instruments of soviet control

Warsaw Pact Countries, 1955-91 (U)

Warsaw Pact Barents

Sea
Albania* Hungary
Bulgaria Poland
Czechoslovakia Romania
East Germany U.S.S.R.
*Albania withheld support in Norwegian Sea
1961 over the China split and
officially withdrew in 1968.

U.S.S.R
Moscow
North
Sea
Baltic Sea
Nor th
A t l an t i c
East
Ocean Germany Poland

Czecho- Caspian
slovakia Sea

Hungary
Romania
Black Sea
Bulgaria
Albania

M e di t e r ra ne a n Se a

0 500 Kilometers

0 500 Miles Boundary representation is

not necessarily authoritative.

UNCLASSIFIED 793831AI (G00112) 3 -11

soviet union albania

poland romania
hungary east germany
czechoslovakia bulgaria
table of contents

I. Sponsorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

II. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

IV. Essays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

V. Selected Declassified Intelligence Documents . . . . . . 19

VI. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

Electronic Reading Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

VII. Special Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

2 wartime statutes
Sponsorship

Historical Review Program

Information Management Services, Historical Collections Division (HCD), in partnership with

the Directorate Information Review Officers, is responsible for executing the Agencys Histori-
cal Review Program. This program seeks to identify and review for declassification collections of
documents that detail the Agencys analysis and activities relating to historically significant topics
and events. HCDs goals include increasing the usability and accessibility of historical collections.
HCD also develops release events and partnerships to highlight each collection and make it avail-
able to the broadest audience possible.

HCDs mission is to:

Promote an accurate, objective understanding of the information that has helped shape major
US foreign policy decisions.

Broaden access to lessons-learned, presenting historical material that gives greater under-
standing to the scope and context of past actions.

Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on the impacts and
effects arising from past foreign policy decisions.

Showcase CIAs contributions to national security and provide the American public with valu-
able insight into the workings of its government.

Demonstrate the CIAs commitment to the Open Government Initiative and its three core
values: Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration.

instruments of soviet control 3

4 wartime statutes
overview

soviet control of east It was only in 1969 that the Warsaw Pact adopted
at Soviet insistence (along with the Committee of
european military forces Defense Ministers and Military Council) a Stat-
ute on the Combined Armed Forces and Com-
New Evidence on Imposition of the bined Command of the Warsaw Pact Member
1980 Wartime Statute States (for Peacetime) that created an elaborate
Warsaw Pact military headquarters in Moscow
by A. Ross Johnson with East European deputy defense ministers
Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson designated as deputy Warsaw Pact commanders. 2
International Center for Scholars These institutional changes gave the Warsaw Pact
more semblance of a multinational military alli-
Soviet military planning for conflict in Europe ance and granted to the East European military
after World War II from the outset harnessed establishments a greater consultative voice in
East European military capabilities to Soviet Warsaw Pact military matters, while streamlining
military purposes and assumed operational decision-making on training and armaments in a
subordination of East European military for- manner serving Soviet interests.3
mations to higher-level Soviet commands. A
Polish command-staff exercise in 1950, for Oddly for a military alliance, the 1969 military
example, assumed subordination of a Polish statute was silent on wartime command ar-
Army (comprised of five divisions and other rangements and explicitly confined its purview
units) to a Soviet Maritime Front (tasked in the to peacetime, notwithstanding the greater
exercise with occupying Denmark).1 Following importance that East European armed forces
1
founding of the Warsaw Treaty Organization assumed in Soviet military planning in the
(Warsaw Pact) in May 1955, a supreme War- 1960s. As in World War II, Soviet coalition
saw Pact military command was established in warfare doctrine of the 1960s envisaged the
Moscow, but this institution existed largely on controlled use of military allies of questionable
paper until the 1960s. military efficiency and political reliability by

1
Recollection of Colonel Michael Sadykiewicz, who participated in the exercise, letter to the author, March 8, 2010. In Soviet
practice, a theater headquarters commanded Fronts, comprised of Armies, which were in turn comprised of divisions and other
large military units.
2
CIA document FIR-DB 312/00538-78 dated March 21, 1978 (English translation from original Russian). A full German
translation from East German military archives was published on-line by the Parallel History Project (http://www.php.isn.ethz.
ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=21221&navinfo=15697)
and a partial English text is published in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the
Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991 (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2005), document 62. The 1969 military
structures of the Warsaw Pact are described in A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, East European Military
Establishments; The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier (New York: Crane Russak, 1980), Appendix A, pp.151-156.

6 wartime statutes
subordinating East European military forma- unacceptable surrender of national sovereignty.
tions to Soviet operational commands at the The Polish General Staff raised questions along
Front level or below. The respective Soviet similar lines. In the end, the Ceausescu regime
commands were in turn subordinated not to never signed or agreed to abide by the provisions
the Warsaw Pact military headquarters but to of the wartime statute, while Polish Party chief
the Soviet General Staff and High Command Edward Gierek did. Kuklinski argued that the
in Moscow. As veteran British observer and Romanian example demonstrated it was pos-
official Malcolm Macintosh observed at the sible for an East European country to resist So-
time, the Warsaw Pact Combined Command viet pressure even within the Soviet-dominated
remained a peacetime structure, equivalent Warsaw Pact.7 While a different Polish leader-
to a traditional European war office with ad- ship might have attempted a more autonomous
ministrative duties for training, mobilization, course, Poland was not Romania. Poland, part
and armaments, but without responsibility for of the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier and with the
conduct of military operations. 4 In Ryszard largest East European military force, was central
Kuklinskis words, the banner of the so-called to Soviet military planning for conflict in Eu-
Combined Command of the Combined Armed rope; Romania was not. Soviet military forces
Forces masked Soviet control.5 had vacated Romania in 1958. Romania under
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu had
In the late 1970s, the USSR sought to formal- for two decades pursued an independent foreign,
ize these wartime Warsaw Pact command ar- military, and intelligence policy. Poland under
rangements in a new Statute on the Combined Wladyslaw Gomulka and Gierek had remained
Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member closely aligned with Moscow in all these areas.
States and Their Command Organs for War- Poland was home to the Soviet Northern Group
time, adopted in March 1980. 6 This effort to of Forces, headquartered in Legnica, which 1 in7
fill the glaring gap highlighted by the peacetime the 1980s was also the location of the headquar-
statute was delayed by objections from Nicolae ters of the Western Theater of Military Opera-
Ceausescus Romania, which viewed it as an tions (TVD), established as the forward Soviet

3
Johnson, Dean, Alexiev, op. cit., p. 15.
4
Malcolm Macintosh, The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact, Adelphi Papers, No. 58, June 1969, pp. 11-15.
5
Interview in Kultura, Paris, April 1987, p. 54.
6
CIA document FIRDB-312/01995-80 dated July 25, 1980 (English translation from the original Russian). A full German
translation from East German military archives was published on-line by the Parallel History Project (http://www.php.isn.
ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=20408&navinfo=15697 ) and a partial English text is published in Mastny and
Byrne, op. cit, document 86. Detailed comparison of Warsaw Pact peacetime and wartime command structures is provided in
Michael Sadykiewicz, The Warsaw Pact Command Structure in Peace and War (Santa Monica: R AND Corporation, 1988),
Report 3558-RC.
7
Kuklinski interview, op. cit, pp. 56-57.

Instruments of soviet control 7

command for military operations in Europe. concepts first advocated by Marshal Nikolai
In 1980-1981, with the emergence of the Soli- Ogarkov. In the course of the 1980s, mounting
darity trade union and preparations for Soviet economic problems and social unrest in Eastern
intervention and martial law, the Soviet high Europe and weariness of its ruling elites made
command demonstrated that it could operate East European armed forces a less attractive
independently in Poland, ignoring the Polish even junior partner to the Soviet military. 8 The
military whenever it wished. paradox of the Warsaw Pact military statute was
illustrated by the 1988 Warsaw Pact Shchit-88
The Warsaw Pact wartime statute adopted in pre-war mobilization exercise.9 That exercise
March 1980 formalized Soviet wartime control assumed subordination of Polish forces (in this
over East European military forces that had been case the Eighth Army) to a Soviet-dominated
assumed since the 1950s. It demonstrated that Front (which would have been subordinated in
the Warsaw Pact military Combined Command turn to the Western TVD headquarters and
in Moscow was irrelevant for a Soviet Union at the Soviet High Command). Yet unlike earlier
war in Europe. It made clear that in marshalling Warsaw Pact exercises through the early 1980s,
military forces for imminent conflict as well as which assumed rapid offensive operations into
in conducting combat operations, Soviet gener- Western Europe, Shchit-88 utilized an (initially)
als would bypass East European political and defensive and essentially defeatist scenario that
military leaders and command East European can be read as striking acknowledgment of the
generals directly. degree of demoralization of Polish forces and
limitations on Soviet use of the Polish army by
If the Warsaw Pact wartime statute served Soviet that time.
purposes in formalizing and rationalizing Sovi-
et wartime control over East European military These observations provide context for the 22
forces, it was adopted just as those forces were documents on the Warsaw Pact in this CIA
becoming relatively less important in Soviet release. 17 of the documents are English trans-
military planning. By the early 1980s, coalition lations of key original Warsaw Pact military
warfare terminology had almost disappeared documents obtained clandestinely at the time
from Soviet military writings. This was only one and now declassified. Three of the documents,
of a number of indicators of reduced reliance in issued after 1981, offer insightful observations
Soviet military planning on East European forc- by an informed military insider. They cover a
es. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces lacked the range of issues discussed publicly by and attrib-
operational capabilities of Soviet forces for rapid uted to Ryszard Kuklinski.10 One document is
advances with high-technology conventional a 1983 CIA Directorate of Intelligence analysis
weaponry on the modern battlefield under new that drew on these Warsaw Pact documents,

8
A. Ross Johnson, East European Armed Forces and Soviet Military Planning: Factors of Change (Santa Monica: R AND
Corporation, 1989), Note N-2856-AF, declassified and released November 2006.
9
Documentation of and commentary on Shchit-88 are posted on the Woodrow Wilson Center Cold War International
History Project web site at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&doc_
id=600908&group_id=13349.

8 wartime statutes
and other clandestine materials, to provide a German versions on the PHP web site. Other
detailed picture of Soviet Control of Warsaw documents in the CIA release and all original
Pact Forces. A final document, released ear- Russian texts have yet to be located in East
lier, is the 1983 National Intelligence Estimate European archives. The documents released by
on East European military reliability. Both the CIA serve historians today not only as useful
CIA analysis and the Estimate stand the test translations but as valuable source material. As
of time, indicating that the intelligence reports such they complement previous CIA releases of
released here, and other materials, allowed U.S. classified Military Thought articles, classified
officials to accurately appraise Soviet-dominat- Soviet military academy course materials, and
ed mechanisms of the Warsaw Pact at the time. Polish military plans for martial law.11
It is noteworthy how quickly some of these
highly sensitive Warsaw Pact documents be-
came available in Washington. The final war-
time statute and ratification documents were
dated March 18, 1980 and April 30, 1980; they
were issued as a translated CIA intelligence re-
port on July 25, 1980.

Following collapse of Communist regimes

in Eastern Europe, dissolution of the USSR,
and abolition of the Warsaw Pact, many origi-
nal Warsaw Pact and East European military
documents have become available in a number
of archives, especially the German Military Ar-
chive in Freiburg (incorporating East German
military archives), the Polish Institute of Na-
tional Remembrance, and the Czech military
archive. Many such documents were obtained
and posted on-line by the Parallel History Proj-
ect (http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/) and some
were translated for the PHP book, A Card-
board Castle? Some documents related to the
Warsaw Pact military statute released by CIA
in English translation can be found in (East)

10
Kuklinski interview, op.cit; Benjamin Weiser, A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid
to Save His Country (Public Affairs: New York, 2004); Benjamin B. Fischer, Entangled in History: The Vilification and Vindi-
cation of Colonel Kuklinski, Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000), pp. 19-34. Weisers book is based in part on interviews
with Kuklinski and on CIA reports from Kuklinski (750 pages of notes and raw files) that have not otherwise been released
(Weiser, op. cit., pp. xi-xiii).
11
Available in the CIA on-line Special Collections Archive, http://www.foia.cia.gov/special_collections_archive.asp.

Instruments of soviet control 9

10 wartime statutes
essays

origins and significance rank and acquired more responsibilities, my ex-

posure to the special reporting from this source
of the warsaw pact wartime continued, but were less frequent. For example,
while commanding a psychological operations
statute documents
(PSYOP) battalion at Fort Bragg in the early
1980s, I occasionally was called upon by the
Personal Recollections and Comments Army Staff to provide my views on some of this
by Les Griggs reporting. From my position at the time, I not-
ed but was not overly surprised by-- the series
of reports dealing with the drafting and ratifi-
As a serving intelligence officer and foreign
cation of a new wartime statute by the Warsaw
area specialist (Poland and Czechoslovakia) in
Pact. To me, the reporting served mainly to
the United States Army from 1959 until 1986,
confirm the view that the Soviets dominated
I was exposed to special human intelligence
the Warsaw Pact and could have their way on
(HUMINT) reporting concerning Eastern
any issue, great or small.
Europe as required from time to time. In 1974,
when one of my tasks on the Army Staff in the
In 1981 I returned to the Army Staff in the
Pentagon was to screen such reporting and brief
Pentagon to work for General Bill Odom in the
it to my superiors, I noticed reporting from
office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intel-
what appeared to be new special source(s), Over
ligence. He immediately ordered me to work
the following years, as an Army General Staff
full-time on this sources materials, and the
officer and in other assignments, I noted the
wartime statute issue moved up on my list of
wide range of topics reported on by what clearly
priorities. I soon discovered that US Army in-
were the same source(s) information on such
telligence analysts and Army strategic planners
subjects as current and future weapons systems,
found the wartime statute issue to be intrigu-
war plans, exercises, etc. of direct interest and
ing, but difficult to apply as actionable intel-
value to the Army and other elements of the
ligence. It was hard to quantify the materials
Department of Defense.
in the preferred way placing a dollar and cents
savings tag on the information (E.g., this in-
We gradually discerned that the materials
formation saved us $XXXXX on the design of
probably were from one source. As I rose in

1
Source protection was the prime consideration throughout the HUMINT operation, as it should be in any HUMINT case;
however, it often limited use of the information. For example, only a handful of principals received the reports from CIA, and
copying as well as dissemination of the reports beyond the Washington area was prohibited. In particular, these rules hand-
cuffed the US Army Missile Intelligence Agency (Alabama) and US Army Foreign Science and Technology (Charlottesville,
VA), at the time two of the Army Staff s most important intelligence-producing field agencies

12 wartime statutes
our new tank). Even so, the information about ligence cycle and the challenges of making of
the statute and its implementing structure the intelligence stew. In my view, however,
(new headquarters, communications systems, the heart of the collection consists of the op-
etc.) was of value to war planners, war gamers, erational field reporting by one special human
targeteers and even PSYOP strategists, who intelligence sourcethe one discussed above.
could hope to take advantage of the surrender His reports are filled with facts and his field
of national sovereignty issue during crisis or analysis, even while conveying the frustrations
war. In fact, some high officials in the Office and emotions you might expect from this patri-
of the Secretary of Defense pushed for making otic officer. We owe him a lot for his courage.
the statute reporting public immediately as a
public diplomacy weapon against the USSR;
however, this notion reportedly was vetoed by
the DCI for source-protection reasons.1

A few high-level US military and civilian lead-

ers also saw this intelligence as an early war-
winner, offering NATO an opportunity to
destroy or disable the Warsaw Pact command
and control system at the Theater of Military
Operations (TVD) level almost immediately
upon the outbreak of hostilities. Accordingly,
driven largely by the statute reporting, appro-
priate modifications and reprioritizations re-
portedly were made to target lists. Thankfully,
the Warsaw Pact collapsed before target strikes
became necessary.

The collection of wartime statute documents

released here by the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy and Wilson Center is concise and to the
topic yet rich with substance, and should be of
enormous use to historians of the period. The
documents provided from the Wilson Center
and elsewhere provide a fulsome background
and context for the issues, while the finished
intelligence documents the national estimate
and particularly the incisive CIA analytic pa-
perafford the reader a glimpse of the intel-

instruments of soviet control 13

a journey of rediscovery own people was characterized by moral capitula-
tion; like the imposition of Polish martial law or
the slaughter of Czechs and Hungarians.
by Aris Pappas
Retired CIA Officer, Senior Director of the These documents were not widely distributed,
Microsoft Institute for Advanced Technology but they did provide context to important
in Government decision-makers who were afforded the oppor-
tunity to understand better the nature of their
opposition. To see the pressures and tensions
A journey of rediscovery. Thats the feeling I
working internally to tear the Warsaw Pact
have as I review the material that serves as the
apart, but also to recognize the great danger
core of this event. While involved daily with
represented by such unalloyed power.
professional responsibilities, there is very little
Such differences between appearance and real-
time for quiet retrospectives. Life is evolution-
ity remain pertinent, and the need for deep un-
ary, and the job of intelligence is focused on the
derstanding by intelligence agencies is no less
future. But now, thanks in no small measure to
significant today.
the heroic efforts of the people who combined
their skills and, literally, risked their lives to
Thankfully, the Wartime Statute was never
obtain this material, we have the golden op-
invoked. We never had to test the reliability
portunity to look back.
of the Soviet allies. An essentially unnatural
and flawed system proved simply too difficult
Its not really a pretty sight. These papers docu-
to sustain and finally collapsed.
ment a record of oppression and outright bully-
History tends to record great victories by refer-
ing that, although commonly understood, was
ence to battles won and lost. These documents,
rarely so painfully visible even in the stark
however, offer a small insight to a Cold War
reality of the world of intelligence. Clearly,
victory where measured, though never perfect,
the sovereignty of the Soviet Unions East Eu-
understanding helped us avoid pitched battle.
ropean allies, was a chimera; a status to be
I consider myself fortunate to have played even
revered in diplomatic venues, but never allowed
a minor role in that great effort.
to interfere with the needs of Soviet security.

Repetition even affected the lazy and gullible

in the West because public pronouncements, by
master and servants alike, allowed all-too-easy
and facile comparisons between the Warsaw Pact
and NATO. But the reality was far different.
Indeed, reading through these records, its hard
to avoid pity for the vassals who paid a heavy
price in terms of their own integrity to protect
their benefits. They were both beholden to and
threatened by their Soviet rulers. A friendless
situation in which power was derived from obei-
sance to a cruel master, while their ties to their

14 wartime statutes
Instruments of soviet control 15
1 61 6 w aw ra tr itmi em es ts at ta ut tu et se s
SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
18 wartime statutes
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20 wartime statutes
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22 wartime statutes
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24 wartime statutes
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26 wartime statutes
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28 wartime statutes
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30 wartime statutes
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32 wartime statutes
instruments of soviet control 33
34 wartime statutes
instruments of soviet control 35
freedom of information act (foia)
electronic reading room

The CIA has established this site to provide The Warsaw Pact: Treaty of Friendship,
the public with an overview of access to CIA Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance
information, including electronic access to pre-
viously released documents. Because of CIAs A collection of sensitive Soviet and Warsaw
need to comply with the national security laws Pact military journals from 1961 to 1984 that
of the United States, some documents or parts provide a view into Warsaw Pact military strat-
of documents cannot be released to the public. egy. New information was added to this site in
In particular, the CIA, like other U.S. intelli- January 2010.
gence agencies, has the responsibility to protect
intelligence sources and methods from disclo- Air America: Upholding the Airmens Bond
sure. However, a substantial amount of CIA
information has been and/or can be released A fascinating assembly of documents revealing
following review. See Your Rights for further the role that Air America, the Agencys propri-
details on the various methods of obtaining etary airline, played in the search and rescue of
this information. pilots and personnel during the Vietnam War.
The collection has personal accounts by the
rescued pilots and thank you letters as well as
special collections
commendations from various officials.
Additional document collections released by
Preparing for Martial Law: Through the Eyes
the Historical Collection Division can be
of Col. Ryszard Kuklinski
found on the FOIA Electronic Reading Room
and include:
A captivating collection of over 75 documents
concerning the planning and implementation
Strategic Warning and the Role of Intelli-
of martial law in Poland from mid-1980 to late
gence: Lessons Learned From the 1968 Soviet
1981. Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a member of
Invasion of Czechoslovakia
the Polish Army General Staff and the source
of the documents, provided information and
This collection consists of DI intelligence mem-
personal commentary that gave intelligence
orandums, various estimates and memos written
analysts and US policy makers invaluable in-
by the Office of National Estimates (ONE), ar-
sight into the crisis.
ticles from the Central Intelligence Bulletin (a
current intelligence daily publication), Weekly
Baptism by Fire: CIA Analysis of the
Summaries, Intelligence Information Cables,
Korean War.
and Situation Reports, which were published up
to three times a day during the crisis when ten-
This collection includes more than 1,200 docu-
sions flared.
ments consisting of national estimates, intelli-
gence memos, daily updates, and summaries of

36 wartime statutes
foreign media concerning developments on the largest single release of Helms-related informa-
Korean Peninsula during 1947-1954. This col- tion to date. The documents, historical works
lection, coinciding with the 60th anniversary and essays offer an unprecedented, wide-ranging
of the start of the war, is the largest collection look at the man and his career as the United
of CIA documents on this issue ever released. States top intelligence official and one of its
HCD and the Harry S. Truman Presidential most important diplomats during a crucial de-
Library co-hosted a conference entitled New cade of the Cold War. From mid-1966, when
Documents and New Histories: Twenty-first he became DCI, to late 1976, when he left Iran,
Century Perspectives on the Korean War that Helms dealt directly with numerous events
highlighted the document collection. whose impact remains evident today and which
are covered in the release.
Creating Global Intelligence
A-12 OXCART Reconnaissance
Discover the back story of the US intelligence Aircraft Documentation
community by exploring this collection of more
than 800 documents from the late 1940s to the This release, containing approximately 1,500
early 1950s that pertain to the establishment of pages of material, consisting of about 350 docu-
the Central Intelligence Agency. The collection ments, maps, diagrams, and photographs will
provides perspective on the complex issues that provide researchers on aviation and intelligence
senior US government officials grappled with as with significant additional detail about the de-
they considered how to establish an enduring sign and development of the A-12.
national intelligence capability.

The Original Wizards of Langley: Overview

of the Office of Scientific Intelligence

This overview and collection of documents and

other material related to the Office of Scientific
Intelligence (OSI) offer a glimpse of CIAs con-
tribution to the analysis of Soviet capabilities in
science and technology during the Cold War.

A Life in IntelligenceThe Richard

Helms Collection

This collection of material by and about Rich-

ard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) and Ambassador to Iran comprises the

instruments of soviet control 37

 about this publication

Since the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in DVD Document CollectionThis collection in
1955, the anticipated reliability of Non-Soviet the Warsaw Pact series features a wealth of newly de-
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces in the event of classified Central Intelligence Agency documents.
a crisis was a topic of intense interest for the
United States and its NATO allies as well as Warsaw Pact: Wartime StatutesInstruments
for the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union en- of Soviet Control explores evolving U.S. views
gaged in successive efforts from the late 1960s on the relationship between the Soviet Union
onwards to codify its command and control and its Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies.
arrangements over the armed forces of its East
European alliesfirst through a peacetime and The companion DVD will work on most com-
later a wartime statutethe U.S. Intelligence puters and the documents are in .PDF format.
Communitys collection and analytic efforts on
the subject were ongoing.

DISCLAIMER: All statements of fact, opinion, or analy-

sis expressed in this booklet are those of the authors. They
do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the
Central Intelligence Agency or any other US government
entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be
construed as asserting or implying US government endorse-
ment of an articles statements or interpretations.

38 wartime statutes
special acknowledgements

The Historical Review Program, part of the CIA Information Management Services, identifies,
collects and produces historically relevant collections of declassified documents.

These collections, centered on a theme or event and with supporting analysis, essays, video, audio,
and photographs, are showcased in a booklet and DVD that are available to the academic realm
and the public.

All of our Historical Collections are available in the Freedom of Information Act Elec-
tronic Reading Room. Go to w w w.foia.cia.gov and click on Special Collections or contact
us at [email protected].

Thanks to the Wilson Centers Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) for hosting
and co-organizing this important event and for contributing images as well as documents from
their own collection of non-US sources for the publication.

instruments of soviet control 39

 This page is left intentionally blank.

44 00 wartime statutes
20010607011