Royal Institute of Philosophy

The Problem of Justice in Plato's Republic

Author(s): B. M. Laing
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 32 (Oct., 1933), pp. 412-421
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3746533
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 THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE IN PLATO'S
REPUBLIC
B. M. LAING, M.A., D. Litt.

IT is well known to readers of the Republic that, according to

Plato's representation, a casual meeting of several friends develops
into a sederunt for the express purpose of finding a solution to the
question, what is justice ? The question has its origin in the remark
of the aged Cephalus, quoting Pindar, that whoever lives a life
of justice and holiness,
Sweet hope, the nourisher of age, his heart
Delighting, with him lives; which most of all
Governs the many veering thoughts of man.

The subsequent argument and treatment of the problem have been

so frequently and ably discussed as to make any further discussion
seem commonplace and superfluous. The only plea that can be offered
here for returning to a well-worn theme is that the Republic is so
stimulating and provocative of thought that it will always repay
effort expended upon it. The discussion carried on in the Republic
is many-sided in its nature and strikes different minds in various
ways.
The point which is to be considered here is a limited one; and
though at first sight it seems a minor one, yet when carefully
examined it will be seen to be much more significant in its relevance.
The Republic, like many other of the Platonic dialogues, introduces
analogies from the arts; and this is particularly marked in the case
of the first and part of the second books. What, then, is to be con-
sidered here is the bearing of these analogies from the arts upon
the course of the argument and finally upon the solution offered
concerning the nature of justice. The aim of the present paper is
to show that in the Republic the course of the argument leads away
from the conception of justice as an art, that conception being
indefensible and based upon a misunderstanding of the question at
issue, and, instead, proceeds towards the elucidation and defence
of the view that justice is the principle which co-ordinates different
arts.
The method of discussion employed is well known. Definitions of
justice are proffered, and they are taken by Socrates and carefully
analysed in order that their tenability may be found. When one is
found indefensible, it is rejected. Though the result is thus negative,
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 THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

the discussion has not been fruitless, for, besides conducing to

intellectual clearness, the course of the analysis serves to suggest a
fresh possible solution. Nevertheless, the preliminary part of the
inquiry ends negatively, for no satisfactory answer to the question
has been found. That justice is truth-speaking or payment of debts,
that it is the giving to each man his due, or doing good to friends
and injury to enemies, that justice is the interest of the stronger or
of the ruler, that justice is something artificial or conventional-all
such views are untenable.
The impression which the Republic is apt to make upon many
readers at first is unfavourable. The procedure of Socrates is felt to
be somehow unsatisfactory. They have a secret, if not openly ex-
pressed, sympathy with Thrasymachus in his outburst against
Socrates. Their attitude is quite well stated in the sixth book by
Adeimantus. "Indeed, Socrates, no one is able to contradict you
as to these things; but all who hear you at any time advancing
what you do at present, are somehow affected in this manner.
Being led off a little by your reasoning on each question, through
their inexperience in this method of question and answer, when all
these littles are collected together, at the close of your reasonings,
they reckon that the mistake appears considerable, and the contrary
of their first concessions; and like those who play at talus with such
as are dexterous, but are themselves unskilful, they are in the
end shut up, and can do no more."
It is also true that Socrates seems to readers of the Republic at
first to fall into a serious contradiction. He is at great pains to refute
the doctrine of Thrasymachus that justice is the rule of the stronger
for their own advantage, and that hence rulers rule in their own
interest, while later in the Republic he declares that the source of
all instability in the community lies in the fact that rulers who have
families or who are owners of property tend to think first of their
own family or property interests. In consequence of this a communis-
tic scheme is formulated whereby the source of disorder in the State
will be eliminated. The behaviour of the rulers in looking after their
own interests is stated by Socrates as a fact evidenced by experience;
and it is this experienced fact on which Thrasymachus undoubtedly
bases his own theory of justice.
It is quite easy, however, to clear Socrates of the charge of contra-
diction. He can quite well admit that, as a matter of fact, rulers do
govern for their own advantage, and yet refuse to accept the defini-
tion of Thrasymachus. One point that might be, and is in fact one
of the important points, raised and discussed is the meaning to be
attached to the phrase "their own advantage." What is a person's
own advantage? Wherein does it lie? A second point, and one
immediately relevant to the purpose of the present paper, is that
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 PHILOSOPHY

for Socrates the experienced matter of fact is a fact of misgovern-

ment and thus of injustice; and what he is maintaining is that justice
cannot be defined by reference to instances which are really cases of
injustice. The fulfilment of a function cannot be equated to the
non-fulfilment of the function in question. And Thrasymachus has
fallen into this confusion.
The refutation of the view of Thrasymachus, as well as the refu-
tation of the other definitions of justice, is effected by means of
analogies from the arts-the art of medicine, the art of the shepherd,
the art of navigation, and so on. They are used to elucidate the
validity of successive definitions of justice. Their use gives to the
argument a certain character, one almost of quibbling, with which
the average modern reader is impatient. But this impatience arises
from a failure to appreciate properly the level on which the argument
is conducted.
In the first place, the definitions of justice propounded and
examined are all ordinary commonplaces of unenlightened and
unreflective current moral opinion. The exception to this, it might
be held, is the doctrine put forward by Thrasymachus and the
theory formulated by Glaucon. These two views may be considered
as laying claim to being scientific and philosophical, seeing that they
were maintained and defended in Sophistic circles. But, on the other
hand, if, as has been held, the power of the Sophists and the appeal
which they made to the mass of the people were due to the fact
that they were astute enough to gauge mass-opinion and to restate
that opinion, though in a more attractive rhetorical form, to the
multitude, then there is no special reason to differentiate between
the views. The argument is conducted by Socrates upon the basis
of the prevalent assumptions associated with these definitions.
The use of analogies from the arts is quite in accordance with these
assumptions; and it is significant that none of the audience, not
even Thrasymachus, calls in question their use. There is no evidence
that Socrates himself really believes in the usefulness of these
analogies for a finally satisfactory solution of the question concerning
the nature of justice. It is true that he does make use of them,
but in doing so he is meeting his opponents on their own ground
and by arguments which are comprehensible by them. He is con-
founding them out of their own mouth.
In the second place, while it is possible that the tone of the dis-
cussion is determined by considerations of literary presentation,
the intention being to show the skill of Socrates in refuting oppo-
nents, yet it is more probable that the discussion has the definitely
serious purpose of overthrowing prevalent conceptions and of
preparing the way for a truer conception and a more adequate
statement of its nature. As is shown in the case of the definition
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 THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

suggested by Thrasymachus, the analogy used can be turned right

round and made to refute the view of justice which it was intended
to support. The arts of the shepherd, of the medical man, of the
pilot, are shown to imply that persons fulfilling these functions,
and hence persons fulfilling the function of government, seek not
their own advantage but the advantage of those on whom their
skill is directed. It is true that Thrasymachus tries to rule out any
reference to "what ought to be"; but Socrates insists on tying him
down to his own expressed principle that function must be con-
sidered strictly in terms of function. The skill involved in, and
necessary to, the pursuit of an art is, further, neutral in regard to
the use to which it is put; the efficient medical man, while skilled
for the purpose of healing the body, can equally use that skill for
effecting the death of a patient, and may thus prove the most efficient
murderer. Now, it was a prevalent view that politics or government
was an art; and consequently the careful, and what seems to many
the tedious, examination of these analogies shows that something
is lacking in the generally accepted conception of politics; for if it
is so understood, government can be equally just and unjust, this
implying that government and misgovernment are one and the same
thing.
In the third place, the nature of the discussion is limited by the
intellectual level of the members present at the debate. They show
no comprehension of the real nature of the question at issue, and are
not aware of the kind of answer required. Thrasymachus falls into
error and is unable to stand up to Socrates because he, equally with
the others, fails in this respect. Socrates, on the other hand, under-
stands the problem fully and conceives it in a totally different manner
from the others; and it is because he does so and is aware of the formal
characteristics which the answer must possess that he is able to
play with the various proffered solutions and to throw his opponents
into intellectual confusion. This is really the most vital feature
of the preliminary discussion in the Republic, and it is this which
accounts for the helplessness of those taking part in the examination
of the problem.
The type of question asked, namely, what is justice? is similar to
that of questions raised in other dialogues. It is analogous to the
question, what is knowledge ? raised and considered in the Theaetetus.
In the latter dialogue Theaetetus at first misunderstands the question,
just as the various characters do in the Republic concerning justice.
He gives the answer that "geometry and all the things you spoke of
just now-and also cobblery and the other craftsmen's arts, each
and all of these are nothing else but knowledge." But Socrates draws
his attention to the fact that he was asked for one thing and that he
has stated a variety of things. "The question, Theaetetus, was not
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 PHILOSOPHY

to what knowledge belongs, nor how many the forms of knowledge

are; for we do not wish to number them, but to find out what know-
ledge itself really is. .... If any one should ask us about some
common everyday thing, for instance, what clay is, and we should
reply that it is the potters' clay and the oven-makers' clay and the
brickmakers' clay, should we not be ridiculous?" Theaetetus is
brought to see what exactly is asked, being helped by the study of
problems and the search for solutions in the course of his own
mathematical investigations.
In the Republic the nature of the question at issue and the kind of
answer required are not explicitly raised and discussed as they are
in the Theaetetus. The reason why they are not raised, when by so
doing Socrates could have clarified the discussion, cannot be stated.
It may be a matter of literary presentation or of expository method,
or, more probably, it may be that the point would have been too
difficult for the comprehension of the hearers and the procedure is
adapted to their intelligence. It has to be remembered, on the other
hand, that Theaetetus is represented as a brilliant young mathe-
matician, and that Socrates considers his ability such as to enable
him to appreciate and understand the point raised. Socrates never
points out that the definitions offered concerning justice are not
answers to the real question asked, even though they are on a level
with, and as ridiculous as, the answer at first volunteered by Theae-
tetus to the question asked him. To say that justice is paying one's
debts, or that it is doing good to one's friends and injury to one's
enemies, is on a level with saying that clay is potters' clay. The
proffered definitions are all instances of justice. The answer amounts
to nothing else than that to pay one's debts is just or to do good to
one's friends and injury to one's enemies is just, and carries one no
nearer to a conception of the nature of justice. Even if it is admitted
that the instances cited are really instances of justice, there still
remains the question as to what is the nature of this justness which
makes the payment of one's debts just. There are many specific
acts which can be called just; but what is wanted is an answer to the
question, what is the nature of that quality which they all possess
and in virtue of which they are said to be just? Because of this
misconception of the question at issue, Socrates directs his criticism
mainly to showing that the instance is not an instance of justice or
that it is not the sole instance or that it is an instance only in a
partial sense; and, by doing so, he makes clear the inadequacy of
any answer which consists of a definition by means of instances.
This misunderstanding of the question shows itself in the tendency
to regard justice as an art. In view of prevalent conceptions, it is
the easiest and most natural way of viewing the matter. The question,
what is justice? is accordingly regarded as being identical with the
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 THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

question, what is the just life? and the answer to the latter question
is considered to be that it is an art; and as such it is held to be charac-
terizable in terms of specific acts or activities. This is the line along
which the minds of those taking part in the discussion move. It is
quite otherwise, however, with Socrates, for whom the two questions
are distinct. He is not seeking primarily an answer to the question,
what is the just life? What he is seeking to discover is the nature
of the just inherent in the just life. Hence, analogies from the arts
are of no avail in this connection; for a similar question can be
raised regarding each art. In all cases the question is one concerning
the principle of the art, not the principle of an art in general but of
each specific art. Each art has necessarily its own distinctive prin-
ciple, in virtue of which it is a distinct art. The just life, conceived
as an art, has its distinctive principle; and this principle is justice.
The use of analogies from other arts obviously, therefore, will not
serve to elucidate this principle called justice. The problem of
justice is analogous to the problem of the nature of the principle of
any other art. Justice is not analogous to an art but to the principle
of an art. In the same way as the art of medicine is the fulfilment
of the function of healing, and this function has to be understood
by reference to the conception of health, so the just life has to be
considered as the fulfilment of the function of being just, and this
function has to be understood by reference to the conception of
justice. For Socrates, in contrast to the others, justice is the principle
of a life that is just. In Platonic terminology justice is a Form, and
the task is to apprehend the Form of the just life or that which makes
a life a just life or informs it with justice. As there is only one way
of discovering the nature of an art or function, namely, by analysis
of the art or function in question, so there is only one way of dis-
covering the nature of justice, namely, by an analysis of life, that is,
of the individual life and of social life.
Accordingly, in the Republic, the discussion drops the notion that
the question can be satisfactorily answered on the basis of analogies
from the arts, and proceeds to an analysis of human and social life.
This does not mean that analogies are no longer used, for resort is
frequently made to one analogy or another. What it does mean is
that the problem of justice is freed from the confusion arising
from the mistaken identification of justice with an art, while analo-
gies continue to be used in so far as they help towards a solution by
clarifying the issue.
Life is resolved into three main types of functions, the fulfilment
of each of which constitutes an art. Life thus manifests itself as a
series of arts, and each of them has its distinctive principle. The
manner in which the virtues are treated on the basis of this analysis
seems at first peculiar. Wisdom is declared to be the virtue of the
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 PHILOSOPHY

administrative or governing class; and this means that the function

of knowing is distinctive of that class. Nevertheless, the productive
arts, which are followed by the third or labour-class, cannot be
carried on without knowledge, and some form of knowledge must be
assigned to the artisans. This, of course, is recognized in the Republic,
where the knowledge or wisdom embodied in the administrators is
expressly distinguished from the kind of knowledge requisite for
the artisan. Something similar can be said regarding the virtue of
courage which is characteristic of the soldier-class, for some kind of
courage must be possessed also by the artisans. The virtues which
are discussed are relative to the various functions, not in their
technical but in their social aspect. What is being examined is the
sense in which a city can be said to be wise or courageous or temperate.
The method of analysis is always faced with the danger of leading
to a number of distinct elements which come to be regarded as
isolated and independent. The Republic never falls into this
error. The analysis is so carried out as to emphasize the fact
that the several classes are social classes or classes composing the
city, and that the various functions are varying ways in which
the life of the city is manifested. The significance of the virtues
depends wholly upon the fact of specialization of function; and, from
the side of the individual, upon the threefold division of human
nature. Difficulties, of course, may be felt with regard to the com-
pleteness of the analogy between the city and the individual, for
while the individual is held to be tri-functional, he is, as a member of
the city, treated as uni-functional. The point, however, which is
important is that the virtues are to be understood only on the basis
of the division of labour and specialization of function.
Wisdom is definitely stated to be the virtue of a special class. This
might suggest that the class was to be identified with the art of know-
ledge; but the Republic does not make any such identification,
although it might occur to one that there would be required a class
whose specialty was scientific and philosophic research. The highest
class is identified with the art of statesmanship, and the wisdom in
question is the knowledge requisite for the exercise of this art.
Considered in this light this wisdom is a technical affair, just as
technical as is the knowledge required by any productive artisan.
The same applies to courage, which is the virtue of another special
class. It is otherwise with temperance, for "its operation is unlike
that of courage and wisdom, which residing in separate parts
respectively made the city, the one wise and the other brave. That is
not the way of temperance, for it extends literally throughout the
entire gamut. ... So that we should be quite right in affirming
this unanimity to be temperance, the concord of the naturally superior
and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the
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 THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

individual." Temperance is thus not a virtue of a distinct art or of a

social class; its significance lies in its expressing a relation between
different social classes and their different functions. The meaning
of temperance, which, as discussed in the Republic, has been felt
by many students to be with difficulty distinguishable from justice,
thus presupposes the distinction of functions into higher and lower,
and is to be expressed as the subordination of the lower to the
higher, based on the recognition by each class that such subordina-
tion is right. Temperance in the same sense is held to apply to the
individual, although here it is impossible to speak of appetite
agreeing with reason in the belief that the higher ought to rule, in
any sense analogous to that in which the members of two social
classes can agree in a common belief. Nevertheless, in spite of diffi-
culties of detail, the meaning of the doctrine is clear, namely, that
the satisfactions of appetite should be sought within the limits of
the laws or principles formulated by reason.
Justice, as described in the Republic, though different from
temperance, has certain features in common with it. There is no
special class, whose virtue is justice or whose art is the just art.
The theory of justice and the theory of temperance both alike imply
that there is no distinct art of justice or of temperance. A just man
is not to be understood as one who follows the just art, as a shepherd
is understood as one who follows the shepherd's art and a medical
man as one who follows the medical art. There is no specific art, the
virtue of which is justice, in a way analogous to that in which
courage is a virtue identified with the art of war or the soldier's
art. Hence it is not merely impossible to define justice in terms of
art and not enough to point out that such definition involves a
confusion between an art and the principle of an art; it now appears
that justice cannot be defined as the principle of any distinct and
specific art. Justice is essentially relational in character. If the nature
of man were utterly simple, or if there were only one social class or
one function, there would be no such thing as justice. In this respect
justice is like temperance; but, unlike it, it does not rest upon any
distinction between higher and lower functions. What the conception
of justice implies is that the nature of each art is capable of being
defined and the boundaries of each art delimited, that the members
of each class are capable of understanding this definition and delimi-
tation, and that they recognize and accept the duty of devoting
themselves to activities within these limits. When a man and a
class so devote themselves, there is justice within the city. When the
various parts of a man's nature fulfil each its distinctive function
within the limits prescribed by reason in virtue of its knowledge and
insight, that man is just.
The wisdom which is spoken of in the Republic as a virtue, while in
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 PHILOSOPHY

one sense it is the technical knowledge of the statesman's art, is

primarily the knowledge which is necessary for the organization of
the different arts or social functions into an harmoniously working
system. Justice may be described as the spirit in which each art is
carried on; and, while it is distinct from the arts in their technical
aspects, yet it is a feature of them in so far as they have social
significance. The conception of justice is designed to emphasize the
fact that each art or function has a social value in addition to its
purely technical character of efficiency; or, if the term efficiency is
to be used, justice may be described as social efficiency, expressed by
way of every man "minding his own business." In one respect justice
does mean increased technical efficiency; but in another and more
important respect it means social efficiency in the form of social
stability and welfare.
In Platonic terminology justice is a Form in which each class or
each art participates when it carries on or is carried on under the
conditions which serve to define justice. But it is a Form which is
transcendent to any class or any specific art. It is a Form in which
the city participates. Along with wisdom, courage, and temperance,
it is a component of goodness; and hence in its turn participates in
the Form of the Good.
In several of Plato's dialogues there is a discussion as to whether
goodness or virtue is teachable-a discussion which involves the
doctrine, associated with the name of Socrates, that virtue is know-
ledge. The treatment of the question will be confined to the subor-
dinate point, whether and in what sense justice is teachable. It is
obvious, as a result of the preceding discussion, that the matter
needs clarification. Justice may be taken to mean the Form of
justice or the principle of just acts. It is about justice in this sense
that the Republic is concerned. Justice may, however, be taken to
mean a just life; and the question is then whether men can be
taught to live justly. In the light of what has been already said a
just life is not a specific art and hence cannot be taught in the sense
in which any specific art, can be taught. The claim, for instance,
made by Sophists, to teach virtue, was based upon the analogy
between virtue and the arts. The departure from this analogy in the
Republic and the advance to another view of justice requires the
reconsideration of the question from another angle. Yet the Republic
very definitely expresses the belief that justice in the sense of a
Form or principle can be taught, for this is the aim of the educational
curriculum; and though it cannot be taught to or apprehended by
all, yet there are a select few to or by whom it can be so. This implies
that in regard to the multitude justice is not teachable. The many
cannot be taught the principles underlying virtuous conduct; and
hence, even if the just life is considered as an art, which can be taught
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 THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

only in the sense that a man is instructed in the principles of the art,
the just life cannot be taught to the many.
In the light of this, accordingly, if virtue in the full and perfect
sense is the characteristic quality of that life lived in accordance
with the knowledge of, and insight into, the principles which underlie
virtuous action, or, in other words, consciously moulded by the Forms
of justice, temperance, and so on, then virtue in that sense is realizable
only in the lives of philosophers; and the virtue characteristic of the
other classes is something falling short of this perfection. The
distinction between the two is that between a virtue that is know-
ledge and a virtue that is belief or opinion or faith. This distinction,
of course, rests upon the consideration whether the individual does
or does not possess knowledge; and in the latter case the individual
has to live his life within the framework prescribed by those philo-
sophic individuals who do possess the knowledge. If the matter is
considered, on the other hand, from the side of the city as a whole
in contrast to the merely individual aspect, then, since the framework
is the embodiment of wisdom or knowledge, the virtue of the artisan
or of the artisan class, as well as of the soldier and the soldier class,
is knowledge, not of course directly of the individuals or classes
concerned, but indirectly of the administrative class. Hence the
virtue of the city is the knowledge or wisdom of the city.

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