SALVADOR vs.

PATRICIA, INC
G.R. No. 195834 November 09, 2016

Jurisdiction over a real action is determined based on the allegations in the complaint of the assessed value of the property
involved. The silence of the complaint on such value is ground to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction because the trial
court is not given the basis for making the determination.
The Case
1
For review is the decision promulgated on June 25, 2010 and the resolution promulgated on February 16, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV
2
No. 86735, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 96-81167, thereby
respectively reversing and setting aside the decision rendered on May 30, 2005 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, in
3
Manila, and denying their motion for reconsideration.
Antecedents
The CA adopted the summary by the RTC of the relevant factual and procedural antecedents, as follows:
This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns the property occupied by the plaintiffs and
intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares.
Additionally, to prevent the defendant Patricia Inc., from evicting the plaintiffs from their respective improvements along Juan
Luna Street, plaintiffs applied for a preliminary injunction in their Complaint pending the quieting of title on the merits.
The complaint was amended to include different branches of the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila. A Complaint-in-
Intervention was filed by the City of Manila as owner of the land occupied by the plaintiffs. Another Complaint-in-Intervention
by Ciriano Mijares was also filed alleging that he was similarly situated as the other plaintiffs.
A preliminary injunction was granted and served on all the defendants.
Based on the allegations of the parties involved, the main issue to be resolved is whether the improvements of the plaintiffs
stand on land that belongs to Patricia Inc., or the City of Manila. Who owns the same? Is it covered by a Certificate of Title?
All parties agreed and admitted in evidence by stipulation as to the authenticity of the following documents:
(1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44247 in the name of the City of Manila;
(2) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35727 in the name of Patricia Inc.;
(3) Approved Plan PSD-38540; and
(4) Approved Subdivision Plan PCS-3290 for Ricardo Manotok.
The issue as to whether TCT 35727 should be cancelled as prayed for by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares is laid
to rest by agreement of the parties that this particular document is genuine and duly executed. Nonetheless, the cancellation of
a Transfer Certificate of Title should be in a separate action before another forum.
Since the Transfer Certificates of Title of both Patricia Inc. and the City of Manila are admitted as genuine, the question now is:
4
Where are the boundaries based on the description in the respective titles?
To resolve the question about the boundaries of the properties of the City of Manila and respondent Patricia, Inc., the RTC
appointed, with the concurrence of the parties, three geodetic engineers as commissioners, namely: Engr. Rosario Mercado,
5
Engr. Ernesto Pamular and Engr. Delfin Bumanlag. These commissioners ultimately submitted their reports.
On May 30, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against Patricia, Inc., permanently enjoining the
latter from doing any act that would evict the former from their respective premises, and from collecting any rentals from
them. The RTC deemed it more sound to side with two of the commissioners who had found that the land belonged to the City
of Manila, and disposed:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED:
1. Defendant Patricia Inc. and other person/s claiming under it, are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED to REFRAIN
and DESIST from any act of EVICTION OR EJECTMENT of the PLAINTIFFS in the premises they
occupy;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. Defendant Patricia Inc. STOP COLLECTING any rentals from the plaintiffs who may seek reimbursement of
previous payments in a separate action subject to the ownership of the City of Manila
and;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 3. Attorney's fees of P10,000.00 to each plaintiff and intervenor, Ciriano Mijares; P20,000.00 to the City of
Manila. (emphasis ours)
No pronouncement as to costs.
6
SO ORDERED.
Decision of the CA
7
On appeal, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 86735, reversed the RTC's judgment, and dismissed the complaint. The CA declared that
the petitioners were without the necessary interest, either legal or equitable title, to maintain a suit for quieting of title;
castigated the RTC for acting like a mere rubber stamp of the majority of the commissioners; opined that the RTC should have
conducted hearings on the reports of the commissioners; ruled as highly improper the adjudication of the boundary dispute in
an action for quieting of title; and decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated May 30, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 32. Civil Case No. 96-81167 is hereby DISMISSED for utter want of merit. Accordingly, the questioned
order enjoining Patricia and all other person/s acting on its stead (sic) to refrain and desist from evicting or ejecting
plaintiffs/appellees in Patricia's own land and from collecting rentals is LIFTED effective immediately.
No costs.
8
SO ORDERED.
The CA denied the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and intervenor Mijares through the assailed resolution of
9
February 16, 2011.
Hence, this appeal by the petitioners.
Issues
The petitioners maintain that the CA erred in dismissing the complaint, arguing that the parties had openly raised and litigated
the boundary issue in the RTC, and had thereby amended the complaint to conform to the evidence pursuant to Section 5, Rule
10 of the Rules of Court; that they had the sufficient interest to bring the suit for quieting of title because they had built their
improvements on the property; and that the RTC correctly relied on the reports of the majority of the commissioners.
On its part, the City of Manila urges the Court to reinstate the decision of the RTC. It reprises the grounds relied upon by the
10
petitioners, particularly the application of Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
In response, Patricia, Inc. counters that the boundary dispute, which the allegations of the complaint eventually boiled down to,
was not proper in the action for quieting of title under Rule 63, Rules of Court; and that Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of
11
Court did not apply to vest the authority to resolve the boundary dispute in the RTCC.
In other words, did the CA err m dismissing the petitioners' complaint?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
1.
Jurisdiction over a real action depends on
the assessed value of the property involved
as alleged in the complaint
The complaint was ostensibly for the separate causes of action for injunction and for quieting of title. As such, the allegations
that would support both causes of action must be properly stated in the complaint. One of the important allegations would be
those vesting jurisdiction in the trial court.
The power of a court to hear and decide a controversy is called its jurisdiction, which includes the power to determine whether
or not it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether or not the
statement of facts that confer jurisdiction exists, as well as all other matters that arise in the case legitimately before the court.
Jurisdiction imports the power and authority to declare the law, to expound or to apply the laws exclusive of the idea of the
power to make the laws, to hear and determine issues of law and of fact, the power to hear, determine, and pronounce
judgment on the issues before the court, and the power to inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to pronounce the
12
judgment.
But judicial power is to be distinguished from jurisdiction in that the former cannot exist without the latter and must of
13
necessity be exercised within the scope of the latter, not beyond it.
Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law because it is conferred only by law, as distinguished from venue, which is a purely
procedural matter. The conferring law may be the Constitution, or the statute organizing the court or tribunal, or the special or
general statute defining the jurisdiction of an existing court or tribunal, but it must be in force at the time of the
14
commencement of the action. Jurisdiction cannot be presumed or implied, but must appear clearly from the law or it will not
15 16
be held to exist, but it may be conferred on a court or tribunal by necessary implication as well as by express terms. It cannot
17 18
be conferred by the agreement of the parties; or by the court's acquiescence; or by the erroneous belief of the court that it
19 20 21
had jurisdiction; or by the waiver of objections; or by the silence of the parties.
The three essential elements of jurisdiction are: one, that the court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one
to be adjudged belongs; two, that the proper parties must be present; and, three, that the point decided must be, in substance
and effect, within the issue. The test for determining jurisdiction is ordinarily the nature of the case as made by the complaint
and the relief sought; and the primary and essential nature of the suit, not its incidental character, determines the jurisdiction
22
of the court relative to it.
Jurisdiction may be classified into original and appellate, the former being the power to take judicial cognizance of a case
instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law, and the latter being the authority of a court
higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower court that tried the case elevated for judicial review.
Considering that the two classes of jurisdiction are exclusive of each other, one must be expressly conferred by law. One does
23
not flow, nor is inferred, from the other.
24
Jurisdiction is to be distinguished from its exercise. When there is jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision
25
of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. Considering that jurisdiction over the subject
matter determines the power of a court or tribunal to hear and determine a particular case, its existence does not depend upon
26
the regularity of its exercise by the court or tribunal. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the court or tribunal had the
power to enter on the inquiry, not whether or not its conclusions in the course thereof were correct, for the power to decide
necessarily carries with it the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly. In a manner of speaking, the lack of the power to act
at all results in a judgment that is void; while the lack of the power to render an erroneous decision results in a judgment that is
27
valid until set aside. That the decision is erroneous does not divest the court or tribunal that rendered it of the jurisdiction
28
conferred by law to try the case. Hence, if the court or tribunal has jurisdiction over the civil action, whatever error may be
29
attributed to it is simply one of judgment, not of jurisdiction; appeal, not certiorari, lies to correct the error.
The exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases is conferred and provided for in Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), viz.:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and costs or the value of the property in controversy, amounts
to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, the trial court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction in relation to the
averments or allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon
30
all or some of the claims asserted therein. Based on the foregoing provision of law, therefore, the RTC had jurisdiction over the
cause of action for injunction because it was one in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
But the same was not true in the case of the cause of action for the quieting of title, which had the nature of a real action
31
that is, an action that involves the issue of ownership or possession of real property, or any interest in real property in view
of the expansion of the jurisdiction of the first level courts under Republic Act No. 7691, which amended Section 33(3) of Batas
32
Pambansa Blg. 129 effective on April 15, 1994, to now pertinently provide as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. -
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds (sic) Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x
As such, the determination of which trial court had the exclusive original jurisdiction over the real action is dependent on the
assessed value of the property in dispute.
An action to quiet title is to be brought as a special civil action under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Although Section 1 of Rule
33
63 specifies the forum to be "the appropriate Regional Trial Court," the specification does not override the statutory provision
34
on jurisdiction. This the Court has pointed out in Malana v. Tappa, to wit:
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be
filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may"- that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule"
on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and
indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word shall and explicitly
requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real
property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:
xxxx
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00;
therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction
35
of the MTC, not the RTC.
The complaint of the petitioners did not contain any averment of the assessed value of the property. Such failure left the trial
court bereft of any basis to determine which court could validly take cognizance of the cause of action for quieting of title. Thus,
the RTC could not proceed with the case and render judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Although neither the parties nor the
lower courts raised jurisdiction of the trial court in the proceedings, the issue did not simply vanish because the Court can
hereby motu proprio consider and resolve it now by virtue of jurisdiction being conferred only by law, and could not be vested
36
by any act or omission of any party.
2.
The joinder of the action for injunction
and the action to quiet title
was disallowed by the Rules of Court
Another noticeable area of stumble for the petitioners related to their having joined two causes of action, i.e., injunction and
quieting of title, despite the first being an ordinary suit and the latter a special civil action under Rule 63. Section 5, Rule 2 of
the Rules of Court disallowed the joinder, viz.:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of
action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action arc between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be
allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue
lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action arc principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall he the
test of jurisdiction.
Consequently, the RTC should have severed the causes of action, either upon motion or motu proprio, and tried them
separately, assuming it had jurisdiction over both. Such severance was pursuant to Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which
expressly provides:
Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. -- Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined
cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately. (n)
The refusal of the petitioners to accept the severance would have led to the dismissal of the case conformably with the
mandate of Section, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. - If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the
presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate
action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (3a)
3.
The petitioners did not show that they were
real parties in interest to demand
either injunction or quieting of title
Even assuming that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action for quieting of title, the petitioners failed to allege and
prove their interest to maintain the suit. Hence, the dismissal of this cause of action was warranted.
An action to quiet title or remove the clouds over the title is a special civil action governed by the second paragraph of Section
1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on
equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to
put things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but
also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he
could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems
best. But "for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
37
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
The first requisite is based on Article 477 of the Civil Code which requires that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to,
or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Legal title denotes registered ownership, while
38
equitable title means beneficial ownership, meaning a title derived through a valid contract or relation, and based on
39
recognized equitable principles; the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal title transferred to him.
To determine whether the petitioners as plaintiffs had the requisite interest to bring the suit, a resort to the allegations of the
complaint is necessary. In that regard, the complaint pertinently alleged as follows:
THE CAUSE OF ACTION
5. Plaintiffs are occupants of a parcel of land situated at Juan Luna Street, Gagalangin, Tondo (hereinafter "subject property");
6. Plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open and notorious possession of the subject property for more than
thirty (30) years;
7. Plaintiffs have constructed in good faith their houses and other improvements on the subject property;
8. The subject property is declared an Area for Priority Development (APD) under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended;
9. Defendant is claiming ownership of the subject property by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 35727 of the
Registry of Deeds for the City of Manila. x x x
10. Defendant's claim of ownership over the subject property is without any legal or factual basis because, assuming but not
conceding that the TCT No. 35727 covers the subject property, the parcel of land covered by and embraced in TCT No. 35727
has already been sold and conveyed by defendant and, under the law, TCT No. 35727 should have been cancelled;
11. By virtue of TCT No. 35727, defendant is evicting, is about to evict or threatening to evict the plaintiffs from the said parcel
of land;
12. Because of the prior sales and conveyances, even assuming but not conceding that the subject property is covered by and
embraced in Transfer Certificate of title No. 35727, defendant cannot lawfully evict the plaintiffs from the subject property
since it no longer owns the subject property;
13. Any attempted eviction of the plaintiffs from the subject property would be without legal basis and consequently, would
only be acts of harassment which are contrary to morals, good customs and public policy and therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to
enjoin the defendant from further harassing them;
14. Plaintiffs recently discovered that the subject property is owned by the City of Manila and covered by and embraced in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44247, a copy of which is attached hereto as Annex "B", of the Registry of Deeds for the City of
Manila;
15. TCT No. 35727 which is apparently valid and effective is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable,
and constitutes a cloud on the rights and interests of the plaintiffs over the subject property;
16. Plaintiffs are entitled to the removal of such cloud on their rights and interests over the subject property;
17. Even assuming, but not admitting, that defendant owns the subject property, it cannot evict the plaintiffs from the subject
property because plaintiffs' right to possess the subject property is protected by Presidential Decree No. 2016.
18. Even assuming, but not admitting, that defendant owns the subject property, it cannot evict the plaintiffs from the subject
property without reimbursing the plaintiffs for the cost of the improvements made upon the subject property;
19. Because of defendant's unwarranted claim of ownership over the subject property and its attempt to evict or disposses the
plaintiffs from the subject property, plaintiffs experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, social humiliation, sleepless nights
and loss of appetite for which defendant should be ordered to pay each plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages;
20. Because of defendant's unwarranted claim of ownership over the subject property and its attempt to evict or disposses the
plaintiffs from the subject property, plaintiffs were constrained to litigate to protect their rights and interests, and hire services
of a lawyer, for which they should each be awarded the amount of P10,000.00.
21. The plaintiffs and the defendants are not required to undergo conciliation proceeding before the Katarungan Pambarangay
40
prior to the filing of this action.
The petitioners did not claim ownership of the land itself, and did not show their authority or other legal basis on which they
had anchored their alleged lawful occupation and superior possession of the property. On the contrary, they only contended
that their continued possession of the property had been for more than 30 years; that they had built their houses in good faith;
and that the area had been declared an Area for Priority Development (APD) under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended.
Yet, none of such reasons validly clothed them with the necessary interest to maintain the action for quieting of title. For one,
the authenticity of the title of the City of Manila and Patricia, Inc. was not disputed but was even admitted by them during trial.
As such, they could not expect to have any right in the property other than that of occupants whose possession was only
tolerated by the owners and rightful possessors. This was because land covered by a Torrens title cannot b e acquired by
41
prescription or by adverse possession. Moreover, they would not be builders entitled to the protection of the Civil Codeas
42
builders in good faith. Worse for them, as alleged in the respondent's comments, which they did not deny, they had been
lessees of Patricia, Inc. Such circumstances indicated that they had no claim to possession in good faith, their occupation not
being in the concept of owners.
At this juncture, the Court observes that the fact that the area was declared an area for priority development (APD) under
Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended, did not provide sufficient interest to the petitioners. When an area is declared as an
APD, the occupants would enjoy the benefits provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1517 (Proclaiming Urban land Reform in
43
the Philippines and Providing for the Implementing Machinery Thereof). In Frilles v. Yambao, the Court has summarized the
salient features of Presidential Decree No. 1517, thus:
P. D. No. 1517, which took effect on June 11, 1978, seeks to protect the rights of bona-fide tenants in urban lands by prohibiting
their ejectment therefrom under certain conditions, and by according them preferential right to purchase the land occupied by
them. The law covers all urban and urbanizable lands which have been proclaimed as urban land reform zones by the President
of the Philippines. If a particular property is within a declared Area for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zone, the
qualified lessee of the said property in that area can avail of the right of first refusal to purchase the same in accordance with
Section 6 of the same law. Only legitimate tenants who have resided for ten years or more on specific parcels of land
situated in declared Urban Land Reform Zones or Urban Zones, and who have built their homes thereon, have the right not to
be dispossessed therefrom and the right of first refusal to purchase the property under reasonable terms and conditions to
be determined by the appropriate government agency. [Bold emphasis supplied]
Presidential Decree No. 1517 only granted to the occupants of APDs the right of first refusal, but such grant was true only if and
when the owner of the property decided to sell the property. Only then would the right of first refusal accrue. Consequently,
the right of first refusal remained contingent, and was for that reason insufficient to vest any title, legal or equitable, in the
petitioners.
Moreover, the CA's adverse judgment dismissing their complaint as far as the action to quiet title was concerned was correct.
The main requirement for the action to be brought is that there is a deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding casting cloud on
the plaintiffs' title that is alleged and shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy, the eliminates the existence of the requirement. Their admission of the genuineness and authenticity of Patricia,
Inc.'s title negated the existence of such deed, instrument, encumbrance or proceeding that was invalid, and thus the action
must necessarily fail.
4.
The petitioners did not have
a cause of action for injunction
The petitioners did not also make out a case for injunction in their favor.
The nature of the remedy of injunction and the requirements for the issuance of the injunctive writ have been expounded
44
in Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Carantes, as follows:
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular act, in which case it is
called a mandatory injunction or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction. As a
main action, injunction seeks to permanently enjoin the defendant through a final injunction issued by the court and contained
in the judgment. Section 9, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides,
SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or
acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person
enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.
Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the acts against which
the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. Particularly, in actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will lie
only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or right thereto by a proper action for the purpose. [Emphasis Supplied]
Accordingly, the petitioners must prove the existence of a right to be protected. The records show, however, that they did not
have any right to be protected because they had established only the existence of the boundary dispute between Patricia, Inc.
and the City of Manila. Any violation of the boundary by Patricia, Inc., if any, would give rise to the right of action in favor of the
City of Manila only. The dispute did not concern the petitioners at all.
5.
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
did not save the day for the petitioners
The invocation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court in order to enable the raising of the boundary dispute was
unwarranted. First of all, a boundary dispute should not be litigated in an action for the quieting of title due to the limited
scope of the action. The action for the quieting of title is a tool specifically used to remove of any cloud upon, doubt, or
45
unce1iainty affecting title to real property; it should not be used for any other purpose. And, secondly, the boundary dispute
would essentially seek to alter or modify either the Torrens title of the City of Manila or that of Patricia, Inc., but any alteration
or modification either way should be initiated only by direct proceedings, not as an issue incidentally raised by the parties
46
herein. To allow the boundary dispute to be litigated in the action for quieting of title would violate Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree by virtue of its prohibition against collateral attacks on Torrens titles. A collateral attack takes place when,
47
in another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action. This is exactly what
the petitioners sought to do herein, seeking to modify or otherwise cancel Patricia, Inc.'s title.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 25, 2010 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86735;
and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

MANGUBAT vs. MORGA-SEVA

G.R. No. 202611 November 23, 2015
 1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated (i) July 13, 2011 which
dismissed for lack of merit petitioner Abner Mangubat's (Abner) Petition for Annulment of Judgment and, (ii) June 13,
2
2012 which denied his motion for reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

On March 5, 1974, Gaudencio Mangubat (Gaudencio) and his wife Aurelia Rellora-Mangubat (Aurelia) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against respondent Belen Morga-
Seva (Belen) and two other defendants. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. P-279 and raffled to the RTC Branch 31. On
3
August 27, 1985, the RT.C issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads in part, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Based on the facts x x x established x x x and the cited applicable law and jurisprudence, this Court hereby renders judgment
and orders:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

3. The defendants to reimburse the plaintiffs the total amount the latter have paid the (Development Bank of the Philippines
[DBP]) after 1971, the year the defendants defaulted in their amortization payments to DBP, and in the event of the failure of
the defendants to make such reimbursement, for plaintiffs to assume the rights of the old creditor (DBP) and take such
remedial action as the situation may warrant, x x x

xxxx

5. The defendants [are] entitled to claim and recover title or ownership over the following properties held as collaterals by DBP,
subject, however, to the encumbrance in favor of the plaintiffs, who have substituted for DBP as
creditors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 6337 with all the improvements thereon; x x x

xxxx
4
SO ORDERED. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary

Since Belen and her co-defendants' appeal to the CA and later to this Court were both unsuccessful, the RTC Decision became
final and executory.

On September 3, 1998, Gaudencio and his children as heirs (the heirs) of the deceased Aurelia filed with the same court a
5
Complaint for Revival of the Decision in Civil Case No. P-279. They averred that the writ of execution could not be
implemented because Belen and her co-defendants evaded service thereof. And since five years had already lapsed from the
date of its entry, Gaudencio and the heirs prayed for the revival of the RTC Decision.

Gaudencio, assisted by Atty. Reynaldo L. Herrera (Atty. Herrera) and Belen by Atty. Junnel M. Relativo, entered into a
6
Compromise Agreement which states as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx

The defendants admit that they shall pay the amount of P33.OOO.OO that was previously paid by the plaintiffs to [the DBP1
prior to the issuance of the decision in Civil Case No. 279, plus its legal interest of 12% per annum since August [1990 until] the
year 2000 or a total sum of P72,600.00 plus P5,000.00 for attorney's fee, payable on or before June 30, 2001;

That upon payment of said amount, the plaintiffs will transfer the title, TCT No. 6337 to defendant Belen Morga Seva;

All other claims and counterclaims that the parties may have [against each other] are hereby waived.
7
x x x x cralawlawlibrary
 8 9
The RTC approved the agreement and on February 23, 2001 rendered a Decision in accordance therewith. Upon its finality,
10
the Writ of Execution was ordered issued by the said court.
11
On June 24, 2002, Abner, on his own behalf, moved to substitute his father Gaudencio who died on January 31, 2002. A few
months thereafter and now allegedly in behalf of his co-heirs, Abner, through Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba (Atty. Vista-Gumba)
filed another motion to substitute Gaudencio exclusively for the purpose of executing the final judgment in the case on the
12 13
claim that it was necessary for the settlement of the intestate estate of his father. In an Order dated September 13, 2002,
the RTC granted Abner's motion for substitution but for purposes of execution only.
14
On December 18, 2003, Belen handed to Atty. Herrera her payment of P91,280.00 in accordance with the Compromise
15
Agreement. Alleging, however, that the heirs refused to convey to Belen the lot covered by TCT No. 6337, the RTC, upon
16
motion of Atty. Herrera, directed (1) Abner, who was allegedly in possession of the owner's copy of the title, to surrender the
same to the Clerk of Court; and (2) the Clerk of Court to execute in behalf of the heirs a deed of sale or conveyance of the lot in
17
favor of Belen pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court. Abner, however, manifested that as far as he is
18
concerned, Belen has not yet made any payment to the heirs as he was not notified by Atty. Herrera of the same. Thus, Atty.
Herrera reported to the court that out of the P91,280.00 handed to him by Belen, he had turned-over the amount of
19 20
P84,480.00 to the Clerk of Court and retained 6,800.00 as his attorney's fee. This was duly noted by the RTC.
21
On January 20, 2005, Abner terminated the services of Atty. Herrera. Subsequently and purportedly in behalf of all the heirs,
22
Abner, through Atty. Vista-Gumba, filed a Motion to Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void. It was alleged therein
that Gaudencio acted only on his own behalf when he entered into the compromise agreement with Belen, hence, the same is
null and void for want of consent and participation of the heirs who were indispensable parties.

Interestingly, however, two of the heirs namely, Ruth Mangubat Parcia and Job Mangubat filed a Manifestation with Motion to
23
Withdraw the Heirs['] Respective Shares. According to them, they were seven siblings all in all and each is entitled to
P12,068.00 from Belen's payment. They do not agree with the course of action taken by Abner relative to the case and prayed
that the case be considered closed and terminated and their respective shares from Belen's payment released to them. Belen,
on the other hand, questioned Abner's capacity to assail the compromise agreement. She averred that in the decision of the
24
probate court regarding the intestate estate of Gaudencio, Abner was disinherited by his father.
25
In an Order dated September 8, 2005, the RTC ruled on the Motion to Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The present action for Declaration of Nullity of the Compromise Agreement was filed by Abner Mangubat, son and one. of the
heirs of Gaudencio and Aurelia Mangubat, who has been disinherited by final judgment in Spec. Procs. No. P-984 before RTC[,]
Branch 33 of this Court x x x thus, Abner Mangubat is not a real party in interest to bring this present action ([to] declare [the]
amicable settlement null and void] under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. His allegations that the present motion was
brought in behalf of the other heirs of Gaudencio and Aurelia Mangubat is gratuitous and without basis, there is no evidence to
show that he is authorized to represent them. As a matter of fact, two of the heirs, Ruth Mangubat Parcia and Job Mangubat
manifested that they do not want to be involved and dragged in this proceeding nor in any other action that Abner may
institute; that accordingly, they are satisfied with the decision of the Court, and they want to get their share of the deposit x x
x.

Be it noted that the decision has been partially satisfied when defendant Belen Morga Seva, thru Atty. Reynaldo Herrera,
deposited the amount of P84,480.00 to the Clerk of Court as per [R]eceipt No. 1201439 dated April 6, 2005. Moreover, by his
own act, Abner Mangubat is bound by the compromise agreement when he substituted for his father. Record shows that Abner
Mangubat continued to retain the legal services of Atty. Reynaldo Herrera as counsel for the plaintiffs contrary to his
allegations. The services of Atty. Herrera was terminated only sometime in January 2005. x x x

It is well settled that a judgment on a compromise is not appealable and is immediately executory, unless a motion is filed to
set aside the compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress in which case an appeal may be taken from the order
denying the motion.

The inaction of Abner Mangubat or [the] other heirs of Gaudencio Mangubat and Aurelia Mangubat for a period of almost four
(4) years after becoming aware of the compromise agreement and of the judgment thereon, amounts to a ratification on their
part of said agreement. For laches operates to validate an agreement otherwise invalid, granting that the herein compromise
agreement was invalid, when the party on becoming aware of the compromise fails to repudiate it promptly. Such ratification is
presumed from his or their inaction.
The validity of a judgment or order of a Court cannot be assailed collaterally unless the ground of attack is lack of jurisdiction. If
the purported nullity of the judgment lies on the party's lack of consent to the compromise agreement, as claimed by Abner
Mangubat being the heir of Aurelia Rellora-Mangubat who died before the filing of this case for revival of judgment, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is to have it reconsidered, and if denied to appeal from such judgment or if final to apply for
relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court or to file an annulment of judgment under Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 before the Honorable
Court of Appeals.

It is unfortunate that Abner Mangubat failed to avail of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court and opted to file
this instant motion to declare the compromise agreement null and void which has no leg to stand on.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, for lack of sufficient merit, the motion to declare [the] amicable settlement null and
void is hereby DENIED.
26
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

27
Again purportedly on behalf of all the heirs, Abner moved for the reconsideration of the above-quoted Order but was denied
28
by the RTC in its Order of February 27, 2006. When the same became final, Belen filed a Motion for Execution of Specific
29
Acts wherein she once more prayed that Abner be ordered to surrender to the RTC the owner's copy of TCT No. 6337 and the
Clerk of Court to execute in her favor and on behalf of the heirs a deed of sale involving the lot covered by the said title. This
30
was granted by the RTC in an Order dated July 14, 2006. Still, Abner refused to comply. Hence, the said court upon motion of
31 32
Belen issued its Order of September 25, 2006, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, plaintiffs through Abner Mangubat [are] hereby divested of the ownership of the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6337 pursuant to the decision of this Court dated February 23, 2001 and
the same is vested to herein defendant Belen Morga-Seva. This order shall now have the force and effect of a conveyance
executed in due form oflaw pursuant to the last sentence of Sec. 10(a) of Rule 39 of the [R]ules of Court.
33
SO ORDERED. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary

34
Trie afore-mentioned order became final on November 19, 2006. Pursuant thereto, the RTC directed the Registrar of Deeds of
35
Camarines Sur to transfer title to the property under TCT No. 6337 to Belen.
Riding of the Court of Appeals

36
On September 21, 2010, Abner filed a Petition for Annulment of Final Order with the CA. He contended that under the
Compromise Agreement, Belen was supposed to make her payment on or before June 30, 2001. However, the same was made
only on December 18, 2003 or way beyond the period agreed upon. Thus to Abner, it was unjust for the RTC to have issued its
September 25, 2006 Order divesting the heirs of ownership of the subject property. Moreover, Abner argued that since the
February 23, 2001 RTC Decision approving the Compromise Agreement had long become final and executory, the RTC had
already lost its jurisdiction over the case when it issued the September 25, 2006 Order.
37 38
In a Resolution dated July 13, 2011, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The Motion for Reconsideration thereto
39
was also denied in Resolution dated June 13, 2012.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

The Parties' Arguments

Abner basically reiterates the arguments he advanced before the CA.

For her part, Belen argues that the RTC has jurisdiction over the Complaint for revival of judgment. In fact, the RTC's issuance of
the September 25, 2006 Order is nothing but an exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to its authority to handle the case until the full
satisfaction of its Decision. At any rate, Abner is guilty of laches as it was only after almost four years from the finality of the
said Order that he questioned the same.
Our Ruling
The Petition fails.

It must be stressed that the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under certain exceptional circumstances as this
40
is adverse to the concept of immutability of final judgments. Hence, it is allowed only on two grounds, i.e., extrinsic fraud and
41
lack of jurisdiction.

Abner anchors his Petition for Annulment of Final Order on lack of jurisdiction. He posits that the RTC had lost jurisdiction over
the case when its February 23, 2001 Decision became final, hence, any issuance subsequent thereto is made without any
jurisdiction.

The argument is, however, specious. "Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order
is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
42
petitioner." Here, it is undisputed that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Abner, he having asked for affirmative
43
relief therefrom several times. As mentioned, what Abner questions is the RTC's jurisdiction over the case.

"In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of
jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the
court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject
44
matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law." The RTC's jurisdiction over petitions
45
for revival of judgment had already been upheld by the Court. It was held that "[a]n action for revival of judgment may be
filed either 'in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in
46
any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.'" Here, the Complaint for revival of
judgment was filed in the same court (RTC-Pili Camarines Sur, Branch 31) which rendered the August 27, 1985 Decision in Civil
Case No. P-279. Undoubtedly, the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. There is therefore no valid ground for the Petition for
Annulment of Final Order that Abner filed with the CA.

To the mind of the Court, Abner's flawed arguments emanate from his misconception of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action as a ground for annulment. As aptly observed by the CA, he has confused lack of jurisdiction with
error in the exercise of jurisdiction, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is settled that once jurisdiction has been acquired, it is not lost until the court shall have disposed of the case in its entirety.
[Abner's] predecessor having elected to enforce the compromise agreement, the RTC is still vested with jurisdiction until
compliance therewith has been fully enforced.

[Abner] clearly confused lack of jurisdiction with error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise
of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the
decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise
of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. The error raised by [Abner] pertains to
the trial court's exercise of its jurisdiction, not its lack of authority to decide the case. In a petition for annulment of judgment
based on lack of jurisdiction, [a] petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of
authority to hear and decide the case. On this basis, there would be no valid ground to grant the petition for annulment of
47
judgment. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary

Even assuming that the claim of lack of jurisdiction is well-grounded, Abner's Petition for Annulment of Final Order is barred by
laches. An action for annulment of judgment or final order if based on lack of jurisdiction, must brought before it is barred by
48
laches. "The principle of laches or 'stale demands' ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier ~ negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined
49
to assert it." In this case, it was only after almost four years from the finality of the September 25, 2006 Order that Abner
brought an action to annul the same. He did not even care to provide in his petition any justification for his inaction for such a
long period of time. Such unreasonable delay warrants the presumption that Abner has declined to assert his right to the
property covered by TCT No. 6337. Verily, to permit him now to assert the same would be unfair and inequitable.

In any event, Abner's Petition for Annulment of Final Order was not the proper remedy to nullify the September 25, 2006 Order
which is an interlocutory order. "An interlocutory order refers to a ruling respecting some point or matter between the
commencement and end of the suit, but is not a final adjudication of the claims and liabilities of the parties that are in dispute
50
in that suit. The September 25, 2006 Order merely dealt with the incidental matter of causing the transfer of the title to the
property covered by TCT No. 6337 under the name of Belen in accordance with the final and executory February 23, 2001 RTC
Decision after Abner refused to comply with the directive to deliver the owner's copy thereof. No further settlement of any
claim or imposition of any further liability was made in the said order.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July 13,
2011 and June 13, 2012 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MANGUBAT vs. MORGA-SEVA

G.R. No. 195834 November 09, 2016
Jurisdiction over a real action is determined based on the allegations in the complaint of the assessed value of the property
involved. The silence of the complaint on such value is ground to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction because the trial
court is not given the basis for making the determination.
The Case
1
For review is the decision promulgated on June 25, 2010 and the resolution promulgated on February 16, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV
2
No. 86735, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 96-81167, thereby
respectively reversing and setting aside the decision rendered on May 30, 2005 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, in
3
Manila, and denying their motion for reconsideration.
Antecedents
The CA adopted the summary by the RTC of the relevant factual and procedural antecedents, as follows:
This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns the property occupied by the plaintiffs and
intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares.
Additionally, to prevent the defendant Patricia Inc., from evicting the plaintiffs from their respective improvements along Juan
Luna Street, plaintiffs applied for a preliminary injunction in their Complaint pending the quieting of title on the merits.
The complaint was amended to include different branches of the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila. A Complaint-in-
Intervention was filed by the City of Manila as owner of the land occupied by the plaintiffs. Another Complaint-in-Intervention
by Ciriano Mijares was also filed alleging that he was similarly situated as the other plaintiffs.
A preliminary injunction was granted and served on all the defendants.
Based on the allegations of the parties involved, the main issue to be resolved is whether the improvements of the plaintiffs
stand on land that belongs to Patricia Inc., or the City of Manila. Who owns the same? Is it covered by a Certificate of Title?
All parties agreed and admitted in evidence by stipulation as to the authenticity of the following documents:
(1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44247 in the name of the City of Manila;
(2) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35727 in the name of Patricia Inc.;
(3) Approved Plan PSD-38540; and
(4) Approved Subdivision Plan PCS-3290 for Ricardo Manotok.
The issue as to whether TCT 35727 should be cancelled as prayed for by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares is laid
to rest by agreement of the parties that this particular document is genuine and duly executed. Nonetheless, the cancellation of
a Transfer Certificate of Title should be in a separate action before another forum.
Since the Transfer Certificates of Title of both Patricia Inc. and the City of Manila are admitted as genuine, the question now is:
4
Where are the boundaries based on the description in the respective titles?
To resolve the question about the boundaries of the properties of the City of Manila and respondent Patricia, Inc., the RTC
appointed, with the concurrence of the parties, three geodetic engineers as commissioners, namely: Engr. Rosario Mercado,
5
Engr. Ernesto Pamular and Engr. Delfin Bumanlag. These commissioners ultimately submitted their reports.
On May 30, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against Patricia, Inc., permanently enjoining the
latter from doing any act that would evict the former from their respective premises, and from collecting any rentals from
them. The RTC deemed it more sound to side with two of the commissioners who had found that the land belonged to the City
of Manila, and disposed:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED:
1. Defendant Patricia Inc. and other person/s claiming under it, are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED to REFRAIN
and DESIST from any act of EVICTION OR EJECTMENT of the PLAINTIFFS in the premises they
occupy;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. Defendant Patricia Inc. STOP COLLECTING any rentals from the plaintiffs who may seek reimbursement of
previous payments in a separate action subject to the ownership of the City of Manila
and;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
3. Attorney's fees of P10,000.00 to each plaintiff and intervenor, Ciriano Mijares; P20,000.00 to the City of
Manila. (emphasis ours)
No pronouncement as to costs.
6
SO ORDERED.
Decision of the CA
7
On appeal, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 86735, reversed the RTC's judgment, and dismissed the complaint. The CA declared that
the petitioners were without the necessary interest, either legal or equitable title, to maintain a suit for quieting of title;
castigated the RTC for acting like a mere rubber stamp of the majority of the commissioners; opined that the RTC should have
conducted hearings on the reports of the commissioners; ruled as highly improper the adjudication of the boundary dispute in
an action for quieting of title; and decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated May 30, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 32. Civil Case No. 96-81167 is hereby DISMISSED for utter want of merit. Accordingly, the questioned
order enjoining Patricia and all other person/s acting on its stead (sic) to refrain and desist from evicting or ejecting
plaintiffs/appellees in Patricia's own land and from collecting rentals is LIFTED effective immediately.
No costs.
8
SO ORDERED.
The CA denied the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and intervenor Mijares through the assailed resolution of
9
February 16, 2011.
Hence, this appeal by the petitioners.
Issues
The petitioners maintain that the CA erred in dismissing the complaint, arguing that the parties had openly raised and litigated
the boundary issue in the RTC, and had thereby amended the complaint to conform to the evidence pursuant to Section 5, Rule
10 of the Rules of Court; that they had the sufficient interest to bring the suit for quieting of title because they had built their
improvements on the property; and that the RTC correctly relied on the reports of the majority of the commissioners.
On its part, the City of Manila urges the Court to reinstate the decision of the RTC. It reprises the grounds relied upon by the
10
petitioners, particularly the application of Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
In response, Patricia, Inc. counters that the boundary dispute, which the allegations of the complaint eventually boiled down to,
was not proper in the action for quieting of title under Rule 63, Rules of Court; and that Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of
11
Court did not apply to vest the authority to resolve the boundary dispute in the RTCC.
In other words, did the CA err m dismissing the petitioners' complaint?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
1.
Jurisdiction over a real action depends on
the assessed value of the property involved
as alleged in the complaint
The complaint was ostensibly for the separate causes of action for injunction and for quieting of title. As such, the allegations
that would support both causes of action must be properly stated in the complaint. One of the important allegations would be
those vesting jurisdiction in the trial court.
The power of a court to hear and decide a controversy is called its jurisdiction, which includes the power to determine whether
or not it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether or not the
statement of facts that confer jurisdiction exists, as well as all other matters that arise in the case legitimately before the court.
Jurisdiction imports the power and authority to declare the law, to expound or to apply the laws exclusive of the idea of the
power to make the laws, to hear and determine issues of law and of fact, the power to hear, determine, and pronounce
judgment on the issues before the court, and the power to inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to pronounce the
12
judgment.
But judicial power is to be distinguished from jurisdiction in that the former cannot exist without the latter and must of
13
necessity be exercised within the scope of the latter, not beyond it.
Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law because it is conferred only by law, as distinguished from venue, which is a purely
procedural matter. The conferring law may be the Constitution, or the statute organizing the court or tribunal, or the special or
general statute defining the jurisdiction of an existing court or tribunal, but it must be in force at the time of the
14
commencement of the action. Jurisdiction cannot be presumed or implied, but must appear clearly from the law or it will not
15 16
be held to exist, but it may be conferred on a court or tribunal by necessary implication as well as by express terms. It cannot
17 18
be conferred by the agreement of the parties; or by the court's acquiescence; or by the erroneous belief of the court that it
19 20 21
had jurisdiction; or by the waiver of objections; or by the silence of the parties.
The three essential elements of jurisdiction are: one, that the court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one
to be adjudged belongs; two, that the proper parties must be present; and, three, that the point decided must be, in substance
and effect, within the issue. The test for determining jurisdiction is ordinarily the nature of the case as made by the complaint
and the relief sought; and the primary and essential nature of the suit, not its incidental character, determines the jurisdiction
22
of the court relative to it.
Jurisdiction may be classified into original and appellate, the former being the power to take judicial cognizance of a case
instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law, and the latter being the authority of a court
higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower court that tried the case elevated for judicial review.
Considering that the two classes of jurisdiction are exclusive of each other, one must be expressly conferred by law. One does
23
not flow, nor is inferred, from the other.
24
Jurisdiction is to be distinguished from its exercise. When there is jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision
25
of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. Considering that jurisdiction over the subject
matter determines the power of a court or tribunal to hear and determine a particular case, its existence does not depend upon
26
the regularity of its exercise by the court or tribunal. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the court or tribunal had the
power to enter on the inquiry, not whether or not its conclusions in the course thereof were correct, for the power to decide
necessarily carries with it the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly. In a manner of speaking, the lack of the power to act
at all results in a judgment that is void; while the lack of the power to render an erroneous decision results in a judgment that is
27
valid until set aside. That the decision is erroneous does not divest the court or tribunal that rendered it of the jurisdiction
28
conferred by law to try the case. Hence, if the court or tribunal has jurisdiction over the civil action, whatever error may be
29
attributed to it is simply one of judgment, not of jurisdiction; appeal, not certiorari, lies to correct the error.
The exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases is conferred and provided for in Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), viz.:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and costs or the value of the property in controversy, amounts
to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, the trial court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction in relation to the
averments or allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon
30
all or some of the claims asserted therein. Based on the foregoing provision of law, therefore, the RTC had jurisdiction over the
cause of action for injunction because it was one in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
But the same was not true in the case of the cause of action for the quieting of title, which had the nature of a real action
31
that is, an action that involves the issue of ownership or possession of real property, or any interest in real property in view
of the expansion of the jurisdiction of the first level courts under Republic Act No. 7691, which amended Section 33(3) of Batas
32
Pambansa Blg. 129 effective on April 15, 1994, to now pertinently provide as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. -
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds (sic) Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x
As such, the determination of which trial court had the exclusive original jurisdiction over the real action is dependent on the
assessed value of the property in dispute.
An action to quiet title is to be brought as a special civil action under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Although Section 1 of Rule
33
63 specifies the forum to be "the appropriate Regional Trial Court," the specification does not override the statutory provision
34
on jurisdiction. This the Court has pointed out in Malana v. Tappa, to wit:
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be
filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may"- that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule"
on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and
indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word shall and explicitly
requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real
property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:
xxxx
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00;
therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction
35
of the MTC, not the RTC.
The complaint of the petitioners did not contain any averment of the assessed value of the property. Such failure left the trial
court bereft of any basis to determine which court could validly take cognizance of the cause of action for quieting of title. Thus,
the RTC could not proceed with the case and render judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Although neither the parties nor the
lower courts raised jurisdiction of the trial court in the proceedings, the issue did not simply vanish because the Court can
hereby motu proprio consider and resolve it now by virtue of jurisdiction being conferred only by law, and could not be vested
36
by any act or omission of any party.
2.
The joinder of the action for injunction
and the action to quiet title
was disallowed by the Rules of Court
Another noticeable area of stumble for the petitioners related to their having joined two causes of action, i.e., injunction and
quieting of title, despite the first being an ordinary suit and the latter a special civil action under Rule 63. Section 5, Rule 2 of
the Rules of Court disallowed the joinder, viz.:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of
action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action arc between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be
allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue
lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action arc principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall he the
test of jurisdiction.
Consequently, the RTC should have severed the causes of action, either upon motion or motu proprio, and tried them
separately, assuming it had jurisdiction over both. Such severance was pursuant to Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which
expressly provides:
Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. -- Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined
cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately. (n)
The refusal of the petitioners to accept the severance would have led to the dismissal of the case conformably with the
mandate of Section, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. - If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the
presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate
action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (3a)
3.
The petitioners did not show that they were
real parties in interest to demand
either injunction or quieting of title
Even assuming that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action for quieting of title, the petitioners failed to allege and
prove their interest to maintain the suit. Hence, the dismissal of this cause of action was warranted.
An action to quiet title or remove the clouds over the title is a special civil action governed by the second paragraph of Section
1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on
equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to
put things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but
also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he
could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems
best. But "for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
37
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
The first requisite is based on Article 477 of the Civil Code which requires that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to,
or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Legal title denotes registered ownership, while
38
equitable title means beneficial ownership, meaning a title derived through a valid contract or relation, and based on
39
recognized equitable principles; the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal title transferred to him.
To determine whether the petitioners as plaintiffs had the requisite interest to bring the suit, a resort to the allegations of the
complaint is necessary. In that regard, the complaint pertinently alleged as follows:
THE CAUSE OF ACTION
5. Plaintiffs are occupants of a parcel of land situated at Juan Luna Street, Gagalangin, Tondo (hereinafter "subject property");
6. Plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open and notorious possession of the subject property for more than
thirty (30) years;
7. Plaintiffs have constructed in good faith their houses and other improvements on the subject property;
8. The subject property is declared an Area for Priority Development (APD) under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended;
9. Defendant is claiming ownership of the subject property by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 35727 of the
Registry of Deeds for the City of Manila. x x x
10. Defendant's claim of ownership over the subject property is without any legal or factual basis because, assuming but not
conceding that the TCT No. 35727 covers the subject property, the parcel of land covered by and embraced in TCT No. 35727
has already been sold and conveyed by defendant and, under the law, TCT No. 35727 should have been cancelled;
11. By virtue of TCT No. 35727, defendant is evicting, is about to evict or threatening to evict the plaintiffs from the said parcel
of land;
12. Because of the prior sales and conveyances, even assuming but not conceding that the subject property is covered by and
embraced in Transfer Certificate of title No. 35727, defendant cannot lawfully evict the plaintiffs from the subject property
since it no longer owns the subject property;
13. Any attempted eviction of the plaintiffs from the subject property would be without legal basis and consequently, would
only be acts of harassment which are contrary to morals, good customs and public policy and therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to
enjoin the defendant from further harassing them;
14. Plaintiffs recently discovered that the subject property is owned by the City of Manila and covered by and embraced in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44247, a copy of which is attached hereto as Annex "B", of the Registry of Deeds for the City of
Manila;
15. TCT No. 35727 which is apparently valid and effective is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable,
and constitutes a cloud on the rights and interests of the plaintiffs over the subject property;
16. Plaintiffs are entitled to the removal of such cloud on their rights and interests over the subject property;
17. Even assuming, but not admitting, that defendant owns the subject property, it cannot evict the plaintiffs from the subject
property because plaintiffs' right to possess the subject property is protected by Presidential Decree No. 2016.
18. Even assuming, but not admitting, that defendant owns the subject property, it cannot evict the plaintiffs from the subject
property without reimbursing the plaintiffs for the cost of the improvements made upon the subject property;
19. Because of defendant's unwarranted claim of ownership over the subject property and its attempt to evict or disposses the
plaintiffs from the subject property, plaintiffs experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, social humiliation, sleepless nights
and loss of appetite for which defendant should be ordered to pay each plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages;
20. Because of defendant's unwarranted claim of ownership over the subject property and its attempt to evict or disposses the
plaintiffs from the subject property, plaintiffs were constrained to litigate to protect their rights and interests, and hire services
of a lawyer, for which they should each be awarded the amount of P10,000.00.
21. The plaintiffs and the defendants are not required to undergo conciliation proceeding before the Katarungan Pambarangay
40
prior to the filing of this action.
The petitioners did not claim ownership of the land itself, and did not show their authority or other legal basis on which they
had anchored their alleged lawful occupation and superior possession of the property. On the contrary, they only contended
that their continued possession of the property had been for more than 30 years; that they had built their houses in good faith;
and that the area had been declared an Area for Priority Development (APD) under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended.
Yet, none of such reasons validly clothed them with the necessary interest to maintain the action for quieting of title. For one,
the authenticity of the title of the City of Manila and Patricia, Inc. was not disputed but was even admitted by them during trial.
As such, they could not expect to have any right in the property other than that of occupants whose possession was only
tolerated by the owners and rightful possessors. This was because land covered by a Torrens title cannot b e acquired by
41
prescription or by adverse possession. Moreover, they would not be builders entitled to the protection of the Civil Codeas
42
builders in good faith. Worse for them, as alleged in the respondent's comments, which they did not deny, they had been
lessees of Patricia, Inc. Such circumstances indicated that they had no claim to possession in good faith, their occupation not
being in the concept of owners.
At this juncture, the Court observes that the fact that the area was declared an area for priority development (APD) under
Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended, did not provide sufficient interest to the petitioners. When an area is declared as an
APD, the occupants would enjoy the benefits provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1517 (Proclaiming Urban land Reform in
43
the Philippines and Providing for the Implementing Machinery Thereof). In Frilles v. Yambao, the Court has summarized the
salient features of Presidential Decree No. 1517, thus:
P. D. No. 1517, which took effect on June 11, 1978, seeks to protect the rights of bona-fide tenants in urban lands by prohibiting
their ejectment therefrom under certain conditions, and by according them preferential right to purchase the land occupied by
them. The law covers all urban and urbanizable lands which have been proclaimed as urban land reform zones by the President
of the Philippines. If a particular property is within a declared Area for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zone, the
qualified lessee of the said property in that area can avail of the right of first refusal to purchase the same in accordance with
Section 6 of the same law. Only legitimate tenants who have resided for ten years or more on specific parcels of land
situated in declared Urban Land Reform Zones or Urban Zones, and who have built their homes thereon, have the right not to
be dispossessed therefrom and the right of first refusal to purchase the property under reasonable terms and conditions to
be determined by the appropriate government agency. [Bold emphasis supplied]
Presidential Decree No. 1517 only granted to the occupants of APDs the right of first refusal, but such grant was true only if and
when the owner of the property decided to sell the property. Only then would the right of first refusal accrue. Consequently,
the right of first refusal remained contingent, and was for that reason insufficient to vest any title, legal or equitable, in the
petitioners.
Moreover, the CA's adverse judgment dismissing their complaint as far as the action to quiet title was concerned was correct.
The main requirement for the action to be brought is that there is a deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding casting cloud on
the plaintiffs' title that is alleged and shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy, the eliminates the existence of the requirement. Their admission of the genuineness and authenticity of Patricia,
Inc.'s title negated the existence of such deed, instrument, encumbrance or proceeding that was invalid, and thus the action
must necessarily fail.
4.
The petitioners did not have
a cause of action for injunction
The petitioners did not also make out a case for injunction in their favor.
The nature of the remedy of injunction and the requirements for the issuance of the injunctive writ have been expounded
44
in Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Carantes, as follows:
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular act, in which case it is
called a mandatory injunction or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction. As a
main action, injunction seeks to permanently enjoin the defendant through a final injunction issued by the court and contained
in the judgment. Section 9, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides,
SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or
acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person
enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.
Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the acts against which
the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. Particularly, in actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will lie
only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or right thereto by a proper action for the purpose. [Emphasis Supplied]
Accordingly, the petitioners must prove the existence of a right to be protected. The records show, however, that they did not
have any right to be protected because they had established only the existence of the boundary dispute between Patricia, Inc.
and the City of Manila. Any violation of the boundary by Patricia, Inc., if any, would give rise to the right of action in favor of the
City of Manila only. The dispute did not concern the petitioners at all.
5.
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
did not save the day for the petitioners
The invocation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court in order to enable the raising of the boundary dispute was
unwarranted. First of all, a boundary dispute should not be litigated in an action for the quieting of title due to the limited
scope of the action. The action for the quieting of title is a tool specifically used to remove of any cloud upon, doubt, or
45
unce1iainty affecting title to real property; it should not be used for any other purpose. And, secondly, the boundary dispute
would essentially seek to alter or modify either the Torrens title of the City of Manila or that of Patricia, Inc., but any alteration
or modification either way should be initiated only by direct proceedings, not as an issue incidentally raised by the parties
46
herein. To allow the boundary dispute to be litigated in the action for quieting of title would violate Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree by virtue of its prohibition against collateral attacks on Torrens titles. A collateral attack takes place when,
47
in another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action. This is exactly what
the petitioners sought to do herein, seeking to modify or otherwise cancel Patricia, Inc.'s title.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 25, 2010 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86735;
and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.