufficient to conclude that he is psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what
is expected from a lawyer.
II
Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.
The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin in Molina.42 One
of the Guidelines set forth therein states:
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological --
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court clarified that the above Guideline does not require
that the respondent should be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua
non for the declaration of the nullity of marriage. What is important is "the presence of evidence that
can adequately establish the partys psychological condition."
Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided, the Court backtracked a bit when it
held in Republic v. Dagdag44 that, "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts" and this requirement was not deemed complied
with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified on the alleged psychological incapacity of one
party.
Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages,45 promulgated by this Court on March 15, 2003, geared towards the relaxation of
the requirement of expert opinion. Section 2, paragraph (d) states:
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged.
In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court categorically explained that under the New Rules, a
petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert opinion on
the psychological incapacity or on its root cause. What must be alleged are the physical
manifestations indicative of said incapacity. The Court further held that the New Rules, being
procedural in nature, apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.
Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine in Republic v. Iyoy.47 Thus:
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist
as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Such psychological incapacity, however, must
be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v. Pesca.48 Pesca stemmed from a complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered wife sometime in April 1994.
The trial court, in its Decision dated November 15, 1995, decreed the marriage void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
courts Decision, applying the Guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals49 and Molina.50 When
the matter was brought to this Court, the wife argued that Santos and Molina should not have
retroactive application, the Guidelines being merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. She
submitted that the proper application of Santos and Molina warranted only a remand of her case to
the trial court for further proceedings, not a dismissal. The Court declined to remand Pesca51 on the
premise that the Santosand Molina Guidelines "constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute
is enacted," thus:
The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of the
law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself
later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good
faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non replicit.
The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the wife failed, both in her allegations
in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
her husband. The Court then concluded that "emotional immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity.
Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to the instant case, there is no
reason to remand it to the trial court. The records clearly show that there is sufficient evidence to
establish the psychological condition of Justo.
III
Whether the totality of evidence in the case

shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.
The last issue left for this Courts consideration is whether the totality of the evidence is sufficient to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the dissolution of the
marriage in question.
At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the States policy on marriage. Article
XV of the Constitution mandates that:
SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been enshrined in Article 1 of the Family Code
which states that:
ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union, between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law, and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law, this Court has held fast to the
position that any doubt as to the validity of a marriage is to be resolved in favor of its
validity.52 Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in heaven. Imperfect humans more
often than not create imperfect unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in nature and
renders a person incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, the State provides
refuge to the aggrieved spouse under Article 36 of the Family Code which reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36,
thus:
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological --
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.
The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the Court in Santos,54 to
reiterate: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and
(c) incurability.
A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence, shows that Rosas
main grounds in seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are his infidelity,
profligacy which includes the falsification of her signature in one of the loan documents, failure to
support the children, and abandonment of the family. Both the courts below found the charges
unsubstantiated and untrue. However, this Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the
evidence sufficient to support Rosas charges of sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, and
abandonment of family, thus:
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANTS SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the signatures of
complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis--vis the questioned
signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents, contracts of mortgage
and other related instrument, yielded the following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written
by one and the same person.
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not
written by one and the same person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of
complainant. However, an analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that
the questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by
respondent as said falsified signatures were the same as the sample signatures of respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in
his favor by complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank
of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot
water. For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from the banks, then why did he have to
falsify his wifes signatures in the bank loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to
especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the principal using his own
name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE
The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his children and
three other persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his
infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The
baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was named as the father of the
child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his deceased first-born daughter
Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete
City bolster the allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the
mother of his illegitimate child.
While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity,
falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless,
there is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part.
In other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a good start, resulting in the birth of
their four (4) children. The early days of their cohabitation were blissful and harmonious. Justo was
deeply in love with Rosa, even persuading his mother to give her a dowry. They were able to build a
10-room family home and acquire several properties, thus, proving themselves to be responsible
couple. Even Rosa admitted that Justo took care of their children when they were young.
Unfortunately, the passage of time appeared to have taken its toll on their relationship. The acts
committed by Justo appeared to have been the result of irreconcilable differences between them
caused by the death of their two (2) children and financial difficulties due to his failure to win the
mayoralty election and to sustain his law practice. Furthermore, the superior business acumen of
Rosa, as well as the insolent attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his ego and lowered his self-
esteem.
There is no evidence that Justos "defects" were present at the inception of the marriage. His
"defects" surfaced only in the latter years when these events took place; their two children died; he
lost in the election; he failed in his business ventures and law practice; and felt the disdain of his wife
and her family. Surely, these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only after
almost 30 years of their marriage.
Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justos "defects" are incurable or grave.
The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the marriage between Justo and Rosa
should not be annulled.
In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55 which involved a promiscuous wife who left her family to live with one
of her many paramours, this Court ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment do not
constitute psychological incapacity absent a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the
inception of the marriage, thus:
x x x. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that
respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in
fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in
church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.
In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wifes inability to conceive led her husband to other women
so he could fulfill his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court ruled that this
is not a manifestation of psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v.
Choa,57 this Court declared that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. And, again, in Iyoy,58 a Filipina left her
husband, married an American and had a family by him, which she flaunted to her former husband.
This Court ruled that these acts, while embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did not satisfactorily
establish a serious or grave psychological or mental defect of an incurable nature present at the time
of marriage; and that irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity, and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment per se do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36.
What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage because of a
conflicting relationship with his wife and her family and repeated lifes setbacks. While these do not
justify his sins, they are not sufficient to establish that he is psychologically incapacitated.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take

cognizance of and assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 59 As this Court repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the
Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. 60
Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. 61
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals. While this
Court commiserates with Rosas plight, however, it has no choice but to apply the law. Dura lex sed
lex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chief Justice, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
2
Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
3Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili (retired) and concurred in by Associate

Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. (retired) and Associate Justice Rebecca Guia-Salvador. Rollo, pp.
34-45.
4 Id., pp. 70-75.
5 TSN, January 18, 1994, p. 3.

6 Id., p. 5.
7
Id., p. 5.
8 Id., p. 8.
9 Id., p. 9.
10 Id., p. 9. See also TSN, January 25, 1994, p. 8.
11 Id., p. 10.
12 Id., p. 20.
13 Id., p. 11.
14 Id., pp. 12 -19.
15 Id., p. 12.
16 Id., p. 20.
17 Id., pp. 21-24.
18 Id., June 28, 1994, p. 7.
19
Id.
20 Id., June 28, 1994, p. 8.
21 Records, p. 11.
22 Id., p. 11.
23 Id., p. 12. See also TSN, June 28, 1994, p. 13.
24 Id., p.12.
25
TSN, June 28, 1994, p. 11.
26 Id., p. 17.
27 Records, p. 12.
28 Id., pp. 12-13.
29 RTC Decision, Id., p. 495.
30 Id., pp. 495-496.
31
Id., pp. 492- 494.
32 Id., p. 497.
33 Id., pp. 497- 498.
34
Supra, footnote 1.
35 Court of Appeals Decision, rollo, pp. 42-43.
36 Id., pp. 12-13.
37 Court of Appeals Resolution, id., p. 71.
38 Id., pp. 142-143; Memorandum of the Petitioner, pp. 46-47.
39
Office of the Court Administrator v. Sardido, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1370. April 25, 2003, 401
SCRA 583.
40 No. L 27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562.
41 See also Cojuangco v. Palma, Adm. Case No. 2474, September 15, 2004, 438 SCRA 306.
42 Supra, footnote 1.
44 G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425.

45 A.M. No. 01-11-10-SC.
46 G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003, 412 SCRA 41.
48 G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001, 356 SCRA 588.
49 G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20. In this case, the Court held that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and
(c) incurability.
52 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
53 Supra, Footnote 1.
55
G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 461.
56 G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422.
57 G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002, 392 SCRA 641.
58
Supra, footnote 47.
60 Supra, footnote 2, citing:
Article 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a)
Article 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement,
the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However,
such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family. (110a)
Article 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The
expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the
community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their
separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such
obligations shall be satisfied from their separate properties. (111a)
Article 71. The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both
spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the
provisions of Article 70. (115a)
61 Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or
political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child
of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years,
even if pardoned;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the

Philippines or abroad;
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than
one year.
FIRST DIVISION
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, G.R. No. 165424

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,*
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
April 16, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the January
26, 2004 decision[1] and September 24, 2004 resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili and respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili[3] were only 21 and 19 years
of age, respectively, when they got married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila. After the wedding,
they continued to live with their respective parents and never lived together but maintained the
relationship nonetheless.
A year after, the couple started bickering constantly. Petitioner stopped seeing respondent and went
on dates with other women. It was at this time that he started receiving prank calls telling him to stop
dating other women as he was already a married man.
Thereafter, petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158 a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that he was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
his essential marital obligations to respondent.[4] He claimed that he thought that the wedding
performed at the City Hall of Manila was a joke and that the marriage certificate he signed was fake.
He also pointed out that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife and never
consummated the marriage.
The RTC granted the petition and declared petitioner psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential
marital obligations.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and held that, taken in totality, the evidence
for petitioner failed to establish his psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The
same was denied. Hence, this petition.
The question before us is whether or not the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove that
petitioner suffered from psychological incapacity which effectively prevented him from complying with
his essential marital obligations.
We deny the petition.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent. [5] He failed to discharge
the burden.
The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and a psychological report written by Dr.
Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., a clinical psychologist, who also testified on the matters contained therein.
According to Dr. Dayan, petitioner was suffering from a personality disorder characterized as a mixed
personality disorder from self-defeating personality to dependent personality disorder brought about by
a dysfunctional family background. Petitioner's father was very abusive and domineering. Although
petitioner and his siblings were adequately supported by their father, a very wealthy man, they lacked
affirmation. Because of this, petitioner grew up without self-confidence and very immature. He never
really understood what it meant to have a family, much less to be a husband. According to Dr. Dayan,
this was very much evident in petitioner's impulsive decision to get married despite having gone steady
with respondent for only six months.
Moreover, she added that both petitioner and respondent were psychologically incapacitated to perform
their essential marital obligations as they never lived together as husband and wife. They also never
consummated their marriage. Furthermore, they constantly fought. Their separation was inevitable as
they were both immature. Dr. Dayan then abruptly concluded that petitioner's psychological incapacity
was grave and incurable.
In this case, although petitioner was able to establish his immaturity, as evidenced by the psychological
report and as testified to by him and Dr. Dayan, the same hardly constituted sufficient cause for
declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity. It had to be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. [6]
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[7] we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than
just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. A mere showing
of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not equate to psychological
incapacity.[8] Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in petitioner's
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
obligations,[9] had to be shown. In this, petitioner failed.
The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that he and respondent had difficulty getting along
with each other as they constantly fought over petty things. [10] However, there was no showing of
the gravity and incurability of the psychological disorder supposedly inherent in petitioner, except for
the mere statement or conclusion to that effect in the psychological report. The report, and even the
testimonies given by petitioner and his expert witness at the trial, dismally failed to prove that petitioner's
alleged disorder was grave enough and incurable to bring about his disability to assume the essential
Petitioner also made much of the fact that he and respondent never lived together as husband and
wife. This, however, fails to move us considering that there may be instances when, for economic and
practical reasons, a married couple might have to live separately though the marital bond between
them remains.[11] In fact, both parties were college students when they got married and were obviously
without the financial means to live on their own. Thus, their not having lived together under one roof
did not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that one of them was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. It is worth noting that petitioner himself admitted that he
and respondent continued the relationship after the marriage ceremony. It was only when they started
fighting constantly a year later that he decided to file a petition to have the marriage annulled. It appears
that petitioner just chose to give up on the marriage too soon and too easily.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 26, 2004 decision and September 24,
2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(On Leave)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On Leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices
Elvi John S. Asuncion (dismissed from the service) and Lucas P. Bersamin of the Fourth Division
of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 10-21.
[2] Id., pp. 22-24.
[3] Hereafter referred to as respondent.
[4] It was docketed as JDRC Case No. 4138.
[5] Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 376, citing Republic v. CA and
Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[6] Choa v. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, 26 November 2002, 392 SCRA 641, 650.
[7] Supra note 5.
[8] Choa v. Choa, supra at 651.
[9] Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 121, 129-130.
[10] For instance, they would frequently quarrel over respondents insistence that petitioner pick her up
on time whenever they go out on dates.

[11] Santos v. CA, 310 Phil. 22 (1995). See Justice Padilla's dissent, p. 48.
THIRD DIVISION
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, G.R. No. 161793

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,
NACHURA, and
Respondent,
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
Oppositor.
February 13, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in
our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case,
however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily
imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with
the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The
petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of
the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-
Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then
initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man
decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and
respondent, a freshman.[3]
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a
certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first
meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and
jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that
month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket. [4]
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation
and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go
back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family
was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide,
Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place. [5]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25
years old, and she, 20.[6] The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated
like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns
and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.[7] At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to
his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents home and live with them. Edward
relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could
live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he
would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home. [8]
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his
parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for
him.[9]
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should
live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.[10]
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of
the latters psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.[12] In
the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and
deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings. [13]
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine
if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits. [14]
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized
Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college
at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is married to and
separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a
psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the
latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon
Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased
sister. Both his parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as
generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the
family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly
remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being
a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until
1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He
[is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves
to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a
disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared
intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the
foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to
respondent that he is having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted
that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From
that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live
together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and
inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is
rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and
she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the
idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a
friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to
rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was
suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help from petitioners
parents.When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all
out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime while
petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called
petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately
and when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he
appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit
suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again.Respondent would call by phone
every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to
do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and
scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to
make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage.
Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996,
respondents uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,]
petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually
never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the
parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to
allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle
showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going
home, they will commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even
made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for
him at his parents[ ]and relatives[ ]houses.Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able
to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and they forgave
him and supported him by giving him military escort.Petitioner, however, did not inform
them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,]
petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact
respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents
while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would
only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his
parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever
he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded
these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own
family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to
stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her
already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be
able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live
separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck
and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to
commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting
boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination

Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly
impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different
notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready
so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he
wants in life.He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a
lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too
akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a
relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously
aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer
to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-

rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life
of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her
marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In
order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband
is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth,
she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself
before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is
profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by
petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively
taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely
introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition.
She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful,
insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that
she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage.
Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them
to take.[15]
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision[16] declaring the marriage of the parties
null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.[17] The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of
appeal.[18]
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision[19] in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867, reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling. [20] It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the
evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina[21] needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.[22] The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of
the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case
may be, the petition.[23] The CA later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise
assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.[24]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June
15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.[25]
In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner
also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter
represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders
and notices.[27]
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,[28] that the annulment petition filed before
the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply
with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was
it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine
the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code,
the marriage between the parties is null and void. [31]
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of
jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family
Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[33]
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the
UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then
Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the
background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of
including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the
UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were
in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years
of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation
between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on
this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee

and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership between a

man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional

concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded,
and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute
divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector
of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute
divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought
that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce
but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such
action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil
Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two
Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New
Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void
marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion
of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages
in the present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the

time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be

invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision
of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the

absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be
University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of lack of due discretion for
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her
husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that
they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychosexual anomaly.[34]
In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature
of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the
following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any

reference to wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage and to mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these
phrases refer to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . .
but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation. There being a defect in consent, it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of
consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to marriage.
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological

incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or mental

impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that
this term is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is
why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather
express it as psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno
opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with
another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the
phrase and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise
to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it
would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy
was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and special
situations, hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage,
such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage,
the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive
mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon
Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal
annuls a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really
existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence,
a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics
can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal
procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The
grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon
Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found
themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but
yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that

the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of
psychological incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the same as a ground for
declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not
provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from
a combination of three old canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable
according to law in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at
least not ignorant of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force
and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for
consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds
for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time
of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that
the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made
during the wedding ceremony.
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation
for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for
annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to
give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had
displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.[36]
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that
by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. [37] The law is then so designed as to allow some
resiliency in its application.[38]
Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68[40] of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be

made between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave
lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential
obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if
somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the
assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract, there
remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different
locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire
unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph
of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving
consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give
consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and its
particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does
not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a
psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed
towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction:
the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of
consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not
capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic
incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been
an increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity
to assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises
from sexual anomalies.Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has
studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in
every case imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties
of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so
that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system,
and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that
these persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical
sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel
a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its
frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism,
masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether
possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues
to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its
responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether
such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may
be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent,
rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this

regard. The initial steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity
is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna,
for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse,
is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of
reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of
this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as
it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse,
would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true
that the intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It
would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are
certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and
evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be
juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the
exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It
would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically
ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house
he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way
more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction
between the inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object
of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the
meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would
have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons,
capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in
another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had
likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the
object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with
nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of knowing
and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the
delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus
doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say,
the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a
free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of
things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a
spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and
especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a
person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity,
although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage
are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer
to this ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express
a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These
anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or
psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment
dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding
himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person
incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the
long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the

contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately
thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic
personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone
how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the
fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual
consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony.Another incapacity could
arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The
canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is
capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather
than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be
the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good and the
financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the
other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual
description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case
concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that
while the respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential
obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his
constitutional immorality.
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment
of responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially
during the moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of
the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of
marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a
person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When
one speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not
looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In
[the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent
to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person,
precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards
the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably
disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to
recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement,
unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise
common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order
to achieve ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial

obligations. One of them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding
obligations are basically centered around the good of the spouses and of the
children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may
give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are
some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic
features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective immaturity,
narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric
homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is
homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of
marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage
so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an
autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of
matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also
the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical
structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual
is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person
is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity,
and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion
because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual
faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of
marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other
words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the
object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of
incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers
the opinion that the clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other
words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there
is something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his
capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis
contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the
extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes
the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in ones consciousness
would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference
being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the development of the
habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It would seem then that the
law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some
degree of freedom.[42]
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the
lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,[43] ruled that the findings of the trial
court are final and binding on the appellate courts. [44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on
the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,[45] explained that when private respondent testified
under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic
marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which
the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,[46] thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down
for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation
of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
psychologists.
exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characterological peculiarities,
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor

Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
Here, the State and the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from
each othershall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in
the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred in the result and another threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose
their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according
to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite
to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
for that of the trial court.[48]
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, [49] the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs
exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. [50] The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the
sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.[51]
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for
there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State,
through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
evidence.[52] The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse,
child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume
the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the
infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. [53] Let it be noted that
in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a
concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the
judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand,
the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality
disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of
the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,[55] there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral
pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.[56]
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.[57]
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological

expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life,
both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked
to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence
of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not
amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation
by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was
now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage
breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a
legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be
assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the
concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both
grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now
considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological

incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that
incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the
spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the
community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a
distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of marriage
are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage
depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair
the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the
fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital

commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal

communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations
are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable
expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms.
A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often
fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already

detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the
parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack
of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties'
incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as
promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of
lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered
into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the
time the marriage was entered into.[58]
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to

establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts, there is no requirement that the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option
for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are
no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the
case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative to present their own expert
witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as
adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat,
dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for
respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as
follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons

recent and long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually
limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe
enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal
relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by
adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle
or old age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a
variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in
social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are
perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an
awareness of their behaviors.Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other
people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others
for their problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or
difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to
interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a
variety of causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors,
neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development
led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and
phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-
aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of
obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the
anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability
to engage in intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little evidence
that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific
personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor
involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less
evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin
studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality,
researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA)
negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a past history of suicide
attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine
oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported

in antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported
abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal
EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality
disorders are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have
these disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality

disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic
and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive
personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or
fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not otherwise specified,
that can be used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do
not qualify as any of the specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term

concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.[64]
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive

behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they
actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have
this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance
from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where
to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty
starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning
in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and
are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. [65]
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the

conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over
a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or
criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse
without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a faade of charm and
even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and
the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some
individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness
and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral
insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by
impairments in reasoning.
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four
dramatic personality disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic. [66]
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case,
finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the
marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further
consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at the
same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make
most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he
believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and
is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense
of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in
life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This
finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of
others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by society.[68] Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive
and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-
Magtolis and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp. 23-36.
[2] Id. at 38-39.
[3] TSN, September 12, 2000, p. 2.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 2-3.

[6] Records, p. 8.
[7] TSN, September 12, 2000, pp. 3-4.
[8] Id.
[9]
Id.
[10] Id. at 4.
[11] Records, p. 1.
[12] Id. at 24.
[13] Id. at 36-37.
[14] Id. at 39.
[15] Id. at 48-55.
[16] Id. at 61-66.
[17] The dispositive portion of the RTCs July 30, 2001 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff EDWARD
KENNETH NGO TE and defendant ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ UY-TE, officiated by Honorable
Judge Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan, of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 82, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
on April 23, 1996, NULL AND VOID, ab initio, on the ground of the couples psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code; and dissolving their property regime in accordance with law, if
there is any.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the City Civil Registry of Valenzuela City where the marriage
took place and City Civil Registry of Quezon City where this decision originated for proper recording.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 66.)
[18] Records, pp. 67-68.
[19] Supra note 1.
[20] The dispositive portion of the CAs August 5, 2003 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed decision dated July 30, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 106, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-
00-39720, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the marriage
between petitioner-appellee Edward Kenneth Ngo Te and respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te
VALID and SUBSISTING. The petition is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35.)
[21] 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[22] Executive Order No. 209, entitled The Family Code of the Philippines, enacted on July 6, 1987.
[23] Rollo, pp. 28-35.
[24] Supra note 2.
[25] Rollo, p. 79.
[26] Id. at 95-104.
[27] Id. at 100-102.
[28] Id. at 82-93.
[29] Supra note 21.
[30] Rollo, pp. 86-92.
[31] Supra note 22.
[32]
Id.
[34] Id. at 38-41. (Italics supplied.)
[35] Supra note 21.
[36] Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 681-685.
[37] Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108, quoting Sempio-Dy,
Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1998, p. 37.
[38] Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 31.
[39] Id.
[40] Article 68 of the Family Code provides in full:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.
[41] Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 34.
[42] Dacanay, Canon Law on Marriage: Introductory Notes and Comments, 2000 ed., pp. 110-119.
[43] 326 Phil. 169 (1996).
[44] Id. at 182.
[45] 334 Phil. 294, 300-304 (1997).
[46] Supra note 21.

[48] Id. at 680.
[49]
See Republic of the Philippines v. Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30,
2008; Nilda V. Navales v. Reynaldo Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008; Lester Benjamin S.
Halili v. Chona M. Santos-Halili, et al., G.R. No. 165424, April 16, 2008; Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294,
February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123; Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA
81; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121; Republic v.
Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123; Zamora v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 141917, February 7, 2007, 515 SCRA 19; Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July
17, 2006, 495 SCRA 396; Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA
177; Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353; Villalon v. Villalon, G.R. No.
167206, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 572; Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005,
470 SCRA 508; Carating-Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422; Republic v.
Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735; Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900
(2004); Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 626 (2003); Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175 (2002); Pesca
v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001); Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA
425; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000); Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010,
December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76.
[50] See Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 668.
[51] Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity, 2006 ed., pp. 14-16,
cites the following:

Canon 1095, 3 concerning psychological incapacity pointed out cases of various psychological
disorders from the Roman Rota as enumerated below (Fr. Bacareza, 1999).
6.1. From the 1917 Code of the Second Vatican Council
1. Coram Teodori in Italy on January 19, 1940 on Nymphomania.
2. Coram Heard on June 5, 1941 on Nymphomania.
3. Coram Heard in Quebec on January 30, 1954 on Lethargic Encephalitis.
4. Coram Mattioli in Quebec, Canada on November 6, 1956 on General Paralysis.
5. Coram Sabbatani in Naples, Italy on June 21, 1957 on Nymphomania.
6. Coram Mattioli in Rome on November 28, 1957 on Schizophrenia.
7. Coram Lefebvre on December 19, 1959 on Nymphomania.
8. Coram De Jorio on December 19, 1961 on Schizophrenia.
6.2 From the Second Vatican Council to the Promulgation of the 1983 Code
9. Coram Monsigneur Charles Lefebre on the following:
a. Homosexuality,
b. Hypersexuality-Nymphomania,
c. Hypersexuality-Satyriasis, and
d. Affective Immaturity and Passive Dependent Personality.
10. Coram Monsigneur Lucien Anne on February 25, 1969 on Lesbianism.
11. Coram De Jorio on April 30, 1969 on Maturity of Judgment.
12. Coram Jose Maria Pinto Gomez on the following:
a. Serious Paranoid Schizophrenia (November 26, 1969),
b. Anti-Social Personality Disorder (March 18, 1971),
c. Vaginismus or Psychic impotence; Frigidity (July 15, 1977)
d. Neurasthenic Psychopath (April 20, 1979)
e. Sexual Disorder (December 3, 1982)
13. Coram Bruno on the following:
a. Hypersexuality-Nymphomania (December 15, 1972)
b. Sexual Neurosis (March 27, 1981)
c. Psychoneurosis (December 17, 1982)
14. Coram Jose Maria Serrano Ruiz on the following:
a. Hypersexuality-Satyriasis (April 5, 1973)
b. Lack of Interpersonal Integration (April 15, 1973)
c. Immature Personality (July 9, 1976)
d. Psychic Immaturity (November 18, 1977)
e. Depressive Neurosis (July 12, 1978)
f. Obsessive-Compulsive Personality (May 23, 1980)
g. Frigidity (July 28, 1981)
h. Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)
15. Coram Ewers on the following:
a. Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)
b. Sexual Neurosis (April 4, 1981)
16. Coram Pariscella on the following:
a. Obsessive-Compulsive Neurosis (February 23, 1978)
b. Homosexuality (June 11, 1978)
17. Coram Fiore (May 27, 1981)
18. Coram Agustoni (March 23, 1982)
6.3. After the Promulgation of the 1983 Code of Canon Law
19. Rotal Case No. 41:c. Colagiovanni on March 3, 1983 on Homosexuality
20. Rotal Case No. 42 c. Huot on July 18, 1983 on Alcoholism and Immature
Personality.
21. Rotal Case No. 43: c. Giannechini on July 19, 1983 on Homosexuality.
22. Rotal Case No. 45: c. Colagiovanni on November 22, 1983 about an ex-priest who
was a liar, cheat and swindler (Anti-Social Personality)
23. Rotal Case No. 46: c. Stankiewiez on November 24, 1983 on Homosexuality.
24. Rotal Case No. 47: c. Egan on March 29, 1984 on Hysterical Personality.
25. Rotal Case No. 48: c. Di Felice on June 9, 1984 on Psychic Immaturity.
26. Rotal Case No. 49: c. Pinto on May 30, 1986 on Alcoholism and Gambling.
27. Rotal Case No. 50: c. Giannecchini on December 20, 1988 on Hypersexuality-
Nymphomania.
[52] Justice Padillas Dissenting Opinion, Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 36-37; Ancheta
v. Ancheta, supra note 49, at 917.
[53] Supra note 34.
[54] See Article 36 of the Family Code; see also Justice Carpios Dissenting Opinion, Tenebro v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 272, 299.
[55] Supra note 49, at 370.
[56] Records, pp. 54-55; TSN, November 7, 2000, pp. 5-6.
[57] Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, D.D., of the Archdiocese of Lingayen-Dagupan, explains in Marriage
Tribunal Ministry, 1992 ed., that [s]tandard practice shows the marked advisability of Expert intervention
in Marriage Cases accused of nullity on the ground of defective matrimonial consent on account of
natural incapacity by reason of any factor causative of lack of sufficient use of reason, grave lack of
due discretion and inability to assume essential obligationsalthough the law categorically mandates
said intervention only in the case of impotence and downright mental disorder x x x. (p. 106).
[59] Supra note 49, at 88; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supra note 49, at 743.
[60] Supra note 49, at 850; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supra note 49, at 742; Republic v.
Iyoy, supra note 49, at 526; Zamora v. Court of Appeals, supra note 49, at 27; Paras v. Paras, supra
note 49, at 96-97.
[61] The Court, however, by saying
[T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him
by respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever
claim to have done so. In fact, his Professional Opinion began with the statement [I]f what Alfonso
Choa said about his wife Leni is true, x x x
xxxx
Obviously, Dr. Guanzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely
been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand
information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and
unreliable.
Dr. Guanzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioners character,
not only through the descriptions given by respondent, but also through the formers at least fifteen
hours of study of the voluminous transcript of records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a
whole day or a whole week to examine the records of this case, we still find his assessment of
petitioners psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.
in Choa v. Choa (Supra note 49, at 190-191), in effect, required the personal examination of the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
[62] Psychologists of the Psychological Extension Evaluation Research Services (PEERS) enumerate
the segments of the psychological evaluation report for psychological incapacity as follows:
Identifying Data: Personal Information
Referral Question: Data coming from informants and significant others (psychologists,
psychiatrists, physicians, parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, friends, etc.).
Test Administered (Dates): List by name
Background Information:
Current Life Situation: Presenting complaint (personal and marital conflict), history of problem,
and consequences in clients life.
Life History Information: Childhood development, educational history, vocational history, medical
history, sexual and marital history, personal goals.
Behavior Observations: Description of client, relationship with examiner, and test related
behaviors.
Interpretation of Test Results:
Intellectual Functioning: Wechsler tests, Stanford-Binet, etc. Obtained IQ scores and specific
strengths and deficits.
Cognitive Functioning: Rorschach, TAT, MMPI, etc. Perception of reality or perceptual
efficiency, conceptual organization, psychological needs, conflicts, preoccupations,
suspiciousness, hallucinations, or delusions.
Emotional Functioning (MMPI, Rorschach, etc.): Liability of emotions, impulse control,
predominant concerns like aggression, anxiety, depression, guilt, dependency, and hostility.
Relationship Patterns (MMPI, Rorschach, TAT, etc.): Problem areas in work or school,
friendships, intimate relationships, difficulties such as immaturity, irresponsibility,
cooperativeness, sociability, introversion, impulsivity, aggression, dangerousness to self or
others.
Defenses and compensations: Evidence of any strength, any coping mechanisms, or any useful
compensation that might be helping the client maintain himself/herself.
Integration of Test Results with Life History: Presenting a clinical picture of the client as a total
person against the background of his marital discords and life circumstances. Hypotheses posed
through the referral question and generated and integrated via test results and other reliable
information.
Summary, Conclusion, Diagnosis, Prognosis:
Summary: Emphasis should be on conciseness and accuracy so that the reader can quickly find
the essential information and overall impression.
Conclusion: Integrating the material (data) into a more smoothly stated conceptualization of the
clients personality and problem areas as regards root causes and characteristics as ground for
nullity of marriage.
Diagnosis: Diagnostic impression is evolved form the data obtained, formed impression of
personality disorders, and classified mental disorders based on the criteria and multi axial
system of the DSM IV.
Prognosis: Predicting the behavior based on the data obtained that are relevant to the current
functioning of the client, albeit under ideal conditions.
Recommendation: Providing a careful specific recommendation is based on the referral sources
and obtained data in dealing with a particular client that may be ameliorative, remedial, or unique
treatment/intervention approaches. As to psychological incapacity, specific recommendation on
the nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code and expertise and clinical judgment
of the Clinical Psychologist should be given emphasis. (Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legaland
Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity, supra note 51, at 179-181.)
[63] A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 15, 2003.
[64] Kahn and Fawcett, The Encyclopedia of Mental Health, 1993 ed., pp. 291-292. See Bernstein,
Penner, Clarke-Stewart, Roy, Psychology, 7th ed., 2006, pp. 613-614, defining personality disorders as
long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as
dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood
or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others. Some psychologists view
personality disorders as interpersonal strategies or as extreme, rigid, and maladaptive expressions of
personality traits. (Citations omitted.)
[65]
Id. at 131.
[66] Id. at 50-51.
[67] Supra note 65.
[68] Supra note 66.

THIRD DIVISION
BENJAMIN G. TING, G.R. No. 166562

Petitioner,
Present:
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,*
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
March 31, 2009
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003
Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R.
CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[4]
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in
1972 while they were classmates in medical school.[5] They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26,
1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.[6] When their second
child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmens family home in Cebu City.[7] In September
1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations[8] and thereafter proceeded to take a residency
program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin
completed the preceptorship program for the said field[9] and, in 1980, he began working
for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of its active staff, [10] while Carmen worked
as the hospitals Treasurer.[11]
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis,
born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986;
Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991. [12]
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their
youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their
marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. [13]
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that
Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. [14] But after they were married,
petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee
hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically assault her
and force her to have sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot
the gate of their house.[15]Because of his drinking habit, Benjamins job as anesthesiologist was affected
to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to
other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they
perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latters drinking
problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same. [16]
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their
family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of
providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy
expensive equipment for his hobby.[17] He rarely stayed home[18] and even neglected his obligation to
his children.[19]
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.[20] He would gamble two or
three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had
no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wifes own jewelry to finance his gambling.[21] There
was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin
inherited from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts. [22] Benjamin only stopped going
to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said
he purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling establishments. [23]
In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following

manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to

sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off
his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give
regular financial support to his family.[24]
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and
athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being
a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances. [25] As for his alleged failure to support his
family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees
from VelezHospital when he was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist. [26] In his testimony,
Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his means whenever he could
and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary
things.[27] He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while
Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.[28]
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking and gambling habits and
violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses children
from 1987 to 1992.[29] Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when Benjamin
maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.[30]
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a psychiatrist.[31] Instead of the
usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamins deposition because the latter had already gone to work as
an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr.
Oate concluded that Benjamins compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of
respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder. [32]
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a
consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto MemorialMedical Center, as his expert
witness.[33] Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the transcript of
stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a
psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obras) interview with Benjamins
brothers.[34] Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with
petitioners personality, considering the latters good relationship with his fellow doctors and his good
track record as anesthesiologist.[35]
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision[36] declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found
Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular
activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a
personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to
Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[37]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision[38] reversing the trial courts ruling. It faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof was
adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he
married Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on theories and not on established
fact,[39] contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals [40] and in Rep. of the Phils. v.
Court of Appeals and Molina.[41]
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines
should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13,
1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC. [42] She claimed that
the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle
of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the
prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the
prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari[43] with this Court. In a Resolution[44] dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the
petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmens motion for reconsideration. [45]On review, the CA
decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended
Decision[46] reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial courts decision. [47]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in its
December 13, 2004 Resolution.[48]
For our resolution are the following issues:

I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow
the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of
the Family Code has been liberalized; and
III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by
this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. [49] Basically, it is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, [50] necessary for two simple reasons: economy and
stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. [51]
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and
was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos
discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v.
Commission on Elections[52] is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand by the thing and
do not disturb the calm. The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone
observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, it is an established rule to abide by
former precedents where the same points come again in litigation. As the rule evolved,
early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were plainly
unreasonable; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and,
(3) the binding force of the decision was the actual principle or principles necessary for
the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the
U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, strict rules and precedents are necessary to
prevent arbitrary discretion in the courts. Madison agreed but stressed that x x x once the
precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected.
Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison disagree about the countervailing
policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent. He added that
their ideas reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule
of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the
Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries.
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's
observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains
of stare decisishave been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare
decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to
cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires
that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that
vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has
been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not
one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare

decisis constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare
decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare
decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy
more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisisin constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds
sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and
inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be
followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which
is again called upon to consider a question once decided. In the same vein, the venerable
Justice Frankfurter opined: the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution
itself and not what we have said about it. In contrast, the application of stare decisis on
judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: after a
statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by
other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the
judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself. This stance reflects both respect
for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1)
it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for
predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1)
its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot
accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to
overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges
can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck
agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare
decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals
is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's separate but equal
doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated
on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that
separate . . . is inherently unequal. Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare
decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of
inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by
the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the
Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we
overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private
respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that

courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior
rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes
in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the
voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule
in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged
test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply
in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance
that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to
the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine;
and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification. [53]
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed

in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v.
Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or
construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is
only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine
may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,[56] we declared that, in hindsight,
it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological
incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but
unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on
all fours with another.[57]
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to
give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament
of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua
non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.[58] At best, courts must treat such opinions
as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. [59] The trial
court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the
expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving
the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements
set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on
the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited
psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They
adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces
where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax
this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination
of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of
psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial
conference.[60]
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged psychological
incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in
deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent
insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of
the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts and the appellate courts
rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.[61] The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[62]
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that
petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is
insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence adduced prove such defects to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining
whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not
convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondents allegation of
psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological
evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners behavior is a positive indication of a personality
disorder,[63] while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality.
Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, aside from analyzing the
transcript of Benjamins deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration
the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africawho personally
examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview with Benjamins brothers. [64] Logically,
therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and gambling problems, or
his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must
remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same
to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as well as the totality of evidence
presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to
Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of

marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.[65] In this case, the presumption has not been amply
rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special Order No. 602
dated March 20, 2009.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and
Sergio L. Pestao, concurring; rollo, pp. 78-89.

[2] Rollo, pp. 110-111.
[3] Id. at 35-45.
[4] Art. 36 of the Family Code provides in full:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. [as amended by Executive Order No.
227 dated July 17, 1987]
[5]
TSN, December 7, 1994, morning, p. 4.
[6]
Id. at 12.
[7] Id. at 17.
[8] Id. at 14; Exhibit 3.
[9] Id. at 13, 15.
[10] Id. at 21-23.
[11] Id. at 10.
[12] Rollo, p. 48.
[13] Id. at 35.
[14] TSN, January 6, 1995, pp. 3, 8-9.
[15] Rollo, p. 36.
[16]
Id. at 37.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at 40.
[19] Id. at 44.
[20] Id. at 40.
[21] Id.
[22] Id. at 36.
[23] Id. at 40.
[24] Id. at 48-49.
[25] Id. at 42, 49.
[26] Id. at 49.
[27] TSN, December 7, 1994, morning, pp. 23-25.
[28] Id. at 26.
[29] TSN, August 31, 1995, pp. 5-26.
[30]
Id. at 7-9.
[31] Rollo, p. 38.
[32] Id. at 39.
[33] Id. at 41.
[34] Id. at 54-55.
[35] Id. at 42.
[36] Id. at 35-45.
[37] Id. at 45.
[38] Id. at 47-65.
[39] Id. at 64.
[41] 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[42] Rollo, pp. 80-81.
[43]
Docketed as G.R. No. 150479.
[44]
CA rollo, pp. 199-202.
[45] Rollo, pp. 78-79.
[46] Supra note 1.
[47] Pertinent portion of the CAs Amended Decision dated November 17, 2003 reads:
The foregoing considered and taking a cue on the adoption x x x of the Honorable Justices of the
Supreme Court of the new Rule On Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) which took effect on March 15, 2003, this Court hereby
RECONSIDERS itself and GRANTS the motion for reconsideration filed by the herein petitioner-
appellee on November 29, 2000. Consequently, respondent-appellants appeal is hereby DISMISSED
and the DECISION of the court below declaring the marriage between CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING and
BENJAMIN G. TING null and void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines is
hereby AFFIRMED.
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, we can not do any less but sustain the decision dated 29 August 2002
of the court below in Civil Case No. CEB-14826 declaring the marriage between petitioner-appellee
Carmen Velez-Ting and respondent-appellant Benjamin G. Ting void from the beginning under Article
36, Family Code (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987).
Consequently, the Decision of this Court promulgated on October 19, 2000 is hereby SET ASIDE and
a new one rendered AFFIRMING the appealed Decision of the Court a quo.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 88-89.)
[48] Rollo, pp. 110-111.
[49] De Mesa v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc., G.R. Nos. 153063-70, August 19, 2005, 467 SCRA
433, 440.
[50] Id. at 438.
[51]
Art. 8 of the Civil Code provides in full:
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines.
[52] G.R. Nos. 174153 and 174299, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160.
[53] Id. at 308-312. (Citations and emphasis omitted.)
[54] 408 Phil. 713 (2001).
[55] G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353.
[56] G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009.
[58] Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000).
[59] Id. at 850.
[60]
Rationale for the New Rules as submitted by the Committee on the Revision of Rules to the Supreme
Court, November 11, 2002, p. 3, as cited in Sta. Maria, Jr., Court Procedures in Family Law Cases,
2007 ed., pp. 10-11.
[62] Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 58, at 850-851.
[63] Rollo, p. 39.
[64] Id. at 54-55.
[65] Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 437.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009
MARIETA C. AZCUETA Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31, 2007, 1 and its
Resolution dated November 20, 2007.2
Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two months after their
first meeting, they got married on July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of Padua Church, Antipolo City. At the
time of their marriage, petitioner was 23 years old while respondent was 28. They separated in 1997
after four years of marriage. They have no children.
On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed
as Civil Case No. 02-6428.
Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons upon him.
Because of this, the trial court directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether there
was collusion between the parties. In a report dated August 16, 2002, Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca
found that there was no collusion between the parties.
On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance for the Republic of the
Philippines and submitted a written authority for the City Prosecutor to appear in the case on the
States behalf under the supervision and control of the Solicitor General.
In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. According to
petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to
married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a husband.
Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked his
mother for financial assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfos mother who found them a
room near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who paid the monthly rental.
Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment. She even
bought him a newspaper every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most jobs have
an age limit and that he had no clothes to wear to job interviews. To inspire him, petitioner bought him
new clothes and a pair of shoes and even gave him money. Sometime later, her husband told
petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner was overjoyed. However, some weeks after,
petitioner was informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his parents when he was
supposed to be at work. Petitioner discovered that her husband didnt actually get a job and the
money he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from his mother. When she confronted
him about the matter, Rodolfo allegedly cried like a child and told her that he pretended to have a job
so that petitioner would stop nagging him about applying for a job. He also told her that his parents
can support their needs. Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his mother and that all
his decisions and attitudes in life should be in conformity with those of his mother.
Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became
physically violent towards her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had sex
once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When they discussed this problem, Rodolfo would
always say that sex was sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor abused. He did not even want to
have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when petitioner requested that
they move to another place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents, Rodolfo did not
agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow her. But he
did not.
During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfos first cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a
witness. In 1993, Ramos, the niece of Rodolfos father, was living with Rodolfos family. She
corroborated petitioners testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not gainfully employed when he married
petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given by his mother. This witness also confirmed that
it was respondents mother who was paying the rentals for the room where the couple lived. She also
testified that at one time, she saw respondent going to his mothers house in business attire. She
learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that he has a job but in truth he had none. She also stated
that respondent was still residing at the house of his mother and not living together with petitioner.
Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that after
examining petitioner for her psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature, independent,
very responsible, focused and has direction and ambition in life. She also observed that petitioner
works hard for what she wanted and therefore, she was not psychologically incapacitated to perform
the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Dr. Villegas added that based on the information gathered
from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from Dependent
Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings.
She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were those whose
response to ordinary way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence,
constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other people. She added
that the root cause of this psychological problem was a cross-identification with the mother who was
the dominant figure in the family considering that respondents father was a seaman and always out
of the house. She stated that this problem began during the early stages in his life but manifested
only after the celebration of his marriage. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also
severe because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibilities expected of a married
person. It was incurable because it started in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into
his personality.
Based on petitioners evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision dated October 25, 2004, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally
failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual
intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual
relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore sex
relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own
decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply
with his marital obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the
account of respondents severe and incurable psychological incapacity.
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo B. Azcuata is
hereby declared null and void abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family Code.
The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Antipolo City are ordered to make
proper entries into the records of the parties pursuant to judgment of the court.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.3
On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision4 to correct the first name of Rodolfo
which was erroneously typewritten as "Gerardo" in the caption of the original Decision.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that (a) the psychiatric report of Dr.
Villegas was based solely on the information provided by petitioner and was not based on an
examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was no showing that the alleged psychological defects were
present at the inception of marriage or that such defects were grave, permanent and incurable.
Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially ruled that petitioner failed to
sufficiently prove the psychological incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological disorder
existed prior to the marriage and was grave and incurable. In setting aside the factual findings of the
RTC, the CA reasoned that:
The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondents alleged irresponsibility and over-
dependence on his mother is symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above explained.
xxx xxx xxx
Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellees failure to prove that respondents supposed psychological
malady existed even before the marriage. Records however show that the parties were living in
harmony in the first few years of their marriage and were living on their own in a rented apartment.
That respondent often times asks his mother for financial support may be brought about by his feeling
of embarrassment that he cannot contribute at all to the family coffers, considering that it was his wife
who is working for the family. Petitioner-appellee likewise stated that respondent does not like to have
a child on the pretense that respondent is not yet ready to have one. However this is not at all a
manifestation of irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent has shown that he has a full grasp of
reality and completely understands the implication of having a child especially that he is unemployed.
The only problem besetting the union is respondents alleged irresponsibility and unwillingness to
leave her (sic) mother, which was not proven in this case to be psychological-rooted.
The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his youth and emotional immaturity which
by themselves, do not constitute psychological incapacity (Deldel vs. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA
461, 466 [2004]). At all events, petitioner-appellee has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity (Pesca vs. Pesca, 356 SCRA 588,
594 [2001]). As held by the Supreme Court:
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs.
Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007).
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated July 19, 2005 fo the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The marriage berween petitioner-appellee Marietta C. Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo
B. Azcueta remains VALID.5 (emphasis ours)
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
his essential marital obligations.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that the appellate court correctly ruled
that the "totality of evidence presented by petitioner" failed to prove her spouses psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and settled jurisprudence.
We grant the petition.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 6 Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which
the state is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation
is not the concern alone of the family members. 7
Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina8 stringent
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
x x x.9 (Emphasis supplied)
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. 11 It should refer to "no less
than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." 12 The
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.13
However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid
down in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.14 Each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In
regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case
is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and
the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.15 With the advent of Te v. Te,16 the Court encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends
on the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from
the Molina doctrine.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with
Molina to warrant the annulment of the parties marriage under Article 36.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her
husband.
The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, highlights the lack of personal
examination of Rodolfo by said doctor and the doctors reliance on petitioners version of events.
In Marcos v. Marcos,17 it was held that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the
totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the psychologist, petitioner testified in court on
the facts upon which the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under oath before the
lower court and was cross-examined, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony.18 Significantly, petitioners narration of facts was corroborated in material points by the
testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise testified in court to elaborate on her
report and fully explain the link between the manifestations of Rodolfos psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the
trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts
because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving
testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 19 Since the trial court itself accepted the
veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological
incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witness. 20
Second, the root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the
trial courts decision.
The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully employed
and, despite pleas from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find employment;
that from the choice of the family abode to the couples daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his
mother; and that the couples inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfos refusal to have a child
stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to his mother.1avvphi1
These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his marital obligations were linked to medical
or clinical causes by an expert witness with more than forty years experience from the field of
psychology in general and psychological incapacity, in particular. In a portion of her psychiatric
evaluation, Dr. Villegas elucidated the psychodynamics of the case of petitioner and Rodolfo, thus:
Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has very limited education. Being the eldest, she is
expected to be the role model of younger siblings. In so doing, she has been restricted and physically
punished, in order to tow the line. But on the other hand, she developed growing resentments
towards her father and promised herself that with the first opportunity, shell get out of the family.
When Rodolfo came along, they were married 1 months after they met, without really knowing
anything about him. Her obsession to leave her family was her primary reason at that time and she
did not exercise good judgment in her decision making in marriage. During their 4 years marital
relationship, she came to realize that Rodolfo cannot be responsible in his duties and responsibilities,
in terms of loving, caring, protection, financial support and sex.
On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3rd among 5 boys. The father, who was perceived to be weak, and
his two elder brothers were all working as seaman. Rodolfo who was always available to his mothers
needs, became an easy prey, easily engulfed into her system. The relationship became symbiotic,
that led to a prolonged and abnormal dependence to his mother. The mother, being the stronger and
dominant parent, is a convenient role model, but the reversal of roles became confusing that led to
ambivalence of his identity and grave dependency. Apparently, all the boys were hooked up to his
complexities, producing so much doubts in their capabilities in a heterosexual setting. Specifically,
Rodolfo tried, but failed. His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is referable to an unconscious guilt
feelings of defying the mothers love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife
and the mother, so that his continuous relationship with his wife produces considerable anxiety, which
he is unable to handle, and crippled him psychologically.
Based on the above clinical data, family background and outcome of their marriage, it is the opinion
of the examiner, that Mrs. Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and responsible and is
psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and obligations of marriage. Due to her numerous
personal problems she has difficulty in handling her considerable anxiety, at present. There are
strong clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder
associated with severe inadequacy that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of marriage.
The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged dependence with a
parent of the opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation crippled
his psychological functioning related to sex, self confidence, independence, responsibility and
maturity. It existed prior to marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration due to marital
stresses and demands. It is considered as permanent and incurable in nature, because it started
early in his life and therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality structure. It is severe or
grave in degree, because it hampered and interfered with his normal functioning related to
heterosexual adjustment.21
These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr. Villegas during her testimony, the relevant
portion of which we quote below:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what was your psychological
evaluation?
A: Ive found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as matured, independent, very
responsible, focused, she has direction and ambition in life and she work hard for what she
wanted, maam, and therefore, I concluded that she is psychologically capacitated to perform
the duties and responsibilities of the marriage, maam.
Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your psychological evaluation with
regards to the respondent?
A: Based on my interview, Ive found out that the husband Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage suffering
from a psychiatric classification as Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe
inadequacy related to masculine strivings, maam.
Q: In laymans language, Madame Witness, can you please explain to us what do you mean
by Dependent Personality Disorder?
A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in which their response to ordinary
way of life are ineffectual and inept characterized by loss of self confidence, always in doubt
with himself and inability to make his own decision, quite dependent on other people, and in
this case, on his mother, maam.
Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a psychological problem of respondent,

Rodolfo Azcueta?
A: Very much, maam.
Q: Why?
A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and disrupt his duties and responsibilities as a
husband and as a father, maam.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what is the root cause of this psychological
problem?
A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross identification with the mother who is
the dominant figure in the family, the mother has the last say and the authority in the family
while the father was a seaman and always out of the house, and if present is very shy, quiet
and he himself has been very submissive and passive to the authority of the wife, maam.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what circumstance this kind of
psychological problem manifested?
A: This manifested starting his personality development and therefore, during his early stages
in life, maam.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem existed to Rodolfo Azcueta,
the respondent in this case, before the celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And it became manifested only after the celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it became manifested with thethat the
manifestation came too late?
A: The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta was very mild,
no stresses, no demand on his life, at 24 years old despite the fact that he already finished
college degree of Computer Science, there is no demand on himself at least to establish his
own, and the mother always would make the decision for him, maam.
Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem severe?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem severe, Madame Witness?
A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibility that is expected of a
married person, maam.
Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?
A: It is incurable because it started early in development and therefore it became so deeply

ingrained into his personality, and therefore, it cannot be changed nor cured at this stage,
maam.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?
A: It is permanent in nature, sir.
Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of the psychological problem as
far as the marriage relationship of Rodolfo Azcueta is concerned?
A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship because standard
expectation is, the husband has to work, to feed, to protect, to love, and of course, to function
on (sic) the sexual duties of a husband to the wife, but in this case, early in their marriage, they
had only according to the wife, experienced once sexual relationship every month and this is
due to the fact that because husband was so closely attached to the mother, it is a result of the
unconscious guilt feeling of the husband in defying the mothers love when they will be having
heterosexual relationship and therefore, at that point, he will not be able to distinguish between
the mother and the wife and therefore, sex relationship will not be satisfactory according to
expectation, maam.22
In Te v. Te, we held that "[b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence
the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties." 23
Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly explained the basis for its decision, which
we reproduce here for emphasis:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally
failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual
intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual
relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore sex
relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own
decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply
with his marital obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the
account of respondents severe and incurable psychological incapacity.
Third, Rodolfos psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. Contrary to the CAs finding that the parties lived
harmoniously and independently in the first few years of marriage, witnesses were united in testifying
that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfos irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and
abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be sure, these manifestations of Rodolfos
dependent personality disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early
development and a by product of his upbringing and family life.
Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render
him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The Court is wary of the CAs bases for overturning factual findings of the trial court on this point. The
CAs reasoning that Rodolfos requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due
to his embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting
a child was his "responsible" realization that he should not have a child since he is unemployed are
all purely speculative. There is no evidence on record to support these views. Again, we must point
out that appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with that of the trial court or the expert
witnesses, save only in instance where the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted by
evidence.
We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfos irresponsibility and overdependence on his
mother can be attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at the time of his
marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or the fact that the expert testimony has identified a
grave clinical or medical cause for his abnormal behavior.
In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature of a dependent personality disorder
and how one afflicted with such a disorder would be incapacitated from complying with marital
obligations, to wit:
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to
make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when
he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone
and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has
no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear
direction in life.24
Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent personality disorder is
automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. We
realize that psychology is by no means an exact science and the medical cases of patients, even
though suffering from the same disorder, may be different in their symptoms or manifestations and in
the degree of severity. It is the duty of the court in its evaluation of the facts, as guided by expert
opinion, to carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the gravity of the same before declaring the
nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles
68 to 71 of the Family Code.25 As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfos dependent
personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a
husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love,
respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife;
one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters
that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-
being of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the
meaning of Article 36.
Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfos condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his
early years was supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself in those
instances when it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and apply
them to situations and people in a society in flux. With respect to the concept of psychological
incapacity, courts must take into account not only developments in science and medicine but also
changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional gender roles. In this day and
age, women have taken on increasingly important roles in the financial and material support of their
families. This, however, does not change the ideal that the family should be an "autonomous" social
institution, wherein the spouses cooperate and are equally responsible for the support and well-being
of the family. In the case at bar, the spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a
cohesive unit based on mutual love, respect and support, due to the failure of one to perform the
essential duties of marriage.
This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not
psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in
Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.26 (emphasis ours)
In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

LUCAS P. BERASMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose
L. Sabio, Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal; rollo, pp. 37-50.
2 Id. at 36.
3 CA Records pp. 36-37.
4 Id. at p. 41.
5 Rollo, pp. 45-49.
6 Section 12 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution state:
SECTION 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
7Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740; Tuason v. Court
of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180-181 (1996).
8
G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
9 Id. at 209-213.
10 310 Phil. 21 (1995).
11 Id. at 39.
12 Id. at 40.
13 Id.
14 Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 370.
15Republic of the Philippines v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425,
431.
16 G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009.
17 397 Phil. 840 (2000).
18 Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997, 266 SCRA 324, 330.
19Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 105, 126 (1995), citing Serrano v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 45125, April 22, 1991,196 SCRA 107, 110.
20 Supra note 14.
21 Rollo, pp. 63-64.
22 TSN dated February 26, 2004, at pp. 13-20.
23 Supra note 16.
24 Id.
25ART. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
ART. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement,
the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However,
such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family.
ART. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The
expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the
community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their
separate properties. In case [of] insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such
obligations shall be satisfied from their separate properties.
ART. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both
spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the
provisions of Article 70.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012
ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the
evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave,
incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.
Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC) declaring her
marriage with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as null and void.
Antecedents
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New
Guinea. They had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were still in
college she, at Assumption College while he, at San Beda College taking a business management
course. After a month of courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy ultimately led to her
pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca. They got married on her eighth
month of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City on June 24, 1991, 2 after which they moved
to her place, although remaining dependent on their parents for support.
When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds from petitioners best friend to
settle the hospital bills. He remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he
finished his college course in October 1993. She took on various jobs to meet the familys needs, first
as a part-time aerobics instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-time employee in Sanofi, a
pharmaceutical company. Being the one with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the familys
expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their childs educational needs).
On his part, Dominic sold Colliers Encyclopedia for three months after his graduation from college
before he started working as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in 1994.3 Ironically,
he spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she
shouldered all the household expenses and their childs schooling because his irregular income could
not be depended upon. In September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-
employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between them became rare until they started
to sleep in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship. 4
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present. Later on, he
asked her to issue two blank checks that he claimed would be for the cars insurance coverage. She
soon found out, however, that the checks were not paid for the cars insurance coverage but for his
personal needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on
her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with P164,000.00
belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After petitioner and her mother bailed him out of
jail, petitioner discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were even
threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister themselves. 5
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for "time
and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him
to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in another
place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of her
marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition.
Ruling of the RTC
In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume
Samson, and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and
presented no evidence.
On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute
nullity,6 holding in part:
xxx. The result of Dr. Samsons clinical evaluation as testified to by her and per Psychiatric Report
she issued together with one Dr. Doris Primero showed that petitioner appears to be mature, strong
and responsible individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes her vulnerable and easy to forgive
and forget. Petitioner also believes that marriage was a partnership "for better and for worse", she
gave all of herself unconditionally to respondent. Unfortunately, respondent cannot reciprocate. On
the one hand, respondent was found to have a personality that can be characterized as inadequate,
immature and irresponsible. His criminal acts in the present time are mere extensions of his
misconduct established in childhood. His childhood experiences of separations and emotional
deprivation largely contributed to this antisocial (sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle.
She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply with what is required of him as a
husband and father. Besides from his adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his malevolent
conduct and lack of true remorse indicate that he is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the role of a
married man.7
The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and
incurability, as set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina), 8 were attendant, establishing
Dominics psychological incapacity, viz:
Gravity from the evidence adduced it can be said that respondent cannot carry out the normal and
ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary
circumstances of life and work. Respondent is totally incapable of observing mutual love, respect and
fidelity as well as to provide support to his wife and child. Ever since the start of the marriage
respondent had left all the household concerns and the care of their child to petitioner while he
studied and indulged in night outs with friends. This continued even when he finished his studies and
landed a job. He concealed his salary from the petitioner and worse, had the gall to engage in sexual
infidelity. Likewise worthy of serious consideration is respondents propensity to borrow money, his
deceitfulness and habitual and continuous evasion of his obligations which (sic) more often than not
had led to the filing of criminal cases against him.
Antecedence Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of respondents personality disorder
and it was only after marriage that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared that respondents
behavioral equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. His dishonesty and lack of remorse are
mere extensions of his misconduct in childhood which generally attributable to respondents
childhood experiences of separation and emotional deprivations. In fine, his psychological incapacity
is but a product of some genetic causes, faulty parenting and influence of the environment although
its over manifestation appear only after the wedding.
Incurability Respondents personality disorder having existed in him long before he contracted
marriage with petitioner, there appears no chance for respondent to recover any (sic) ordinary means
from such incapacity.
All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show that he does not possess the proper
outlook, disposition and temperament necessary for marriage. Indeed, this ultimate recourse of nullity
is the only way by which petitioner can be delivered from the bondage of a union that only proved to
be a mockery and brought pain and dishonor to petitioner.9
Ruling of the CA
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominics personality traits
either constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code; that the testimony of the expert witness, while
persuasive, was not conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for the parties separation
had been their frequent quarrels over financial matters and the criminal cases brought against
Dominic.10
On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the
RTC.11 Specifically, it refused to be bound by the findings and conclusions of petitioners expert
witness, holding:
It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that respondents condition, assuming it is
serious enough, was present before or during the celebration of the marriage. Although petitioners
expert witness concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated even before the parties
marriage, the Court refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the fact that the witness findings,
admittedly, were concluded only on the basis of information given by the petitioner herself, who, at
the time of the examination, interview, was already head strong in her resolve to have her marriage
with the respondent nullified, and harbored ill-feelings against respondent throughout her consultation
with Dr. Samson.12
The CA held the testimonies of petitioners witnesses insufficient to establish Dominics psychological
affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. Relying on
the pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag,13 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals14 and Pesca v.
Pesca,15 the CA observed:
In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature, deceitful and without remorse for his
dishonesty, and lack of affection. Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily constitute a case
of psychological incapacity. A persons inability to share or take responsibility, or to feel remorse for
his misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members, are indicative of an immature
mind, but not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that cannot be cured.
Even the respondents alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily equivalent to psychological
incapacity, although it may constitute adequate ground for an action for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code. Nor does the fact that the respondent is a criminal suspect for estafa or
violation of the B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage to petitioner.
Again, it may constitute ground for legal separation provided the respondent is convicted by final
judgment and sentenced to imprisonment of more than six (6) years. 16
Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
Issues
Petitioner assails the CAs refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation she
had presented in the trial of the case, and the CAs reliance on the pronouncements in Dagdag,
Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the report on the psychiatric evaluation conducted
by Dr. Samson more than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos v. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20) and Molina. She insists that the CA should have
applied the ruling in Marcos v. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755) to the
effect that personal medical or psychological examination was not a requirement for a declaration of
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
We consider the CAs refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be well taken
and warranted. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards Dominic,
which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the basis to doubt the findings
of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected
to an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioners expert; and that he also did not participate in the
proceedings; and that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were
solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him rendered by
petitioner and her witnesses.
Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to resort to other people in order to
verify the facts derived from petitioner about Dominics psychological profile considering the ill-
feelings she harbored towards him. It turned out, however, that the only people she interviewed about
Dominic were those whom petitioner herself referred, as the following testimony indicated:
Fiscal Zalameda
Q: So youre saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards the respondent? At the time you
interviewed?
A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.
Q: How about during the subsequent interview?
A: During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner was able to talk regarding her marital
problems which is uncomfort(able), so she was able to adapt, she was able to condition herself
regarding her problems, Sir.
Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?
A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.
Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as the respondent is concerned, would
you say that the petitioner would only tell you information negative against the respondent?
A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people the facts given to me by the
petitioner, Sir.
Q: And these other people were also people given to you or the name are given to you by the
petitioner, Madame Witness?
A: Yes, Sir.17
In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast serious doubt on Dr.
Samsons findings. The CA rightly refused to accord probative value to the testimony of such expert
for being avowedly given to show compliance with the requirements set in Santos and Molina for the
establishment of Dominics psychological incapacity.
The CAs reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not misplaced. It is easy to see why.
In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root
cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by
experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of
her husband."18 But here, the experts testimony on Dominics psychological profile did not identify,
much less prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine
Dominic in person before completing her report but simply relied on other peoples recollection and
opinion for that purpose.
In Hernandez, we ruminated that:
xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is
mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 19
but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed
psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the
inception of the marriage.
The Court in Pesca observed that:
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence,
to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of
solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.20
Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical experts
testimony alone that was crucial but rather petitioners failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden of
showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage. In other words, the
totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was the crucial
consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to
give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must
treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given
case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its
decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of the proceedings.
Petitioners view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent spouse therein was not a requirement for the declaration of his
psychological incapacity22 is not entirely accurate. To be clear, the statement in Marcos ran as
follows:
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non
in the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination of
Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a
finding of his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any form of medical
or psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the
granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should
emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos.
But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present the professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged psychological
incapacity, then the opinions should be presented and be weighed by the trial courts in order to
determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages.
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of their proceedings.23
We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he suffered from
such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in
dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not
physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must
concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, to observe love,
respect and fidelity, and to render help and support. We have also held that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of marriage, a
persons psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to
comprehend and comply with the essential objects of marriage, including the rights and obligations
between husband and wife. The affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must be
incurable.
Accordingly, the RTCs findings that Dominics psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity,
antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to show that his
actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or
clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his dishonesty and lack
of affection did not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take
responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members,
albeit indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that was
incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with psychological
incapacity.24 Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses manifestations of
psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground only for an action for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
Finally, petitioner contends that the Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the
OSG no longer required, and that the appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could be
deemed to have become functus officio if not totally disregarded. 25
The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by
the OSG were no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to
actively participate in all stages of the proceedings, to wit:
a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit
to the court proof of such service within the same period. 26
b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office
of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen
days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to
file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or
papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided,
the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda. 27
c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with
copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published
once in a newspaper of general circulation.28
d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties.1wphi1 Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial,
or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General. 29
e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice
of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial.
The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties. 30
The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the
capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal
judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby
ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical
antecedence-would succeed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on March 19, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68615.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. I 3-21: penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired), with Associate
Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong
(retired/deceased) concurring.
2 Id. at 77-78.
3 Id. at 79.
4 Id. at 4-5.
5 Id. at 81-82.
6 CA Rollo, pp. 41-44.
7 Id. at 42-43.
8 G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198, 207.
9 Rollo, p. 6.
10 Id. at 84.
11 Id. at 84-85.
12 Id. at 19-20
14 G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76.
15 G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001, 356 SCRA 588.
16 Rollo, p. 19.
17 TSN, May 26, 1999, pp. 25-26.
18 Supra note 13, at 434-435.
19 Supra note 14, at 88.
21 G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694, 709.
22
Rollo, p. 8.
23 Id.
24 Pesca v. Pesca, supra note 15, at 594.
25 Rollo, p. 9.
26 A.M. No. 02-11-10, Section 5, paragraph 4.
27 Id., Section 18.
28 Id., Section 19, paragraph 2.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS,
.JR., Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the declaration by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen, Pangasinan of the nullity
of the marriage between respondent Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and Catalina Delos Santos-
De Quintos (Catalina) based on the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold once again the validity of a marriage
on the ground that the alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently established.
Antecedents
Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal
Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan.2 The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas
hysterectomy following her second miscarriage.3
On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, 4 citing
Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not
interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot
located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.5 After conducting an investigation, the public prosecutor
determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina. 6
Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty
arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of
her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted
daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since
1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.7
Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L.
Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina,8 Dr. Reyes opined that
Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes
found that Catalinas disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. 9
Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation, 10 whereby she admitted
her psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardos consent and
flirting with different men. She insisted that she had only one live-in partner; and that she would not
give up her share in the conjugal residence because she intended to live there or to receive her share
should the residence be sold.11
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Honorable Court finds for the plaintiff
and judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and Catalina delos Santos de
Quintos, a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan to cancel the marriage of the
parties from the Civil Register of Lingayen, Pangasinan in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC ruled that Catalinas infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with her
family, and her incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her duty to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It held that considering that the matter of
determining whether a party was psychologically incapacitated was best left to experts like Dr. Reyes,
the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was the best evidence of Catalinas
psychological incapacity.13
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID,
DEFENDANT CATALINA DELOS SANTOS-DE QUINTOS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT
HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.
On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The CA
concluded that Eduardo proved Catalinas psychological incapacity, observing that the results of the
neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes showed that Catalina had been "mentally or
physically ill to the extent that she could not have known her marital obligations;" and that Catalinas
psychological incapacity had been medically identified, sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the
complaint and clearly explained by the trial court.
Issue
In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges that the CA gravely
erred because:
I
THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINAS ALLEGED PERSONALITY TRAITS ARE
CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE TIME OF
MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE A

SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
III
ABANDONMENT OF ONES FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION.
IV
GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE ESTABLISHED TO BE A SYMPTOM OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR. ANNABELLE REYES

FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF CATALINAS INCAPACITY AND PROVE THAT IT
EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE. 14
The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA did not conform to the
guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina); 15 and that Catalinas
refusal to do household chores, and her failure to take care of her husband and their adopted
daughter were not "defects" of a psychological nature warranting the declaration of nullity of their
marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect to perform her marital obligations.
The OSG further argues that Catalinas infidelity, gambling habits and abandonment of the conjugal
home were not grounds under Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof that her infidelity
and gambling had occurred prior to the marriage, while her abandonment would only be a ground for
legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code; that the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr.
Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalinas psychological incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not shown
to have exerted effort to look into Catalinas past life, attitudes, habits and character as to be able to
explain her alleged psychological incapacity; that there was not even a finding of the root cause of her
alleged psychological incapacity; and that there appeared to be a collusion between the parties
inasmuch as Eduardo admitted during the trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange
for her non-appearance in the trial.
The OSG postulated that Catalinas unsupportive in-laws and Eduardos overseas deployment that
had required him to be away most of the time created the strain in the couples relationship and
forced her to seek her friends emotional support and company; and that her ambivalent attitude
towards their adopted daughter was attributable to her inability to bear children of her own.
Issue
The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of
Catalinas marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Ruling
We grant the petition for review.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal,
or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and
the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married
person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological illness.16
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17 we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those
enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in deciding cases
involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we then laid down the
following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina, 18 viz:
xxxx
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.
xxxx
marriage. x x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x
x x.
xxxx
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.
xxxx
x x x.
xxxx
appear as counsel for the state. x x x.19
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in
deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the
existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not
on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.20 Indeed, the incapacity should be
established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, 21making it incumbent upon the petitioner
to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. 22
Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that they thereby explained the gravity
and severity of Catalinas psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to the celebration of
their marriage.23
We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of
sufficiently explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalinas purported psychological
incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their appreciation of the scanty evidence that Eduardo
submitted to establish the incapacity.
To start with, Catalinas supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving the
house without Eduardos consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of their
adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even established. Eduardo presented no other witnesses
to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his testimony was self-serving and would
have no serious value as evidence upon such a serious matter that was submitted to a court of law.
Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychological
evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of Catalinas
psychological incapacity. In particular, they relied on the following portion of the report of Dr. Reyes,
to wit:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is characterized, mainly by immaturity in

several aspects of the personality. One aspect is in the area of personal relationships, where a
person cannot really come up with what is expected in a relationship that involves commitments.
They are generally in and out of relationships, as they do not have the patience to sustain this [sic]
ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be attended to as they might end up doing things
which are often regrettable. These people however usually do not feel remorse for their wrongdoings.
They do not seem to learn from their mistakes, and they have the habit of repeating these mistakes to
the detriment of their own lives and that of their families. Owing to these characteristics, people with
these pattern of traits cannot be expected to have lasting and successful relationships as required in
marriage. It is expected that even with future relationships, things will not work out.
Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship are not also that ideal. If this be the
background of the developing child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also end up as such.
xxxx
With all these collateral information being considered and a longitudinal history of defendant made, it
is being concluded that she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of her as a wife. Her
behavior and attitude before and after the marriage is highly indicative of a very immature and
childish person, rendering her psychologically incapacitated to live up and meet the responsibilities
required in a commitment like marriage. Catalina miserably failed to fulfill her role as wife and mother,
rendering her incapacitated to comply with her duties inherent in marriage. In the same vein, it cannot
be expected that this attitude and behavior of defendant will still change because her traits have
developed through the years and already ingrained within her. 24
Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalinas
supposed psychological incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source of
vital information that the report missed out on. Aside from rendering a brief and general description of
the symptoms of borderline personality disorder, both the report and court testimony of Dr. Reyes
tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have brought about such behavior on the part of
Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalinas various acts or omissions typified the conduct of a
person with borderline personality, and did not also discuss the gravity of her behavior that translated
to her inability to perform her basic marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina was
childish and immature, and that her childishness and immaturity could no longer be treated due to her
having already reached an age "beyond maturity."25
Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties
by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity.26 We have explained this need in Lim v. Sta. Cruz-
Lim,27 stating:
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and
unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it
from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the
testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the
assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion
and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded. 28
But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not personally seek out and meet with
other persons, aside from Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the conduct of the
spouses before and during the marriage. For that reason, Dr. Reyes report lacked depth and
objectivity, a weakness that removed the necessary support for the conclusion that the RTC and the
CA reached about Catalinas psychological incapacity to perform her marital duties.
Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present the gravity and
incurability of Catalinas psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence showing the
root cause of her alleged borderline personality disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to
her marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be identified as a psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.29
What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo adduced was Catalinas immaturity and
apparent refusal to perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone did not constitute
psychological incapacity.30 To rule that such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must
be shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the
spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, which inability
was merely due to her youth or immaturity.31
Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo32 that there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital
obligations, viz:
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations
must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on
the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment of
the conjugal home to live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the
nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being
instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, her
sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a manifestation of a
disordered personality that made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage.33 Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of
her infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.
Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The
assertion was based on his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of P50,000.00 as
her share in the conjugal home in order to convince her not to oppose his petition or to bring any
action on her part,34 to wit:
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG
Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your wife, the herein defendant, Catalina
delos Santos-de Quintos, has been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I noticed that she is
no longer attending and represented by counsel, did you talk to your wife?
A No, sir.
Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both of you, if, she will not attend the
hearing of this case you filed against her, is it not?
A No, sir. I did not.

Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an agreement regarding this case?
A None, sir.
Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that you will pay her an amount of
P50,000.00, please tell us, what is that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00?
A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.
Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired at the time of your marriage?
A Yes, sir.
Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?
A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat, that is why I agreed, sir.
Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this petition for declaration of marriage
which you filed against her?
A She does not opposed [sic], sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about this case is the division of your
conjugal properties?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share of your conjugal properties, so
that she will not pursue whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to the case you filed against her,
is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr. witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00 that is the reason why she is no
longer around here?
A Yes sir, it could be.35
Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and
Eduardo.1wphi1 To recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of
conceding her psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear enough that she was
unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave her the
amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition of her unquestionable
legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not he did so also to encourage her
to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage
should by no means be of any consequence in determining the issue of collusion between the
spouses.
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Catalina, we
cannot but resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.36
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the Court of
Appeals promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit.
Costs to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1Rollo, pp. 51-57; penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz (retired), with
Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria Tirona (retired) and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring.
2 Exhibit "A", Exhibit Folder, p. 1.
3 Exhibit Folder, p. 2.
4 Records, pp. 2-4.
5 Id. at 10-11.
6 Id. at 14-15.
7 TSN dated December 7, 1998, pp. 4-5.
8Dr. Reyes administered the following tests, namely:- Purdue Non Verbal Test, Draw-A-
Person Test, House-Tree-Person Test, Sacks Sentence Completion Test, and Bender Visual
Motor Gestalt Test (see Exhibit "B", Exhibit Folder, p. 5).
9
TSN dated January 18, 1999, pp. 3-4.
10 Records, pp. 10-11.
11 Id. at 10-11.
12 Id. at 68.
13 Id. at 66-67.
14 Rollo, pp. 22-23.
16 Yambao v. Republic, G.R. No. 184063, January 24, 2011, 640 SCRA 355, 367.
17 G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
18 Supra note 15.
19 Id. at 209-213.
20 Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425, 431.
21
Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123, 132.
23 Rollo, p. 62.
24
Exhibit Folder, pp. 4, 6.
25 TSN dated January 18, 1999, p. 7.
26Marable v. Marable, G.R. No. 178741, January 17, 2011, 639 SCRA 557, 567; Suazo
v.Suazo, G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010, 615 SCRA 154, 176.
28 Id. at 585.
29 Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 315, 321-322.
30Republic v. Galang, G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 540; Navarro, Jr. v.
Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121, 130.
31 Dedel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 461, 466.
32 Supra note 26, at 174-175.
33 Villalon v. Villalon, G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 572, 582.
34 TSN dated December 14, 1998.
35 Id. at 3-4.
36 Alcazar v. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 604, 620.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170022, January 09, 2013]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1rl1 filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines
challenging the October 7, 2005 amended decision2rl1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that
reconsidered its March 22, 2004 decision3rl1 (original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its
original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002 decision4rl1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which
The Factual Antecedents
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5rl1 and the union bore two children, Maricar and
Manny.6rl1 To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June
12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with
Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7rl1 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and
lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with
the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita's
psychological incapacity.8rl1
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her
promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their
home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.9rl1
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita's infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the
family home.10rl1 He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their
children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin. 11rl1
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12rl1 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima
Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from
any form of major psychiatric illness[,]13rl1 but had been "unable to provide the expectations
expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship;14rl1 her "transferring from one job
to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in
attaining her ambitions;15rl1and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her
reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship.16rl1
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision,17rl1 the RTC declared Cesar's marriage to Lolita void, finding
sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.cralawlibrary
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.cralawlibrary
The CA Ruling
The CA originally18rl1 set aside the RTC's verdict, finding that Lolita's abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness.
Lolita merely refused to comply with her marital obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA
significantly observed that infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the
nullity of a marriage.cralawlibrary
Cesar sought reconsideration19rl1 of the CA's decision and, in due course, attained his objective.
The CA set aside its original decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC's decision. In its
amended decision,20 the CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita's serious psychological
incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita's unwarranted refusal to perform her marital
obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita's willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal
dwelling.cralawlibrary
The OSG then filed the present petition.cralawlibrary
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores' psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been
suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely
grounds for legal separation.cralawlibrary
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolita's infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her
grave and incurable psychological incapacity.cralawlibrary
The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar's
marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.cralawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar's marriage to Lolita on the ground of
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence

on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations;21rl1 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.22rl1 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the
existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the
errant spouse.23rl1
Cesar failed to prove Lolita's

psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar's testimony failed to prove Lolita's alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified
on the dates when he learned of Lolita's alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their
home,24rl1as well as his continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned
of the affair,25rl1but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita's alleged affair with Alvin and her
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.cralawlibrary
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal
separation.26rl1 To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness
and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring
spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.27rl1 No evidence on record exists to
support Cesar's allegation that Lolita's infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any
psychological illness.cralawlibrary
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores' psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged
psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer
from any major psychiatric illness.28rl1 Dr. Flores' observation on Lolita's interpersonal problems
with co-workers,29rl1 to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she
was at the time of her marriage psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with
Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife's psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply
be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are
poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their
relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be compared or to
serve as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores
prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores' further belief that Lolita's refusal to go
with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship 30rl1 is a mere
generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot
support.cralawlibrary
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita's psychological incapacity; thus, the
CA committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its original decision.cralawlibrary
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution 31rl1 protected by the State.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its
dissolution and nullity.32rl1 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions
made by one party to the other during the marriage.cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar
Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.cralawlibrary
Costs against the respondent.cralawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.cralawlibrary
Endnotes:
1rl1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; rollo, pp. 9 37.cralawlibrary
2rl1
Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, and concurred in by Associate Justices
Godardo A. Jacinto and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court); id. at 39-42.cralawlibrary
3rl1 Id. at 43-50.cralawlibrary
4rl1 Records, pp. 436-438; penned by Judge Nimfa Cuesta-Yilches.cralawlibrary
5rl1 Id. at 6.cralawlibrary
7rl1
Id. at 2 and 73. Also stated as "1989" and "1990" in other parts of the record and the
TSN; rollo, pp. 44 and 92; TSN, August 22, 1996, p. 36; records, p. 119.cralawlibrary
8rl1 Records, pp. 1-4.cralawlibrary
9rl1 Id. at 165-167 and 313-318.cralawlibrary
13rl1 Id. at 245.cralawlibrary
14rl1 Ibid.
15rl1 Ibid.cralawlibrary
16rl1 Ibid.
17rl1 Supra note 4.cralawlibrary
rl1 CA rollo, pp. 87-93.cralawlibrary

19
rl1 Supra note 2.cralawlibrary

20
21rl1
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, September 19, 2011, 657 SCRA 822, 836-
837.cralawlibrary
22rl1
Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador, G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 519,
538; Toring v. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 389, 405; Paz v. Paz, G.R. No.
166579, February 18, 2010, 613 SCRA 195, 205; Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27,
2008, 556 SCRA 272, 288; Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 81,
106; Republic of the Phils. v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 502 (2005); and Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of
Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 678 (1997).cralawlibrary
rl1 Kalaw v. Fernandez, supra note 21, at 823; Republic v. Galang, G.R. No. 168335, June 6,
23
2011, 650 SCRA 524, 544; Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159220, September 22,
2008, 566 SCRA 154, 161-162; Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008, 556
SCRA 711, 725; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919, 932 (1999); and Rep. of the Phils. v.
Court of Appeals, supra, at 676.cralawlibrary
26rl1
The Family Code, Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds:
xxxx
xxxx
27rl1 Toring v. Toring, supra note 22, at 406.cralawlibrary
31rl1 Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 429, 439; and Camacho-
Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 461, 464.cralawlibrary
32rl1 Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 517, 524; Republic v.
Cabamug-Baguio, supra note 23, at 727; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, supranote 23, at
676.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's
Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised
on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners
experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts
opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the
form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of
his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these
allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their
children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged
in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to
three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she
played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own
testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While
he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to
respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This
was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor,
going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was
presented to prove her visits to beauty salons orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner
presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that
respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating
other men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated
with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for legal
separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment
of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and
performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected
by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they
were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts tosee and take
care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever
that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two
sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to
link their academic short comings to Malyns actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of
psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was
psychological incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies,
and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations,
the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual
findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained
them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be
grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004
Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.2
In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look
into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by
the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not both
parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage
that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the term
psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations
of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to
gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision
Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision
"with less specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its
application."4 Illustrative of the "less specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family
Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited
the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of
church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the
Canon Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as used in
Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed independently of "but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:
not physical, althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095
of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally
subject to our law on evidence whatis decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article
36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some
resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in recognition
of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court."10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and
thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for
the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a partys
psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the
testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly
erroneous.12 In every situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the
facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its
own judgment.13 It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and
substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code regard
marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional
mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution 14 only relates to a valid
marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a
marriage has no legal existence.15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and
promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is
thereby made all the more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in
the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying.16 The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr.
Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely
based on the petitioners version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert
opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts
sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the
standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not
anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioners factual
premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioners testimony, as well as on
her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would
seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that
basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the records,
including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of the
respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert
testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the
nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having
the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties." 18
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly
determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner).
Consequently, the lack of personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed with
personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. The
Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is no requirement for one to bedeclared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is important is
the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the partys psychological incapacity. Hence, "if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." 20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that
a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the
expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other
evidence on the causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be
considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other
evidence to establish causation. The experts findings under such circumstances would not constitute
hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. 22 This is so, considering that any ruling that
brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be
eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties upbringing and
psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates expertopinion should be considered not in isolation but
along with the other evidence presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was expectedto
compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondents own witness, and
those of Dr. Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive
and dependent tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the
respondents psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways.
Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her
relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult for
her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for rejection. To others,
Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions
contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a less
conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely,
placed an enormous value on having significant others would depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and immature, doubting
his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She
became relationship-dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory
test26 conducted on the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on
dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are
several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score of
dependency, narcissism and compulsion.
Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?
A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will
be considered as acceptable.
Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?
A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84. 27
It is notable that Dr. Dayans findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to
the effect that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with
AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms. So,
more or less, could you please tell me in more laymans terms how you arrived at your findings that
the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?
A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background, her
fatherdied in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to look
for a job to partly assume the breadwinners role in her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother
partly took care of her and her siblings against the fact that her own mother was unable to carry out
her respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings considering that
the husband died prematurely. And there was an indication that Elena Fernandez on several
occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother because she
herself never experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a precedent
in her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in
psychology a script, the tendency to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of care, lets say some
kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life when you have your own
family. I did interview the son because I was not satisfied with what I gathered from both Trinidad and
Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he could not
see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of Elena and that he preferred to
live with the father actually.
Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?
A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still
insearch of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to
another. There is this need for attention, this need for love on other people.
Q : And that led you to conclude?

A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife
and as a mother.28
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or
opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve
as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert
witnesses vis--vis the other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila
Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee.
Regarding Father Healys expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial understanding of
psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars
of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by
experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological incapacity adopted
under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondents level of immaturity and
irresponsibility with regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological
incapacity, testifying thusly:
ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated. On
the facts as you read it based on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you
say to that claim of respondent?
A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic
irresponsibility with regards to her own children.
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically
incapacitated is not true?
A : Yes. It should be rejected.
Q : Why do you say so?
A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been
manifested running through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility because
her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life and being the bread winner
of the family put her in an unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate her own ego and
she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became an obsession and that led to her few
responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had embraced.
Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on the
relationship of the respondent with her husband?
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and
toher children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and
associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?
A : Secondary.
Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?
A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody
takes for granted. The concentration on the husband and the children before everything else would
be subordinated to the marriage withher. Its the other way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman
history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?
A : Its a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of
Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a
person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the
top priority in her life.
xxxx
Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this
narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or .?
A : I would say its grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious
obligations which she has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with
herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already
existing at the time or marriage or even thereafter?
xxxx
A : When you get married you dont develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring with
you into the marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept these
responsibilities. And now you show that you dont accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling
them and you dont care about them.
Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?
A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended [sic]
upon her and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustans, it began to inflate her ego so much that
this became the top priority in her life. Its her lifestyle.
Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?
A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she was
neglecting such fundamental obligations.
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that
you mentioned?
A : Lets say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family background
situation. Say, almost for sure would be incurable now.
Q : What specific background are you referring to?
A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so important
to give in her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual situation for a young
girl and her position in the family was exalted in a very very unusual manner and therefore she had
that pressure on her and in her accepting the pressure, in going along with it and putting it in top
priority.31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healys opinions and findings
commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial
determination of the parties psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could
thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of marriage,
and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric
to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard his opinions and
findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the
cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked togive professional opinions about a
party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended
to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
sexual anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving
obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
to the other spouse.
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure
of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to
assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered
into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out
marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into."
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to

establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totalityof
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.33
Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the
standards set in Molina,34 the courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the ponencia
of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the
result" and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their
individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to
to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
for that of the trial court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards,
without too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as
"courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in
Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's
exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the
very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far fromwhat was intended by the Court,
Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, tocontinuously debase and pervert the
sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there
are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through
the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child
abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot
psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let itbe noted that in
Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners
allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a
week and always withthe permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home.
The children corroborated this, saying that theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in
their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two
of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents mahjong-
playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-
playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus,
while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were not proven. 36 (Emphasis supplied)
The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of
the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious
failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her
marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that
bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a
culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondents obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on
her family life, particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures
made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37 the parties eldest son in his deposition, whereby the son
confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parents separation, do you remember any habit or activity
or practice which your mother engaged in, before the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I cant
remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you
remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I cant, I cant
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?
WITNESS : Really long cuzwe would go to my aunts house in White Plains and I think we would get
there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON: You,
you went there? She brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess shed go out by herself. 38
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point
to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of
gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the observation of Father Healy
himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current psychological state of
the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens moral and mental development. This
disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined
under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing of
such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and
good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-
discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in
them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them
from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to
the effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and
thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so
without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her answer, 39 whereby she averred that it
was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitionerspsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?
A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those short
temper of the petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even the time
that they were together, that they were living in, she also had noticed some of his psychological
deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also dependent and she was one who
determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even those kinds of problems that she
had seen.
Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, Im talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to
conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?
A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was not really
thinking of marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her.
And even that time he was not also a monogamous person.
Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I
think so, Sir.
Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you that
in his younger years he was often out seeking other women. Im referring specifically to page 18. He
also admitted to you that the thought of commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these
admissions by petitioner to you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to enter into marriage
despite this fear of commitment and given his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it possible for
this person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?
A : Sir, its difficult.
Q : It would be difficult for that person?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.
Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the respondent?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his
psychological capacity to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?
A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role of
husband to Malyn.
Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner was
behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question
again and request you to answer that directly?
A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband
because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent
who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated
with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if
psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have
already accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the
eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only to
themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater injustice
should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their children to
endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero decried in her
erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes
today.1wphi1 It is not, in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a
"habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with
emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his
wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and towhich he is legally
entitled?
of his wifes psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation. In this case, the
marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted with psychological
incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the
nullity of the marriage between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society
does not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind,
have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that
"[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These
provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the
institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever
socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such
legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it
also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and
the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations
that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and
those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is.
Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article
36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person
as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given
the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves
as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against
marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further
the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons
who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.42 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November
4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN**

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.
** Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 7, Rule 2, Internal Rules.

1 657 SCRA 822.
2 Id. at 836-839.
3 Rollo, pp. 689-704.
4 See Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 31.
5 See Salita v. Magtolis, G.R No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108.
6 Supra note 4.
7 Id. at 34.
9 Id. at 209-213.
10 Separate Statement of Justice Teodoro Padilla in Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, note
8, at 214.
11Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76;
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735.
12 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996, 256 SCRA 158, 170.
13Separate Statement of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra
note 10.
14
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
15 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 461 ("[B]lind
adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution and in our statutes that marriage
is an inviolable social institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite
convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage is
doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.").
16Collado v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72780, February 13, 1992, 206 SCRA
206, 212; People v. Basmayor, G.R. No. 182791, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 369, 382-383.
18 Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193, 228.
19 G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 757.
20 Id. at 764.
21 Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume V (1999), pp. 804-805.
22 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, supra, note 15, at 487.
23 Carcereny, et al., Annulment in the Philippines: Clinical and Legal Issues (2010), p. 16.
24 Records Volume II, pp. 87-105.
25 Id. at 100, 103.
26A psychological test used to find personality disorders based on the respondents answers to
175 true/false questions (Ng, et al., Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity
[2006], p. 109).
27
TSN dated January 30, 1996, p. 13.
28 TSN dated February 15, 1995, pp. 8-10.
29 Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, G.R. No. 176464, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 569, 585.
30 Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 17, at 370.
31 TSN dated June 17, 1998, pp. 24-28.
32 Supra note 18.
33 Id. at 229-232.
34 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 8.
35 Supra note 18, at 220-228.
36 Decision, pp. 837-838.
37 Records, pp. 354-391.
38 Id. at 363.
39
Paragraph 3 (Records, Vol. I, p. 20) of which runs:
3. She specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the

Petition alleging that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations to the marriage and that such incapacity manifested itself only
after the marriage, the truth of the matter being that it is the petitioner who is
psychologically incapacitated.
40 TSN dated March 14, 1996, pp. 10-12.
42 Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 17, at 371-373.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208790 January 21, 2015
GLENN VIAS, Petitioner,

vs.
MARY GRACE PAREL-VIAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 rendered on January 29, 2013 and Resolution2 issued on August 7, 2013
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set aside the Decision3 dated
January 29, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil Case No.
SP-6564(09), which declared the marriage between Glenn Vifias (Glenn) and Mary Grace Parel-Vifias
(Mary Grace) as null and void.
Antecedents
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married in civil
rites held in Lipa City, Batangas.4 Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant, however, died
at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the infants death was caused by
Mary Graces heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.
The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender, while Mary Grace was a
production engineer.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn
subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was
filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary
Grace.He alleged that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly
resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and
drank and smoked heavily even whenshe was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to perform
even the most essential household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace
had not exhibited the foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship.6
Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the death of the infant whom she
delivered. She lived as if she were single and was unmindful of her husbands needs. She was self-
centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her about her behavior, she showed
indifference. She eventually left their home without informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she
left for an overseas employment in Dubai.7
Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace,
he consulted the latters friends. They informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken family and
was left to be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The foregoing circumstance must have contributed
to her sense of insecurity and difficulty in adjusting to married life. 8
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted himself to a
psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as
"amply aware of his marital roles" and "capable of maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual
relationship."9
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Graces personality through the data she had gathered
from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back in college.
Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college graduate. She belongs to a middle
class family. Her father is an overseas contract worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the time
Dr. Tayag prepared her report, Mary Grace was employed in Dubai and romantically involved with
another man.10
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically harmed Glenn during the couples
fights. Mary Grace is also ill-tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-oriented.11
Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-
social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenns relationship is not founded on mutual
love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the
propriety of declaring the nullity of the couples marriage. 12
In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained that:
The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe, serious, grave, permanent and chronic
in proportion and is incurable by any form of clinical intervention. It has already been deeply
embedded within her system as it was found to have started as early as her childhood years.
Because of such, it has caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and functionally[-]impaired especially
with regards to heterosexual dealings.
Such disorder of [Mary Grace]is mainly characterized by grandiosity, need for admiration and lack of
empathy[,] along with her pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,] which utterly
distorted her perceptions and views especially in terms of a fitting marital relationship. Such disorder
manifested in [Mary Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of entitlement and arrogance.
Throughout her union with [Glenn], she has exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen in her
marked inability to show proper respect for her husband. x x x She is too headstrong that most of the
time[,] she would do things her own way and would not pay close attention to what her husband
needed. She had been a wife who constantly struggled for power and dominance in their relationship
and [Glenn], being too considerate to her, was often subjected to her control.x x x She is into many
vices and loved hanging out with her friends at night[,] and she even got involved in an illicit
relationship[,] which was still going on up to the present time. x x x.
The root cause of [Mary Graces]personality aberration can be said to have emanated from the
various forms of unfavorable factors in her milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,] which is
the crucial stage in the life of a person as thisis the time when the individuals character and behavior
are shaped. [Mary Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with lenient and tolerating parents[,] who
never impose any restrictions [upon] their children. Considering such fact, she apparently failed to
feel the love and affection of the nurturing figures that she had[,] who were supposed to bethe first to
show concern [for] her. x x x She has acquired a domineering character as she was not taught to
have boundaries in her actions because of the laxity she had from her caregivers and also because
she grew up to be the eldest in the brood. She sees to it that she is the one always followed with
regards to making decisions and always mandates people to submit to her wishes. She has not
acquired the very essence of morality [and] has certainly learned set of unconstructive traits that
further made her too futile to assume mature roles. Morals and values were not instilled in her young
mind that as she went on with her life, she never learned to restrain herself from doing ill-advised
things even if she isamply aware of the depravity of her actions.
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical antecedence as it was already inher
system even prior to the solemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. x x x. 13 (Underlining ours)
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of his
marriage with Mary Grace. Substituted service of summons was made upon Mary Grace through her
aunt, Susana Rosita.14 Mary Grace filed no answer and did not attend any of the proceedings before
the RTC.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were offered as evidence. Glenn
and Rodelito described Mary Grace as outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the exact
opposite of Glenn, who is conservative and preoccupied with his work. 15 On her part, Dr. Tayag
reiterated her findings in the psychological report dated December 29, 2008.
Ruling of the RTC
On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage between Glenn and
Mary Grace as null and void on account of the latters psychological incapacity. The RTC cited the
following as grounds:
The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the] grant of the petition. Reconciliation
between the parties under the circumstances is nil. For the best interest of the parties, it is best that
the legal bond between them be severed.
The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the miserable life [Glenn] had with [Mary
Grace] who is a Narcissistic Personality Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who does not
treat him as her husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are separated in fact since the year 2006. [Mary
Grace] abandoned [Glenn] without telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it not for the insistence
of[Glenn] that he would not know the whereabouts of his wife. The law provides that [a] husband and
[a] wife are obliged to live together, [and] observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x x x For all
intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace] was in a quandary on what it really means. x x x.
From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary Grace] failed to comply with the basic
marital obligations of mutual love, respect, mutual help and support. [Glenn] tried his best to have
their marriage saved but [Mary Grace] did not cooperate with him. [Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of
her marital obligations.
The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a clinical psychologist with sufficient
authority to speak on the subject of psychological incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and was able to
gather sufficient data and information about [Mary Grace]. x x x This [Narcissistic] personality disorder
of[Mary Grace] is ingrained in her personality make-up, so grave and so permanent, incurable and
difficult to treat. It is conclusive that this personal incapacity leading to psychological incapacity is
already pre-existing before the marriage and was only manifested after. It has become grave,
permanent and incurable.17 (Underlining ours and italics in the original)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in
its Order18dated December 1, 2010.
The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA
On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist proving that Mary
Grace indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her
marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite the root cause of Mary Graces
disorder. Further, the RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayags statements
anent the gravity and incurability of Mary Graces condition. The RTC resorted to mere
generalizations and conclusions sansdetails. Besides, what psychological incapacity contemplates is
downright incapacity to assume marital obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown, but these do not warrant the
grant of Glenns petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this does not
translate into a psychological illness.19
Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSGs appeal.
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and
declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA stated the
reasons below:
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that "psychological incapacity" should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, asso expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The psychological condition must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace] was carefree, outgoing, immature, and
irresponsible which made her unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He likewise
alleged that she refused to communicate with him to save the marriage and eventually left him to
work abroad. To Our mind, the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a case of
psychological incapacity on her part.
While it is true that [Glenns] testimony was corroborated by [Dr. Tayag], a psychologist who
conducted a psychological examination on [Glenn], however, said examination was conducted only
on him and no evidence was shown that the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] was
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive value in determining the psychological
incapacity of a person as she would be in the best position to assess and evaluate the psychological
condition of the couple, she being an expert in this field of study of behavior. Although the
psychologist stated that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, she did not
fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she makea conclusion as to its gravity or
permanence. Moreover, she admitted that she was not able to examine the respondent[,] hence, the
information provided to her may be subjective and self-serving. Essential in this petition is the
allegation of the root causeof the spouses psychological incapacity which should also be medically or
clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity
must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriageand shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles
220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in
the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did not establish the root cause of the
psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] nor was such ground alleged in the complaint. We reiterate
the ruling of the Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be: a) medically or clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently proven by
experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina, has this to say:
"Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis x x x[,] nevertheless[,] suchroot
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists."
The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that"Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves". It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party evenbefore the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." Psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage.
From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage of the parties for the obvious
failure of [Glenn] to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for his failure to observe the guidelines outlined in
the afore-cited cases.
Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to [Glenn]. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted from the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family.20 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis and italics in the
original)
The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution21 dated August 7, 2013, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration22filed by Glenn.
Issue
Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of whether or not sufficient evidence exist
justifying the RTCs declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage should
be judged according to its own set of facts, and not on the basis of assumptions, predilections or
generalizations. The RTC judge should pains takingly examine the factual milieu, while the CA must
refrain from substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 23 Further, Glenn argues that in
Marcos v. Marcos,24 the Court ruled that it is not a sine qua non requirement for the respondent
spouse to be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before a marriage could be
declared as a nullity.25 However, if the opinion of an expert is sought, his or her testimony should be
considered as decisive evidence.26 Besides, the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of
the witnesses should be respected.27
In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes that the arguments Glenn raise for
our consideration are mere reiterations of the matters already resolved by the CA. 28
Ruling of the Court

The instant petition lacks merit.
The lack of personal examination orassessment of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is

not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to."29
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the
documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary
Graces condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not
inclined to perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is romantically-involved
with another man. She has not been maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the
latter filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and
is the exact opposite of Mary Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible
personalities, the latters acts and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity.
Rumbaua v. Rumbaua30 is emphatic that:
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling toperform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the
respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential
marital obligations had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondents stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly
irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the
respondents act of living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be
equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted
that respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their
marriage; their problems only came in later.
x x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance ofand to assume basic
marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or
"ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological
illness that is contemplated by said rule.31 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis in the
original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years from
1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses under one roof is
not an impossibility. Mary Graces departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or
mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a
greater burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability of the formers condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenns testimony is
wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenns
statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary Graces traits
and acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there isnary a proof on the antecedence of
Mary Graces alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before they got married, they
saw each other almost everyday.32 Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and well[-]educated person"33 in
Mary Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayags assessment of Mary Graces condition, the Court finds the same as
unfounded.1wphi1 Rumbaua34provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the
testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayags conclusions about the respondents psychological
incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side the petitioner whose bias in
favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does notdisqualify the
psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a
more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr.
Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually
hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the
doctors probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioners narrations, and on this basis
characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who
"believes that the world revolves around him"; and who "used love as adeceptive tactic for
exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." x x x.
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with
the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondents narcissistic
personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain
the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of
fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot
avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayags conclusion in her Report i.e., that the respondent suffered
"Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave
and incurable" is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the
petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same
statement cannot be made with respect to the respondents condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondents psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the
content of such evidence.
xxxx
A careful reading of Dr. Tayags testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time
the parties were married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived
him of the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she
adequately explain howshe came to the conclusion that respondents condition was grave and
incurable. x x x
xxxx
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondents exact condition
except in a very general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but
disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can besaid to be suffering from
narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and
why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the
respondents awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
All these are critical to the success of the petitioners case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on
what the petitioner related toher. x x x If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent
means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such
independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly
about the respondents early life and associations, and about events on orabout the time of the
marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appearto us to be no more than
a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meagre facts that the petitioner related, and were
all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We
say this because only the baser qualities of the respondents life were examined and given focus;
none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus on
having a job, his determination to improve himself through studies, his care and attention in the first
six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also what character and
qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the respondents family opposed
the marriage and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if
this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have
failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic
incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity. x x
x.35 (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary Graces status as the eldest among
her siblings,36her fathers being an overseas contract worker and her very tolerant mother, a
housewife.37 These, however, are not sufficient to establish and explain the supposed psychological
incapacity of Mary Grace warranting the declaration of the nullity of the couples marriage.
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who
can attest to the antecedence of a persons psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not
exempt a petitioner from complying with what the law requires. While the Court also commiserates
with Glenns marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides inadequate basis for the
Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
obligations as Glenns spouse.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29, 2013 and Resolution
dated August 7, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Additional member per Raffle dated January 12, 2015 vice Associate Justice Francis H.
Jardeleza.
1Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, with Associate Justices Rosmari D.
Carandang and Leoncia Real-Dimagiba, concurring; rollo, pp. 26-33.
2 Id. at 24.
3 Rendered by Acting Judge Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr.; CA rollo, pp. 7-13.
4 See Certificate of Marriage, id. at 22.
5 Original Records, pp. 4-13.
6 Id. at 5.
7 Id. at 6-7.
8 Id. at 8.
9 Id. at 8-10.
10Please seethe psychological report of Dr. Tayag, dated December 29, 2008, Folder of
Exhibits, p. 20.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 23, 26.
13 Id. at 23-26.
14 Original Records, pp. 18, 20.
15 CA rollo, pp. 82-83.
16 Id. at 7-13.
17 Id. at 12-13.
18 Id. at 14-15.
19 Please seeAppellants Brief, id. at 40, 44-46.
20 Rollo, pp. 30-33.
21
Id. at 24.
22 CA rollo, pp. 88-92.
23 Id. at 6.
24 397 Phil. 840 (2000).
25
Rollo, p. 6.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 7.
28 Id. at 45-47.
29 Zamora v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 701, 708 (2007).
30 612 Phil. 1061 (2009).
31 Id. at 1083-1084.
32 TSN, October 5, 2009, p. 19.
33 Original Records, p. 5.
34 Supra note 30.
35 Id. at 1084-1092.
36 TSN, September 14, 2009, p. 12.
37 Id. at 18.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 192718 February 18, 2015

ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner,
vs.
LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
November 20, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010 Resolution,2 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, which reversed and set aside the September 20, 2002 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br.37), declaring the marriage between
petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) and private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void.
The Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC-Br. 23). On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the petition.
Robert appealed this judgment before the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On
January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision "due to lack of participation of the State
as required under Article 48 of the Family Code."3The case was remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings and its records were thereafter transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter
was designated as Family Court pursuant to the Family Code Act of 1997.
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering
from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to
comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more
apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility,
deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes
demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert who
manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did not
appear during the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal appeared for the State. When
Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and had married an
American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating
another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in
her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following circumstances: (1) it was he who
did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2) it was her mother who
prepared their meal while her sister was the one who washed their clothes because she did not want
her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her sister who took care of their children while she spent
her time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different
men; (5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was
not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he
was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance
Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage
annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan
Tribunal).
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage
invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as
contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal with the
CA. The OSG argued that Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Luz. It pointed out that the real cause of the marital discord was the sexual infidelity of Luz. Such
ground, the OSG contended, should not result in the nullification of the marriage under the law, but
merely constituted a ground for legal separation.
The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision.
The decision, including the decretal portion, partially reads:
[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny of the records reveals, as
correctly noted by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. x x x.
xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence adduced by Robert fell short
of establishing the fact that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological
defect which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities.
xxxx
We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellees undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a
court compels Us to apply the law at all costs, however harsh it may be on whomsoever is called
upon to bear its unbiased brunt.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010
Resolution,6 stating that the arguments of Robert were mere rehash of the same ground, arguments
and discussion previously pointed out by him, and that no new substance was brought out to warrant
the reconsideration or reversal of its decision.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL GAP
TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OFTHE RTC DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER
TO RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE

MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACKOF DUE DISCRETION.
III
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS.
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his marriage even in the absence of
any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination of the wife by a competent and qualified
professional. To bolster his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that Luz
exhibited grave lack of discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations mutually
given and accepted in marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT.
Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men coupled with the fact that
she failed to function as a home maker to her family and as a housewife to him incapacitated her from
accepting and complying with her essential marital obligations. For said reason, he asserts that the
case of Luz was not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that was rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition which incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a
married woman. Robert avers that a sex maniac is not just a mere sexual infidel but one who is
suffering from a deep psychological problem.
Position of the State
The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Robert was not
sufficient to support a finding that Luz was psychologically incapacitated. His evidence fell short of
establishing his assertion that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological
defect which deprived her of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities.
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG claims that the same
were only given persuasive value and were not controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of marriage.
Further, the decision was based on grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights
and obligations due to outside factors other than psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article
36 of the Family Code. The OSG also raises the strong possibility of collusion between the parties as
shown by the events that took place after the issuance of the March 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG
wrote:
Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March 7, 1996 Decision
unmistakably show the collusion between the parties to obtain the reliefs pleaded. Among others,
respondents Retraction of Testimony was executed without the presence of counsel sometime in
1998, a few months before she married an American. This irregularity was even noticed by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
xxxx
The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became indispensable, in the
present recourse, when, in a whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE FACE executed a
"Retraction of Testimony" and a "Waiver of Custody" waiving custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a
minor, her son by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the Appellee, in the Court a quo, obdurately
denied the material allegations of the Appellants complaint and declared that it was the Appellant
who was psychologically incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the present
recourse, to the extent of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even praying for the
reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or a
modus vivendi between the parties, outlawed by the Family Code of the Philippines and the
Constitution. x x x
The Courts Ruling
The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition is bereft of merit.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. "Psychological incapacity," as a
ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental
not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to
live together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.7
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the
marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.8
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr., 9 the Court reiterated the well-settled
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina,10based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus:
xxxx
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.
xxxx
marriage. x x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x
x x.
xxxx
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.
xxxx
x x x.
xxxx
appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Roberts evidence failed to
establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the alleged
incapacity of Luz. He presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on her behavior.
Thus, his testimony was self-serving and had no serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically
identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that her
disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for
dating and receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the
parameters of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that
justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological
incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of
the errant spouse.11 Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or
be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Psychological incapacity refers only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.12
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves,
constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity. Robert argues
that the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of the psychological defect
that she was suffering within her person, which could be considered as nymphomania or "excessive
sex hunger." Other than his allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was adduced to
prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply
rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological incapacity embodied in Article 36. To stress,
Roberts testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of psychological incapacity.
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the Philippines, 13 the
Court ruled that the respondents act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with
a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait
already existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that the
respondents unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao
Medical Center, Cagayan deOro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological in capacity of Luz.
There was nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was
subjected to a psychological examination. The finding as to her psychological incapacity was based
entirely on hearsay and the self-serving information provided by Robert.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of
Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 14 the Court stated
that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence.
Thus:
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be given value since it
was not offered during the trial, and the Court has in no way of ascertaining the evidence considered
by the same tribunal.
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of the declaration of
nullity of marriage by the NAMT was not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes
of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of the Family Code, but the second paragraph of Canon
1095 which refers to those who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent
portions of the NAMT decision are as follows:
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the deposition of the
petitioner the respondent understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which she was
duly cited for Contempt of Court and premised on the substantially concordant testimonies of the
Witnesses, the woman Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action and
reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgement
for marriage intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested
by her emotional ambivalence x x x.
WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the Divine Name and having
in mind the Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby declares and
decrees the confirmation of the nullity decision rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance
for the Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N. 63/2000
on the ground provided by Canon 1095 par. 2CIC on the part of the woman Respondent but NOT
on the part of the man Petitioner for lack of evidence. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) 15
In Santos v. Santos,6 the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the
Family Code. It went out to state that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon
1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Najera v. Najera,17 the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether to consider an
annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the only ground recognized in our
law. In the said case, the NAMT decision was also based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095.
The Court ruled that it was not similar to, and only annulments under the third paragraph of, Canon
1095 should be considered. Elucidating, the Court wrote: Petitioners argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity
to consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that
the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5,
2004 when it resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of
Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that
petitioners motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded
to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June14, 1999, he did not appear before the
Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead
this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-
respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby
rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw
the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken marriages;
Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he
depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs and alcohol before
marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative,
peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now
lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his
drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked
her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name
and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby
proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the
nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-
appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-
appellants mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R.
Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994
wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing
and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the
opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the
latters testimonies, this Court is without any clue. True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,
et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as
follows:
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different
set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness. Furthermore, it is an
elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano
vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to
reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.[31]
Santos v. Santos18 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family
Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code
of Canon Law, which reads:
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions
causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who
suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the
Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead
this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-
respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby
rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name
and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby
proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the
nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
x x x.
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court
a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in
stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of
respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in the
original; Underscoring supplied)
Hence, Roberts reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the NAMT
was based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave
lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under Article 36 of the Family Code. A
cause of psychological nature similar to Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of
the Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos 19), which for ready reference reads:
xxxx
To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph of Canon
1095 should also be covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include. What
would prevent members of other religious groups from invoking their own interpretation of
psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be
legislating from the bench.1wphi1 As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,20 interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are given great
respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.
In Republic v. Galang,21 it was written that the Constitution set out a policy of protecting and
strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and the marriage was the foundation of the
family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim
of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity
of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and
serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold
the indissolubility of the marital tie.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient and
convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.
As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for legal separation. Hence,
this decision is without prejudice to an action for legal separation if a party would want to pursue such
proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot decree a legal separation because in such
proceedings, there are matters and consequences like custody and separation of properties that need
to be considered and settled.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
78303-MIN, dated November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are hereby
AFFIRMED, without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated Acting member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order No.
1910, dated January 12, 2015.
1Rollo, pp. 47-60, penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, and Associate Justice
Edgardo T. Lloren and Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring.
2 Id. at 76-77.
3 Id. at 48.
4Id. at 47 penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, and Associate Justice Edgardo T.
Lloren, with Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring.
5 Id. at 57-59.
6 Id. at 76.
7 Republic v. Garcia, G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014.
8 Ligarde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 315, 320321.
9 G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 33, 42-43.
10 335 Phil. 664, 676 678 (1997).
11 Republic v. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013, 668 SCRA 215, 221.
12 Republic v. Gracia, supra note 7.
15 Rollo, p. 83.
16 310 Phil. 21, 37 (1995).
17
609 Phil. 316, 336 (2009), also citing Santos v. Santos, supra.
18 Supra note 16.
19 Supra note 16.
21 G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 543-544.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES
R. AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of
discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against
petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J
alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center
Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No.
4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina
dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior
marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23
1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign
employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon
her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal
properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered
that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and
thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her
properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to
her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on account
of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and
ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect;
and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of
their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management and administration
of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and
unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for
lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with
another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145
SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95
Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage
contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another
woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage should
first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous
rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and
Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no

property in his possession is an issue that may be determined only after
trial on the merits. 1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS 2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September
11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days
from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap
v. CA 4 cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the
successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property corollary
with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution
of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of
the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied
by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of
nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the
properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's
prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents
of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has
jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which
the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an
adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied for lack of merit. 5
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain
real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People v. Mendoza, 7 contends that SP. No.
1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent
must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation
of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no
allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the
former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it
is from the beginning. 8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. 9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the
Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,
bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these
occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be
nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void
or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same
issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of
the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or
annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial
declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of
such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and applied

the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a
declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her deceased
husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during
the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to
the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or
a ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is
now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out
by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39.
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a

final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also
voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked

only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether
or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly
proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final

judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno,

however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to
produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final

judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include
the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice
Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if
the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be
made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial
declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other
members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed valid
until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno
remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might
result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in
the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as
collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there
should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare
for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other members affirmed.
Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that
point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption
that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the
defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista
added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of
the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a
unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof.
Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed
that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be

invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes

of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided
in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the

absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis
of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the
objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute

nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a
previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original
wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes

of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre
v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly
immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other
than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes
of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration
that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits
that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this
purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As
it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the
Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case
"solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been
such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the
clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as
an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary,
to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains
subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law
to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why
should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage,
other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is

the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." 20 In more explicit terms, the
Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial
are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy,
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so
defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso
jure and with no legal effect and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would
be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for
nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could
conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts,
and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be
contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to
be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where
the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the
petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is
untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely"
was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes
of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno
suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee
approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary,
petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery
of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower
court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the
issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to
separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private
respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as
the separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide
for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in
proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may
be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children,
the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by
operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in
bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated
as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage
shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will
simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary
civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the
effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to
the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom
the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the
incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed
no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated
February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I should like,
however, to put in a modest observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no judicial decree is required to
establish their nullity, except in the following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code; viz.:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in case a party thereto was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36,
Family Code), where an action or defense for the declaration of nullity prescribes ten (10) years after
the Family Code took effect (Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed unaffected
by the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, and
justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or
the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific instances where certain effects of a valid
marriage can still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are children of void
marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article 52
(due to failure of partition, delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following
the annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial
declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family
Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant per se. Neither the
conjugal, partnership of gain under the old regime nor the absolute community of property under the
new Code (absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead, their property relations shall be
governed by the co-ownership rules under either Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must
hasten to add as a personal view, however, that the exceptional effects on children of a void marriage
because of the psychological incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended to cover even
the personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages where
the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts and with little uncertainty, the term
"psychological incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of nullity is made
its interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses
themselves are concerned but also as regards third persons with whom the spouses deal.
# Separate Opinions
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I should like,
however, to put in a modest observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no judicial decree is required to
establish their nullity, except in the following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code; viz.:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in case a party thereto was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36,
Family Code), where an action or defense for the declaration of nullity prescribes ten (10) years after
the Family Code took effect (Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed unaffected
by the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, and
justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or
the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific instances where certain effects of a valid
marriage can still flow from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are children of void
marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article 52
(due to failure of partition, delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following
the annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial
declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family
Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant per se. Neither the
conjugal, partnership of gain under the old regime nor the absolute community of property under the
new Code (absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead, their property relations shall be
governed by the co-ownership rules under either Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must
hasten to add as a personal view, however, that the exceptional effects on children of a void marriage
because of the psychological incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended to cover even
the personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages where
the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts and with little uncertainty, the term
"psychological incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of nullity is made
its interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses
themselves are concerned but also as regards third persons with whom the spouses deal.
# Footnotes
1 Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 28-29.
2 L-28093, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315.
3 Annex "J", Rollo, pp. 62-67, Justice Jorge S. Imperial, ponente and Justices Luis A.
Javellana and Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurring.
4 L-40003, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 229.
5 Annex "M", Rollo, p. 80.
6 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).
7 95 Phil. 845 (1954).
8 CIVIL CODE, art. 80, par. 4; FAMILY CODE, arts. 35, par. 4 and 41.
9 Rollo, pp. 102 and 106.
10 See: Note 6 at p. 1036; Note 7 at p. 848.
11 L-23214, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 615, 620-621.

12 L-43905, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 525.
13 G.R. No. 53703, August 19, 1986, 143 SCRA 499.
14 FAMILY CODE, art. 39.
15 Id., art. 40. See also: arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148.
16 The Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
prepared the draft of the revision of Book I of the Civil Code of the Philippines. After
more than four years, the draft was turned over to the Civil Code Revision Committee of
the UP Law Center which reviewed and revised the same for more than three years.
17 August 23, 1986, pp. 4-7.
18 J. A.V. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

46 (1988).
19 Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 6, 11.
20 CONST., art. XV, sec. 2.
22 Id.
23 Id., art. 11.
24 See: Note 17, at p. 7.
25 Art. 50 (2).
26 In relation to Art. 50 (1) The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5)
of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against
Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No.
34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he
purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting
with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after
giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his
children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five
children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore,
he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument
with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of
the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was
disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the
withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to
him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children
with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva
Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license.
Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony
with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko
abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single
parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on
December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage
before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code,
said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which
is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of
marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At
the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet,
he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his
first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a
marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial
Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was
already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior
as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life.
A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life.
These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand
on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v.
Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement
benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique,
Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. 1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique
who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first,
that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and
second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning
attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet
Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that
chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6)
months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980
after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in
San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime
in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him
that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left
Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home.
He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in
England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No.
38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica
first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too
had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica
Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued
to refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not
report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her
daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given
birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished
to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life
in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from
leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so,
she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for
England. She further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present
whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July
17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker
Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. 4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed
a well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently
established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where
the following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a
well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead;
and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition
was a proper case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family
Code. 5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-
founded belief that his wife is already dead." 6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which
provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded, 7 the
following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise
has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death to enable the spouse present to remarry. 8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a
stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there
be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code. 9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the
absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. 11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he
had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent
spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing
spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up
the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant
had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of
his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the
parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of
securing information concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion
only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the
fact that she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique
after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many
millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire
the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London
and I went to London to look for her I could not find her (sic). 15 (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts
doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the
mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference
between London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could
mean one place in England, the port where his ship docked and where he found
Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay
City, Kalookan City, or Paraaque, would announce to friends and relatives, "We're
going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of destination does not appear
to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and
London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three
hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or
London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there which is in effect
what Nolasco says he did can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her
personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his
failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to
his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these
returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from
their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during
trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case,
admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to
respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to
show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and
not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983,
he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the
delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to
November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet
Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent
failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London
and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and
respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica
was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter
period by virtue of any contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one
of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on
marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial
court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it
impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care,
still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements
of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does
not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family
life. It is the foundation of the familyand an inviolable social institution whose nature,
limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which
the State bas the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most
fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the
following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article
149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution
which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations
are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of
the family shall be recognized or given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his
absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial
court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both
Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.
# Footnotes
1 Petition, p. 2; Record, p. 7.
2 Records, p. 13.
3 Records, p. 14.
4 Trial Court Decision, p. 4; Records, p. 39.
5 Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 13.
6 Id.
7 Pertinent portions of Article 83 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any other person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of the
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according
to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
8 See A. V. Sempio Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1988),
p. 48.
9 See generally Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937).

10 Petition, p. 11; Rollo; p. 15.
11 Memorandum for Respondent, p. 4.
12 25 Phil. 71 (1913).
13 25 Phil. at 73.
14 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 16.
15 Id., p. 8.
16 Court of Appeal's Decision, p. 6.
17 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 14.
18 See generally Ramos v. Sandiganbayan, 191 SCRA 671 (1990).
19 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 10.
20 35 Phil. 252 (1919).
21 35 Phil. at 254.
22 81 Phil. 461 (1948).
23 203 SCRA 750 (1991).
24 203 SCRA at 761.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an
estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta
Calisterio. Esm
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William
Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11
February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without
Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Esmsc
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico,
filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the
Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas,
Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage
between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and
thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator,
without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the
obligations of the estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds
had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than
eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the
surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the
decedent. Esmmis
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and
respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of
Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia; it
adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitioner and against the
oppositor whereby herein petitioner, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as the sole
heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos."[1]
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, formulating that-
"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code in the instant case
despite the fact that the controversy arose when the New Civil Code was the law in
force.
"2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-appellant and
the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the former to secure a
decree of the presumptive death of her first spouse.
"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at No. 32 Batangas
Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is the conjugal property of the oppositor-
appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. Esmso
"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a legal heir of
deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration should be granted
solely in favor of oppositor-appellant."[2]
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated
its now assailed decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring as follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City, belong to the conjugal partnership property with the concomitant
obligation of the partnership to pay the value of the land to Teodorico's estate as of the
time of the taking;
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is entitled to one half of her
husband's estate, and Teodorico's sister, herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her
children, to the other half; Msesm
"(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of Marietta E. Calisterio to
act as administrator of Teodorico's estate, and if so found competent and willing, that
she be appointed as such; otherwise, to determine who among the deceased's next of
kin is competent and willing to become the administrator of the estate."[3]
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, prompting
her to interpose the present appeal. Petitioner asseverates:
"It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and
setting aside the decision of the trial court is not in accord with the law or with the
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court."[4]
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between the deceased
Teodorico and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving
spouse. Exsm
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May
1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on
03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code[5] itself limited its retroactive governance only to
cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil Code
which provides: Kyle
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according
to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph
(2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the
three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee
spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. [6] Bad faith imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of the nature of
fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.[7] The Court does not find
these circumstances to be here extant. Kycalr
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary[8] as long as the prescribed
period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by
the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent
court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second
marriage. Calrky
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of
the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is
danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of
disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee
for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41[9], in relation to Article 40,[10] of the
Family Code. Mesm
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William
Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a
second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the
absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate
another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with
the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one portion
going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The
successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate [11] of the deceased,
concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being
entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation
in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in
their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in
representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The
appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its judgment,
successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is
invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother. Slx
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is AFFIRMED
except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof that the children of
petitioner are likewise entitled, along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is
hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to
the exclusion of her own children. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 45.

[2] Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[3] Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[4] Rollo, p. 15.
[5] Article 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

[6] The good faith or bad faith of the other contracting party to the subsequent marriage is not all that
consequential (See Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177).

[7] Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 557.
[8]
Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.
[9]Article 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the civil code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
[10] Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
[11]
First deducting to her favor her one-half share of the conjugal property.
SECOND DIVISION
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. November 29, 2005
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3,
convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion
of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P.
MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the
said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein
complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P.
MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].
CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before
Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal. [4] He met
the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in
Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer
Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her.
Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo
succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her
that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was
assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were
married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio
City, Branch 61.[5] It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was single.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts,
they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel
started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless,
and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.[6] Sometime in January 2001,
Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics
Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured
an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.[7] She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she
learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows. [8]
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest
Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous
marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in
order until this one time when he noticed that she had a love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned her.
Eduardo further testified that he declared he was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to
seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened
to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned.
He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina
believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more
than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina
Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit. [9]
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his first
marriage had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate
him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,[10] the trial court further
ruled that even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the
latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy
because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious
intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest
belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by
malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to
have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the
New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v.
Pealosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.[12]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos defense of good faith and
reliance on the Courts ruling in United States v. Enriquez[13] were misplaced; what is applicable is Article
41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court
in Republic v. Nolasco,[14] the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code,
there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the
present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not
be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the
private complainants knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an
offense against the State and not just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was
erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to
the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel
could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaas
presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado
v. Tan[15] and Domingo v. Court of Appeals[16] to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31,
2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said
Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD
UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41
OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO
BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.[18]
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in
1996, Gaa had been absent for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was
presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the
Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be
presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule
on legal presumption of death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of
law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that
he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge
of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
presumptive death of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the
Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of
bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil
Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of
the Civil Code does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on
presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate
courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor
of the private complainant. The private complainant was a GRO before he married her, and even knew
that he was already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support.
He also pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioners
conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim,
the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[19]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legtimamente disuelto el

anterior, ser castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.[20] The phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal
Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which
provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of
presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy.[21]
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she
has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage
having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage
or subsequent marriage.[22] It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage.[23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage must be
entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony
by dolo.[24] On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy:
(1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second
marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have
juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled
in Domingo v. Court of Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the Family Code of the Philippines,
the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared
that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3)
fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act. [28] He explained that:
This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in
the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal
Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the
subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very
strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a
crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and well-
founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many years that have elapsed
since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her,
cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent
which is one of the essential elements of the crime. [29]
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony
by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when
the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony
by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. [30] Although the words with malice
do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word voluntary. [31]
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a felony
is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been
intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable
consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must
prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence. [34]
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and
an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.[35]
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.[36] The
prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the
effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance
of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private
complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975.
He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death
of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the
Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and
would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a
consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to
discharge his burden.
The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered on the proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of
the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of
bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution, the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the
interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its
severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. [37] The laws regulating civil
marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil
marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it
enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an
approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching
nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to
innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure
the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death
of the absent spouse[38] after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the
requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as
proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death
of the first spouse. Indeed, men readily believe what they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old jurists.
To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be
dead would make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily
capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals. [39] Only with
such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.[40] Thus, Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal
belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance,[41] namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy
is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which
is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the
vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and
his existence has not been known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial
declaration.[42] However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on
presumptive death, reads:
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the
reappearance of the absent spouse.[43]
With the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the period of seven years under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration
of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse,[45] without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance
of the absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:[46]
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four
consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances
stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike
the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose
the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.
The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40,
of the Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the
spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with
bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities
on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes of the
marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the
spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage,
however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.[48] In In Re Szatraw,[49] the Court declared that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven
years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality
or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard from in
seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because
he or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the
lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste
its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act. [50] The Court also took
note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made
in collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the Court declared that the words proper
proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such
as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate
of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,[52] the Court rejected the contention of the
petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the
presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings
in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that the provision of Article 349 or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the
proper proceedings is erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined that such
provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first
spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent
marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true.[53] A second marriage is bigamous
only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not
present.[54] Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require
judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second
marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even
if it be annullable, should not give rise to bigamy. [55] Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand,
was of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she
contracts a second marriage.[56]
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where
a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage
only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being
charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.[57] Such judgment is proof of the good faith of
the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As
explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the
present spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse
in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of
the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary
proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the latters reappearance. This provision is intended to
protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the
Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses
presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second
marriage is already established.[58]
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote
that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for
purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will
suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp
of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x should be disregarded because of Article
83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy. [59]
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal
Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial
declaration of presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement
of his estate.[60] Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous
even if done in good faith.[61] Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of the
ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have
been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, which requires a summary hearing for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry.
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same
Code.[62]
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral
damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be
awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of
them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v.
Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner
maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she
adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in
those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral
damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling
in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi indedublamente porque el
articulo 2219 del Cdigo Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los
delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin
incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal
para adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.[64]
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law.
The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act or omission.[65] An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the
following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly
sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third,
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[66]
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated
in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No.
3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the
action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved
party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise,
there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219 [67] and analogous
cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or
resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.) [68]
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in
which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219
in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This provision
contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones
duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty
and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in
bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[69]
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. [70] If the provision does not provide a remedy
for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be
proper. Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. On the other hand, Article 21 provides that
any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision
is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove
for specifically in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting
in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends
upon the circumstances of each case.[71]
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He
assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant
where he and his parents made the same assurance that he was single. Thus, the private complainant
agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She
lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was
her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private
complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners chicanery and heartless
deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day,
he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and
support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation,
being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband. [72]
The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after
his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to
the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages.
Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,[73] the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries,
damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor
is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956).
But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent,
recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they
consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery
Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local
24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here
the defendants conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously
wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff,
and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory
but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v
Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendants
bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and
ashamed to go out but couldnt sleep but couldnt eat, had terrific headaches and lost quite
a lot of weight. No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jurys reasonable
allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37
N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.[74] 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and
subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not
barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent
her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:[75]
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which,

in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral,
but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so
inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act.
Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892,
9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the defendant that he
was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave
her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that she had
unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him
would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her
damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise to give
the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to assume
and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for
such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and
Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendants misrepresentation. The
criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental
results of the defendants fraud for which damages may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage
relation have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114
N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom
v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A.
411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the circumstances
are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was
induced solely by the defendants misrepresentation, and that she does not base her
cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the
enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily
become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v.
Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958. [76]
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for
moral damages to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGA
On leave
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.
and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, concurring; rollo, pp. 28-41.
[2] Penned by Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4] Exhibit B, records, p. 7.
[5] Exhibit A, id. at 6.
[6] TSN, April 23, 2002, p. 15.
[7] Exhibit B, records, p. 7.
[8] TSN, April 23, 2002, p. 15.
[9] Records, pp. 111-116.
[10] 58 Phil. 817 (1933).
[11] 1 Phil. 109 (1902).
[12] G.R. No. 111656, March 20, 1996, 255 SCRA 202.
[13] 32 Phil 202 (1915).
[14] G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.
[15] G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 122.
[16] G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993, 226 SCRA 572.
[17] Rollo, p. 41.
[18] Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[19] Supra, at note 14.
[20] CUELLO CALON, DERECHO PENAL REFORMADO, VOL. V, 627.
[21] AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. III, 497 (1988 ed.) (emphasis supplied).
[22]
Id. at 634.
[23]
People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 247 (1935).
[24]
Tres son los elementos esenciales del mismo; el vinculo matrimonial anterior, la celebracin de nuevo
matrimonio antes de la disolucin de ese vinculo anterior, y por ultimo, la intencin fraudulenta, que
constituye la criminalidad misma del acto. Este ultimo elemento no lo consigna el articulo, por hallarse
indudablemente embebido en ese principio anterior a todos los Codigos, e inscrito en el frontispicio del
nuestro (Art. I.), que donde no hay voluntad, no hay delito. xxx (CODIGO PENAL REFORMADO,
TOMO 5, 560) Groizard is of the view that bigamy may be committed by culpa. (id. at 558).
[25] DERECHO PENAL REFORMADO, VOL. 1, 629-630.
[28] ALBERT, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 819 (1932 ed.).
[29] Id.
[30] L.B. REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, BOOK ONE, 37 (13th ed. 1993).
[31] United States v. Pealosa, 1 Phil. 109.
[32] WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME 1, 302.
[33] People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d. 798; 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
[34] WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. 1, 203.
[35] Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111656, March 20, 1996, 255 SCRA 202.
[36] Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 747.
[37] People v. Bitdu, supra, at note 10.
[38] Geisselman v. Geisselman, 134 Md. 453, 107 A. 185 (1919).
[39] WHARTON CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. 2, 2377 (12th ed., 1932).
[40] Id.
[41] Id.
[42] TOLENTINO, THE NEW CIVIL CODE, VOL. I, 690.
[43] Emphasis supplied.
[44] The Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) took effect on August 4, 1988.
[45] Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996, 259 SCRA 129.
[46]
G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 201.
[47] 64 Phil. 179 (1937).
[48] Id. at 83.
[49] 81 Phil. 461 (1948).
[50] Id. at 463.
[51] 98 Phil. 574 (1956).
[52] 107 Phil. 381 (1960).
[53] AQUINO, REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. III, 490.
[54] Id. at 497.
[55] PADILLA, COMMENTS ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. IV, 717-718.
[56] THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 1981 ED., VOL. II, 906.
[57]
Republic v. Nolasco, supra, at note 19.
[58] HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE, 48-49.
[59] THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED, 62-63 (1992 ed.).
[60] REGALADO, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS, 633 (1st ed., 2000), citing Lukban v.
Republic, supra.
[61] Id. citing People v. Reyes, CA-G.R. No. 12107-R, June 30, 1955, and People v. Malana, CA-G.R.
No. 5347, January 30, 1940.

[62] SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 358.
[63] CA-G.R. No. 22573-R, April 23, 1959.
[64] Article 2217, Civil Code.
[65] Francisco v. Ferrer, Jr., G.R. No. 142029, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 261.
[66] Id. at 266.
[67] TOLENTINO, NEW CIVIL CODE, VOL. II, 658, citing People v. Plaza, 52 O.G. 6609.
[68]
Id.
[69] Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16.
[70] Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989,
176 SCRA 778.

[71] Id.
[72] Leventhal v. Liberman, 186 N.E. 675 (1933).
[73] 135 A.2d 657 (1957).
[74] Id. at 662.
[75] Id. at 611-612.
[76] 164 N.E. 609 (1929).
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 159614

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF TINGA, and
APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION) CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
and ALAN B. ALEGRO,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
December 9, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan,
Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton.
In an Order[1] dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for hearing on May 30, 2001 at 8:30
a.m. and directed that a copy of the said order be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Samar, and
that a copy be posted in the courts bulletin board for at least three weeks before the next scheduled
hearing. The court also directed that copies of the order be served on the Solicitor General, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan, through counsel, and that copies be sent to Lea by registered
mail. Alan complied with all the foregoing jurisdictional requirements. [2]
On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss[3] the petition, which was, however, denied by the court for failure to
comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. [4]
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in
Catbalogan, Samar.[5] He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and
he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single
person, it would be better for her to go back to her parents.[6] Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when
he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the
day, Lea was nowhere to be found.[7] Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents house in Bliss,
Sto. Nio, Catbalogan, Samar.[8] However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the house of Leas
parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was not there. He also went to the house of
Leas friend, Janeth Bautista, at Barangay Canlapwas, but he was informed by Janettes brother-in-law,
Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth had left for Manila.[9]When Alan went back to the house of his parents-in-
law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their house but that she left without
notice.[10] Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him locate his
wife. He also inquired from his friends of Leas whereabouts but to no avail.[11]
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to
leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan
agreed.[12] However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a
house in Navotas where Janeth, Leas friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told
him that she had not seen her.[13] He failed to find out Leas whereabouts despite his repeated talks with
Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the
malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed. [14]
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local police station. [15] The police
authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. [16] Alan also reported Leas disappearance to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001.[17]
Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared that on February
14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by his house and he told Alan that she did
not. Alan also told him that Lea had disappeared. He had not seen Lea in the barangay ever
since.[18] Leas father, who was his compadre and the owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not
know where Lea was.[19]
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor
General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioners absent spouse

ROSALIA JULATON is hereby declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of the
petitioners subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absent spouse.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered judgment on August 4,
2003, affirming the decision of the RTC.[21] The CA cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco.[22]
The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CAs decision alleging that respondent Alan B.
Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead.[23] It averred that
the respondent failed to exercise reasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even
admitted that Leas father told him on February 14, 1995 that Lea had been to their house but left without
notice. The OSG pointed out that the respondent reported his wifes disappearance to the local police
and also to the NBI only after the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The petitioner avers
that, as gleaned from the evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and locate Lea. Finally,
the petitioner averred:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of ones spouse, the degree of due diligence set
by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a
missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of
the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well
that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who
cannot have their marriages x x x declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary nature
of its proceedings.
It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social
institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. For respondents failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is
already
dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing
wife, the petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the
trial court and the Honorable Court of Appeals.[24]
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:

marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
reappearance of the absent spouse.[25]
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon
writes that es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.[26]
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved
by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the
inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the
character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the
conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize
their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,[27] competence evidence on the ultimate question
of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of
the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by present spouse.[28]
Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the present spouse that
the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco,[29] the Court warned against collusion
between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal
means. It is also the maxim that men readily believe what they wish to be true.
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The
respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom
he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent
admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law on February 14, 1995, his father-in-
law told him that Lea had just been there but that she left without notice.
The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he chided her for coming
home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for her to go
home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and
never returned. Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode
because of her resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month after their
marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law
regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility
of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Leas whereabouts considering
that Leas father was the owner of Radio DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea,
but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the
RTC.
In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-
founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already
dead.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondents petition.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
[1] Records, p. 1.
[2] Exhibits C to H and H-1, folder of exhibits, pp. 10-21.
[3] Records, pp. 3-6.
[4] Id. at 9.
[5] Exhibit A, folder of exhibits, p. 5.
[6] TSN, 20 September 2001, p. 6.
[7] Id. at 9.
[8]
Id. at 7.
[9] TSN, 20 September 2001, p. 12.
[10] Id. at 16.
[11] Id. at 13-15.
[12] Id. at 16.
[13] Id. at 17-19.
[14] Id. at 20-21.
[15] Exhibits I and I-1, folder of exhibits, p. 22.
[16] Exhibit J, Id. at 23.
[17] Exhibit K, Id. at 24.
[18] TSN, November 5, 2001, pp. 4-6.
[19]
Id. at 8.
[20] Records, pp. 23-24.
[21] Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz
and Noel G. Tijam, concurring; rollo, pp. 33-40.

[22]
G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.
[23] Rollo, p. 17.
[24] Id. at 26-28.
[25] Emphases supplied.
[26] Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 633.
[27] Tyrrell v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 115 A.L.R., 392 (1937), citing In re: Hurlburts
Estate,35 L.R.A. 794 68 Vt.366, 35 A.77.

[28] Gall v. Gall, 69 Sickels 109, 21 NE 106 (1889).
[29] Supra, note 19.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution dated September 28,
20043 reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for
review on certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in
Barcelona, Sorsogon.6
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sorsogon a petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication of
the Notice of Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby
declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon. 10
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960
and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died. 11
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,00012 by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits 13 which was also granted
by the SSS on April 6, 1998.14
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa)
contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed
that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother
Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for
Bailons medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in
support of her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit
dated February 13, 199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who
cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the
necessary court action to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally
know that Alice is "still very much alive."16
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian
of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailons death, 17 he
further attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailons beneficiaries
before the SSS.20
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the
cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the
refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the
denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during
his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailons
beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under the law, after the amount
erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by misrepresentation in
declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.
xxxx
x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead," did not
become final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
xxxx
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith,
and is the deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.
xxxx
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his
marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of
reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz
[sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of. 21 (Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000, 22 advised respondent that
as Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses, she should return
the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,23 the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of
her monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her
marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latters marriage with Alice was still
subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become
final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the validity of the order. It thus requested
respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly pension she
had received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS
dated October 12, 1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 1999 25 to the SSC, she
reiterated her request for the release of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon
was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and
subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000, 26 maintained the denial of her
claim for and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she
was not deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her
entitlement to monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount
of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings
"forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any amount during Bailons wake." 28
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondents petition, and the parties filed their respective Position
Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch
attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by
Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have
easily located her, she having stayed at her parents residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she
found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their
separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void
and, therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows,
quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the
legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00
representing the death benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999 as
well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising
from the demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as
Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this
Commission of its compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable
conclusion that the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of
Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member
represented in bad faith. This Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in
its Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,32revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona,
Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and by
exerting fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the deceased
member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is void,
considering that the first marriage on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled,
invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties thereto. x x x as determined
through the investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not
Alice Diaz Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law wife of
the deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary, to the
latters death benefit. x x x
xxxx
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary
beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she
received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle
of solutio indebiti x x x
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and burial
of Clemente Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her by the
SSS as funeral benefit.33(Underscoring supplied)
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration34 having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a
petition for review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June
4, 2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due
her. Held the CA:
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of the
then CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more
importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings
of the RTC, and on its own, declare the latters decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar import,
can respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the first marriage subsisting and the second
marriage null and void?
xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as
the finding that "the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the
second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the
competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and
upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere
does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare the second
marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the decision of the
RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular
courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due
credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the
decision of the RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of fair
play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not given
ample opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.
xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil
Registry is no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore
as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the latters
death. Neither is there a second marriage to terminate because the second marriage was likewise
dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance
with the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the
respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare
the second marriage null and void.36(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration 37 which were both denied for
lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS present petition for review on certiorari38 anchored on the following grounds:
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OF JURISDICTION.39
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on the
prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to
determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant
to Section 540 of the Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due
process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.
The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no
moment to the present controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of the
SSCs finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue
of which Alice has a better right to the death benefits." 41
The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and
contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less
reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the
December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same,
making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alices marriage on the one hand
and the invalidity of Bailon and respondents marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court. The
law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of
its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988
of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law
in effect at the time of their celebration. 42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and
void by a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime
of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or
contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under
any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It
follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage. 44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years 45 when
Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
requirement then for purposes of remarriage.46
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the
validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second
marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first
marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was
contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of
the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life of the
first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.47 (Underscoring
supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus
Article 42 thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact
of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of
the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. 49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses
in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded
as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by

judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of
dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in
a direct action for annulment.52(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed
dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons
involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore,
the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must
be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse," as expressly provided
in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding. 54 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio.56
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and respondents
marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered
unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)

Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On Official Leave.
1Penned by Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Justices Mariano C.
del Castillo and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
2 CA rollo, pp. 147-157.
3 Id. at 195.
4 Id. at 47-55.
5 Id. at 56.
6 SSC records, p. 112.

7
Id. at 65-67.
8 CA rollo, pp. 6-9.
9 Id. at 8-9.

11 CA rollo, p. 11.

13 Ibid.
14 Id. at 96-97.
15 Id. at 55.
16 Ibid.
17 Id. at 109.
18 Id. at 110.
19Herminia Bailon-Argente, Cecilia Bailon-Yap, Norma Bailon-Chavez, Roselyn Bailon-

Ladesma, Susan J. Bailon, Charito Bailon-Soriano, and Clemente J. Bailon, Jr.
20 SSC records, pp. 113-120.
21 Id. at 135-136.
22 Id. at 137.
23 Id. at 124.
24 Id. at 125.
25 Id. at 129-130.
26 Id. at 134.
27 CA rollo, pp. 12-14.
29 CA rollo, pp. 15-19.
30 Id. at 144.
31 Rollo, pp. 56-57.
32 Pertinent portions of the Memorandum provide:
xxxx
1. Based on the interview conducted by our Account Officer, Mr. Rolando G. Gomez to
[sic] the relatives of Alice (not Aliz) Diaz namely: Rogelio Del Prado and Emelita Diaz at
Poblacion Sur, Barcelona, Sorsogon they alleged that subject deceased member and
Alice live [sic] as husband and wife for only a year. Alice never left Barcelona, Sorsogon
since their separation and is not dependent for support nor received support from the
deceased member. x x x
33
Rollo, pp. 53-56.
34
SSC records, pp. 172-174.
35
CA rollo, pp. 2-5.
36 Rollo, pp. 41-44.
37 CA rollo, pp. 161-170.

38 Rollo, pp. 10-34.
39 Id. at 22.
40 SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to
coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto,
shall be cognizable by the Commission, and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard
by the Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing officers duly authorized by the
Commission and decided within the mandatory period of twenty (20) days after the submission
of the evidence. The filing, determination and settlement of disputes shall be governed by the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission.
xxxx
41 Rollo, p. 28.
42Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it
thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
43 Article 41 of the Family Code now provides:
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
44 Armas v. Calisterio, 386 Phil. 402, 409 (2000).
45 CA rollo, p. 8.
46 Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179, 183 (1937).
47I A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 282
(1999 ed.). (Citations omitted)
48Art. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of
the marriage:
xxxx
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former husband or
wife believed to be dead was in fact living and the marriage with such former husband
or wife was then in force;
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Art. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and
within the periods as follows:
xxxx
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been
absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during
the lifetime of the other;
xxxx
50 Ibid.
51 Id. at 285-286.

53 150 Phil. 204 (1972).
54 Id. at 213.
55 Nial v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 673 (2000). (Citations omitted)
56 Id. at 674.
THIRD DIVISION
ANGELITA VALDEZ, G.R. No. 180863

Petitioner,
Present:
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus -
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:

September 8, 2009
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12, 2007
dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdezs petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband,
Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971,
petitioner gave birth to the spouses only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued
constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972,
Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to return but, finally, in May
1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents home in Bancay 1 st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years
passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1 st. He and petitioner
talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed a document to that effect. [1] That
was the last time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didnt hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts
or even if he was alive or not.[2]
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20,
1985.[3] Subsequently, however, Virgilios application for naturalization filed with the United States
Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioners marriage to Sofio was
subsisting.[4] Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac
seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision[5] on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit.
The RTC held that Angelita was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio
Polborosa was already dead. It said that under Article 41 of the Family Code, the present spouse is
burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and that she has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. This
belief, the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
The RTC found that, by petitioners own admission, she did not try to find her husband anymore
in light of their mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioners daughter testified that her
mother prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also said there is a strong possibility that
Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have been only 61 years old by then, and people who have
reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in health and spirits, and, even assuming as true
petitioners testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is no evidence that he
continues to drink and smoke until now.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[6] She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in
this case and not the Family Code since petitioners marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11,
1971, long before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a vested
right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the Family Code should not be
applied against her because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on declaration of
absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be found, was not expressly repealed by the
Family Code. To apply the stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had
acquired under the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10, 2007. [7]
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and Motion for
Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion,[8] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended that
the Court set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio presumptively
dead. The OSG argues that the requirement of well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code
is not applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner could not be expected to comply with this
requirement because it was not yet in existence during her marriage to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The
OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner already acquired a vested
right as to the validity of her marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio under
the Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of Sofios death, the OSG posits, could not be
affected by the obligations created under the Family Code.[9]
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by Article 41 of the
Family Code.[10] Title XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly repealed by
the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code provides that its provisions shall not be
retroactively applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. [11]
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must state that
we are denying the Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to
this Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one
hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; on the other
hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct application
of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts. [12]
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to
prove a well-founded belief that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family
Code, to wit:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January
11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of
if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390
and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared
null and void by a competent court.
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-
five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may
be opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of
civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does
not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.[13]
Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings
independent of the settlement of the absentees estate.
In re Szatraw[14] is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish national
in 1937. They lived together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the husband, on
the pretext of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with their child and never returned. After
inquiring from friends, petitioner found that her husband went to Shanghai, China. However, friends
who came from Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen there. In 1948, petitioner filed a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband arguing that since the latter had been
absent for more than seven years and she had not heard any news from him and about her child, she
believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it
does not appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had
acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the
latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead
after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been
established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an
action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision
to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the
presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or
special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the
final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact
(Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not pray for a declaration that
the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed
dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at
securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be
granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not
improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by
law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a
prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the
subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter
involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide
finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a
party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise
or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or
status determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the judgment
on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon
the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack,
except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a
judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard
from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof,
cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be
made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial
decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in
seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary
period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and
remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. [15]
In Lukban v. Republic,[16] petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco

Chuidian on December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after a
violent quarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent search, inquiries from his parents
and friends, and search in his last known address, proved futile. Believing her husband was already
dead since he had been absent for more than twenty years, petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a
declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and has no legal
impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the antecedents in Gue v.
Republic[17]are similar to Szatraw. On January 5, 1946, Angelina Gues husband left Manila where they
were residing and went to Shanghai, China. From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not written
to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his whereabouts. Despite her efforts and diligence,
she failed to locate him. After 11 years, she asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of
death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial
declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not
authorized by law.[18]
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is
established by law[19] and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is
presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence,[20] Sofio is to be presumed dead starting
October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to

petitioners capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of well-founded belief is not
required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family
Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in
1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit well-
founded belief will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the
time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that
the Family Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofios death
can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law.
However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was
celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 33.

[2] Id. at 5-6.
[3] Id. at 10.
[4] Id. at 11.
[5] Penned by Judge Jose S. Vallo, id. at 35-39.
[6] Rollo, pp. 40-55.

[7] Id. at 56-61.
[8] Id. at 86-98.
[9] Id. at 92-93.
[10] Id. at 94.
[11] Id. at 96.
[12] Philippine Veterans Bank v. Monillas, G.R. No. 167098, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 251. (Citations
omitted.)
[13] Jones v. Hortigela, 64 Phil. 179, 183 (1937).
[14]
In re Szatraw, 81 Phil. 461 (1948).
[15]
Id. at 462-463. (Emphasis supplied.)
[16] 98 Phil. 574 (1956).
[17] 107 Phil. 381 (1960).
[18] Id. at 386.
[19] In re Szatraw, supra note 14.
[20] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 5th ed., p. 738.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an
action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person
declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals'
resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a
petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15,
2007.1 Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.2chanrobleslaw
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina
rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June
18, 1980.3 After a year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell
business.4chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper. 5 As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her
to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's
insistence, he allowed her to work abroad.7 She allegedly applied in an employment agency in
Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from
again.8chanrobleslaw
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. 9 He went to Celerina's parents in
Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts. 10 He also inquired
about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information. 11chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since
Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.12chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she
could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies.13chanrobleslaw
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment 14 before the Court of
Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived
her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the
court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. 15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in
Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. 16 This residence had been her and
Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a result of Ricardo's
misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring
her presumptively dead.18chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic
helper abroad.20 Neither did she go to an employment agency in February 1995. 21 She also claimed
that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their
conjugal dwelling in Quezon City.22 It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit
with another woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her
contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition. 24chanrobleslaw
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had
never been published in a newspaper. 25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.26chanrobleslaw
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition
for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. 27 According to the Court of Appeals,
the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance
in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code. 28chanrobleslaw
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated November 28,
2008.29 The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated March 5,
2009.30chanrobleslaw
Hence, this petition was filed.
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring
presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is
appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of
presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's death.31 She added that it would
be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place. 32 She
insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death
is obtained fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code
would not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment
declaring her presumptive death.34chanrobleslaw
In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy
because it cannot be availed when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always file an
affidavit of reappearance to terminate the subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of
Appeals' ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code is the
appropriate remedy.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution
has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate
remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner."36chanrobleslaw
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. 37 This court
defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic
when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant
commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from presenting
all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy. 39 (Emphasis supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo
deliberately made false allegations in the court with respect to her residence. 40 Ricardo also falsely
claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of
Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general circulation. 41 Celerina claimed that because of these, she
was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively
dead.42chanrobleslaw
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death
were false.43 Celerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's
petition.44chanrobleslaw
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with
the Court of Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45 on November 17, 2008. This was less than two
years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her
discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period
allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is the
period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.46chanrobleslaw
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the
fraud perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions,
presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years,
coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that
constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another
marriage.47chanrobleslaw
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the
presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her
marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent
marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances
of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the
subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will
cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the
Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's
reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if
the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent
spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming,
such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This
presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. 48 The
second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. 49 The burden of proof to show that the first
marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second
marriage.50chanrobleslaw
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the
subsequent marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere
reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent
marriage were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
[filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]"53 "Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded
as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by
law."54chanrobleslaw
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the
second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was
absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage
may be considered valid when the following are present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse. 55
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of
presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the spouse is already dead.
The first marriage will not be considered as. validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid
termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. 57 Only a
subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an
action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage still applies.58chanrobleslaw
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her
presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be
considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the
circumstances lack the element of "well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is
essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply. 59chanrobleslaw
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the
subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from
availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage
may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and
obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage." 60chanrobleslaw
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the
subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of
the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is
valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property
relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages." 61 If it is terminated
by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination
shall still be considered legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense
against prosecution for bigamy.63chanrobleslaw
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the
effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the prospect
of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or wife."64 This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be
benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, 65 this remedy is not
available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the
effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an
affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of
judgment will, therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of
extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Perlas-Bernabe,* JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
* Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1829 dated October 8, 2014.
1Rollo, pp. 23, 27-29, 35-36.
2 Id. at 62.
3 Id. at 27.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6
Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 28.
10 Id. at 27-28.
11 Id. at 28.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 18.
14 Id. at 37-45.
15 Id. at 40.
16 Id. at 40, 42.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 40-41.
19 Id. at 42.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 43.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 41.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 23.
28 Id. at 23-24.
29 Id. at 25.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 16.
32
Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 16-17.
35 Id. at 57-67.
37
RULES OF COURT, Rule 47, Sec. 2.
38Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, 374 Phil. 879 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
39 Id. at 890.
40Rollo, pp. 39^0.
41 Id. at 39.
42 Id. at 40-41.
43 Id. at 41-43.
44 Id. at 41.
45 Id. at 37-45.
47 Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
spouse.
48Seealso A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND
JURISPRUDENCE, vol. 1, 282 (2004).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 520 Phil. 249 (2006) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
52The applicable law in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon was the Civil Code, although there
was a short discussion on the relevant Family Code provisions.
53 Id. at 264.
54Id., citing A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND
JURISPRUDENCE, vol. 1, 285-286 (1999); See also A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, vol. 1, 285-286 (2004).
55Family CODE, art. 41. (A declaration of presumptive death must be based on good faith and on a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead.)
58 FAMILY CODE, Art. 35(4) and 41; Rev. Pen. Code, art. 349.
59See A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND
60 520 Phil. 249, 264 (2006) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division], citing A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, vol. 1, 282 (1999); See
also A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND
JURISPRUDENCE vol. 1, 284 (2004).
61A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE: OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND
62 FAMILY CODE, art. 43
The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered
legitimate, and their custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the court in a proper
proceeding. . .
63
Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 833-835, 836-837 (2005) (Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
64See A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (March 4, 2003)
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND

ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
....
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife, (n)
....
See also Ablaza v. Republic, G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 27, 34 [Per J. Bersamin,
Third Division] wherein this court explained that:
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on
August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to
proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. (Emphasis in the original)
The subsequent marriage in this case took place in 2008.
65(In Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 577 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third
Division], this court ruled that a real party in interest may file an action to nullify a marriage.)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 210929 July 29, 2015

vs.
EDNA ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA, Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
Edna Orcelino-Villanueva (Edna) was a domestic helper based in Singapore. In 1993, she came
home immediately after she heard news from her children that her husband, Romeo L. Villanueva
(Romeo), left their conjugal dwelling. She came home, leaving her work, for the purpose of looking for
her husband and taking care of her children. She had limited resources for her search.
For 15 or 16 years, she endured the absence of her husband. Within those long years, whether in
good times or bad, she never heard from him. He did not discharge any of his duties as husband.
In ruling against her and concluding that she did not search hard enough for Romeo, the majority fails
to appreciate several crucial facts:
First, Edna turned away from her livelihood, her modest means of subsistence, just to search for
Romeo.
Second, Edna did not only embark on a token search. She did not limit herself to her parents-in-law
and to common friends in Iligan City, the . place where she and Romeo were married. Edna went all
the way to Romeo's birthplace, which was Escalante, Negros Oriental. There, she inquired from
Romeo's relatives as to his whereabouts.
Third, 15 or 16 years had passed since Edna was told that Romeo had gone missing when she filed
her Petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead. If Edna merely intended to use a petition for
declaration of presumptive death as a convenient means for circumventing laws that protect the
institution of marriage, it is astounding that she would await the inconvenience of 15 or 16 years.
Edna established a well-founded belief that her husband, Romeo, is already dead.
I vote to sustain the assailed October 18, 2013 Decision 1 and January 8, 2014 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03768-MIN, affirming the October 8, 2009 Judgment 3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, declaring Romeo presumptively dead
pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
I reiterate the position I articulated in my dissent to Republic of the Philippines v. Cantor.4 I maintain
that a strict standard should not be used in evaluating the efforts made by a spouse to ascertain the
status and whereabouts of an absent spouse. The marital obligations provided for by the Family Code
require the continuing presence of each spouse. A spouse is well to suppose that this shall be
resolutely fulfilled by the other spouse. Failure to do so for the period established by law gives rise to
the presumption that the absent spouse is dead, thereby enabling the spouse present to remarry.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
spouse.
Article 41s requirement of a "well-grounded belief" calls for an inquiry into a spouses state of
mind.5 Otherwise abstract, ones state of mind can only be ascertained through overt acts. Article 41
requires this belief to be "well-grounded." It therefore requires nothing more than for a spouse to have
a "reasonable basis for holding to such belief."6 Article 41 relies on a basic and plain test: rationality.7
What is rational in each case depends on context. Rationality is not determined by the blanket
imposition of pre-conceived standards. Rather, it is better determined by an appreciation of a
persons unique circumstances.8
Moreover, all that Article 41 calls to sustain is a presumption. By definition, there is no need for
absolute certainty. A presumption is, by nature, favorable to a party and dispenses with the burden of
proving. Consequently, neither is there a need for conduct that establishes such a high degree of
cognizance that what is established is proof, and no longer a presumption:
In declaring a person presumptively dead, a court is called upon to sustain a presumption, it is not
called upon to conclude on verity or to establish actuality. In so doing, a court infers despite an
acknowledged uncertainty. Thus, to insist on such demanding and extracting evidence to "show
enough proof of a well-founded belief", is to insist on an inordinate and intemperate standard. 9
It is improper for the majority to insist upon the same "strict standard approach" 10 that was relied on in
Cantor and conclude that Ednas efforts "were not diligent and serious enough." 11 The majority fails to
appreciate several crucial facts in this case that define the limits of her situation.
Ednas lack of resources appears in the records. She only had the ability to present herself as
witness.
Concededly, Edna could have engaged in other effortsasking for the help of police officers, filing a
formal missing-person report, announcing Romeos absence in radio or television programsas
would show how painstakingly she endeavored to search for Romeo. Insisting on Edna to have also
made these efforts, however, is to insist that she act in an ideal manner. It takes her away from her
own reality and requires her to fulfill pre-conceived notions of what satisfies notice. It fails to
appreciate the merit of the lengths she actually went through to search for Romeo.
Unless Edna had the ability to gain access to radio or television programs with nationwide coverage
or ensure that her notices were posted in all precincts, then requiring this type of search would have
been futile and economically wasteful. If we are to lend truth to the concept of social justice, we have
to make judgments based on her context. To reiterate, she is one of the millions who had to go
abroad to earn a more prosperous life for herself and her children. She had to cut short her
employment to come home and make an honest search for her husband. To require her to squander
more time and money to reach media and the police would have been economically expensive for
her. The law should be interpreted in the context of realityand ours is different from Ednas.
Edna was an abandoned wife whose husband was missing for 15 or 16 years. Her search for Romeo
began more than two decades ago in a province in Mindanao, far removed from this nations capital.
She was an overseas Filipino worker, a domestic helper, who was compelled to return to the
Philippines to tend to a missing husband. Twenty-two years ago, when she embarked on her search,
she could not have been aided by the convenience of ready access to communication networks. To
go to her husbands birthplace and inquire from his relatives, she could not have merely boarded an
hour-long flight; she must have endured hours, even days at sea. It is in light of these human realities
that Ednas efforts must be appreciated.
This court must realize that insisting upon an ideal will never yield satisfactory results. A stringent
evaluation of a partys efforts made out of context will always reveal means through which a spouse
could have done more or walked the proverbial extra mile to ascertain his or her spouses
whereabouts. A reason could always be conceived for concluding that a spouse did not try hard
enough.
So, too, insisting on Ednas perceived shortcomings unjustly puts the blame on her and undermines
the shortcoming that Romeo himself committed. All marital obligations recognized in the Family Code
are predicated upon each spouses presence. The primordial marital obligation is "to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." 12 As I explained in my
dissent in Cantor:
The opinions of a recognized authority in civil law, Arturo M. Tolentino, are particularly enlightening:
Meaning of "Absent" Spouse. The provisions of this article are of American origin, and must be
construed in the light of American jurisprudence. An identical provision (except for the period) exists
in the California civil code (section 61); California jurisprudence should, therefore, prove enlightening.
It has been held in that jurisdiction that, as respects the validity of a husbands subsequent marriage,
a presumption as to the death of his first wife cannot be predicated upon an absence resulting from
his leaving or deserting her, as it is his duty to keep her advised as to his whereabouts. The spouse
who has been left or deserted is the one who is considered as the spouse present; such spouse is
not required to ascertain the whereabouts of the deserting spouse, and after the required number of
years of absence of the latter, the former may validly remarry.
Precisely, it is a deserting spouses failure to comply with what is reasonably expected of him/her and
to fulfil the responsibilities that are all but normal to a spouse which makes reasonable (i.e., well-
grounded) the belief that should he/she fail to manifest his/her presence within a statutorily
determined reasonable period, he/she must have been deceased. The law is of the confidence that
spouses will in fact "live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support" such that it is not the business of the law to assume any other circumstance than that a
spouse is deceased in case he/she becomes absent.13
It is Romeo who has been absent. In so doing, he is rightly considered to be no longer in a position to
perform his marital obligations to Edna. Having been absent for the statutorily prescribed period
despite his legal obligations as a married spouse, Romeo should be rightly considered presumptively
dead.
The majority burdened itself with ensuring that petitions for declaration of presumptive death are not
used as procedural shortcuts that undermine the institution of marriage. While this is a valid concern,
the majority goes to unnecessary lengths to discharge this burden. Article 41 of the Family Code
concedes that there is a degree of risk in presuming a spouse to be dead, as the absent spouse may,
in fact, be alive and well. Thus, Article 41 provides that declarations of presumptive death are "without
prejudice to the reappearance of the absent spouse." The state is thus not bereft of remedies.
Consistent with this, Article 42 of the Family Code provides for the automatic termination of the
subsequent marriage entered into by the present spouse should the absent spouse reappear: Art. 42.
The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab nitio.
of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. Moreover, in Santos v.
Santos,14 we recognized that in cases where a declaration of presumptive death was fraudulently
obtained, the subsequent marriage shall not only be terminated, but all other effects of the declaration
nullified by a successful petition for annulment of judgment:
....
affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. 15
The majority is gripped with the apprehension that a petition for declaration of presumptive death may
be availed of as a dangerous expedient. Nothing, in this case, sustains fear. A misplaced anxiety is all
that there is. As things stand, Edna has shown facts that warrant a declaration that Romeo is
presumptively dead. Proceeding from these merits, this Petition must be denied.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 03768-MIN, affirming the October 8, 2009 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10,
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, declaring Romeo L. Villanueva presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41
of the Family Code, must be affirmed.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
Footnotes
1Rollo, pp. 2735. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Edward B. Contreras and
concurred in by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren and Associate Justice Marie Christine
Azcarraga Jacob.
2
Id. at 3637.
3 Id. at 4849. The Judgment was penned by Judge Josefina Centiles Bacal.
4J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic of the Philippines v. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621,
December 10, 2013, 712 SCRA 1, 3553 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
5Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, 513 Phil. 391 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second
Division].
6J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic v. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013,
712 SCRA 1, 48 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Ponencia, p. 5.
11 Id. at 7.
13J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic v. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013,
712 SCRA 1, 5152 [Per J. Brion, En Banc], citing1 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,281282 (1990), citing People v. Glab,
13 App. (2d) 528, 57 Pac. (2d) 588 and Harrington Estate, 140 Cal. 244, 73 Pac. 1000; and
FAMILY CODE, art. 68.
14 G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.htm
l?file=/jurisprudence/20l4/october2014/187061.pdt> [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
15 Id. at 1-10.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JOSE B. SAREOGON, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge a
trial court''s declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of The Family Code of the
Philippines1(Family Code).2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assails the October 24, 2011 Decision4 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 04158-MIN dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of
the Philippines (Republic).
Factual Antecedents
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition 5 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz6 City-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie
S.7Sareogon (Netchie).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the Petition for initial hearing on April
16, 2009. It likewise directed the publication of said Order in a newspaper of general circulation in the
cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed
the Petition.9 Trial then followed.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991, 11 They later became
sweethearts and on August 10,1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall. 12 However,
they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as a seaman while
Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. 13 For three months, he did not receive any
communication from Netchie.14 He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts.15 While still abroad,
he tried to contact Netchie''s parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis
Occidental.16 He returned home after his contract expired.17 He then inquired from Netchie''s relatives
and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was. 18 Because of these,
he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. 19 He filed the Petition before the RTC so
he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose''s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareogon, and by Netchie''s aunt,
Consuelo Sande.21 These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband
and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for separate destinations
abroad.22 These two added that they had no information regarding Netchie''s
location.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision24 dated January 31,2011 in Spec. Proc. No. 045-08, the RTC held that Jose had
established by preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to the relief prayed for under Article 41
of the Family Code.25 The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason
enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead. 26 The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondent
presumptively dead for purposes of remarriage of petitioner.
SO ORDERED.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On April 19,2011, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the
judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari28, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
In its Decision29 of October 24, 2011, the CA held that the Republic used the wrong recourse by
instituting a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA perceived no
error at all in the RTC''s judgment granting Jose''s Petition for the declaration of the presumptive
death of his wife, Netchie. The CA thus held in effect that the Republic''s appeal sought to correct or
review the RTC''s alleged misappreciation of evidence which could not translate into excess or lack of
jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of discretion.30 The CA noted that the RTC properly caused the
publication of the Order setting the case for initial hearing. 31 The CA essentially ruled that, "[a] writ
of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower court''s evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an
appeal,"32 The CAthendisposed of the case in this wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Issues
The Republic filed the instant Petition34 raising the following issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ITS ASSAILED
DECISION BECAUSE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN

DISMISSING THE REPUBLIC''S PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, ON
THE GROUND THAT THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL THE RTC
DECISION, BECAUSE IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OR DECISIONS
ARE NOT APPEALABLE UNDER THE EXPRESS PROVISION OF
LAW.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE DO NOT

SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT''S ABSENT WIFE
X X X IS PROBABLY DEAD.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner''s Arguments
The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
proper remedy to challenge an RTC''s immediately final and executory Decision on a presumptive
death.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose''s alleged efforts in locating Netchie did not
engender or generate a well-founded belief that the latter is probably dead.37 It maintains that even as
Jose avowedly averred that he exerted efforts to locate Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the
assistance of the relevant government agencies like the Philippine National Police, the National
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration, the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, or the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. 38 It likewise
points out that Jose did not present any disinterested person to corroborate his allegations that the
latter was indeed missing and could not be found. 39 It also contends that Jose did not advert to
circumstances, events, occasions, or situations that would prove that he did in fact make a
comprehensive search for Netchie.40 The Republic makes the plea that courts should ever be vigilant
and wary about the propensity of some erring spouses in resorting to Article 41 of the Family Code for
the purpose of terminating their marriage.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert that he wanted to have Netchie
declared presumptively dead because he intends to get married again, an essential premise of Article
41 of the Family Code.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent''s Arguments
Jose counters that the CA properly dismissed the Republic''s Petition because the latter''s petition is
erected upon the ground that the CA did not correctly weigh or calibrate the evidence on record, or
assigned to the evidence its due worth, import or significance; and that such a ground does not avail
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.43 Jose also contends that the
Republic should have instead filed a motion for reconsideration44 of the RTC''s Decision of January
31, 2011, reasoning out that a motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
law. Jose furthermore submits that the RTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting his
petition because it even dutifully complied with the publication requirement.45 He moreover argues
that to sustain the present petition would allow the executive branch to unduly make inroads into
judicial territory.46 Finally, he insists that the trial court''s factual findings are entitled to great weight
and respect as these were arrived after due deliberation. 47chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Court''s Ruling
This Court finds the Republic''s petition meritorious.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to question the
RTC''s Decision in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,48 we held that the RTC''s Decision on a Petition for
declaration of presumptive death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately final and
executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a notice of appeal pertaining to such
judgment.49 Concurring in the result, Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban further therein
pointed out that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC Decision was to institute a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, and not a petition for review under Rule 45. 50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We expounded on this appellate procedure in Republic v. Tango:51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon,
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family
Code:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in
an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and
three of the same title. It states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court''s
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file
a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be
sure, even if the Court''s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs
and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum, x x x52 (Citation omitted; Underscoring supplied)
"In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the Decision of the C A, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court."53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In fact, in Republic v. Narceda,54 we held that the OSG availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a
notice of appeal under Rule 42 with the CA to question the RTCs Decision declaring the presumptive
death of Marina B. Narceda.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Above all, this Court''s ruling in Republic v. Cantor56 made it crystal clear that the OSG properly
availed of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the RTCs Order therein declaring Jerry
Cantor as presumptively dead.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Republic correctly availed of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court in assailing before the CA the aforesaid RTCs Decision.
The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with only upon a
showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead
We now proceed to determine whether the RTC properly granted Jose''s Petition. Article 41 of the
Family Code pertinently provides that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse. (83a)
In Republic v. Cantor,57 we further held that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in
Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee.58 (Underscoring supplied)
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case invites extended
discussion), the holding is that the -
mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack of news that such
absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the] general
presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the
premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the
additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief which can only be discharged upon
a due showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse''s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already
dead.
xxxx
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of
each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to
comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). 59 (Emphasis omitted; underscoring
supplied)
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose 1ms "well-founded belief that Netchie was already dead
upon the following grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie''s parents while he was still out of the country, but did not
reach them as they had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because when he returned home, he was
not able to obtain any information that Netchie was still alive from Netchie''s relatives and friends;
(3) Jose''s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence must be presumed dead, was
corroborated by Jose''s older brother, and by Netchie''s aunt, both of whom testified that he (Jose)
and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month and that after this, there had been
no information as to Netchie''s whereabouts.
In the above-cited case of Republic v. Cantor,60 this Court held that the present spouse (Maria Fe
Espinosa Cantor) merely conducted a "passive search" because she simply made unsubstantiated
inquiries from her in-laws, from neighbors and friends. For that reason, this Court stressed that the
degree of diligence and reasonable search required by law is not met (1) when there is failure to
present the persons from whom the present spouse allegedly made inquiries especially the absent
spouse''s relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is failure to report the missing spouse''s
purported disappearance or death to the police or mass media, and (3) when the present spouse''s
evidence might or would only show that the absent spouse chose not to communicate, but not
necessarily that the latter was indeed dead.61 The rationale for this palpably stringent or rigorous
requirement has been marked out thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx [T]he Court fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage, has
consistently applied the "strict standard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently
circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the
stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. xxx
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State''s
policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as the family''s
foundation and since it is the state''s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. xxx
xxx [I]t has not escaped this Court''s attention that the strict standard required in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to
cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and
reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this
situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in
cases under Article 41 of the Family Code." (Citations omitted) 62chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Given the Court''s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC''s finding
that Jose''s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in reference to the
"well-founded belief standard. If anything, Jose''s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing
Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence.
For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie''s
whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly
saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove
that he sought the assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media, Nor did he
show mat he undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least
two years (and what those years were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities,
barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he
interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, The Decision dated October 24, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 04158-MN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent''s Petition in
said Spec. Proc. No. 045-08 is accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., see dissenting opinion.
Endnotes:
1 EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209.

2Republic v. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013, 712 SCRA 1, 16-18.
3
Rollo, pp. 9-40.
4Id. at 42-50; penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abelia Maxino and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles.
5 Id. at. 51-52.
6 Also spelled as "Ozamis" in other parts of the CA Decision.
7 In Rollo, p. 53, Netchie''s maiden name per a copy of their Marriage Contract dated August 10, 1996
is "Netchie S. Polistico".
8Rollo, p. 43.
9 Id. at 54.
10 Id. at 43.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 43-44 and 54.
17 Id. at 44 and 54.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20
Id. at 44 and 55.
21 Id. at 44 and 54.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 54-55; penned by Executive Judge Edmundo P. Pintac.
25
Id. at 44 and 55.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 55.
28 Id. at 42 and 44.
29 Id. at 42-50.
30 Id. at 49.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 50.
34 Id at 9-40.
35 Id. at 16-17.
36 Id. at 17-27, 102-109.
37 Id. at 27-35, 109-114.
38 Id. at 31, 111-112.
39 Id. at 31-32, 112.
40 Id. at 31, 112.
41 Id. at 33-35, 113-114.
42 Id. at 35-36, 114-115.
43 Id. at 62-63, 90-92.
44 Id. at 63, 93.
45 Id. at 63-65, 92.
46
Id. at 64, 92.
47 Id. at 65, 92-93.
48 489 Phil. 761 (2005).
49 Id. at 768-769.
50
Republic v. Granada, 687 Phil. 403,408-409 (2012), citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, supra.
51
612 Phil. 76 (2009).
52 Id. at 82-83.
53Republic v. Granada, supra note 50 at 411.
54 G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 483.
55 Id. at 489-490.
56 Supra note 2 at 14-18.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 18.
59Republic v. Cantor, supra note 2 at 20, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 513 Phil. 391, 397-398
(2005).
60 Supra note 2.
61Republicv. Cantor, supra note 2 at 20-25, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, Republic v.
Granada, supra note 50, and Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.
62 Republic v, Cantor, supra note 1 at 25-27.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I dissent.
A petition praying for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse should be resolved on
its own merits, not on the basis of preconceived notions of acts that the present spouse ought to have
done. Approaching such cases with an a priori disapproving stance, which may be trumped only by
compliance with an idealized "to-do list," is unreasonable. It not only prevents courts from
appreciating the present spouse''s efforts for their inherent merits; it also casts aside the more
basicand statutorily imposed1duty of each spouse to be present: "to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." 2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent Jose B. Sareogon (Jose) was an overseas Filipino worker. Harsh realities, such as the
lack of economic opportunities at home compounded with the need to provide for a fledgling family,
compelled him to work abroad as a seafarer. However, because of Jose''s dire situation, not only he
but also his wife Netchie S. Sareogon (Netchie) was compelled to go abroad in search of greener
pastures. Within a month of being married, Jose and Netchie had to endure the bitterness of being
separated in foreign lands just to make ends meet. 3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As things would turn out, it was not only their deliberate, self-imposed separation that Jose would
have to endure. Three months after leaving home for employment overseas, Jose received no
communication from Netchie.4 Even his inquiries with Netchie''s parents proved futile as they were not
to be found in their residence in Clarin, Misamis Occidental. 5 Undaunted, Jose personally searched
for Netchie as soon as his means allowed himthat is, as soon as his contract as a seafarer
expired approaching her relatives and friends, all to no avail.6 It was only after all these that Jose
resigned himself to Netchie''s loss and pursued appropriate legal action through the Petition we now
resolve.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The majority is of the opinion that Jose''s Petition for declaration of Netchie''s presumptive death must
be denied. It concludes that Jose failed to show that he acted out of the well-founded belief that
Netchie was already dead and asserts that Jose''s efforts did not show "honest-to-goodness
efforts"8 to ascertain whether Netchie was still alive. In doing so, the majority relies chiefly
on Republic of the Philippines v. Cantor,9 where a "strict standard"10 was imposed on petitions for
declaration of presumptive death of absent spouses.
I registered my Dissent in Cantor, I do so again here.
As in Cantor,11 I maintain that such a strict standard cannot be the basis for appreciating the efforts
made by a spouse in ascertaining the status and whereabouts of his or her absent spouse. This strict
standard makes it apparent that marital obligations remain incumbent only upon the present spouse.
It unduly reduces the mutual duty of presence to the sole and exclusive obligation of the spouse
compelled to embark on a search. It turns a blind eye to how the absent spouse has failed to live up
to his or her own duty to be present. As I emphasized in my Dissent in the similar case of Republic of
the Philippines v. Orcelino-Villanueva:12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The marital obligations provided for by the Family Code require the continuing presence of each
spouse. A spouse is well to suppose that this shall be resolutely fulfilled by the other spouse. Failure
to do so for the period established by law gives rise to the presumption that the absent spouse is
dead, thereby enabling the spouse present to remarry. 13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse are specifically provided for in
Article 41 of the Family Code, which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
spouse.
Article 41 permits a spouse to seek judicial relief, not on the basis of antecedent occurrences that
have actually transpired, but on the mere basis of a "belief." Article 41 petitions are, thus, unique in
that they may be initiated and prosper not based on something concrete, but based on something that
can be considered an abstraction: a spouse''s state of mind. 14 Because this abstraction cannot
otherwise be factually established, it becomes necessary to inquire into how the petitioning spouse
actually conducted himself or herself, that is, his or her overt acts.
Article 41 imposes a qualitative standard for the availing of relief. Not only must there be a belief, this
belief must be "well-grounded." To say that this belief is well-grounded is to say that there is
"reasonable basis for holding to such belief."15 Therefore, what Article 41 requires is the satisfaction
of a basic and plain test: rationality.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
What is rational or reasonable to a person is a matter that cannot be dealt with in absolute terms.
Context is imperative. In appreciating reasonableness, cut-and-dried a priori standards cannot
control. Reliance on such standards erroneously presupposes similarity, if not complete uniformity, of
human experience:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
What is rational in each case depends on context. Rationality is not determined by the blanket
imposition of pre-conceived standards. Rather, it is better determined by an appreciation of a
person''s unique circumstances.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As vital as the point from which Article 41 petitions proceed (i.e., reasonable belief) is the point to
which they intend to proceed, that is, sustaining a mere presumption. As crucial as the starting point
of a well-founded belief is the intended endpoint of a mere presumption:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[A]ll that Article 41 calls to sustain is a presumption. By definition, there is no need for absolute
certainty. A presumption is, by nature, favorable to a party and dispenses with the burden of proving.
Consequently, neither is there a need for conduct that establishes such a high degree of cognizance
that what is established is proof, and no longer a presumption:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In declaring a person presumptively dead, a court is called upon to sustain a presumption, it is not
called upon to conclude on verity or to establish actuality. In so doing, a court infers despite an
acknowledged uncertainty. Thus, to insist on such demanding and extracting evidence to "show
enough proof of a well-founded belief, is to insist on an inordinate and intemperate
standard.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The figurative bookendsthe root and the cuspof Article 41 petitions delineate the boundaries of
judicial inquiry. A strict standard grounded on idealized standards, on "what should have been," is
misplaced.
The dearth of resources at Jose''s disposal is manifest. It was for the precise reason of his modest
status that both he and his wife found themselves having to leave the Philippines for employment
within only a month of being married.
What remains clear is that Jose exerted efforts as best as he could. Even as his circumstances
prevented him from returning to the Philippines, he searched for Netchie through her parents.
However, even Netchie''s parents could not be found. As soon as he was able to return to the
Philippines, that is, as soon as his contract as a seafarer expired, he personally launched a search for
Netchie. Undaunted by the absence of Netchie''s own parents, Jose asked Netchie''s other relatives
and friends for her whereabouts. Even this, however, proved futile.
The circumstances of Netchie''s absence are attested to not only by Jose''s own testimony but also by
those of Netchie''s own aunt and Jose''s brother.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose may not have been a man of disconsolate or utterly miserable means, but he was certainly one
who had to contend with his modest and limited capacities. It is in light of this that his efforts must be
appreciated. It may be conceded that Jose could have engaged in other, ostensibly more painstaking
efforts, such as seeking the aid of police officers, filing a formal missing-person report, and
announcing Netchie''s absence in radio or television programs. However, insisting on these other,
idyllic acts that Jose could have done compels him to comply with illusory objectives that may just
have been beyond his means. As I emphasized in my Dissent in Orcelino-
Villanueva:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This court must realize that insisting upon an ideal will never yield satisfactory results. A stringent
evaluation of a party''s efforts made out of context will always reveal means through which a spouse
could have ''done more'' or walked the proverbial extra mile to ascertain his or her spouse''s
whereabouts. A reason could always be conceived for concluding that a spouse did not try ''hard
enough.''20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The majority characterizes Jose''s search as a mere "passive search" 21 and notes that Jose failed to
satisfy the standards supposedly set by Cantor.22 I caution against the use of such dismissive
descriptions as "passive" in the face of seeming non-compliance with Cantor''s requirements. Even
more, I caution against a continuing and indiscriminate reliance on Cantor''s stringent requirements.
Doing so proceeds from a misplaced presumption that the factual moorings of all Article 41 petitions
are alike and that the standards that suffice for one case are the only ones that will suffice for all
others.
Spouses are fundamentally called "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support."23 Presence is integral to marital relations. As I explained in my
Dissent in Cantor:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The opinions of a recognized authority in civil law, Arturo M. Tolentino, are particularly
enlightening:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Meaning of "Absent" Spouse.The provisions of this article are of American origin, and must be
construed in the light of American jurisprudence. An identical provision (except for the period) exists
in the California civil code (section 61); California jurisprudence should, therefore, prove enlightening.
It has been held in that jurisdiction that, as respects the validity of a husband''s subsequent marriage,
a presumption as to the death of his first wife cannot be predicated upon an absence resulting from
his leaving or deserting her, as it is his duty to keep her advised as to his whereabouts. The spouse
who has been left or deserted is the one who is considered as the ''spouse present''; such spouse is
not required to ascertain the whereabouts of the deserting spouse, and after the required number of
years of absence of the latter, the former may validly remarry.
Precisely, it is a deserting spouse''s failure to comply with what is reasonably expected of him or her
and to fulfill the responsibilities that are all but normal to a spouse which makes reasonable (i.e., well-
grounded) the belief that should he or she fail to manifest his or her presence within a statutorily
determined reasonable period, he or she must have been deceased. The law is of the confidence that
spouses will in fact "live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support" such that it is not the business of the law to assume any other circumstance than that a
spouse is deceased in case he or she becomes absent.24 (Emphasis in the original)
Focusing on the supposed inadequacies of Jose''s efforts makes it seem as though the burden of
presence is his alone to bear, when it is Netchie who is missing. It is she who has proven herself no
longer capable of performing her marital obligations. As she has been absent for the statutorily
prescribed period despite her obligations as Jose''s spouse, Netchie must be considered
presumptively dead.
The majority heavily quotes from Cantor and cites the supposed rationale for imposing a strict
standard: that is, to ensure that Article 41 petitions are not used as shortcuts to undermine the
indissolubility of marriage. I addressed this matter in my Dissent in Orcelino-
Villanueva:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
While this is a valid concern, the majority goes to unnecessary lengths to discharge this burden.
Article 41 of the Family Code itself concedes that there is a degree of risk in presuming a spouse to
be dead, as the absent spouse may, in fact, be alive and well. Thus, Article 41 provides that
declarations of presumptive death are "without prejudice to the reappearance of the absent spouse."
The state is thus not bereft of remedies.
Consistent with this, Article 42 of the Family Code provides for the automatic termination of the
subsequent marriage entered into by the present spouse should the absent spouse
reappear:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
Moreover, in Santos v. Santos, we recognized that in cases where a declaration of presumptive death
was fraudulently obtained, the subsequent marriage shall not only be terminated, but all other effects
of the declaration nullified by a successful petition for annulment of
judgment:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
....
affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. 25 (Citations omitted)
As with Cantor and Orcelino-Villanueva, "[t]he majority is gripped with the apprehension that a petition
for declaration of presumptive death may be availed of as a dangerous expedient." 26 As also with
these cases, however, nothing here sustains and justifies fear. Inordinate anxiety is all that there is.
What is manifest is that Jose has established facts that warrant the declaration that Netchie is
presumptively dead. Thus, the present Petition must be denied.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 04158-MIN affirming the January 31, 2011 Decision of Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court,
Ozamis City, declaring Netchie S. Sareogon presumptively dead, pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code, must be affirmed.
Endnotes:
1 Article 68 of the Family Code obliges the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
3
Rollo, p. 43
4 Id.
5
Id. at 43-44.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Ponencia, p. 7.
9 G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013, 712 SCRA 1 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
10 Ponencia, p. 10.
11J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic of the Philippines v. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621,
December 10, 2013, 712 SCRA 1, 35-53 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
12
J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic of the Philippines v. Orcelino-Villanueva, G.R. No.
210929, July 29, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/july2015/210929_leonen.pdf
> [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
13 Id. at 2.
14Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, 513 Phil. 391 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
15
J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic v. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013, 712
SCRA 1, 48 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
16 Id.
17J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic of the Philippines v. Orcelino-Villanueva, G.R. No.
210929, July 29,
2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/july2015/210929_leone
n.pdf> 3 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
18Id., citing J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic v. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10,
2013 712 SCRA 1, 48 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
19
Rollo, p. 44.
20 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic of the Philippines v. Orcelino-Villanueva, G.R. No.
210929, July 29, 2015
> [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
21 Ponencia, p. 9.
22 Id. As the ponencia summarizes: "[T]he degree of diligence and reasonable search required by law
is not met (1) when there is failure to present the persons from whom the present spouse allegedly
made inquiries especially the absent spouse''s relatives or neighbors and friends, (2) when there is
failure to report the missing spouse''s purported disappearance or death to the police or mass media,
and (3) when the present spouse''s evidence might or would only show that the absent spouse chose
not to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed dead."
24J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic v. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013, 712
SCRA 1, 51-52 [Per J. Brion, En Banc], citing 1 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 281-282 (1990), in turn citing People v. Glab, 13
App (2d) 528 57 Pac. (2d) 588 and Harrington Estate, 140 Cal. 244, 73 Pac. 1000; and FAMILY
CODE, art. 68.
25J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic of the Philippines v. Orcelino-Villanueva, G.R. No.
210929, July 29, 2015
> 5-6 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
26 Id. at 6.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. NILDA B. TAMPUS, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 17, 2013 and the
Resolution3 dated September 2, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
04588, which affirmed the Decision4 dated July 29, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu
City, Branch 54 (RTC) declaring respondent's spouse, Dante L. Del Mundo, as presumptively dead.
The Facts
Respondent Nilda B. Tampus (Nilda) was married to Dante L. Del Mundo (Dante) on November 29,
1975 in Cordova, Cebu. The marriage ceremony was solemnized by Municipal Judge Julian B. Pogoy
of Cordova, Cebu.5 Three days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The
couple had no children.6
Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante,. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts
proved futile.7 Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition8 to declare Dante as
presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33)
years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead. 9
Due to the absence of any oppositor, Nilda was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. She
testified on the allegations in her petition, affirming that she exerted efforts to find Dante by inquiring
from his parents, relatives, and neighbors, who, unfortunately, were also not aware of his
whereabouts. She averred that she intends to remarry and move on with her life. 10
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision11 dated July 29, 2009, the RTC granted Nilda's petition and declared Dante as
presumptively dead for all legal purposes, without prejudice to the effect of his reappearance. It found
that Dante left the conjugal dwelling sometime in 1975 and from then on, Nilda never heard from him
again despite diligent efforts to locate him. In this light, she believes that he had passed away
especially since his last assignment was a combat mission. Moreover, the RTC found that the
absence of thirty-three (33) years was sufficient to give rise to the presumption of death. 12
Dissatisfied, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), filed a petition for certiorari13 before the CA assailing the RTC Decision.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated June 17, 2013, the CA denied the OSG's petition and affirmed the RTC
Decision declaring Dante as presumptively dead. The CA gave credence to the RTC's findings that
Nilda had exerted efforts to find her husband by inquiring from his parents, relatives, and neighbors,
who likewise had no knowledge of his whereabouts. Further, the lapse of thirty-three (33) years,
coupled with the fact that Dante had been sent on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu, gave rise to Nilda's
well-founded belief that her husband is already dead. 15
Moreover, the CA opined that if Dante were still alive after many years, it would have been easy for
him to communicate with Nilda, taking into consideration the fact that Dante was only 25 years old
when he left and, therefore, would have been still physically able to get in touch with his wife.
However, because neither Nilda nor his own family has heard from him for several years, it can be
reasonably concluded that Dante is already dead. 16
The OSG's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated September 2, 2014; hence,
this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision
declaring Dante as presumptively dead.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has merit.
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded
beliefthat the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that
the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has
a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.20
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the foregoing requisites under Article
41 of the Family Code exist. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of
presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the
burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.21
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence
of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse
is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would
not suffice.22 The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not
only the absent spouse's whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is
already dead.23
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also
did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further
efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request
information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities
or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP
on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired from the
AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto.
To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her
purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy
the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.
Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who could
have corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These resource persons
were not even named. In Republic v. Nolasco,24 it was held that the present spouse's bare assertion
that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse's whereabouts was found insufficient as the
names of said friends were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses. 25cralawred
Finally, other than Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had been offered to
support her allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What appears from
the facts as established in this case was that Nilda simply allowed the passage of time without
actively and diligently searching for her husband, which the Court cannot accept as constituting a
"well-founded belief that her husband is dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-
founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great
many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by the present spouse. 26
In fine, having fallen short of the stringent standard and degree of due diligence required by
jurisprudence to support her claim of a "well-founded belief that her husband Dante is already dead,
the instant petition must be granted.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 17, 2013 and the
Resolution dated September 2, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04588 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition of respondent Nilda B. Tampus to have her
husband, Dante L. Del Mundo, declared presumptively dead is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 9-22.
2Id. at 24-29. Permed by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan with Associate Justices
Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla concurring.
3 Id. at 31-33. Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla with Associate Justices
Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap concurring.
4 Id. at 61-63. Penned by Presiding Judge Victor Teves, Sr.
5 Id. at 25 and 59.
6 Id. at 25.
7
Id.
8 Id. at 56-57.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 62.
11 Id. at 61-63.
12 Id. at 62-63.
13 Id. at 39-55.
14
Id. at 24-29.
15 Id. at 27-28.
16 Id. at 28.
17 See motion for reconsideration dated July 15, 2013; id. at 34-38.
18 Id. at 31-33.
19 Article 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
spouse.
20Republic v. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013, 712 SCRA 1, 18.
21
Id. at 18-19.
22 See id. at 20.
23 Id. at 20, citing Republic of the Philippines v. CA, 513 Phil. 391, 397-398 (2005).
24 G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.cralawred
25 Id. at 28.
26Republic of the Philippines v. CA, supra note 23, at 398.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 99357 January 27, 1992
MA. LOURDES VILLANUEVA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLUE CROSS INSURANCE, INC., respondents.
Aggabao, Fernandez, Arellano & Fule Law Offices for petitioner.
Samuel F. Baldado for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the nullification of the resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals dated May 8, 1991, reconsidering its preceding resolution of March 15, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 24120, entitled "Ma. Lourdes R. Villanueva vs. Blue Cross Insurance, Inc."
Petitioner's plaint in her present recourse narrates that on October 12, 1989, she filed a complaint
with the Insurance Commission alleging, inter alia, that, in consideration of the annual payment of
P7,535.00, private respondent executed a policy of sickness and accident insurance; that on August
12, 1989, petitioner was admitted to a hospital where she was diagnosed and operated on for
cholecystitis; that petitioner paid the hospital and doctor's bills in the aggregate sum of P48,934.05,
the same being the actual hospital and professional fees charged to her; and that private respondent
wrongfully refused to pay petitioner the said amount which she is entitled to recover under the policy.
Private respondent's answer raised the special and affirmative defenses that under the insurance
policy, definitions and exclusions were clearly specified and among the exclusions are conditions
which pre-existed before the effective date of the insurance of which the insured was aware or should
reasonably be aware; and that cholecystitis was a pre-existing condition, hence petitioner's sickness
is non-compensable.
On September 21, 1990, the Insurance Commission rendered its decision in I.C. Case No. 3277 in
favor of petitioner ordering private respondent to pay the latter the amount of P48,934.05 with legal
interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully satisfied, plus P5,000.00 attorney's fees
and costs. In the main, the Insurance Commission, after a review of the evidence presented,
concluded that petitioner's illness, contrary to private respondent's defenses, was not a pre-existing
disease and therefore, is fully compensable. 1
According to respondent court, a copy of said decision was received by private respondent on
September 27, 1990. On October 15, 1990, or more than the fifteen (15) days allowed by Section 2,
Republic Act No. 5434, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which petitioner
opposed. On December 13, 1990, the Insurance Commission denied said motion for
reconsideration. 2 On December 17, 1990, private respondent filed a notice of appeal with the
Insurance Commission. 3
On March 15, 1991, the Third Division of respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the
ground that it was filed out of time and that private respondent did not duly file a copy of its notice of
appeal with respondent Court as mandated by Republic Act No. 5434. 4
Respondent court noted that under the aforesaid Section 2 of Republic Act No. 5434, private
respondent had ten (10) days from its receipt on December 14, 1990 of the aforesaid order denying
its motion for reconsideration within which to appeal. While respondent court, in its resolution of May
8, 1991, subsequently agreed that private respondent filed its notice of appeal with the Insurance
Commission within the said 10-day period, no such notice was filed with respondent court as required
by Section 3, Republic Act No. 5434.
Private respondent then moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of its appeal. On May 8, 1991,
the Special Third Division of respondent court resolved to reconsider its original resolution and
ordered the reinstatement of the appeal "in keeping with the ends of substantial justice." 5
Hence, the petition at bar with the following assignment of errors:
1. The respondent court committed an error in reinstating the appeal when it has no
jurisdiction to do so, no notice of appeal having been filed with it.
2. The manner of appeal from quasi-judicial bodies has been fixed with the solemnity of
a statute; the Court of Appeals erred in ignoring it. 6
We agree with petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred in reconsidering its previous resolution
dismissing herein private respondent's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 24120. The dismissal of said
appeal is proper and fully justified by private respondent's failure to file a notice of appeal with the
Court of Appeals as required by Republic Act No. 5434 for the perfection of its appeal from the
decision of the Insurance Commission.
The Court of Appeals has been vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, except those falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
During the period relevant to and involved in the appeal from the Insurance Commission to
respondent court in CA-G.R. SP No. 24120, subject of the present review, the appeal to the Court of
Appeals from said quasi-judicial body was governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434
insofar as the same are not inconsistent with the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. 7
As restated and clarified in the Lacsamana case, to perfect an appeal under Republic Act No. 5434,
the following rules must be observed:
In an appeal from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under Republic Act No.
5434 and Section 22(c) of the Interim Rules, the appeal shall be taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the Court of Appeals and with the quasi-judicial body within fifteen days
from notice of the ruling, award, order, decision or judgment; or in case a motion for
reconsideration is filed within said period, then within ten days from notice of the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 5434).
No extension of time to file such a notice of appeal is needed, much less allowed. 8
It is, therefore, indubitable that to perfect an appeal, notice must be filed both with the Court of
Appeals and with the board, commission or agency that made or rendered the ruling, award, order,
decision or judgment appealed from. In the instant case, even assuming that a notice of appeal was
seasonably filed with the Insurance Commission, no such notice of appeal was filed with the Court of
Appeals. The said failure of petitioner to comply with the requirements of law for the perfection of its
appeal is fatal to its present remedial attempt. It renders the decision of the Insurance Commission
final and executory and the same can no longer be a subject of review. 9
This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid
down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. 10 The failure to perfect an appeal as
required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party and precluding the
appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. 11
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege,
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. 12 The
party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so,
the right to appeal is lost. 13
It is true that in some cases the filing of an appeal was allowed where a stringent application of the
rules would have denied it, but only when it would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of the court's equity jurisdiction. 14 In the case at bar, however, the interests of justice would
not be served by a policy of liberality, nor has the private respondent advanced any compelling
reason to warrant the same. In fact, in its original resolution, 15 respondent court itself expounded at
length on the very same doctrines enjoining strict compliance with the rules governing appeals which
we have set out herein and, on such considerations, dismissed the appeal therein.
Moreover, relaxation of the rules is not called for since the issues raised are mainly factual. The
decision of the Insurance Commission was based on its findings that the illness of private respondent,
cholecystitis, was not a pre-existing ailment and is, therefore, fully compensable. It further specifically
found that private respondent failed to prove petitioner's awareness of that pre-existing condition
which is excluded under the insurance policy. We find no reason to disturb the said findings which are
supported by the evidence on record and the conclusions of experts.
Settled is the rule that factual findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but
finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these quasi-judicial tribunals from
handling specific matters falling under their jurisdiction. 16 Courts cannot take cognizance of such
factual issues. 17 In reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing court cannot re-examine the
sufficiency of the evidence. The findings of fact must be respected, so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. 18
It has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the
prevention of needless ENDING delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial
business. 19 For a party to seek exception for its failure to comply strictly with the statutory
requirements for perfecting its appeal, strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice
and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof must be shown, in order to warrant the Court's
suspension of the rules. 20 Otherwise, the rules must strictly apply, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The challenged resolution of respondent court dated May 8,
1991 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and its resolution of March 15, 1991 is REINSTATED.
The decision of the Insurance Commission in I.C. Case No. 3277, dated September 21, 1990, is
hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Original Record, 374-377.
2 Ibid., 400.
3 Ibid., 401.
4 Rollo, 20-21. The resolution of dismissal was penned by Justice Luis L. Victor, with
the concurrence of Justices Santiago M. Kapunan and Segundino G. Chua.
5 Ibid., 24-25. The second resolution was likewise penned by Justice Victor but with the
concurrence of Justices Santiago Kapunan and Fortunato A. Vailoces.
6 Ibid., 6.
7 Sec. 9, B.P. Blg. 129; Pars. 16 and 22(c), Interim and Transitional Rules and
Guidelines.
8 Lacsamana, et al. vs. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., 143 SCRA 643 (1986).
9 Quiqui, et al. vs. Boncaros, etc., et al., 151 SCRA 416 (1987); Medina, Sr. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 181 SCRA 837 (1990).
10 Reyes vs. Carrasco, 38 SCRA 296 (1971); Republic, et al. vs. Reyes, etc., et al., 71
SCRA 450 (1976); Borre, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 158 SCRA 560 (1988).
11 Martha Lumber Mill, Inc. vs. Lagradante, et al., 99 Phil. 434 (1956); Pabores vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al., 104 Phil. 505 (1958); A.L. Ammen
Transportation, Co., Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al., 12 SCRA
508 (1964).
12 Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, et al., 152 SCRA 540 (1987);
Borre, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
13 Ozaeta vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 179 SCRA 800 (1989).
14 Toledo, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 152 SCRA 579 (1987).
15 Rollo, 21.
16 Mapa vs. Arroyo, et al., 175 SCRA 76 (1989); A.M. Oreta & Co., Inc. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, et al., 176 SCRA 218 (1989).
17 Rizal Memorial Colleges Faculty Union-Davao Workers Union, et al. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, et al., 178 SCRA 439 (1989).
18 Baliwag Transit, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 147 SCRA 82 (1987).
19 Alvero vs. De la Rosa, etc., et al., 76 Phil. 428 (1946).
20 Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, 5 SCRA 304 (1962); Workmen's Insurance Co., Inc. vs.
Augusto, et al., 40 SCRA 123 (171).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T.
ALMELOR, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise
involves a true intertwining of personalities.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the
petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong
remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on
January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral. 3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina
Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel
Homer, born on July 4, 1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an
anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to annul
their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where
they worked as medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person
who got along well with other people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got
married.6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel
was the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home,
Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered.
Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent
fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection
Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her
decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were
first aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance,
she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male
caller.9She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. 10 Her worse
fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain
Dr. Nogales.11 When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her
children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. 12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr.
del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests
on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma.
Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).13 She concluded that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated.14Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and
appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He,
however, maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for
annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry.
It began when he refused to heed the memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The
memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary
hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as
Manuel's clinic and residence.17 In other words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in
the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them.
At most, he only imposed the necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to
return the love and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is
especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years. 18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found
fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and possessive nature. 19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends.
He wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up
stories about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in
his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity. 20
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he
usually stayed at Manuel's house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness
to the generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True,
they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to
what Leonida described in her testimony.21
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed
another man. He denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date, 22 he and Manuel
went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except their
driver.23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert
witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following
disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects
under the law null and void from the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of
defendant's share thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose legal custody is
awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the
Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto;
and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Pias City and Manila City to cause the
registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code.
It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the

allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that
in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero
sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes
marriage as a special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus
when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to
correct the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code].
This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself
that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will
surely come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting
him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family. 25
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a
petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. 26
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction;
that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share
in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court
AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
254), in Las Pias City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.27
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition
for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the
lower Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by
appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the
subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the
exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof. 28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE

TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND
VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE

TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN
HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial
justice and in the Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate
mode shall be dismissed.30 This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and
mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of
all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. 31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary
remedies are available or no longer available through no fault of petitioner. 32 However, in Buenaflor v.
Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this
wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and,
therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception
is that while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules
on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception
to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations.
Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of
time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so
would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.34(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing
appeals.35 It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality. 36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to
consider his petition before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court
for annulling his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this
Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner Delia R.
Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six (6)
months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-
month suspension during the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without
back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of
the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-
91) petitioner is filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme
Court.38(Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate
mode of appeal.39 The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No.
1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review."40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the
Administrative Circular. The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court
of Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do
justice to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules,
which should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has
been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the
vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case
from the operation of the rules.41 (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong
remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary
appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of
discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice.
The Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result
from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of
substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present
petition and treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what
is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court
reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to
appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial
system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. 45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties
a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice. 46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to
appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the
denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance.
She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary
appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked to the
detriment of Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court
has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's
liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so require. 47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross
negligence of petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made
to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be
allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any
act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as
an act of his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and
dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage
suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such
ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be
allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the
lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved
by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which
has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in court.49 (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever
the demands of justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving
the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of one's action. 50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance System
v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in
Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit
exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the
power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of
justice require it.53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality
per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his
quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown
at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the supporting
grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went
further by citing Republic v. Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant

quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and
difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to
establish psychological incapacity.55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in
Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing
overt acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals. 56 She wanted to prove that the
perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and
Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower
court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there
is fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to
establish with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can
be deduced from the totality of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own
close friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-
75, 15 December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the
rumor she heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all
the truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened
after that. There may have been more important matters to attend to than to waste time and
effort filing cases against and be effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on
defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be
advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his
homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain - even during his marriage
with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got thicker,
reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing,
plaintiff and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even
small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more
authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December
2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently
showing that he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on
separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing
another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly
discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity
becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the name of
the game in this case; but the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the defendant
is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of
such a very untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and family as a
whole.57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a
homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court
considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of
witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate
it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled
when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, 58 such as concealment of
homosexuality.59Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that
Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his
wife.60 It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent
of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party
in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both
parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family
Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances 61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is
not among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations 62 of the Committees on
the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the
grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are
talking only of "concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge
Diy added that in legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46,
the ground existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they
add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The
Committee approved the suggestion.63
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that
serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket
denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to
prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that
questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the
exclusive sexual bond between the spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which
would make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to
discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the
natural course of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her
health.67
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are
significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged
incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage
bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven
(11) years, which produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found
in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant
resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court,
as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court
of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats
or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his
mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and
safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security
guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to
keep himself out of harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that
the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could
not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is
flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his
inability to copulate with the appellee. x x x
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of
any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit
with the appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account
petitioner's homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its
existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
basicautonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 70 The State and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by fabricated evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or
conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without
the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal
partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property
regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and
Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children.
Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's
share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDEand
the petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO


Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1See Separate Opinion of Justice Romero in Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763,
February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
2Rollo, pp. 22-42. Dated July 31, 2007. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, with
Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring.
3 Id. at 46.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 26.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 47.
14Id. x x x defendant x x x suffer(s) from Narcissistic Personality Disorder of lack of empathy or
unresponsiveness to the needs and feelings of his spouse and children, sense of entitlements
or expectations of automatic compliance, manipulative and deceit stance, grandiose sense of
self-importance, the strong need to seek approval and recognition and to prove his self-worth
with Anti-social Features of irritability, verbal and physical aggression and lack of genuine
remorse. Rigidly pervasive and egosyntonic in nature and hence no effective psychiatric
therapeutic modality could satisfactorily remedy his unremitting psychology, defendant's
psychological incapacity has its antecedence as early as before his marriage. x x x
15
Id. at 48. Dated October 27, 1998.
16
Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 47. Dated November 1, 2002.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 51-52.
25 Id. at 49.
26Id. at 22. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93817. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio,
with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring.
27 Id. at 41.
28 Id. at 36-37.
29 Id. at 10.
30 Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 (1994).
31 Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112547, July 18, 1994, 234 SCRA 192.
32 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 47, Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. Coverage. - This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for
which ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.
34 Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, id. at 568.
35 Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44050, July 16, 1985, 137 SCRA 570.
36 Gerales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85909, February 9, 1993, 218 SCRA 638; Teodoro v.
Carague, G.R. No. 96004, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 429; Cabutin v. Amacio, G.R. No.
55228, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 750; American Express International, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70766, November 9, 1988, 167 SCRA 209; Fonseca
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-36035, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 40; Calasiao Farmers
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50633, August 17,
1981, 106 SCRA 630; A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35560, October 30,
1980, 100 SCRA 590; Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43511, July 28, 1976, 72
SCRA 120; Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 (1910).
37 G.R. No. 123561, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 610.
38 Nerves v. Civil Service Commission, id. at 613.
39 Id. at 613-614.
40 Id. at 614.
41
Id. at 615.
43 Tan v. Dumarpa, id. at 665.
44 G.R. 142920, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 459.
45 Salazar v. Court of Appeals, id. at 471.
46Sarraga, Sr. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 143783, December 9,
2002, 393 SCRA 566.
47 Id. at 574.
49 Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id. at 465.
50 Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114282, November 28, 1995, 250 SCRA 371.
51 G.R. No. 137448, January 31, 2002, 375 SCRA 431.
52 G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 140.
53Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc., supra note
51, at 445.
54 Supra note 1.
55 Rollo, p. 49.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 49-50.
58 Family Code, Art. 45(3).
59 Id., Art. 46(4).
60
Rollo, pp. 49-51.
61 Article 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3
of the preceding Article:
1) Non-disclosure of previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime

involving moral turpitude;
2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband;
3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at

the time of the marriage; or
4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, or homosexuality or lesbianism

existing at the time of the marriage.
62Minutes of the 154th Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees held on
September 6, 1986, 9:00 a.m. at the Conference Room, First Floor, Bacobo Hall, U.P. Law
Complex, Diliman, Quezon City.
63 Id. at 12.
64 Id.
65 78 ALR 2d 807.
66 38 So. 337 (1905).
67 Crutcher v. Crutcher, id. at 337.
68 G.R. No. 132955, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 565.
69 Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, id. at 569-570.
70 Philippine Constitution (1987), Art. II, Sec. 12 provides:
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x
Art. XV, Secs. 1-2 provides:
71 Tolentino v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-23264, March 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 1.
72 Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong
to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject
to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
59550 which dismissed the petitioners petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to
annul the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No.
NC-662 nullifying the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the
resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.
This case arose from the following facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. They had eight children during their coverture, whose names and dates of births are as
follows:
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA born October 6, 1959
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA born May 18, 1962
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA born October 29, 1965
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA born March 6, 1967
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA born November 19, 19703

On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their
children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 40, against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. The case was
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, the petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM
Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila.4
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement 5 where some of the conjugal
properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite)
located at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood
Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-
storey building, pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements. All of the shares of stocks of Ancheta
Biofoods Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3) to the petitioner and the eight children one-
twelfth (1/12) each.6
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, the
respondent vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and
improvements thereon. The petitioner, with the knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in
the said property.
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-
662. Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting
Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was
residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro
Manila, "where she may be served with summons."7 The clerk of court issued summons to the
petitioner at the address stated in the petition. 8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the
petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioners son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta
III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. 9
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to the court stating
that the summons and a copy of the petition were served on the petitioner through her son Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:
RETURN OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and its annexes was
received by the herein defendant thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the
signature appearing on the summons. Service was made on June 6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.

Sheriff10
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-
Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m.
During the hearing on the said date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The public
prosecutor appeared for the State and offered no objection to the motion of the respondent who
appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and
allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified in his behalf and
adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition
and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. 11 The clerk of court issued a Certificate of
Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996. 12
On February 14, 1998, Valentines Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil
rights before the municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite. 13
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of
Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC
of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550.
The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by making
it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor.
CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, when in truth and in fact, the
respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.
According to the petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said
case, and ultimately secure a favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also
alleged that the respondent caused the service of the petition and summons on her by substituted
service through her married son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite, where the respondent was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed to deliver
to her the copy of the petition and summons. Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the trial
court in favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2)
due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She further contended that there was no
factual basis for the trial courts finding that she was suffering from psychological incapacity. Finally,
the petitioner averred that she learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended
to the petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of the petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.
The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render Judgment granting the
Petition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
14, Naic, Cavite).
2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner
a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P200,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for every hearing;
d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
e. Costs of suit.14
On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the following ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of any clear and
specific averment by petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Neither is there any
averment or allegation that the present petition is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic fraud can be a valid ground therefor,
that it was not availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion for new trial, or petition for
relief.15
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution, appending thereto an
amended petition in which she alleged, inter alia, that:
4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period after discovery of the
extrinsic fraud.
6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have been availed of in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
were no longer available through no fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said
remedies. This petition is the only available remedy to her.16
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the respondents
marriage was null and void for the court a quos failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to
appear for the State.
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that the CA erred as
follows:
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought to be annulled.
2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.
3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules of
Court.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioners Motion to Admit the Amended Petition; and in
not admitting the Amended Petition.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality. 17

An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to annul
a judgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two grounds: (a)
extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a
condition precedent, namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. 18 The petitioner must
allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment,
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the
petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief
from judgment through her own fault or negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals,
she cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her
inaction or negligence.19
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available through no
fault of her own. The petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The
safeguard was incorporated in the rule precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy. 20 Access to the courts
is guaranteed. But there must be limits thereto. Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a
valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to sue anew.
The prevailing party should not be vexed by subsequent suits. 21
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, and petition for relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own. She merely
alleged therein that she received the assailed order of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The
petitioners amended petition did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition, because although
she admitted therein that she did not avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief
from judgment, she did not explain why she failed to do so.
We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and denying
admission of the amended petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take
note from the material allegations of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic
fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons
and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not served on her. While the original
petition and amended petition did not state a cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order
on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause of action for the
nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of
the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new
trial or reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the
petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or
appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment
rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed
any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any
action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by laches.23
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the
material averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of
the trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the
summons and a copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint were served on
her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give her the said summons and
complaint.
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its annexes will show
that it is, prima facie meritorious; hence, it should have been given due course by the Court of
Appeals.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon, 24 we held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court
over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its
authority or by service of summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is
to inform him that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is,
thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the
absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and void. 25 Jurisdiction cannot be
acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the case against him unless
he is validly served with summons.26
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy thereof to him in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her. 27 However, if there is
impossibility of prompt service of the summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to
find him, service of the summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in Section 7,
Rule 14 of the said Rules:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies
of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies of defendants office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.28
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of service should be strictly followed in
order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is only when a
defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be
made by stating the efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the summons and
complaint and the fact that such effort failed.30 This statement should be made in the proof of service
to be accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary because substituted service is a
derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that substituted service of summons is a
method extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances
categorized by statutes.31
As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes thereof, the
summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the same day, the summons
was served on and received by Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, 33 the petitioners son. When the
return of summons was submitted to the court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no statement was
made on the impossibility of locating the defendant therein within a reasonable time, or that any effort
was made by the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was no mention therein that Venancio
Mariano Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza,
Las Pias, where the petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly residing. It turned out that Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III had been residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely
showed him the summons and the complaint and was made to affix his signature on the face of the
summons; he was not furnished with a copy of the said summons and complaint.
4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I
have been residing on the adjoining land consisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my
father as his share of the conjugal partnership. Since then, I have been residing therein up to
the present.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated on my fathers lot),
my father came to see me and then asked me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my
father) and the Sheriff did not allow me to read. Apparently, these papers are for the Summons
to my mother in the case for annulment of marriage filed by my father against her. I was not
given any copy of the Summons and/or copy of the complaint/petition. 34
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition of the
petitioner and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final order of the trial
court. However, we cannot but express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown by the
records. The records show that for the petitioners failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial
court granted the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutor
condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent.
The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment
against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the
trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment.35
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court
(now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. If the defendant in
an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exits, and if there is
no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 38
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,40regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the State.41 The trial court, abetted by the ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the
public prosecutor, waylaid the Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of this
Court.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. 42
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion.
Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing
any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default
but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties.
The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment
through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and
fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which
the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is
not the concern of the family members alone. 43Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or
a family should stay together must not depend on the whims and caprices of only one party, who
claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her
marital duties and obligations.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby SET
ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., (Chairman), on leave.
Footnotes
1Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia
(Chairman) and B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz, concurring.
2 Penned by Judge Enrique M. Almario.
4
Id. at 26.
5 Rollo, pp. 95-102.
7 Id. at 49.
8 Id. at 53.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 54.
11 Id. at 57-59.
12 Id. at 212.
13 Id. at 213.
14 Id. at 21.
15 Id. at 101.
16 Id. at 109.
17
Rollo, p. 36.
18 Rule 47, Section 1.
19 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 352 SCRA 235 (2001).
20 Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. III, 1997 ed., p. 549.
21 Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, 115 SCRA 117 (1982).
22 Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 635 (1989).
23SEC. 3. Period for filing action.If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within
four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by
laches or estoppel.
24 211 SCRA 879 (1992).
25
Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 339 SCRA 243 (2000).
26 United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, 368 SCRA 464 (2001).
27 Rule 14, Section 6, Rules of Court.
28 Supra.
29 326 SCRA 278 (2000).
30 Keister v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209 (1977).
31 Ibid.
32 CA Rollo, p. 53.
33 Ibid.
34 Id. at 55-56.
35 Supra.
36 Supra.
37 268 SCRA 198 (1997).
38 Id. at 213.
39 355 SCRA 285 (2001).
40 Supra.
41The procedure has been modified by the Supreme Court in Administrative Matter No. 02-11-
10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Sec. 8. Answer.(1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from
service of summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of
service of summons by publication. The answer must be verified by the respondent
himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.
(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her
in default.
(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court
shall order the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between
the parties.
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of
the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor
shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve
copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis
thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the
finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court
shall set the report for hearing and, if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it
shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the
State at the pre-trial.
42 See note 39.
43 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., and
ELVIRA GOZON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169977
INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, ALFREDO GOZON, and WINIFRED GOZON, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review, 1 assailing the 7 July 2005 Decision2 and
the 30 September 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447.
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered by TCT No. 5357. 4 The property
is situated in Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the name of "Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo),
married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira)."
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial Court (Cavite RTC) a petition
for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis
pendens, which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357.
On 31 August 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi
(Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell5 (Agreement) involving the property for the price
of P18 million. Among the stipulations in the Agreement were that Alfredo would: (1) secure an
Affidavit from Elvira that the property is Alfredos exclusive property and to annotate the Agreement at
the back of TCT No. 5357; (2) secure the approval of the Cavite RTC to exclude the property from the
legal separation case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice of lis pendens pertaining to the said
case and annotated on TCT No. 5357. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo
failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment
of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993. On 6 September
1993, the Agreement was annotated on TCT No. 5357.
Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision 6 in the legal separation case, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation between petitioner and
respondent. Accordingly, petitioner Elvira Robles Gozon is entitled to live separately from respondent
Alfredo Gozon without dissolution of their marriage bond. The conjugal partnership of gains of the
spouses is hereby declared DISSOLVED and LIQUIDATED. Being the offending spouse, respondent
is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon
whose custody is awarded to petitioner.
Furthermore, said parties are required to mutually support their child Winifred R. Gozon as her needs
arises.
SO ORDERED.7
As regards the property, the Cavite RTC held that it is deemed conjugal property.
On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter,
Winifred Gozon (Winifred). The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Gil Tabije, cancelled TCT No. 5357
and issued TCT No. M-105088 in the name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the
notice of lis pendens on TCT No. M-10508.
On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney9 executed in his favor by
Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million.10 IDRI paid
Alfredo P18 million, representing full payment for the property. 11 Subsequently, the Register of Deeds
of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-1097612 to IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial Court (Malabon RTC) a complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
On 3 April 2001, the Malabon RTC rendered a decision,13 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
01. On the preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction:
1.1 The same is hereby made permanent by:
1.1.1 Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional

Realty, Inc. and Gil Tabije, their agents, representatives and all persons acting in
their behalf from any attempt of commission or continuance of their wrongful acts
of further alienating or disposing of the subject property;
1.1.2. Enjoining defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. from entering and

fencing the property;
1.1.3. Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional

Realty, Inc. to respect plaintiffs possession of the property.
02. The Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993, between plaintiff and defendant
Alfredo Gozon is hereby approved, excluding the property and rights of defendant Elvira
Robles-Gozon to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property subject of this case.
03. The Deed of Donation dated 22 August 1994, entered into by and between defendants
Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon is hereby nullified and voided.
04. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, executed by defendant Winifred
Gozon, through defendant Alfredo Gozon, in favor of defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc.
is hereby nullified and voided.
05. Defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby ordered to deliver its Transfer
Certificate of Title No. M-10976 to the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.
06. The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to cancel Certificate of
Title Nos. 10508 "in the name of Winifred Gozon" and M-10976 "in the name of Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc.," and to restore Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5357 "in the name of
Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Robles" with the Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August
1993 fully annotated therein is hereby ordered.
07. Defendant Alfredo Gozon is hereby ordered to deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
plaintiff over his one-half undivided share in the subject property and to comply with all the
requirements for registering such deed.
08. Ordering defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to sit with plaintiff to agree on the selling price of
her undivided one-half share in the subject property, thereafter, to execute and deliver a Deed
of Absolute Sale over the same in favor of the plaintiff and to comply with all the requirements
for registering such deed, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of this DECISION.
09. Thereafter, plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant Alfredo Gozon the balance of Four
Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) in his one-half undivided share in the property to be set off by
the award of damages in plaintiffs favor.
10. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon the price they had
agreed upon for the sale of her one-half undivided share in the subject property.
11. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to pay the
plaintiff, jointly and severally, the following:
11.1 Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as actual and compensatory damages;
11.2 One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
11.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages;
11.4 Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) as attorneys fees; and
11.5 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as litigation expenses.
11.6 The above awards are subject to set off of plaintiffs obligation in paragraph 9
hereof.
12. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and severally the following:
12.1 Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000.00) which constitute the amount the former
received from the latter pursuant to their Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994,
with legal interest therefrom;
12.2 One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
12.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
12.4 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as attorneys fees.
13. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Malabon RTCs decision with modification. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 7 July 2005 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated April 3, 2001 of the RTC, Branch
74, Malabon is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
1. The sale of the subject land by defendant Alfredo Gozon to plaintiff-appellant Siochi is
declared null and void for the following reasons:
a) The conveyance was done without the consent of defendant-appellee Elvira Gozon;
b) Defendant Alfredo Gozons one-half () undivided share has been forfeited in favor
of his daughter, defendant Winifred Gozon, by virtue of the decision in the legal
separation case rendered by the RTC, Branch 16, Cavite;
2. Defendant Alfredo Gozon shall return/deliver to plaintiff-appellant Siochi the amount of P5

Million which the latter paid as earnest money in consideration for the sale of the subject land;
3. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to pay
plaintiff-appellant Siochi jointly and severally, the following:
a) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
d) P20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
e) The awards of actual and compensatory damages are hereby ordered deleted for
lack of basis.
4. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay defendant-
appellant IDRI jointly and severally the following:
a) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
c) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.

Defendant Winifred Gozon, whom the undivided one-half share of defendant Alfredo Gozon was
awarded, is hereby given the option whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the subject
land.
The rest of the decision not inconsistent with this ruling stands.
SO ORDERED.15
Only Mario and IDRI appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals. In his petition, Mario alleges that
the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of
the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to
the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale
over the property upon his payment of P9 million to Elvira.
On the other hand, IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value. Thus, IDRI prays that the
Court should uphold the validity of IDRIs TCT No. M-10976 over the property.
We find the petitions without merit.
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property
occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Article 124 of
the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to the recourse
to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date
of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo
was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property.
However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written
consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is
void.16 The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the
portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. 17Even if the other
spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written
consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. 18 The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and
Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards
Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras
acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by
Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
However, we disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the one-half undivided share of
Alfredo in the property was already forfeited in favor of his daughter Winifred, based on the ruling of
the Cavite RTC in the legal separation case. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the ruling of the
Cavite RTC that Alfredo, being the offending spouse, is deprived of his share in the net profits and the
same is awarded to Winifred.
The Cavite RTC ruling finds support in the following provisions of the Family Code:
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds
shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but
the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the
provisions of Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the
provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce
the following effects:
xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of
the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or,
in default of children, the innocent spouse; (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by
the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of
Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that "[f]or purposes of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration
of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution." Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of
Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the
conjugal partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good
faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about
the vendors title to the property. The representative of IDRI testified that he knew about the existence
of the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 5357 and the legal separation case filed before the Cavite
RTC. Thus, IDRI could not feign ignorance of the Cavite RTC decision declaring the property as
conjugal.
Furthermore, if IDRI made further inquiries, it would have known that the cancellation of the notice of
lis pendens was highly irregular. Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,19 the notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled (a) upon order of the court, or (b) by the Register of Deeds upon verified
petition of the party who caused the registration of the lis pendens. In this case, the lis pendens was
cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon the request of Alfredo. There was no court order for the
cancellation of the lis pendens. Neither did Elvira, the party who caused the registration of the lis
pendens, file a verified petition for its cancellation.
Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that
Alfredos donation of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 12520 of
the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the
other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.1avvphi1
Nevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate the order of the Malabon RTC for the reimbursement of
the P18 million paid by IDRI for the property, which was inadvertently omitted in the dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals decision.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447 with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) We DELETE the portions regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo Gozons one-half undivided
share in favor of Winifred Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred Gozon whether or not to
dispose of her undivided share in the property; and
(2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly
and severally the Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) which was the amount paid by Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. for the property, with legal interest computed from the finality of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2Rollo(G.R. No. 169900), pp. 65-128. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-
Fernando with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa,
concurring.
3Id. at 153-154.
4Rollo (G.R. No. 169977), pp. 166-168.
5Rollo (G.R. No. 169900), pp. 163-168.
6Id. at 169-176.
7Id. at 175-176.
8Rollo (G.R. No. 169977), pp. 169-170.
9Id. at 171-173.
10
See Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, rollo (G.R. No. 169977), pp. 174-177.
11See Memorandum for Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc., rollo (G.R. No. 169900), p. 588. In their
joint memorandum, Alfredo and Winifred did not deny receipt of full payment from IDRI and in
fact prays that IDRI be considered a buyer in good faith and for value, rollo, (G.R. No. 169900),
pp. 421-440.
12Rollo (G.R. No. 169977), pp. 178-179.
13Rollo (G.R. No. 169900), pp. 221-259.

14Id. at 257-259.
15Id. at 126-127.
16Spouses Guiang v. CA, 353 Phil. 578 (1998).
17Alinasv. Alinas, G.R. No. 158040, 14 April 2008, 551 SCRA 154, citing Homeowners
Savings and Loan Bank v. Dailo, 493 Phil. 436, 442 (2005).
18Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, 425 Phil. 346 (2002).
19SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. - Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon order of the court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified
petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.
20Art.125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent
of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate
donations from the conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing
or family distress.
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, G.R. No 176556

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS
C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented
by their mother RITA QUIAO, Promulgated:
Respondents. July 4, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family where
children are born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in the
community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and fight over properties, without
regard to the message they send to their children.Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our
obligation to rule on this case involving legal separation escalating to questions on dissolution and
partition of properties.
The Case
This case comes before us via Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The petitioner seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order [2]dated January 8, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said order, we are asked to issue a
Resolution defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of legal separation
in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or alternatively, in accordance
with the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.
Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal
separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). [3] Subsequently, the RTC rendered a
Decision[4] dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-
respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but
the marriage bond shall not be severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely,
Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the
plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the
RCBC, all the remaining properties, namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of
[P]45,740.00.
[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership
is forfeited in favor of the common children.
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [P]19,000.00 as

attorney's fees and litigation expenses of [P]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.[5]
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for under
Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation. [6]
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution[7] which the trial court
granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby granted. Let a
writ of execution be issued for the immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution [9] which reads as
follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B.
QUIAO you cause to be made the sums stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic],
together with your lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution
and your lawful fees, then we command you that of the lands and buildings of the said
[petitioner], you make the said sums in the manner required by law. You are enjoined to
strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings immediately after
the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.[10]
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents the
amount of P46,870.00, representing the following payments:
(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;

(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.[11]
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,[12] asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits
Earned.
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order[13] dated August 31,
2006, which held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of
the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. [14] The Order
further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits
earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. [15] The dispositive portion
of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all
the remaining properties after deducting the payments of the debts for only separate
properties of the defendant-respondent shall be delivered to him which he has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [17] on
September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order[18]dated November 8, 2006, holding
that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider
the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of net profit
earned.[19] Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside.
NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common
children, is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family
Code.[20]
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[21] praying for the
correction and reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007,[22] the
trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration
whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31,
2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this instant
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON

PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF
LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED
UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND

AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF
THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS
ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE

OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF
THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?[23]
Our Ruling
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain laws, we are
well-aware that the respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated October
10, 2005 has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was filed. [24] Thus, we are constrained
to resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10, 2005 and subsequently discuss
the matters that we can clarify.
The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and
executory at the time the Motion for Clarification was filed on
July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal
is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
(30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided in
the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that it would be practical
to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [26]
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to
the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. [27] In other words,
a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial
court's decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to
avail of the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or
final order in question final and executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner
neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or after 67
days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for execution; and on
February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of execution. Finally, when
the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had
lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net profits earned. From the foregoing,
the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the RTCs Decision dated October 10, 2005. For
270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had already been partially
executed. Thus at the time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial courts decision has
become final and executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the reglementary period
to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this
Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became
final.[28]
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being such, the
petitioner's thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of
the decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that a void judgment is no judgment at
all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor any obligation. [29] But what precisely
is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment becomes void?
A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief or
no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both. [30] In other words, a court, which does
not have the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties,
will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.[31]
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the trial
court has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon
an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide,
among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status and property relations of the husband
and wife or those living together.[32] The Rule on Legal Separation[33] provides that the petition [for legal
separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non-
resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. [34] In
the instant case, herein respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six
months prior to the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the
respondent's petition below.Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both
parties, considering that summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served upon the
herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed his Answer to the Complaint
on January 9, 2001.[35] Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the questioned judgment,
has jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial court is clearly
not void ab initio, since it was rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such, the same
cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is meant to correct what may be considered an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law.[36]In fact, we have ruled that for [as] long as the public respondent
acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing
more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.[37] Granting without
admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's remedy
should be an appeal filed within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do
this. He has already lost the chance to question the trial court's decision, which has become immutable
and unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify the very question raised below and nothing more.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the October 10,
2005 judgment has already become immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a woman who
is not his wife;[38]
(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita;[39]
(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership; [40]
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership;[41]
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody; [42]
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession;[43]
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
spouse;[44]
(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of gains and
pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during the marriage, whether
acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved; [45]
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they were living
together;[46]
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed;[47]
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and liquidated and
the fact that respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the administration of these properties; [48]
(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under Article 121
of the Family Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling P503,862.10 shall be charged to the income
generated by these properties;[49]
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had separate
properties which can satisfy his share for the support of the family; [50]
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7); [51]
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall therefore be
divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the children's legitime; [52]
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children;[53] and
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of P19,000.00 as attorney's
fees and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.[54]
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, we will
discuss the following issues for the enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case
since the parties' property relation is governed by the system
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision
under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal
separation.
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article 129(7) of the Family
Code applies in this case. We agree with the trial court's holding.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the record, we can
deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the
time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No.
386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains.[55] Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute
or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime.In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations of the
petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property relation, the
husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from
their work or industry.[56] The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal
partnership of gains.[57]
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law
in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129
of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable
because according to Article 256 of the Family Code [t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
law.[58]
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal
partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2)
and 129 of the Family Code?
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: As earlier
adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being
owned in common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be given retroactive
application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net remainder of the
conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code.[59] In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses
is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired
vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of
the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common
by the husband and wife.[60] Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the
conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after the
promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family Code may deprive
him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits retroactive application
of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals,[61] we define and explained vested right in the following manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon
events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and
which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term
vested right expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and
natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto the present or

future enjoyment of property.[62] (Citations omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson
S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,[63] we also explained:
The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due

process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the
right has become vested.Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and
[64]
irrefutable. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may
lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-
aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to
her.[65] In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets
between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting
and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. [66] Second, when the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting
what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. [67] Thus, the
petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's vested right is one
founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision
is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the
conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share
of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the
children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership
property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries,
or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not
apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net
profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even
under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he
is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the
chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the
Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,[68] we reiterated our long-standing ruling that:
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the
conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an
equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the
community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is
limited to the net remainder or remanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from the
liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the
marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there
are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective
heirs.[69] (Citations omitted)
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision dated October 10,
2005 that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code. [70] The petitioner did not
file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is now precluded from
questioning the trial court's decision since it has become final and executory. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from disturbing the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 because final and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by
this Court.[71]
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the present case
since the parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains and since the trial court's Decision has attained finality and immutability.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the
fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the
products of their labor and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of net profits earned by the conjugal partnership for
purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that since
there is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture
as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies.
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of net profits earned in the
conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute
community?
Now, we clarify.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property relations
between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of net profits. As earlier discussed, Article
129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. In other words, the
computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under Article 129 of the said Code.
Moreover, as to the definition of net profits, we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code,
since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under
Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. [72] Thus, without any iota of doubt,
Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the
Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the processes used under the
dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the
processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
Code.
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community regime and
the conjugal partnership regime.
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes
joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family
Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community
is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in
the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally
owned.[73]
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared,
listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each;
then the debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute community's
assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple
will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be
delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall
be divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property
at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. [74]
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits requires that we first find the market
value of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value
of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute community and this result to
the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the
market value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the net profits. [75]
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see what will happen
if we apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no separate
properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of the absolute community. And
its market value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute community constitutes the market value
at dissolution.
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all the properties
which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the community. Such debts and obligations
will be subtracted from the market value at dissolution.
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total assets of the
absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And from such net asset/remainder of
the petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market value at the time of marriage will be
subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes the net profits.
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would be returned to
each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. However, in the
Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his
children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left
to the petitioner since both parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear that
Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining net profit. As
earlier explained, the definition of net profits in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the
absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2)
of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of
the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.[76] From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and
debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. [77]
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article 129
of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal
partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the
conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts

and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset
thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in
the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership
of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the
conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter
be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or
deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse,
even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the
profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has
been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the
partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse
with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age
of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties of
the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the couple's conjugal
properties and their separate properties.[78] In the instant case, the trial court found that the couple has
no separate properties when they married.[79] Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal
properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de

Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.[80]
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during the marriage
is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership; [81]and if the community is enriched
at the expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties
to their respective owners shall be made.[82]
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal
partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective
separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations,
the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable. [83]
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of the wife
shall be returned to each of them.[84] In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial
court that the spouses have no separate properties,[85] there is nothing to return to any of them. The
listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains
in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective
heirs.[86] However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits
of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property
which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled to
any property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial
court. However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January 8, 2007.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of
Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional
Trial Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in
accordance with the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1] Rollo, pp. 7-35.

[2] Penned by Judge Eduardo S. Casals; id. at 115-122.
[3] Id. at 36.
[4] Id. at 36-57.
[5] Id. at 56-57.
[6] A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC.
[7] Rollo, p. 185.
[8] Id. at 59.
[9] Id. at 58-59.
[10] Id. at 59.
[11] Id. at 60.
[12] Id. at 61-69.
[13] Id. at 70-76.
[14] Id. at 75.
[15] Id. at 74-75.
[16] Id. at 75-76.
[17] Id. at 77-86.
[18] Id. at 87-91.
[19] Id. at 90.
[20] Id. at 91.
[21] Id. at 92-97.
[22] Id. at 115-122.
[23] Id. at 18.
[24] Id. at 143-146.
[25] 506 Phil. 613, 629 (2005).
[26] Id. at 626.
[27] Id. at 627.
[28] PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., v. Milan, G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010, 617 SCRA 258.
[29] Rollo, p. 166.
[30] See Moreno, Federico B., Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1988, p. 998.
[31] People v. Judge Navarro, 159 Phil. 863, 874 (1975).
[32]
R.A. No. 8369, Section 5(d).
[33] A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC.
[34] Id. at Section 2(c).
[35] Rollo, p. 38.
[36] Sps. Edillo v. Sps. Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 21, 2010, 610 SCRA 590, 601-602.
[37] Lim v. Judge Vianzon, 529 Phil. 472, 483-484 (2006); See also Herrera v. Barretto and Joaquin, 25
Phil. 245, 256 (1913), citing Miller v. Rowan, 251 Ill., 344.
[38] Rollo, pp. 50-51.
[39] Id. at 51.
[40] Id.
[41] Id. at 51-52.
[42] Id. at 52 and 56.
[43] Id. at 52.
[44] Id.
[45] Id.
[46] Id.
[47] Id. at 52-53.
[48] Id. at 53.
[49] Id. at 53-54.
[50] Id. at 55.
[51] Id.
[52]
Id. at 56.
[53] Id. at 57.
[54] Id.
[55] CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 119.
[56] Id. at Art. 142.
[57] Id. at Art. 143.
[58] FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 256.
[59] Rollo, p. 29.
[61] G.R. No. 172027, July 29, 2010, 626 SCRA 180, 201.
[62] Id. at 199.
[63]
The Court consolidated the following cases: ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S.
Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056; Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 168207; Association of
Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. v. Cesar V. Purisima, et al., G.R. No. 168461; Francis Joseph G.
Escudero v. Cesar V. Purisima, et al, G.R. No. 168463; and Bataan Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. v.
Hon. Eduardo R. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 168730.
[64] Id.
[65] Rollo, p. 37.
[66] Id. at 39.
[67] Id. at 55-57.
[68] 482 Phil. 877-894 (2004).
[69] Id. at 890-891.
[70]
Rollo, p. 55.
[71] Malayan Employees Association-FFW v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 181357, February
2, 2010, 611 SCRA 392, 399; Catmon Sales Int'l. Corp. v. Atty. Yngson, Jr., G.R. No. 179761, January
15, 2010, 610 SCRA 236, 245.
[72] FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 102(4).
[73] Id. at Art. 91; See also Tolentino, Arturo, M., COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE WITH THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 379 (1990).
[74] FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 102.
[75] Tolentino, Arturo, M., COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE WITH THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 401-402
(1990).
[77] Tolentino, Arturo, M., COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE, 365 (1974).

[78]
Tolentino, Arturo, M., COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES: VOLUME ONE WITH THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 472 (1990).
[79] Rollo, p. 55.
[80] Id. at 56-57.
[82] Id. at Art. 129(3).
[83] Id. at Art. 129(4).
[84] Id. at Art. 129(5).
[85] Rollo, p. 55.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO,
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE
DOES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on expectancy in fabled
fortune.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her
husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have
custody of her husband in consortium.
On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of
unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari
pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. 2 This case was consolidated
with another case3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K.
Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to
see her.
On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus 4 for lack of merit, and granted the
petition5 to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7
What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision. 8
On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a.
m., without requiring the mandatory presence of the parties.
In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit:
(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner Potenciano
Ilusorio;
(b) Whether the same is relevant; and
(c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same. 9

The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its resolution, enjoined the parties and
their lawyers to initiate steps towards an amicable settlement of the case through mediation and other
means.
On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and compliance of the parties with the
resolution of October 11, 2000.10
On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion praying that
Potenciano Ilusorio be produced before the Court and be medically examined by a team of medical
experts appointed by the Court.11
On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Court's order of January
31 , 2001.12
The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for reconsideration are mere reiterations of her
arguments that have been resolved in the decision.
Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus:
First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium
and that Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, the very root cause of the entire
petition is her desire to have her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she
wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.
Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin
and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights
out of pure greed.14 She claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign
away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued
that since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees
Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were
the ones controlling the corporations.15
The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March
23, 1999.16Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing
anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not
have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought
before the Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state.
We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see
his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that may
be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.
Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the facts found by
the Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and
incomplete. We see no reason why the High Court of the land need go to such length. The hornbook
doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court. 17 We
emphasize, it is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again. 18 Although there are exceptions to
the rule,19 Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance.
Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family
Code support her position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live
together and care for each other. We agree.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. 21
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having
separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between
husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem"
respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.22
On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his Creator and Supreme
Judge. Let his soul rest in peace and his survivors continue the much prolonged fracas ex aequo et
bono.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the case has been
rendered moot by the death of subject.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51689.
2 Docketed as G.R. No. 139789.
3 G. R No. 139808.
4 G. R. No. 139789.
5 G. R. No. 139808.
6 In CA-G.R. SP No. 51689, promulgated on April 5, 1999.
7 Decision, Rollo of G.R. No. 139808, pp. 290-A 290-J.
8 Promulgated on May 12, 2000.
9 Rollo of G. R No. 139808, p. 409.
10 Rollo of G. R No. 139808, p. 438.
11 Rollo of G. R No. 139808, p. 453-A.
12 Rollo of G. R No. 139808, p. 596.
13 Rollo of G. R. No. 139789, p. 24.
14 Rollo of G.R. No. 139808, p. 311.
15 Rollo of G.R. No. 139789, p. 560.
16 Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G. R. SP No. 51689, Rollo of G.R. No. 139789, pp. 29-38.
17 Omandam vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128750, January 18, 2001.
18Co vs. Court of Appeals, 317 Phil. 230, 238 [1995]; Gobonseng, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,
316 Phil. 570 [1995].
19Romago Electric Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G. R No. 125947, June 8, 2000; Halili vs. Court of
Appeals, 287 SCRA 465 [1998]; Bautista vs. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16
[1994].
20
Art. 68, Family Code.
21Tsoi vs. Lao-Tsoi, 334 Phil. 294 [1997], citing Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298
[1964].
22 Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 21.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001]
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C.

TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA,
RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modification the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No. 4593, declaring as void a deed of donation inter vivos executed
by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its subsequent resolution [3] denying reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered
owners of Lot No. 437-A located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street) and Calle
Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot was 418
square meters.[4] After the death of Zosima on October 3, 1980, Francisco and his mother-in-law,
Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which
the latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to Francisco.[5] On June 27,
1916, Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds. [6]
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia
Bellosillo,[7] the latters cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian,[8] and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to
take care of his house, as well as the store inside. [9]
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and
Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same
room,[10] while Erlinda Tabancura,[11] another niece of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her
that Cirila was his mistress.[12] On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who could enter
the masters bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that Francisco in any case was too old
for her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse.[13]
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of
Francisco.[14] Cirila testified that she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old
widower when she began working for the latter; that he could still walk with her assistance at that
time;[15] and that his health eventually deteriorated and he became bedridden. [16] Erlinda Tabancura
testified that Franciscos sole source of income consisted of rentals from his lot near the public
streets.[17] He did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper, though he provided her family
with food and lodging.[18]
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument
denominated Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150
square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same
instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that the
donation was being made in consideration of the faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the
past ten (10) years. The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.[19] and later registered by Cirila
as its absolute owner.[20]
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, the lot which Cirila received from
Francisco had a market value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00.[21]
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for declaration of nullity of
a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the
decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the
common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void under
Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion
of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding the
donation void under this provision of the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based on
the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of one Cirila Comille.
The documents were (1) an application for a business permit to operate as real estate lessor, dated
January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the signature Cirila Comille; [22] (2) a sanitary permit to operate
as real estate lessor with a health certificate showing the signature Cirila Comille in black ink; [23] and
(3) the death certificate of the decedent with the signature Cirila A. Comille written in black ink. [24] The
dispositive portion of the trial courts decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille recorded as
Doc. No. 7; Page No. 3; Book No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic T.
Lacaya (Annex A to the Complaint) null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and lot subject of the deed unto the
plaintiffs within thirty (30) days after finality of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision subject
of this appeal. As already stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was based
on (1) the testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly showing
Cirilas use of Franciscos surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals
to Cirila as Franciscos common-law wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the common-law wife of the late
Francisco Comille is not correct and is a reversible error because it is based on a misapprehension of
facts, and unduly breaks the chain of circumstances detailed by the totality of the evidence, its
findings being predicated on totally incompetent or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere
speculation, conjecture or possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in
Quiason, Philippine Courts and their Jurisdictions, 1993 ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence from the plaintiff to
defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in a way probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable jurisprudence in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil. 577,
584.[26]
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code
to the circumstances of this case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence
of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and (j) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.[27] It appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence
presented by both parties, the general rule should apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan,[28] we held that the term cohabitation or living together as husband and wife
means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of
course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may
no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a
woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out
to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated,
do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. [29] In this jurisdiction, this
Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the
parties,[30]a conviction of concubinage, [31] or the existence of illegitimate children.[32]
Was Cirila Franciscos employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco
resided under one roof for a long time. It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship,
since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At
the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and
patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancuras testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there
are other indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura
presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname Comille. As previously stated,
these are an application for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor, [33] a sanitary permit to
operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate,[34] and the death certificate of Francisco.[35] These
documents show that Cirila saw herself as Franciscos common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have
used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Franciscos lessees in Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs.
Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy, RTC Civil Case No. 4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees
referred to Cirila as the common-law spouse of Francisco. Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand
from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but
Franciscos common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law. [36] It
is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human
reason would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Franciscos common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation
made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]Per Associate Justice Bernardo Salas and concurred in by Associate Justices Presbiterio Velasco,
Jr. and Edgardo Cruz.
[2]
Per Judge Wilfredo C. Martinez.
[3]
Per Associate Justice Edgardo Cruz, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Teodoro Regino
and Presbitero Velasco, Jr.
[4] Exh. A; Records, p. 66.
[5] Exh. D; id., p. 71.
[6] Exhs. E & 3; id., pp. 73, 102.
[7] Also called Letitia, Letecia, and Leticia Belosillo.
[8] Also known as Luzminda.
[9] TSN (Leticia Bellosillo), pp. 12-15, Sept. 27, 1994; TSN (Cirila Arcaba), p. 8, Aug. 14, 1994.
[10] TSN (Leticia Bellosillo), p. 14, Sept. 27, 1994.
[11] Also known as Erlinda Tabangcura Vda. de Batocael.
[12] TSN (Erlinda Tabancura), p. 17, April 28, 1994.
[13] TSN (Cirila Arcaba), p. 11, Aug. 14, 1996.
[14] TSN (Leticia Bellosillo), pp. 14-16, Sept. 27, 1994.
[15] TSN (Cirila Arcaba), p. 8, Aug. 14, 1996.
[16] Id., p. 10; Rollo, p. 33.
[17] TSN (Erlinda Tabancura), p. 12, April 28, 1994; TSN (Cirila Arcaba), p. 8, Aug. 14, 1994.
[18] TSN (Erlinda Tabancura), p. 9, Aug. 14, 1996.
[19] Exh. C; Records, p. 69.
[20] TSN (Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.), pp. 3-4, Feb. 13, 1995; Exh. 3-B; Records, p. 102.
[21] Exh. B; Records, p. 68.
[22] Exh. H-1; id., p. 154.
[23] Exh. J-2; id., p. 155.
[24] Exh. O-1; id., p. 159.
[25] Decision, pp. 1-13; Rollo, pp. 36-48.
[26] Petition, p. 7; Rollo, p. 9.
[27]
Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123547, May 21, 2001; Floro v. Llenado, 244 SCRA 715
(1995).
[28]
112 SCRA 113 (1982); See also A. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines
115-117 (1995).
[29] 52 Am Jur 2d 50.
[30]
The Insular Life Company, Ltd. v. Ebrado, 80 SCRA 181 (1977); Matabuena v. Cervantes, 38 SCRA
284 (1971).
[31] Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun, 129 SCRA 675 (1984).
[32]
People v. Villagonzalo, 238 SCRA 215 (1994); Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 676
(1994).
[33] Exh. H-1; Records, p. 154.
[34] Exh. J-2; id., p. 155.
[35] Exh. O-1; id., p. 159.
[36] LABOR CODE, ARTS. 99-101.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

The controlling facts are undisputed:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

4 Articles 53 (4) and 58, New Civil Code.

5 Article 80 (3), New Civil Code.

6 Article 70, New Civil Code.

[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000]

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA

In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice

FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,

The trial court made the following findings:

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you?

A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.

A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19

Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

The petition lacks merit.