G.R. No.

L-32599 June 29, 1979 the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya.
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-
vs. driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed Civil
Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents. Case No. 80803 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents jeep-
David G. Nitafan for petitioner. owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol. truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for the damages sustained by his car as a
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar. result of the collision involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner
Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum allegedly for the
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J: reason that petitioner was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief against both
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of respondent on only one of them.
Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for Damages based on quasi- On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No.
delict against respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar. 80803 on the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as follows: cases and that it fails to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way vehicular petitioner.
accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Complaint
Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the afore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss
Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and On September 30, 1970, petitioner sought before this Court the review of that dismissal,
driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations to which petition we gave due course.
for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge also
Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The race dismissed the case as against the former. Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it
against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for causing is true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by hitting it at the right could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it
rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car, which happened arose, the New Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an
to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed express reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the
as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of same would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2 Petitioner's Motion for
petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00 Reconsideration thereof was denied in the order dated February 23, 1971, with
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver Salazar respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more
overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left going towards the poblacion of decisive interpretation of the rule. 3
Marilao, and hit his car which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before us, also to
the impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's review the last two mentioned Orders, to which we required jeep-owner-driver Salazar to
jeep was bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the file an Answer.
accident was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the other The Complaint against
hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal truck-owner Timbol
indicating his intention to turn left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970, dismissing
the intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montova causing him to In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge sustained
be thrown out of the jeep, which then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal
was coming from the opposite direction. Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria, rendered made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove
judgment, stating in its decretal portion: damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not state a cause
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Freddie of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-
Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage suffered by his car.
property thru reckless imprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227, and Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case,
hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have
Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of P972.50 as actual damages, been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties;
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine and (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and
indemnity, with costs. second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense action.
charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de oficio, and his bond It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we
is ordered canceled agree with petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of action between Criminal Case
SO ORDERED. 1 No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to
in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court
had put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7 said:
accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing
Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228. 4 And more importantly, in the criminal cases, the damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an
cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a
under Article l of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code As held independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and
in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5 individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in. Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed
individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and
Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles
Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso,
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized
Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant- Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso
petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil ... .
Code. In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further observed
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct
is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the
along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that
suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the sudden Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in character and is not within
swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but
Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of
the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision, the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940."
petitioner's car suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No.
incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees. Clearly, 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his
therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or The suit against
wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or jeep-owner-driver Salazar
lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal Case No.
truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, were alleged in SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.
the Complaint. 6 At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action
Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck- for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminalunder Article 100 of the Revised
owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under
regardless of the result of the latter. Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously
the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of application by the offended party. 8
the result of the latter. The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa
that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and
independent civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action, invoking section intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil
2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says: liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the
Section 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No.
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal SM-228.
action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the trial Court in this wise:
preceding section. Such civil action shau proceed independently of the In view of what has been proven and established during the trial,
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of accused Freddie Montoya would be held able for having bumped and
evidence. hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar,
 Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of
Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.
result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue
cannot be held able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident
car. 9 involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeep- Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit.
owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner's car. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising
In other words, "the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly, from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents
inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit,
delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of (b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising
Court 10 which provides: from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: the criminal proceeding has been rendered;
xxx xxx xxx The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the
c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final denied on August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of
judgment that the fact from which the civil night arise did not exist. ... First Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging
And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex- that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil
delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. 2
case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the
action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in
of the Civil Code quoted here under: suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the when an independent civil action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence ... improper; and that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable is a Writ of mandamus (Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to by respondent Judge in an Order dated November 14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").
that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on
not the acquittal is due to that ground. February 25, 1971. 3
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we sustain Petitioner makes these:
respondent Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
different grounds. 1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY,
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO.
against private respondent Felino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his 189 FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE
successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN
dated January 30, 1971 and February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case THE CRIMINAL CASE.
No. 80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld. 2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO
No costs. AVOID DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM
SO ORDERED. FOR DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur. 3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979 FOR certiorari IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant, QUESTION IS INTERLOCUTORY.
vs. 4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First DEFECTIVE. 4
Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an
Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents- independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal
appellees. action.
Eriberto Seno for appellant. From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is
Jose M. Mesina for appellees. evident that the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated
principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
between the parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
only for one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
whom one is responsible. 1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of
xxx xxx xxx unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's)
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a
xxx xxx xxx devious and cumbersome method of obtaining a reliel True, there is
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the
a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure
driver, Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being
the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and
petitioner because of the collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the similar public conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with
damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents. which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant, cases to go through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably
Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to
employees, particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
based on quasi-delict. 5 At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are
independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code. principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n) is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi- the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said,
delict, which is readily discernible from the foregoing codal provision, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,
has been expounded in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620- others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And
621, 6 thus: according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only responsibility should fail upon the principal or director who could have
reckless but also simple imprudence. if we were to hold that articles chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the such
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol.
punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility
Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747)
damage to property through any degree of negligence even the that before third persons the employer and employee vienen a ser
slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en
hability arising from crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would la de quien la emplea y utihza (become as one personality by the
remain for quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We are loath to impute to the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and utilizes him.) All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor
not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost vehicles.
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 11910 of the Spanish Civil overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack
Code. of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for
culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to seek
 damages only by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime, (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles (5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed (Emphasis supplied)
by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa concept of quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. 7 It makes
to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property"
pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both
seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we cause the injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property
stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. An
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for
crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the bet damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to persons or property."
ter safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent
and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of
civil action, not depending on the issues, stations and results of a Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his criminal case is finally terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the
counsel is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. other errors assigned becomes unnecessary.
(Garcia vs. Florida 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First
supplied) Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil
section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading: Case No. 189 of that Court.
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles Without pronouncement as to costs.
31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are SO ORDERED.
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the c action, G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of the vs.
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
evidence. minor, defendants-appellees.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action." Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in
surrounding the civil action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the BARREDO, J.:
Rules of Court, supra which refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29,
in the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case 6 once 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing,
the criminal action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages
can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his
until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for
civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when
should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides: Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from 1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1,
the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of 2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or
the result of the latter. in res-adjudicata;
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of 3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill,
obligation "not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through
the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that: emancipation by marriage.
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from: (P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
(1) Law; was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the
(2) Contracts; defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was
(3) Quasi-contracts; issued:
 Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil
January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well- The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
founded. machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and
reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case. therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it
SO ORDERED. was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not
Record on Appeal.) the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
Our resolution the following assignment of errors: prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore
UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT - a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject
I matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa
111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE; aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized,
II even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after
FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA; such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising
III from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically
OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V.
and House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
IV negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages
DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902
GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.) The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are
appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it
of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only
Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles
acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the
appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little
the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to. scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the
Our resolution are: slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere
criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed? would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth
legally married? life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-
clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish
607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Civil Code.
Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
 damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this
not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and 2177 of the new code provides:
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
Phil.) damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at
Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of
the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter
lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by
forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said
to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence,
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that
seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be
stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence
crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the
better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and,
additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also
action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article
621, 73 Phil.) 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether
Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the may be punishable by law.4
spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full- extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant
grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made action against him.
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage
Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that
Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be
doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that upheld.
the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article
of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909
enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorneys
father, mother or guardian." fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not The factual antecedents are as follows:
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic;
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan,
father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his
Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from
situation which is not unusual. Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of
solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the
obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive
causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for
sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the
it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans
(See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites Memorial Medical Center.
judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos,
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on
be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal
is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
subsidiary to that of his son. In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to 1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well
proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees. as the venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur. 2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave. 3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division. 4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the
existence of the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being
Separate Opinions ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although
AQUINO, J, concurring: there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into. 3
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of
when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo
board enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil
developed in any society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad
tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the
same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work.
74 Phil. 576, 579). Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to
G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007 look for a job. She narrated that she thought her husband went to his hometown in
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners, Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went to her husbands
vs. hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go there.1awphil.net
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent. The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the
DECISION court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies
of respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said case, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to pay
together with other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of costs.12
Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.13
and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error
documents he had brought.8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and in the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects. 14
documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since the Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the
same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said Court of Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence. I
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
TSN9 of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case TRIAL COURTS QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND
No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
he was already dead. II
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
TSNs10 of the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in TRIAL COURTS RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89. THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision? III
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
resolute in saying it was the former who caused the smash up. TRIAL COURTS UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs DEFENSE
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows: OF EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took EMPLOYEES.
place. According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to IV
70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit TRIAL COURTS QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEE.
Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with
jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still this Court, we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife,
at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita
testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan. 15
following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. In their Reply to respondents Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision 16 of
He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge 17 of Reckless
followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also overtook Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a
the jeep in which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the photocopy thereof.
plaintiff swerved to the right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of
stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be
meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47,
plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
behind. For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former
Bus bumped the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in
the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the
before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the
[Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.22
would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by
their respective vehicles.]11 the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No.
of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The
Manliclic. criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare
and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads: that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants employees.23
ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the
of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and the materials testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI
used for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and failed to object on their admissibility.
another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as attorneys fees,
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its
document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:
since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to "4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board
except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the
provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are North Luzon Expressway heading South towards Manila together with
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the same;
be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 24 Hearsay "5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the
evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is above-described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a
made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being
deserves.25 driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently lost control of
of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case his vehicle;
when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the "6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor
testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners. 26 Moreover, vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside
petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato where it fell on its drivers side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the
Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies above-described motor vehicle which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND
of plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to be
why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;
case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot "7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which
argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the compounded plaintiffs frail physical condition and required his hospitalization
criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate
testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando "8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-
Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely
unfair. due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that it will be denied due process drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or
when the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos observance of existing traffic rules and regulations;
in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI "9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the
to raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its
a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper drivers; x x x"31
time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not comply with Section 47. Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his
Puno,28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite part?
therein petitioners assertion that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent
130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was "when the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause
belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to object based on said of the accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the
ground. jeep"; x x x
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been We do not agree.
admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was
"testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though said section beyond the control of accused-appellant.
speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former xxxx
case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being part Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for
of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined
the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled. 29 in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.32
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner
as to how the accident occurred is more credible than respondents version. They anchor Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the
their contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules
of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical of Criminal Procedure which reads:
Injuries. (b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics acquittal in the civil case. extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising civil might arise did not exist.
from, or based on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The
reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not
to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas operation of their respective vehicle.
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15)
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. 33 about the fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a took place. The allegation that another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a was testified to by him only in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court
delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he should not be held
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also apparent
an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now when it would be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit
settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. 35 the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he
liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the
However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or collision took place. For this inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the bus took
which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability place should be taken with caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar Buan
based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned by the former
speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep when the collision
action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of. between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however,
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that statement should not escape attention. The one-day difference between the giving of the
accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is two statements would be significant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not having received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his
exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely statement and the statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the unreliability of the
Code.36 An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he
case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. did not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took
disregard that of respondents. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the place.
process of overtaking respondents jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to xxxx
the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision. If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been
conclusive on the Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should
review thereof unless: have fallen on the road itself rather than having been forced off the road. Useless,
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by
(2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.40
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash up, there
conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.41 Under Article 218042 of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 39 immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in in the selection and supervision of their employee.43
driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the
version of the respondent, the trial court has this say: required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner
Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner
Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can
diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of ready further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and
investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the required due regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI
diligence in the supervision of its employees. know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to being lent to all the drivers?
their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily
and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount
complied with everything that was incumbent on them.44 of P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 45 it was explained that: towing and repair of his jeep.47 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the damages, same, under the circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the by the trial court as moral damages must be reduced to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.49 The amount
whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award
necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be of P15,000.00 for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and law.51
beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the
acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00;
functions. and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees petitioners.
may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence SO ORDERED.
of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of
the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the
latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the
existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is
decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption. [G.R. No. 104392. February 20, 1996]
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the
formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being
complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of
its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing
the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
safety were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a
APPEALS (First Division), HON. RUBEN C.
family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as AYSON, in his capacity as Acting Presiding
follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
very good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. IV, Baguio City, and ALFREDO
There is no evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There
has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus BOADO, respondents.
company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should
manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody
in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while DECISION
operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to
MENDOZA, J.:
supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has
been negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its
employees, particularly the driver involved in this case. Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not
enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner buses which were used in transporting employees of the
Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above- Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to
mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough
supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have
its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in correctly denied petitioners motion to suspend the
Loakan, Baguio City. proceedings in the civil case.3
On January 7, 1990, one of his buses figured in a Hence this petition for review on certiorari. There is no
vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by dispute that private respondent, as offended party in the
private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring a separate
Road, BaguioCity. As a result of the accident, a criminal civil action, based on the same accident, either against the
case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to driver, Herminio Andaya, or against the latters employer,
property and multiple physical injuries was filed on March 2, herein petitioner Ruben Maniago. The question is whether
1990 against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya, with the despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch III, where it was may nonetheless bring an action for damages against
docketed as Criminal Case No. 7514-R. A month later, on petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code:
April 19, 1990, a civil case for damages was filed by private
respondent Boado against petitioner himself The complaint, Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
docketed as Civil Case No. 2050-R, was assigned to Branch another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
IV of the same court. for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the
this Chapter.
criminal case against his driver. But the trial court, in its order
dated August 30, 1991, denied petitioners motion on the Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but
proceed independently of the criminal action, in addition to also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the
criminal case. xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
the Court of Appeals, maintaining that the civil action could their employees and household helpers acting within the
not proceed independently of the criminal case because no scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made not engaged in any business or industry.
in the criminal case.
Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence
On January 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed under the above-quoted provisions is entirely separate and
his petition on the authority of Garcia v. distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
Florido, and Abellana v. Marave, which it held allowed a
1 2
the Revised Penal Code.
civil action for damages to be filed independently of the
criminal action even though no reservation to file the same However, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
has been made. Therefore, it was held, the trial court Procedure, while reiterating that a civil action under these
provisions of the Civil Code may be brought separately from this action separately. (The records show that while this
the criminal action, provides that the right to bring it must be case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the criminal
reserved. This Rule reads: action was dismissed on July 10, 1992 for failure of the
prosecution to file a formal offer of its evidence, with the
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a consequence that the prosecution failed to prosecute its
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery case. Accordingly, it seems to be petitioners argument that
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, since the civil action to recover damages was impliedly
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves instituted with the criminal action, the dismissal of the
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action.)
prior to the criminal action.
Private respondent admits that he did not reserve the
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the right to institute the present civil action against Andayas
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, employer. He contends, however, that the rights provided in
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code are substantive rights
from the same act or omission of the accused. and, as such, their enforcement cannot be conditioned on a
reservation to bring the action to enforce them separately.
xxx xxx xxx Private respondent cites in support of his position
statements made in Abellana v. Marave,4 Tayag v.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil Alcantara,5 Madeja v. Caro,6 and Jarantilla v. Court of
actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to Appeals,7to the effect that the requirement to reserve the civil
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the action is substantive in character and, therefore, is beyond
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such the rulemaking power of this Court under the Constitution.8
reservation. After considering the arguments of the parties, we have
reached the conclusion that the right to bring an action for
xxx xxx xxx damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required
by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed.
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In
the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of I.
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil A. To begin with, 1 quite clearly requires that a
action which has been reserved may be brought by the reservation must be made to institute separately all civil
offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be
action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such
civil actions are not limited to those which arise from the
Based on these provisions, petitioner argues that the offense charged, as originally provided in Rule 111 before
civil action against him was impliedly instituted in the the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In other words
criminal action previously filed against his employee the right of the injured party to sue separately for the
because private respondent did not reserve his right to bring
recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived
delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but
must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by
with the criminal action.9 either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has
disappeared.11The statement that Rule 111, 1 of the 1964
Thus Rule 111, 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Rules is an unauthorized amendment of substantive law,
Procedure expressly provides:
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.- When a for the reservation is not the ruling of the Court but only an
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery aside, quoted from an observation made in the footnote of a
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, decision in another case.12
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves Another case cited by private respondent in support of
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action his contention that the civil case need not be reserved in the
prior to the criminal action. criminal case is Abellana v. Marave13 in which the right of
persons injured in a vehicular accident to bring a separate
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the action for damages was sustained despite the fact that the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, right to bring it separately was not reserved. But the basis of
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising the decision in that case was the fact that the filing of the
from the same act or omission of the accused. civil case was equivalent to a reservation because it was
made after the decision of the City Court convicting the
B. There are statements in some cases implying that accused had been appealed. Pursuant to Rule 123, 7 of the
Rule 111, 1 and 3 are beyond the rulemaking power of the 1964 Rules, this had the effect of vacating the decision in
Supreme Court under the Constitution. A careful the criminal case so that technically, the injured parties could
examination of the cases, however, will show that approval still reserve their right to institute a civil action while the
of the filing of separate civil action for damages even though criminal case was pending in the Court of First Instance. The
no reservation of the right to institute such civil action had statement the right of a party to sue for damages
been reserved rests on considerations other than that no independently of the criminal action is a substantive right
reservation is needed. which cannot be frittered away by a construction that could
In Garcia v. Florido10 the right of an injured person to render it nugatory without raising a serious constitutional
bring an action for damages even if he did not make a question14 was thrown in only as additional support for the
reservation of his action in the criminal prosecution for ruling of the Court.
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was upheld On the other hand, in Madeja v. Caro15 the Court held
on the ground that by bringing the civil action the injured that a civil action for damages could proceed even while the
parties had in effect abandoned their right to press for criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence was
recovery of damages in the criminal case. . .. Undoubtedly pending and did not have to await the termination of the
an offended party loses his right to intervene in the criminal case precisely because the widow of the deceased
had reserved her right to file a separate civil action for liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the
damages. We do not see how this case can lend support to criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising
the view of private respondent. from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the
criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately
In Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals16 the ruling is that the
is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the
acquittal of the accused in the criminal case for physical
criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it
injuries through reckless imprudence on the ground of
was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the
reasonable doubt is not a bar to the filing of an action for
acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability
damages even though the filing of the latter action was not
unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from
reserved. This is because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code which
which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of
provides that when an accused is acquitted on the ground
Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt,
a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may Indeed the question on whether the criminal action and
be instituted. This ruling obviously cannot apply to this case the action for recovery of the civil liability must be tried in a
because the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case single proceeding has always been regarded a matter of
against the driver is the fact that the prosecution failed to procedure and, since the rulemaking power has been
prove its case as a result of its failure to make a formal offer conferred by the Constitution on this Court, it is in the
of its evidence. Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on keeping of this Court. Thus the subject was provided for by
Evidence provides that The court shall consider no evidence G.O. No. 58, the first Rules of Criminal Procedure under the
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which American rule. Sec. 107 of these Orders provided:
the evidence is offered must be specified.
The privileges now secured by law to the person claiming
To the same effect are the holdings in Tayag, Sr. v.
to be injured by the commission of an offense to take part
Alcantara,17 Bonite v. Zosa18 and Diong Bi Chu v. Court of in the prosecution of the offense and to recover damages
Appeals.19 Since Art. 29 of the Civil Code authorizes the
for the injury sustained by reason of the same shall not be
bringing of a separate civil action in case of acquittal on held to be abridged by the provisions of this order; but such
reasonable doubt and under the Revised Rules of Criminal
person may appear and shall be heard either individually or
Procedure such action is not required to be reserved, it is
by attorney at all stages of the case, and the court upon
plain that the statement in these cases that to require a conviction of the accused may enter judgment against him
reservation to be made would be to sanction an
for the damages occasioned by his wrongful act. It shall,
unauthorized amendment of the Civil Code provisions is a
however, be the duty of the promotor fiscal to direct the
mere dictum. As already noted in connection with the case prosecution, subject to the right of the person injured to
of Garcia v. Florido, that statement was not the ruling of the
appeal from any decision of the court denying him a legal
Court but only an observation borrowed from another case.20
right.
The short of it is that the rulings in these cases are
consistent with the proposition herein made that, on the This was superseded by the 1940 Rules of Court, Rule
basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil 106 of which provided:
SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal reservation to bring them separately must be made. Put in
action. - Unless the offended party has waived the civil another way, it is the conduct of the trial of the civil action -
action or expressly reserved the right to institute it after the not its institution through the filing of a complaint - which is
termination of the criminal case, and subject to the allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the
provisions of Section 4 hereof, he may intervene, criminal case.
personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
C. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right
to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code
This Rule was amended thrice, in 1964, in 1985 and
lastly in 1988. Through all the shifts or changes in policy as separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more
than one action for the same act or omission against the
to the civil action arising from the same act or omission for
same party. Any award made against the employer, whether
which a criminal action is brought, one thing is clear: The
change has been effected by this Court. Whatever contrary based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the
Revised Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180
impression may have been created by Garcia v. Florid21and
its progeny22 must therefore be deemed to have been of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the
accused.23
clarified and settled by the new rules which require
reservation of the right to recover the civil liability, otherwise In the present case, the criminal action was filed against
the action will be deemed to have been instituted with the the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and
criminal action. found insolvent, his employer would have been held
subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a
Contrary to private respondents contention, the
requirement that before a separate civil action may be separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from
quasi-delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that
brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or
the employer would be held liable because in such a case
defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in
the general interest of orderly procedure. The requirement is there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of
the accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and
merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised
Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person independent civil action under the Civil Code would not
result in the employee being held liable for the same act or
criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party
omission. The rule requiring reservation in the end serves to
the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever
questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before implement the prohibition against double recovery for the
same act or omission.24 As held in Barredo v. Garcia,25 the
it may be brought separately.
injured party must choose which of the available causes of
Indeed, the requirement that the right to institute actions action for damages he will bring. If he fails to reserve the
under the Civil Code separately must be reserved is not filing of a separate civil action he will be deemed to have
incompatible with the independent character of such actions. elected to recover damages from the bus driver on the basis
There is a difference between allowing the trial of civil of the crime. In such a case his cause of action against the
actions to proceed independently of the criminal prosecution employer will be limited to the recovery of the latters
and requiring that, before they may be instituted at all, a subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
 II. his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital
Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO.,
Nor does it matter that the action is against the employer INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.
to enforce his vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil BIDIN, J.:
Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the
employer is very much a party, as long as the right to bring Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution dated
or institute a separate action (whether arising from crime or November 17, 1991 denying herein, petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
from quasi delict) is not reserved.26 The ruling that a decision On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon
convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of
which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed
employer not only with regard to its civil liability but also with Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
regard to its amount because the liability of an employer Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her
own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for
cannot be separated but follows that of his employee27 is true damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard
not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp.
("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed
but also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code. as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:
Since whatever is recoverable against the employer is 1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO.,
ultimately recoverable by him from the employee, the policy INC., (Defendant Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY
against double recovery requires that only one action be CORPORATION (Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly
organized and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, with offices
maintained for the same act or omission whether the action at 10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza Santa Cruz, Manila.
is brought against the employee or against his employer. They are impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the former
appears to be the employer of defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA
Thus in Dulay v. Court of Appeals28 this Court held that an (defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly acknowledged
employer may be sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code responsibility for the acts of defendant TORZUELA by extending its
sympathies to plaintiffs.
and that the right to bring the action did not have to be Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of
reserved because, having instituted before the criminal case defendant SAFEGUARD and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the
time of the incident complained of, was under their control and
against the employee, the filing of the civil action against the supervision. . . .
employer constituted an express reservation of the right to 3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA,
while he was on duty as security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang,"
institute its separately. Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON
V. DULAY with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to defendant
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per Police Report dated
RESERVED and the complaint against petitioner is January 7, 1989, copy attached as Annex A);
4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was
DISMISSED. due to the concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant
TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to
SO ORDERED. him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995 supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children xxx xxx xxx
KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed (Rollo, pp. 117-118)
DULAY, petitioners, Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and
vs. attorney's fees. The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p.
ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed 110)
that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for
the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability reconsideration thereof was denied.
therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the
negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, New Civil Code.
cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision
petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela of their employees. This liability is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or
in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the
p. 55-59). Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the employer may therefore proceed
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96). Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under
provides: Article 33 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
whom one is responsible. action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
xxx xxx xxx proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which
even though the former are not engaged in any business or an provides:
industry. Rule 111. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently In the cases
(Emphasis supplied) provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may
Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private respondents as be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the
alternative defendants in the complaint is justified by the following: the Initial Investigation criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela is an employee of (Emphasis supplied)
SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated,
petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98). frustrated and attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with conviction is unnecessary since the civil action can proceed independently of the criminal
homicide was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as action. On the other hand, it is the private respondents' argument that since the act was
Criminal Case No. 89-1896. not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not
motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses
respondent judge held that the complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to
constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela death, aside from being purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not
in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in the performance of his duties. have been part of his duties as security guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil
Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the Code covers only: acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the
defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also declared We find for petitioners.
that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal
100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi- shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated April 13, 1989 states: Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
ultimate facts alleged in the verified complaint and in accordance with instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
the applicable law on the matter as well as precedents laid down by civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the
the Supreme Court, the complaint against the alternative defendants civil action prior to the criminal action.
Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and
 Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on
the accused. (Emphasis supplied) both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis supplied)
requirement of express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate
357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence
private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial
delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is reasons, this Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action. Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193
constituting the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The [1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However,
purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily
of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil.
itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical
112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would show injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also
that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293
the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno [1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action
Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must
the complaint. be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his
between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the duties as a security guard. It having been established that the instant action is not ex-
provisions of this Chapter. delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the private respondents.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by
scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v.
case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that: Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided in the selection and supervision of their employee.
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of negligence attributable to private respondents.
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal action, the general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi- cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of
in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or action exist if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the
has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied) (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held: may maintain an action for recovery of damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only SCRA 33 [1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or [1993])
negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an entrance door of the area, prompting petitioner to grope for a way out. While doing so, a
actionable breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents folding wooden counter top fell on her head causing her serious brain injury. The
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that negligence was allegedly compounded by respondents PHI and DTPCIs failure to render
Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting prompt and adequate medical assistance.
occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or Petitioners version of the antecedents of this case is as follows:
SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This does not On 11 June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited her
operate however, to establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not the friend, petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at the hotels swimming pool facility.
shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was They started bathing at around 5:00 p.m. At around 7:00 p.m., the hotels swimming pool
actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents attendant informed them that the swimming pool area was about to be closed. The two
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of subsequently proceeded to the shower room adjacent to the swimming pool to take a
a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable, are questions which can be shower and dress up. However, when they came out of the bathroom, the entire
better resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove swimming pool area was already pitch black and there was no longer any person around
their respective allegations and defenses. In determining whether the allegations of a but the two of them. They carefully walked towards the main door leading to the hotel
complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the but, to their surprise, the door was locked.9
complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause Petitioner and Delia waited for 10 more minutes near the door hoping someone would
of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del come to their rescue but they waited in vain. Delia became anxious about their situation
Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a so petitioner began to walk around to look for a house phone. Delia followed petitioner.
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be After some time, petitioner saw a phone behind the lifeguards counter. While slowly
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava walking towards the phone, a hard and heavy object, which later turned out to be the
Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation folding wooden counter top, fell on petitioners head that knocked her down almost
v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of unconscious.10
cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified the hotel telephone operator
than that a claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur of the incident. Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at the main entrance door of the
v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury swimming pool area but it took them at least 20 to 30 minutes to get inside. When the
to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present evidence of door was finally opened, three hotel chambermaids assisted petitioner by placing an ice
such injury. pack and applying some ointment on her head. After petitioner had slightly recovered,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The she requested to be assisted to the hotels coffee shop to have some rest. Petitioner
decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated demanded the services of the hotel physician.11
April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is Dr. Violeta Dalumpines (Dr. Dalumpines) arrived. She approached petitioner and
remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This decision is immediately introduced herself as the hotel physician. However, instead of immediately providing the
executory. needed medical assistance, Dr. Dalumpines presented a "Waiver" and demanded that it
SO ORDERED. be signed by petitioner, otherwise, the hotel management will not render her any
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur. assistance. Petitioner refused to do so.12
G.R. No. 180440 December 5, 2012 After eating her dinner and having rested for a while, petitioner left the hotels coffee
DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG, Petitioner, shop and went home. Thereupon, petitioner started to feel extraordinary dizziness
vs. accompanied by an uncomfortable feeling in her stomach, which lasted until the following
PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., DUSIT THANI PUBLIC CO., LTD. And FIRST day. Petitioner was constrained to stay at home, thus, missing all her important
LEPANTO TAISHO INSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondents. appointments with her patients. She also began experiencing "on" and "off" severe
DECISION headaches that caused her three (3) sleepless nights. 13
PEREZ, J.: Petitioner, thus, decided to consult a certain Dr. Perry Noble (Dr. Noble), a neurologist
For this Courts resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the from Makati Medical Center, who required her to have an X-ray and a Magnetic
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87065 Resonance Imaging (MRI) tests.14 The MRI Report15 dated 23 August 1995 revealed the
dated 9 August 2007, affirming the Decision2 of Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court following findings:
(RTC) of Makati City in Civil Case No. 96-1367 dated 21 February 2006, dismissing for CONSULTATION REPORT:
lack of merit herein petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huangs Complaint for Damages. MRI examination of the brain shows scattered areas of intraparenchymal contusions and
Assailed as well is the Court of Appeals Resolution3 dated 5 November 2007 denying for involving mainly the left middle and posterior temporal and slightly the right anterior
lack of merit petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. temporal lobe.
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages filed on 28 August 1996 by petitioner Other small areas of contusions with suggestive pertechiae are seen in the left fronto-
Dr. Genevieve L. Huang4against herein respondents Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI)5 and parietal, left parieto-occipital and with deep frontal periventricular subcortical and cortical
Dusit Thani Public Co., Ltd. (DTPCI),6 as owners of Dusit Thani Hotel Manila (Dusit regions. There is no mass effect nor signs of localized hemorrhagic extravasation.
Hotel);7 and co-respondent First Lepanto Taisho Insurance Corporation (First The ventricles are not enlarged, quite symmetrical without shifts or deformities; the
Lepanto),8 as insurer of the aforesaid hotel. The said Complaint was premised on the peripheral sulci are within normal limits.
alleged negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCIs staff, in the untimely putting off all The C-P angles, petromastoids, sella, extrasellar and retro orbital areas appear normal.
the lights within the hotels swimming pool area, as well as the locking of the main The brainstem is unremarkable.
IMPRESSION: Scattered small intraparenchymal contusions mainly involving the left 5. Cervical Sprain, chronic recurrent
middle-posterior temporal lobe and also right medial anterior temporal, both deep frontal It is my opinion that the symptoms she complained of in the foregoing history are all
subcortical, left parieto-occipital subcortical and cortical regions. Ischemic etiology not related to and a result of the injury sustained on 11 June 1995.
ruled out. No localized intra - or extracerebral hemorrhage.16 It is further my opinion that the above diagnosis and complaints do materially affect her
Petitioner claimed that the aforesaid MRI result clearly showed that her head was duties and functions as a practicing physician and dermatologist, and that she will require
bruised. Based also on the same MRI result, Dr. Noble told her that she has a very treatment for an undetermined period of time.
serious brain injury. In view thereof, Dr. Noble prescribed the necessary medicine for her The percentage of disability is not calculated at this time and will require further
condition.17 evaluation and observation.34
Petitioner likewise consulted a certain Dr. Ofelia Adapon, also a neurologist from Makati Dr. Pardo, Jr. then advised petitioner to continue her medications. 35
Medical Center, who required her to undergo an Electroencephalogram examination Petitioner likewise consulted a certain Dr. Tenchavez36 for her follow-up EEG.37 He
(EEG) to measure the electrostatic in her brain.18Based on its result,19 Dr. Ofelia Adapon similarly prescribed medicine for petitioners deep brain injury. He also gave her pain
informed her that she has a serious conditiona permanent one. Dr. Ofelia Adapon killer for her headache and advised her to undergo physical therapy. Her symptoms,
similarly prescribed medicines for her brain injury.20 however, persisted all the more.38
Petitioners condition did not get better. Hence, sometime in September 1995, she In 1999, petitioner consulted another neurologist at the Makati Medical Center by the
consulted another neuro-surgeon by the name of Dr. Renato Sibayan (Dr. Sibayan), who name of Dr. Martesio Perez (Dr. Perez) because of severe fleeting pains in her head,
required her to have an X-ray test.21 According to petitioner, Dr. Sibayans finding was arms and legs; difficulty in concentration; and warm sensation of the legs, which
the same as those of the previous doctors that she had consultedshe has a serious symptoms also occurred after the 11 June 1995 incident. Upon examination, Dr. Perez
brain injury.22 observed that petitioner has been experiencing severe pains and she has a slight
By reason of the unfortunate 11 June 1995 incident inside the hotels swimming pool difficulty in concentration. He likewise noted that there was a slight spasm of petitioners
area, petitioner also started to feel losing her memory, which greatly affected and neck muscle but, otherwise, there was no objective neurologic finding. The rest of
disrupted the practice of her chosen profession.23 Thus, on 25 October 1995, petitioner, petitioners neurologic examination was essentially normal.39
through counsel, sent a demand letter24 to respondents PHI and DTPCI seeking payment Dr. Perezs neurologic evaluation40 of petitioner reflected, among others: (1) petitioners
of an amount not less than P100,000,000.00 representing loss of earnings on her past medical history, which includes, among others, mitral valve stenosis; (2) an
remaining life span. But, petitioners demand was unheeded. interpretation of petitioners EEG results in October 1995 and in January 1999, i.e., the
In November 1995, petitioner went to the United States of America (USA) for further first EEG showed sharp waves seen bilaterally more on the left while the second one
medical treatment. She consulted a certain Dr. Gerald Steinberg and a certain Dr. Joel was normal; and (3) interpretation of petitioners second MRI result, i.e., petitioner has a
Dokson25 from Mount Sinai Hospital who both found that she has "post traumatic-post permanent damage in the brain, which can happen either after a head injury or after a
concussion/contusion cephalgias-vascular and neuralgia."26 She was then prescribed to stroke. Dr. Perez concluded that petitioner has post-traumatic or post concussion
take some medications for severe pain and to undergo physical therapy. Her condition syndrome.41
did not improve so she returned to the Philippines.27 Respondents, on the other hand, denied all the material allegations of petitioner and, in
Petitioner, once again, consulted Dr. Sibayan, who simply told her to just relax and to turn, countered the latters statement of facts, thus:
continue taking her medicines. Petitioner also consulted other neurologists, who all According to respondents PHI and DTPCI, a sufficient notice had been posted on the
advised her to just continue her medications and to undergo physical therapy for her glass door of the hotel leading to the swimming pool area to apprise the people,
neck pain.28 especially the hotel guests, that the swimming pool area is open only from 7:00 a.m. to
Sometime in 1996, petitioner consulted as well a certain Dr. Victor Lopez (Dr. Lopez), an 7:00 p.m.42 Though the hotels swimming pool area is open only between the aforestated
ophthalmologist from the Makati Medical Center, because of her poor vision, which she time, the lights thereon are kept on until 10:00 p.m. for, (1) security reasons; (2)
has experienced for several months.29 Petitioners Eye Report dated 5 March housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning of the swimming pool surroundings; and (3)
199630 issued by Dr. Lopez stated: "IMPRESSION: Posterior vitreous detachment, right people doing their exercise routine at the Slimmers World Gym adjacent to the
eye of floaters." Dr. Lopez told petitioner that her detached eye is permanent and very swimming pool area, which was then open until 10:00 p.m., to have a good view of the
serious. Dr. Lopez then prescribed an eye drop to petitioner. 31 hotels swimming pool. Even granting that the lights in the hotels swimming pool area
For petitioners frustration to dissipate and to regain her former strength and physical were turned off, it would not render the area completely dark as the Slimmers World
well-being, she consulted another neuro-surgeon from Makati Medical Center by the Gym near it was well-illuminated.43
name of Dr. Leopoldo P. Pardo, Jr. (Dr. Pardo, Jr.).32 She disclosed to Dr. Pardo, Jr. that Further, on 11 June 1995, at round 7:00 p.m., the hotels swimming pool attendant
at the age of 18 she suffered a stroke due to mitral valve disease and that she was given advised petitioner and Delia to take their showers as it was already closing time.
treatments, which also resulted in thrombocytopenia. In Dr. Pardo, Jr.s medical Afterwards, at around 7:40 p.m., Pearlie Benedicto-Lipana (Ms. Pearlie), the hotel staff
evaluation of petitioner dated 15 May 1996,33 he made the following diagnosis and nurse, who was at the hotel clinic located at the mezzanine floor, received a call from the
opinion: hotel telephone operator informing her that there was a guest requiring medical
DIAGNOSIS AND OPINION: assistance at the hotels swimming pool area located one floor above the clinic. 44
This patient sustained a severe head injury in (sic) 11 June 1995 and as a result of which Immediately, Ms. Pearlie got hold of her medical kit and hurriedly went to the hotels
she developed the following injuries: swimming pool area. There she saw Delia and petitioner, who told her that she was hit
1. Cerebral Concussion and Contusion on the head by a folding wooden counter top. Although petitioner looked normal as there
2. Post-traumatic Epilepsy was no indication of any blood or bruise on her head, Ms. Pearlie still asked her if she
3. Post-concussional Syndrome needed any medical attention to which petitioner replied that she is a doctor, she was
4. Minimal Brain Dysfunction
fine and she did not need any medical attention. Petitioner, instead, requested for a was contradicted by one of the witnesses presented by the respondents who positively
hirudoid cream to which Ms. Pearlie acceded.45 declared that it has been a normal practice of the hotel management not to put off the
At about 8:00 p.m., after attending to petitioner, Ms. Pearlie went back to the hotel clinic lights until 10:00 p.m. to allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the swimming pool
to inform Dr. Dalumpines of the incident at the hotels swimming pool area. But before surroundings, including the toilets and counters. Also, the lights were kept on for security
she could do that, Dr. Dalumpines had already chanced upon Delia and petitioner at the reasons and for the people in the nearby gym to have a good view of the swimming pool
hotels coffee shop and the latter reported to Dr. Dalumpines that her head was hit by a while doing their exercise routine. Besides, there was a remote possibility that the hotels
folding wooden counter top while she was inside the hotels swimming pool area. When swimming pool area was in complete darkness as the aforesaid gym was then open until
asked by Dr. Dalumpines how she was, petitioner responded she is a doctor, she was 10:00 p.m., and the lights radiate to the hotels swimming pool area. As such, petitioner
fine and she was already attended to by the hotel nurse, who went at the hotels would not have met the accident had she only acted with care and caution. 54
swimming pool area right after the accident. Dr. Dalumpines then called Ms. Pearlie to The trial court further struck down petitioners contention that the hotel management did
verify the same, which the latter confirmed.46 not extend medical assistance to her in the aftermath of the accident. Records showed
Afterwards, Dr. Dalumpines went back to petitioner and checked the latters condition. that the hotel management immediately responded after being notified of the accident.
Petitioner insisted that she was fine and that the hirudoid cream was enough. Having The hotel nurse and the two chambermaids placed an ice pack on petitioners head.
been assured that everything was fine, Dr. Dalumpines requested petitioner to execute a They were willing to extend further emergency assistance but petitioner refused and
handwritten certification47 regarding the incident that occurred that night. Dr. Dalumpines merely asked for a hirudoid cream. Petitioner even told them she is a doctor and she was
then suggested to petitioner to have an X-ray test. Petitioner replied that it was not fine. Even the medical services offered by the hotel physician were turned down by
necessary. Petitioner also refused further medical attention. 48 petitioner. Emphatically, petitioner cannot fault the hotel for the injury she sustained as
On 13 June 1995, petitioner called up Dr. Dalumpines. The call, however, had nothing to she herself did not heed the warning that the swimming pool area is open only from 7:00
do with the 11 June 1995 incident. Instead, petitioner merely engaged in small talk with a.m. to 7:00 p.m. As such, since petitioners own negligence was the immediate and
Dr. Dalumpines while having her daily massage. The two talked about petitioners proximate cause of her injury, she cannot recover damages. 55
personal matters, i.e., past medical history, differences with siblings and family over The trial court similarly observed that the records revealed no indication that the head
inheritance and difficulty in practice. Petitioner even disclosed to Dr. Dalumpines that she injury complained of by petitioner was the result of the alleged 11 June 1995 accident.
once fell from a horse; that she had a stroke; had hysterectomy and is incapable of Firstly, petitioner had a past medical history which might have been the cause of her
having children for her uterus had already been removed; that she had blood disorder, recurring brain injury. Secondly, the findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation
particularly lack of platelets, that can cause bleeding; and she had an "on" and "off" between the 11 June 1995 accident and the brain damage suffered by petitioner. Even
headaches. Petitioner oftentimes called Dr. Dalumpines at the hotel clinic to discuss Dr. Perez himself testified that the symptoms being experienced by petitioner might have
topics similar to those discussed during their 13 June 1995 conversation. 49 been due to factors other than the head trauma she allegedly suffered. It bears stressing
Also, during one of their telephone conversations, petitioner requested for a certification that petitioner had been suffering from different kinds of brain problems since she was 18
regarding the 11 June 1995 incident inside the hotels swimming pool area. Dr. years old, which may have been the cause of the recurring symptoms of head injury she
Dalumpines accordingly issued Certification dated 7 September 1995, which states is experiencing at present. Absent, therefore, of any proof establishing the causal relation
that:50 between the injury she allegedly suffered on 11 June 1995 and the head pains she now
CERTIFICATION suffers, her claim must fail. Thirdly, Dr. Teresita Sanchezs (Dr. Sanchez) testimony
This is to certify that as per Clinic records, duty nurse Pearlie was called to attend to an cannot be relied upon since she testified on the findings and conclusions of persons who
accident at the poolside at 7:45PM on 11 June 1995. were never presented in court. Ergo, her testimony thereon was hearsay. Fourthly, the
Same records show that there, she saw petitioner who claimed the folding countertop fell medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of doctors whom petitioner
on her head when she lifted it to enter the lifeguards counter to use the phone. She sought for examination or treatment were neither identified nor testified to by those who
asked for Hirudoid. issued them. Being deemed as hearsay, they cannot be given probative value. Even
The same evening petitioner met Dr. Dalumpines at the Coffee Shop. After narrating the assuming that petitioner suffered head injury as a consequence of the 11 June 1995
poolside incident and declining Dr. Dalumpines offer of assistance, she reiterated that accident, she cannot blame anyone but herself for staying at the hotels swimming pool
the Hirudoid cream was enough and that petitioner being a doctor herself, knew her area beyond its closing hours and for lifting the folding wooden counter top that
condition and she was all right. eventually hit her head.56
This certification is given upon the request of petitioner for whatever purpose it may For petitioners failure to prove that her serious and permanent injury was the result of
serve, 7 September 1995 at Makati City.51 (Emphasis supplied). the 11 June 1995 accident, thus, her claim for actual or compensatory damages, loss of
Petitioner personally picked up the afore-quoted Certification at the hotel clinic without income, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees, must all fail. 57
any objection as to its contents.52 With regard to respondent First Lepantos liability, the trial court ruled that under the
From 11 June 1995 until 7 September 1995, the hotel clinic never received any complaint contract of insurance, suffice it to state that absent any cause for any liability against
from petitioner regarding the latters condition. The hotel itself neither received any respondents PHI and DTPCI, respondent First Lepanto cannot be made liable thereon.
written complaint from petitioner.53 Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals with the following
After trial, the court a quo in its Decision dated 21 February 2006 dismissed petitioners assignment of errors: (1) the trial court erred in finding that the testimony of petitioner is
Complaint for lack of merit. self-serving and thus void of credibility; (2) the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of
The trial court found petitioners testimony self-serving, thus, devoid of credibility. proximate cause in cases of breach of contract and even assuming arguendo that the
Petitioner failed to present any evidence to substantiate her allegation that the lights in doctrine is applicable, petitioner was able to prove by sufficient evidence the causal
the hotels swimming pool area were shut off at the time of the incident. She did not even connection between her injuries and respondents PHI and DTPCIs negligent act; and (3)
present her friend, Delia, to corroborate her testimony. More so, petitioners testimony the trial court erred in holding that petitioner is not entitled to damages. 58
On 9 August 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the findings and Moreover, petitioner failed to sufficiently substantiate that the medical symptoms she is
conclusions of the trial court. currently experiencing are the direct result of the head injury she sustained on 11 June
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this wise: 1995 as was aptly discussed in the lower courts findings.
At the outset, it is necessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide this case on xxxx
the theory that herein respondents PHI and DTPCI are liable for breach of contract or on It bears stressing that in civil cases, the law requires that the party who alleges a fact and
the theory of quasi-delict. substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it. Hence, for
xxxx petitioner to be entitled to damages, she must show that she had suffered an actionable
It cannot be gainsaid that herein petitioners use of the hotels pool was only upon the injury. Regrettably, petitioner failed in this regard.59 (Emphasis supplied).
invitation of Delia, the hotels registered guest. As such, she cannot claim contractual Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit in a Resolution dated
relationship between her and the hotel. Since the circumstances of the present case do 5 November 2007.
not evince a contractual relation between petitioner and respondents, the rules on quasi- Hence, this Petition raising the following issues:
delict , thus, govern. (1) Whether or not the findings of fact of the trial court and of the Court of
The pertinent provision of Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or Appeals are conclusive in this case.
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for (2) Whether or not herein respondents PHI and DTPCI are responsible by
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation implied contract to exercise due care for the safety and welfare of the petitioner.
between the parties, is called quasi-delict." (3) Whether or not the cause of action of the petitioner can be based on both
A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delict or tort, also breach of contract and tort.
known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound (4) Whether or not it is respondents PHI and DTPCI and its employees who are
by contract, whether express or implied. Thus, to sustain a claim liability under quasi- liable to the petitioner for negligence, applying the well-established doctrines of
delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault res ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior.
or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; (5) Whether the petitioners debilitating and permanent injuries were a result of
and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the the accident she suffered at the hotel on 11 June 1995.
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. (6) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the payment of damages,
Viewed from the foregoing, the question now is whether respondents PHI and DTPCI attorneys fees, interest, and the costs of suit.
and its employees were negligent? We do not think so. Several factors militate against (7) Whether or not the respondent insurance company is liable, even directly, to
petitioners contention. the petitioner.
One. Petitioner recognized the fact that the pool areas closing time is 7:00 p.m.. (8) Whether or not petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
She, herself, admitted during her testimony that she was well aware of the sign Court of Appeals is pro forma.60
when she and Delia entered the pool area. Hence, upon knowing, at the outset, Petitioner argues that the rule that "findings of fact of the lower courts are conclusive and
of the pools closing time, she took the risk of overstaying when she decided to must be respected on appeal" finds no application herein because this case falls under
take shower and leave the area beyond the closing hour. In fact, it was only the jurisprudentially established exceptions. Moreover, since the rationale behind the
upon the advise of the pool attendants that she thereafter took her shower. afore-mentioned rule is that "the trial judge is in a vantage point to appreciate the
Two. She admitted, through her certification that she lifted the wooden bar conduct and behavior of the witnesses and has the unexcelled opportunity to evaluate
countertop, which then fell onto her head. The admission in her certificate their testimony," one logical exception to the rule that can be deduced therefrom is when
proves the circumstances surrounding the occurrence that transpired on the the judge who decided the case is not the same judge who heard and tried the case.
night of 11 June 1995. This is contrary to her assertion in the complaint and Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals in ruling that no contractual relationship
testimony that, while she was passing through the counter door, she was existed between her and respondents PHI and DTPCI since her use of the hotels
suddenly knocked out by a hard and heavy object. In view of the fact that she swimming pool facility was only upon the invitation of the hotels registered guest. On the
admitted having lifted the counter top, it was her own doing, therefore, that contrary, petitioner maintains that an implied contract existed between them in view of
made the counter top fell on to her head. the fact that the hotel guest status extends to all those who avail of its servicesits
Three. We cannot likewise subscribe to petitioners assertion that the pool area patrons and invitees. It follows then that all those who patronize the hotel and its
was totally dark in that she herself admitted that she saw a telephone at the facilities, including those who are invited to partake of those facilities, like petitioner, are
counter after searching for one. It must be noted that petitioner and Delia had generally regarded as guests of the hotel. As such, respondents PHI and DTPCI are
walked around the pool area with ease since they were able to proceed to the responsible by implied contract for the safety and welfare of petitioner while the latter
glass entrance door from shower room, and back to the counter area where the was inside their premises by exercising due care, which they failed to do.
telephone was located without encountering any untoward incident. Otherwise, Petitioner even asserts that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar
she could have easily stumbled over, or slid, or bumped into something while any liability for tort since the act that breaks a contract may also be a tort. Hence, the
searching for the telephone. This negates her assertion that the pool area was concept of change of theory of cause of action pointed to by respondents is irrelevant.
completely dark, thereby, totally impairing her vision. Petitioner similarly avows that the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior
xxxx are applicable in this case. She argues that a person who goes in a hotel without a
The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than that the "bukol" or hematoma and comes out of it with a "bukol" or hematoma is a clear case of
proximate and immediate cause of the injury of petitioner was due to her own negligence. res ipsa loquitur. It was an accident caused by the fact that the hotel staff was not
present to lift the heavy counter top for petitioner as is normally expected of them
because they negligently locked the main entrance door of the hotels swimming pool
area. Following the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, respondents PHI and DTPCIs (j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
negligence is presumed and it is incumbent upon them to prove otherwise but they failed and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
to do so. Further, respondents PHI and DTPCI failed to observe all the diligence of a (k) When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees, hence, disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
following the doctrine of respondeat superior, they were liable for the negligent acts of conclusion.64
their staff in not verifying if there were still people inside the swimming pool area before Upon meticulous perusal of the records, however, this Court finds that none of these
turning off the lights and locking the door. Had respondents PHI and DTPCIs employees exceptions is obtaining in this case. No such justifiable or compelling reasons exist for
done so, petitioner would not have been injured. Since respondents PHI and DTPCIs this Court to depart from the general rule. This Court will not disturb the factual findings
negligence need not be proved, the lower courts erred in shifting the burden to petitioner of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and adequately supported by the
and, thereafter, holding the hotel and its employees not negligent for petitioners failure to evidence on record.
prove their negligence. Moreover, petitioner alleges that there was no contributory Also, this Court will not review the factual findings of the trial court simply because the
negligence on her part for she did not do anything that could have contributed to her judge who heard and tried the case was not the same judge who penned the decision.
injury. And, even if there was, the same does not bar recovery. This fact alone does not diminish the veracity and correctness of the factual findings of
Petitioner equally declares that the evidence on record, including the objective medical the trial court.65 Indeed, "the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact
findings, had firmly established that her permanent debilitating injuries were the direct that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless
result of the 11 June 1995 accident inside the hotels swimming pool area. This fact has there is showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him." 66 In
not been totally disputed by the respondents. Further, the medical experts who had been this case, there was none.
consulted by petitioner were in unison in their diagnoses of her condition. Petitioner was It bears stressing that in this jurisdiction there is a disputable presumption that the trial
also able to prove that the falling of the folding wooden counter top on her head while courts decision is rendered by the judge in the regular performance of his official duties.
she was at the hotels swimming pool area was the cause of her head, eye and neck While the said presumption is only disputable, it is satisfactory unless contradicted or
injuries. overcame by other evidence. Encompassed in this presumption of regularity is the
Petitioner reiterates her claim for an award of damages, to wit: actual, including loss of presumption that the trial court judge, in resolving the case and drafting the decision,
income; moral, exemplary; as well as attorneys fees, interest and costs of suit. She reviewed, evaluated, and weighed all the evidence on record. That the said trial court
states that respondents PHI and DTPCI are liable for quasi-delict under Articles 19, 2176 judge is not the same judge who heard the case and received the evidence is of little
and 2180 of the New Civil Code. At the same time, they are liable under an implied consequence when the records and transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) are
contract for they have a public duty to give due courtesy, to exercise reasonable care complete and available for consideration by the former, 67 just like in the present case.
and to provide safety to hotel guests, patrons and invitees. Respondent First Lepanto, on Irrefragably, the fact that the judge who penned the trial courts decision was not the
the other hand, is directly liable under the express contract of insurance. same judge who heard the case and received the evidence therein does not render the
Lastly, petitioner contends that her Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of findings in the said decision erroneous and unreliable. While the conduct and demeanor
Appeals was not pro forma for it specifically pointed out the alleged errors in the Court of of witnesses may sway a trial court judge in deciding a case, it is not, and should not be,
Appeals Decision. his only consideration. Even more vital for the trial court judges decision are the contents
The instant Petition is devoid of merit. and substance of the witnesses testimonies, as borne out by the TSNs, as well as the
Primarily, only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a Petition for object and documentary evidence submitted and made part of the records of the case. 68
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 61 This Court is not a trier of This Court examined the records, including the TSNs, and found no reason to disturb the
facts and it is beyond its function to re-examine and weigh anew the respective evidence factual findings of both lower courts. This Court, thus, upholds their conclusiveness.
of the parties.62 Besides, this Court adheres to the long standing doctrine that the factual In resolving the second and third issues, a determination of the cause of action on which
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are petitioners Complaint for Damages was anchored upon is called for.
conclusive on the parties and this Court.63 Nonetheless, this Court has, at times, allowed Initially, petitioner was suing respondents PHI and DTPCI mainly on account of their
exceptions thereto, to wit: negligence but not on any breach of contract. Surprisingly, when the case was elevated
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or on appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner had a change of heart and later claimed that
conjectures; an implied contract existed between her and respondents PHI and DTPCI and that the
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; latter were liable for breach of their obligation to keep her safe and out of harm. This
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion; allegation was never an issue before the trial court. It was not the cause of action relied
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; upon by the petitioner not until the case was before the Court of Appeals. Presently,
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting; petitioner claims that her cause of action can be based both on quasi-delict and breach
(f) When in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of of contract.
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and A perusal of petitioners Complaint evidently shows that her cause of action was based
the appellee; solely on quasi-delict. Telling are the following allegations in petitioners Complaint:
(g) When the Court of Appeals findings are contrary to those by the trial court; 6. THAT, in the evening of 11 June 1995, between the hours from 7:00 to 8:00
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on oclock, after herein petitioner and her friend from New York, Delia, the latter
which they are based; being then a Hotel guest, were taking their shower after having a dip in the
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and hotels swimming pool, without any notice or warning, the Hotels staff put off all
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; the lights within the pool area including the lights on the hallway and also locked
the main entrance door of the pool area, x x x;
 7. THAT, Hotel guest Delia started to panic while petitioner pacified her by top on her head causing her serious brain injury. The said negligence was allegedly
telling her not to worry as they would both find their way out. Petitioner knowing compounded by respondents PHI and DTPCIs failure to render prompt and adequate
that within the area there is a house phone, started to look around while Delia medical assistance. These allegations in petitioners Complaint constitute a cause of
was following her, eventually petitioner saw a phone behind the counter x x x, action for quasi-delict, which under the New Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission
that while slowly moving on towards the phone on a stooping manner due to the which causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence. 70
darkness CAUSED BY UNTIMELY AND NEGLIGENTLY PUTTING OFF WITH It is evident from petitioners Complaint and from her open court testimony that the
THE LIGHTS BY THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS PHI AND DTPCIS reliance was on the alleged tortious acts committed against her by respondents PHI and
EMPLOYEE while passing through the open counter door with its Folding DTPCI, through their management and staff. It is now too late in the day to raise the said
Counter Top also opened, x x x, a hard and heavy object fell onto the head of argument for the first time before this Court.71
the petitioner that knocked her down almost unconscious which hard and heavy Petitioners belated reliance on breach of contract as her cause of action cannot be
object turned out to be the Folding Counter Top; sanctioned by this Court. Well-settled is the rule that a party is not allowed to change the
8. THAT, Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified the Hotel theory of the case or the cause of action on appeal. Matters, theories or arguments not
Telephone Operator about the incident, immediately the hotel staffs (sic) arrived submitted before the trial court cannot be considered for the first time on appeal or
but they were stranded behind the main door of the pool entrance and it too certiorari.72 When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be
(sic) them more than twenty (20) minutes to locate the hotel maintenance permitted to change his theory on appeal for to permit him to do so would not only be
employee who holds the key of the said main entrance door; unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
9. THAT, when the door was opened, two Hotel Chamber Maids assisted the justice and due process.73 Hence, a party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the
petitioner to get out of the counter door. Petitioner being a Physician tried to cause of action he stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to
control her feelings although groggy and requested for a HURIDOID, a medicine repudiate his theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the
for HEMATOMA, as a huge lump developed on her head while the two matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal.74
Chamber Maids assisted petitioner by holding the bag of ice on her head and In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the following differences
applying the medicine on the huge lump; between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and breach of contract (culpa contractual). In quasi-
10. THAT, petitioner after having recovered slightly from her nightmare, though delict, negligence is direct, substantive and independent, while in breach of contract,
still feeling weak, asked to be assisted to the Hotel Coffee Shop to take a rest negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the contractual obligation; there is a
but requested for the hotels Physician. Despite her insistent requests, the Dusit pre-existing contract or obligation.75 In quasi-delict, the defense of "good father of a
Hotel refused to lift a finger to assists petitioner who was then in distress until a family" is a complete and proper defense insofar as parents, guardians and employers
lady approached and introduced herself as the Hotels house Doctor. Instead are concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in
however of assisting petitioner by asking her what kind of assistance the Hotel the selection and supervision of employees.76 In quasi- delict , there is no presumption of
could render, in a DISCOURTEOUS MANNER presented instead a paper and negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence of the
demanding petitioner to affix her signature telling her that the Hotel defendant, otherwise, the formers complaint will be dismissed, while in breach of
Management would only assists and answer for all expenses incurred if contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be proved that there was breach of
petitioner signs the paper presented, but she refused and petitioner instead the contract and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in
wrote a marginal note on the said paper stating her reason therefore, said paper the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is followed. 77
later on turned out to be a WAIVER OF RIGHT or QUIT CLAIM; Viewed from the foregoing, petitioners change of theory or cause of action from quasi-
xxxx delict to breach of contract only on appeal would necessarily cause injustice to
14. THAT, due to the unfortunate incident caused by respondents PHI and respondents PHI and DTPCI. First, the latter will have no more opportunity to present
DTPCIs gross negligence despite medical assistance, petitioner started to feel evidence to contradict petitioners new argument. Second, the burden of proof will be
losing her memory that greatly affected and disrupted the practice of her chosen shifted from petitioner to respondents PHI and DTPCI. Petitioners change of theory from
profession x x x. quasi-delict to breach ofcontract must be repudiated.
xxxx As petitioners cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove
19. THAT, due to respondents PHI and DTPCIs gross negligence as being the presence of the following requisites before respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held
narrated which caused petitioner to suffer sleepless nights, depression, mental liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, and embarrassment with her defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection
Diplomate friends in the profession and industry, her social standing in the of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
community was greatly affected and hence, respondents PHI and DTPCI must incurred by the plaintiff.78 Further, since petitioners case is for quasi-delict , the
be imposed the hereunder damages, prayed for x x x and Artile (sic) 2176 and negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. 79 The
2199 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines x x x. burden of proof is upon petitioner. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that
xxxx "burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary
22. THAT, as to Moral, Exemplary and Actual Damages, as well as petitioners to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." It is then up
Loss of Income, the amounts are stated in its prayer hereunder. 69 for the plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the defendant to establish his defense.
It is clear from petitioners allegations that her Complaint for Damages was predicated on Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged because of the
the alleged negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCIs staff in the untimely putting off of negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence. It is even
all the lights within the hotels swimming pool area, as well as the locking of its main presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. The quantum of proof
door, prompting her to look for a way out leading to the fall of the folding wooden counter required is preponderance of evidence.80
In this case, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Even petitioners assertion of negligence on the part of respondents PHI and DTPCI in
utterly failed to prove the alleged negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI. Other than not rendering medical assistance to her is preposterous. Her own Complaint affirmed that
petitioners self-serving testimony that all the lights in the hotels swimming pool area respondents PHI and DTPCI afforded medical assistance to her after she met the
were shut off and the door was locked, which allegedly prompted her to find a way out unfortunate accident inside the hotels swimming pool facility. Below is the portion of
and in doing so a folding wooden counter top fell on her head causing her injury, no other petitioners Complaint that would contradict her very own statement, thus:
evidence was presented to substantiate the same. Even her own companion during the 14. THAT, due to the unfortunate incident caused by respondents PHI and DTPCIs
night of the accident inside the hotels swimming pool area was never presented to gross negligence despite medical assistance, petitioner started to feel losing her memory
corroborate her allegations. Moreover, petitioners aforesaid allegations were that greatly affected and disrupted the practice of her chosen profession. x x
successfully rebutted by respondents PHI and DTPCI. Here, we quote with conformity x.84 (Emphasis supplied).
the observation of the trial court, thus: Also, as observed by the trial court, respondents PHI and DTPCI, indeed, extended
x x x Besides not being backed up by other supporting evidence, said statement is being medical assistance to petitioner but it was petitioner who refused the same. The trial
contradicted by the testimony of Engineer Dante L. Costas, 81 who positively declared that court stated, thus:
it has been a normal practice of the Hotel management not to put off the lights until Further, herein petitioners asseverations that the Hotel Management did not extend
10:00P.M. in order to allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the pools medical assistance to her in the aftermath of the alleged accident is not true. Again, this
surrounding, the toilets and the counters. It was also confirmed that the lights were kept statement was not supported by any evidence other that the sole and self-serving
on for security reasons and so that the people exercising in the nearby gym may be able testimony of petitioner. Thus, this Court cannot take petitioners statement as a gospel
to have a good view of the swimming pool. This Court also takes note that the nearby truth. It bears stressing that the Hotel Management immediately responded after it
gymnasium was normally open until 10:00 P.M. so that there was a remote possibility the received notice of the incident. As a matter of fact, Ms. Pearlie, the Hotel nurse, with two
pool area was in complete darkness as was alleged by herein petitioner, considering that chambermaids holding an ice bag placed on petitioners head came to the petitioner to
the illumination which reflected from the gym. Ergo, considering that the area were extend emergency assistance when she was notified of the incident, but petitioner merely
sufficient (sic) illuminated when the alleged incident occurred, there could have been no asked for Hirudoid, saying she was fine, and that she was a doctor and know how to take
reason for the petitioner to have met said accident, much less to have been injured as a care of herself. Also, the Hotel, through its in-house physician, Dr. Dalumpines offered its
consequence thereof, if she only acted with care and caution, which every ordinary medical services to petitioner when they met at the Hotels coffee shop, but again
person is expected to do.82 petitioner declined the offer. Moreover, the Hotel as a show of concern for the petitioners
More telling is the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals, to wit: welfare, shouldered the expenses for the MRI services performed on petitioner at the
Viewed from the foregoing, the question now is whether respondents PHI and DTPCI Makati Medical Center. Emphatically, petitioner herself cannot fault the Hotel for the
and its employees were negligent? We do not think so. Several factors militate against injury she allegedly suffered because she herself did not heed the warning at the pool to
petitioners contention. the effect that it was only open from 7:00 to 7:00 P.M. Thus, when the petitioners own
One. Petitioner recognized the fact that the pool areas closing time is 7:00 p.m.. She, negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, shecannot recover
herself, admitted during her testimony that she was well aware of the sign when she and damages x x x.85
Delia entered the pool area. Hence, upon knowing, at the outset, of the pools closing With the foregoing, the following were clearly established, to wit: (1) petitioner stayed in
time, she took the risk of overstaying when she decided to take shower and leave the the hotels swimming pool facility beyond its closing hours; (2) she lifted the folding
area beyond the closing hour. In fact, it was only upon the advise of the pool attendants wooden counter top that eventually hit her head; and (3) respondents PHI and DTPCI
that she thereafter took her shower. extended medical assistance to her. As such, no negligence can be attributed either to
Two. She admitted, through her certification, that she lifted the wooden bar countertop, respondents PHI and DTPCI or to their staff and/or management. Since the question of
which then fell on to her head. The admission in her certificate proves the circumstances negligence is one of fact, this Court is bound by the said factual findings made by the
surrounding the occurrence that transpired on the night of 11 June 1995. This is contrary lower courts. It has been repeatedly held that the trial court's factual findings, when
to her assertion in the complaint and testimony that, while she was passing through the affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive and binding upon this Court, if they are
counter door, she was suddenly knocked out by a hard and heavy object. In view of the not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance
fact that she admitted having lifted the countertop, it was her own doing, therefore, that and influence. Petitioner has not presented sufficient ground to warrant a deviation from
made the counter top fell on to her head. this rule.86
Three. We cannot likewise subscribe to petitioners assertion that the pool area was With regard to petitioners contention that the principles of res ipsa loquitur and
totally dark in that she herself admitted that she saw a telephone at the counter after respondeat superior are applicable in this case, this Court holds otherwise.
searching for one. It must be noted that petitioner and Delia had walked around the pool Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction
area with ease since they were able to proceed to the glass entrance door from the speaks for itself." It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause
shower room, and back to the counter area where the telephone was located without thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and
encountering any untoward incident. Otherwise, she could have easily stumbled over, or not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence
slid, or bumped into something while searching for the telephone. This negates her and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is
assertion that the pool area was completely dark, thereby, totally impairing her vision. lacking.87 Simply stated, this doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of
xxxx absence or presence of negligence. If there is sufficient proof showing the conditions and
The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than that the circumstances under which the injury occurred, then the creative reason for the said
proximate and immediate cause of the injury of petitioner was due to her own doctrine disappears.88
negligence.83 (Emphasis supplied). Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the
defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or of respondents PHI and DTPCI, thus, the latter cannot also be held liable for negligence
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with and be made to pay the millions of pesos damages prayed for by petitioner.
the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any The issue on whether petitioners debilitating and permanent injuries were the result of
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. 89 the accident she suffered at the hotels swimming pool area on 11 June 1995 is another
In the case at bench, even granting that respondents PHI and DTPCIs staff negligently question of fact, which is beyond the function of this Court to resolve. More so, this issue
turned off the lights and locked the door, the folding wooden counter top would still not has already been properly passed upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. To
fall on petitioners head had she not lifted the same. Although the folding wooden counter repeat, this Court is bound by the factual findings of the lower courts and there is no
top is within the exclusive management or control of respondents PHI and DTPCI, the cogent reason to depart from the said rule.
falling of the same and hitting the head of petitioner was not due to the negligence of the The following observations of the trial court are controlling on this matter:
former. As found by both lower courts, the folding wooden counter top did not fall on Firstly, petitioner had a past medical history which might have been the cause of her
petitioners head without any human intervention. Records showed that petitioner lifted recurring brain injury.
the said folding wooden counter top that eventually fell and hit her head. The same was Secondly, the findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation between the 11 June
evidenced by the, (1) 11 June 1995 handwritten certification of petitioner herself; (2) her 1995 accident and the brain damage suffered by petitioner. Dr. Perez himself testified
Letter dated 30 August 1995 addressed to Mr. Yoshikazu Masuda (Mr. Masuda), General that the symptoms being experienced by petitioner might have been due to factors other
Manager of Dusit Hotel; and, (3) Certification dated 7 September 1995 issued to her by than the head trauma she allegedly suffered. Emphasis must be given to the fact that
Dr. Dalumpines upon her request, which contents she never questioned. petitioner had been suffering from different kinds of brain problems since she was 18
Here, we, respectively, quote the 11 June 1995 handwritten certification of petitioner; her years old, which may have been the cause of the recurring symptoms of head injury she
letter to Mr. Masuda dated 30 August 1995; and Dr. Dalumpines Certification dated 7 is experiencing at present.
September 1995, to wit: Thirdly, Dr. Sanchezs testimony cannot be relied upon since she testified on the findings
Petitioners 11 June 1995 Handwritten Certification: and conclusions of persons who were never presented in court. Ergo, her testimony
I was requested by Dr. Dalumpines to write that I was assured of assistance should it be thereon was hearsay. A witness can testify only with regard to facts of which they have
necessary with regard an accident at the pool. x x x The phone was in an enclosed area personal knowledge. Testimonial or documentary evidence is hearsay if it is based, not
on a chair I lifted the wooden bar counter top which then fell on my head producing a on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on the knowledge of some other person
large hematoma x x x.90 not on the witness stand. Consequently, hearsay evidence -- whether objected to or not -
Petitioners Letter addressed to Mr. Masuda dated 30 August 1995: - has no probative value.94
Dear Mr. Masuda, Fourthly, the medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of doctors
xxxx whom petitioner sought for examination or treatment were neither identified nor testified
x x x We searched and saw a phone on a chair behind a towel counter. However, in to by those who issued them. Being deemed as hearsay, they cannot be given probative
order to get behind the counter I had to lift a hinged massive wooden section of the value.1wphi1
counter which subsequently fell and knocked me on my head x x x. 91 The aforesaid medical reports/evaluations/certifications of different doctors in favor of
Dr. Dalumpines Certification dated 7 September 1995: petitioner cannot be given probative value and their contents cannot be deemed to
CERTIFICATION constitute proof of the facts stated therein. It must be stressed that a document or writing
This is to certify that as per Clinic records, duty nurse Pearlie was called to attend to an which is admitted not as independent evidence but merely as part of the testimony of a
accident at the poolside at 7:45PM on 11 June 1995. witness does not constitute proof of the facts related therein.95 In the same vein, the
Same records show that there, she saw petitioner who claimed the folding countertop fell medical certificate which was identified and interpreted in court by another doctor was
on her head when she lifted it to enter the lifeguards counter to use the phone. She not accorded probative value because the doctor who prepared it was not presented for
asked for Hirudoid. its identification. Similarly, in this case, since the doctors who examined petitioner were
The same evening petitioner met Dr. Dalumpnes at the Coffee Shop. After narrating the not presented to testify on their findings, the medical certificates issued on their behalf
poolside incident and declining Dr. Dalumpines offer of assistance, she reiterated that and identified by another doctor cannot be admitted as evidence. Since a medical
the Hirudoid cream was enough and that petitioner]being a doctor herself, knew her certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness,
condition and she was all right. it cannot be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to
This certification is given upon the request of petitioner for whatever purpose it may show his qualifications.96 Thus, an unverified and unidentified private document cannot
serve, 7 September 1995 at Makati City.92 (Emphasis supplied). be accorded probative value. It is precluded because the party against whom it is
This Court is not unaware that in petitioners Complaint and in her open court testimony, presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom
her assertion was, "while she was passing through the counter door, she was suddenly the statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author should be presented as a
knocked out by a hard and heavy object, which turned out to be the folding wooden witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents.
counter top." However, in her open court testimony, particularly during cross- Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its
examination, petitioner confirmed that she made such statement that "she lifted the hinge contents suspect and of no probative value.97
massive wooden section of the counter near the swimming pool." 93 In view thereof, this All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents PHI and DTPCI, as well
Court cannot acquiesce petitioners theory that her case is one of res ipsa loquitur as it as their management and staff, they cannot be made Iiable to pay for the millions of
was sufficiently established how petitioner obtained that "bukol" or "hematoma." damages prayed for by the petitioner. Since respondents PHI and DTPCI arc not liable, it
The doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the absence of any showing necessarily follows that respondent First Lepanto cannot also be made liable under the
that the employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI were negligent. Since in this case, contract or Insurance.
the trial court and the appellate court found no negligence on the part of the employees
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution or the Court of SO ORDERED.
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87065 dated 9 August 2007 and 5 November 2007, Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and
SO ORDERED. that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its
[G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000] passengers. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on
SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents. the ground that it is not supported by evidence. Sdaadsc
D E C I S I ON The petition has no merit.
MENDOZA, J.: The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a
March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Missdaa
Dumaguete City, and awarding damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in
Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage. Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: for the damage caused to petitioners jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known
Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
the vehicle. Sclaw because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor,
passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena destination.[2] In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code
and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier
casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital the burden of proof. Slxmis
lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding
Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioners jeepney, should be
months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period. binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. Korte relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some
Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of
held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of
jeepney. Rtcspped negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides: Slxsc
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
ground that Sungas cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence
and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
reads: expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set
SET ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-appellant: Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages; as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
(3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and circumstances.
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
(5) to pay the costs. carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
 negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has
diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755. "residual bowing of the fracture side." She likewise decided not to
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at further pursue Physical Education as her major subject, because "my
once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe left leg x x x has a defect already."
extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Scslx Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of the
could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral damages in the sum of
the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate P50,000.00, which is fair, just and reasonable.
against petitioners contention. Slx As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and Civil Code.[5] As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the
facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art.
4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides: 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his motor faith, as provided in Art. 2220.[6]
vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no
vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance
unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the of the contract of carriage. Sungas contention that petitioners admission in open court
highway. that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than the allowed construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck
seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides: Mesm who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any motor plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he
vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his was the one at fault for the accident. Exsm
vehicle than its registered capacity. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner award of moral damages is DELETED.
unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury SO ORDERED.
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Buena, JJ., concur.
transporting passengers. Calrky Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., on leave.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas taking an G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
"extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated vs.
merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.
event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. [3] This
requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the SANCHEZ, J.:
event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael
manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
creditor.[4] Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the
body protruding two meters into the highway. Kycalr portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate,
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees;
and without basis in law. We find this contention well taken. and the costs of suit.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated: Kyle On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all
student in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University, other respects", with costs against petitioner.
majoring in Physical Education. Because of the injury, she was not The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
able to enroll in the second semester of that school year. She testified The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of
that she had no more intention of continuing with her schooling, record", are:
because she could not walk and decided not to pursue her degree, Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that
major in Physical Education "because of my leg which has a defect left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
already." On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent,
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane
confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first
 class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the fact. 20
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" Court of Appeals support its judgment.
seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager 3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from
according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the
nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he
having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had
Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
(Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the
"first class" seat in the plane.3 availability of first class seats.
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief
respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make before the Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial
complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to court erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class
consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court's decision. seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class
on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued,
determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law would be accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of
on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the
complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7 necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The We cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company
law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It
the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it
decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping
the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or
sentence the facts" which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the riot the tickets it issues are to be honored or not.22
mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's
to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as contention, thus:
the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no
conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C"
with respect to the evidence for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, and "C-1", and defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony
"There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) and testified as follows:
the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this
sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the OK mean?
Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the A. That the space is confirmed.
findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into Q. Confirmed for first class?
consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the xxx xxx xxx
decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael
defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the
item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the
regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and
the court and passed upon by it. 15 plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket
written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support without any reservation whatever.
the decision and judgment rendered thereon". 16They consist of the Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified
court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of that the reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The
law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for an court cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18 with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a confirmation in Hongkong. 23
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos
in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a 6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience
judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that and embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to
affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of take a Pan American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to
First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the Manila.32
assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as xxx xxx xxx
finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be 2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations
regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby
in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation,
are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court and the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of xxx xxx xxx
the conclusions of the trial court. 26 The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class
an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's
a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he
to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral
be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint.
and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances
lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation between the
ticket. parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel
upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the
a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to
the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was
of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to
subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an
first class seat to provoke an issue". 29And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence.
went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the
Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the
the seat? plane belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent but against his will,
claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an has been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court,
award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that the corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his
decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal notebook which notation reads as follows:
allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are: "First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air will, and that the captain refused to intervene",
Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-
behalf of the defendant, under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of
defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do so. It is
during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this
point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... . evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
accommodation but only after protestations, arguments and/or insistence were The Court of appeals further stated
made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees. Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead the white man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-
furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran class ticket to him when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff
and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's should not have been picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to
employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after he be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the
was already seated. presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence
committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the more drastic
step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. 5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be
We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager,
by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
explain the meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
said "that the space is confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
another witness for defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of latter for the damage.
defendant, testified as follows: In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
reservation the passenger has arranged with you? 6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with
247, June 19, 1959) the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a
point: relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
man" have a "better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by
The record is silent. The defendant airline did not prove "any better", the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are
nay, any right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part
corresponding "first class" ticket. of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's carrier. 44
Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it by Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a
having taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third
defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under
suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was not
Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is
as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may
not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the
plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because the said conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train
Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the witness was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he
Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38 would pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by
transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier
of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.1awphl.nt
from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. proper.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is 7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So
ulterior purpose." 39 one of the flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad and I said, What for? and she said, "We will note that you transferred to the
faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus: tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything there because I
transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating am protesting to this transfer".
circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent Q Was she able to note it?
of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have A No, because I did not give my ticket.
him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was Q About that purser?
occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't
a "white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me
accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this "white man" and the purser was there. He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my
had any "better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff notebook." He read it and translated it to me because it was recorded in
was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding "first French "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against
class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40 his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
 Mr. VALTE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES MINERVA TIMAN and
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the FLORES TIMAN, respondents.
best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49 Salalima, Trenas, Pagaoa & Associates for petitioner.
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry Paul P. Lentejas for private respondents.
in his notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence
[Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of
SARMIENTO, J.:
inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come
within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a A social condolence telegram sent through the facilities of the petitioner
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the gave rise to the present petition for review on certiorari assailing the
impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of
the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical
judgment2 of the trial court, dated February 14, 1985, the dispositive portion
condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the of which reads:
notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of
petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted 1. Ordering the defendant RCPI to pay plaintiff the amount of
Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition P30,848.05 representing actual and compensatory damages;
of the purser could have cleared up the matter. P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in damages.
evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to
grant exemplary damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that 2. Awarding of attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00. Costs
defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or against the defendant.
malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first
class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages. 54 SO ORDERED.3
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages
justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the
courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do The facts as gleaned from the records of the case are as follows:
not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised as it was here
should not be disturbed.
On January 24, 1983, private respondents-spouses Minerva Timan and
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary Flores Timan sent a telegram of condolence to their cousins, Mr. and Mrs.
damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily Hilario Midoranda, at Trinidad, Calbayog City, through petitioner Radio
with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI, hereinafter) at Cubao,
of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and Quezon City, to convey their deepest sympathy for the recent death of the
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57 mother-in-law of Hilario Midoranda4 to wit:
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from
reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So
ordered. MR. & MRS. HILARIO MIDORANDA
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro, TRINIDAD, CALBAYOG CITY
JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.
MAY GOD GIVE YOU COURAGE AND STRENGTH TO BEAR YOUR
LOSS. OUR DEEPEST SYMPATHY TO YOU AND MEMBERS OF THE
G.R. No. 79578 March 13, 1991 FAMILY.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. MINER & FLORY.5

(RCPI), petitioner,
vs.
The condolence telegram was correctly transmitted as far as the written text THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING
was concerned. However, the condolence message as communicated and PETITIONER TO PAY ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF
delivered to the addressees was typewritten on a "Happy Birthday" card and P5,000.00 PLUS COSTS OF SUIT.8
placed inside a "Christmasgram" envelope. Believing that the transmittal to
the addressees of the aforesaid telegram in that nonsuch manner was done The four assigned errors are going to be discussed jointly because they are
intentionally and with gross breach of contract resulting to ridicule, all based on the same findings of fact.
contempt, and humiliation of the private respondents and the addressees,
including their friends and relatives, the spouses Timan demanded an We fully agree with the appellate court's endorsement of the trial court's
explanation. Unsatisfied with RCPI's explanations in its letters, dated March conclusion that RCPI, a corporation dealing in telecommunications and
9 and April 20, 1983, the Timans filed a complaint for damages.6 offering its services to the public, is engaged in a business affected with
public interest. As such, it is bound to exercise that degree of diligence
The parties stipulated at the pre-trial that the issue to be resolved by the trial expected of it in the performance of its obligation.9
court was:
One of RCPI's main arguments is that it still correctly transmitted the text of
WHETHER or not the act of delivering the condolence message in a the telegram and was received by the addressees on time despite the fact
Happy Birthday" card with a "Christmasgram" envelope constitutes a that there was "error" in the social form and envelope used.10 RCPI asserts
breach of contract on the part of the defendant. If in the affirmative, that there was no showing that it has any motive to cause harm or damage
whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages.7 on private respondents:

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondents Timans which Petitioner humbly submits that the "error" in the social form used
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. RCPI now submits the does not come within the ambit of fraud, malice or bad faith as
following assignment of errors: understood/defined under the law.11

I We do not agree.

THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING In a distinctly similar case,12 and oddly also involving the herein petitioner as
PETITIONER TO PAY ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY the same culprit, we held:
DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P30,848.05.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
II receiving and transmitting messages. Everytime a person transmits
a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner
PETITIONER TO PAY MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF undertakes to transmit the message accurately . . . As a corporation,
P10,000.00. the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the acts of
its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of
III the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the
acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner's business is to
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of
PETITIONER TO PAY EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT an effective and adequate remedy.13
OF P5,000.00.
Now, in the present case, it is self-evident that a telegram of condolence is
IV intended and meant to convey a message of sorrow and sympathy.
Precisely, it is denominated "telegram of condolence" because it tenders
sympathy and offers to share another's grief. It seems out of this world,
therefore, to place that message of condolence in a birthday card and
deliver the same in a Christmas envelope for such acts of carelessness and cases. Nothing has been shown to convince us to justify the relaxation of
incompetence not only render violence to good taste and common sense, this rule in the petitioner's favor. On the contrary, these factual findings are
they depict a bizarre presentation of the sender's feelings. They ridicule the supported by substantial evidence on record.
deceased's loved ones and destroy the atmosphere of grief and respect for
the departed. Anent the award of moral and exemplary damages assigned as errors, the
findings of the respondent court are persuasive. 1wphi1

Anyone who avails of the facilities of a telegram company like RCPI can
choose to send his message in the ordinary form or in a social form. In the . . . When plaintiffs placed an order for transmission of their social
ordinary form, the text of the message is typed on plain newsprint paper. On condolence telegram, defendant did not inform the plaintiff of the
the other hand, a social telegram is placed in a special form with the proper exhaustion of such social condolence forms. Defendant-appellant
decorations and embellishments to suit the occasion and the message and accepted through its authorized agent or agency the order and
delivered in an envelope matching the purpose of the occasion and the received the corresponding compensation therefor. Defendant did
words and intent of the message. The sender pays a higher amount for the not comply with its contract as intended by the parties and instead of
social telegram than for one in the ordinary form. It is clear, therefore, that transmitting the condolence message in an ordinary form, in
when RCPI typed the private respondents' message of condolence in a accordance with its guidelines, placed the condolence message
birthday card and delivered the same in a colorful Christmasgram envelope, expressing sadness and sorrow in forms conveying joy and
it committed a breach of contract as well as gross negligence. Its excuse happiness. Under the circumstances, We cannot accept the
that it had run out of social condolence cards and envelopes14 is flimsy and defendant's plea of good faith predicated on such exhaustion of
unacceptable. It could not have been faulted had it delivered the message in social condolence forms. Gross negligence or carelessness can be
the ordinary form and reimbursed the difference in the cost to the private attributed to defendant-appellant in not supplying its various stations
respondents. But by transmitting it unfittinglythrough other special forms with such sufficient and adequate social condolence forms when it
clearly, albeit outwardly, portraying the opposite feelings of joy and held out to the public sometime in January, 1983, the availability of
happiness and thanksgivingRCPI only exacerbated the sorrowful situation such social condolence forms and accepted for a fee the
of the addressees and the senders. It bears stress that this botchery transmission of messages on said forms. Knowing that there are no
exposed not only the petitioner's gross negligence but also its callousness such forms as testified to by its Material Control Manager Mateo
and disregard for the sentiments of its clientele, which tantamount to wanton Atienza, and entering into a contract for the transmission of
misconduct, for which it must be held liable for damages. messages in such forms, defendant-appellant committed acts of bad
faith, fraud or malice. . . .17
It is not surprising that when the Timans' telegraphic message reached their
cousin, it became the joke of the Midorandas' friends, relatives, and RCPI's argument that it can not be held liable for exemplary damages, being
associates who thought, and rightly so, that the unpardonable mix-up was a penal or punitive in character,18 is without merit. We have so held in many
mockery of the death of the mother-in-law of the senders' cousin. Thus it cases, and oddly, quite a number of them likewise involved the herein
was not unexpected that because of this unusual incident, which caused petitioner as the transgressor.
much embarrassment and distress to respondent Minerva Timan, he
suffered nervousness and hypertension resulting in his confinement for xxx xxx xxx
three days starting from April 4, 1983 at the Capitol Medical Center in
Quezon City.15
. . . In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be
awarded if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
The petitioner argues that "a court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or oppressive or malevolent manner. There was gross negligence on
1wphi1

guess work as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on the the part of RCPI personnel in transmitting the wrong telegram, of
actual proof that damages had been suffered and evidence of the actual which RCPI must be held liable. Gross carelessness or negligence
amount.16 In other words, RCPI insists that there is no causal relation of the constitutes wanton misconduct.
illness suffered by Mr. Timan with the foul-up caused by the petitioner. But
that is a question of fact. The findings of fact of the trial court and the
xxx xxx xxx
respondent court concur in favor of the private respondents. We are bound
by such findingsthat is the general rule well-established by a long line of
 . . . punitive damages may be recovered for wilful or wantonly collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the latter, accusing
negligent acts in respect of messages, even though those acts are petitioner of inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby
violating his leasehold rights over it.
neither authorized nor ratified (Arkansas & L.R. Co. vs. Stroude 91
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied that he induced the heirs of Bai
SW 18; West vs. Western U. Tel. Co., 17 P807; Peterson vs. Tonina to sell the property to him, contending that the heirs were in dire need of money
Western U. Tel. Co., 77 NW 985; Brown vs. Western U. Tel. Co., 6 to pay off the obligations of the deceased. He also denied interfering with private
SE 146). Thus, punitive damages have been recovered for mistakes respondents leasehold rights as there was no lease contract covering the property when
in the transmission of telegrams (Pittman vs. Western Union Tel. he purchased it; that his personal investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or
Co., 66 SO 977; Painter vs. Western Union Tel. Co., 84 SE 293) encumbrances on the subject lots.
Petitioner claimed that before he bought the property, he went to Atty. Benjamin
(emphasis supplied).19
Fajardo, the lawyer who allegedly notarized the lease contract between private
respondent and Bai Tonina Sepi, to verify if the parties indeed renewed the lease
We wish to add a little footnote to this Decision. By merely reviewing the contract after it expired in 1974. Petitioner averred that Atty. Fajardo showed him four
number of cases that has reached this Court in which the petitioner was copies of the lease renewal but these were all unsigned. To refute the existence of a
time and again held liable for the same causes as in the present case lease contract, petitioner presented in court a certification from the Office of the Clerk of
Court confirming that no record of any lease contract notarized by Atty. Fajardo had been
breach of contract and gross negligencethe ineluctable conclusion is that
entered into their files. Petitioner added that he only learned of the alleged lease contract
it has not in any way reformed nor improved its services to the public. It when he was informed that private respondent was collecting rent from the tenants of the
must do so now or else next time the Court may be constrained to adjudge building.
stricter sanctions. Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be unwarranted, petitioner filed his
counterclaim and prayed for the payment of actual and moral damages.
On July 29, 1986, the court a quo found for private respondent (plaintiff below):
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff:
AFFIRMED in toto. 1. Declaring the Contract of Lease executed by Bai Tonina Sepi
Mangelen Guiabar in favor of the plaintiff on November 6, 1974 (Exh.
Costs against the petitioner. A and A-1) over Lot No. 6395, Pls-73. Lot No 6396. Pls.-73. Lot No.
6399. 3ls-73, and Lot no.9777-A. CSD-11-000076-D (Lot No. 3-A.
40124), all situated along Ledesma St., Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat,
SO ORDERED. which document was notarized by Atty. Benjamin S. Fajardo, Sr. and
entered into his notarial register as Doc. No. 619. Page No. 24. Book
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur. No. II. Series of 1974, to be authentic and genuine and as such valid
and binding for a period of ten (10) years specified thereon from
November 1, 1974 up to October 31, 1984;
[G.R. No. 119107. March 18, 2005] 2. Declaring the plaintiff as the lawful owner of the commercial
JOSE V. LAGON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and buildings found on the aforesaid lots and he is entitled to their
MENANDRO V. LAPUZ, respondents. possession and the collection (of rentals) of the said commercial
DECISION buildings within the period covered by this Contract of Lease in his
CORONA, J.: favor;
On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina 3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the following:
Sepi, through an intestate court,[1] two parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan a) Rentals of the commercial buildings on the lots covered by the
Kudarat. A few months after the sale, private respondent Menandro Lapuz filed a Contract of Lease in favor of the plaintiff for the period from
complaint for torts and damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) October 1, 1978 up to October 31, 1984, including accrued
of Sultan Kudarat. interests in the total amount of Five Hundred Six Thousand Eight
In the complaint, private respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed that he entered into a Hundred Five Pesos and Fifty Six Centavos (P506, 850.56), the
contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over three parcels of same to continue to bear interest at the legal rate of 12% per
land (the property) in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning 1964. One of the annum until the whole amount is fully paid by the defendant to the
provisions agreed upon was for private respondent to put up commercial buildings which plaintiff;
would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would b) Moral damages in the amount of One Million Sixty Two
answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,062,500.00);
of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but since the construction of the c) Actual or compensatory damages in the amount of Three
commercial buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was allegedly renewed. Hundred Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P312, 500.00);
When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to the d) Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of One Hundred
court-appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator advised him to Eighty Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P187,500.00)
stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he constructed, he discovered
that petitioner, representing himself as the new owner of the property, had been
 e) Temperate or moderate damages in the amount of Sixty Two respondent insisted that it was impossible for petitioner not to know about the contract
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00); since the latter was aware that he was collecting rentals from the tenants of the building.
f) Nominal damages in the amount of Sixty Two Thousand Five While the appellate court disbelieved the contentions of both parties, it nevertheless held
Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00); that, for petitioner to become liable for damages, he must have known of the lease
g) Attorneys fees in the amount of One Hundred Twenty Five contract and must have also acted with malice or bad faith when he bought the subject
Thousand Pesos (P125,000.00); parcels of land.
h) Expenses of litigation in the amount of Sixty Two Thousand Five Via this petition for review, petitioner cites the following reasons why the Court
Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00); should rule in his favor:
i) Interest on the moral damages, actual or compensatory 1. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in holding that petitioner is
damages temperate or moderate damages, nominal damages, liable for interference of contractual relation under Article 1314 of the New
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in the amounts as Civil Code;
specified hereinabove from May 24, 1982 up to June 27, 1986, in 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that private
the total amount of Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos respondent is precluded from recovering, if at all, because of laches;
(P900,000.00); all of which will continue to bear interests at a 3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner liable for actual
legal rate of 12% per annum until the whole amounts are fully damages and attorneys fees, and;
paid by the defendants to the plaintiffs; 4. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners
4. For failure of the defendant to deposit with this Court all the rentals counterclaims.[6]
he had collected from the thirteen (13) tenants or occupants of the Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who induces another to
commercial buildings in question, the plaintiff is hereby restored to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The tort
the possession of his commercial buildings for a period of seventy- recognized in that provision is known as interference with contractual relations. [7] The
three (73) months which is the equivalent of the total period for which interference is penalized because it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to
he was prevented from collecting the rentals from the tenants or reap the benefits that should result therefrom.[8]
occupants of his commercial buildings from October 1, 1978 up to The core issue here is whether the purchase by petitioner of the subject property,
October 31, 1984, and for this purpose a Writ of Preliminary during the supposed existence of private respondents lease contract with the late Bai
Injunction is hereby issued, but the plaintiff is likewise ordered to pay Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which petitioner should be held liable
to the defendant the monthly rental of Seven Hundred Pesos for damages.
(P700.00) every end of the month for the entire period of seventy The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals,[9] laid down the
three (73) months. This portion of the judgment should be considered elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid
as a mere alternative should the defendant fail to pay the amount of contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract
Five Hundred Five Pesos and Fifty Six Centavos (P506,805.56) and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse. In that case,
hereinabove specified; petitioner So Ping Bun occupied the premises which the corporation of his grandfather
5. Dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendant for lack of was leasing from private respondent, without the knowledge and permission of the
merit; corporation. The corporation, prevented from using the premises for its business, sued
6. With costs against the defendant.[2] So Ping Bun for tortuous interference.
Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals. [3] In a decision dated As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly
January 31, 1995,[4] the appellate court modified the assailed judgment of the trial court established. To prove this, private respondent presented in court a notarized copy of the
as follows: purported lease renewal.[10] While the contract appeared as duly notarized, the
a) The award for moral damages, compensatory notarization thereof, however, only proved its due execution and delivery but not the
damages, exemplary damages, temperate or moderate damages, and veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petitioners
nominal damages as well as expenses of litigation in the amount counsel and after the trial court declared it to be valid and subsisting, the notarized copy
of P62,500.00 and interests under paragraph 3-a(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), of the lease contract presented in court appeared to be incontestable proof that private
(g), (h), and (i) are deleted; respondent and the late Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease contract. Settled is
b) The award for attorneys fees is reduced to P30,000.00; the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized
c) Paragraphs 1,2,5 and 6 are AFFIRMED; document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its execution
d) Additionally, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay to and delivery.[11]
the plaintiff by way of actual damages the sum of P178,425.00 The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge on the
representing the amount of rentals he collected from the period of part of the interferer that the contract exists. Knowledge of the subsistence of the
October 1978 to August 1983, and minus the amount of P42,700.00 contract is an essential element to state a cause of action for tortuous interference.[12] A
representing rentals due the defendant computed at P700.00 per month defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for interfering with a contract he is
for the period from August 1978 to August 1983, with interest thereon at unaware of.[13] While it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless
the rate until the same is fully paid; be aware of the facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete
e) Paragraph 4 is deleted.[5] disclosure of the contractual relations and rights of the parties in the contract.[14]
Before the appellate court, petitioner disclaimed knowledge of any lease contract
between the late Bai Tonina Sepi and private respondent. On the other hand, private
 In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract. His petitioner corporation after several defaults in payment. We held there that there can be
sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not inform him of any existing damage without injury where the loss or harm is not the result of a violation of a legal
lease contract. duty. In that instance, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of petitioner since the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
meritorious. He conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no amount to legal injury or wrong.[24] Indeed, lack of malice in the conduct complained of
suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe deeper and watch precludes recovery of damages.[25]
out for any conflicting claim over the property. An examination of the entire propertys title With respect to the attorneys fees awarded by the appellate court to private
bore no indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent. Even the registry of respondent, we rule that it cannot be recovered under the circumstances. According to
property had no record of the same.[15] Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may be awarded only when it has been
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such knowledge stipulated upon or under the instances provided therein.[26] Likewise, being in the concept
alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous interference. Which brings us to of actual damages, the award for attorneys fees must have clear, factual and legal
the third element. According to our ruling in So Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable bases[27] which, in this case, do not exist.
only when there was no legal justification or excuse for his action [16] or when his conduct Regarding the dismissal of petitioners counterclaim for actual and moral damages,
was stirred by a wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the the appellate court affirmed the assailed order of the trial court because it found no basis
defendant must have acted with malice[17] or must have been driven by purely impious to grant the amount of damages prayed for by petitioner. We find no reason to reverse
reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot be justified. [18] the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Actual damages are those awarded in
Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private respondent that satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they
petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The word must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree
induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose one course of of certainty.[28] Petitioner was unable to prove that he suffered loss or injury, hence, his
conduct by persuasion or intimidation.[19] The records show that the decision of the heirs claim for actual damages must fail. Moreover, petitioners prayer for moral damages was
of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and not warranted as moral damages should result from the wrongful act of a person. The
that petitioner did absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent worries and anxieties suffered by a party hailed to court litigation are not compensable. [29]
himself did not proffer any evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that With the foregoing discussion, we no longer deem it necessary to delve into the
private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina issue of laches.
Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
established. No costs.
In So Ping Bun, the Court discussed whether interference can be justified at all if SO ORDERED.
the interferer acts for the sole purpose of furthering a personal financial interest, but Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia,
without malice or bad faith. As the Court explained it: JJ., concur.
x x x, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of another
exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist
where the actors motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities
believe that it is not necessary that the interferers interest outweigh that of the party
whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is
substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are
negatived, for he acts in self-protection. Moreover, justification for protecting ones
financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic
interest in the subject matter with that of the others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his
conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. [20]
The foregoing disquisition applies squarely to the case at bar. In our view,
petitioners purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of his financial
or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives. In
the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy,[21] the Court declared that a person is not a
malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by a proper business interest. In other
words, a financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an officious
interferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.
In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner liable for
tortuous interference are present, petitioner cannot be made to answer for private
respondents losses.
This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury. Injury is the
legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from
the injury.[22] In BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals ,,[23] the Court turned
down the claim for damages of a cardholder whose credit card had been cancelled by