West Phil Sea China Sea

PCA Case N 2013-19
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
- before -
AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED UNDER ANNEX VII TO THE

1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
- between -
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
- and -
THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
__________________________________________________________
AWARD ON JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY
__________________________________________________________
Arbitral Tribunal:
Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Presiding Arbitrator)

Judge Jean-Pierre Cot
Judge Stanislaw Pawlak
Professor Alfred H.A. Soons
Judge Rdiger Wolfrum
Registry:
Permanent Court of Arbitration
29 October 2015
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Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility
29 October 2015
REPRES ENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AGENT
Mr. Florin T. Hilbay No agents or representatives appointed

Solicitor General of the Philippines
replacing Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza,
as of 2 March 2015
COUNS EL AND ADVOCATES
Mr. Paul S. Reichler

Mr. Lawrence H. Martin
Foley Hoag LLP, Washington, DC
Professor Bernard H. Oxman

University of Miami School of Law, Miami
Professor Philippe Sands QC

Matrix Chambers, London
Professor Alan Boyle

Essex Court Chambers, London
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................................................1
II. PROCEDURAL HIS TORY .................................................................................................................................. 15
A. Initiation of the Arbitrati on ...................................................................................................................... 15
B. Constituti on of the Tri bunal ..................................................................................................................... 16
C. Administrative Directive No. 1, Procedural Order No. 1, and Rules of Procedure ...................... 16
D. Written Arguments ..................................................................................................................................... 18
E. Bifurcati on of Proceedings ........................................................................................................................ 23
F. Pre-Hearing Procedures and Requests from Other States .............................................................. 25
G. Hearing on J urisdiction and Admissibility ........................................................................................... 28
H. Post-Hearing Proceedings ......................................................................................................................... 31
I. Deposits for Costs of the Arbitration ..................................................................................................... 32
III. RELIEF REQUES TED AND S UB MISS IONS ................................................................................................ 33
IV. PRELIMINARY MATTERS ................................................................................................................................ 37
A. The Status of the Philippi nes and China as Parties to the Conventi on......................................... 37
B. The Leg al and Practical Consequences of Chinas Non-Partici pation ......................................... 39
C. Whether the Arbitration Constitutes an Abuse of Legal Process .................................................. 42
V. IDENTIFICATION AND CHARACTERIS ATION OF THE DISPUT E................................................ 45
A. The Parties Positions ................................................................................................................................. 45
1. Chinas Position ..................................................................................................................................45
2. The Philippines Position .................................................................................................................. 48
B. The Tri bunals Decision............................................................................................................................. 57
VI. WHETHER ANY THIRD PARTIES ARE INDISPENS ABLE TO THE PROCEEDINGS .............. 71
VII. PRECONDITIONS TO THE TRIB UNALS J URISDICTION.................................................................. 75
A. Article 281 (Procedure Where no Settlement Has Been Reached by the Parties) ..................... 76
1. Application of Article 281 to the DOC........................................................................................... 77
(a) Chinas Position ..................................................................................................................... 78
(b) The Philippines Position ..................................................................................................... 79
(c) The Tribunals Decision ....................................................................................................... 82
2. Application of Article 281 to Other Bilateral Statements ........................................................... 89
(a) Chinas Position ..................................................................................................................... 91
(c) The Tribunals Decision ....................................................................................................... 93
3. Application of Article 281 to the Treaty of A mity ....................................................................... 97
(a) Possible Ob jections ............................................................................................................... 98
(c) The Tribunals Decision ..................................................................................................... 100
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4. Application of Article 281 to the CBD ......................................................................................... 101

(a) Possible Ob jections ............................................................................................................. 102
(b) The Philippines Position ................................................................................................... 102
B. Article 282 (Obligati ons under General, Regional or Bilateral Agreements) ........................... 106
1. Application of Article 282 to the DOC and Other Bilateral Statements ................................. 106
2. Application of Article 282 to the Treaty of A mity ..................................................................... 108
3. Application of Article 282 to the CBD ......................................................................................... 109
C. Article 283 (Exchange of Views) and Obligati on to Negoti ate ...................................................... 112
1. Chinas Position ................................................................................................................................112
2. The Philippines Position ................................................................................................................ 113
3. The Tribunals Decision .................................................................................................................. 115
VIII. LIMITATIONS AND EXC EPTIONS TO THE TRIB UNALS J URISDICTION .............................. 125
A. Article 297 and Automatic Li mitations to the Tri bunal s Jurisdiction ...................................... 125
1. Possible Ob jections ..........................................................................................................................126
B. Article 298 and Optional Exceptions to the Tri bunals Jurisdicti on........................................... 129
1. Chinas Position and Possible Further Objections...................................................................... 130
C. The Application of Articles 297 and 298 and the Tribunals Findings on the Scope of
its Jurisdiction ............................................................................................................................................134
1. Whether Issues of Jurisdiction Possess an Exclusively Preliminary Character................. 135
(a) The Applicable Legal Standard ......................................................................................... 135
(b) The Parties Positions on the Link between Jurisdiction and the Merits ................... 137
(c) Tribunals Decision ............................................................................................................. 138
2. The Tribunals Conclusions on its Jurisdiction ........................................................................... 140
IX. DECIS ION ...............................................................................................................................................................149
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TABLE OF FIGURES AND M APS
The figures in this Award have been taken from the Philippines Memorial and are included for
illustrative purposes only. Their use in this Award is not an indication that the Tribunal endorses the
figures or adopts any associated arguments from the Philippines.
Figure 1 The South China Sea (Memorial, Figure 2.1)

Figure 2 Map attached to Chinas Notes Verbales to the United Nations
Secretary General, Nos. CML/17/2009 & CML/18/2009 (showing
so-called Nine-Dash Line) (Memorial, Figure 1.1)
Figure 3 Northern Sector of the South China Sea (including Scarborough
Shoal) (Memorial, Figure 2.4)
Figure 4 Southern Sector of the South China Sea (including Spratly Islands
and highlighting features identified in the Philippines Submissions)
(Memorial, Figure 2.5)
Figure 5 Chinas Maximum Potential Entitlements under UNCLOS
Compared to its Nine-Dash Line Claim in the Southern Sector
(Memorial, Figure 4.2)
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GLOS S ARY OF DEFINED TERMS
ASEAN The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CBD The Convention on Biological Diversity
China The Peoples Republic of China
Chinas 2006 The Declaration of the Peoples Republic of China under Article 298 of
Declaration the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, dated
25 August 2006
Chinas Position The Position Paper of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China
Paper on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated
by the Republic of the Philippines, published on 7 December 2014
Chinese Ambassadors The Letter from the Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of the
First Letter Netherlands, addressed to the individual members of the Tribunal, dated
6 February 2015
Chinese Ambassadors The Letter from the Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of the
Second Letter Netherlands, addressed to the individual members of the Tribunal, dated
1 July 2015
Chinese Embassy The Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands
Convention The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (or
UNCLOS)
DOC The ChinaASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea, dated 4 November 2002
Hearing on The Hearing held from 7 to 13 July 2015 pursuant to Procedural Order
Jurisdiction No. 4, to consider the matter of the Tribunals Jurisdiction and, as
necessary, the admissibility of the Philippines submissions
ICJ The International Court of Justice
ITLOS The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
Memorial The Memorial of the Philippines, filed on 30 March 2014
Notification and The Notification and Statement of Claim of the Republic of the
Statement of Claim Philippines, filed on 22 January 2013
PCA The Permanent Court of Arbitration
Philippines The Republic of the Philippines
Request for Further The Tribunals Request for Further Written Argument by the Philippines
Written Argument Pursuant to Article 25(2) of the Rules of Procedure, annexed to Procedural
Order No. 3, dated 16 December 2014.
Submissions The Submissions of the Philippines set out at pp. 271-272 of its Memorial
Supplemental Written The Supplemental Written Submission of the Philippines, filed on
Submission 16 March 2015, pursuant to Article 25 of the Rules of Procedure and
Procedural Order No. 3.
Treaty of Amity The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, concluded on 24
February 1976
UNCLOS The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (or
Convention)
Viet Nam The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
Viet Nams Statement The Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam for the
attention of the Tribunal in the Proceedings between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Peoples Republic of China, dated 5 December 2014
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GLOS S ARY OF GEOGRAPHIC NAMES MENTIONED IN THIS AWARD
For ease of reference, and without prejudice to any States claims, the Tribunal uses throughout this
Award the common English designation for the following geographic features, the translations for
which were provided in the Philippines Memorial:
English Name Chinese Name Filipino Name

Cuarteron Reef Huayang Jiao Calderon Reef

Fiery Cross Reef Yongshu Jiao Kagitingan Reef

Gaven Reef Nanxun Jiao Burgos

Johnson (South) Reef Chigua Jiao Mabini Reef

Macclesfield Bank Zhongsha Qundao

McKennan Reef Ximen Jiao Chigua Reef
(incl. Hughes Reef) (McKennan)
Dongmen Jiao
(Hughes)
Mischief Reef Meiji Jiao Panganiban

Namyit Island Hongxiu Dao Binago Island

Reed Bank Liyue Tan Recto

Scarborough Shoal Huangyan Dao Panatag Shoal or Bajo de
Masinloc
Second Thomas Shoal Renai Jiao Ayungin Shoal

Sin Cowe Island Jinghong Dao Rurok Island

South China Sea Nan Hai West Philippine Sea

Spratly Island Group Nansha Qundao Kalayaan Islands
(Spratlys)
Subi Reef Zhubi Jiao Zamora Reef

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I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Parties to this arbitration are the Republic of the Philippines (the Philippines) and the
Peoples Republic of China (China). Both States are parties to the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (the Convention or UNCLOS), the Philippines having
ratified the Convention on 8 May 1984, and China on 7 June 1996.
2. The Convention establishes a comprehensive legal order for the worlds seas and oceans. An
integral part of the Convention is the system for dispute settlement set out in its Part XV. It was
pursuant to Part XV of the Convention that the Philippines initiated this arbitration against China
on 22 January 2013, to resolve a dispute over the Parties respective maritime entitlements and
the lawfulness of Chinese activities in the South China Sea.
3. The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea in the western Pacific Ocean spanning an area of
almost 3.5 million square kilometres. It is a crucial shipping lane, a rich fishing ground, and
believed to hold substantial oil and gas resources. The South China Sea abuts seven States, five
of which have competing claims to its waters. As shown in Figure 1 on page 3 below, the South
China Sea lies to the south of China and the islands of Hainan and Taiwan; to the west of the
Philippines; to the east of Viet Nam; and to the north of Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and
Indonesia. The South China Sea includes hundreds of geographical features, either above or
below water. Some of these are the subject of long-standing territorial disputes amongst the
coastal States.
4. In this arbitration the Philippines seeks rulings in respect of three inter-related matters. First, it
seeks declarations that the Parties respective rights and obligations in regard to the waters,
seabed, and maritime features of the South China Sea are governed by the Convention and that
Chinas claims based on historic rights encompassed within its so-called nine-dash line are
inconsistent with the Convention and therefore invalid. Chinas nine-dash line, as depicted in
a map submitted by China to the Secretary General of the United Nations in 2009, is reproduced
at Figure 2 on page 5 below.
5. Second, the Philippines seeks determinations as to whether, under the Convention, certain
maritime features claimed by both China and the Philippines are properly characterised as
islands, rocks, low tide elevations, or submerged banks. According to the Philippines, if these
features are islands for the purposes of the Convention, they could generate an exclusive
economic zone or entitlement to a continental shelf extending as far as 200 nautical miles. If,
however, the same features are rocks within the meaning of Article 121(3) of the Convention,
they would only be capable of generating a territorial sea no greater than 12 nautical miles. If
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they are not islands, but merely low-tide elevations or submerged banks, then pursuant to the
Convention they would be incapable of generating any such entitlements. The Philippines
states that no amount of artificial reclamation work can change the status of the features for the
purposes of the Convention. The Philippines focuses in particular on Scarborough Shoal
(highlighted in Figure 3 on page 7 below) and eight features in the Spratly Island Group
(highlighted in Figure 4 on page 9 below).
6. Third, the Philippines seeks declarations that China has violated the Convention by interfering
with the exercise of the Philippines sovereign rights and freedoms under the Convention and
through construction and fishing activities that have harmed the marine environment.
7. The requests of the Philippines are formally set out in 15 specific submissions at the end of the
Philippines Memorial of 30 March 2014 (the Memorial).
8. Conscious that the Convention is not concerned with territorial disputes, the Philippines has
stated at all stages of this arbitration that it is not asking this Tribunal to rule on the territorial
sovereignty aspect of its disputes with China. Similarly, conscious that in 2006 China made a
declaration, in accordance with the Convention, to exclude maritime boundary delimitations
from its acceptance of compulsory dispute settlement procedures under the Convention, the
Philippines has stated that it is not asking this Tribunal to delimit any maritime boundaries.
9. The Philippines refers to a long history of attempts by the Parties to resolve their disputes by
negotiation. Ultimately, the Philippines considered that those efforts had failed or become futile
and resorted to commencing this arbitration, pursuant to the dispute settlement provisions of the
Convention and its Annex VII concerning arbitration.
10. China, however, has consistently rejected the Philippines recourse to arbitration and adhered to
the position of neither accepting nor participating in these proceedings. It has articulated this
position in public statements and in many diplomatic Notes Verbales both to the Philippines and
to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (the PCA), which serves as the Registry in this
arbitration. Chinas position of non-acceptance of and non-participation in the arbitration was
also reaffirmed by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its 7 December 2014 Position
Paper of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the
South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Chinas Position
Paper) and later in two letters sent to the members of the Tribunal from the Chinese
Ambassador to the Netherlands. The Chinese Government has consistently stated that the
aforementioned communications shall by no means be interpreted as Chinas participation in the
arbitral proceeding in any form.
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Figure 1: The South China Sea (Memorial, Figure 2.1)
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Figure 2: Map attached to Chinas Notes Verbales to the United Nations Secretary General, Nos. CML/17/2009
and CML/18/2009 (showing so-called Nine-Dash Line) (Memorial, Figure 1.1)
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Figure 3: Northern Sector of the South China Sea (including Scarborough Shoal) (Memorial, Figure 2.4)
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Figure 4: Southern Sector of the South China Sea (including Spratly Islands and highlighting
features identified in the Philippines Submissions) (Memorial, Figure 2.5)
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11. Article 9 of Annex VII to the Convention expressly addresses the situation of a non-
participating party, providing that: [a]bsence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case
shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Thus the non-participation of China does not bar
this Tribunal from proceeding with the arbitration. China is still a party to the arbitration, and
pursuant to the terms of Article 296(1) of the Convention and Article 11 of Annex VII, it shall
be bound by any award the Tribunal issues.
12. Chinas non-participation does, however, impose a special responsibility on the Tribunal. The
Tribunal does not simply adopt the Philippines claims, and there can be no default judgment as
a result of Chinas non-appearance. Rather, under the terms of Article 9 of Annex VII, the
Tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the
claim is well founded in fact and law before making any award.
13. In its written arguments, the Philippines attempted to anticipate and address possible objections
to the Tribunals jurisdiction that China might have raised had it participated. The Philippines
also suggested that the Tribunal take into account statements by officials and review the
academic literature. The Tribunal itself has actively sought to satisfy itself as to whether it has
jurisdiction over the dispute. Following Chinas decision not to make a formal submission in
this arbitration, the Tribunal requested the Philippines to provide further written argument on
certain questions relating to jurisdiction and posed questions to the Philippines both prior to and
during an oral hearing held in July 2015 at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the Netherlands.
14. The publication of Chinas Position Paper in December 2014 facilitated the Tribunals task to
some extent, because in it, China expounded three main reasons why it considers that the
Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over this case. China summarises these as follows:
The essence of the subject-matter of the arbitrat ion is the territorial sovereignty over
several marit ime features in the South China Sea, wh ich is beyond the scope of the
Convention and does not concern the interpretation or application of the Convention.
China and the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the
Declaration on the Conduct of Part ies in the South China Sea, to settle their relevant
disputes through negotiations. By unilaterally init iating the present arbitration, the
Philippines has breached its obligation under international law;
Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject-matter of the arb itration were concerned
with the interpretation or application of the Convention, that subject-matter would
constitute an integral part of maritime delimitation between the two countries, thus
falling within the scope of the declarat ion filed by China in 2006 in accordance with
the Convention, which excludes, inter alia, disputes concerning maritime
delimitation from compulsory arbitration and other compulsory dispute settlements.
15. In its Procedural Order No. 4 of 21 April 2015, the Tribunal decided to treat the Position Paper
and certain communications from China as constituting, in effect, a plea concerning jurisdiction.
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Under the Tribunals Rules of Procedure, this meant that the Tribunal would conduct a hearing
dedicated to jurisdiction and rule on any plea concerning jurisdiction as a preliminary question,
unless it determines that any objection to jurisdiction does not possess an exclusively
preliminary character, in which case it shall rule on such a plea in conjunction with the merits.
Accordingly, the Tribunal held a hearing from 7 to 13 July 2015 focused on issues of
jurisdiction and admissibility. In line with its duty to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction, the
Tribunal did not limit the hearing to the three issues raised in Chinas Position Paper, but invited
the Philippines to address other possible jurisdictional questions. China did not attend the
hearing, but was provided with daily transcripts and all documents submitted during the course
of the hearing. In addition to a large delegation from the Philippines, representatives from
Malaysia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, the Kingdom of
Thailand, and Japan attended the hearing as observers.
16. In this Award, the Tribunal only addresses matters of jurisdiction and admissibility; it does not
address the merits of the Philippines claims. If the Tribunal finds it has no jurisdiction, the
matter ends here. If the Tribunal finds it has jurisdiction over any of the Philippines claims, it
will hold a subsequent hearing on the merits of those claims. If it finds that any of the
jurisdictional issues are so closely intertwined with the merits that they cannot be decided as
preliminary questions, the Tribunal will defer those jurisdictional issues for decision after
hearing from the Parties on the merits.
17. This Award is structured as follows.
18. Chapter II sets out the Procedural History of the arbitration. Under Article 5 of Annex VII,
the Tribunal has a duty to assure each party a full opportunity to be heard and to present its
case. In line with this duty, and as the Procedural History demonstrates, the Tribunal has
communicated to the Philippines and China all developments in this arbitration and provided
them with the opportunity to comment on substance and procedure. The Tribunal has reminded
China that it remains open to it to participate in these proceedings at any stage. The Tribunal
has also taken steps to ensure that the Philippines is not disadvantaged by Chinas non-
appearance and has conducted the proceedings in line with its duty under Article 10 of the Rules
of Procedure, so as to avoid unnecessary delay and expense and to provide a fair and efficient
process for resolving the Parties dispute.
19. Chapter III contains the Parties requests for relief, including the claims initially made in the
Philippines Amended Statement of Claim, those refined and encapsulated in the
15 submissions in the Philippines Memorial of 30 March 2015, as well as the specific findings
that the Philippines requests the Tribunal to make in this preliminary jurisdictional phase. The
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Chapter sets out Chinas position insofar as can be discerned from communications and public
statements, while taking note that China does not accept the arbitration and is not participating
in the proceedings.
20. Chapter IV deals with a number of preliminary matters. It examines whether the Tribunal has
been properly constituted in accordance with the Convention and addresses the legal and
practical consequences of Chinas non-appearance. The Tribunal then considers whether
Chinas allegations that the Philippines initiation of the arbitration was an abuse of
international legal procedure or that the Tribunal manifestly lacks jurisdiction require any
special procedure under Article 294 of the Convention or engage Article 300 on good faith and
abuse of rights.
21. Chapter V concerns the identification and characterisation of the dispute. The Tribunal
examines, first, whether there is a dispute between the Parties concerning the matters raised by
the Philippines and, second, whether such a dispute concerns the interpretation or application of
the Convention. In so doing, the Tribunal addresses (a) Chinas contention that the dispute
essentially concerns territorial sovereignty and (b) Chinas characterisation of the dispute as
relating to maritime boundaries. For each category of the Philippines submissions, the
Tribunal then identifies whether there is a dispute concerning the interpretation and application
of the Convention.
22. In Chapter VI the Tribunal addresses whether the Philippines recourse to arbitration is
precluded by the fact that there are other States bordering the South China Sea whose interests
may be affected by the arbitration, but who are not parties to the arbitration.
23. In Chapter VII the Tribunal considers Section 1 of Part XV of the Convention, which requires
States to settle their disputes by peaceful means and preserves their freedom to agree on the
means to do so. The Tribunal examines whether the Parties had an agreement, reflected
particularly in the 2002 ChinaASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (the DOC), that would preclude recourse to arbitration by virtue of Articles 281
and 282 of the Convention. The Tribunal then addresses whether the Parties have engaged in an
exchange of views as required by Article 283.
24. Chapter VIII examines whether the limitations and exceptions set out in Section 3 of Part XV of
the Convention (for example relating to sea boundary delimitations, historic bays or titles, and
military activities) pose any obstacle to the Tribunals jurisdiction over the Philippines
15 submissions. To the extent that the Tribunal is able to make such an assessment now, the
Tribunal decides whether it has jurisdiction over certain of the Philippines submissions. For the
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remaining submissions, to the extent that they give rise to jurisdictional questions not of an
exclusively preliminary nature (meaning that the Tribunal cannot decide them without also
examining the merits), the Tribunal reserves any decision as to whether it has jurisdiction over
those submissions for further consideration in conjunction with the merits of the Philippines
claims.
25. Chapter IX contains the Tribunals formal decisions at this stage of the arbitration.
* * *
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. INITIATION OF THE ARBITRATION
26. By Notification and Statement of Claim dated 22 January 2013, the Philippines initiated
arbitration proceedings against China pursuant to Articles 286 and 287 of the Convention and in
accordance with Article 1 of Annex VII of the Convention. The Philippines stated that it seeks
an Award that:
(1) declares that the Parties respective rights and obligations in regard to the waters,
seabed and marit ime features of the South China Sea are governed by UNCLOS,
and that Chinas claims based on its nine dash line are inconsistent with the
Convention and therefore invalid;
(2) determines whether, under Article 121 o f UNCLOS, certain marit ime features
claimed by both China and the Philipp ines are islands, low tide elevations or
submerged banks, and whether they are capable of generating entitlement to
maritime zones greater than 12 M; and
(3) enables the Philippines to exercise and enjoy the rights within and beyond its
economic zone and continental shelf that are established in the Convention.1
The Philippines also stressed that it:
does not seek in th is arbitrat ion a determination of which Party en joys sovereignty over the
islands claimed by both of them. Nor does it request a delimitation of any maritime
boundaries. The Philippines is conscious of Chinas Declaration of 25 August 2006 under
Article 298 of UNCLOS, and has avoided raising subjects or making claims that China has,
by virtue of that Declaration, excluded from arbitral jurisdiction.2
27. In response, China presented a Note Verbale to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the
Philippines on 19 February 2013, rejecting the arbitration and returning the Notification and
Statement of Claim to the Philippines.3 In its Note Verbale, China stated that its position on the
South China Sea issues has been consistent and clear and that at the core of the disputes
between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea are the territorial disputes over some
islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands. China noted that the two countries also have
overlapping jurisdictional claims over parts of the maritime area in the South China Sea and
that both sides had agreed to settle the dispute through bilateral negotiations and friendly
consultations.
1 Notification and Statement of Claim of the Republic of the Philippines, 22 January 2013 (hereinafter
Notification and Statement of Claim), para. 6 (Annex 1).
2 Notification and Statement of Claim, para. 7.
3 Note Verbale fro m the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in Manila to the Department of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. (13) PG-039, 19 February 2013 (Annex 3).
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B. CONS TITUTION OF THE TRIBUNAL
28. In its Notification and Statement of Claim, the Philippines appointed Judge Rdiger Wolfrum, a
German national, as a member of the Tribunal in accordance with Article 3(b) of Annex VII to
the Convention.
29. China did not appoint a member of the Tribunal within 30 days of receiving the Notification and
Statement of Claim. Consequently, on 22 February 2013, the Philippines requested the
President of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to appoint the second
arbitrator pursuant to Articles 3(c) and 3(e) of Annex VII to the Convention. On 23 March
2013, the President of ITLOS appointed Judge Stanislaw Pawlak, a national of Poland, as
arbitrator.
30. By letter dated 25 March 2013, the Philippines requested the President of ITLOS to appoint the
three remaining members of the Tribunal pursuant to Article 3(d) and (e) of Annex VII to the
Convention. On 24 April 2013, the President of ITLOS appointed Judge Jean-Pierre Cot, a
national of France, and Professor Alfred H.A. Soons, a national of the Netherlands, as
arbitrators and Ambassador M.C.W. Pinto, a national of Sri Lanka, as arbitrator and President of
the Tribunal.
31. On 21 May 2013, Ambassador Pinto withdrew from the Tribunal. By letter dated 27 May 2013,
the Philippines requested that the President of ITLOS fill the vacancy in accordance with
Articles 3(e) and (f) of Annex VII to the Convention. On 21 June 2013, the President of ITLOS
appointed Judge Thomas A. Mensah, a national of Ghana, as arbitrator and President of the
Tribunal, thus constituting the present Tribunal.
C. ADMINIS TRATIVE DIRECTIVE NO . 1, PROCEDURAL ORDER NO . 1, AND RULES OF PROCEDURE
32. On 5 July 2013, the President of the Tribunal wrote to the Permanent Court of Arbitration to
ascertain whether the PCA was willing to serve as Registry for the Proceedings. On the same
date, the PCA responded affirmatively.
33. On 6 July 2013, the President of the Tribunal wrote to the Parties to seek their views about the
designation of The Hague as the seat of the arbitration and the PCA as the Registry. On 8 July
2013, the Philippines confirmed that it was comfortable with both designations. China did not
respond.
34. On 11 July 2013, a meeting of the Tribunal was held at the Peace Palace in The Hague.
Following the meeting, on 12 July 2013, the Tribunal issued Administrative Directive No. 1,
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pursuant to which the Tribunal formalised the appointment of the PCA as Registry and set in
place arrangements for a deposit to cover fees and expenses. Along with Administrative
Directive No. 1, the Tribunal provided the Parties with draft Rules of Procedure and
Declarations of Acceptance and Statements of Impartiality and Independence signed by each
arbitrator. Both Parties were invited to comment on the draft Rules of Procedure and to provide
the Registry with contact details of their Agents, Counsel, or other representatives. The PCA
transmitted these materials to the Agent for the Philippines and the Embassy of the Peoples
Republic of China in the Kingdom of the Netherlands (the Chinese Embassy).
35. On 15 July 2013, the Secretary-General of the PCA, in accordance with Administrative
Directive No. 1, informed the Tribunal and the Parties that Ms. Judith Levine, PCA Senior
Legal Counsel, had been appointed to serve as Registrar in these proceedings.
36. On 31 July 2013, the Philippines submitted its comments on the draft Rules of Procedure.
37. By Note Verbale dated 29 July 2013, China reiterated its position that it does not accept the
arbitration initiated by the Philippines and returned the Tribunals letter of 12 July 2013 and
accompanying documents. China emphasised that its Note Verbale shall not be regarded as
Chinas acceptance of or participation in the arbitration procedure. Throughout these
proceedings, China has consistently asserted its non-acceptance of, and non-participation in, this
arbitration and has returned all subsequent correspondence by way of Notes Verbales
substantively similar to that dated 29 July 2013.
38. On 20 August 2013, the Tribunal, having considered the communications from the Parties,
provided the Parties with revised drafts of the Rules of Procedure and Procedural Order No. 1
and informed them that it would issue the documents within a week, absent strong reservations
expressed by either Party.
39. On 27 August 2013, the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 1, by which it adopted the Rules
of Procedure and fixed 30 March 2014 as the date for the Philippines to submit a Memorial that
shall fully address all issues including matters relating to jurisdiction, admissibility, and the
merits of the dispute. Among other things, the Rules of Procedure, in Article 25(1), recalled
that:
Pursuant to Article 9 of Annex VII to the Convention, if one of the Part ies to the dispute
does not appear before the Arbitral Tribunal or fails to defend its case, the other Party may
request the Arbitral Tribunal to continue the proceedings and to make its Award. Absence
of a Party or failure of a Party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the
proceedings. Before making its award, the Arbitral Tribunal must satisfy itself not only
that it has jurisdiction over the d ispute but also that the claim is well founded in fact and
law.
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29 October 2015
Pursuant to Article 12 of the Rules of Procedure, the Registry transmitted these documents and
all subsequent communications in these proceedings to the Agent of and Counsel for the
Philippines and to the Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
40. On 14 November 2013, after the Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom requested a
meeting with the President of the Tribunal, the Tribunal sent a letter to remind the Parties to
refrain from ex parte communications with members of the Tribunal. The Tribunal stated that
[i]f a Party wishes to express its position on matters in dispute, it should be aware that such
statements will be made available to all members of the Tribunal, the Registry and the other
Party, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and the need to ensure that the Parties are
treated with equality. The Tribunal encouraged the Parties to direct any questions of a
procedural nature to the Registry. The Tribunal recalled that the Registry had on two prior
occasions discussed informal questions of a procedural nature with a representative of the
Chinese Embassy and assured the Parties that any informal questions would be treated as such
and would not affect either Partys formal position with respect to the proceedings.
41. On 3 February 2014, following enquiries from other States, the media, and the public and
having sought the views of the Parties, the Tribunal directed the PCA to publish the Rules of
Procedure on its website in accordance with Article 16 of the Rules of Procedure.
D. WRITTEN ARGUMENTS
42. On 28 February 2014, the Philippines applied for leave to amend its Statement of Claim by
adding a request to determine the status pursuant to the Convention of the feature known
internationally as Second Thomas Shoal.
43. On 11 March 2014, having considered the Philippines request and the proposed amendments
and having sought and received no comments from China, the Tribunal granted the requested
leave pursuant to Article 19 of the Rules of Procedure and accepted the Philippines Amended
Statement of Claim.
44. On 18 March 2014, the Philippines wrote to the Tribunal concerning the recent actions of
China to prevent the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed at Second Thomas
(Ayungin) Shoal. The Philippines stated that Chinas conduct seriously aggravates and
extends the dispute and reserved the right to bring an application for the indication of
provisional measures at the appropriate moment. On 19 March 2014, the Tribunal noted that it
had not been called upon to take specific action at that time and welcomed any comments China
might wish to provide on the Philippines letter.
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29 October 2015
45. On 30 March 2014, pursuant to Procedural Order No. 1, the Philippines submitted its Memorial
and accompanying annexes, Chapter 7 of which dealt in particular with jurisdictional issues. In
accordance with the Rules of Procedure, copies of the Memorial were sent to members of the
Tribunal, the PCA, and the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
46. On 7 April 2014, the Philippines wrote further to the Tribunal regarding Chinas most recent
actions in and around Second Thomas (Ayungin Shoal) and expressed concern about its
ability to resupply its personnel. The Philippines reserved all of its rights, including the right
to bring an application for the indication of provisional measures. On the same day, the
Tribunal transmitted a copy of the letter to China, noting that it had not been asked to take
specific action, and invited any comments China might wish to make.
47. On 12 April 2014, the Tribunal received a Note Verbale from the Embassy of the Socialist
Republic of Viet Nam (Viet Nam) in the Netherlands, which stated that Viet Nams legal
interests and rights may be affected by the arbitration and requested that the Embassy be
furnished with all copies of the pleadings and documents annexed thereto, and any documents
relevant to the proceedings. The Tribunal conveyed a copy of the Note Verbale to the Parties
on 14 April 2014 and invited them to provide any comments they might wish to make.
48. On 21 April 2014, the Philippines wrote to the Tribunal, stating that it does not consider that
Viet Nams legal interests and rights may be affected by the proceedings in the present case
and recalling the sections of its Memorial pertaining to third parties. Nevertheless, in the
interests of transparency, and because Viet Nam is also a coastal State in regard to the South
China Sea, the Philippines consented to the request that Viet Nam be provided with copies of
pleadings, and left it to the discretion of the Tribunal to furnish Viet Nam with other
documents relevant to the proceedings. China did not comment on Viet Nams requests.
49. On 24 April 2014, having sought the views of the Parties, the Tribunal agreed to grant Viet Nam
access to the Memorial of the Philippines and its annexed documents and noted that the
Tribunal would consider in due course Viet Nams request for access to any other relevant
documents.
50. The Tribunal met in The Hague on 14-15 May 2014. On 15 May 2014, the Tribunal provided
the Parties with a Draft Procedural Order No. 2 and a proposed timetable and invited comments
from the Parties. The Tribunal recalled that China had reiterated its position that it does not
accept the arbitration initiated by the Philippines but also noted that it [n]onetheless remains
open to China to participate in these proceedings.
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29 October 2015
51. On 29 May 2014, the Philippines provided comments on the Draft Procedural Order No. 2 and
the proposed timetable.
52. On 2 June 2014, the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 2, in which it set 15 December 2014
as the date by which China could submit a Counter-Memorial.
53. On 30 July 2014, the Philippines wrote to the Tribunal, drawing attention to Chinas activities at
several features in the South China Sea, in particular the land reclamation at McKennan
(Hughes) Reef, Johnson Reef, Gaven Reef, and Cuarteron Reef. The Philippines expressed
concern regarding: (a) the effect of these activities on the maritime entitlements of the features;
(b) the effect on the fragile marine environment; (c) the significant departure from the status
quo; (d) the consistency of these activities with the ChinaASEAN Declaration on the Conduct
of Parties in the South China Sea of 4 November 2002; and (e) the obligation of a State not to
take action that might aggravate or extend a pending dispute to which it is party. The
Philippines indicated that it was continuing to evaluate its options and reserved all of its rights
in these proceedings.
54. On 5 December 2014, the Vietnamese Embassy sent a Note Verbale to the Tribunal,
accompanied by a Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam for the Attention
of the Tribunal in the Proceedings between the Republic of the Philippines and the Peoples
Republic of China and annexed documents (Viet Nams Statement). Viet Nams Statement
requested that the Tribunal give due regard to the position of Viet Nam with respect to:
(a) advocating full observance and implementation of all rules and procedures of the
Convention, including Viet Nams position that it has no doubt that the Tribunal has jurisdiction
in these proceedings; (b) preserving Viet Nams rights and interests of a legal nature; (c) noting
that the Philippines does not request this Tribunal to consider issues not subject to its
jurisdiction under Article 288 of the Convention (namely questions of sovereignty and maritime
delimitation); (d) resolutely protest[ing] and reject[ing] any claim by China based on the
nine-dash line; and (e) supporting the Tribunals competence to interpret and apply Articles
60, 80, 194(5), 206, 293(1), and 300 of the Convention and other relevant instruments. Viet
Nam reserved the right to seek to intervene if it seems appropriate and in accordance with the
principles and rules of international law, including the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. Viet
Nam also repeated its request to receive copies of all relevant documents in the arbitration.
55. On 7 December 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China
published a Position Paper of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China on the Matter
of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines.
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29 October 2015
56. On 8 December 2014, the Chinese Embassy deposited with the PCA a Note Verbale requesting
that the PCA forward Chinas Position Paper and its English translation to the members of the
Tribunal. The Note Verbale added: The Chinese Government reiterates that it will neither
accept nor participate in the arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines. The Chinese
Government hereby makes clear that the forwarding of the aforementioned Position Paper shall
not be regarded as Chinas acceptance of or its participation in the arbitration.
57. On 11 December 2014, the Tribunal wrote to the Parties, noting that it had received the Note
Verbale from the Peoples Republic of China and the accompanying Position Paper. The
Tribunal also enclosed and sought the Parties views on Viet Nams Statement, in particular with
respect to (a) Viet Nams request for any further documents relevant to Viet Nams interests in
this matter and (b) Viet Nams statement that it reserves the right to seek to intervene if it
seems appropriate and in accordance with the principles and rules of international law.
58. On 16 December 2014, the Tribunalobserving that China had not filed a Counter-Memorial in
time and mindful of the provisions of Annex VII to the Convention, including Article 5 (which
provides that the Tribunal shall determine its own procedure, assuring to each party a full
opportunity to be heard and to present its case) and Article 9 (which provides for the
continuation of proceedings if one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the
arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its case)issued Procedural Order No. 3. In Procedural
Order No. 3, the Tribunal established a timetable for written submissions from both Parties in
accordance with Article 25(2) of the Rules of Procedure. Article 25(2) of the Rules of
Procedure provides:
In the event that a Party does not appear before the Arbitral Tribunal or fails to defend its
case, the Arbitral Tribunal shall invite written argu ments fro m the appearing Party on, o r
pose questions regarding, specific issues which the Arbitral Tribunal considers have not
been canvassed, or have been inadequately canvassed, in the pleadings submitted by the
appearing Party. The appearing Party shall make a supplemental written submission in
relation to the matters identified by the Arb itral Tribunal within three months of the
Arbitral Tribunals invitation. The supplemental submission of the appearing Party shall be
communicated to the non-appearing Party for its comments which shall be submitted within
three months of the communication of the supplemental submission. The Arbitral Tribunal
may take whatever other steps it may consider necessary, within the scope of its powers
under the Convention, its Annex VII, and these Rules, to afford to each of the Part ies a fu ll
opportunity to present its case.
59. The Tribunal annexed to Procedural Order No. 3 a Request for Further Written Argument by the
Philippines Pursuant to Article 25(2) of the Rules of Procedure (the Request for Further
Written Argument) and fixed 16 March 2015 as the date for the Philippines to file a
Supplemental Written Submission. The Tribunal also fixed 16 June 2015 as the date by which
China could provide comments in response. The Request for Further Written Argument
included specific questions relating to admissibility, jurisdiction, and the merits of the dispute
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29 October 2015
and invited the Philippines comments on any relevant public statements made by Chinese
government officials or others.
60. In a letter accompanying Procedural Order No. 3, the Tribunal invited the Parties comments on
certain procedural matters, including (a) the possible bifurcation of the proceedings, (b) the
possible appointment of an expert hydrographer, (c) the possibility of a site visit, (d) the
appropriate procedure with regard to any amicus curiae submissions that the Tribunal may
receive, and (e) the scheduling of a hearing in July 2015. The Tribunal noted Chinas reiteration
of its position that it does not accept the arbitration, but recalled that it nonetheless remains open
to China to participate in these proceedings.
61. On 22 December 2014, the Embassy of Viet Nam sent a Note Verbale to the Tribunal,
requesting that it be furnished with a copy of Procedural Order No. 3 and further
communications between the Tribunal and the Parties. The Tribunal forwarded the Note
Verbale to the Parties on 24 December 2014 for their comments.
62. On 26 January 2015, the Philippines wrote twice to the Tribunal. The first letter set out the
Philippines comments on Viet Nams requests. The Philippines noted, amongst other things,
that it values the principles of openness and transparency and stated that it would be appropriate
to allow Viet Nam access to the requested documents. The Philippines considered that the
Tribunals broad discretion on procedural matters encompasses the power to permit
intervention, to accept Viet Nams statement into the record, and to take any steps it might
consider appropriate to request information from Viet Nam.
63. The second letter contained the Philippines comments on the procedural matters raised in the
Tribunals letter of 16 December 2014. The Philippines (a) opposed bifurcation, (b) made
suggestions as to the appropriate profile of a technical expert, (c) commented on the desirability
and prospects of organizing a site visit, (d) commented on appropriate procedures for evaluating
any amicus curiae submission, and (e) commented on the dates and scope of an oral hearing.
64. On 6 February 2015, the Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands wrote
individually to the members of the Tribunal, setting out the Chinese Governments position on
issues relating to the South China Sea arbitration initiated by the Philippines (the Chinese
Ambassadors First Letter). The Chinese Ambassadors First Letter described Chinas
Position Paper as having comprehensively explain[ed] why the Tribunal . . . manifestly has no
jurisdiction over the case. The letter also stated that the Chinese Government holds an
omnibus objection to all procedural applications or steps that would require some kind of
response from China. The letter further clarified that Chinas non-participation and
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29 October 2015
non-response to any issue raised by the Tribunal shall not be understood or interpreted by
anyone in any sense as Chinas acquiescence in or non-objection to any and all procedural or
substantive matters already or might be raised by the Arbitral Tribunal. The letter further
expressed Chinas firm opposition to some of the procedural items raised in the PCAs
correspondence, such as intervention by other States, amicus curiae submissions, and site
visit[s]. Finally, the letter recalled the commitment of China and ASEAN countries to
resolving disputes through consultation and negotiation and expressed the hope that all
relevant actors will act in a way that contributes to peaceful settlement of the South China Sea
disputes, cooperation among the coastal States of the South China Sea and the maintenance of
peace and stability in the South China Sea.
65. On 17 February 2015, the Tribunal authorised the Registry to provide Viet Nam with a copy of
Procedural Order No. 3 and the Tribunals accompanying Request for Further Written Argument.
The Tribunal stated that it would address the permissibility of intervention in these proceedings
only in the event that Viet Nam in fact makes a formal application for such intervention.
66. On 2 March 2015, the Philippines wrote to the Tribunal, advising that Acting Solicitor General
Florin T. Hilbay would replace the former Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza as Agent for
the Philippines.
67. On 16 March 2015, pursuant to Procedural Order No. 3, the Philippines submitted its
Supplemental Written Submission and accompanying annexes (the Supplemental Written
Submission). In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, copies were sent to members of the
Tribunal, the PCA, and the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands. A copy was also made available to Viet Nam.
E. B IFURCATION OF PROCEEDINGS
68. On 21 April 2015, following its third meeting in The Hague, the Tribunal issued Procedural
Order No. 4, in which it noted the views of the Parties on bifurcation and the practice of
international courts and tribunals of (a) taking note of public statements or informal
communications made by non-appearing Parties, (b) treating such statements and
communications as equivalent to or as constituting preliminary objections, and (c) bifurcating
proceedings to address some or all of such objections as preliminary questions. Procedural
Order No. 4 provided as follows:
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29 October 2015
1. Scope and Dates of July Hearing
1.1 The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the communicat ions by China, including
notably its Position Paper of 7 December 2015 and the Letter of 6 February 2015
fro m the A mbassador of the Peoples Republic of China to the Netherlands,
effectively constitute a plea concerning this Arb itral Tribunals jurisdiction for the
purposes of Article 20 of the Rules of Procedure and will be treated as such for the
purposes of this arbitration.
1.2 As provided for in Article 20(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Arbitral Tribunal
shall rule on any plea concerning its jurisdiction as a preliminary question, unless
the Arbitral Tribunal determines, after seeking the views of the Parties, that the
objection to its jurisdiction does not possess an exclusively preliminary character.
1.3 The Arbitral Tribunal considers that, in light of the circu mstances and its duty to
assure to each Party a full opportunity to be heard and to present its case, it is
appropriate to bifurcate the proceedings and to convene a hearing to consider the
matter o f the Arbitral Tribunals jurisdiction and, as necessary, the admissibility of
the Philippines submissions (Hearing on Jurisdiction).
1.4 Notwithstanding its decision that Chinas co mmunications effectively constitute a

plea concerning the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Arbitral Tribunal
considers that it continues to have a duty pursuant to Article 9 of Annex VII to the
Convention to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction over the dispute. Accordingly, the
Arbitral Tribunal shall not be prevented from considering other possible issues of
jurisdiction and admissibility not addressed in Chinas Position Paper, and the
Hearing on Jurisdiction will not be limited to the questions raised in Ch inas
Position Paper.
1.5 The Hearing on Jurisdiction will co mmence on 7 July 2015 and will close on 13 July
2015, in accordance with a detailed schedule to be finalised in consultation with the
Parties.
1.6 Noting that pursuant to Procedural Order No. 3 China has until 16 June 2015 to
submit co mments on the Philippines Supplemental Written Submission and the
Philippines suggestions in its letter of 26 January 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal will
aim to circulate, on or before 22 June 2015, any questions it may have relating to
issues of jurisdiction and ad missibility which it wants the Parties to address during
the Hearing on Jurisdiction. The Part ies will, however, not be limited during the
Hearing on Jurisdiction to addressing those questions and this procedure will not
rule out the possibility of individual members of the Arbitral Tribunal raising
questions during the course of the hearing.
2. Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility

2.1 Conscious of its duty to conduct proceedings to avoid unnecessary delay and
expense and to provide a fair and efficient process, and the Philippines expressed
concerns about delay and disruption, the Arbitral Tribunal will endeavour to issue its
decision on such preliminary objections that it determines appropriate as soon as
possible after the Hearing.
2.2 If the Arbitral Tribunal determines after the Hearing on Jurisdiction that there are
jurisdictional objections that do not possess an exclusively preliminary character,
then, in accordance with Art icle 20(3) of the Rules of Procedure, such matters will
be reserved for consideration and decision at a later stage of the proceedings.
. ..
69. Along with Procedural Order No. 4, the Tribunal wrote to the Parties regarding the proposed
schedule and logistics for the hearing on jurisdiction and admissibility (the Hearing on
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29 October 2015
Jurisdiction). The letter explained that the Arbitral Tribunal does not intend to open the
hearing to members of the public and that it will only consider whether representatives of
interested States may attend the hearing as observers upon request from that State. It further
stated that it would consider whether to make the verbatim records of the hearings public at
some later date. Finally, the Tribunal stated that it was [c]onscious of its duty under Article
10(1) of the Rules of Procedure to conduct the proceedings so as to avoid unnecessary delay
and expense and to provide a fair and efficient process for resolving the Parties dispute. The
Tribunal accordingly invited the Parties views on whether it should:
without prejudice to any findings on jurisdiction and ad missibility, nevertheless proceed to:
(i) reserve a period of time in the next 6-12 months for a subsequent hearing should such a
hearing become necessary; (ii) take steps now to ascertain the availability of potential
technical experts who may assist the Arbitral Tribunal in the event a subsequent hearing on
the merits should become necessary.
The Parties were also invited to comment on all other matters covered in the letter.
70. On 22 April 2015, the Tribunal informed Viet Nam that it had taken note of Viet Nams
Statement of 5 December 2014 and noted that the Statement had been included in the record by
the Philippines as Annex 468 to the Supplemental Written Submission.
F. PRE-HEARING PROCEDURES AND REQUES TS FROM OTHER STATES
71. On 11 May 2015, the Philippines wrote to the Tribunal concerning the procedural matters
relating to the Hearing on Jurisdiction. The Philippines stated its strong interest in
transparency and public access to information and proposed that the verbatim records of the
hearing be published after review and correction. The Philippines also urged the Tribunal to
consider opening the Hearing on Jurisdiction to the public and indicated that it was in favour of
the Tribunal provisionally scheduling dates for subsequent hearings on the merits and making
provisional arrangements to engage an appropriate technical expert.
72. On 21 May 2015, the Tribunal received a letter from the Philippines dated 27 April 2015 (the
transmission of which had been delayed), which described Chinas current[] engage[ment] in a
massive land reclamation project at various features in the South China Sea as deeply
troubling to the Philippines and submitted that such actions were in violation of the
Philippines rights and in disregard of . . . Chinas duty not to cause serious harm to the marine
environment. In light of such developments, the Philippines suggested that a merits hearing be
provisionally scheduled at the earliest possible date.
73. On 2 June 2015, the Tribunal confirmed the schedule for the Hearing on Jurisdiction. With
respect to publicity, the Tribunal decided that the Registry would issue a press release at the
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29 October 2015
time of the Hearing on Jurisdiction and would publish corrected transcripts shortly thereafter.
However, the Tribunal informed the Parties that the hearing would not be open to the public
generally and that the Tribunal would only consider allowing representatives of interested States
to attend the hearing upon receipt of a written request. With respect to provisional dates for a
merits hearing, the Tribunal asked the Parties to reserve dates in late November 2015. The
Tribunal also advised that it was checking the availability of expert candidates.
74. On 11 June 2015, the Tribunal received a Note Verbale from the Embassy of Malaysia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands noting that as one of the littoral states of the South China Sea,
Malaysia has been following the proceedings and considers . . . that Malaysias interests might
be affected. The Malaysian Embassy therefore requested copies of pleadings and other
relevant documents and requested that a small delegation of representatives be permitted to
attend the Hearing on Jurisdiction as observers. The Tribunal then wrote to the Parties seeking
their views on Malaysias requests.
75. By 16 June 2015, the date set by Procedural Order No. 3 for Chinas comments on the
Philippines Supplemental Written Submission, no comments had been received from China.
76. On 21 June 2015, the Philippines wrote to the Tribunal, repeating its strong interest in the
transparency of these proceedings and indicating that it had no objection to Malaysia receiving
copies of the relevant documents or sending a small delegation to attend the Hearing on
Jurisdiction.
77. On 23 June 2015, the Tribunal wrote to the Parties in preparation for the Hearing on Jurisdiction
and, as anticipated in Procedural Order No. 4, set out a list of issues that the Philippines might
wish to address in the course of the Hearing.
78. On 25 June 2015, the Tribunal informed the Parties and the Malaysian Embassy that, having
sought the views of the Parties, it had decided to permit Malaysia to be furnished with copies of
certain documents and to send a small delegation to attend the Hearing on Jurisdiction as
observers.
79. On 26 June 2015, the Tribunal received a Note Verbale from the Embassy of Japan in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands expressing the interest of Japan as State Party to the Convention
in attending the Hearing on Jurisdiction as an observer. The Tribunal conveyed the Japanese
request to the Parties for comment. The Philippines replied on 28 June 2015 that it did not
object to a small delegation of Japanese representatives attending the Hearing on Jurisdiction as
observers.
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29 October 2015
80. On 29 June 2015, the Tribunal received requests from the Embassies of the Socialist Republic
of Viet Nam and the Republic of Indonesia in the Kingdom of the Netherlands for permission to
send small delegations of observers to the Hearing on Jurisdiction. A similar request was
received from the Royal Thai Embassy in The Kingdom of the Netherlands on 30 June 2015.
The Tribunal conveyed the requests to the Parties for comment.
81. On 30 June 2015, the Philippines advised that its Agent, Mr. Florin T. Hilbay, had been
promoted to Solicitor General of the Philippines as of 16 June 2015.
82. On 1 July 2015, the Philippines stated, [i]n light of its oft-stated interest in transparency, that
it had no objection to Thailand, Indonesia or Viet Nam sending small delegations of
representatives to observe the hearing.
83. On 1 July 2015, Chinas Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands sent a second letter to
the members of the Tribunal (the Chinese Ambassadors Second Letter) setting out the
Chinese Governments position. The letter first recalled Chinas consistent policy and practice
of [resolving] the disputes related to territory and maritime rights and interests with States
directly concerned through negotiation and consultation and noted Chinas legitimate right
under the Convention not to accept any imposed solution or any unilateral resorting to a third-
party settlement, a right that it considered the Philippines breached by initiating the arbitration.
Second, the Ambassador expressed the Chinese Governments concern that the Philippines
unilateral resort to arbitration would erode the confidence shared by China and ASEAN
Member States in jointly safeguarding peace and stability in the South China Sea. Third, the
Ambassador recalled that the Chinese Governments position had been elaborated in Chinas
Position Paper. Finally, the Ambassador stated that the Chinese Governments statements,
including the Ambassadors letters, shall by no means be interpreted as Chinas participation in
the arbitral proceeding and that China opposes any moves to initiate and push forward the
arbitral proceeding, and does not accept any arbitral arrangements, including the hearing
procedures. A copy of the Chinese Ambassadors Second Letter was sent to the Philippines on
2 July 2015.
84. On 3 July 2015, the Tribunal informed the Parties that it had agreed to permit a small delegation
from each of the governments of Viet Nam, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand (in addition to
Malaysia) to send small delegations of representatives to attend the hearing as observers. All
observer delegations were informed of the hearing schedule and were reminded that their role
would be to watch and listen, not to make statements.
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29 October 2015
85. On 7 July 2015, the Embassy of Brunei Darussalam in Brussels asked to be provided with the
transcripts of the arbitration and any other relevant information as soon as it becomes
available.
G. HEARING ON J URIS DICTION AND ADMIS S IBILITY
86. Pursuant to Procedural Order No. 4, the Hearing on Jurisdiction took place in two rounds on
7, 8, and 13 July 2015 at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the Netherlands. The following were
present at the Hearing:
Tribunal
Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Presiding)
Judge Jean-Pierre Cot
Judge Stanislaw Pawlak
Professor Alfred H.A. Soons
Judge Rdiger Wolfrum
Philippines
Agent
Solicitor General Mr. Florin T. Hilbay
Representatives of the Philippines

House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert F. Del Rosario
Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima
Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin
Secretary Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
Secretary Ronaldo M. Llamas
Justice Francis H. Jardeleza
Justice Antonio T. Carpio
Ambassador Jaime Victor B. Ledda
Ambassador Victoria S. Bataclan
Deputy Executive Secretary Menardo I. Guevarra
Undersecretary Emmanuel T. Bautista
Undersecretary Abigail D. F. Valte
Undersecretary Mildred Yovela Umali-Hermogenes
Assistant Secretary Benito B. Valeriano
Assistant Secretary Maria Cleofe R. Natividad
Assistant Secretary Eduardo Jose De Vega
Assistant Secretary Naealla Rose Bainto-Aguinaldo
Assistant Secretary Jose Emmanuel David M. Eva III
Justice Sarah Jane T. Fernandez
Consul General Henry S. Bensurto, Jr.
Minister and Consul General Marie Charlotte G. Tang
Minister and Consul Dinno M. Oblena
Director Ana Marie L. Hernando
Second Secretary and Consul Zoilo A. Velasco
Brigadier General Danilo D. Isleta
Colonel Romulo A. Manuel, Jr.
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29 October 2015
Attorney Josel Mostajo

Attorney Maximo Paulino T. Sison III
Attorney Aiza Katrina S. Valdez
Associate Solicitor Elvira Joselle R. Castro
Associate Solicitor Maria Graciela D. Base
Associate Solicitor Melbourne D. Pana
Mr. Ruben A. Romero
Mr. Rene Fajardo
Ms. Bach Yen Carpio
Attorney Jennie Logronio
Attorney Holy Ampaguey
Attorney Oliver Delfin
Attorney Melquiades Marcus N. Valdez
Counsel and Advocates

Mr. Paul S. Reichler
Mr. Lawrence H. Martin
Professor Bernard H. Oxman
Professor Philippe Sands QC
Professor Alan Boyle
Counsel
Mr. Yuri Parkhomenko
Mr. Nicholas M. Renzler
Technical Expert
Mr. Scott Edmonds
Assistants
Ms. Jessie Barnett-Cox
Ms. Elizabeth Glusman
Ms. Nancy Lopez
China
No Agent or representatives present
Delegations from Observer States
Republic of Indonesia
Mr. Ibnu Wahyutomo, Embassy of Indonesia
Mr. Ayodhia GL Kalake, Ministry for Maritime Affairs
Mr. Damos Dumoli Agusman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ms. Ourina Ritonga, Embassy of Indonesia
Ms. Monica Nila Sari, Embassy of Indonesia
Ms. Tita Yowana Alwis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ms. Fedra Devata Rossi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Japan
Mr. Masayoshi Furuya, Embassy of Japan
Mr. Nobuyuki Murai, Embassy of Japan
Ms. Kaori Matsumoto, Embassy of Japan
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29 October 2015
Malaysia
Mr. Azfar Mohamad Mustafar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Tan Ah Bah, Department of Survey and Mapping
Mr. Mohd Helmy Ahmad, Prime Ministers Department
Mr. Ahmad Zuwairi Yusoff, Embassy of Malaysia
Thailand
Ambassador Ittiporn Boonpracong
Mr. Asi Mamanee, Embassy of Thailand
Ms. Prim Masrinuan, Embassy of Thailand
Ms. Kanokwan Ketchaimas, Embassy of Thailand
Ms. Natsupang Poshyananda, Embassy of Thailand
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam

Mr. Trinh Duc Hai, National Boundary Commission
Ambassador Nguyen Duy Chien
Mr. Nguyen Dang Thang, National Boundary Commission
Mr. Thomas Grant, Counsel
Permanent Court of Arbitration

Ms. Judith Levine (Registrar)
Mr. Garth Schofield
Mr. Robert D. James
Mr. Brian McGarry
Ms. Nicola Peart
Ms. Julia Solana
Ms. Galle Chevalier
Court Reporter
Mr. Trevor McGowan
87. The Secretary-General of the PCA, Mr. Hugo H. Siblesz, also attended part of the Hearing on
Jurisdiction as an observer.
88. During the Hearing, oral presentations were made by: Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay, the
Agent of the Philippines; Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of
the Philippines; Mr. Paul S. Reichler and Mr. Lawrence H. Martin of Foley Hoag LLP,
Washington, DC; Professor Philippe Sands QC of Matrix Chambers, London; Professor Bernard
H. Oxman of the University of Miami; and Professor Alan Boyle of Essex Court Chambers,
London.
89. The Registry delivered daily transcripts of the Hearing to the Chinese Embassy, along with
copies of all materials submitted by the Philippines during the course of their oral presentations.
90. On 10 July 2015, the Tribunal provided the Parties with Questions for the Philippines to
Address in the Second Round. Copies of the questions were subsequently made available to
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the observer delegations. Also on 10 July 2015, the Tribunal invited the Parties to comment on
various requests for documents from the observer delegations.
91. On 12 July 2015, the Philippines submitted to the Tribunal various items in connection with the
hearing, including: (a) a letter stating the Philippines had no objection to furnishing the
observer delegations with copies of the Tribunals questions of 10 July 2015; (b) a letter
commenting on various document requests from the observer delegations; (c) a letter enclosing
a copy of a Note Verbale from the Embassy of China in Manila dated 6 July 2015; (d) a letter
enclosing Annex 583 which comprised a list of data about satellite photos and navigational
charts; and (e) a list of new Annexes which had been referred to in the course of the Philippines
oral pleadings. Copies of these materials were sent to the Chinese Embassy.
92. On 13 July 2015, in the second round of the Hearing on Jurisdiction, the Philippines responded
to the Tribunals written questions circulated on 10 July 2015 as well as to oral questions posed
by individual arbitrators. Following a closing statement by the Agent for the Philippines, the
Presiding Arbitrator outlined the next steps in the proceeding, including an invitation to the
Philippines to submit by 23 July 2015 written responses to certain questions posed during the
second round and an opportunity for China to comment by 17 August 2015 on any matter raised
during or after the Hearing on Jurisdiction. The Presiding Arbitrator then declared the Hearing
on Jurisdiction closed.
H. POS T-HEARING PROCEEDINGS
93. On 18 July 2015, in accordance with the Tribunals invitation to both Parties, the Philippines
suggested certain corrections to the transcript.
94. On 23 July 2015 the Philippines filed its Written Responses to the Arbitral Tribunals 13 July
2015 Questions and accompanying annexes, copies of which were conveyed to China.
95. On 24 July 2015, having sought the views of the Parties on the various requests from observer
delegations and from Brunei Darussalam, the Tribunal informed the Parties that it would grant
the observer delegations and Brunei Darussalam access to certain documents, including written
submissions, procedural orders, answers to the Tribunals questions, and the reviewed and
corrected hearing transcripts.
96. China did not respond to the invitation to submit to the Tribunal, by 17 August 2015, comments
on matters raised during or after the Hearing on Jurisdiction. However, on 24 August 2015,
China published Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunyings Remarks on the Release of
the Transcript of the Oral Hearing on Jurisdiction by the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal
31
29 October 2015
Established at the Request of the Philippines. In those remarks, the spokesperson recalled that
China had consist[e]ntly expounded its position of neither accepting nor participating in the
South China Sea arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines and that Chinas Position
Paper had pointed out that the Arbitral Tribunal . . . has no jurisdiction over the case and
elaborated on the legal grounds for Chinas non-acceptance and non-participation in the
arbitration.4
97. In a letter to the Parties dated 27 September 2015, the Tribunal requested further information
from the Philippines about certain annexes in the record. The Philippines responded to this
request on 7 October 2015.
I. DEPOS ITS FOR COS TS OF THE ARBITRATION
98. Article 33 of the Rules of Procedure states that the PCA may from time to time request the
Parties to deposit equal amounts as advances for the costs of the arbitration. Should either Party
fail to make the requested deposit within 45 days, the Tribunal may so inform the Parties in
order that one of them may make the payment. The Parties have so far been requested to make
payments toward the deposit on two occasions. While the Philippines paid its share of the
deposit within the time limit granted on each occasion, China has made no payments toward the
deposit. Having been informed of Chinas failure to pay, the Philippines paid Chinas share of
the deposit.
* * *
4 Foreign M inistry Spokesperson Hua Chunyings Remarks on the Release of the Transcript of the Oral
Hearing on Jurisdiction by the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Established at the Request of the
Philippines 24 August 2015, published at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1290752.shtml.
32
29 October 2015
III. RELIEF REQUESTED AND SUBMISSIONS
99. In its Amended Statement of Claim, the Philippines requested, under the heading Relief
Sought, that the Tribunal issue an Award that:
Declares that Chinas rights in regard to marit ime areas in the South China Sea, like
the rights of the Philippines, are those that are established by UNCLOS, and consist
of its rights to a Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone under Part II of the
Convention, to an Exclusive Economic Zone under Part V, and to a Continental
Shelf under Part VI;
Declares that Ch inas maritime claims in the South Ch ina Sea based on its so-called
nine-dash line are contrary to UNCLOS and invalid;
Requires Ch ina to bring its domestic legislation into conformity with its obligations
under UNCLOS;
Declares that Mischief Reef, McKennan Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are
submerged features that form part of the Continental Shelf of the Philippines under
Part VI o f the Convention, and that Chinas occupation of and construction activities
on Mischief Reef and McKennan Reefs; and its exclusion of Philippine vessels fro m
Second Thomas Shoal, violate the sovereign rights of the Philippines;
Requires that China end its occupation of and activit ies on Mischief Reef and
McKennan Reef and at Second Thomas Shoal;
Declares that Gaven Reef and Subi Reef are submerged features in the South China
Sea that are not above sea level at high tide, are not islands under the Convention,
and are not located on Chinas Continental Shelf, and that Chinas occupation of and
construction activities on these features are unlawful;
Requires China to terminate its occupation of and activit ies on Gaven Reef and Subi
Reef;
Declares that Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross
Reef are submerged features that are below sea level at h igh tide, except that each
has small protrusions that remain above water at high tide, which are rocks under
Article 121(3) o f the Convention and which therefore generate entitlements only to a
Territorial Sea no broader than 12 M; and that China has unlawfully claimed
maritime entitlements beyond 12 M from these features;
Requires that China refrain fro m preventing Philippine vessels fro m exp loit ing in a
sustainable manner the liv ing resources in the waters adjacent to Scarborough Shoal
and Johnson Reef, and fro m undertaking other activit ies inconsistent with the
Convention at or in the vicinity of these features;
Declares that the Philippines is entitled under UNCLOS to a 12 M Territorial Sea, a

200 M Exclusive Economic Zone, and a Continental Shelf under Parts II, V and VI
of UNCLOS, measured from its archipelagic baselines;
Declares that China has unlawfully claimed, and has unlawfully exploited the living
and non-living resources in the Philippines Exclusive Econo mic Zone and
Continental Shelf, and has unlawfully prevented the Philippines fro m exp loiting
liv ing and non-liv ing resources within its Exclusive Econo mic Zone and Continental
Shelf;
Declares that China has unlawfully interfered with the exercise by the Ph ilippines of
its rights to navigation and other rights under the Convention in areas within and
beyond 200 M of the Philippines archipelagic baselines; and
33
29 October 2015
Requires that China desist from these unlawful activities.5
100. With respect specifically to jurisdiction, the Philippines submitted in its Memorial that the
Tribunal has jurisdiction in regard to all of the claims raised by the Philippines in its Amended
Statement of Claim and in [the] Memorial because:
1. All aspects of the disputes raised in the Ph ilippines A mended Statement of Claim
concern the interpretation and application of UNCLOS;
2. Chinas decision not to appear has no effect on the Tribunals jurisdiction;
3. The 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea
does not bar the exercise of jurisdiction by this Tribunal;
4. The Philippines fulfilled the requirement to engage in an exchange of views with

China;
5. The limitations to jurisdiction provided in Article 297 are inapplicab le to the claims
of the Philippines in this case; and
6. The optional exceptions to jurisdiction provided in Article 298 also do not apply to
the claims of the Philippines.6
101. The Philippines final submissions as set out at pages 271 and 272 of its Memorial (the
Submissions) are as follows:
On the basis of the facts and law set forth in this Memorial, the Philippines respectfully
requests the Tribunal to adjudge and declare that:
1) Chinas maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those of the Philippines,
may not extend beyond those permitted by the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention);
2) Chinas claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and to historic rights, with
respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea enco mpassed by the so-called
nine-dash line are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the
extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of Chinas maritime
entitlements under UNCLOS;
3) Scarborough Shoal generates no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or

continental shelf;
4) Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Subi Reef are low-t ide elevations that do
not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf, and are not features that are capable of appropriation by occupation or
otherwise;
5) Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the exclusive economic zone
and continental shelf of the Philippines;
6) Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) are low-tide elevations
that do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf, but their low-water line may be used to determine the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea of Namy it and Sin Cowe, respectively, is
measured;
5 Notification and Amended Statement of Claim, pp. 17-19.

6 Memorial, para. 7.157.
34
29 October 2015
7) Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef generate no entitlement to an
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf;
8) China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of the sovereign
rights of the Philippines with respect to the living and non-liv ing resources of its
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf;
9) China has unlawfu lly failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from exp loit ing the
living resources in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines;
10) China has unlawfully prevented Philipp ine fishermen fro m pursuing their
livelihoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal;
11) China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect and preserve the
marine environment at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal;
12) Chinas occupation and construction activities on Mischief Reef
(a) violate the provisions of the Convention concerning artificial islands,

installations and structures;
(b) violate Chinas duties to protect and preserve the marine environ ment under
the Convention; and
(c) constitute unlawful acts of attempted appropriation in v iolation of the

Convention;
13) China has breached its obligations under the Convention by operating its law
enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner causing serious risk of collision to
Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal;
14) Since the co mmencement of this arbit ration in January 2013, Ch ina has unlawfully
aggravated and extended the dispute by, among other things:
(a) interfering with the Philippines rights of navigation in the waters at, and
adjacent to, Second Thomas Shoal;
(b) preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed at

Second Thomas Shoal; and
(c) endangering the health and well-being of Ph ilippine personnel stationed at

Second Thomas Shoal; and
15) China shall desist from further unlawful claims and activities.7
102. At the close of the Hearing on Jurisdiction, the Philippines presented its final submissions as
follows:
The Philippines respectfully asks the Tribunal to adjudge and declare that the claims
brought by the Philippines, as reflected in its submission recorded at pages 271 and 272 of
our Memorial, are entirely within its jurisdiction and are fully admissible.8
103. While China does not accept and is not participating in this arbitration, it has stated its position
that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over this case.9
7 Memorial, pp. 271-72.

8 Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 3), p. 80.
35
29 October 2015
104. As set out in Procedural Order No. 4 of 21 April 2015, the Tribunal considered Chinas
statements and communications as equivalent to or as constituting preliminary objections10
and decided that they effectively constitute a plea concerning this Tribunals jurisdiction.11
105. China points out that its Position Paper does not express any position on the substantive issues
related to the subject-matter of the arbitration initiated by the Philippines.12
* * *
9 Chinas Position Paper, para. 2; see also Letter fro m the Ch inese Ambassador to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, addressed to the individual members of the Tribunal, 6 February 2015; Letter fro m the
Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, addressed to the individual members of the
Tribunal, 1 July 2015.
10 Procedural Order No. 4, p. 5.
11 Procedural Order No. 4, para 1.1.
12 Chinas Position Paper, para. 2.
36
29 October 2015
IV. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. THE STATUS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CHINA AS PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION
106. The Tribunal recalls that both the Philippines and China are parties to the Convention.13 The
Philippines ratified it on 8 May 1984 14 and China on 7 June 1996.15 Accordingly, they are both
bound by the dispute settlement procedures provided for in Part XV of the Convention in
respect of any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention.
107. The dispute settlement provisions set out in Part XV of the Convention were heavily negotiated
and reflect a compromise. While according States Parties the flexibility to resolve disputes in
the manner of their choosing, the Convention nevertheless provides compulsory dispute
procedures that are subject only to very specific exceptions spelled out in the Convention itself.
Chinas declaration of 25 August 200616 is an example of a declaration intended to activate
certain exceptions to the compulsory settlement of disputes set out in Article 298 of the
Convention. Beyond these specific exceptions, however, Article 309 provides that [n]o
reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly permitted by other
articles of this Convention. The States Parties to the Convention are accordingly not free to
pick and choose the portions of the Convention they wish to accept or reject.
13 1833 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994).
14 Upon signing the Convention on 10 December 1982, the Philippines issued an Understanding which
was confirmed upon ratificat ion. Among other things, the Understanding stated: The agreement of the
Republic of the Philipp ines to the submission for peacefu l resolution, under any of the procedures
provided in the Convention, of d isputes under article 298 shall not be considered as a derogation of
Philippines sovereignty. The Philippines made no declaration upon ratification on 8 May 1984.
15 When China ratified the Convention on 7 June 1996, it issued a statement, which included the following:
1. In accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, the Peoples Republic of Ch ina shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction
over an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf.
2. The Peoples Republic o f China will effect, through consultations, the delimitation
of the boundary of the maritime jurisdiction with the States with coasts opposite or
adjacent to China respectively on the basis of international law and in accordance
with the principle of equitability.
3. The Peoples Republic of China reaffirms its sovereignty over all its archipelagos
and islands as listed in art icle 2 of the Law of the Peoples Republic of China on the
territorial sea and the contiguous zone, which was promulgated on 25 February
1992.
16 On 25 August 2006, China made the following Declarat ion under Article 298 of the Convention
(hereinafter Chinas 2006 Declaration):
The Government of the Peoples Republic of Ch ina does not accept any of the procedures
provided for in Section 2 of Part XV o f the Convention with respect to all the categories of
disputes referred to in Paragraph 1(a)-(c) of Article 298 of the Convention.
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29 October 2015
108. Part XV of the Convention, concerning the settlement of disputes, is structured in three
Sections. Section 1 lays out general provisions, including those aimed at reaching agreement
through negotiations and other peaceful means. Section 2 provides for compulsory procedures
entailing binding decisions, which apply where no settlement has been reached by recourse to
Section 1 but are subject to Section 3, which sets out a number of specific limitations and
exceptions to jurisdiction. This scheme is encapsulated in Article 286 of the Convention, which
provides:
Article 286
Application of procedures under this section
Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this

Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be
submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having
jurisdiction under this section.
109. Article 287 of the Convention accords parties a choice of procedures for the settlement of their
disputes.17 Neither the Philippines nor China has made a written declaration choosing one of
the particular means of dispute settlement set out in Article 287, Paragraph 1. Accordingly,
under Paragraph 3 of that Article, both Parties are deemed to have accepted arbitration in
accordance with Annex VII to the Convention. The present dispute has therefore correctly been
submitted to arbitration before a tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the Convention. The
Tribunal also notes, as evidenced by the procedural history set out in Chapter II, that the
Tribunals constitution was in accordance with the Convention and its Annex VII.
110. Article 288 addresses jurisdiction. It states in Paragraph 4 that a court or tribunal referred to in
Article 287 shall have jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of this Convention which is submitted to it in accordance with this Part. This Tribunals
jurisdiction thus depends on a finding that the Parties actually have a dispute and that the
dispute concern[s] the interpretation or application of this Convention. Further, as stated in
Article 286, the Tribunal must be satisfied that no settlement has been reached by recourse to
other peaceful means of dispute settlement as contemplated in Section 1 of Part XV.
Additionally, the Tribunal must be satisfied that none of the specific limitations and exceptions
set out in Section 3 of Part XV of the Convention apply.
17 Article 287(1) provides: When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter,
a State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of the following means for
the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention: (a) the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI; (b) the International
Court of Justice; (c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII; (d) a special arbitral
tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes specified
therein. Article 287(3) provides: A State Party, which is a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration
in force, shall be deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII.
38
29 October 2015
111. Article 288(4) of the Convention provides that [i]n the event of a dispute as to whether a court
or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal.18
B. THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONS EQUENCES OF CHINAS NON-PARTICIPATION
112. As evident from the Procedural History recounted in Chapter II, China has not participated in
this arbitration at any stage. It did not participate in the constitution of the Tribunal, it did not
submit a Counter-Memorial in response to the Philippines Memorial, it did not attend the
Hearing on Jurisdiction in July 2015, and it has not advanced any of the funds requested by the
Tribunal toward the costs of arbitration. Throughout the proceedings, China has rejected and
returned correspondence from the Tribunal sent by the Registry, explaining on each occasion
its position that it does not accept the arbitration initiated by the Philippines.
113. Under the Convention, non-participation by one of the parties to a dispute does not constitute a
bar to the proceedings. For arbitrations pursuant to Annex VII, Article 9 of that Annex applies.
The Article provides as follows:
Article 9
Default of Appearance
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to
defend its case, the other party may request the tribunal to continue the proceedings and to
make its award. Absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not
constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before making its award, the arb itral tribunal must
satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the claim is well
founded in fact and law.
114. In its Memorial, the Philippines expressly requested, for the avoidance of any doubt, that these
proceedings continue, 19 and in accordance with Article 9 of Annex VII, the Tribunal has
continued the proceedings. Despite its non-appearance, China remains a Party to these
proceedings, with the ensuing rights and obligations, including that it will be bound by any
decision of the Tribunal. 20 Article 296(1) of the Convention provides that [a]ny decision
rendered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under [Section 2 of Part XV] shall be final
and shall be complied with by all the parties to the dispute. In addition, Article 11 of
Annex VII provides that [t]he award shall be final and without appeal . . . . It shall be
complied with by the parties to the dispute. Hence, despite its non-participation in the
18 Convention, Article 288(4). As to Article 288, see Chinas Position Paper, para. 83.
19 Memorial, paras. 1.21, 7.39.
20 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Merits,
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14 at p. 24, para. 28 (Annex LA-15); Arctic Sunrise (Kingdom of the
Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 November 2013, ITLOS Reports
2013, p. 230 at p. 242, para. 51 (Annex LA-45); Arctic Sunrise (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian
Federation), Jurisdiction, Award of 26 November 2014, para. 60 (Annex LA-180); Arctic Sunrise
(Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Merits, Award of 14 August 2015, para. 10.
39
29 October 2015
proceedings, China is a Party to the arbitration and is bound under international law by any
awards rendered by this Tribunal.
115. The Tribunal notes that for situations of non-participation, Article 9 seeks to balance the risks of
prejudice that could be suffered by either party. First, it protects participating parties by
ensuring that the proceedings will not be frustrated by the decision of the other party not to
participate. Second, it protects the rights of non-participating parties by ensuring that a tribunal
will not simply accept the claim of the participating party by default. Instead, the Tribunal must
satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction and that the claim is well founded in fact and law.
116. The Tribunal has conducted these proceedings in such a way as to avoid the prejudice to either
Party that could arise as a result of Chinas non-participation. Article 5 of Annex VII leaves it
to the Tribunal to determine its own procedure, assuring to each party a full opportunity to be
heard and to present its case. The duty to treat the parties equally is also reflected in Article 10
of the Rules of Procedure.
117. The Tribunal has taken a number of measures to safeguard the procedural rights of China.
Among others, it has (a) ensured that all communications and materials in this arbitration have
been promptly delivered, both electronically and physically, to the Ambassador of China to the
Netherlands in The Hague; (b) granted China adequate and equal time to submit written
responses to the pleadings submitted by the Philippines; (c) invited China to comment on
procedural steps taken throughout the proceedings; (d) provided China with adequate notice of
hearings; (e) promptly provided China with copies of transcripts of the Hearing on Jurisdiction
and all documents submitted in the course of the hearing; (f) invited China to comment on
anything said during the Hearing on Jurisdiction or in post-hearing written comments; (g) made
the Registry staff available to the Chinese Embassy to answer any questions of an administrative
or procedural nature; and (h) reiterated that it remains open to China to participate in the
proceedings at any stage.
118. The Tribunal has also taken a number of measures to safeguard the Philippines procedural
rights. As noted by ITLOS in Arctic Sunrise, the participating party should not be put at a
disadvantage because of the non-appearance of the [non-participating party] in the
proceedings.21 In addition to imposing the duty to treat the Parties equally, Article 10 of the
Rules of Procedure in this case requires the Tribunal to avoid unnecessary delay and expense
and to provide a fair and efficient process for resolving the Parties dispute. Conscious of this
duty, the Tribunal has been responsive to the views of the Parties on scheduling and logistics.
21 Arctic Sunrise (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of
22 November 2013, ITLOS Reports 2013, p. 230 at p. 243, para. 56 (Annex LA-45).
40
29 October 2015
119. A further disadvantage that the Philippines could suffer as a result of Chinas non-appearance is
what the Philippines described as being in the position of having to guess what Chinas
arguments might be and formulate arguments for both States.22 The Philippines suggested that
the Tribunal could discern Chinas arguments by consulting communications from its officials,
statements of those associated with the Government of China, and academic literature by
individuals closely associated with Chinese authorities.23 Acknowledging that the Tribunal of
course may wish to raise certain matters proprio motu, the Philippines was also anxious to
ensure that Chinas non-appearance would not deprive it of an opportunity to address any
specific issues that the Arbitral Tribunal considers not to have been canvassed, or to have been
canvassed inadequately by the Philippines. 24 Conscious of these concerns, the Tribunal
introduced the following process into Article 25(2) of its Rules of Procedure:
In the event that a Party does not appear before the Arbitral Tribunal or fails to defend its
case, the Arbitral Tribunal shall invite written argu ments fro m the appearing Party on, o r
pose questions regarding, specific issues which the Arbitral Tribunal considers have not
been canvassed, or have been inadequately canvassed, in the pleadings submitted by the
appearing Party. The appearing Party shall make a supplemental written submission in
relation to the matters identified by the Arb itral Tribunal within three months of the
Arbitral Tribunals invitation. The supplemental submission of the appearing Party shall be
communicated to the non-appearing Party for its comments which shall be submitted within
three months of the communication of the supplemental submission. The Arbitral Tribunal
may take whatever other steps it may consider necessary, within the scope of its powers
under the Convention, its Annex VII, and these Rules, to afford to each of the Part ies a fu ll
opportunity to present its case.
120. The Tribunal implemented the above procedure by issuing a Request for Further Written
Argument on 16 December 2014, containing 26 questions. On 23 June 2015, the Tribunal also
sent both Parties a list of questions to address in advance of the Hearing and circulated further
questions on 10 July 2015 before the second round of the Hearing.
121. Any concerns about the Philippines having to guess what Chinas arguments might be have
also been alleviated to some extent by Chinas decision to make public its Position Paper. The
Position Paper has since been followed by two letters from the Chinese Ambassador addressed
to the members of the Tribunal and by regular public statements of Chinese officials that touch
on the arbitration.
122. In its Procedural Order No. 4, the Tribunal took cognizance of the practice of international
courts and tribunals in interstate disputes of (a) taking notice of public statements or informal
communications made by non-appearing Parties, (b) treating such statements and
communications as equivalent to or as constituting preliminary objections, and (c) bifurcating

24 Letter from the Philippines to the Tribunal (31 July 2013), commenting on draft Rules of Procedure.
41
29 October 2015
proceedings to address some or all of such objections as preliminary questions.25 The Tribunal
decided to treat the communications by China, including its Position Paper and the Chinese
Ambassadors First and Second Letters, as effectively constituting a plea concerning the
Tribunals jurisdiction for purposes of Article 20 of the Rules of Procedure.
123. However, the Tribunal also stated that it would not confine itself to addressing only those issues
raised in Chinas Position Paper and that, in line with its duty to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction,
the Tribunal would consider other issues that might potentially pose an obstacle to the
continuation of these proceedings. One such issue, to which the Tribunal turns in Chapter VI, is
whether the Tribunal should be barred from proceeding by the absence of other States as parties
to the arbitration.
C. WHETHER THE ARBITRATION CONS TITUTES AN ABUS E OF LEGAL PROCES S
124. In its Position Paper, China repeatedly claims that the Tribunal manifestly lacks jurisdiction
and describes the Philippines initiation of this arbitration is an abuse of the compulsory
dispute settlement procedures.26 This language calls to mind two separate provisions in the
Convention which the Tribunal briefly addresses here, Article 300 and Article 294.
125. Article 300 appears in Part XVI of the Convention, entitled General Provisions, and provides:
Article 300
Good faith and abuse of rights
States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and
shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedo ms recognized in this Convention in a
manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.
126. The Tribunal notes that China has not specifically tied its allegations of abuse to Article 300 of
the Convention and does not request a declaration that the Philippines has breached Article 300.
Nevertheless, the Tribunal notes that the mere act of unilaterally initiating an arbitration under
25 Procedural Order No. 4, 21 April 2015, p. 5, citing as examples Arctic Sunrise (Kingdom of the
Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 November 2013, ITLOS Reports
2013, p. 230 at p. 243, para. 54 (Annex LA-45); Arctic Sunrise (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian
Federation), Jurisdiction, Award of 26 November 2014, para. 44 (Annex LA-180); Fisheries Jurisdiction
(United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 3 (Annex LA-8); Nuclear Tests
(Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 253 (Annex LA-7); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
(Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 3 (Annex LA-9).
26 Chinas Position Paper, paras. 3, 29, 85, 86; see also Foreign Min istry Spokesperson Hua Chunyings
Remarks on the Release of the Transcript of the Oral Hearing on Jurisdict ion by the South China Sea
Arbitral Tribunal Established at the Request of the Philipp ines 24 August 2015, published at
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_ 665405/t1290752.shtml (The
Philippines unilateral submission of the relevant disputes to compulsory arbitration in itiation of
arbitration . . . constitutes . . . an abuse of international legal procedure. . . .).
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Part XV in itself cannot constitute an abuse of rights. In this regard it recalls the following
statement in Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago:
[T]he unilateral invocation of the arb itration procedure cannot by itself be regarded as an
abuse of right contrary to A rticle 300 of UNCLOS, or an abuse of right contrary to general
international law. Article 286 confers a unilateral right, and its exercise unilaterally and
without discussion or agreement with the other Party is a straightforward exercise of the
right conferred by the treaty, in the manner there envisaged. . . .27
127. The language of Chinas allegations of abuse is also reminiscent of the following terms in
Article 294 of the Convention:
Article 294
Preliminary Proceedings
1. A court or tribunal provided for in article 287 to which an application is made in
respect of a dispute referred to in article 297 shall determine at the request of a party,
or may determine proprio motu, whether the claim constitutes an abuse of legal
process or whether prima facie it is well founded. If the court or tribunal determines
that the claim constitutes an abuse of legal process or is prima facie unfounded, it
shall take no further action in the case.
2. Upon receipt of the application, the court or tribunal shall immediately notify the
other party or parties of the application, and shall fix a reasonable time-limit within
which they may request it to make a determination in accordance with paragraph 1.
3. Nothing in this article affects the right of any party to a dispute to make preliminary
objections in accordance with the applicable rules of procedure.
128. China has not made an application to the Tribunal pursuant to Article 294(1) of the Convention,
and the Tribunal is therefore under no obligation to follow the procedure outlined in Article
294(2). While the Tribunal is entitled to determine proprio motu whether the Philippines claim
constitutes an abuse of legal process or whether prima facie it is unfounded, it declines to do so
in the present case. In light of the serious consequences of a finding of abuse of process or
prima facie unfoundedness, the Tribunal considers that the procedure is appropriate in only the
most blatant cases of abuse or harassment.28 In the view of the Tribunal, Chinas concerns
about the potential obstacles to the Tribunals jurisdiction over the Philippines Submissions are
more appropriately dealt with as preliminary objections in accordance with the applicable rules
of procedure which, as Article 294(3) provides, remain unaffected by Articles 294(1) and (2).
The Tribunal, therefore, does not need to decide whether the case falls within the meaning of a
27 Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, Award of 11 April 2006, PCA Award Series at pp. 96-97, para. 208,
RIAA Vol. XXVIII, p. 147 at pp. 207-08, para. 208 (Annex LA-54).
28 At the 61st Plenary Meeting of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, 6 April 1976, a concern was
raised that, in the absence of a provision such as Article 294, the acceptance of compulsory third-party
settlement would mean that the coastal State might be subjected to constant harassment by having to
appear before international tribunals at considerable loss of money and time. A rticle 294 can be
understood as a safeguard against such harassment arising fro m frivolous or clearly unfounded claims.
See Intervention of the representative of Kenya, Mr. Njenga, at the Third UN Conference on the Law of
the Sea on 6 April 1976, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Record,
Vol. V, para. 49.
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dispute referred to in article 297, a characterisation which in any event could only apply to
some of the Philippines Submissions.
129. In the present case, the applicable rules on preliminary objections can be found in Article 20 of
the Rules of Procedure. As noted above at Paragraphs 68, 104, and 122, the Tribunal ruled in
Procedural Order No. 4 that Chinas communications would be treated, for purposes of
Article 20 of the Rules of Procedure, as effectively constituting a plea that the Tribunal does not
have jurisdiction. In accordance with Article 20(3) of the Rules of Procedure, in the remainder
of this Award, the Tribunal shall rule on any plea concerning its jurisdiction as a preliminary
question. However, if the Tribunal determines that any objection to jurisdiction does not
possess an exclusively preliminary character with respect to any Submission, it shall rule on
such jurisdictional issues at a later phase, in conjunction with the merits.
* * *
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V. IDENTIFICATION AND CHARACTERISATION OF THE DISPUTE
130. Article 288 of the Convention limits the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to disputes concerning the
interpretation and application of this Convention. Article 288 provides as follows:
Article 288
Jurisdiction
1. A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall have jurisdiction over any dispute
concerning the interpretation or applicat ion of this Convention which is submitted to
it in accordance with this Part.
2. A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall also have jurisdiction over any
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of an international agreement
related to the purposes of this Convention, which is submitted to it in accordance
with the agreement.
. ..
4. In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter
shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal.
131. Accordingly, the Tribunal is required to determine, first, whether there is a dispute between the
Parties concerning the matters raised by the Philippines and, second, whether such a dispute
concerns the interpretation or application of the Convention.
A. THE PARTIES POS ITIONS
132. The Tribunal has decided to treat the objections in Chinas Position Paper and communications
as effectively constituting a plea on jurisdiction. Preliminary objection proceedings typically
take the form of a self-contained case in which the objecting State appears as applicant.
Accordingly, in this Award, summaries of the possible or actual objections of China are set out
first, followed by summaries of the Philippines positions in response.
1. Chinas Position
133. China has addressed two aspects of the characterisation of the Parties dispute in its Position
Paper of 7 December 2014, which the Tribunal understands to reflect Chinas position on the
issues raised therein, notwithstanding Chinas non-participation in these proceedings. First,
China argues that the essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is territorial sovereignty
over several maritime features in the South China Sea, which is beyond the scope of the
Convention and does not concern the interpretation or application of the Convention. 29
Second, China argues that even if the Parties dispute were concerned with the Convention, the
45
29 October 2015
dispute would constitute an integral part of maritime delimitation between the two countries,
thus falling within the scope of the Declaration filed by China in 2006.30
134. According to China, the dispute raised by the Philippines is actually one of sovereignty because
[t]o decide upon any of the Philippines claims, the Arbitral Tribunal would inevitably have to
determine, directly or indirectly, the sovereignty over both the maritime features in question and
other maritime features in the South China Sea.31 China divides the Philippines Submissions
between those concerned with Chinas historic rights, those relating to the status of certain
maritime features, and those involving Chinas exercise of rights in the South China Sea.32
135. In Chinas view, the Philippines Submissions concerning the extent of Chinas historic rights
reflect a dispute over sovereignty because only after the extent of Chinas territorial
sovereignty in the South China Sea is determined can a decision be made on whether Chinas
maritime claims in the South China Sea have exceeded the extent allowed under the
Convention. 33 China recalls the general principle that sovereignty over land territory is the
basis for the determination of maritime rights. 34 China also recalls the preamble to the
Convention and submits that due regard for the sovereignty of all States is the prerequisite for
the application of the Convention to determine maritime rights of the States Parties. 35
Accordingly, China concludes:
without first having determined Ch inas territorial sovereignty over the maritime features in
the South China Sea, the Arbitral Tribunal will not be in a position to determine the extent to
which China may claim maritime rights in the South China Sea pursuant to the Convention,
not to mention whether Chinas claims exceed the extent allowed under the Convention.36
136. China likewise submits that the Philippines claims concerning the status of features constitute a
dispute over sovereignty because without determining the sovereignty over a maritime feature,
it is impossible to decide whether maritime claims based on that feature are consistent with the
Convention. 37 According to China, [w]hen not subject to State sovereignty, a maritime
feature per se possesses no maritime rights or entitlements whatsoever, and [i]f the
sovereignty over a maritime feature is undecided, there cannot be a concrete and real dispute for
arbitration as to whether or not the maritime claims of a State based on such a feature are

46
29 October 2015
compatible with the Convention.38 Moreover, in Chinas view, [w]hether low-tide elevations
can be appropriated as territory is in itself a question of territorial sovereignty, not a matter
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention.39 China also argues that by
focusing on only a few maritime features, the Philippines is attempting to gainsay Chinas
sovereignty over the whole of the Nansha Islands and distort the nature of the Parties
dispute.40
137. Finally, China submits that the Philippines remaining Submissions reflect a dispute over
sovereignty because the legality of Chinas actions in the waters of the Nansha Islands and
Huangyan Dao rests on both its sovereignty over relevant maritime features and the maritime
rights derived therefrom.41 According to China, the Philippines claims concerning sovereign
rights and jurisdiction are based on the premise that the spatial extent of the Philippines
maritime jurisdiction is defined and undisputed, and that Chinas actions have encroached upon
such defined areas.42 In fact, China argues, [u]ntil and unless the sovereignty over the
relevant maritime features is ascertained and maritime delimitation completed, this category of
claims of the Philippines cannot be decided upon.43
138. In the alternative, China submits that the subject matter of these proceedings is an integral part
of the dispute of maritime delimitation between the two States and accordingly excluded from
the Tribunals jurisdiction by Article 298.44 According to China, the legal issues:
presented by the Philippines in the present arbitration, including maritime claims, the legal
nature of marit ime features, the extent of relevant maritime rights, and law enforcement
activities at sea, are all fundamental issues dealt with in past cases of maritime delimitation
decided by international judicial or arb itral bodies and in State practice concerning
maritime delimitation.45
For China, these issues are part and parcel of maritime delimitation, which is an integral,
systemic process.46 The Philippines selection of certain of those issues for presentation in
these proceedings would, in Chinas view, destroy the integrity and indivisibility of maritime

46 Chinas Position Paper, paras. 66, 67.
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delimitation and contravene the principle that maritime delimitation must be based on
international law . . . and that all relevant factors must be taken into account.47
139. China also considers that certain of the Philippines Submissions amount to a request for
maritime delimitation by the Arbitral Tribunal in disguise.48 China refers to the Submissions
requesting declarations that certain maritime features are part of the Philippines EEZ and
continental shelf or that China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise by
the Philippines of sovereign rights in its EEZ and continental shelf.49 For China, these requests
are obviously . . . an attempt to seek a recognition by the Arbitral Tribunal that the relevant
maritime areas are part of the Philippines EEZ and continental shelf.50
2. The Philippines Position
140. The Philippines submits that the essence of the Parties dispute concerns Chinas claims to
historic rights in the South China Sea which [China] says are enshrined in its national law
and general international law, and which exist outside the scope of the Convention and
supersede and, in effect, nullify the rights of other states.51 The Philippines considers that it
has positively opposed this contention52 and rejects the attempts made in Chinas Position Paper
to characterise the Parties dispute as relating either to sovereignty or to maritime boundary
delimitation. The Philippines also reviews its Submissions and argues that an identifiable
dispute between the Parties, relating to the interpretation and application of the Convention,
exists with respect to each of them.
141. With respect to sovereignty, the Philippines accepts that a dispute concerning sovereignty over
maritime features in the South China Sea exists between the Parties and acknowledges that the
Philippines disputes with China in the South China Sea have more than one layer. 53
However, the Philippines considers that this is entirely irrelevant to the Tribunals jurisdiction,
because [n]one of [the Philippines] submissions require the Tribunal to express any view at all
as to the extent of Chinas sovereignty over land territory, or that of any other state.54 The

53 Supplemental Written Submission, para. 26.8.
54 Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 1), pp. 61-62.
48
29 October 2015
Philippines cites arbitral awards as support for the conclusion that sovereignty claims over
maritime features raise no impediment to the determination of their maritime entitlements.55
142. According to the Philippines, the fact that there is a dispute between the Parties in respect of
sovereignty does not prevent the Tribunal from considering the other disputes presented by the
Philippines Submissions. The Philippines relies on the decisions in United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran,56 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,57 and
Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 199558 for the principle that a dispute may
have different elements, which does not preclude some elements from falling within
jurisdiction.59 The Philippines also distinguishes the decision in Chagos Marine Protected Area
to deny jurisdiction over disputes relating to sovereignty. 60 According to the Philippines, the
parties in that case were in agreement that in order to address Mauritiuss first submission, the
tribunal in that case was required to make a prior determination as to which state had
sovereignty, whereas the Philippines present submissions require no such decision.61
143. The Philippines argues that its Submissions concerning the relationship between Chinas claimed
historic rights and the Convention do not require any prior determination of sovereignty. The
Philippines agrees with China that the land dominates the sea, but points to the corollary that
without land, there can be no maritime entitlements on the basis of historic rights or otherwise.
The Philippines notes that the Convention includes provisions on the maximum extent of maritime
entitlements and submits that such entitlements emanate exclusively from maritime features.
According to the Philippines, even assuming that China is sovereign over all of the insular
features it claims, its claim to historic rights within the areas encompassed by the nine-dash line
exceeds the limits of its potential entitlement under the Convention.62 In the Philippines view,
Chinas maximum potential maritime entitlements in the Spratlys (contrasted with the area
55 Written Responses to the Tribunals 13 July 2015 Questions, paras. III.7-III.12, citing Territorial and
Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 659 at p. 702, para. 135 (Annex LA-177); Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, p. 40 at pp. 98-99,
paras. 191, 196 (Annex LA-26); Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Merits,
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 624 at pp. 642-45, paras. 28-38 (Annex LA-35); Dubai-Sharjah Border
Arbitration, Award of 19 October 1981, 91 ILR p. 543 at pp. 673-77 (Annex LA-231).
56 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports
1980, p. 3 at pp. 19-20, para. 36 (Annex LA-175).
57 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 392 at pp. 439-40, paras. 105-106 (Annex LA-13).
58 Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v.
Greece), Judgment of 5 December 2011, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 644 at p. 659, para. 37 (Annex LA-221).
60 Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award of 18 March 2015 (Annex LA-225).
62 Supplemental Written Submission, para. 26.13 [emphasis in original].
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29 October 2015
enclosed by the nine-dash line) can be seen graphically in the following Figure 5 on page 51
below, which appears as Figure 4.2 in the Philippines Memorial. This depicts in pink the area
within the nine-dash line, in blue lines the 200 nautical mile limits from the coasts of
surrounding States, and in red circles the Philippines portrayal of Chinas maximum potential
entitlements under UNCLOS.
144. In the Philippines view, there is likewise no need to determine sovereignty before considering
the existence of maritime entitlements on the basis of features in the South China Sea.
According to the Philippines:
(a) The proper approach to determining the existence of maritime entitlements must
necessarilyand logicallybe to determine the character and nature of a particular
feature.63 This does not require any prior determination of which state has sovereignty
over the feature64 because [t]he maritime entitlement that feature may generate is . . . a
matter for objective determination. In other words, the Philippines argues, the same
feature could not be a rock if it pertains to one State but an island capable of generating
entitlement to an EEZ and continental shelf if it pertains to another. Thus sovereignty
is wholly irrelevant.65
(b) No significance follows from the Philippines focus on specific features. For the
Philippines, this is merely pragmatic in light of the large number of maritime features in
the Spratlys, and if the largest of the Spratly features is incapable of generating an EEZ
and continental shelf entitlement, then it is most unlikely that any of the other 750
features will be able to do so.66
(c) And, in response to Chinas arguments concerning low-tide elevations: [w]hether or not
a feature is a low-tide elevation is to be determined by reference to Article 13(1) of the
Convention, and is accordingly within the Tribunals jurisdiction. Additionally, Bay of
Bengal Maritime Boundary demonstrates that tribunals have routinely made
determinations with regard to low-tide elevations, the incidental result of which is that
sovereignty over that feature vests in one or another state.67

67 Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary (Bangladesh v. India), Award of 7 July 2014, para. 191 (Annex LA-179);
Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 1), p. 95.
50
29 October 2015
Figure 5: Chinas Maximum Potential Entitlements under UNCLOS Compared to

its Nine-Dash Line Claim in the Southern Sector (Memorial, Figure 4.2)
51
29 October 2015
52
29 October 2015
145. Finally, the Philippines rejects Chinas argument that sovereignty must be determined before the
Philippines Submissions concerning the exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction may be
considered. According to the Philippines, [t]he Philippines claims pertaining to Chinas
unlawful conduct are premised on Chinas maximum permissible entitlement under the
Convention, even assuming that it, quod non, has sovereignty over all disputed insular
features.68 The Philippines emphasises that [t]his part of the Philippines claim . . . is made
entirely regardless of sovereignty, and entirely without prejudice to Chinas territorial
assertions, or indeed the territorial assertions of any other state.69
146. The Philippines similarly rejects Chinas overarching characterisation of the Parties dispute as
relating to maritime boundary delimitation. According to the Philippines, Chinas contention
conflates two different things: (1) entitlement to maritime zones, and (2) delimitation of areas
where those zones overlap.70 The Philippines considers one of the major accomplishments of
the Convention to have been the near universal adherence to a detailed elaboration of what are,
and are not, the entitlements of coastal states71 and emphasises that issues of entitlement
engage the overall interests of the international community. 72 In contrast, a question of
maritime delimitation involves only the States concerned73 and does not arise unless and until
it is determined that there are overlapping maritime entitlements. 74 In this respect, the
Philippines recalls the approach in Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh
and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal and Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v.
Colombia) in first determining the existence of overlapping entitlements before turning to
delimitation. 75 The Philippines concludes that [t]he fact that resolution of delimitation issues
may require the prior resolution of entitlement issues does not mean that entitlement issues are
an integral part of the delimitation process itself.76
147. Turning to its own Submissions in detail, the Philippines argues that each and every one of the
submissions is indeed the subject of a legal dispute . . . and that it arises under and calls for the

75 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal
(Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment of 14 March 2012, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4 at p. 99, paras. 376-77
(Annex LA-43); Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Merits, Judgment, ICJ
Reports 2012, p. 624 at p. 688, para. 169 (Annex LA-35).
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interpretation or application of specific identified provisions of the Convention. 77 According to

the Philippines:
Submissions No. 1 and 2 relate to:
Chinas claim that its marit ime entit lements in the South China Sea extend beyond
those permitted by UNCLOS (in opposition to [the Philippines] submission 1), and
its claim to historic rights, including sovereign rights and jurisdiction, within the
marit ime area enco mpassed by the nine-dash line beyond the limits of its UNCLOS
entitlements (in opposition to [the Philippines] submission 2).78
The Philippines refers to its own Note Verbale to China 79 and multiple Chinese
statements concerning Chinas historic rights80 as evidence of the dispute.
Submission No. 3 relates to the Philippines position that Scarborough Shoal is a rock
under Article 121(3), opposed by Chinas position that it is not a sand bank but rather an
island. The Philippines refers to the proceedings of the 10th and 18th PhilippinesChina
Foreign Ministry Consultations and other diplomatic communications.81
Submission No. 4 relates to the Philippines position that Mischief Reef, Second Thomas
Shoal, and Subi Reef are low tide elevations that do not generate entitlement to maritime
zones, opposed by Chinas view that Chinas Nansha Islands is fully entitled to
Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf. The Philippines
refers to its own Notes Verbales82 and Chinas diplomatic communications.83

79 Note Verbale fro m the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Ph ilippines to the Un ited Nat ions to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. 000228 ), pp. 3-4 (5 April 2011) (Annex 200).
80 Note Verbale fro m the Permanent Mission of the Peoples Republic of China to the United Nat ions to the
Secretary-General o f the Un ited Nations, No. CM L/17/2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 191); Memorandum
fro m the Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Beijing to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of the Philippines, No. ZPE-064-2011-S, p. 2, para. 8 (21 June 2011) (Annex 72); Min istry of
Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of Ch ina, Foreign Min istry Spokesperson Jiang Yus Regular
Press Conference on September 15, 2011, p. 2 (16 September 2011) (Annex 113); China Asserts Sea
Claim with Politics and Ships, NY Times, p. 3 (11 August 2012) (Annex 320); Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Peoples Republic of Ch ina, Foreign Min istry Spokesperson Hong Leis Statement
Regarding Co mments by an Official of the United States Department of State on the South China Sea
(8 February 2014) (Annex 131).
81 Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Ph ilippines, Record of Proceedings: 10th
Philippines-Ch ina Foreign Ministry Consultations (30 July 1998) (Annex 184); Depart ment of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, Notes on the 18th Philippines-Ch ina Foreign Ministry
Consultations, p. 12, para. 52 (19 October 2012) (Annex 85); Foreign Min istry of the Peoples Republic
of Ch ina, Chinese Foreign M inistry Statement Regarding Huangyandao (22 May 1997) (Annex 106);
Memorandu m fro m Rodolfo C. Severino, Undersecretary, Depart ment o f Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of the Philippines, to the President of the Republic of the Philippines, p. 2 (27 May 1997) (Annex 25).
82 Note Verbale fro m the Depart ment of Fo reign Affairs of the Republic o f the Philippines to the Embassy
of the Peoples Republic of Ch ina in Manila, No. 983577, p. 2 (5 November 1998) (Annex 185); Note
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Submission No. 5 relates to a dispute over whether Mischief Reef and Second Thomas
Shoal are part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines or,
as China puts it, of Chinas Nansha Islands. According to the Philippines, the dispute
turns on whether the Spratly Islands can generate an EEZ and continental shelf.84 The
Philippines refers to its bilateral consultations with China and diplomatic
communications.85
Submission No. 6 relates to a dispute over whether Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef
(including Hughes Reef) are low-tide elevations that do not generate any maritime
entitlements of their own.86 The Philippines refers to Chinas statements regarding the
entitlements of the Nansha Islands.87
Submission No. 7 relates to a dispute on whether these three reefs [Johnson Reef,
Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef] do or do not generate an entitlement to an
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 88 The Philippines refers to Chinas
statements regarding the entitlements of the Nansha Islands.89
Submission No. 8 relates to a dispute that arises because China has interfered with lawful
activity of the Philippinespetroleum exploration, seismic surveys and fishingwithin
200 miles of the Philippines mainland coast, as a consequence of Chinas erroneous belief
Verbale fro m the Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Ph ilippines to the Embassy of the
Peoples Republic of China in Manila, No. 110885, p. 1 (4 April 2011) (Annex 199).
83 Note Verbale fro m the Permanent Mission of the Peoples Republic of China to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, No. CM L/ 8/2011, p. 2 (14 April 2011) (Annex 201); Memorandum fro m the
Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Beijing to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of the Philippines, No. ZPE-071-2014-S (10 March 2014) (Annex 100); Memorandum fro m the Embassy
of the Republic of the Philippines in Beijing to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the
Philippines, No. ZPE-070-2014-S, para. 4 (7 March 2014) (Annex 98).
85 Philippine-Ch ina Bilateral Consultations: Su mmary of Proceedings, p. 7 (20-21 March 1995)
(Annex 175); Memorandu m fro m Assistant Secretary, Asian and Pacific Affairs, Depart ment of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the
Philippines (11 March 2014) (Annex 101).
the United Nations, No. CML/8/2011, p. 2 (14 April 2011) (Annex 201).
55
29 October 2015
that it is entitled to claim sovereign rights beyond its entitlements under UNCLOS.90 The
Philippines refers to Chinas diplomatic correspondence and public statements.91
Submission No. 9 relates to a dispute over the legality under UNCLOS of Chinas
purported grant of rights to nationals and vessels in areas over which the Philippines
exercises sovereign rights.92 The Philippines refers to Chinas statements on the extent
of Chinese fishing rights in the Nansha Islands.93
Submission No. 10 relates to a dispute premised on [the] fact that China has unlawfully
prevented Philippine fishermen from carrying out traditional fishing activities within the
territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal. 94 The Philippines refers to Chinese statements
directing Philippines fishing vessels to stay away from Scarborough Shoal.95
Submission No. 11 relates to a dispute concerning Chinas failure to protect and

preserve the marine environment at these two shoals [Scarborough Shoal and Second
Thomas Shoal]. 96 The Philippines refers to Chinas conduct in ignoring repeated
Philippines protests. In the Philippines view, China either believes its fishermen are
acting lawfully, or it does not care that they are acting unlawfully.97
Submission No. 12 relates to a dispute premised on the characterisation of Mischief

Reef as a low-tide elevation that is part of the seabed and subsoil and located in the
Philippines EEZ and continental shelf and on Chinas construction and other
activities.98 The Philippines refers to Chinas diplomatic communications concerning
construction activity on Mischief Reef.99

91 Memorandu m fro m Rafael E. Seguis, Undersecretary for Special and Ocean Concerns, Depart ment of
Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the
Philippines, p. 1 (30 July 2010) (Annex 63); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of
China, Foreign M inistry Spokesperson Jiang Yus Regular Press Conference on September 15, 2011, p. 2
(16 September 2011) (Annex 113); Note Verbale fro m the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of Ch ina to
the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, No. (15)PG-229 (6 July 2015) (Annex 580).
93 Memorandu m fro m the A mbassador of the Republic of the Ph ilippines in Beijing to the Undersecretary of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, p. 2 (10 April 1995) (Annex 21).
95 Memorandu m fro m the Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Beijing to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. ZPE-110-2012-S, p. 5 (26 July 2012) (Annex 84).
99 Memorandu m fro m A mbassador of the Republic of Philippines in Beijing to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. ZPE-76-98-S (6 November 1998) (Annex 33).
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Submission No. 13 relates to the Philippines protest against Chinas purported law
enforcement activities as violating the Convention on the International Regulations for the
Prevention of Collisions at Sea and also violating UNCLOS100 and Chinas rejection of
those protests.101
Submission No. 14 relates to a dispute concerning Chinas activities at Second Thomas

Shoal . . . after these proceedings were commenced, including the prevention of the
rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel at the Shoal and interference with
navigation. 102 The Philippines refers to Chinas diplomatic communications and
communications with the Philippine forces stationed on Second Thomas Shoal.103
B. THE TRIBUNALS DECIS ION
148. The concept of a dispute is well-established in international law and the inclusion of the term
within Article 288 constitutes a threshold requirement for the exercise of the Tribunals
jurisdiction. Simply put, the Tribunal is not empowered to act except in respect of one or more
actual disputes between the Parties. Moreover, such disputes must concern the interpretation
and application of the Convention.
149. In determining whether these criteria are met, the Tribunal recalls that, under international law,
a dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests
between two persons. 104 Whether such a disagreement exists is a matter for objective
determination. 105 A mere assertion by one party that a dispute exists is not sufficient to prove
the existence of a dispute any more than a mere denial of the existence of the dispute proves its
nonexistence.106 It is not adequate to show that the interests of the two parties to such a case
are in conflict. It must be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the
100 Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 144; Note Verbale fro m the Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the
Philippines to the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in Manila, No. 12-1222, p. 1 (30 April
2012) (Annex 209).
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. (12) PG-239, p. 1 (25 May 2012) (Annex 211).
103 Memorandu m fro m the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines to the President of
the Republic of the Philippines (23 April 2013) (Annex 93); Letter fro m the Virgilio A. Hernandez,
Major General, Armed Forces of the Ph ilippines, to the Secretary of Foreign A ffairs, Depart ment of
Foreign Affairs of Republic of the Philippines (10 March 2014) (Annex 99).
104 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Jurisdiction, Judg ment of 30 August 1924, PCIJ Series A, No. 2, p.
6 at p. 11 (Annex LA-57).
105 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opin ion,
ICJ Reports 1950, p. 65 at p. 74 (Annex LA-1).
106 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opin ion,
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other. 107 Moreover, the dispute must have existed at the time the proceedings were
commenced.108 In the present case, that would be 22 January 2013, the date of the Philippines
Notification and Statement of Claim.
150. Where a dispute exists between parties to the proceedings, it is further necessary that it be
identified and characterised. The nature of the dispute may have significant jurisdictional
implications, including whether the dispute can fairly be said to concern the interpretation or
application of the Convention or whether subject-matter based exclusions from jurisdiction are
applicable. Here again, an objective approach is called for, and the Tribunal is required to
isolate the real issue in the case and to identify the object of the claim.109 In so doing it is not
only entitled to interpret the submissions of the parties, but bound to do so. As set out in
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), it is for the Court itself to determine on an objective
basis the dispute dividing the parties, by examining the position of both parties.110 Such a
determination will be based not only on the Application and final submissions, but on diplomatic
exchanges, public statements and other pertinent evidence.111 In the process, a distinction should
be made between the dispute itself and arguments used by the parties to sustain their respective
submissions on the dispute.112
151. In the present case, the Philippines argues that it has submitted to the Tribunal a series of
concrete disputes concerning the interpretation or application of specific articles of the
Convention to Chinese activities in the South China Sea and to certain maritime features
occupied by China. The Philippines also considers that it has submitted a dispute concerning
the interaction of historic rights claimed by China with the provisions of the Convention.
Chinas Position Paper sets out two overarching characterisations of the Parties dispute that, in
Chinas view, exclude it from the Tribunals jurisdiction. In its Position Paper, China argues,
107 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
108 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 70 at pp. 84-85,
para. 30 (Annex LA-34).
109 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 457 at p. 466, para. 30; see also
Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Courts Judgment of
20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, Order of 22 September 1995, ICJ
Reports 1995, p. 288 at p. 304, para. 55.
110 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1998, p. 432 at
p. 448, para. 30 (Annex LA-23).
p. 449, para. 31 (Annex LA-23).
p. 449, para. 32 (Annex LA-23); see also Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. United Kingdom),
Award of 18 March 2015, para. 208 (Annex LA-225).
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first, that the Parties dispute concerns territorial sovereignty over several maritime features in
the South China Sea and, second (in what the Tribunal understands to be an alternative
argument), that the Parties dispute concerns matters that are an integral part of maritime
delimitation. The former characterisation would, in Chinas view, mean that the dispute is not
one concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention; the latter would bring it
within the ambit of the jurisdictional exceptions created by Chinas declaration under Article
298 of the Convention. As Chinas objections concern the Philippines Submissions as a whole,
the Tribunal considers it appropriate to address them generally, before turning to the
Philippines arguments concerning the proper characterisation of its Submissions.
152. There is no question that there exists a dispute between the Parties concerning land sovereignty
over certain maritime features in the South China Sea. The Philippines concedes as much,113
and the objection set out in Chinas Position Paper is premised on the existence of such a
dispute. A dispute over sovereignty is also readily apparent on the face of the diplomatic
communications between the Parties provided by the Philippines. The Tribunal does not accept,
however, that it follows from the existence of a dispute over sovereignty that sovereignty is also
the appropriate characterisation of the claims the Philippines has submitted in these
proceedings. In the Tribunals view, it is entirely ordinary and expected that two States with a
relationship as extensive and multifaceted as that existing between the Philippines and China
would have disputes in respect of several distinct matters. Indeed, even within a geographic
area such as the South China Sea, the Parties can readily be in dispute regarding multiple
aspects of the prevailing factual circumstances or the legal consequences that follow from them.
The Tribunal agrees with the International Court of Justice in United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran that there are no grounds to decline to take cognizance of one aspect
of a dispute merely because that dispute has other aspects, however important.114
153. The Tribunal might consider that the Philippines Submissions could be understood to relate to
sovereignty if it were convinced that either (a) the resolution of the Philippines claims would
require the Tribunal to first render a decision on sovereignty, either expressly or implicitly; or
(b) the actual objective of the Philippines claims was to advance its position in the Parties
dispute over sovereignty. Neither of these situations, however, is the case. The Philippines has
not asked the Tribunal to rule on sovereignty and, indeed, has expressly and repeatedly
requested that the Tribunal refrain from so doing.115 The Tribunal likewise does not see that any
113 Memorial, para. 1.16; Supplemental Written Submission, para. 26.8.

114 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports
115 Memorial, para. 1.16; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 1), pp. 76-77, 99.
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of the Philippines Submissions require an implicit determination of sovereignty. The Tribunal is

of the view that it is entirely possible to approach the Philippines Submissions from the
premiseas the Philippines suggests116 that China is correct in its assertion of sovereignty over
Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys. The Tribunal is fully conscious of the limits on the claims
submitted to it and, to the extent that it reaches the merits of any of the Philippines
Submissions, intends to ensure that its decision neither advances nor detracts from either Partys
claims to land sovereignty in the South China Sea. Nor does the Tribunal understand the
Philippines to seek anything further. The Tribunal does not see that success on these
Submissions would have an effect on the Philippines sovereignty claims and accepts that the
Philippines has initiated these proceedings with the entirely proper objective of narrowing the
issues in dispute between the two States.117 In this respect, the present case is distinct from the
recent decision in Chagos Marine Protected Area. The Tribunal understands the majoritys
decision in that case to have been based on the view both that a decision on Mauritius first and
second submissions would have required an implicit decision on sovereignty and that
sovereignty was the true object of Mauritius claims. For the reasons set out in this paragraph,
the Tribunal does not accept the objection set out in Chinas Position Paper that the disputes
presented by the Philippines concern sovereignty over maritime features.
154. One aspect of this objection, however, warrants further comment. In its Position Paper, China
objects that the Philippines selects only a few features and argues that [t]his is in essence an
attempt at denying Chinas sovereignty over the Nansha Islands as a whole.118 The Tribunal
does not agree that the Philippines focus only on the maritime features occupied by China
carries implications for the question of sovereignty. The Tribunal does, however, consider that
this narrow selection may have implications for the merits of the Philippines claims. To the
extent that a claim by the Philippines is premised on the absence of any overlapping
entitlements of China to an exclusive economic zone or to a continental shelf, the Tribunal
considers it necessary to consider the maritime zones generated by any feature in the South
China Sea claimed by China, whether or not such feature is presently occupied by China.
155. Turning now to the question of maritime boundaries, the Tribunal is likewise not convinced by the
objection in Chinas Position Paper that the Parties dispute is properly characterised as relating to
maritime boundary delimitation. The Tribunal agrees with China that maritime boundary
delimitation is an integral and systemic process. In particular, the Tribunal notes that the concepts
of an equitable solution, of special circumstances in respect of the territorial sea, and of

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relevant circumstances in respect of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf may
entail consideration of a wide variety of potential issues arising between the parties to a
delimitation. It does not follow, however, that a dispute over an issue that may be considered in
the course of a maritime boundary delimitation constitutes a dispute over maritime boundary
delimitation itself.
156. In particular, the Tribunal considers that a dispute concerning the existence of an entitlement to
maritime zones is distinct from a dispute concerning the delimitation of those zones in an area
where the entitlements of parties overlap. While fixing the extent of parties entitlements and
the area in which they overlap will commonly be one of the first matters to be addressed in the
delimitation of a maritime boundary, it is nevertheless a distinct issue. A maritime boundary
may be delimited only between States with opposite or adjacent coasts and overlapping
entitlements. In contrast, a dispute over claimed entitlements may exist even without overlap,
wherefor instancea State claims maritime zones in an area understood by other States to
form part of the high seas or the Area for the purposes of the Convention.
157. In these proceedings, the Philippines has challenged the existence and extent of the maritime
entitlements claimed by China in the South China Sea. This is not a dispute over maritime
boundaries. The Philippines has not requested the Tribunal to delimit any overlapping
entitlements between the two States, and the Tribunal will not effect the delimitation of any
boundary. Certain consequences, however, do follow from the limits on the Tribunals
competence in this respect and the limited nature of the dispute presented by the Philippines.
China correctly notes in its Position Paper that certain of the Philippines Submissions
(Submissions No. 5, 8 and 9) request the Tribunal to declare that specific maritime features are
part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines or that certain
Chinese activities interfered with the Philippines sovereign rights in its exclusive economic
zone. Because the Tribunal has not been requested toand will notdelimit a maritime
boundary between the Parties, the Tribunal will be able address those of the Philippines
Submissions based on the premise that certain areas of the South China Sea form part of the
Philippines exclusive economic zone or continental shelf only if the Tribunal determines that
China could not possess any potentially overlapping entitlement in that area. This fact also
bears on the decisions that the Tribunal is presently prepared to make regarding the scope of its
jurisdiction (see Paragraphs 390 to 396 below).
158. Having addressed the two objections raised generally by China concerning the nature of the
Parties dispute, the Tribunal turns to the disputes that it considers do appear from the
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Philippines Submissions, as reflected in the Parties diplomatic correspondence in the record

and the public statements of the Parties.
159. The Tribunal is called upon to address an issue arising from the manner in which China has
chosen to publicly present its claimed rights in the South China Sea and also from Chinas
non-participation in these proceedings. The existence of a dispute in international law generally
requires that there be positive opposition between the parties, in that the claims of one party
are affirmatively opposed and rejected by the other.119 In the ordinary course of events, such
positive opposition will normally be apparent from the diplomatic correspondence of the
Parties, as views are exchanged and claims are made and rejected.
160. In the present case, however, China has not elaborated on certain significant aspects of its
claimed rights and entitlements in the South China Sea. China has, for instance, repeatedly
claimed historic rights or rights formed in history in the South China Sea.120 But China has
not, as far as the Tribunal is aware, clarified the nature or scope of its claimed historic rights.
Nor has China clarified its understanding of the meaning of the nine-dash line set out on the
map accompanying its Notes Verbales of 7 May 2009. 121 Within the Spratlys, China has also
generally refrained from expressing a view on the status of particular maritime features and has
119 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
ICJ Reports 1962, p. 319 at p. 328.
120 See, e.g., Memorandum fro m the Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Beijing to the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. ZPE-064-2011-S, p. 6, para. 8 (21 June 2011)
(Annex 72); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Jiang Yus Regular Press Conference on September 15, 2011, p. 2 (16 September 2011)
(Annex 113).
Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CM L/17/2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 191); Note Verbale
fro m the Permanent Mission of the Peoples Republic of China to the United Nations to the Secretary-
General of the Un ited Nat ions, No. CM L/18/2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 192). The Tribunals use of the
term n ine-dash line is not to be understood as recognizing any particular nomenclature or map as
correct or authoritative. The Tribunal observes that different terms have been used at different t imes and
by different entities to refer to this line. For examp le, Ch ina refers to Chinas dotted line in the South
China Sea (Chinas Position Paper, para. 8); Viet Nam refers to the nine-dash line (Viet Nams
Statement, para. 4(i)); Indonesia has referred to the so called n ine-dotted-lines map (Note Verbale fro m
the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the
United Nat ions, No. 480/POL-703/ VII/10, pp. 1-2 (8 July 2010) (Annex 197); and some co mmentators
have referred to it as the Cows Tongue and U-Shaped Line. Further, the Tribunal observes that the
number o f dashes varies, depending on the date and version of the map consulted. Fo r examp le, there
were eleven dashes in the 1947 Atlas Map Showing the Location of the Various Islands in the South
China Sea (Nanhai Zhu Dao Wei Zhi Tu) (Memorial, Figure 4.5, Annex M20) and those in the 1950s
(Annexes M1-M3 ) . Nine dashes appeared in subsequent maps, including that appended to the 2009
Notes Verbales to the UN Secretary-General (Memorial Figure 1.1, Note Verbale fro m the Permanent
Mission of the Peoples Republic of China to the United Nat ions to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, No. CM L/ 17/ 2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 191); Note Verbale fro m the Permanent Mission of the
Peoples Republic o f Ch ina to the Un ited Nat ions to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
No. CM L/18/2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 192)). Ten dashes appear in the more recent 2013 Map of the
Peoples Republic of China produced by China Cartographic Publishing House (Annex M19).
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rather chosen to argue generally that Chinas Nansha Islands [are] fully entitled to Territorial
Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf.122 The Tribunal sees nothing
improper about this and considers that China is free to set out its public position as it considers
most appropriate. Nevertheless, certain consequences follow for the Tribunals determination
of whether a dispute can reasonably be said to exist where the Philippines claims raise matters
on which China has so far refrained from expressing a detailed position.
161. The Tribunal notes that:
a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal v iews or interests, or the

positive opposition of the claim of one party by the other need not necessarily be stated
expressis verbis. In the determination of the existence of a dispute, as in other matters, the
position or the attitude of a party can be established by inference, whatever the professed
view of that party.123
The existence of a dispute may also be inferred from the failure of a State to respond to a claim
in circumstances where a response is called for.124
162. The Tribunal recalls that this issue arose in the Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate
under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, in which the
United States declined to expressly affirm or contradict the United Nations view that its
legislation constituted a violation of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement. The Court,
on that occasion, noted that:
where one party to a treaty protests against the behaviour or a decision of another party, and
claims that such behaviour or decision constitutes a breach of the treaty, the mere fact that
the party accused does not advance any argument to justify its conduct under international
law does not prevent the opposing attitudes of the parties fro m g iving rise to a dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty.125
Similarly, in Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Nigeria adopted a reserved
approach to setting out its position and argued only generally that there was no dispute
concerning the delimitation of that boundary as such throughout its whole length. 126 The Court
observed that:
122 See, e.g., Note Verbale fro m the Permanent Mission of the Peoples Republic of Ch ina to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, No. CML/8/2011, p. 2 (14 April 2011) (Annex 201).
123 Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Ob jections, Judgment, ICJ Reports
1998, p. 275 at p. 315, para. 89 (Annex LA-25).
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 70 at pp. 84-85,
125 Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters
Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1988, p. 12 at p. 28, para. 38.
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Nigeria is entitled not to advance arguments that it considers are for the merits at the
present stage of the proceedings; in the circu mstances however, the Court finds itself in a
situation in which it cannot decline to examine the submission of Cameroon on the ground
that there is no dispute between the two States. Because of Nigerias position, the exact
scope of this dispute cannot be determined at present; a dispute nevertheless exists between
the two Parties, at least as regards the legal bases of the boundary. It is fo r the Court to pass
upon this dispute.127
163. In the Tribunals view, two principles follow from this jurisprudence. First, where a party has
declined to contradict a claim expressly or to take a position on a matter submitted for
compulsory settlement, the Tribunal is entitled to examine the conduct of the Partiesor,
indeed, the fact of silence in a situation in which a response would be expectedand draw
appropriate inferences. Second, the existence of a dispute must be evaluated objectively. The
Tribunal is obliged not to permit an overly technical evaluation of the Parties communications
or deliberate ambiguity in a Partys expression of its position to frustrate the resolution of a
genuine dispute through arbitration.
164. In the Tribunals view, the Philippines Submissions No. 1 and 2 reflect a dispute concerning
the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea and the interaction of Chinas
claimed historic rights with the provisions of the Convention. This dispute is evident from
the diplomatic exchange between the Parties that followed Chinas Notes Verbales of 7 May
2009, which stated, in relevant part that:
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent
waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the
seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached map). The above position is consistently held by
the Chinese Government and is widely known by the international community.128
The Notes enclosed a map depicting what is known as the nine-dash line in the South China Sea.
165. The Philippines contrasting view that entitlements in the South China Sea stem only from land
features is well set out in its Note Verbale of 5 April 2011, issued in explicit response to Chinas
Notes Verbales of 7 May 2009. In addition to claiming sovereignty over the Kalayaan Island
Group (KIG), the Note provides in relevant part:
On the Waters Adjacent to the Islands and other Geological Features

SECOND, the Philipp ines, under the Roman notion of dominium maris and the
international law princip le of la terre domine la mer wh ich states that the land dominates
the sea, necessarily exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters around or
adjacent to each relevant geological feature in the KIG as provided for under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
127 Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports
Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CM L/17/2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 191); Note Verbale
General of the United Nations, No. CML/18/2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 192).
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At any rate, the extent of the waters that are adjacent to the relevant geological features
are definite and determinable under UNCLOS, specifically under Art icle 121 (Regime o f
Islands) of the said Convention.
On the Other Relevant Waters Seabed and Subsoil in the SCS
THIRD, since the adjacent waters of the relevant geological features are definite and
subject to legal and technical measurement, the claim as well by the Peoples Republic o f
China on the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (as reflected in the
so-called 9-dash line map attached to Notes Verbales CM L/ 17/ 2009 dated 7 May 2009 and
CM L/18/2009 dated 7 May 2009) outside of the aforementioned relevant geological
features in the KIG and their adjacent waters would have no basis under international
law, specifically UNCLOS. W ith respect to these areas, sovereignty and jurisdiction or
sovereign rights, as the case may be, necessarily appertain or belong to the appropriate
coastal or archipelagic state the Philippines to which these bodies of waters as well as
seabed and subsoil are appurtenant, either in the nature of Territorial Sea, or 200 M
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), or Continental Shelf (CS) in accordance with Articles 3,
4, 55, 57, and 76 of UNCLOS.129
166. This Note prompted an immediate and comprehensive objection from China, which both
rejected the Philippines claim of sovereignty and set out certain comments on Chinas claimed
maritime rights. Chinas Note of 14 April 2011 stated in relevant part that:
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent
waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over relevant waters as well as the
seabed and subsoil thereof. Chinas sovereignty and related rights and jurisdiction in the
South China Sea are supported by abundant historical and legal evidence. The contents of
the Note Verbale No 000228 of the Republic of Philippines are totally unacceptable to the
Chinese Government.
. . . Furthermore, under the legal p rinciple of la terre domine la mer, coastal states
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf claims shall not infringe upon the
territorial sovereignty of other states.
Since 1930s, the Chinese Govern ment has given publicity several times the geographical
scope of Chinas Nansha Islands and the names of its components. Chinas Nansha Islands
is therefore clearly defined. In addition, under the relevant provisions of the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as the Law of the Peoples Republic of
China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992) and the Law on the Exclusive
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the Peoples Republic of China (1998),
Chinas Nansha Islands is fully entit led to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
and Continental Shelf.130
167. In the Tribunals view, a dispute is readily apparent in the text and context of this exchange:
from the map depicting a seemingly expansive claim to maritime entitlements, to the
Philippines argument that maritime entitlements are to be derived from geological features
and based solely on the Convention, to Chinas invocation of abundant historical and legal
evidence and rejection of the contents of the Philippines Note as totally unacceptable. The
existence of a dispute over these issues is not diminished by the fact that China has not clarified
the meaning of the nine-dash line or elaborated on its claim to historic rights.
Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. 000228 (5 April 2011) (Annex 200).
the United Nations, No. CML/8/2011 (14 April 2011) (Annex 201).
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168. Nor is the existence of a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention
vitiated by the fact that Chinas claimed entitlements appear to be based on an understanding of
historic rights existing independently of, and allegedly preserved by, the Convention. The
Philippines position, apparent both in its diplomatic correspondence and in its submissions in
these proceedings, is that UNCLOS supersedes and nullifies any historic rights that may have
existed prior to the Convention.131 This is accordingly not a dispute about the existence of
specific historic rights, but rather a dispute about historic rights in the framework of the
Convention. A dispute concerning the interaction of the Convention with another instrument or
body of law, including the question of whether rights arising under another body of law were or
were not preserved by the Convention, is unequivocally a dispute concerning the interpretation
and application of the Convention.
169. In the Tribunals view, the Philippines Submissions No. 3, 4, 6, and 7 reflect a dispute
concerning the status of the maritime features and the source of maritime entitlements in the
South China Sea. The Philippines has requested that the Tribunal determine the statusas an
island, rock, low-tide elevation, or submerged featureof nine maritime features, namely:
Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Subi Reef, Gaven Reef and
McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef), Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef.
In this instance, the Parties appear to have only rarely exchanged views concerning the status of
specific individual features.132 China has set out its view on the status of features in the Spratly
Islands as a group, stating that Chinas Nansha Islands [are] fully entitled to Territorial Sea,
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf.133 The Philippines has likewise made
general claims, setting out its view that the extent of the waters that are adjacent to the
relevant geological features are definite and determinable under UNCLOS, specifically under
Article 121 (Regime of Islands) of the said Convention.134 The Philippines has, however, also
underlined its view that the features in the Spratly Islands are entitled to at most a 12 nautical
mile territorial sea and that any claim to an exclusive economic zone or to a continental shelf in
the South China Sea must emanate from one of the surrounding coastal or archipelagic States.
For example, following an incident concerning survey operations in the area of Reed Bank, the
Philippines stated:
131 Memorial, para. 4.96(2).

132 See, e.g., Memorandum fro m Rodolfo C. Severino, Undersecretary, Department of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of the Philippines, to the President of the Republic of the Philippines (27 May 1997) (Annex 25).
Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. 000228 (5 April 2011) (Annex 200).
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SECOND, even while the Republic o f the Philipp ines has sovereignty and jurisdiction over
the [Kalayaan Island Group], the Reed Ban k where [service contract] CSEC 101 is situated
does not form part of the adjacent waters, specifically the 12 M territorial waters of any
relevant geological features in the [Kalayaan Island Group] either under customary
international law or the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS);
THIRD, Reed Ban k is not an island, a rock, or a low tide elevation. Rather, Reed Ban k is a
completely submerged bank that is part of the continental marg in of Palawan. Accordingly,
Reed Bank, wh ich is about 85 M fro m the nearest coast of Palawan and about 595 M fro m
the coast of Hainan, forms part of the 200 M continental shelf of the Ph ilippine archipelago
under UNCLOS;
FOURTH, Article 56 and 77 of UNCLOS provides that the coastal or archipelagic State
exercises sovereign rights over its 200 M Exclusive Economic Zone and 200 M Continental
Shelf. As such, the Philippines exercises exclusive sovereign rights over the Reed Bank.135
170. The Tribunal considers that, viewed objectively, a dispute exists between the Parties concerning
the maritime entitlements generated in the South China Sea. Such a dispute is not negated by
the absence of granular exchanges with respect to each and every individual feature. Rather, the
Tribunal must distinguish between the dispute itself and arguments used by the parties to
sustain their respective submissions on the dispute.136 International law does not require a
State to expound its legal arguments before a dispute can arise.
171. The Tribunal is conscious that it may emerge, in the course of the Tribunals examination or in
light of further communications from China, that the Parties are not, in fact, in dispute on the
status of, or entitlements generated by, a particular maritime feature. In this respect, the
Tribunal considers the situation akin to that faced by the International Court of Justice in Land
and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria): even if the exact scope of this dispute cannot
be determined at present; a dispute nevertheless exists between the two Parties. 137 The
Tribunal is entitled to deal with this dispute.
172. In the Tribunals view, the Philippines Submission No. 5 merely presents another aspect of the
same general dispute between the Parties concerning the sources of maritime entitlements in the
South China Sea. In Submission No. 5, however, the Philippines has asked not for a
determination of the status of a particular feature, but for a declaration that Mischief Reef and
Second Thomas Shoal as low-tide elevations are part of the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf of the Philippines. In so doing, the Philippines has in fact presented a dispute
concerning the status of every maritime feature claimed by China within 200 nautical miles of
Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, at least to the extent of whether such features are
135 Note Verbale fro m the Depart ment of Fo reign Affairs of the Republic o f the Philippines to the Embassy
of the Peoples Republic of China in Manila, No. 110885 (4 April 2011) (Annex 199).
p. 449, para. 32 (Annex LA-23).
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islands capable of generating an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone and to a continental

shelf. Only if no such overlapping entitlement existsand only if China is not entitled to claim
rights in the South China Sea beyond those permitted by the Convention (the subject of the
Philippines Submissions No. 1 and 2)would the Tribunal be able to grant the relief requested
in Submission No. 5.
173. If the Philippines Submissions No. 1 through 7 concern various aspects of the Parties dispute
over the sources and extent of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the Philippines
Submissions No. 8 through 14 concern a series of disputes regarding Chinese activities in the
South China Sea. The incidents giving rise to these Submissions are well documented in the
record of the Parties diplomatic correspondence and the Tribunal concludes that disputes
implicating provisions of the Convention exist concerning the Parties respective petroleum and
survey activities, 138 fishing (including both Chinese fishing activities and Chinas alleged
interference with Philippine fisheries),139 Chinese installations on Mischief Reef,140 the actions
of Chinese law enforcement vessels, 141 and the Philippines military presence on Second
Thomas Shoal.142
138 See, e.g., Note Verbale fro m the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of Ch ina in Manila to the Depart ment
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. (10)PG-047 (22 February 2010) (Annex 195);
Note Verbale fro m the Depart ment of Fo reign Affairs of the Republic o f the Philippines to the Embassy
of the Peoples Republic of Ch ina in Manila, No. 110526 (2 March 2011) (Annex 198); Note Verbale
fro m the Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines to the Embassy of the Peoples
Republic of Ch ina in Manila, No. 110885 (4 April 2011) (Annex 199); Note Verbale fro m the Embassy
of the Peoples Republic of Ch ina in Manila to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the
Philippines, No. (11)PG-202 (7 July 2011) (Annex 202).
139 See, for instance, the extensive correspondence collected at the Memorial, para. 3.40 n. 211.
140 See, e.g., Govern ment of the Republic of the Philippines and Govern ment of the Peoples Republic of
China, Ph ilippine-Ch ina Bilateral Consultations: Su mmary of Proceedings (20-21 March 1995)
(Annex 175); Govern ment of the Republic of the Philippines and Govern ment of the Peoples Republic
of China, Joint Statement: Ph ilippine-Ch ina Experts Group Meeting on Confidence Bu ild ing Measures,
(23 March 1995) (Annex 178); Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Ph ilippines,
Transcript of Proceedings: RP-PRC Bilateral Talks (9 August 1995) (Annex 179); Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and Govern ment of the Peoples Republic of China, Agreed Minutes on the
First Philippines-Ch ina Bilateral Consultations on the South China Sea Issue (10 August 1995)
(Annex 180); Note Verbale fro m the Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Ph ilippines to
the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in Manila, No. 983577 (5 November 1998) (Annex 185).
141 See, e.g., Note Verbale fro m the Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines to the Embassy of the
Peoples Republic of China in Manila, No. 12-1222, p. 1 (30 April 2012) (Annex 209); Note Verbale
fro m the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of Ch ina in Manila to the Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of the Philippines, No. (12) PG-239, p. 1, (25 May 2012) (Annex 211).
142 See, e.g., Note Verbale fro m the Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines to the
Embassy of the Peoples Republic of Ch ina in Manila, No. 13-1585 (9 May 2013) (Annex 217); Note
Peoples Republic o f China in Manila, No. 13-1882, 10 June 2013 (Annex 219); Note Verbale fro m the
Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines to the Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in
Manila, No. 140711 (11 March 2014) (Annex 221); Memorandum fro m the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of the Ph ilippines to the President of the Republic of the Philippines (23 April 2013)
(Annex 93).
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174. Submissions No. 11 and 12(b), which concern allegations that Chinas activities in the South
China Sea have caused environmental harm,143 require particular consideration in light of their
reference to the provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity (the CBD). In its
Memorial, the Philippines stated that Chinas toleration of its fishermens environmentally
harmful activities at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal . . . constitute violations of
its obligations under the CBD. 144 The Tribunal has given consideration to whether, for the
purposes of its jurisdiction under Article 288, Submissions No. 11 and 12(b) constitute
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of this Convention, or disputes that
concern the interpretation or application of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
175. The Tribunal is satisfied that the incidents alleged by the Philippines, in particular as to the use
of dangerous substances such as dynamite or cyanide to extract fish, clams, or corals at and
around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal,145 could involve violations of obligations
under Article 194 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 192 of the Convention, to
take measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment.
176. The Tribunal also accepts the Philippines assertion that, while it considers Chinas actions and
failures to be inconsistent with the provisions of the CBD, the Philippines has not presented a
claim arising under the CBD as such.146 The Tribunal is satisfied that Article 293(1) of the
Convention, together with Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
enables it in principle to consider the relevant provisions of the CBD for the purposes of
interpreting the content and standard of Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention.147
177. While the Tribunal acknowledges that the factual allegations made by the Philippines could
potentially give rise to a dispute under both the Convention and the CBD, the Tribunal is not
convinced that this necessarily excludes its jurisdiction to consider Submissions No. 11 and
12(b). It is not uncommon in international law that more than one treaty may bear upon a
143 See, e.g., Memo randum fro m Assistant Secretary of the Depart ment of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the
Philippines, to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines (23 March 1998)
(Annex 29); Note Verbale fro m the Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines to
the Embassy of the Peoples Republic o f Ch ina in Manila, No. 2000100 (14 January 2000) (Annex 186);
Memorandu m fro m the Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Beijing to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. ZPE-09-2001-S (17 March 2001) (Annex 47); Note
Peoples Republic of China in Manila, No. 12-0894 (11 April 2012) (Annex 205).
144 Memorial, paras. 6.85-6.89.
145 Memorial, paras. 6.80, 6.89.
146 Supplemental Written Submission, para. 11.
147 Supplemental Written Submission, paras. 11.3-11.5; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 97; see also
Memorial, para. 6.82, on the relevance of the CBD under Article 293(1) of the Convention.
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particular dispute, and treaties often mirror each other in substantive content. 148 Moreover, as
stated by ITLOS in MOX Plant, although different treaties contain rights or obligations similar
to or identical with the rights and obligations set out in the Convention, the rights and
obligations under those agreements have a separate existence from those under the
Convention.149
178. The Tribunal is accordingly satisfied that disputes between the Parties concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention exist with respect to the matters raised by the
Philippines in all of its Submissions in these proceedings.
* * *
148 MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, Separate
Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, ITLOS Reports 2001, p. 131.
149 MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, ITLOS
Reports 2001, p. 95 at p. 106, paras. 48-52 (Annex LA-39); see also Southern Bluefin Tuna (New
Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports
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VI. WHETHER ANY THIRD PARTIES ARE INDISPENSABLE TO THE PROCEEDINGS
179. In this arbitration, the Tribunal has been asked to rule on the status of, and maritime
entitlements generated by, a number of features in the South China Sea over which sovereignty
is claimed not only by the Philippines and China, but also by Viet Nam and/or others. China
has not argued in its Position Paper or elsewhere that Viet Nams absence as a party in the
present arbitration is a factor that would bar jurisdiction. 150 Nonetheless, the Tribunal considers
it appropriate to dispose of the issue, which has been addressed by the Philippines and was the
subject of correspondence between the Tribunal and the Parties.151
180. As concluded above at Paragraphs 152 to 154, the determination of the nature of and
entitlements generated by the maritime features in the South China Sea does not require a
decision on issues of territorial sovereignty. The legal rights and obligations of Viet Nam
therefore do not need to be determined as a prerequisite to the determination of the merits of the
case.
181. The present situation is different from the few cases in which an international court or tribunal
has declined to proceed due to the absence of an indispensable third party, namely in Monetary
Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 and East Timor before the International Court of Justice and
in the Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom arbitration.152 In all of those cases, the rights of the third
States (respectively Albania, Indonesia, and the United States of America) would not only have
been affected by a decision in the case, but would have form[ed] the very subject-matter of the
decision.153 Additionally, in those cases the lawfulness of activities by the third States was in
question, whereas here none of the Philippines claims entail allegations of unlawful conduct by
Viet Nam or other third States.
150 In its Position Paper, Ch ina simp ly pointed out that [t]he South China Sea issue involves a number of
countries, and it is no easy task to solve it. Ch inas Position Paper, para. 47. China also refers to its
negotiated boundaries with Viet Nam as an example of successful peaceful negotiations between China
and its neighbours.
151 Memorial, paras. 5.115-5.137; Letter fro m the Philippines to the Tribunal (26 January 2015);
Supplemental Written Submission, paras. 25.1-25.4; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 3), pp. 120-25.
152 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom, and United States),
Preliminary Question, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1954, p. 19 at p. 32 (Annex LA-3); East Timor (Portugal v.
Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 90 (Annex LA-22); Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, Award of
5 February 2001, 119 ILR p. 566 (Annex LA-52).
153 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom, and United States),
Preliminary Question, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1954, p. 19 at p. 32 (Annex LA-3); East Ti mor (Portugal
v. Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 90 at p. 104-105, para. 34 (Annex LA-22); Larsen v.
Hawaiian Kingdom, Award of 5 February 2001, 119 ILR p. 566 at pp. 588, 596-97, paras. 11.8, 12.17
(Annex LA-52).
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182. The Tribunals conclusion is supported by the position Viet Nam itself has taken in the present
arbitration. 154 The Tribunal can certainly appreciate why Viet Nam and other neighbouring
States are interested in the present proceedings. The nine-dash line that is the subject of the
Philippines first two Submissions was notably appended to Chinas Notes Verbales to the
United Nations Secretary-General in 2009, in direct response to Viet Nams separate submission
and joint submission with Malaysia to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.155
And the Tribunal has already mentioned Viet Nams sovereignty claims to the features
identified in the Philippines Submissions No. 4 to 7.
183. As early as April 2014, Viet Nam informed the Tribunal that it had been following the
proceedings closely and requested copies of the pleadings to help it determine whether Viet
Nams legal interests and rights may be affected.156 After seeking the views of the Parties, the
Tribunal granted Viet Nam access to the Memorial. On 7 December 2014, Viet Nam delivered
for the Tribunals attention a Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam. The
Statement requests the Tribunal to have due regard to the position of Viet Nam in order to
protect its rights and interests of a legal nature in the South China Sea . . . which may be
affected in this arbitration.157 With respect to jurisdiction, Viet Nam expressed support for
UNCLOS States Parties which seek to settle their disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of the Convention . . . through the procedures provided for in Part XV of the
Convention. 158 It stated that Viet Nam has no doubt that the Tribunal has jurisdiction in these
proceedings and expected that the Tribunals decision could contribute to clarifying the legal
positions of the parties in this case and interested third parties.159
184. Viet Nam noted that matters of territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation had deliberately
been excluded from the Philippines claim. With respect to the merits of the claims, Viet Nam
resolutely protests and rejects any claim . . . based on the nine-dash line . . . [which] has no
154 See, e.g., Letter fro m Viet Nam to the Tribunal (8 April 2014) and Viet Nams Statement (Annex 468),
both discussed below.
Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CM L/ 17/ 2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 191); Note Verbale
General of the Un ited Nat ions, No. CM L/18/2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 191); Socialist Republic o f Viet
Nam, Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Partial Submission in Respect
of Vietnams Extended Continental Shelf: North Area (April 2009) (Annex 222); Malaysia and the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Joint Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, in Respect of the Southern Part of the South China Sea (6 May 2009) (Annex 223).
156 Letter from Viet Nam to the Tribunal (8 April 2014).
157 Viet Nams Statement, p. 1 (Annex 468).
159 Viet Nams Statement, pp. 1-2 (Annex 468).
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legal, historical or factual basis and is therefore null and void.160 With respect to the features
mentioned specifically in the Philippines Memorial, Viet Nam considers that none of them
can enjoy their own exclusive economic zone and continental shelf or generate maritime
entitlements in excess of 12 nautical miles since they are low-tide elevations or rocks under
Article 121(3) of the Convention.161 Viet Nam added its support to the Tribunal applying
Articles 60, 80, 94, 194, 206, and 300 of the Convention. 162 Viet Nam reserved its right to
protect its legal rights and interests in the South China Sea by any peaceful means as
appropriate and necessary in accordance with the Convention and in addition reserved its right
to seek to intervene if it seems appropriate and in accordance with the principles and rules of
international law, including the relevant provisions of UNCLOS.163
185. The Tribunal invited the Parties to comment on Viet Nams Statement, in particular its request
for documents and its reservation of the right to intervene.164 The Philippines was in favour of
sharing documents with Viet Nam and allowing Viet Nam to be present at any hearing as an
observer. On the question of intervention, the Philippines noted that the Tribunals broad
discretion to determine its own procedure would encompass the power to permit intervention.
The Philippines stated that it would not object to Viet Nams Statement being accepted into the
record and to the Tribunal remaining cognizant of the positions stated therein, akin to the
approach adopted by the International Court of Justice with respect to the Philippines in
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia).165 China did not
directly comment on Viet Nams Statement, but the Chinese Ambassadors First Letter did
express serious concern and opposition to a procedure of intervention by other States as being
inconsistent with the general practices of international arbitration.166
186. The Tribunal informed Viet Nam that it would address the permissibility of intervention in
these proceedings only in the event that Viet Nam in fact makes a formal application for such
intervention.167 Viet Nam has not applied to intervene in the proceedings.

162 Viet Nams Statement, pp. 5-6 (Annex 468).
164 Letter from the Tribunal to the Parties (11 December 2014).
165 Philippines Letter to Tribunal (26 January 2015), citing Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau
Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001,
p. 575 at p. 607, paras. 93-94.
166 Letter fro m the Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, addressed to the individual
members of the Tribunal, 6 February 2015, para. 5.
167 Letter fro m the Tribunal to the Vietnamese A mbassador to the Kingdom o f the Netherlands (17 Feb ruary
2015).
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29 October 2015
187. In the circumstances described above and in light of Viet Nams own stance with respect to the
proceedings, the Tribunal finds that Viet Nam is not an indispensable third party and that its
absence as a party does not preclude the Tribunal from proceeding with the arbitration.
188. Similarly, the absence of other States as parties to the arbitration poses no obstacle. Like Viet
Nam, Malaysia and Indonesia have received copies of the pleadings and attended the hearings
as observers and Brunei Darussalam has been provided with copies of documents. No argument
has been made by China, the Philippines, or the neighbouring States that their participation is
indispensable to the Tribunal proceeding with this case.
* * *
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VII. PRECONDITIONS TO THE TRIBUNALS JURISDICTION
189. In the following sections, the Tribunal analyses, by reference to the provisions in Section 1 of
Part XV of the Convention, whether there are any circumstances that would preclude access to
the compulsory dispute resolution procedures in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention and
thus bar jurisdiction over the Philippines claims.
190. In particular, the Tribunal examines Chinas position that the Philippines is precluded from
recourse to arbitration because of the long-standing agreement between the Parties to resolve
their disputes in the South China Sea through friendly consultations and negotiations.168 China
bases this argument on a number of statements jointly made by the Parties starting in the mid-
1990s and on the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in
2002, the latter subsequently reinforced by further statements committing the Parties to settling
disputes by negotiation. The Tribunal also considers, proprio motu, whether the Treaty of Amity
and Co-operation in Southeast Asia could preclude the submission of the Parties dispute to
arbitration or whether the Convention on Biological Diversity could preclude jurisdiction over the
Philippines claims concerning the marine environment.
191. Section 1 of Part XV of the Convention contains General Provisions relating to the
Settlement of Disputes. It begins with Article 279, recalling the obligation on States to settle
their disputes peacefully and to this end requiring them to seek solutions through the means
indicated in Article 33, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter (namely negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of [the parties] own choice). Article 280 then confirms that nothing in Part XV
impairs the freedom of States to agree at any time to settle their disputes concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention by any peaceful means of their own choice.
192. If States have so agreed on a peaceful mechanism of their own choice, then under certain
circumstances set out in Articles 281 and 282, their agreement may preclude recourse to the
compulsory procedures in Part XV, Section 2. Article 281 is discussed in Section A below, and
Article 282 is discussed in Section B. In any case, pursuant to Article 283 of the Convention,
access to Part XV, Section 2 is preconditioned on the Parties having had an exchange of views
regarding [the] settlement [of the dispute] by negotiation or other peaceful means. As
168 Chinas Position Paper, paras. 3, 30-44; see also Note Verbale fro m the Embassy of the Peoples
Republic of Ch ina in Manila to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Ph ilippines,
No. (13) PG-039, p. 1 (19 February 2013) (Annex 3).
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discussed in Section C below, China does not agree with the Philippines that the Parties have
exchanged views.169
A. ARTICLE 281 (PROCEDURE WHERE NO SETTLEMENT HAS B EEN REACHED BY THE

PARTIES )
193. Article 281 of the Convention provides:
Article 281
Procedure where no settlement has been reached by the Parties
1. If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a
peaceful means of their o wn choice, the procedures provided for in this Part apply
only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the
agreement between the parties does not exclude any further procedure.
2. If the parties have also agreed on a time-limit , paragraph 1 applies only upon the
expiration of that time-limit.
194. Article 281 is premised upon the existence of a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention. If there is no such dispute, Article 281 is irrelevant. The
Tribunal has, for the reasons set out in Chapter V, found that there are disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention. The Philippines sought to imply that China, by
invoking Article 281, necessarily conceded the existence of a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention. 170 The Tribunal does not accept that China
makes that admission. China has argued that the essence of the subject-matter of the
arbitration . . . does not concern the interpretation or application of the Convention and
prefaced its Article 281 position by stating that [e]ven supposing that the Philippines claims
were concerned with the interpretation or application of the Convention, the compulsory
procedures . . . of the Convention still could not be applied . . . .171
195. The next question under Article 281 is whether the Parties have agreed to seek settlement of
the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice. If there is no such agreement, then Article
281 poses no obstacle to jurisdiction. If there is such an agreement, the compulsory procedures of
Part XV, Section 2 will only be available if (i) no settlement has been reached by recourse to the
agreed means, (ii) the Parties agreement does not exclude any further procedure, and (iii) any
agreed time limits have expired.
196. China argues that for all disputes over the South China Sea, including the claims in this
arbitration, the only means of settlement agreed by the parties is negotiation, to the exclusion of

170 See Memorial, para. 7.77; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 9.
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any other means. China calls attention to the fact that [t]hrough bilateral and multilateral
instruments, China and the Philippines have agreed to settle their relevant disputes by
negotiations, without setting any time limit for the negotiations. China further argues that the
two States:
have excluded any other means of settlement. In these circumstances, it is evident that,
under the above-quoted provisions [Article 280 and 281] of the Convention, the relevant
disputes between the two States shall be resolved through negotiations and there shall be no
recourse to arbitration or other compulsory procedures.172
197. The Tribunal now examines the respective instruments which may possibly be viewed as
forming such an agreement for the purposes of Article 281, either as argued by China in its
Position Paper or raised by the Tribunal in its questions to the Parties.
1. Application of Article 281 to the DOC
198. The DOC was signed on 4 November 2002 by government representatives of the ASEAN
Member States and China. The signatory States set out their desire to enhance favourable
conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries
concerned.173 In the DOC, the signatory States declare as follows:
1. The Parties reaffirm their co mmit ment to the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Princip les of Peacefu l
Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of international law which
shall each serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations;
. ..
4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional

disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat of force, through friendly
consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance
with universally recognized princip les of international law, including the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea;
5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would
complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among
others, refraining fro m act ion of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands,
reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a
constructive manner.
199. There follows a list of confidence building measures for the signatory States to undertake
pending a peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, including military
dialogue and the treatment of persons in distress. Paragraph 6 then lists areas for cooperative
activities that may be explored pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the
dispute, such as marine protection and research, navigational safety and combatting crime.

173 DOC, preamble (Annex 144).
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200. Finally, the DOC provides for continuing consultations towards the eventual adoption of a code
of conduct:
7. The Parties concerned stand ready to continue their consultations and dialogues
concerning relevant issues, through modalities to be agreed by them, including
regular consultations on the observance of this Declarat ion, for the purpose of
promoting good neighbourliness and transparency, establishing harmony, mutual
understanding and cooperation, and facilitating peaceful resolution of disputes
among them;
8. The Parties undertake to respect the provisions of this Declaration and take actions
consistent therewith;
. ..
10. The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South
China Sea would further pro mote peace and stability in the region and agree to
work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.
201. The Parties have different views on whether the DOC constitutes an agreement for purposes
of Article 281 and, if so, whether it is an agreement to seek settlement by friendly consultations
and negotiations only, to the exclusion of any other means of dispute settlement.
(a) Chinas Position
202. China argues in its Position Paper that by signing the DOC, the Philippines and China have
undertaken a mutual obligation to settle their disputes in relation to the South China Sea through
friendly consultations and negotiations and thus agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a
peaceful means of their own choice within the meaning of Article 281.174
203. China notes that to constitute a binding agreement for purposes of Article 281, an instrument
must evince a clear intention to establish rights and obligations between the parties,
irrespective of the form or designation of the instrument. To this end, China focuses on the
word undertake in paragraph 4 of the DOC, a word which was recognised in Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) to mean give a formal promise, to bind or engage
oneself, to give a promise, to agree, to accept an obligation. 175 China claims that the DOCs
status as an agreement is mutually reinforced by the multitude of other bilateral instruments
in which the two states have reiterated their commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes
through negotiations.

175 Chinas Position Paper, para. 38 (cit ing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports
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29 October 2015
204. China acknowledges that the DOC contains no phrase expressly excluding further procedure.
However, China does not consider that an express exclusion is necessary. Rather, it relies on
the position adopted by the tribunal in Southern Bluefin Tuna that the absence of an express
exclusion of any procedure is not decisive.176 China argues that third-party settlement is
obviously excluded by virtue of (a) the emphasis in paragraph 4 of the DOC on negotiations
being conducted by the sovereign States directly concerned and (b) the Parties reaffirmation in
the DOC and other instruments of negotiations as the means for settling disputes.
205. China rejects the Philippines suggestion that China should be prevented from invoking the
DOC in light of Chinas own alleged violations of the DOC.177 In response to the Philippines
allegation that China had threatened force to drive away Philippine fishermen from the waters of
Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal), China asserts that it was the Philippines that first resorted
to the threat of force in 2012. In response to the Philippines allegation that China had blocked
the resupply of a naval vessel at Renai Jiao (Second Thomas Shoal), China asserts that the
Philippines illegally ran the naval ship aground there in May 1999 and has attempted to build
illegally instead of towing it away. China thus accuses the Philippines of taking a selective and
self-contradictory approach to the DOC, which in Chinas view violates the principle of good
faith in international law.178
206. Finally, China stresses the importance of the DOCs positive role in building trust and
maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea. China recalls that the Parties have been
engaged in consultations regarding the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea and warns
that denying the DOCs significance could lead to a serious retrogression in the current
relationship between China and the ASEAN member States.179
(b) The Philippines Position
207. The Philippines argues that the DOC poses no obstacle for the Tribunals jurisdiction under
Article 281 for four reasons.180
176 Chinas Position Paper, para. 40, citing Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v
Japan), Award on Jurisdiction and Ad missibility of 4 August 2000, RIAA, Vo l. XXIII, p. 1 at pp. 43-44,
177 Chinas Position Paper, paras. 51-53, responding to Memorial, paras. 7.74-7.77.
179 Chinas Position Paper, paras. 54-56.
180 Memorial, paras. 7.50-7.58; Supplemental Written Sub mission, paras. 26.27-26.39; Jurisdictional Hearing
Tr. (Day 2), pp. 7-11.
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208. First, according to the Philippines, the DOC is not a legally binding agreement within the
meaning of Article 281, but merely a non-binding political document that was never intended to
create legal rights and obligations. The Philippines argues that this is evident from (a) the
content of the DOC, which the Philippines describes as replete with aspirational and hortatory
language merely confirming existing obligations; 181 (b) the circumstances of the DOCs
adoption, which according to the Philippines show that the DOC was intended as a political
document, reflecting a compromise reached as a stop-gap measure to reduce tensions,
following years of trying for a legally binding code of conduct; 182 and (c) the Parties
subsequent conduct, both in the way they have characterised the DOC (as political and not
legal) and in their continued efforts over the course of a decade to strive for a binding code of
conduct.183
209. Second, the Philippines submits that, even if the DOC was intended to be a binding agreement,
no settlement has been reached through the means contemplated in it (i.e., consultations and
negotiations). This, according to the Philippines, is a question of fact proven here by the
numerous unsuccessful diplomatic exchanges, negotiations and consultations between the
Parties and the exacerbation of the dispute in recent years.184 The Philippines claims it was
entirely justified in concluding that continued negotiation would be futile.185 In support of the
proposition that Article 281 does not require parties to negotiate indefinitely, the Philippines
cites decisions of both the Annex VII tribunal and ITLOS in Southern Bluefin Tuna, as well as
the ITLOS provisional measures orders in Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the
Straits of Johor, MOX Plant, ARA Libertad, and Arctic Sunrise.186

Tr. (Day 2), p. 10
183 Memorial, para. 7.57; Supplemental Written Submission, para. 26.34-26.38; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr.
(Day 2), p. 10.
186 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility o f 4 August 2000, RIAA, Vo l. XXIII, p. 1 at pp 42-43, para. 55 (Annex LA-50); Southern
Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August
1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 280 at p. 295, para. 60 (Annex LA-37); Land Reclamation by Singapore
in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October
2003, ITLOS Reports 2003, p. 10 at p. 19, para. 47 (Annex LA-41); MOX Plant (Ireland v. United
Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, ITLOS Reports 2001, p. 95 at p. 107, para.
60 (Annex LA-39); Arctic Sunrise (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Provisional
Measures, Order of 22 November 2013, ITLOS Reports 2013, p. 230 at p. 247, para. 76 (Annex LA-45);
ARA Libertad (Republic of Argentina v. Ghana), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December 2012,
ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 326 at p. 346, para. 71 (Annex LA-44).
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210. Third, the Philippines argues that even if the DOC was intended to be a binding agreement, it
does not exclude recourse to the dispute settlement procedures established in Section 2 of
Part XV of the Convention. In the Philippines view, for Article 281 to bar recourse to
arbitration, the terms of the Parties agreement to resolve their dispute by other peaceful means
must expressly exclude recourse to the dispute settlement procedures under Part XV. 187
According to the Philippines, such a view is consistent with the text and context of Article 281,
decisions of ITLOS in Southern Bluefin Tuna and MOX Plant, and the dissent of Judge Keith in
Southern Bluefin Tuna, which the Philippines urges the Tribunal to follow.188 According to the
Philippines, the DOC plainly contains no express exclusion of recourse to further procedures.
Nor, argues the Philippines, can the DOC remotely (let alone obviously) be read to imply an
exclusion of recourse to further procedures.189 The Philippines observes that paragraphs 1 and 4
of the DOC refer to the Convention and submits that these references must necessarily
incorporate Part XV, which is an integral part of the Convention.190 Thus, far from excluding
recourse to the Conventions dispute settlement procedures, the DOC actually incorporates
them.191
211. Fourth, the Philippines argues that, even if the DOC were a binding agreement within the
meaning of Article 281 and even if it purported to exclude further procedures, China still cannot
rely on it to avoid jurisdiction due to Chinas own conduct in flagrant disregard of the
DOC.192 The Philippines invokes the general principle of law that a party which . . . does not
fulfil its own obligations cannot be recognised as retaining the rights which it claims to derive
from the relationship. 193 In particular, the Philippines recalls paragraph 5 of the DOC, in
which the Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would
complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others,
refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and
other features. Chinas disregard of paragraph 5 would, according to the Philippines, deprive it
of any entitlement to claim the benefit of its alleged rights under paragraph 4. The Philippines
refers by way of example to Chinas expulsion of Philippine fishermen from Scarborough
Tr. (Day 2), pp. 13-17.
188 Memorial, paras. 7.68-7.70; Supplemental Written Submission, paras. 26.41; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr.,
(Day 2), pp. 116-118 (citing academic commentary that has favoured a similar approach).
189 Supplemental Written Submission, para. 26.40; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2).
192 Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 17; Memorial, para. 7.49; Supplemental Written Submission, para. 26.25.
193 Memorial, paras. 7.74-7.76, citing Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion,
ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16 at p. 46, para. 91 (Annex LA-6); Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 17.
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Shoal, Chinas assumption of de facto control over Second Thomas Shoal and, more recently,
Chinas large-scale land reclamations on the features it occupies in the Spratly Islands.194 The
Philippines objects to the way China, in its Position Paper, characterises the Philippines own
conduct in connection with these complained of events and notes that it has in fact taken rigorous
measures to avoid the violation of any of the political commitments it undertook in the DOC.195
(c) The Tribunals Decision
212. The Tribunal first considers whether the DOC constitutes a binding agreement within the
meaning of Article 281.
213. To constitute a binding agreement, an instrument must evince a clear intention to establish
rights and obligations between the parties. Such clear intention is determined by reference to
the instruments actual terms and the particular circumstances of its adoption. The subsequent
conduct of the parties to an instrument may also assist in determining its nature. This test is
accepted by both Parties and has been articulated in a number of international cases, including
Aegean Continental Shelf, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), and Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria).196
214. Although the DOC is entitled a declaration rather than a treaty or agreement, the Tribunal
acknowledges that international agreements may take a number of forms and be given a variety of
names. The form or designation of an instrument is thus not decisive of its status as an agreement
establishing legal obligations between the parties.197 The Tribunal observes that the DOC shares
some hallmarks of an international treaty. It is a formal document with a preamble, it is signed
194 Memorial, Chapters 3 and 6, paras. 7.75-7.76; Supplemental Written Sub mission, paras. 26.55-26.57;
Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 17.
195 Supplemental Written Submission, paras. 26.55-26.56 (responding to Chinas Position Paper,
paras. 51-53); Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 3), p. 70 (responding to Tribunal question on unclean
hands); and Philippines Written Response to Tribunal Hearing Questions, 23 July 2015, paras. II.1-II.8.
196 Chinas Position Paper, para. 38; Memo rial, para. 7.51, Supplemental Written Sub mission,
paras. 26.28-26.29; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 12; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v.
Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 3 at p. 39, para. 96 (Annex LA-9), Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994,
p. 112 at pp. 120-22, paras. 23-29 (Annex LA-21); Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria;
Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 303 at pp. 427, 429, paras. 258, 262-263
(Annex LA -27).
197 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 3 at p. 39, para. 96
(Annex LA-9), Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, p. 112 at pp. 120-22, paras. 23-29 (the Court found an
exchange of letters and minutes of consultations between the parties foreign ministers to constitute
agreements to refer the dispute to the Court) (Annex LA-21); Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v.
Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 303 at pp. 427, 429, paras. 258,
262-263 (the Court found a Declaration to constitute an international agreement, having considered
subsequent conduct) (Annex LA-27); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 2(1)(a).
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by the foreign ministers of China and the ASEAN States, and the signatory States are described
in the DOC as Parties.
215. However, with respect to its terms, the DOC contains many instances of the signatory States
simply reaffirming existing obligations. For example, in paragraph 1, they reaffirm their
commitment to the UN Charter, the Convention, and other universally recognized principles
of international law. In paragraph 5, they reaffirm their respect and commitment to the
freedom of navigation and overflight as provided in the Convention. In paragraph 10, they
reaffirm the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace
and stability in the region. The only instance where the DOC uses the word agree is in
paragraph 10 where the signatory States agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the
eventual attainment of a Code of Conduct. This language is not consistent with the creation of
new obligations but rather restates existing obligations pending agreement on a Code that
eventually would set out new obligations. The DOC contains other terms that are provisional or
permissive, such as paragraph 6, outlining what the Parties may explore or undertake, and
paragraph 7, stating that the Parties stand ready to continue their consultations and dialogues.
216. On the other hand, some of the terms used in the DOC are suggestive of the existence of an
agreement. For example, the word undertake, used in paragraph 4 (undertake to resolve their
. . . disputes by peaceful means . . . through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign
states directly concerned) and in paragraph 5 (undertake to exercise self-restraint). As China
mentions, the Court observed in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)198
that the word undertake is regularly used in treaties setting out the obligations of Contracting
Parties and found the ordinary meaning of undertake to be give a formal promise, to bind or
engage oneself, to give a pledge or promise, to agree, to accept an obligation. However, the
Tribunal notes a number of differences between paragraph 4 of the DOC and Article 1 of the
Genocide Convention. First, the Court was operating in the context of a treaty, whose legally
binding character was not in any doubt. The examples cited by the Courtthe International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rightswere also indisputably legally binding treaties. The
Court was not seeking to determine whether an agreement on the submission of disputes was
binding (as it was in Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain) and
Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria)), but rather whether Article 1 of the
198 Chinas Position Paper, para. 38, citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports
2007, p. 43 at pp. 111-12, paras. 162-63 (Annex LA-176).
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Genocide Convention imposed an obligation to prevent genocide that was separate and distinct
from other obligations in the Genocide Convention. Notably, the Court looked beyond the
ordinary meaning of the word undertake to verify its understanding. It thus gave weight to
the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention and the negotiating history of the relevant
provisions.199
217. When a similar exercise is undertaken with respect to the DOC, it becomes apparent to this
Tribunal that the DOC was not intended to be a legally binding agreement with respect to
dispute resolution. The purpose and circumstances surrounding the DOCs adoption reinforce
the Tribunals understanding that the DOC was not intended to create legal rights and
obligations. Descriptions from contemporaneous documents leading up to and surrounding the
adoption of the DOC amply demonstrate that the DOC was not intended by its drafters to be a
legally binding document, but rather an aspirational political document. For example:
(a) In December 1999, the Chinese drafters described their own October 1999 draft as
reflecting the consensus that the Code should be a political document of principle.200
(b) In August 2000, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry reporting on the results
the Second Meeting of the Working Group of the ChinaASEAN Senior Officials
Consultation on the Code of Conduct stated that the Code of Conduct will be a political
document to promote good neighbourliness and regional stability instead of a legal
document to solve specific disputes.201
199 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 43 at pp. 111-13, paras. 162,
164-65 (Annex LA-176).
200 Memo of Ch inas Position Regarding the Latest Draft Code of Conduct by the ASEAN, para. 2
(18 December 1999) (Annex 471). With respect to the use of Code and Declaration in the draft ing
history of the instrument, the Tribunal notes that the DOC originated out of the negotiations on a Code
of Conduct, stemming fro m a proposal by the Chinese negotiators in October 1999 for a text that wou ld
provide an alternative to what they considered to be an unacceptable draft Code. The Chinese alternative,
although originally being referred to as a Code, was a precursor to what would in 2002 be termed a
Declarat ion. This Declarat ion provided a means to move past a polit ical impasse between the positions
reflected in the Ch inese alternative proposal, and a contemporaneous ASEAN proposal, thus enabling
negotiations on an eventual Code of Conduct to continue in light of the consensus reflected in the
Declaration. For this reason, the early documentation referring to the Chinese proposal refers to it as the
Code rather than the Declaration. See, e.g., Memo of Chinas Position Regard ing the Latest Draft
Code of Conduct by the ASEAN, paras. 1, 2 (18 December 1999) (Annex 471); Min istry of Foreign
Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, Spokespersons Comment on China-Asean Consultation, p. 1
(30 August 2000) (Annex 491).
201 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, Spokespersons Comment on China-Asean
Consultation, p. 1 (30 August 2000) (Annex 491).
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(c) According to the official report of the Third Meeting of the same Working Group, which
took place on 11 October 2000, the participants reaffirmed that the Code of Conduct is a
political and not legal document and is not aimed at resolving disputes in the area.202
(d) Rodolfo C. Severino, who was the ASEAN Secretary-General at the time the DOC was
adopted and had been involved with negotiations over the South China Sea on behalf of
the Philippines since the 1990s, recalls that the final version of the DOC that was signed
in 2002 was reduced to a political declaration from the originally envisioned legally
binding code of conduct.203
218. The Parties subsequent conduct further confirms that the DOC is not a binding agreement. In
this respect, the Tribunal notes the Parties continuing efforts over a decade after the DOC was
signed to agree upon a Code of Conduct. The Tribunal also observes that in recent years, at
least before the arbitration commenced, several Chinese officials described the DOC as a
political document.204
219. The Tribunals finding that the DOC was not intended as a legally binding agreement would be
sufficient to dispose of the issue of the DOC for the purposes of Article 281. However, for
completeness and in light of their potential relevance for the other instruments, the Tribunal
briefly addresses the remaining elements of Article 281, namely whether a settlement has been
reached by recourse to the agreed means and whether the agreement excludes any further
procedure.
220. The Tribunal notes as a matter of fact that, despite years of discussions aimed at resolving the
Parties disputes, no settlement has been reached. If anything, the disputes have intensified.205
Article 281 does not require parties to pursue any agreed means of settlement indefinitely.206 It
202 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Report of the Third Meeting of the Working Group of ASEAN-
China Senior Official Consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, para. 3 (11 October
2000) (Annex 498).
203 For Mr. Severinos early role in negotiations, see Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
Govern ment of the Peoples Republic of Ch ina, Agreed Minutes on the First Philippines-China Bilateral
Consultations on the South China Sea Issue (10 August 1995) (Annex 180); Rodolfo Severino, ASEAN
and the South China Sea, 6(2) Security Challenges 45 (2010) (Annex 293).
204 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, Remarks by H.E. Li Keqiang, Premier of
the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, at the 16th ASEAN-China Summit, p. 2 (16 October
2013) (Annex 128). The Tribunal notes that none of the signatory States to the DOC have ever submitted
the DOC to the UN Secretariat for registration and publication.
205 See Section VII.C below.
Admissibility of 4 August 2000, RIAA, Vo l. XXIII, p. 1 at pp. 42-43, para. 55 (Annex LA-50); Southern
Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August
1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 280 at p. 295, para. 60 (Annex LA-37) (holding [a] State Party is not
obliged to pursue procedures under Part XV, section 1 of the Convention when it concludes that the
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only requires parties to abide by any time limit set out in their agreement. There is no time limit
in the DOC.
221. The Tribunal now turns to the final element in Article 281 and finds that the DOC does not
exclude any further procedure.
222. It is common ground between the Parties that the DOC contains no express exclusion of
recourse to the Part XV dispute resolution procedures. The DOC does not say that it excludes
Part XV of the Convention. It could have, but it does not. While the DOC states that the
Parties undertake to resolve their disputes without resorting to the threat or use of force, it
does not say that the Parties undertake to resolve their disputes without resorting to third-party
settlement. It could have, but it does not. The DOC does not say that the parties undertake to
resolve their disputes only through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states
directly concerned. It could have, but it does not. The DOC does not say that the Parties
undertake not to submit a dispute to any method of settlement other than negotiations. It
could havesimilar exclusionary language has been used in the Treaty of the Functioning of
the European Unionbut the signatory States to the DOC did not include such language.207
The DOC does not specify that the chosen means of negotiation shall be an exclusive one and
that no other procedures (including those under Part XV of the Convention) may be resorted to
even if negotiations do not lead to a settlement. 208 It could have, but it does not.
223. As stated above, the Parties disagree on whether an express exclusion is required. The
Philippines argues that the intent to exclude further procedures under the Convention must be
evident from the terms of the agreement itself. China considers an express exclusion
unnecessary and subscribes to the view of the majority of the Annex VII tribunal in Southern
Bluefin Tuna. The Tribunal considers that the better view is that Article 281 requires some clear
possibilit ies of settlement have been exhausted); see also Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around
the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, ITLOS
Reports 2003, p. 10 at p. 19, para. 47 (Annex LA-41); MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom),
Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, ITLOS Reports 2001, p. 95 at p. 107 para. 60
(Annex LA-39); Arctic Sunrise (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Provisional
Measures, Order of 22 November 2013, ITLOS Reports 2013, p. 230 at p. 247, para. 76 (Annex LA-45);
ARA Libertad (Republic of Argentina v. Ghana), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December 2012,
ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 326 at p. 346, para. 71 (Annex LA-44).
207 Article 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states: Member States undertake
not to submit a d ispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of
settlement other than those provided for therein. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 55 Official Journal o f the European Un ion 47 (2012)
(Annex LA-83), as cited in Memorial, para. 7.70.
208 This is a formu la suggested in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary
(hereinafter Virginia Commentary), Vo lu me V 23-24 (Nordquist et al. eds., 1989) (Annex LA-148);
see also Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), pp. 14-15.
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statement of exclusion of further procedures. This is supported by the text and context of
Article 281 and by the structure and overall purpose of the Convention. The Tribunal thus
shares the views of ITLOS in its provisional measures orders in the Southern Bluefin Tuna and
MOX Plant cases,209 as well as the separate opinion of Judge Keith210 in Southern Bluefin Tuna
that the majoritys statement in that matter that the absence of an express exclusion of any
procedure . . . is not decisive211 is not in line with the intended meaning of Article 281.
224. The text of Article 281 provides that when parties agree to resolve their dispute by other
peaceful means, Part XV dispute procedures will apply where the parties agreement does
not exclude any further procedure. This requires an opting out of Part XV procedures. It
does not contain an opting in requirement whereby the Parties must positively agree to
Part XV procedures. Such an opting in is only required where the parties have chosen an
alternative compulsory and binding procedure, as set out in Article 282. Pursuant to Article 282,
the chosen binding procedure will apply in lieu of the Part XV procedures unless the parties
to the dispute otherwise agree. In other words, the Part XV procedures are excluded by the
alternative compulsory binding procedure, and the only way to make them available is for the
parties to opt back in to them by agreeing otherwise. That distinction between Article 281
and 282 is consistent with the overall design of the Convention as a system whereby
compulsory dispute resolution is the default rule and any limitations and exceptions are
carefully and precisely defined in Section 3 of Part XV.212
225. Requiring express exclusion for Article 281 is also consistent with the overall object and
purpose of the Convention as a comprehensive agreement. The drafters of the Convention
recalled that the system for the settlement of disputes must form an integral part and an
essential element of the Convention.213 In introducing the dispute resolution provisions, the
President of the Conference, Ambassador Amerasinghe, explained that [d]ispute settlement
procedures will be the pivot upon which the delicate equilibrium of the compromise must be
209 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of
27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 280 (Annex LA-37); MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom),
Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, ITLOS Reports 2001, p. 95 (Annex LA-39).
210 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Separate Opinion of Justice Sir
Kenneth Keith, RIAA, Vol. XXIII, p. 49 at pp. 53-57, paras. 17-30 (Annex LA-51).
Admissibility of 4 August 2000, RIAA, Vol. XXIII, p. 1 at p. 43, para. 57 (Annex LA-50).
212 Virgin ia Co mmentary, Vo l. V, para. XV.4 ([U]niformity in the interpretation of the Convention should
be sought . . . [and] a few carefully defined exceptions should be allowed).
213 Ibid.
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balanced.214 His successor, Ambassador Koh, stressed the integral nature of the Convention,
meaning that, with very limited exceptions, it is not possible for States to pick what they like
and to disregard what they do not like.215 In these circumstances it is difficult to accept that the
Parties may remove a pivotal part of the Convention without clearly expressing an intention to
do so.
226. In any event, even if the Tribunal were to accept that recourse to Part XV dispute settlement
procedures may be implicitly excluded, the Tribunal finds that no such exclusion can be implied
from the DOC.
227. In paragraph 1 of the DOC, the parties commit to the UN Charter and the 1982 UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea among universally recognized principles of international law which shall
serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations.
228. While China argues that the reference to negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned
implicitly excludes any third-party settlement by those not directly concerned, this argument
overlooks the fact that paragraph 4 actually embraces the Convention, stating in full:
The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional d isputes by
peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly
consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with
universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea.
The DOC did not carve out any part of the Convention, let alone a fundamental part that has
been described by the Conventions founders as the pivot upon which delicate equilibrium of
the compromise must be balanced.216 Instead, the DOC (in paragraphs 1 and 3) repeatedly
invokes the Convention and the UN Charter generally, without differentiating amongst the
component parts of those instruments.
229. The Tribunal accordingly concludes that the DOC does not, by virtue of Article 281, bar the
Tribunals jurisdiction.
214 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Memorandum by the President of the Conference on Document
A/CONF.62/WP.9, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.9/ADD.1, p. 122, para. 6 (31 March 1976) (Annex LA-106).
215 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, 185th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.185, p. 14, para. 53
(26 January 1983) (Annex LA-116).
216 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Memorandum by the President of the Conference on Document
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2. Application of Article 281 to Other Bilateral Statements
230. In addition to and in combination with the DOC, China has pointed to a series of bilateral
documents to show that China and the Philippines have a long-standing agreement to settle their
relevant disputes through negotiations to the exclusion of any other means of settlement.
231. The following documents, which pre-date the DOC, have been discussed by the Parties:
(a) A Joint Statement dated 10 August 1995 reflecting the results of the first consultations
between senior officials of the Philippines and China on the South China Sea issue.217
The two sides agreed on the necessity and desirability of having a code of conduct in the
disputed area and, [p]ending the resolution of the dispute, to abide by a number of
principles, including:
1. Territorial d isputes between the two sides should not affect the normal
development of their relations. Disputes shall be settled in a peaceful and friendly
manner through consultations on the basis of equality and mutual respect.
. ..
3. In the spirit of expanding co mmon ground and narrowing differences, a gradual
and progressive process of cooperation shall be adopted with a v iew to eventually
negotiating a settlement of the bilateral disputes.
4. The two sides agreed to settle their bilateral disputes in accordance with the
recognized princip les of international law, including the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea.
. ..
8. Disputes shall be settled by the countries directly concerned without prejudice to
the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
The document also states that [i]n order to push the process forward, the two sides
agreed to hold discussions among experts on legal issues . . . .
(b) A Joint Statement dated 12 March 1999 of the China-Philippines Experts Group Meeting
on Confidence-Building Measures, in which the two sides reiterated their commitment
to:
1. The understanding to continue to work for a settlement of their differences

through friendly consultations;
2. Settle their dispute in accordance with the generally-accepted principles of
international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea;
217 Govern ment of the Republic of the Philippines and Government of the Peoples Republic of China,
Agreed Minutes on the First Philippines-China Bilateral Consultations on the South China Sea Issue
(10 August 1995) (Annex 180), cited in Chinas Position Paper, para. 31.
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The two sides stated that [t]hey have agreed that the dispute should be peacefully settled
through consultation and that the normal development of bilateral relations should not be
affected by their differences.218
(c) A Joint Statement dated 16 May 2000 on a Framework of Bilateral Cooperation in the
Twenty-First Century in which the two sides undertake to elevate Philippines-China
relations to greater heights in the 21st century and to this end and stated:
1. The two sides reaffirm that the purposes and principles of the United Nations
Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the principles established in
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and other universally
recognized principles of international law are the basic norms governing the
relations between the two countries.
. ..
9. The two sides commit themselves to the maintenance of peace and stability in the
South China Sea. They agree to promote a peaceful settlement of d isputes through
bilateral friendly consultations and negotiations in accordance with universally-
recognized princip les of international law, including the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. They reaffirm their adherence to the 1995 Joint
Statement between the two countries on the South China Sea and agree not to take
actions that might co mplicate or escalate the situation. The t wo sides expressed
their determination to follow through the work o f the Philippines-China Working
Group on Confidence Building Measures to enhance peace and stability in the
region. They reiterate that they will contribute positively toward the formu lation
and adoption of the regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.219
(d) A Joint Press Statement, dated 4 April 2001, of the Third China-Philippines Experts
Group Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures, which reported:
IV. The two sides noted that the bilateral consultation mechanism to explore ways of
cooperation in the South China Sea has been effective. The series of understanding
and consensus reached by the two sides have played a constructive role in the
maintenance of the sound development of Philippines-China relat ions and peace and
stability of the South China Sea area
...
VIII. The two sides will strengthen their cooperation to contribute positively toward
the formulat ion and adoption of an ASEAN-Ch ina reg ional code of conduct in the
South China Sea.220
218 Govern ment o f the Republic o f the Philippines and Govern ment of the Peoples Republic of Ch ina, Joint
Statement: Philippine-China Experts Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures, p. 2 (23 March
1999) (Annex 178), cited in Chinas Position Paper, para 32.
Statement: Framework of Bilateral Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century (16 May 2000)
(Annex 505), cited in Chinas Position Paper, para. 33; Supplemental Written Submission, para. 2.11.
Statement: 3rd Philippines-China Experts Group Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures, Manila,
3-4 April 2001 (4 April 2001) (Annex 506), cited in Chinas Position Paper, para. 34; Supplemental
Written Submission, para. 2.11.
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232. The following bilateral documents, which post-date the DOC, have also been discussed by the
Parties:
(a) A Joint Press Statement dated 3 September 2004 on the occasion of the State visit to
China of the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which reported:
The two sides reaffirmed their co mmit ment to the peace and stability in the South
China Sea and their readiness to continue discussions to study cooperative activities
like joint development pending the comprehensive and final settlement of territorial
disputes and overlapping marit ime claims in the area. They agreed to pro mote the
peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with universally recognized princip les
of international law, including the 1982 United Nat ions Convention on the Law of
the Sea. They agreed that the early and vigorous imp lementation of the 2002
ASEAN-China Declarat ion on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea will
pave the way for the transformat ion of the South China Sea into an area of
cooperation.221
(b) A Joint Statement dated 1 September 2011 on the occasion of the State visit to China of
President Benigno S. Aquino III, which reported:
15. Both leaders exchanged views on the maritime disputes and agreed not to let the
marit ime disputes affect the broader picture of friendship and cooperation between
the two countries. The two leaders reiterated their commit ment to addressing the
disputes through peaceful dialogue, to maintain continued regional peace, security,
stability and an environment conducive to economic progress. Both leaders
reaffirmed their co mmit ments to respect and abide by the Declarat ion on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed by Ch ina and the ASEA N member
countries in 2002.222
233. The Parties take different views on the effect of the above-mentioned statements on the
(a) Chinas Position
234. China characterises the foregoing bilateral instruments as evidence of a long-standing and
binding agreement between the Philippines and China to resolve their disputes in the South
China Sea by friendly negotiations. China reiterates that so long as such instruments intend to
create rights and obligations for the parties, these rights and obligations are binding and the
designation or form of an instrument is not decisive.223
Press Statement on the State Visit of H.E. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the Peoples Republic
of China, 1-3 September 2004 (3 September 2004) (Annex 188). Cited in Chinas Position Paper,
para. 36; Supplemental Written Submission, para. 2.11.
Statement (1 September 2011) (Annex 507). Cited in Ch inas Position Paper, para. 37; Supplemental
Written Submission, para. 2.11.
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235. According to China, the repeated use of the word agree in many of the instruments evinces a
clear intention to establish an obligation between the two countries in this regard.224 China
also argues that the instruments taken together and with the DOC are mutually reinforcing
and form an agreement between China and the Philippines for purposes of Article 281.
236. China then addresses whether this agreement exclude[s] any further procedure within the
meaning of Article 281. China acknowledges that none of the bilateral instruments include
such an express phrase as exclude other procedures of dispute settlement, but, as with the
DOC, argues on the basis of Southern Bluefin Tuna that the absence of an express exclusion of
any procedure . . . is not decisive.225
237. China argues that the bilateral statements obviously have produced the effect of excluding any
means of third-party settlement by virtue of two factors. First, China always insists on
peaceful settlement of disputes by means of negotiations between the countries directly
concerned. According to China, this position was well known and clear to the Philippines
during the drafting and adoption of the bilateral instruments.226 Second, China points to the
expectation that negotiations will eventually settle the dispute, as encapsulated in the August
1995 Statement that a gradual and progressive process of cooperation shall be adopted with a
view to eventually negotiating a settlement of the bilateral disputes.227 According to China, the
use of the term eventually in this context clearly serves to emphasize that negotiations is
the only means the parties have chosen for dispute settlement, to the exclusion of any other
means including third-party settlement procedures.
238. The Philippines argues that, as with the DOC, none of the bilateral instruments invoked by
China, whether taken individually or collectively, can be said to constitute a legally binding
agreement.228 The Philippines observes that joint statements like those relied upon by China are
commonplace in international practice, do not purport to establish binding legal obligations,
224 Chinas Position Paper, paras. 38, 43-44.

225 Chinas Position Paper, para. 40, citing Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v
Japan), Award on Jurisdiction and Ad missibility of 4 August 2000, RIAA, Vo l. XXIII, p. 1 at pp. 43-44,
para. 57.
228 Supplemental Written Submission, paras. 26.61-26.63; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 20.
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and at best, constitute aspirational political statements. The Philippines suggests that States
everywhere would undoubtedly be dismayed to learn otherwise.229
239. In any event, the Philippines argues that nothing in any of the statements, explicitly or
impliedly, excludes recourse to dispute settlement under Part XV of the Convention. To the
contrary, the Philippines points out that at least one of the instruments, the May 2000 statement,
refers to negotiations being conducted in accordance with universally recognized principles of
international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Recalling that Section 2 of Part XV constitutes an integral part of the Convention, the
Philippines argues that the reference to the Convention plainly reflects an understanding that,
while negotiations are to be encouraged, recourse to alternative procedures, including
compulsory procedures, is entirely appropriate when negotiation has failed or is futile.230
240. The Philippines summarily dismisses Chinas reliance on the two bilateral statements post-
dating the DOC. Both statements reaffirm the Parties commitment to the implementation of
the DOC, and according to the Philippines, their force can extend no further than that of the
DOC itself, which for reasons explained the Philippines considers to be of no consequence to
the Tribunals jurisdiction. 231 In other words, by merely reaffirming the DOC, the two
statements cannot give that instrument more weight than the drafters intended.232
241. To determine whether the bilateral statements are legally binding, the Tribunal applies the
standard set out above with respect to the DOC and analyses whether the text of those
instruments and the circumstances of their adoption evince an intention to create legal rights and
obligations.233
242. While it is true that the designation of an instrument is not decisive, the Tribunal observes that
none of the instruments in question are designated as agreements but rather are in the form of
229 Supplemental Written Submission, para. 26.63; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 22.
230 Supplemental Written Sub mission, para. 26.64. The Philippines points to cases in which the ICJ has
found that the fact that negotiations are being actively pursued during the judicial p roceedings does not,
legally, present any obstacle to the exercise by the Court of its judicial function. See, e.g., Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 392 (Annex LA-13); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
(Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, p. 3 (Annex LA-9). The Philippines argues that [i]f
active negotiations are no impediment to the exercise of the judicial function, a fortiori failed or futile
negotiations are not either. Supplemental Written Submission, para. 26.67.
233 See Section VII.A.1.c above.
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joint press statements and reports of meetings of officials of varying ranks. Even where the
statements and reports use the word agree, that usage occurs in the context of other terms
suggestive of the documents being political and aspirational in nature.
243. Notably, many of the statements reference the aspiration of the Parties to conclude a code of
conduct for settlement of disputes in the region at a later date. Thus, the 1995 Statement refers
to the necessity and desirability of having a code of conduct in the dispute area and provides
that, [p]ending the resolution of the dispute, the states shall seek to settle disputes in a
peaceful and friendly manner through consultations. The senior officials who reported on the
consultation even mentioned the need to hold discussions among experts on legal issues in
order to push the process forward. 234 This language is suggestive of an aspirational
arrangement rather than a legally binding agreement. Similarly, the Joint Statement of May
2000 reiterated that the sides will contribute positively toward the formulation and adoption of
the regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea,235 and the April 2001 Press Statement
states that the two sides will strengthen their cooperation to contribute positively toward the
formulation and adoption of an ASEAN-China regional code of conduct in the South China
Sea.236
244. The Tribunal does not accept the argument of China that the bilateral statements mutually
reinforce each other so as to render them legally binding. Repetition of aspirational political
statements across multiple documents does not per se transform them into a legally binding
agreement.
245. The Tribunal is thus not convinced that these statements constitute binding agreements to settle
disputes by other peaceful means within the meaning of the first part of Article 281.
246. In any event, the Tribunal does not find that the statements exclude any further procedure.
None of the instruments expressly rule out compulsory dispute settlement proceedings. To the
contrary, most of them expressly refer to the Convention and/or Article 33 of the UN Charter.
For example, in paragraph 4 of the 1995 Statement, [t]he two sides agreed to settle their
bilateral disputes in accordance with the recognized principles of international law, including
(10 August 1995) (Annex 180).
Statement: Framework of Bilateral Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century, para. 9 (16 May 2000)
(Annex 505).
Statement: 3rd Philippines-China Experts Group Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures, Manila,
3-4 April 2001, para. VIII (4 April 2001) (Annex 506).
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the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.237 The March 1999 Statement reiterates the two
sides commitment to settle their dispute in accordance with the generally accepted principles
of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.238 The
September 2004 press statement on the occasion of President Arroyas visit to China also states
the agreement to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with universally
recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. As already noted above, Part XV of the Convention is an integral part and an
essential element of the Convention and the pivot upon which the delicate equilibrium of the
compromise must be balanced.239 The Tribunal will not imply an exclusion of that integral
part of the Convention from documents which, in the context of dispute settlement, implore
adherence to that very instrument.
247. Finally, the Tribunal addresses Chinas argument that by repeatedly reaffirming negotiations as
the means for settling relevant disputes, and by emphasizing that negotiations be conducted by
sovereign States directly concerned the statements obviously have produced the effect of
excluding any means of third-party settlement. 240 The Tribunal understands that Chinas
preferred means for dispute resolution in the South China Sea is bilateral negotiation. Indeed,
the DOC and other joint statements show that negotiation was also the preferred means for the
Philippines. The Tribunal accepts that China always insists on negotiations and has made this
preference clear and well-known to the Philippines.241 However, repeated insistence by one
party on negotiating indefinitely until an eventual resolution cannot dislodge the backstop of
compulsory, binding procedures provided by Section 2 of Part XV.242 One partys preference
for one means of dispute settlement, however persistent, cannot imply that if negotiations fail or
become futile, the other party has relinquished its right to have recourse to the other means of
dispute settlement set out in Section 2 of Part XV.243
Agreed Minutes on the First Philippines-China Bilateral Consultations on the South China Sea Issue,
para. 4 (10 August 1995) (Annex 180).
Statement: Philippine-China Experts Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures, para. 2
(23 March 1995) (Annex 178).
239 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Memorandum by the President of the Conference on document
242 Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan), Separate Opin ion of Justice Sir
Kenneth Keith, RIAA, Vol. XXIII, p. 49 at p. 56, para. 26 (Annex LA-51).
243 Chinas Position Paper, paras. 40-41.
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248. The Tribunal therefore concludes that, whether treated individually or collectively, the bilateral
statements made by the Philippines and China, both before and after the DOC, do not bar the
Tribunals jurisdiction under the terms of Article 281 of the Convention.
249. Related to the question of whether the bilateral statements and the DOC trigger a bar to
jurisdiction under Article 281 is the question, raised during the hearing, of whether the
Philippines statements and conduct in respect of the DOC could estop the Philippines from
seeking recourse to arbitration.244
250. As recently articulated by the arbitral tribunal in Chagos Marine Protected Area, estoppel is a
general principle of law stemming from the general requirement to act in good faith, designed to
protect the legitimate expectations of a State that acts in reliance upon the representations of
another and to ensure that a State cannot blow hot and cold.245 Estoppel may be invoked
where (a) a State has made clear and consistent representations, by word, conduct, or silence;
(b) such representations were made through an agent authorised to speak for the State with
respect to the matter in question; (c) the State invoking estoppel was induced by such
representations to act to its detriment, to suffer a prejudice, or to convey a benefit upon the
representing State; and (d) such reliance was legitimate, as the representation was one on which
the State was entitled to rely.246
251. In order for the DOC and the Philippines related statements to estop the Philippines from
seeking recourse to arbitration, the Tribunal would first have to find that the Philippines had
made clear and consistent representations that it would not resort to the Part XV compulsory
dispute settlement procedures. The Tribunal finds no evidence of such representations. In fact,
as set out under Section C below, the Philippines specifically raised the prospect of recourse to
compulsory dispute settlement if it were left with no other choice and negotiations were failing.
The DOC contains an undertaking to resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful
means . . . through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly
concerned and invokes universally recognized principles of international law, but neither of
these statements can be construed as a representation that the Philippines would not bring
compulsory proceedings against China. Nor can the statements in the various bilateral
instruments committing to peaceful and friendly consultations have that effect. The
International Court of Justice has held that the fact that negotiations have been or are being
actively pursued at the same time as compulsory proceedings is not, legally, an obstacle to

245 Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award of 18 March 2015, para. 435
(Annex LA-225).
246 Ibid., para. 438 (Annex LA-225).
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jurisdiction. In Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria), the Court found that an
estoppel would apply only if Cameroon had consistently made it fully clear that it had agreed
to settle the dispute by bilateral dialogue alone. 247 The Court found Cameroon did not
attribute an exclusive character to the negotiations conducted with Nigeria. The Tribunal has
similarly found here that neither the DOC nor the subsequent statements attributed an exclusive
character to negotiations. To the contrary, they specifically incorporate the Convention and
Article 33 of the UN Charter, both of which enumerate judicial settlement and arbitration as
acceptable means of dispute settlement. Accordingly, no estoppel arises.
3. Application of Article 281 to the Treaty of Amity
252. The Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (the Treaty of Amity) is a
multilateral treaty concluded on 24 February 1976 amongst the governments of Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. It came into force on 15 July 1976, and
thus pre-dates the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.248 Since its entry into force, dozens of
other States from within and outside of ASEAN have become parties to it. China acceded to the
Treaty on 8 October 2003.
253. The Treaty of Amitys preamble states that the High Contracting Parties were [c]onvinced that
the settlement of differences or disputes between their countries should be regulated by rational,
effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitudes which might endanger
or hinder cooperation. The Treatys purpose includes the promotion of perpetual peace and
everlasting amity and cooperation amongst the parties.
254. Chapter IV of the Treaty of Amity is entitled Pacific Settlement of Disputes and contains the
following provisions:
Article 13. The High Contracting Part ies shall have the determination and good faith to
prevent disputes fro m arising. In case disputes on matters directly affect ing them should
arise, especially disputes likely to disturb regional peace and harmony, they shall refrain
fro m the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves
through friendly negotiations.
Article 14. To settle disputes through regional processes, the High Contracting Part ies shall
constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council comp rising a Representative at ministerial
level fro m each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognizance of the existence of
disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony.
Article 15. In the event no solution is reached through direct negotiations, the High Council
shall take cognizance of the dispute or the situation and shall reco mmend to the parties in
247 Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports
248 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1025 UNTS 319 (opened for signature 24 Feb ruary
1976, entered into force 15 July 1976) (hereinafter Treaty of Amity) (Annex LA-185).
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dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, med iation, inquiry o r
conciliat ion. The High Council may however offer its good offices, or upon agreement of
the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry or
conciliat ion. When deemed necessary, the High Council shall reco mmend appropriate
measures for the prevention of a deterioration of the dispute or the situation.
Article 16. The foregoing provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to a dispute unless all
the parties to the dispute agree to their application to that dispute. However, this shall not
preclude the other High Contracting Part ies not party to the dispute from offering all
possible assistance to settle the said d ispute. Part ies to the dispute should be well disposed
towards such offer of assistance.
Article 17. Nothing in this Treaty shall preclude recourse to the modes of peaceful
settlement contained in Article 33(1) o f the Charter of the Un ited Nations. The High
Contracting Part ies which are parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take init iatives to
solve it by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other procedures provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations.
255. The Tribunal examines here whether the Treaty of Amity could constitute a bar to jurisdiction
by virtue of Article 281. The Philippines says it cannot; China is silent on this point.
(a) Possible Objections
256. Chinas Position Paper refers to the Treaty of Amity only insofar as the parties to the DOC, in
paragraph 1, reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty of Amity, among other instruments,
including the Convention and the Charter of the United Nations.249 China does not otherwise
invoke the Treaty of Amity in itself as a basis for precluding the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
257. On its face, the Treaty of Amity is an agreement between the Parties which includes a range of
choices for peaceful means of dispute settlement. Thus the Tribunal invited the Philippines to
address the effect, if any, of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia on the
Tribunals jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Philippines claims, with reference to
Article 281 of the Convention.250
258. During the Hearing on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal also invited the Philippines to address the
question whether, before seeking arbitration, it was necessary for the Philippines to attempt
resolution through the High Council provisions in the Treaty of Amity, in light of the
precondition in Article 281 that no settlement has been reached by recourse to the [agreed]
means.251
249 Chinas Position Paper, para. 54; DOC, para. 1.

250 Request for Further A rgument, Question 2; see also Letter fro m the Tribunal to the Part ies (23 June
2015), Issue C.
251 Tribunal Questions of 10 July 2015, Question 4 (a).
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259. The Philippines acknowledges that, unlike the DOC and the other bilateral statements discussed
above, the Treaty of Amity is a legally binding agreement to which both the Philippines and
China are parties.252
260. However, the Philippines argues that the Treaty of Amity does not constitute an agreement to
settle disputes in any particular manner. Although Article 13 refers to friendly negotiations
and Articles 14 and 15 refer to a set of procedures for a High Council to recommend certain
non-adversarial means of dispute resolution, the Philippines points out that, under Article 16,
those provisions shall not apply to a dispute unless all the parties to the dispute agree to their
application to that dispute.253
261. Thus, in answer to the Tribunals question about the compulsory nature of the High Council
provisions and whether it was necessary for the Philippines to resort to the High Council before
arbitration, the Philippines stressed that: Article 16 makes it clear that Article 15 is not
compulsory. More than this, Article 16 makes clear that Article 15 cannot apply to this case,
because the parties to the dispute, the Philippines and China, have never agreed to submit the
dispute, or any part of it, to the High Council.254
262. The Philippines draws attention to Article 17 of the Treaty of Amity, which provides that
nothing in the Treaty shall preclude recourse to the modes of peaceful settlement contained in
Article 33(1) of the Charter of the United Nations and that parties to a dispute should be
encouraged to take initiatives to solve it by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other
procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. The Philippines describes the
words should be encouraged as hortatory language that shows pre-arbitration negotiation is
not mandatory but that parties are merely encourage[d] to attempt to settle their dispute by
negotiation. The Philippines also cites State practice to demonstrate a shared understanding
amongst parties to the Treaty of Amity that the High Council provisions are not compulsory.255

253 Treaty of A mity, Article 16; see Supplemental Written Sub mission, paras. 2.2-2.3; Jurisdictional Hearing
Tr. (Day 2), pp. 20-21; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 3), p. 38.
255 Jurisdictional Hearing Tr., (Day 3), pp. 38-40, in response to Tribunal Questions of 10 July 2015,
Question 4. The Philippines notes, in reference to Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the
Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, ITLOS Reports
2003, p. 10 at p. 19, para. 47 (Annex LA-41), and Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary (Bangladesh v.
India), Award of 7 July 2014 (Annex LA-179), that [i]n neither case did the respondent state raise any
objection based on the treaty, nor was there any prior resort to the High Council, wh ich has never even
been constituted in any event.
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263. As for the other elements of Article 281, the Philippines notes that no settlement has been
reached through the means contemplated in the Treaty, recalling the extensive efforts the Parties
have made to settle their dispute through many years of negotiations. It reiterates that pre-
arbitration negotiation is neither mandatory under the Treaty of Amity, nor under general
international law.256
264. Finally, the Philippines argues that the Treaty does not exclude recourse to the procedures
specified in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention. To the contrary, the language in Article 17
makes it crystal-clear that the Contracting States may have recourse to the modes of peaceful
settlement identified in Article 33(1) of the Charter, which include arbitration and judicial
settlement.257
265. The Treaty of Amity is a legally binding agreement. It contains an array of options for peaceful
dispute settlement, including by means of negotiation, mediation, conciliation and use of the
good offices of a High Council composed of ministerial representatives. However, it does not
prescribe a particular form of dispute settlement and certainly does not exclude recourse to
compulsory dispute settlement procedures.
266. Read in isolation, Article 13 appears to impose an obligation that States directly affected by a
dispute shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations.
Likewise, read in isolation, Articles 14 and 15 provide for an obligation to resort to the High
Council in the event direct negotiations fail. However, Articles 13, 14, and 15 all come within
Chapter IV on Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Article 16 in the same Chapter states that the
foregoing provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to a dispute unless all the parties to the
dispute agree to their application to that dispute. In the context of the structure of the Treaty
and composition of Chapter IV, Article 16 must be read as applying to all of the means set out
in Articles 13, 14, and 15. Thus, the Treaty does not constitute a binding agreement to resolve
disputes by negotiation or other chosen means. That obligation only becomes binding if there is
an additional specific agreement amongst all parties to the particular dispute to resort to any of
the means in Articles 13, 14, and 15. The first part of Article 281, is therefore not satisfied for
the Treaty of Amity.
256 Memorial, paras. 3.22-3.72; Supplemental Written Submission, para. 2.7.

257 Supplemental Written Sub mission, para. 2.6; UN Charter, Art. 33(1) (Annex LA-181); Jurisdictional
Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 21.
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267. There has been no settlement of the dispute, as discussed earlier, and the Philippines was not
required to pursue the optional High Council mechanisms as a precursor to arbitration.
268. The Treaty of Amity in any event does not exclude any further procedure. This conclusion is
directly confirmed by the text of Article 17 which envisages recourse to the modes of peaceful
settlement contained in Article 33(1) of the Charter of the United Nations, among which is
arbitration.
269. The Tribunal therefore concludes that the Treaty of Amity is not a bar to its jurisdiction under
Article 281.
4. Application of Article 281 to the CBD
270. The Convention on Biological Diversity, or CBD, is a multilateral treaty for conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity. 258 China has been a party since 29 December 1993, and
the Philippines since 1 June 1994.
271. The CBD obliges Contracting Parties to regulate and manage biological resources important for
the conservation of biological diversity. It also requires Contracting Parties to promote the
protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable populations of species
in natural surroundings.259
272. Article 27 of the CBD contains provisions on Settlement of Disputes as follows:
1. In the event of a d ispute between Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation

or application of this Convention, the parties concerned shall seek solution by
negotiation.
2. If the part ies concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation, they may jointly
seek the good offices of, or request mediation by, a third party.
3. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention or at any time

thereafter, a State or regional economic integration organization may declare in
writing to the Depositary that for a dispute not resolved in accordance with
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 above, it accepts one or both of the following means of
dispute settlement as compulsory:
(a) Arbitration in accordance with the procedure laid down in Part 1 of Annex II
(b) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice.
258 Convention on Biological Diversity, 1760 UNTS 79 (opened for signature 5 June 1992) (entry into force
29 December 1993) (Annex LA-82) (hereinafter CBD).
259 CBD, Arts. 8(c) and (d).
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4. If the parties to the dispute have not, in accordance with paragraph 3 above,
accepted the same or any procedure, the d ispute shall be submitted to conciliation in
accordance with Part 2 of Annex II unless the parties otherwise agree.
. ..
273. The Tribunal examines here whether the CBD could constitute a bar to its jurisdiction by virtue
of Article 281. The Philippines says it cannot; China is silent on this point.
274. The Philippines alleges that Chinas actions have violated the CBD as well as Articles 192 and
194 of the Convention. To the extent, therefore, that both treaties factually protect marine
biodiversity and cover the same allegedly unlawful actions, it might be arguable that China and
the Philippines have, in ratifying the CBD, agreed to seek settlement of the disputes concerning
Submissions No. 11 and 12 (b) in accordance with the dispute settlement procedures set out in
Article 27 of the CBD.260 If it could be shown that the CBD constitutes an agreement within
the meaning of Article 281 and that the CBD excludes recourse to further procedures, then the
Tribunals jurisdiction to decide Submissions No. 11 and 12(b) could be barred.
275. Chinas Position Paper does not make this argument, nor does it address any of the Philippines
allegations about violations of Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention or the CBD.
276. Nevertheless, the Tribunal invited the Philippines to elaborate on the relationship between
alleged violations of the CBD and the Convention and to comment by reference to Articles 281
and 282 of the Convention on the Tribunals jurisdiction to address alleged violations of the
CBD.261 During the Hearing, the Tribunal asked the Philippines whether the Article 281
requirement that no settlement has been reached under an agreed means necessitated that the
Philippines attempt the compulsory conciliation process in Article 27(4) of the CBD.262
277. The Philippines maintains that Article 281 could only apply if the dispute settlement
mechanisms of the CBD were deemed to constitute an agreement to settle disputes concerning
the interpretation or application of this Convention i.e., UNCLOS by recourse to means
other than those provided for in Section 2 of Part XV.263 According to the Philippines, the

261 Request for Further Argument, Question 11; see also Letter fro m Tribunal to the Parties (23 June 2015),
Issue C.
262 Tribunal Questions of 10 July 2015, Question 4 (a).
263 Supplemental Written Submission, para. 11.10 [emphasis in original].
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CBDs dispute settlement procedures apply exclusively to disputes concerning the interpretation
or application of the CBD.
278. The Philippines states further that if, arguendo, Article 27 of the CBD were intended to
constitute an agreement by the Philippines and China to settle disputes concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention by means of their own choice, clear and
unambiguous wording would be required to this effect. The Philippines recalls Judge
Wolfrums observation in MOX Plant that such agreement among the parties to a conflict
cannot be presumed. An intention to entrust the settlement of disputes concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention to other institutions must be expressed
explicitly in respective agreements.264 According to the Philippines, none of the wording in
Article 27 of the CBD (including the compulsory conciliation provision) or its Annexes
expressly excludes further proceedings under the Convention.
279. The Philippines acknowledges that its position is contrary to Southern Bluefin Tuna but
considers that tribunals decision on this point to have been wrongly decided. The Philippines
recalls that the decision has been almost universally disputed in the literature, and by other
judicial decisions and suggests that this Tribunal should decline to follow it. 265 The
Philippines also observes that unlike Southern Bluefin Tuna where the whole dispute primarily
centred on the Bluefin Tuna Convention, the present dispute under Submissions No. 11 and
12(b) is centred on protection and preservation of the marine environment and not at all on
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity under the CBD.
280. The Philippines urges the Tribunal to prefer the reasoning adopted by ITLOS in MOX Plant
because it respects the characterization of the dispute adopted by the party bringing the case, and
because it better reflects the need for a coherent integration of different treaty regimes with each
other.266
281. The Philippines Submissions No. 11 and 12(b) allege that China has violated its obligations
under the Convention to protect and preserve the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal and
264 MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order o f 3 December 2001
(Annex LA-39), Separate Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, ITLOS Reports 2001, p. 131 at p. 132.
265 Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), pp. 114-16, citing, inter alia, Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v.
Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 280
at p. 294, para. 55 (Annex LA-37); and MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures,
Order of 3 December 2001, ITLOS Reports 2001, p. 95 at p. 106, para. 49 (Annex LA-39).
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Second Thomas Shoal and that Chinas occupation of and construction activities on Mischief
Reef also violate Chinas duties to protect and preserve the marine environment under Part XII
of the Convention, specifically its Articles 192 and 194.
282. The Philippines has further clarified that it does not separately plead a claim for breach of the
CBD. It refers to the CBD only insofar as that instrument informs the normative content of
Articles 192 and 194. That the CBD can be used in this way to interpret the Convention is clear
from Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the applicable law
provision in Article 293 of the Convention and has been confirmed in other recent cases.267
283. For the purposes of establishing its jurisdiction under Part XV of the Convention, the Tribunal
must rule out the possibility that its jurisdiction to consider the Philippines Submissions No. 11
and 12(b) is excluded on the basis of Article 281 of the Convention. In particular, the question
that the Tribunal must address is whether the Philippines and China, in ratifying the CBD, have
agreed to settle disputes concerning Articles 192 and 194 of the Conventioninsofar as those
disputes concern the protection of marine biological diversityusing procedures set out in
Article 27 of the CBD.
284. The Tribunal acknowledges some overlap in the subject matter of Part XII of the Convention
and the subject matter of the CBD. For example, there is a General Obligation under Article
192 of the Convention to protect and preserve the marine environment, which may be broadly
enough worded to include the obligation to protect and preserve marine biodiversity. Similarly,
obligations under Article 194 of the Convention may include the protection and preservation of
the biological diversity represented by coral reefs. It is also true that the same facts may
implicate multiple treaties. In its Memorial, the Philippines submitted evidence allegedly
showing Chinas toleration of, and active support for, environmentally harmful fishing practices
employed by Chinese nationals at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, including the
harvesting of endangered species and the use of dynamite and cyanide to harvest fish, clams,
and corals. The Tribunal appreciates, therefore, that the alleged conduct could constitute a
breach of several treaties, including the Convention and the CBD.
285. The Tribunal is of the view, however, that an overlap of subject matter is not sufficient to bring
the CBD within the meaning of Article 281 of the Convention. Article 2 of the CBD defines
biological diversity as variability among living organisms from all sources included, inter
267 Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), pp. 97-98, cit ing M/V SAIGA (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment of 4 December 1997, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 10 at p. 42, paras. 84-85
(Annex LA-36) and M/V Virginia G (Panama/Guinea-Bissau), Judgment of 14 April 2014, ITLOS
Reports 2014, p. 4 at p. 68, para. 216 (Annex LA-223); Arctic Sunrise (Kingdom of the Netherlands v.
Russian Federation), Merits, Award of 14 August 2015, paras. 193-98.
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alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which
they are part . . . . The objective of the CBD, as set out in its Article 1, is the conservation of
biological diversity. The CBD is therefore aimed at protecting biological diversity in
generalbeyond that found in the marine environment. The objective of the CBD potentially
overlaps with, but also goes well beyond, the scope of Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention.
Similarly, the Conventions scope goes well beyond the obligation to protect and conserve the
marine environment. The two treaties establish parallel environmental regimes that overlap in a
discrete area. One creates a distinct jurisdiction to address the protection of the marine
environment whilst the other aims to protect biodiversity in general. The same facts may give
rise to violations of both treaties, but a violation of Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention does
not necessarily give rise to a violation of the CBD such that Article 27 of the CBD may be
invoked to settle disputes regarding the interpretation and application of the Convention. In
this respect the Tribunal agrees with the Philippines that [a] dispute under UNCLOS does not
become a dispute under the CBD merely because there is some overlap between the two.
Parallel regimes remain parallel regimes.
286. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Article 27 of the CBD does not expressly exclude
recourse to dispute settlement procedures under Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention. For the
reasons outlined above in connection with the DOC, the Tribunal is of the view that a clear
exclusion of Part XV procedures is required in order for Article 281 to present an obstacle for the
287. Moreover, Article 22 of the CBD, which addresses the relationship between the CBD and other
international conventions, states that:
1. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any
contracting Party deriving fro m any existing international agreement, except where
the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat
to biological diversity.
2. Contracting Part ies shall imp lement this Convention with respect to the marine
environment consistently with the rights and obligations of States under the law of
the sea.
288. Article 22(1) of the CBD preserves the rights and obligations of the Philippines and China under
the Convention, including under Part XV, Section 2 relating to dispute settlement. Article 22(2)
of the CBD recognises the substantive overlap between the two parallel conventions and
therefore requires that they be implemented consistently.
289. The dispute settlement provisions in the CBD therefore cannot, by virtue of Article 281,
preclude the Tribunals jurisdiction over Submissions No. 11 and 12(b).
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B. ARTICLE 282 (OBLIGATIONS UNDER GENERAL, REGIONAL OR B ILATERAL AGREEMENTS )
290. Article 282 of the Convention provides:
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral
agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be
submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of
the procedures provided for in this Part, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.
291. Assuming there is a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention
(which the Tribunal has already found), Article 282 would only displace the dispute resolution
provisions in Section 2 of Part XV if four requirements are met. These are: (a) that the parties
must have agreed through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise that, (b) at
the request of any party to the dispute, (c) the dispute shall be submitted to a procedure that
entails a binding decision, and (d) that the parties have not otherwise agreed to retain access
(i.e., to opt back in) to the Part XV, Section 2 procedures.
1. Application of Article 282 to the DOC and Other Bilateral Statements
292. Chinas Position Paper does not mention Article 282 of the Convention. Nevertheless, in the
Tribunals Request for Further Argument of 16 December 2014, the Tribunal invited the
Philippines to elaborate on whether the DOC constitutes an agreement within the meaning of
Article 282 of the Convention.268
293. In its 23 June 2015 letter to the Parties listing issues to address at the Hearing on Jurisdiction,
the Tribunal invited the Parties to address the applicable standard for determining whether any
agreement between the Parties provides a procedure that entails a binding decision within the
meaning of Article 282 of the Convention and asked whether any of the DOC, Treaty of
Amity, or Convention on Biological Diversity might constitute such an agreement.269
294. The Philippines does not consider the DOC to fall within the meaning of Article 282 of the
Convention because it is not an agreement and it does not provide for a procedure that entails
a binding decision.
268 Request for Further Argument, Question 1.

269 Letter from Tribunal to the Parties (23 June 2015), Issue D.
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295. The Philippines relies on the same arguments as it made for Article 281 to show that the DOC is
not an agreement but a political undertaking only that does not purport to create legally
binding obligations.270
296. As to the standard for determining whether an agreement provides for a procedure that entails a
binding decision, the Philippines considers the only possible answer to this question is that
the agreement must make express provision for a compulsory procedure that entails a binding
decision. Such procedures can never be implied. 271 Here, there is no such express provision,
and there is certainly none providing for a binding procedure that would apply in lieu of the
Part XV procedures. Although there is agreement to have recourse to procedures in the form
of friendly consultations and negotiations (paragraph 4) or continued consultations and
dialogues (paragraph 7), none of these procedures entail a binding decision.
297. According to the Philippines, the only hint in the DOC of a binding procedure is the undertaking
to resolve jurisdictional disputes through consultations and negotiations in accordance with
the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea. The DOC thus indicates that when negotiations fail, the disputes should
be settled in accordance with the Conventions binding procedures, and there is nothing to
imply a procedure was intended to apply in lieu thereof.
298. With respect to other bilateral statements made by the Philippines and China, the Philippines
recalls that they are all political and aspirational in nature, not legally binding. Further, none of
them even arguably reflects an intent to exclude recourse to compulsory proceedings entailing
a binding decision.272
299. For reasons already expounded in connection with Article 281, the Tribunal does not consider
the DOC to constitute a legally binding agreement within the meaning of Article 282.
300. In any event, the DOC does not provide expressly for a compulsory binding procedure in lieu
of the Part XV procedures. Friendly consultations and negotiations do not entail binding
decisions. To the extent that any procedures entailing binding decisions are envisioned, they are
the provisions in Part XV itself, given the reference in paragraph 4 to the 1982 UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea. Therefore far from devising a compulsory binding procedure in lieu of

272 Supplemental Written Submission, para. 26.64; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 22.
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the Conventions dispute settlement provisions, the DOC specifically contemplates recourse to
the Convention.
301. Similarly, the Tribunal recalls that none of the other joint statements constitute binding
agreements. Further, none of them can be read as providing for compulsory procedures that
entail binding decisions, let alone displace the dispute resolution provisions in the very
Convention that so many of the Statements expressly endorse.273
302. Accordingly, neither the DOC nor the joint statements referred to in Paragraphs 231 to 232
above are legally binding agreements within the meaning of Article 282. They have no impact
on the Tribunals jurisdiction.
2. Application of Article 282 to the Treaty of Amity
303. Chinas Position Paper does not mention Article 282 of the Convention, and includes only a
passing reference to the Treaty of Amity.
304. On its face, the Treaty of Amity is an agreement between the Parties which refers to compulsory
and binding dispute settlement mechanisms. Thus, the Tribunal invited further argument from
the Philippines on the effect, if any, of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
on the Tribunals jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Philippines claims in reference to
Article 282 of the Convention.
305. According to the Philippines, the Treaty of Amity does not implicate Article 282 of the
Convention because none of the Treatys dispute settlement provisions establishes a procedure
entailing a binding decision.
306. The Philippines points out that, failing negotiation, the High Council is at most empowered only
to recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices,
mediation, inquiry or conciliation and/or to constitute itself as a committee of mediation,
inquiry or conciliation. 274 Even those procedures, however, must according to Article 16 be
specifically agreed upon by all the parties in the dispute. They cannot be initiated at the
request of any party to the dispute and thus fall short of the requirements in Article 282.
273 See Section VII.A.2.c above.

274 Supplemental Written Submission, para 2.9, referring to Treaty of Amity (Annex LA-185).
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307. While the Treaty of Amity is a binding agreement, the Tribunal finds that it does not meet the
criteria specified in Article 282 for three reasons.
308. First, it does not contain an agreement for disputes to be submitted to a procedure at the
request of any party to the dispute. The dispute resolution mechanisms described in Articles
13, 14, and 15 of the Treaty of Amity shall, by the terms of Article 16, not apply unless all the
parties to the dispute agree to their application to that dispute.
309. Second, there is no agreement to binding dispute resolution. The mechanisms enumerated in
Articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Treatynamely negotiation, good offices, mediation, inquiry or
conciliationdo not entail a binding decision. When deemed necessary, they might lead to a
recommendation by the High Council as to appropriate preventative measures, but this would
entail a recommendation only, not a binding decision.
310. Finally, the parties to the Treaty have agreed in Article 17 that none of its provisions preclude
recourse to the modes of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33(1) of the UN Charter,
which of course includes arbitration. In these circumstances it is not possible to imply an
agreement to submit to compulsory dispute settlement in lieu of the procedures provided for
in Part XV.
3. Application of Article 282 to the CBD
311. As noted above, Chinas Position Paper does not address the CBD or the Philippines claims
relating to environmental protection under Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention.
312. Nevertheless, the Philippines Memorial alleges that China has violated provisions of the CBD,
as well as Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention. To the extent that both treaties protect
marine biodiversity and cover the same allegedly unlawful actions, it might be arguable that
China and the Philippines have, in ratifying the CBD, agreed to seek settlement of the
Submissions No. 11 and 12 (b) disputes in accordance with Article 27 of the CBD.275 Given the
compulsory nature of some of the dispute settlement options in Article 27, this could raise the
question of whether the CBD constitutes an agreement referring to compulsory binding
procedures within the meaning of Article 282, with the consequence that Article 27 of the CBD
should apply in lieu of the procedures in Part XV, Section 2.
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313. The Tribunal invited the Philippines to comment, by reference to Article 282 of the Convention,
on the Tribunals jurisdiction to address alleged violations of the CBD.276
314. The Philippines reiterates that it does not allege any separate breach of the CBD, and it therefore
considers that the dispute resolution procedures in Article 27 of the CBD are entirely irrelevant
to this dispute. 277 The Philippines only pleads in this arbitration that China has breached
Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention. Submissions No. 11 and 12(a) therefore present a
dispute over the interpretation and application of the Convention. The Philippines only refers to
the CBD insofar as it informs the normative content of Articles 192 and 194. This being the
case, the Philippine argues that the dispute does not concern the interpretation or application of
the CBD.278
315. As with Article 281, the Philippines argues that the CBD could only be used to invoke
Article 282 if Article 27 of the CBD were deemed to constitute an agreement for the settlement
of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this [Law of the Sea] Convention.
Article 27 of the CBD is not such an agreement. By its terms, Article 27 of the CBD constitutes
an agreement only for settling disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the CBD
itself.279
316. Second, the Philippines argues that even if Article 27 of the CBD could be deemed to constitute
an agreement to submit disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention,
it does not fulfil the other requirement of Article 282, which is that it should also be a
compulsory process that entails a binding decision.280
317. As noted above in the context of Article 281, there is no doubt about the status of the CBD as a
legally binding agreement to which both the Philippines and China are parties. The question
here is whether the CBD constitutes an agreement within the terms of Article 282 of the
Convention and whether it satisfies all the requirements of that Article, such that the dispute
resolution provisions in Article 27 of the CBD apply in lieu of the procedures in Part XV,
276 Request for Further Argument, Question 11; Letter from Tribunal to Parties (23 June 2015), Issue D.
277 See generally Supplemental Written Submission, para. 11.1; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 93.
278 Supplemental Written Submission, paras. 11.3-11.4; Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 93.
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Section 2. Article 27 of the CBD would only bar consideration of Submissions No. 11 and
12(b) if this were the case.
318. In order for the CBD to constitute a bar by virtue of Article 282, it must be shown that (a)
Article 27 of the CBD constitutes an agreement for the settlement of a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of the [UNCLOS] Convention; (b) that there is an agreement to
submit such disputes to a compulsory procedure, in the sense that the dispute is capable of being
unilaterally initiated, at the request of any party to the dispute; and (c) the agreed compulsory
procedure entails a binding decision.
319. The Tribunal finds that the CBD does not constitute an agreement for the settlement of disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention and has already set out its
reasoning in that respect in Paragraphs 281 to 289 above.
320. Even if that first requirement were satisfied, the Tribunal has no doubt that the CBD does not
meet the second and third requirements of Article 282, which demand agreement to submit a
dispute to a compulsory process entail[ing] a binding decision. None of the provisions in
Article 27 of the CBD meets those criteria. Article 27(1) of the CBD requires parties to seek a
solution by negotiation. That is not a compulsory process that entails a binding decision.
Article 27(2) provides that, failing negotiation, the parties may jointly seek the good offices of,
or request mediation by, a third party. That is neither compulsory nor does it entail a binding
decision. Article 27(3) provides that a party to the CBD may lodge a written declaration with
the Depositary that, for a dispute not resolved in accordance with Article 27(1) or (2), it accepts
one or both of arbitration or International Court of Justice adjudication as compulsory. Such a
procedure would entail a binding decision, however neither the Philippines nor China has
deposited such a declaration, so it is not available at the request of any party as required under
Article 282. Article 27(4) then provides that if the parties have not accepted the same or any of
the binding procedures in Article 27(3), then the dispute shall be submitted to conciliation.
That is compulsory, but it does not entail a binding decision. At most, a conciliation
commission constituted under Annex II, Part 2 of the CBD can render a proposal for resolution
of the dispute, which the parties shall consider in good faith.281 But that is not a binding
decision.
321. The dispute settlement provisions in the CBD therefore cannot, by virtue of Article 282,
preclude the Tribunals jurisdiction over Submissions No. 11 and 12(b).
281 CBD, Annex II, Part 2, Article 5 (Annex LA-82).
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C. ARTICLE 283 (EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ) AND OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE
322. Article 283 of the Convention sets out an obligation on the Parties to exchange views
concerning the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or other peaceful means prior to the
commencement of arbitral proceedings. Article 283 provides as follows:
Article 283
Obligation to exchange views
1. When a dispute arises between States Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention, the parties to the d ispute shall proceed expedit iously
to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful
means.
2. The parties shall also proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views where a
procedure for the settlement of such a dispute has been terminated without a
settlement or where a settlement has been reached and the circu mstances require
consultation regarding the manner of implementing the settlement.
1. Chinas Position
323. China has addressed the obligation to exchange views in its Position Paper of 7 December 2014,
which the Tribunal understands to reflect Chinas position on the issues raised therein,
notwithstanding Chinas non-participation in these proceedings.
324. According to China:
The Philippines claims that, the t wo countries have been involved in exchanges of views
since 1995 with regard to the subject-matter of the Ph ilippines claims for arbit ration,
without however reaching settlement, and that in its view, the Philippines is justified in
believing that it is meaningless to continue the negotiations, and therefore the Philippines
has the right to initiate arbitration. But the truth is that the two countries have never
engaged in negotiations with regard to the subject-matter of the arbitration.282
325. China goes on to argue that, as a matter of law, general exchanges of views, without having the
purpose of settling a given dispute, do not constitute negotiations. 283 According to China,
however, the exchanges of views between China and the Philippines in relation to their
disputes have so far pertained to responding to incidents at sea in the disputed areas and
promoting measures to prevent conflicts, reduce frictions, maintain stability in the region, and
promote measures of cooperation. 284 In Chinas view, such exchanges are far from
constituting negotiations and did not concern the subject-matter of the Philippines claims for
arbitration. 285 China also questions how the Philippines could have exchanged views

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concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention when the Philippines only
brought its own maritime claims into conformity with the Convention in 2009.286
326. The Philippines addressed the application of Article 283 in both its Memorial and during the
hearing, but in different terms.
327. In its Memorial, the Philippines submitted that the Philippines has over many years had
extensive exchanges of views with China regarding its claims in these proceedings. The
Philippines went on to detail its communications with China, drawing particular attention to its
protest to Chinas Notes Verbales of May 2009,287 consultations on the status of Scarborough
Shoal in 1997 and 1998,288 communications concerning the entitlements of maritime features in
the Spratlys in 2011, 289 and an extended series of correspondence concerning what the
Philippines considered to be Chinas interference with its sovereign rights and jurisdiction.290
328. Prior to the July 2015 hearing, the Tribunal invited the Parties to address whether Article 283 of
the Convention imposes an obligation to exchange views concerning the substance of the
Parties dispute or the means by which the dispute may be settled.
329. In the course of the hearing, the Philippines emphasised that Article 283 is not a requirement to
negotiate as such. Rather, it is only an obligation to exchange views.291 The Philippines also
argued that the obligation has always been understood to impose a modest burden on disputing
states.292 The Philippines went on to take note of the holding of the tribunal in Chagos Marine
Protected Area that Article 283 requires that the Parties engage in some exchange of views
regarding the means to settle the dispute. 293 Ultimately, the Philippines submitted that
whether Article 283 requires an exchange of views on the means by which the dispute will be
settled, the substance of the dispute, or both, the Philippines has met those requirements in this
case.294

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330. In respect of an exchange of views on the means to settle the Parties dispute, the Philippines
argued that it had met the requirements of Article 283 by virtue of two exchanges in 1995 and
1998 that by themselves show this requirement to have been satisfied.295 The Philippines also
noted that, in its view, Chinas Position Paper itself demonstrates that the obligation to
exchange views on the means to settle the dispute has been satisfied.296
331. In respect of an exchange of views on the substance of the Parties dispute, the Philippines
recalled the correspondence set out in its Memorial that shows that the parties exchanged views
on numerous occasions over many years.297 The Philippines went on to address the degree of
specificity required of an exchange of views on the substance of the Parties dispute. Drawing
on the decisions in Chagos Marine Protected Area and Guyana v. Suriname, the Philippines
argued that several general propositions can be extracted. These are:
(a) it is not necessary to exchange views on the substance of each and every submission
per se;298
(b) as long as there has been an exchange of views on the general subject matter of the
dispute, broadly construed, Article 283 is satisfied, both with respect to the main dispute
as well as any incidental issues that are subsumed within it;299 and
(c) relatedly, there is no need for an exchange of views to touch upon specific articles of the
Convention. Indeed it is not even necessary that the Convention itself be mentioned in
the course of the relevant exchanges.300
295 Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 27; Govern ment of the Republic of the Philippines and Govern ment
of the Peoples Republic of China, Philippine-China Bilateral Consultations: Summary of Proceedings
(20-21 March 1995) (Annex 175); Republic of the Philippines, Depart ment of Foreign Affairs, Record of
Courtesy Call on Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (21 March 1995)
(Annex 176); Summary of Proceedings: Philippine-China Bilateral Consultations (20-22 March 1995)
(Annex 177); Govern ment of the Republic of the Philippines and Govern ment of the Peoples Republic
of Ch ina, Joint Statement: Philippine-China Experts Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures
(23 March 1995) (Annex 178); Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Ph ilippines,
Transcript of Proceedings: RP-PRC Bilateral Talks (9 August 1995) (Annex 179); Govern ment of the
Republic of the Ph ilippines and Government of the Peoples Republic o f China, Agreed Minutes on the
First Philippines-China Bilateral Consultations on the South China Sea Issue (10 August 1995)
(Annex 180); Government of the Republic of the Philippines, Transcript of Proceedings Republic of the
Philippines-Peoples Republic of China Bilateral Talks (10 August 1995), p. 3 (Annex 181). Government
of the Republic of the Philippines and Government of the Peoples Republic of China, Joint Press
Communiqu: Philippines-China Foreign Ministry Consultations (29-31 July 1998), para. 4 (Annex 183).
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3. The Tribunals Decision
332. In the Tribunals view, the Parties positions on the application of Article 283 reflect the
uncertainty that has sometimes surrounded the intended meaning of that provision. This also
reflects the fact that diplomatic communications and exchanges do not divide neatly between
procedural and substantive matters. With rare exceptions, States in the midst of a pressing
dispute will not separate their communications between the two. Correspondence elaborating
the Parties views on the substantive matters between them may well shed a great deal of light
on their respective views on how the dispute mayor may notbe settled. Proposals on the
mode of settlement will necessarily involve some discussion of substance. The Convention
must be applied with this reality in mind.
333. As recognised by the tribunal in Chagos Marine Protected Area: Article 283 requires that a
dispute have arisen with sufficient clarity that the Parties were aware of the issues in respect of
which they disagreed . . . . Once a dispute has arisen, Article 283 then requires that the Parties
engage in some exchange of views regarding the means to settle the dispute.301 This view was
recently echoed by the tribunal in Arctic Sunrise, which held that Article 283 requires that the
Parties exchange views regarding the means by which a dispute that has arisen between them
may be settled . . . . Article 283(1) does not require the Parties to engage in negotiations
regarding the subject matter of the dispute.302
334. In the present case, the Tribunal notes the Philippines attention to the two rounds of bilateral
consultations between the Philippines and China that took place in 1995 and 1998 (see
Paragraph 330 above). In the Tribunals view, these consultations do include the exchange of
views on the means of resolving the dispute between the Parties at that time. The Summary of
Proceedings prepared by the Philippines303 of the consultations that took place on 20 March
1995, for instance, record the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, as follows:
Chinas consistent position was to discuss this through bilateral channels, and not let in
countries irrelevant to the dispute. The Vice-M inister stated that the situation in the
301 Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award of 18 March 2015, paras. 382-83
(Annex LA-225).
302 Arctic Sunrise (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Merits, Award of 14 August 2015,
para. 151.
303 The Tribunal notes that the majority of the records of the Parties consultations available to it are the
Philippines internal records and are therefore less authoritative as to what was said than a record that was
prepared jointly. The Tribunal nevertheless considers that the Philipp ines diplomat ic records do have
evidentiary value insofar as they were contemporaneous to the events in question and were prepared in
the course of the Philippines normal diplomatic practice.
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situation in the Nanshas has become very co mplicated, and there are so me countries who
want to further aggravate the situation.304
The record goes on to state that [t]he [Philippines] Undersecretary [of Foreign Affairs, Rodolfo
Severino,] welcomed the Chinese proposal to discuss activities bilaterally, and multilaterally as
well because these would naturally involve other countries.305 As would be expected, these
comments, and numerous others like them, were interspersed throughout the Parties substantive
discussions, but clearly indicate that the Parties discussed the manner in which their dispute, as
it then was, could be settled.
335. The Tribunal also notes that paragraph 4 of the November 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea provides as follows:
4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional

disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through
friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in
accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;306
Notwithstanding the Tribunals finding that this did not constitute a legally binding agreement,
the Tribunal is of the view that the DOC itself, along with discussions on the creation of a
further Code of Conduct, represents an exchange of views on the means of settling the Parties
dispute.307
336. The DOC was signed in 2002. The consultations highlighted by the Philippines took place in
1995 and 1998. At that time, the dispute between the Parties that appears from the record of the
Parties exchanges concerned sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and certain activities at
Mischief Reef. Critical elements of the disputes that the Philippines has put before the Tribunal
had not yet occurred. In particular, China had not yet issued its Notes Verbales of 7 May
Philippine-China Bilateral Consultations: Summary of Proceedings (20-21 March 1995) (Annex 175);
see also Summary of Proceedings: Philippine-China Bilateral Consultations (20-22 March 1995),
para. 36 (Annex 177).
see also Summary of Proceedings: Philippine-China Bilateral Consultations (20-22 March 1995),
para. 40 (Annex 177).
306 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in South China Sea
(4 November 2002) (Annex 144).
307 See, e.g., Memorandu m fro m the Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs for Asia and Pacific Affairs of the
Republic of the Ph ilippines to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines
(21 December 1999) (Annex 471).
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2009, 308 nor had it taken the majority of the actions complained of in the Philippines
Submissions No. 8 to 14.
337. The Tribunal recognises that the various disputes between the Parties concerning the South
China Sea are related and accepts that it may occur that parties will comprehensively exchange
views on the settlement of a dispute only to have that dispute develop further, or other related
disputes arise, prior to the commencement of arbitral proceedings. But the Tribunal need not
definitively determine the application of Article 283 to such a situation, because the record
indicates that the Parties continued to exchange views on the means to settle the disputes
between them until shortly before the Philippines initiated this arbitration. In particular, the
Parties held a bilateral consultation on 14 January 2012 to address a range of issues, including
the South China Sea. The minutes of those discussions record the Philippines Undersecretary of
Foreign Affairs, Ms. Erlinda Basilio, as follows:
134. We look upon our valuable and long-standing friendship with China as one based on
mutual respect and equality. To peacefu lly and finally settle the disputes in the
West Philipp ine Sea, it behooves conflicting claims to be resolved based on the
rules-based regime of the Un ited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). The Philippines is prepared to validate its own claims.
135. The Philippines believes that a rules-based approach is the only legitimate way in
addressing the disputes in the West Philippine Sea.
136. The dispute settlement mechanis m established in the United Nations Convention on
the Law o f the Sea is the fundamental princip le of the rules-based approach being
espoused by the Philippines.
137. The Philippines has proposed to ASEA N the Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship,
and Cooperation as an actionable framework to address Chinas 9 dash line and
resolve disputes through peaceful means by clarify ing and segregating the disputed
land features fro m the non-disputed waters of the West Philippine Sea. In other
words, we are saying that not all of the South China Sea is disputed.
138. The dispute in the [West Philippine Sea] is a regional concern as well as a national
concern because there are several members of the ASEAN who have competing
claims in that area.
139. The Philippines is working closely with ASEAN towards the establishment of a
more legally binding Code of Conduct in the West Philippine Sea.
140. During the November 2011 ASEAN Foreign M inisters Meeting (AMM), the
Philippines, speaking through Secretary Albert Del Rosario, he specifically called
for a meeting of the claimant states, including China, to sit down together under the
auspices of ASEA N to resolve the co mpeting claims and to define the disputed areas
from the non-disputed areas.
141. We continue to present this proposal and enlist the assistance of ASEA N co lleagues
and in this undertaking (and hope that) China will sit down with us. . . . 309
Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CM L/ 17/ 2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 191); Note Verbale
General of the United Nations, No. CML/18/2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 192).
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338. Undersecretary Basilios Chinese counterpart, Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin, replied
as follows:
148. Well on the current stage, it is quite difficult to resolve this dispute through any legal
procedure. Therefore, we believe that the proposals that the Philippines made
previously are not realistic or feasible whether it is about to refer the matter to any
international mechanism or to hold any mu lt ilateral negotiations among claimant
states. Since the dispute is there already, if it cannot be resolved once it is referred to
the international mechanis m, then it will only add to the mistrust between our two
countries. China has been working all along to start the talks. Because it is our long-
standing position that the dispute in the South China Sea should be properly
resolved among parties direct ly involved through peaceful negotiations. So,
therefore, I believe that the classification of/identification of the disputed areas or
non-disputed areas are not what the dispute is about or anything to be negotiated
about.
149. What we need to do now is to start negotiations between our two countries in a
bilateral way and take stock of the current dispute and problem. We may discuss the
establishment of a China-Ph ilippines maritime consultation mechanism or resume
the confidence building mechanis m between our two countries. Recently, the
Philippine side has noted the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines that you would
like to have in formal consultation with China on South Ch ina Sea. China
appreciates this and hopes that consultation will be held in February this year at the
working level on that basis, we shall establish a regular consultation mechanism. It
is good to start talking in any form.310
339. Undersecretary Basilio then stated:
155. Your Excellency, we have listened very carefully during your views with reference
to the West Philippine Sea. As enunciated by our Foreign Minister when he met
with Foreign M inister Yang Jiechi, they agreed then to keep the matter to rest, to put
the matter to rest because obviously, the Chinese position, is diametrically opposed
to the Philippine position. You are for bilateral discussion. We have embarked on a
path that uses the law, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as the basis for
working out the problems that we face in the West Philippine Sea. We believe in a
mu ltilateral approach because there are other competing claims there and they are
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, namely: Vietnam, Brunei,
Malaysia and the Philippines. To approach the matter bilaterally, even theoretically
speaking, you know we try to solve it our way, just the two of us, there are
competing claims there and therefore, in our belief, it is better that we all sit down
together and be able to thresh out the matter in a manner that will contribute to the
peace and stability, be treated in a peaceful manner. Fo r us, we believe that our
recourse is through ASEAN calling for a meeting with all of us seated together
because after all, we are parties to the Declaration on Conduct of Part ies in the South
China Sea. And the Code of Conduct that we envision for ourselves, China is of
course a party to that, we also believe that we should sit down together and discuss
what goes in there in the main elements of such conduct. But obviously, our
positions are not convergent. Let s leave it at that but as our Foreign Minister has
always stressed that we set that aside, we set the West Philippine Sea issue aside. . . .
156. . . . We are for a mult ilateral approach and we, at this stage, we would like to
embark on a mult ilateral approach to it because we want the other claimants who are
also ASEAN member states. And there is again your province, Taiwan. You see,
309 Record of Discussion: 17th Philippines-China Foreign Ministry Consultations, paras. 134-41 (14 January
2012) (Annex 204).
2012) (Annex 204).
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who also has a competing claim there. So they are central parties. That is why we
want a mult ilateral approach to it. So that when we sit down, whatever venue, if you
want to meet with us, and we meet with you, we can arrive at a solution that will
make everybody happy that perhaps at some time.311
340. In the months that followed, certain events occurred in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal as
described in the submissions which the Philippines has made in these proceedings. On 26 April
2012, the Philippines presented China with a Note Verbale concerning the on-going situation
at the Philippines Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal). In this Note Verbale, the
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines:
. . . calls on Ch ina to respect the Philippines' sovereignty and sovereign rights under
international law including UNCLOS, over the Scarborough Shoal and its EEZ,
respectively.
However, if Ch ina believes otherwise, it would be goodas a parallel track to the on-going
efforts to settle the matter peacefullyfo r the two countries to bring the matter befo re an
appropriate third-party adjudication body under international law, specifically the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) with respect to the rights and
obligations of the two countries in the Philippines EEZ under international law,
specifically UNCLOS. In inviting Ch ina to jo in the Philippines in bringing the issue before
any of the dispute settlement mechanism under international law, the Depart ment believes
that this approach would resolve on a long-term basis any differences of position on the
matter, and thus ensure a peaceful, stable, and lasting bilateral relationship between the two
countries.312
341. China replied on 29 April 2012, as follows:
Huangyan Islands is Chinas inherent territory. The proposal fro m the DFA of the
Philippines to bring the so-called Huangyan island issue to a third-party arbitration body
has none ground. The Chinese side urges the Philippine side to pay due respect to and
refrain from any infringement on Chinas territorial sovereignty.313
342. Taking the exchanges in 2012 together, the Tribunal is convinced that the Parties have
unequivocally exchanged views regarding the possible means of settling the disputes between
them that the Philippines has presented in these proceedings. These exchanges did not, of
course, result in agreement. The Philippines favoured either multilateral negotiations involving
other ASEAN Member States or the submission of the Parties disputes to one of the third-party
mechanisms contemplated in the Convention. China, in turn, was adamant that only bilateral
talks could be considered. The same difference in approach is also evident in the Parties earlier
exchanges.
2012) (Annex 204).
312 Note Verbale fro m the Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines to the Embassy of the Peoples
Republic of China in Manila, No. 12-1137 (26 April 2012) (Annex 207).
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, No. (12) PG-206 (29 April 2012) (Annex 208).
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343. The Parties having exchanged views and failed to reach agreement on the approach for
resolving the disputes between them, the Tribunal considers Article 283 to have been satisfied.
The extensive record of communications between the Parties, including frequent bilateral
consultations, establishes that China was aware of the issues in respect of which the Parties
disagreed and cannot have been taken by surprise when the Philippines decided to proceed with
arbitration. The Parties explored whether any mutually agreeable mode of settlement could be
identified and found none. Thereafter, it is well established that the Philippines was not
obliged to continue with an exchange of views when it concludes that the possibilities of
reaching agreement have been exhausted.314
344. Having held that Article 283 requires an exchange of view on the means by which the Parties
dispute would be settled and that this obligation was met, the Tribunal nevertheless considers
that Chinas Position Paperand, in particular, Chinas statement that the two countries have
never engaged in negotiations with regard to the subject-matter of the arbitration 315 squarely
raises a separate question: whether, independently of Article 283, the Convention nevertheless
imposes an obligation on States parties to engage in negotiations prior to resorting to
compulsory settlement.
345. The Tribunal recalls that [n]either in the [United Nations] Charter nor otherwise in
international law is any general rule to be found to the effect that the exhaustion of diplomatic
negotiations constitutes a precondition for a matter to be referred to [international
adjudication].316 An obligation to engage in negotiations may, however, arise as a result of the
particular legal regime applicable in customary law 317 or as a result of interaction of the
respective rights claimed by the States in question. 318 An obligation to negotiate or a
requirement of negotiations prior to compulsory settlement may also arise on the basis of a
treaty applicable between the Parties.319
314 Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional
Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, ITLOS Reports 2003, p. 10 at p. 19, para. 47 (Annex LA-41).
317 North Sea Continental Shelf, (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3 at pp. 46-48, paras. 83-87 (Annex LA-4).
318 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 3 at
pp. 31-32, paras. 73-75 (Annex LA-8).
319 See, e.g., Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14 at
pp. 67-68, para. 149; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Object ions, Judgment, ICJ Reports
2011, p. 70 at pp. 129-30, paras. 147-48 (Annex LA-34).
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346. In the present case, the Tribunal notes that Article 279 of the Convention provides that the
Parties shall seek a solution by the means indicated in Article 33, [P]aragraph 1, of the [United
Nations] Charter and that Article 33 of the United Nations Charter identifies negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, [and] resort to regional agencies
or arrangements as means for the pacific settlement of disputes. Article 286 of the Convention
then provides that [s]ubject to [S]ection 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to
section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having
jurisdiction under this section. The Tribunal recalls the view of the tribunal in Barbados v.
Trinidad and Tobago that:
the only relevant obligation upon the Parties under Section 1 of Part XV is to seek to settle
their dispute by recourse to negotiations, . . . . Upon the failure of the Parties to settle their
dispute by recourse to Section 1, i.e. to settle it by negotiations, Article 287 entitles one of
the Parties unilaterally to refer the dispute to arbitration.320
347. The Tribunal considers it unnecessary to determine precisely the full scope of the obligation to
seek a solution through recourse to Section 1 of Part XV or any obligation to negotiate arising
from the nature of the Parties rights. This is because the Tribunal is satisfied that the
Philippines did seek to negotiate with China concerning the disputes presented in these
proceedings and that its obligations, both under the Convention and customary law, have
accordingly been satisfied.
348. The Philippines has held regular bilateral discussions with China, addressing a wide range of
issues of concern to the two governments, including the South China Sea. Detailed minutes of
several of these sessions have been put before the Tribunal by the Philippines.321 In addition to
these formal, annual meetings, the Philippines and China have convened working groups on
matters such as confidence-building measures, 322 have held meetings between high-level
320 Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, Award of 11 April 2006, PCA A ward Series at p. 96, para. 206, RIAA
Vol. XXVIII, p. 147 at p. 207, para. 206.
Summary of Proceedings: Philippine-China Bilateral Consultations (20-22 March 1995) (Annex 177);
Govern ment of the Republic of the Philippines and Government of the Peoples Republic of China,
(10 August 1995) (Annex 180); Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Ph ilippines, Record
of Proceedings: 10th Philippines-China Foreign Ministry Consultations (30 Ju ly 1998) (Annex 184);
Record of Discussion: 17th Philippines-China Foreign Ministry Consultations (14 January 2012)
(Annex 204); Depart ment o f Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Ph ilippines, Notes on the 18 th
Philippines-China Foreign Ministry Consultations (19 October 2012) (Annex 85).
322 See, e.g., Govern ment of the Republic of the Philippines and Government of the Peoples Republic of
China, Joint Statement: Philippine-China Experts Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures
(23 March 1995) (Annex 178); Govern ment of the Republic of the Philippines and Govern ment of the
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officials to address particular issues,323 and have maintained regular contacts between their
respective foreign ministries and ambassadors in Manilla and Beijing in respect of
developments in the South China Sea.324
349. The Tribunal recognises that even the most formal of these meetings were termed consultations,
rather than negotiations, and that any agreement would almost certainly have required more
sustained and intensive discussions than in fact occurred. The Tribunal does not consider
nomenclature to be dispositive, however, and notes that the discussions between the Parties did
accomplish one of the principal goals of prior negotiations, namely to clarify the Parties
respective positions on the issues in dispute. Most importantly, the Tribunal is also convinced
that these discussions were meaningful and that both the Philippines and China approached
them in good faith and were genuinely interested in seeking agreed solutions to the disputes
between them. That more sustained negotiations did not occur and no agreement was reached
does not reflect a lack of interest or commitment by either Party, but rather mutually
incompatible views as to how such talks should be conducted. With disputes as complex as
those in the South China Sea, this is hardly unexpected. As appears repeatedly throughout the
Parties exchanges, the Philippines believed that it was necessary to take a multilateral approach
involving other littoral States to the South China Sea; China, in contrast, was committed to
addressing matters on a bilateral basis. The Tribunal also considers that the Parties frequent
discussions and exchanges left them well positioned to assess the likelihood of any mutually
agreeable compromise and notes the frequently expressed preference to shelve the more difficult
issues of sovereignty over the features in the South China Sea in favour of confidence-building
measures and efforts to reduce tensions in other aspects of the relationship between the two
States.
Peoples Republic of China, Joint Statement: 3rd Philippines-China Experts Group Meeting on
Confidence-Building Measures, Manila, 3-4 April 2001 (4 April 2001) (Annex 506).
323 See, e.g., Memorandum fro m Secretary General, Co mmission on Maritime and Ocean A ffairs Secretariat,
Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Ph ilippines to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of the Philippines (28 March 2011) (Annex 71).
324 See, e.g., Memorandum fro m the Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Beijing to the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Ph ilippines, No. ZPE-110-2012-S (26 July 2012) (Annex 84);
Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. ZPE-080-2012-S (24 May 2012) (Annex 81);
Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. ZPE-064-2011-S (21 June 2011) (Annex 72);
Memorandu m fro m Acting Assistant Secretary of the Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
the Philippines to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (10 March 2011) (Annex 70); Memorandum fro m
Assistant Secretary, Asian and Pacific Affairs, Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the
Philippines, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines (7 February 2011)
(Annex 68); Memorandum fro m Secretary General, Co mmission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs
Secretariat, Depart ment of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philipp ines to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines (7 December 2010) (Annex 66).
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350. Article 279 calls on the Parties to seek a solution through means that may include negotiations.
As was stated by ITLOS in Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor, a
State Party is not obliged to pursue procedures under Part XV, Section 1, of the Convention when
it concludes that the possibilities of settlement have been exhausted.325 Moreover, even an
obligation to negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement,326 and the States
concerned . . . are in the best position to judge as to political reasons which may prevent the
settlement of a given dispute by diplomatic negotiation.327
351. The Tribunal also recognises that the Parties many discussions and consultations did not
address all of the matters in dispute with the same level of specificity that is now reflected in the
Philippines Submissions. This is to be expected and constitutes no bar to the Philippines
claims. Even an express obligation to negotiate requires only that the subjectmatter of the
negotiations must relate to the subjectmatter of the dispute328 and the Convention does not
require the Parties to set out the specifics of their legal claims in advance of dispute settlement.
352. Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal concludes that neither Article 283, nor
the obligation to seek a solution through pacific means, including negotiation, poses any bar to
the Tribunals consideration of the Submissions presented by the Philippines.
353. For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal concludes that none of the provisions in Part XV,
Section 1 poses any bar to the Tribunals consideration of the Submissions presented by the
Philippines.
* * *
325 Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional
Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, ITLOS Reports 2003, p. 10 at p. 19, para. 47 (Annex LA-41).
326 Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion of 15 October 1931, PCIJ Series A/B,
No. 42, p. 108 at p. 116.
327 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Jurisdiction, Judgment of 30 August 1924, PCIJ Series A, No. 2, p. 6
at p 15 (Annex LA-57).
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Object ions, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 70 at p. 133,
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VIII. LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE TRIBUNALS JURISDICTION
354. Within the dispute settlement provisions of Part XV of the Convention, Section 3 sets out
certain limitations and exceptions to the jurisdiction that a court or tribunal may exercise with
respect to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention. Among these
provisions, Article 297 sets out limitations on jurisdiction that apply automatically to any
dispute between State Parties to the Convention. Article 298 then sets out further, optional
exceptions that a State Party may activate by declaration. Finally, Article 299 confirms that, in
the event that such a limitation or exception is applicable, [a] dispute excluded under article
297 or excepted by a declaration made under article 298 from the dispute settlement procedures
provided for in section 2 may be submitted to such procedures only by agreement of the parties
to the dispute.
355. The Tribunal will now examine the possible implications of each provision before considering
their application to the disputes presented by the Philippines in these proceedings.
A. ARTICLE 297 AND AUTOMATIC LIMITATIONS TO THE TRIBUNALS J URIS DICTION
356. Article 297 provides as follows:
Article 297
Limitations on applicability of section 2
1. Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention with regard
to the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction provided for
in this Convention shall be subject to the procedures provided for in section 2 in the
following cases:
(a) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of the
provisions of this Convention in regard to the freedoms and rights of
navigation, overflight or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or in
regard to other internationally lawful uses of the sea specified in article 58;
(b) when it is alleged that a State in exercising the aforementioned freedoms,
rights or uses has acted in contravention of this Convention or of laws or
regulations adopted by the coastal State in conformity with this Convention
and other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention; or
(c) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of specified
international ru les and standards for the protection and preservation of the
marine environ ment wh ich are applicable to the coastal State and which have
been established by this Convention or through a competent international
organization or diplomatic conference in accordance with this Convention.
2. (a) Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the prov isions of this
Convention with regard to marine scientific research shall be settled in
accordance with section 2, except that the coastal State shall not be obliged to
accept the submission to such settlement of any dispute arising out of:
(i) the exercise by the coastal State of a right or discretion in accordance
with article 246; or
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(ii) a decision by the coastal State to order suspension or cessation of a

research project in accordance with article 253.
(b) A dispute arising fro m an allegation by the researching State that with respect
to a specific project the coastal State is not exercising its rights under
articles 246 and 253 in a manner co mpatib le with this Convention shall be
submitted, at the request of either party, to conciliat ion under Annex V,
section 2, provided that the conciliation co mmission shall not call in question
the exercise by the coastal State of its discretion to designate specific areas as
referred to in art icle 246, paragraph 6, or of its discretion to withhold consent
in accordance with article 246, paragraph 5.
3. (a) Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the prov isions of this
Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in accordance with
section 2, except that the coastal State shall not be obliged to accept the
submission to such settlement of any dispute relat ing to its sovereign rights
with respect to the liv ing resources in the exclusive economic zone or their
exercise, including its discretionary powers for determining the allo wable
catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of surpluses to other States and
the terms and conditions established in its conservation and management
laws and regulations.
(b) Where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1 of this Part, a
dispute shall be submitted to conciliation under Annex V, section 2, at the
request of any party to the dispute, when it is alleged that:
(i) a coastal State has manifestly failed to co mply with its obligations to
ensure through proper conservation and management measures that
the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic
zone is not seriously endangered;
(ii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to determine, at the request of
another State, the allo wable catch and its capacity to harvest liv ing
resources with respect to stocks which that other State is interested in
fishing; or
(iii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to allocate to any State, under
articles 62, 69 and 70 and under the terms and conditions established
by the coastal State consistent with this Convention, the whole o r part
of the surplus it has declared to exist.
(c) In no case shall the conciliation co mmission substitute its discretion for that
of the coastal State.
(d) The report of the conciliation co mmission shall be co mmunicated to the
appropriate international organizations.
(e) In negotiating agreements pursuant to articles 69 and 70, States Parties,
unless they otherwise agree, shall include a clause on measures which they
shall take in o rder to minimize the possibility of a disagreement concerning
the interpretation or application of the agreement, and on how they should
proceed if a disagreement nevertheless arises.
1. Possible Objections
357. Chinas Position Paper does not raise an objection on the basis of any specific automatic
limitation to the Tribunals jurisdiction set out in Article 297. Rather, China expresses the
position that:
As a State Party to the Convention, China has accepted the provisions of section 2 of Part
XV on co mpulsory dispute settlement procedures. But that acceptance does not mean that
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those procedures apply to . . . d isputes already excluded by Article 297. . . . With regard to
the Philippines claims for arb itration, Ch ina has never accepted any of the compulsory
procedures of section 2 of Part XV.329
358. The Tribunal has already held that the Convention does not permit a State Party to exempt itself
generally from the dispute settlement provisions of Part XV and that no consequences for the
Tribunals jurisdiction follow from Chinas decision not to participate in these proceedings (see
Paragraphs 106 to 123 above). The Tribunal considers it imperative to examine, proprio motu
and in light of Chinas general remarks on Article 297, whether a limitation to its jurisdiction
follows from Article 297, in order to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction over the dispute as
required by Article 9 of Annex VII.
359. The Tribunal considers that two issues in relation to Article 297 could potentially impact its
jurisdiction. First, Article 297 could be understood as implicitly limiting the jurisdiction of
courts and tribunals over disputes concerning sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the exclusive
economic zone only to the cases specifically identified in that Article. The Tribunal notes that
Article 297 has sometime been interpreted in this way, 330 although the tribunal in Chagos
Marine Protected Area recently declined to endorse this interpretation. 331 Second, Article
297(3) could potentially bar the Tribunals jurisdiction over the Philippines claims in relation to
fisheries, to the extent that the events in question took place in Chinas exclusive economic zone
or in an area of overlapping entitlements. The Tribunal, therefore, considers it necessary to
examine this question in some detail.
360. Accordingly, in its Request for Further Written Argument and the questions put to the Parties in
advance of the hearing, the Tribunal invited the Philippines to elaborate on the following
possible issues:
(a) the relationship between Article 288, Article 297, and the Tribunals jurisdiction;
(b) the application of Article 297(1)(c) to the Philippines claims concerning the preservation
of the marine environment; and
(c) the application of Article 297(3) to the Philippines claims concerning fisheries.

330 See Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan), Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility of 4 August 2000, RIAA, Vol. XXIII, p. 1 at p. 44, para. 61 (Annex LA-50).
331 Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award of 18 March 2015, para. 317
(Annex LA-225).
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361. The Philippines interpretation of the first portion of Article 297 has evolved in the course of
these proceedings. In its Memorial, the Philippines argued that Paragraph 1 [of Article 297]
excludes from jurisdiction disputes concerning a coastal States exercise of its sovereign rights
and jurisdiction, except those listed in subparagraphs (a)-(c).332 Subsequently, the Philippines
endorsed the Chagos Marine Protected Area tribunals view that Article 297(1) confirms and
expands jurisdiction over environmental disputes, but does not limit it.333
362. According to the Philippines, the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the Parties dispute concerning
the preservation of the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal because the relevant waters
constitute territorial sea, to which Article 297 does not apply.334 The Philippines also considers
that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the dispute concerning preservation of the marine
environment in and around Second Thomas Shoal because Article 297 applies only to the
exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction by the coastal State. Because, in the Philippines
view, only the Philippines is a relevant coastal State with an entitlement to an exclusive
economic zone in the area of Second Thomas Shoal, issues concerning Chinese activities cannot
involve the exercise of Chinas sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and Article 297 therefore
cannot apply. 335 In any event, however, the Philippines considers that, following the
interpretation in Chagos Marine Protected Area, Article 297(1) . . . supports [the Philippines]
case on jurisdiction over environmental disputes within the territorial sea and on the continental
shelf, even if China were the relevant coastal state336
363. The Philippines likewise considers that [n]othing in paragraph 3 of Article 297 impairs the
Tribunals jurisdiction to address Submissions 8, 9 and 10, concerning the living resources of
the Philippines exclusive economic zone and traditional fishing activities at Scarborough
Shoal. 337 According to the Philippines, Article 297(3) would only limit the Tribunals
jurisdiction over the issues raised in Submissions No. 8 and 9 if the relevant areas were part of
Chinas exclusive economic zone. 338 However, because the Philippines considers that it has
demonstrated that none of the insular features claimed by China in the Southern Sector of the
South China Sea generates entitlement to an EEZ or continental shelf, Article 297(3) can have

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no application. 339 In the Philippines view, Article 297(3) is also inapplicable to traditional
fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal because such fishing only ever occurs within the
12 nautical mile territorial sea surrounding the feature.340
B. ARTICLE 298 AND OPTIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE TRIBUNALS J URIS DICTION
364. Article 298 provides as follows:
Article 298
Optional exceptions to applicability of section 2
1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a

State may, without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, declare in
writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in
section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories of disputes:
(a) (i) disputes concerning the interpretation or applicat ion of articles 15,
74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitat ions, or those involving
historic bays or titles, provided that a State having made such a
declaration shall, when such a dispute arises subsequent to the entry
into force o f this Convention and where no agreement within a
reasonable period of time is reached in negotiations between the
parties, at the request of any party to the dispute, accept submission of
the matter to conciliat ion under Annex V, section 2; and provided
further that any dispute that necessarily involves the concurrent
consideration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other
rights over continental or insular land territory shall be excluded fro m
such submission;
(ii) after the conciliation commission has presented its report, which shall
state the reasons on which it is based, the parties shall negotiate an
agreement on the basis of that report; if these negotiations do not
result in an agreement, the parties shall, by mutual consent, submit the
question to one of the procedures provided for in section 2, unless the
parties otherwise agree;
(iii) this subparagraph does not apply to any sea boundary dispute finally
settled by an arrangement between the parties, or to any such dispute
which is to be settled in accordance with a b ilateral or mult ilateral
agreement binding upon those parties;
(b) disputes concerning military activ ities, including military activ ities by
government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and
disputes concerning law enforcement activ ities in regard to the exercise of
sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded fro m the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3;
(c) disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the Un ited Nations is
exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the United Nations,
unless the Security Council decides to remove the matter fro m its agenda or
calls upon the parties to settle it by the means provided for in this
Convention.
. ..

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365. On 25 August 2006, China issued a declaration pursuant to Article 298, activating all of the
optional exceptions to jurisdiction in the following terms: [t]he Government of the Peoples
Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures provided for in section 2 of Part XV of
the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a), (b)
and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention.341
1. Chinas Position and Possible Further Objections
366. Chinas Position Paper recalls its 2006 Declaration under Article 298 and submits that [t]he
purpose and the effect of Chinas 2006 Declaration is such that the disputes listed therein are
fully excluded from the compulsory settlement procedures under the Convention.342 As set out
above (see Paragraphs 138 to 139), China considers that [t]he issues presented by the
Philippines for arbitration constitute an integral part of maritime delimitation between China
and the Philippines.343 In the event that the Philippines and China disagree with respect to
whether the dispute is covered by Chinas declaration, China considers that the Philippines
should first take up this issue with China, before a decision can be taken on whether or not it
can be submitted for arbitration.344 The Tribunal has already consideredand rejectedthis
characterisation of the Parties dispute. As stated in Paragraphs 155 to 157 above, the Tribunal
does not consider the dispute to be over maritime boundary delimitation.
367. Chinas Position Paper does not raise any further objections based on Article 298, although the
Tribunal notes that Article 298 contains a number of other exceptions to the jurisdiction of a
tribunal constituted under Annex VII. For the reasons already given with respect to Article 297,
the Tribunal considers it imperative to examine proprio motu whether any further exception to
its jurisdiction follows from Article 298, in order to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction over the
dispute as required by Article 9 of Annex VII.
368. Although the Tribunal does not agree with Chinas characterisation of the Parties dispute,
Article 298s exclusion of jurisdiction over disputes relating to sea boundary delimitations may
nevertheless constrain the Tribunals jurisdiction.
369. First, the Tribunals jurisdiction over some of the Philippines Submissions could be barred if a
feature claimed by China in the South China Sea were found to be an island within the meaning
of Article 121 of the Convention, entitled to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf
341 See Chinas Position Paper, para. 58.

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overlapping those generated by the Philippines archipelago. In that case, the resolution of the
merits of certain of the Philippines claims would not be possible without first delimiting the
overlapping entitlements, a step which, because of Chinas 2006 Declaration, would be outside
the scope of the Tribunals jurisdiction. However, the question of delimiting overlapping
entitlements would not arise if the Tribunal were to find at the merits phase that none of the
features claimed by China are islands that generate their own exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf.
370. Second, Article 298 excludes disputes involving historic bays or titles which could bear on
the Philippines Submissions concerning Chinas claims to historic rights, if such rights were
found to be permitted by the Convention and within the scope of this exclusion.
371. Finally, Article 298 excludes disputes concerning military activities, as well as law
enforcement activities related to marine scientific research or fisheries. This could be a bar to
the Tribunals jurisdiction over the Parties disputes relating, among others, to (a) Chinese
fisheries enforcement measures, (b) land reclamation and construction at Mischief Reef, (c) the
operation of Chinese law enforcement vessels, and (d) the stand-off between the Philippines and
China at Second Thomas Shoal.
372. Accordingly, in its Request for Further Written Argument and the questions put to the Parties in
advance of the hearing, the Tribunal invited the Philippines to elaborate on the following
possible issues:
(a) the scope of the exception for disputes relating to maritime boundary delimitation and the
relationship between the Philippines Submissions and such a delimitation;
(b) the relationship between the Article 298 reference to historic bays or titles and any
claim by China to historic rights;
(c) whether the Chinese activities addressed in the Philippines Submissions No. 8-14
constitute military activities within the scope of Article 298(1)(b); and
(d) whether the Chinese activities addressed in the Philippines Submissions No. 8-11 and
13-14 constitute law enforcement activities within the scope of Article 298(1)(b).
373. Additionally, in connection with the possible jurisdictional issues described above and the
Philippines argument that none of the features in the Spratlysnot even the largest among
themis capable of generating entitlement to an EEZ or a continental shelf,345 the Tribunal has
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at various points in the proceedings requested the Philippines to provide additional maps, charts,
tidal data, satellite images, photographs, historical, anthropological, geographic, and
hydrographic information regarding certain features in the Spratly Islands.346
374. As stated above (see Paragraph 146), the Philippines rejects Chinas contention that the Parties
disputes constitute, as a whole, an integral part of maritime boundary delimitation. The
Philippines also notes that Article 298(a)(1) refers not simply to maritime boundary disputes,
but specifically to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83
relating to sea boundary delimitations. Whatever the nature of the dispute, therefore, the
Philippines submits that Article 298 has no effect unless the Tribunal is called on to interpret or
apply one of the three specified articles, which relate to the actual delimitation of
respectivelythe territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf.347
375. The Philippines likewise submits that Article 298 does not exclude the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal. Questions of maritime delimitation, the Philippines recalls, arise only in the context
of overlapping entitlements of coastal states.348 According to the Philippines, however, it has
demonstrated that:
none of the insular features claimed by China in the Southern Sector of the South China Sea
generates entitlement to an EEZ or continental shelf. As a result, the waters, seabed and
subsoil within 200 M of the Philippines, but beyond 12 M fro m any high-tide feature,
constitute the EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines, not China.349
Thus, in the Philippines view, no situation of overlapping entitlements potentially requiring

delimitation occurs in the areas in which the events addressed in the Philippines Submissions
took place.
376. With respect to historic bays or titles, the Philippines argues that Article 298 does not apply
. . . because China is not claiming such title in the South China Sea.350 The Philippines
examines the term for historic title in the Chinese text of the Convention and the references to
historic rights in Chinas Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act351 and argues that
346 Request for Fu rther Argu ment, 16 December 2014, Requests No. 17-24; Letter fro m Tribunal to the
Parties (23 June 2015).
351 Peoples Republic of China, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (26 June 1998), Art. 14
(Chinese version) (Annex 107).
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[w]hat is clear is that China claimed historical rights as distinguished from historic title.352
In any event, the Philippines argues, the concept of historic title as used in Article 298 has a
specific and limited meaning: it pertains only to near-shore areas of sea that are susceptible to a
claim of sovereignty as such.353 Furthermore, the Philippines argues, Article 298 was crafted
with the delimitation of the Gulf of Fonseca (a historic bay) in mind and applies only to disputes
over the delimitation of historic bays and titles. According to the Philippines, when Article
298(1)(a)(i) refers to those involving historic bays or titles the those being referred to are not
disputes generally but rather disputes concerning delimitation.354 In the Philippines view, no
such dispute over delimitation is implicated by its submissions in these proceedings.
377. As for military activities, the Philippines submits that [n]one of the activities undertaken by
Chinese government vessels about which the Philippines complains in these proceedings are
properly considered military activities.355 According to the Philippines, the nature and
purpose of the activity itself that determines whether it is to be categorized as military or law
enforcement, not the identity of the actor.356 Nevertheless, absent evidence to the contrary, it
can ordinarily be assumed that [non-military] vessels and aircraft are not engaged in military
activities.357 In the present case, the Philippines argues as follows:
The specific actions of Chinese government vessels of which the Philippines complains in
these proceedings are all characteristic of law enforcement activit ies. Ch inas unlawfu l
fishing activit ies in the Philippines EEZ were carried [out] under the protection of law
enforcement vessels of the [China Marine Surveillance] and [Fisheries and Law
Enforcement Co mmand]. Ch inas interferences with the Ph ilippines exercise of its
sovereign right to exploit the liv ing and non-living resources of its EEZ and continental
shelf were also carried out by vessels of the [China Marine Surveillance]and [Fisheries and
Law Enforcement Co mmand]. . . . The interd iction of Philippine vessels at Scarborough
Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal was carried out exclusively by [China Coast Guard],
[Ch ina Marine Surveillance] and [Fisheries and Law Enforcement Co mmand] vessels, as
were the dangerous navigational manoeuvres that risked (and narrowly avoided) collision
with Philippines vessels.358
Furthermore, in the Philippines view, [e]vidence that Mischief Reef is now occupied by
personnel associated with the Chinese military is not relevant to the question of jurisdiction over
Chinas conduct at the time of its initial occupation and construction activities. At that time,
China itself repeatedly asserted that these activities were for civilian purposes.359 Even since
352 Memorial, para. 4.28; see also Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), pp. 59-62.
359 Jurisdictional Hearing Tr. (Day 2), p. 88 (citing Memo randum fro m the Ambassador of the Republic of
the Philippines in Beijing to the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines
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the expansion of Chinese reclamation activities at Mischief Reef, the Philippines argues, China
itself declares that the main purpose of [its construction] activities is to meet various civilian
demands.360
378. Finally, with respect to the exclusion of law enforcement activities from jurisdiction, the
Philippines emphasises that [o]nly certain types of law enforcement activities may be excluded
by a declaration under paragraph 1(b) of Article 298.361 Such activities must be related to the
jurisdictional limitations for marine scientific research and fisheries set out in Article 297.
According to the Philippines, however, because paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 297 do not apply
to any of the claims of the Philippines in this case, the law enforcement exception in
Article 298 is likewise inapplicable. 362 The Philippines emphasises that it makes no claims
regarding Chinas exercise of its rights . . . to regulate marine scientific research . . . or the
exercise of sovereign rights with respect to living resources in Chinas EEZ. 363 The
Philippines further emphasises that the Philippines claims only concern areas where China has
no entitlement to an EEZ or continental shelf and where neither Article 297 nor,
correspondingly, Article 298(1)(b) can apply.364
C. THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 297 AND 298 AND THE TRIBUNALS FINDINGS ON THE
SCOPE OF ITS J URIS DICTION
379. Having set out the possible limitations and exceptions to its jurisdiction and the Parties views
thereon, the Tribunal now turns to the application of those provisions to the disputes presented
(10 March 1995) (Annex 18); Memo randum fro m the A mbassador of the Republic of the Philippines in
Beijing to the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philipp ines (10 April 1995)
(Annex 21); Memorandu m fro m the A mbassador of the Republic o f the Philippines in Beijing to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. ZPE-231-95 (20 April 1995)
(Annex 22); Memorandum fro m A mbassador of the Republic of Ph ilippines in Beijing to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. ZPE-76-98-S (6 November 1998) (Annex 33);
Memorandu m fro m A mbassador of the Republic of Philippines in Beijing to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of the Ph ilippines, No. ZPE-77-98-S (9 November 1998) (Annex 34);
Memorandu m fro m the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines to the President of
the Republic of the Philippines (14 November 1998) (Annex 36); Memorandu m fro m A mbassador of the
Republic of Philippines in Beijing to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines,
No. ZPE-18-99-S (15 March 1999) (Annex 38); Republic of the Ph ilippines and Govern ment of the
Peoples Republic of China, Philippine-China Bilateral Consultations: Summary of Proceedings
(20-21 March 1995) (Annex 175); Govern ment of the Republic of the Ph ilippines and Government of the
Peoples Republic of Ch ina, Agreed Minutes on the First Philippines-China Bilateral Consultations on
the South China Sea Issue (10 August 1995) (Annex 180); Govern ment of the Republic of the
Philippines, Transcript of Proceedings Republic of the Philippines-Peoples Republic of China Bilateral
Talks (10 August 1995) (Annex 181)).
361 Memorial, 7.153.
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by the Philippines. As an initial step, however, the Tribunal considers it necessary to address
whether such possible issues of jurisdiction are even capable of being decided at this phase of
the arbitration or whether they are so interwoven with the merits that they should properly be
deferred for decision at a later stage.
1. Whether Issues of Jurisdiction Possess an Exclusively Preliminary Character
(a) The Applicable Legal Standard
380. Article 20(3) of the Rules of Procedure provides that the Tribunal shall rule on any plea
concerning its jurisdiction as a preliminary question unless it determines that the objection to
its jurisdiction does not possess an exclusively preliminary character, in which case it shall rule
on such a plea in conjunction with the merits. Thus, in Procedural Order No. 4, when the
Tribunal decided to treat Chinas communications as effectively constituting a plea on
jurisdiction and to hold a separate Hearing on Jurisdiction about those pleas and any other
jurisdictional issues, it noted that:
If the Arbitral Tribunal determines after the Hearing on Jurisdiction that there are
jurisdictional objections that do not possess an exclusively p reliminary character, then, in
accordance with Article 20(3) of the Rules of Procedure, such matters will be reserved for
consideration and decision at a later stage of the proceedings.365
381. The exclusively preliminary character test in Article 20(3) of the Rules of Procedure is
modelled on Article 79(9) of the Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice, which
provides that the Court may, after hearing the parties on any preliminary objections, issue a
judgment in which it declares that the objection does not possess, in the circumstances of the
case, an exclusively preliminary character. If the Court so rules, it shall proceed to fix time-
limits for the further proceedings.366
382. The Court has applied this rule on many occasions.367 Recently, in Territorial and Maritime
Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia),368 the Court summarised its approach as follows:
365 Procedural Order No. 4, 21 April 2015, para. 2.2.

366 ICJ Rules of Court, Article 79(9). For similar provision in the ITLOS Rules, see Article 97(6).
367 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 392 at pp. 425-26, para. 76 (Annex LA-13);
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
ICJ Reports 1998, p. 9 at pp. 28-29, para. 50 (Annex LA-24); Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v.
Nigeria), Preliminary Ob jections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1998, p. 275 at pp. 324-25, paras. 116-17
(Annex LA-25).
368 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judg ment,
ICJ Reports 2007, p. 832 at p. 850, para. 46.
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In principle, a party raising preliminary objections is entitled to have these objections

answered at the preliminary stage of the proceedings unless the Court does not have before
it all facts necessary to decide the questions raised or if answering the preliminary objection
would determine the dispute, or some elements thereof, on the merits.369
In brief, the accumulated jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice indicates that
whether or not a preliminary objection will be found, in the circumstances of a particular case,
to possess an exclusively preliminary character will depend on two types of enquiry: first,
whether the Tribunal has had the opportunity to examine all the necessary facts to dispose of the
preliminary objection; and second, whether the preliminary objection would entail prejudging
the dispute or some elements of the dispute on the merits.
383. Similar tests have been applied in the context of arbitration. For example, in Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
French Republic, the United Kingdom raised two objections to the admissibility of Frances
application to interpret a previous decision. The first, relating to the timeliness of the
application, was capable of being decided in the preliminary phase. However, the second,
relating to whether the application properly fell within the meaning of the interpretation
provision in the arbitration agreement, was held not to possess an exclusively preliminary
character and was deferred to the merits, because the issue raised by the objection was
intimately linked to the merits of the claim. 370 Similar issues arose in Guyana v. Suriname,
where the tribunal declined to convene a separate procedural phase to consider Surinames
jurisdictional objections because they did not possess an exclusively preliminary character.371
In contrast, in Arctic Sunrise, the tribunal dealt with one preliminary objection, relating to
disputes concerning law-enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or
jurisdiction, but deferred its consideration of other possible preliminary objections to the merits
phase.372
369 Ibid., para. 51 (internal citations omitted). See also Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean
(Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Object ions, Judgment, 24 September 2015, para. 53 (in wh ich the Court
found that it was not precluded fro m ruling on Ch iles objection at a preliminary stage because the Court
considers that it has all the facts necessary to rule on Chiles objection . . . .)
370 Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the French Republic, Award of 14 March 1978, RIAA Vo l. XVIII, p. 271 at pp. 290-291,
paras. 16-17.
371 Guyana v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Order No. 2 of 18 July 2005, para. 2. The tribunal in
Chagos Marine Protected Area likewise declined to conduct a separate jurisdictional phase of the United
Kingdoms objections. See Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), Award of
18 March 2015, paras. 28-31 (Annex LA-225), referencing Procedural Order No. 2 of 15 January 2013
(declining UKs application to hear preliminary objections relating to territorial sovereignty separately).
372 Arctic Sunrise (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Jurisdiction, Award of 26 November
2014 (Annex LA-180); Arctic Sunrise (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Merits,
Award of 14 August 2015, paras. 142-86.
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(b) The Parties Positions on the Link between Jurisdiction and the Merits
384. Prior to issuing Procedural Order No. 4, the Tribunal sought the views of the Parties on whether
it should bifurcate the proceedings into a preliminary phase on some or all issues of the
Tribunals jurisdiction and a separate subsequent phase on the merits. The Philippines also
addressed the question of whether any issue of jurisdiction was not of an exclusively
preliminary character in the course of the Hearing.
385. The Chinese Ambassadors First Letter of 6 February 2015 opposed several procedural options
raised by the Tribunal, but notably did not address the issue of bifurcation. 373 Chinas Position
Paper likewise did not express a view on the timing of the Tribunals consideration of its
jurisdiction. The Position Paper did, however, expressly and deliberately limit its arguments to
issues of jurisdiction only and excluded any consideration of the merits of the dispute. China
noted specifically that:
This Position Paper is intended to demonstrate that the arbitral tribunal established at the
request of the Philippines for the present arbitration (Arbit ral Tribunal) does not have
jurisdiction over this case. It does not express any position on the substantive issues related
to the subject-matter of the arbitration initiated by the Philippines.374
386. The Philippines position on the link between the Tribunals jurisdiction and the merits has
evolved in the course of these proceedings. Initially, the Philippines opposed any preliminary
consideration of matters of jurisdiction. In response to the Tribunals invitation, the Philippines
wrote to the Tribunal on 26 January 2015, expressing the view that it would be neither
appropriate nor desirable to conduct a separate jurisdictional phase.
387. According to the Philippines letter the jurisdictional issues in the case . . . are plainly
interwoven with the merits and the jurisdictional issues raised in the Chinese Position Paper
depend in significant measure [on] the same facts and arguments on which the merits of the
case depend. They therefore do not possess an exclusively preliminary character, making
bifurcation inappropriate. For example, the Philippines noted that the extent to which
Article 298(1) poses a jurisdictional bar turns on the scope of the phrase historic titles in
Article 298, and . . . the nature of Chinas claims, both of which can only be decided by
reference to the substance of Chinas claim. Similarly, the Philippines commented that
questions about Article 297(1) can only be answered in light of the specific nature of Chinas
environmentally harmful conduct in the South China Sea and questions about Article 298(1)(b)
can only be answered in light of the character of Chinas relevant conduct as either military or
373 Letter fro m the Chinese Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, addressed to the individual
members of the Tribunal, 6 February 2015.
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non-military in nature. According to the Philippines, such questions can only be assessed in
light of the merits of the Philippines claims and thus lack an exclusively preliminary nature.
As to the core jurisdictional contentions in Chinas Position Paper, the Philippines observed
that whether its claims truly implicate questions of territorial sovereignty and/or maritime
delimitation . . . can only be decided by reference to the nature and substance of the claims of
the Philippines on the merits.375
388. At the Hearing, however, the Philippines argued that there was no need to defer any question of
jurisdiction for further consideration with the merits. The Tribunals list of possible issues to
address at the Hearing included the question whether any potential issue of jurisdiction or
admissibility does not possess an exclusively preliminary character, such that it should be
deferred for consideration in conjunction with the merits of the Philippines claims. During the
Hearing, counsel for the Philippines responded: We say there are none.376 The Philippines
went on to emphasise that the position of the Philippines was that all issues of jurisdiction
argued during the Hearing could and should be resolved at this stage of the proceedings.377
389. Notwithstanding some inconsistency, the Tribunal understands the latter view, expressed in the
course of the Hearing, to represent the position of the Philippines on this question.
(c) Tribunals Decision
390. The basic principle governing the handling of jurisdictional issues before an international
tribunal is straightforward: a State should not have to give an account of itself on issues of
merits before a tribunal which lacks jurisdiction in the matter, or whose jurisdiction has not yet
been established.378 In furtherance of this principle, the International Court of Justice has
stated that a party raising preliminary objections will have these objections answered at the
preliminary stage of the proceedings unless the Court does not have before it all facts necessary
to decide the questions raised or if answering the preliminary objection would determine the
dispute, or some elements thereof, on the merits.379 The Rules of Procedure adopted by this
Tribunal similarly call for it to rule on any plea concerning its jurisdiction as a preliminary
question, unless the Arbitral Tribunal determines, after seeking the views of the Parties, that
the objection to its jurisdiction does not possess an exclusively preliminary character.
375 Philippines Letter of 26 January 2015.
378 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1972,
p. 46 at p. 56.
379 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) Preliminary Ob jections, Judgment, ICJ
Reports 2007, p. 832 at p. 852, para. 51.
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391. Having determined that Chinas Position Paper and its communications effectively constitute a
plea concerning the Tribunals jurisdiction, 380 the Tribunal bifurcated these proceedings to
consider the question of its jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Philippines claims as a
preliminary matter. In the Tribunals view, the objections to jurisdiction set out in Chinas
Position Paper concerning the characterisation of the dispute and the Philippines compliance
with Section 1 of Part XV of the Convention are exclusively preliminary in nature, and the
Tribunal has accordingly proceeded to reach decisions on these objections in Chapters V
and VII of this Award.
392. The Tribunal considers that it is likewise incumbent on it to address any issue of jurisdiction not
raised by Chinaand to satisfy itself as to whether it has jurisdiction over the disputein this
preliminary phase to the greatest extent possible. Nevertheless, the Tribunal considers that the
remaining issues, in particular the limitations and exceptions to jurisdiction in Articles 297 and
298, are in significant respects interwoven with the merits, for the following reasons, inter alia.
393. First, the Tribunals jurisdiction to decide on the merits of some of the Philippines Submissions
may depend upon the nature and validity of any claim by China to historic rights in the South
China Sea. The nature of such historic rights may determine whether the Parties dispute is
covered by the exclusion from jurisdiction of historic bays or titles in Article 298 and also
whether a situation of overlapping entitlement to maritime zones exists in the areas in which
certain Chinese activities are alleged to have occurred. The possible existence of any
overlapping entitlements would, in turn, potentially impact the application of other limitations
and exceptions in Articles 297 and 298. The Philippines has requested the Tribunal to address
both the nature and validity of any Chinese historic rights in its Submission No. 2. This,
however, is a merits determination that the Tribunal cannot make at this point in the
proceedings.
394. Second, the Tribunals jurisdiction to decide on the merits of some of the Philippines
Submissions may depend upon the status of certain maritime features in the South China Sea.
Specifically, if (contrary to the Philippines position) any maritime feature in the Spratly Islands
constitutes an island within the meaning of Article 121 of the Convention, generating an
entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, it may be the case that the
Philippines and China possess overlapping entitlements to maritime zones in the relevant areas
of the South China Sea. In that case, the Tribunal may not be able to reach the merits of certain
of the Philippines Submissions (Nos. 5, 8, and 9) without first delimiting the Parties
overlapping entitlements, a step that it cannot take in light of Article 298 and Chinas
380 Procedural Order No. 4, 21 April 2015, para. 1.1.
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declaration. The Philippines has specifically requested the Tribunal to determine the status of a
number of maritime features and has argued generally that no maritime feature in the South
China Sea generates more than a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. This, however, is a merits
determination that the Tribunal cannot make at this point in the proceedings.
395. Third, the Tribunals jurisdiction to decide on the merits of some of the Philippines
Submissions (Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 13) may depend on the maritime zone in which alleged Chinese
law enforcement activities in fact took place. Specifically, the exclusion from jurisdiction in
Article 298 for disputes relating to law enforcement activities may apply to the extent that such
law enforcement activities took place within Chinas exclusive economic zone or in an area in
which the Parties possess overlapping entitlements to an exclusive economic zone. As already
noted, whether any maritime feature claimed by China generates a possible entitlement to an
exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, and whether any situation of overlapping
entitlements exists as a result, is a merits determination that the Tribunal cannot make at this
point in the proceedings.
396. Fourth, the Tribunals jurisdiction to decide on the merits of some of the Philippines
Submissions may depend upon whether certain Chinese activities are military in nature. If so,
the exclusion from jurisdiction in Article 298 for disputes relating to military activities may bar
the Tribunals jurisdiction. The Philippines has requested the Tribunal to address certain
Chinese activities at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal in its Submissions No. 12 and 14.
The nature of such activities, however, is a merits determination that the Tribunal cannot make
at this point in the proceedings.
2. The Tribunals Conclusions on its Jurisdiction
397. Having considered the application of Articles 297 and 298 of the Convention and the possible
effects of merits issues on the extent of its jurisdiction, the Tribunal decides with respect to its
jurisdiction as follows.
398. The Philippines Submission No. 1 reflects a dispute concerning the source of maritime
entitlements in the South China Sea and the role of the Convention. This is not a dispute
concerning sovereignty or maritime boundary delimitation, nor is it barred from the Tribunals
consideration by any requirement of Section 1 of Part XV. The Philippines Submission No. 1
does, however, require the Tribunal to consider the effect of any historic rights claimed by
China to maritime entitlements in the South China Sea and the interaction of such rights with
the provisions of the Convention. This is a dispute concerning the interpretation and application
of the Convention. The Tribunals jurisdiction to consider this question, however, would be
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dependent on the nature of any such historic rights and whether they are covered by the
exclusion from jurisdiction over historic bays or titles in Article 298. The nature and validity
of any historic rights claimed by China is a merits determination. The possible jurisdictional
objections with respect to the dispute underlying Submission No. 1 therefore do not possess an
exclusively preliminary character. Accordingly, the Tribunal reserves a decision on its
jurisdiction with respect to the Philippines Submission No. 1 for consideration in
conjunction with the merits of the Philippines claims.
399. The Philippines Submission No. 2 reflects the same dispute concerning the source of maritime
entitlements in the South China Sea and the role of the Convention as Submission No. 1.
Again, this is not a dispute concerning sovereignty or maritime boundary delimitation, nor is it
barred from the Tribunals consideration by any requirement of Section 1 of Part XV. The
Philippines Submission No. 2 directly requests the Tribunal to determine the legal validity of
any claim by China to historic rights in the South China Sea. This is a dispute concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention. The Tribunals jurisdiction to consider this
question, however, would be dependent on the nature of any such historic rights and whether
they are covered by the exclusion from jurisdiction over historic bays or titles in Article 298.
The nature and validity of any historic rights claimed by China is a merits determination. The
possible jurisdictional objections with respect to the dispute underlying Submission No. 2
therefore do not possess an exclusively preliminary character. Accordingly, the Tribunal
reserves a decision on its jurisdiction with respect to the Philippines Submission No. 2 for
consideration in conjunction with the merits of the Philippines claims.
400. The Philippines Submission No. 3 reflects a dispute concerning the status of Scarborough
Shoal as an island or rock within the meaning of Article 121 of the Convention and is not
barred from the Tribunals consideration by any requirement of Section 1 of Part XV. This is
not a dispute concerning sovereignty over the feature, which would remain entirely unaffected
by the Tribunals determination. Nor is this a dispute concerning sea boundary delimitation:
given that Scarborough Shoal lies over 200 nautical miles from any maritime feature claimed by
any State to generate an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, no delimitation is
required before the Tribunal may determine the status of Scarborough Shoal, nor is any
delimitation potentially relevant to the determination. Article 298 does not, therefore, limit the
Tribunals jurisdiction. Nor is any other exception or limitation in Article 297 or 298
potentially applicable to the status of Scarborough Shoal. Accordingly, the Tribunal
concludes that it has jurisdiction to address the matters raised in the Philippines
Submission No. 3.
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401. The Philippines Submission No. 4 reflects a dispute concerning the status of Mischief Reef,
Second Thomas Shoal, and Subi Reef as low-tide elevations within the meaning of Article 13
of the Convention and is not barred from the Tribunals consideration by any requirement of
Section 1 of Part XV. Low-tide elevations do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea,
exclusive economic zone, or continental shelf. This is not a dispute concerning sovereignty
over the features, notwithstanding any possible question concerning whether low-tide elevations
may be subjected to a claim of territorial sovereignty. Nor is this a dispute concerning sea
boundary delimitation: the status of a feature as a low-tide elevation, island, or a rock
relates to the entitlement to maritime zones generated by that feature, not to the delimitation of
such entitlements in the event that they overlap. If, however, China has an entitlement to an
exclusive economic zone or to a continental shelf overlapping that of the Philippines in the area
of Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, or Subi Reef, the Tribunal considers that the existence
of overlapping entitlements may have practical considerations for the selection of the vertical
datum and tidal model against which the status of the features is to be assessed. This may be
particularly true if the Parties respective data and models indicate differing results.
Accordingly, subject to a caveat with respect to the possible effects of any overlapping
entitlements, the Tribunal concludes that it has jurisdiction to address the matters raised
in the Philippines Submission No. 4.
402. The Philippines Submission No. 5 reflects a dispute concerning the sources of maritime
entitlements in the South China Sea and whether a situation of overlapping entitlements to an
exclusive economic zone or to a continental shelf exists in the area of Mischief Reef and Second
Thomas Shoal. This dispute is not barred from the Tribunals consideration by any requirement
of Section 1 of Part XV and is not a dispute concerning sovereignty over the feature,
notwithstanding any possible question concerning whether low-tide elevations may be subjected
to a claim of territorial sovereignty. Nor is this a dispute concerning sea boundary delimitation:
the premise of the Philippines Submission is not that the Tribunal will delimit any overlapping
entitlements in order to declare that these features form part of the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf of the Philippines, but rather that no overlapping entitlements can exist. If,
however, another maritime feature claimed by China within 200 nautical miles of Mischief Reef
or Second Thomas Shoal were to be an island for the purposes of Article 121, capable of
generating an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, the resulting
overlap and the exclusion of boundary delimitation from the Tribunals jurisdiction by
Article 298 would prevent the Tribunal from addressing this Submission. Whether this is the
case depends upon a merits determination on the status of maritime features in the South China
Sea. The possible jurisdictional objections with respect to the dispute underlying Submission
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No. 5 therefore do not possess an exclusively preliminary character. Accordingly, the

Tribunal reserves a decision on its jurisdiction with respect to the Philippines Submission
No. 5 for consideration in conjunction with the merits of the Philippines claims.
403. The Philippines Submission No. 6 reflects a dispute concerning the status of Gaven Reef and
McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) as low-tide elevations within the meaning of
Article 13 of the Convention and is not barred from the Tribunals consideration by any
requirement of Section 1 of Part XV. Low-tide elevations do not generate entitlement to a
territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or continental shelf. This is not a dispute concerning
sovereignty over the features, notwithstanding any possible question concerning whether low-
tide elevations may be subjected to a claim of territorial sovereignty. Nor is this a dispute
concerning sea boundary delimitation: the status of a feature as a low-tide elevation, island,
or a rock relates to the entitlement to maritime zones generated by that feature, not to the
delimitation of such entitlements in the event that they overlap. If, however, China has
entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or to a continental shelf overlapping that of the
Philippines in the area of Gaven Reef or McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef), the Tribunal
considers that the existence of overlapping entitlements may have practical considerations for
the selection of the vertical datum and tidal model against which the status of the features is to
be assessed. This may be particularly true if the Parties respective data and models indicate
differing results. Accordingly, subject to a caveat with respect to the possible effects of any
overlapping entitlements, the Tribunal concludes that it has jurisdiction to address the
matters raised in the Philippines Submission No. 6.
404. The Philippines Submission No. 7 reflects a dispute concerning the status of Johnson Reef,
Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef as islands or rocks within the meaning of Article 121
of the Convention. This dispute is not barred from the Tribunals consideration by any
requirement of Section 1 of Part XV and is not a dispute concerning sovereignty over the
features, which would remain entirely unaffected by the Tribunals determination. Nor is this a
dispute concerning sea boundary delimitation: the status of a feature as an island or a rock
relates to the entitlement to maritime zones generated by that feature, not to the delimitation of
such entitlements in the event that they overlap. Article 298 does not, therefore, limit the
Tribunals jurisdiction. Nor is any other exception or limitation in Article 297 or 298
potentially applicable to the status of Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, or Fiery Cross Reef.
Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that it has jurisdiction to address the matters raised
in the Philippines Submission No. 7.
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405. The Philippines Submission No. 8 reflects a dispute concerning Chinas actions that allegedly
interfere with the Philippines petroleum exploration, seismic surveys, and fishing in what the
Philippines claims as its exclusive economic zone. This is not a dispute concerning sovereignty
or maritime boundary delimitation, nor is it barred from the Tribunals consideration by any
requirement of Section 1 of Part XV. The premise of the Philippines submission is that no
overlapping entitlements exist because only the Philippines possesses an entitlement to an
exclusive economic zone in the relevant areas. If, however, another maritime feature claimed
by China within 200 nautical miles of these areas were to be an island for the purposes of
Article 121, capable of generating an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf, the resulting overlap and the exclusion of boundary delimitation from the Tribunals
jurisdiction by Article 298 would prevent the Tribunal from addressing this Submission.
Whether this is the case depends upon a merits determination on the status of maritime features
in the South China Sea. The possible jurisdictional objections with respect to the dispute
underlying Submission No. 8 therefore do not possess an exclusively preliminary character.
Accordingly, the Tribunal reserves a decision on its jurisdiction with respect to the
Philippines Submission No. 8 for consideration in conjunction with the merits of the
Philippines claims.
406. The Philippines Submission No. 9 reflects a dispute concerning Chinese fishing activities in
what the Philippines claims as its exclusive economic zone. This is not a dispute concerning
sovereignty or maritime boundary delimitation, nor is it barred from the Tribunals
consideration by any requirement of Section 1 of Part XV. Article 297 and 298, however,
would restrict the Tribunals jurisdiction over fishing and fisheries-related law enforcement in
the event that the relevant areas formed part of Chinas exclusive economic zone. The premise
of the Philippines submission is that no overlapping entitlements exist because only the
Philippines possesses an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone in the relevant areas. If,
however, another maritime feature claimed by China within 200 nautical miles of these areas
were to be an island for the purposes of Article 121, capable of generating an entitlement to
an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, the resulting overlap and the exclusion of
boundary delimitation from the Tribunals jurisdiction by Article 298 would prevent the
Tribunal from addressing this Submission. Whether this is the case depends upon a merits
determination on the status of maritime features in the South China Sea. The possible
jurisdictional objections with respect to the dispute underlying Submission No. 9 therefore do
not possess an exclusively preliminary character. Accordingly, the Tribunal reserves a
decision on its jurisdiction with respect to the Philippines Submission No. 9 for
consideration in conjunction with the merits of the Philippines claims.
144
29 October 2015
407. The Philippines Submission No. 10 reflects a dispute concerning Chinas actions that allegedly
interfere with the traditional fishing activities of Philippine nationals at Scarborough Shoal.
This is not a dispute concerning sovereignty or maritime boundary delimitation, nor is it barred
from the Tribunals consideration by any requirement of Section 1 of Part XV. The Philippines
has clarified that these activities occur within the 12 nautical mile territorial sea that would be
generated by Scarborough Shoal irrespective of whether the feature were considered to be a
rock or island pursuant to Article 121 of the Convention. The Tribunal notes that traditional
fishing rights may exist even within the territorial waters of another State381 and considers that
its jurisdiction to address this dispute is not dependent on a prior determination of sovereignty
over Scarborough Shoal. Articles 297 and 298 of the Convention have no application in the
Territorial Sea and thus impose no limitation on the Tribunals jurisdiction. Accordingly, to
the extent that the claimed rights and alleged interference occurred within the territorial
sea of Scarborough Shoal, the Tribunal concludes that it has jurisdiction to address the
matters raised in the Philippines Submission No. 10.
408. The Philippines Submission No. 11 reflects a dispute concerning the protection and
preservation of the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal and
the application of Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention. This is not a dispute concerning
sovereignty or maritime boundary delimitation, nor is it barred from the Tribunals
consideration by any requirement of Section 1 of Part XV. Depending on the Tribunals
ultimate decision on the status of these features, the basis for its jurisdiction may differ:
(a) To the extent that the alleged harmful activities took place in the territorial sea
surrounding Scarborough Shoal, or in any territorial sea generated by Second Thomas
Shoal, the Tribunal notes that the environmental provisions of the Convention impose
obligations on States Parties including in the territorial sea. The Tribunals jurisdiction is
thus not dependent on a prior determination of the status of Second Thomas Shoal or of
sovereignty over either feature, and Articles 297 and 298 of the Convention have no
application in the territorial sea.
(b) To the extent that the alleged harmful activities took place in the exclusive economic
zone of the Philippines, of China, or in an area of overlapping entitlements, the Tribunal
notes that Article 297(1)(c) expressly affirms the Tribunals jurisdiction over disputes
concerning the alleged violation of specified international rules and standards for the
protection and preservation of the marine environment in the exclusive economic zone.
381 Eritrea/Yemen, Award of the Arb itral Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings (Territorial
Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute), 9 October 1998, PCA Award Series at p. 145, paras. 525-26,
RIAA Vol. XXII, p. 209 at pp. 329-30, paras. 525-26 (Annex LA-48).
145
29 October 2015
Under neither circumstance, however, is jurisdiction precluded. The Tribunals jurisdiction is

thus not dependent on a prior determination of the status of any maritime feature, on the
existence of an entitlement by China to an exclusive economic zone in the area, or on the prior
delimitation of any overlapping entitlements. Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that it has
jurisdiction to address the matters raised in the Philippines Submission No. 11.
409. The Philippines Submission No. 12 reflects a dispute concerning Chinas activities on Mischief
Reef and their effects on the marine environment. This is not a dispute concerning sovereignty
or maritime boundary delimitation, nor is it barred from the Tribunals consideration by any
requirement of Section 1 of Part XV. However, the Tribunals jurisdiction to address these
questions is dependent on the status of Mischief Reef as an island, rock, or low-tide
elevation. If the Tribunal were to findcontrary to the premise of the Philippines
Submissionthat Mischief Reef is an island or rock and thus constitutes land territory, the
Tribunal would lack jurisdiction to consider the lawfulness of Chinas construction activities or
the appropriation of the feature. The status of Mischief Reef is a matter for the merits.
Additionally, Article 298 excludes disputes concerning military activities from the Tribunals
jurisdiction. The Tribunal considers that the specifics of Chinas activities on Mischief Reef
and whether such activities are military in nature to be a matter best assessed in conjunction
with the merits. The possible jurisdictional objections with respect to the dispute underlying
Submission No. 12 therefore do not possess an exclusively preliminary character. Accordingly,
the Tribunal reserves a decision on its jurisdiction with respect to the Philippines
Submission No. 12 for consideration in conjunction with the merits of the Philippines
claims.
410. The Philippines Submission No. 13 reflects a dispute concerning the operation of Chinas law
enforcement activities in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal and the application of Articles 21,
24, and 94 of the Convention. This is not a dispute concerning sovereignty or maritime
boundary delimitation, nor is it barred from the Tribunals consideration by any requirement of
Section 1 of Part XV. The Tribunal understands this dispute to relate principally to events
occurring in the territorial sea surrounding Scarborough Shoal and notes that Article 298(1)(b)
has no application in the territorial sea. The Tribunal further notes that the provisions of the
Convention invoked by the Philippines impose duties on both the coastal State and on vessels
engaged in innocent passage. The Tribunals jurisdiction is thus not dependent on a prior
determination of sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal. Accordingly, to the extent that the
claimed rights and alleged interference occurred within the territorial sea of Scarborough
Shoal, the Tribunal concludes that it has jurisdiction to address the matters raised in the
Philippines Submission No. 13.
146
29 October 2015
411. The Philippines Submission No. 14 reflects a dispute concerning Chinas activities in and
around Second Thomas Shoal and Chinas interaction with the Philippine military forces
stationed on the Shoal. This is not a dispute concerning sovereignty or maritime boundary
delimitation, nor is it barred from the Tribunals consideration by any requirement of Section 1
of Part XV. However, the Tribunals jurisdiction to address these questions may depend on the
status of Second Thomas Shoal as an island, rock, or low-tide elevation, which is a matter
for the merits. Additionally, Article 298 excludes disputes concerning military activities from
the Tribunals jurisdiction. The Tribunal considers the specifics of Chinas activities in and
around Second Thomas Shoal and whether such activities are military in nature to be a matter
best assessed in conjunction with the merits. The possible jurisdictional objections with respect
to the dispute underlying Submission No. 14 therefore do not possess an exclusively
preliminary character. Accordingly, the Tribunal reserves a decision on its jurisdiction with
respect to the Philippines Submission No. 14 for consideration in conjunction with the
merits of the Philippines claims.
412. The Tribunal has not, so far, addressed the question of its jurisdiction in relation to the
Philippines Submission No. 15, requesting a declaration that China shall desist from further
unlawful claims and activities. In the Tribunals view, the claims and activities to which this
Submission could potentially relate are unclear from the Philippines pleadings to date. The
Tribunal is therefore presently unable to determine whether there exists a dispute between the
Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention or to assess the scope of
the Tribunals jurisdiction in this respect. The Tribunal therefore directs the Philippines to
clarify the content and narrow the scope of its Submission No. 15. The Tribunal reserves
the question of its jurisdiction in relation to Submission No. 15 for consideration in
conjunction with the merits of the Philippines claims.
* * *
147
29 October 2015
148
29 October 2015
IX. DECISION
413. For the above reasons, the Tribunal unanimously:
A. FINDS that the Tribunal was properly constituted in accordance with Annex VII to the
Convention.
B. FINDS that Chinas non-appearance in these proceedings does not deprive the Tribunal
of jurisdiction.
C. FINDS that the Philippines act of initiating this arbitration did not constitute an abuse of
process.
D. FINDS that there is no indispensable third party whose absence deprives the Tribunal of
jurisdiction.
E. FINDS that the 2002 ChinaASEAN Declaration on Conduct of the Parties in the South
China Sea, the joint statements of the Parties referred to in paragraphs 231 to 232 of this
Award, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the Convention on
Biological Diversity, do not preclude, under Articles 281 or 282 of the Convention,
recourse to the compulsory dispute settlement procedures available under Section 2 of
Part XV of the Convention.
F. FINDS that the Parties have exchanged views as required by Article 283 of the
Convention.
G. FINDS that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the Philippines Submissions No. 3,
4, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 13, subject to the conditions noted in
paragraphs 400, 401, 403, 404, 407, 408, and 410 of this Award.
H. FINDS that a determination of whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the
Philippines Submissions No. 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 12, and 14 would involve consideration of
issues that do not possess an exclusively preliminary character, and accordingly
RESERVES consideration of its jurisdiction to rule on Submissions No. 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 12,
and 14 to the merits phase.
I. DIRECTS the Philippines to clarify the content and narrow the scope of its
Submission 15 and RESERVES consideration of its jurisdiction over Submission No. 15
to the merits phase.
J. RESERVES for further consideration and directions all issues not decided in this Award.
149
29 October 2015
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PCA Case N 2013-19

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED UNDER ANNEX VII TO THE

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

AWARD ON JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY

Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Presiding Arbitrator)

Permanent Court of Arbitration

REPRES ENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Mr. Florin T. Hilbay No agents or representatives appointed

COUNS EL AND ADVOCATES

Mr. Paul S. Reichler

Professor Bernard H. Oxman

Professor Philippe Sands QC

Professor Alan Boyle

4. Application of Article 281 to the CBD ......................................................................................... 101

TABLE OF FIGURES AND M APS

Figure 1 The South China Sea (Memorial, Figure 2.1)

GLOS S ARY OF DEFINED TERMS

ASEAN The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

GLOS S ARY OF GEOGRAPHIC NAMES MENTIONED IN THIS AWARD

English Name Chinese Name Filipino Name

Figure 1: The South China Sea (Memorial, Figure 2.1)

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17. This Award is structured as follows.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. INITIATION OF THE ARBITRATION

The Philippines also stressed that it:

B. CONS TITUTION OF THE TRIBUNAL

C. ADMINIS TRATIVE DIRECTIVE NO . 1, PROCEDURAL ORDER NO . 1, AND RULES OF PROCEDURE

1. Scope and Dates of July Hearing

1.4 Notwithstanding its decision that Chinas co mmunications effectively constitute a

2. Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility

F. PRE-HEARING PROCEDURES AND REQUES TS FROM OTHER STATES

G. HEARING ON J URIS DICTION AND ADMIS S IBILITY

Representatives of the Philippines

Attorney Josel Mostajo

Counsel and Advocates

Delegations from Observer States

Socialist Republic of Viet Nam

Permanent Court of Arbitration

H. POS T-HEARING PROCEEDINGS

I. DEPOS ITS FOR COS TS OF THE ARBITRATION

III. RELIEF REQUESTED AND SUBMISSIONS

Declares that the Philippines is entitled under UNCLOS to a 12 M Territorial Sea, a

Requires that China desist from these unlawful activities.5

2. Chinas decision not to appear has no effect on the Tribunals jurisdiction;

4. The Philippines fulfilled the requirement to engage in an exchange of views with

3) Scarborough Shoal generates no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or

5 Notification and Amended Statement of Claim, pp. 17-19.

12) Chinas occupation and construction activities on Mischief Reef

(a) violate the provisions of the Convention concerning artificial islands,

(c) constitute unlawful acts of attempted appropriation in v iolation of the

(b) preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed at

(c) endangering the health and well-being of Ph ilippine personnel stationed at