The Cynical Educator - Ansgar Allen

Ground down, disenchanted, but
committed to education. Unable to quit,

yet deploring everything education has
become. We suer a weakened and
weakening cynicism. This cynicism
exploits the last remaining educational
commitments of an otherwise broken
workforce, draining that workforce of its
nal pleasure: Revolt. Our cynicism is
reactionary and conditional exhausting
where it might invigorate, rendering
complicit, giving safe passage to
bad temper but can be reclaimed.
We need more cynicism, not less.
With The Cynical Educator
a revived, militant Cynicism aronts us.
Drawing on a long history of
religious denial and philosophical
intrigue, it brings our educational
bad faith to the surface. It confronts the
educated with the fruit of their conceit.
THE CYNICAL EDUCATOR
Ansgar Allen
First published by MayFlyBooks in paperback in Leicester
and free online at www.mayflybooks.org in 2017.
CC: Ansgar Allen 2017
Images by Frances Allen, University of California,

Berkeley.
Cover design by Zanna Allen
ISBN (Print) 978-1-906948-35-1

ISBN (PDF) 978-1-906948-36-8
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons

Attribution- Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
Unported. To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc- nd/3.0/ or
send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street,
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Detail from a Dead Fly - Back
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Ansgar Allen is a Lecturer in Education at the University

of Sheffield and author of Benign Violence: Education in
and beyond the Age of Reason.
CONTENTS
I DEAD MATERIALS 1
I am Culture
On Pedantry
On Writing
II PROMISED GOODS 13
Glorify What Exists
Our Nihilism
Half Dead Already
III BENEVOLENT EDUCATORS 33

The Great Educational Swindle
A Christian Soul
Sin Multiplied
IV OUR EDUCATIONAL CONSCIENCE 59

The Healthy Educator
Principles of Pastoral Care
Educational Ill-Health
Principles of Educational Sickness
V MASS CYNICISM 81
Emptied Out and Set to Work
Our Detached Negativity
The Educators Smile
The Educators Last Hope
The Educators Last Breath
VI INSULTS AND OBSCENITIES 105

Scandalous Teachings
Bawdy Educators
Educated Bodies
A Returned Diogenes
The Cynical Educator
VII SPIRIT OF HEAVINESS 133

Held in Denial
Sade as Educator
Mastery or Failure
VIII A MODERN FETISH 151

Incessant Motion
As Universal Good
The Educated Critic
An Odd Beast Indeed
Consumptive Educators
IX THE ABSURD 171

Artificial Brutalities
The Tragedy of Education
With Blistered Fingers
Absurd Lessons
I
DEAD MATERIALS
1
I am Culture
Our educators declare: Education is dying all around us.
They act cornered. As they fight for education they fight
for us. They fight for civilization itself. Human history
becomes more and more a race between education and
2
catastrophe, say the educated, and blink. But when they
fly, or tumble as if out of a barrel, education and
catastrophe are hand-in-hand, overturning, downturning.
Dying all about us? It hardly lived. But education is vital,

cry the educated. More education of whatever kind
3
remains the only conceivable remedy.
1
Aspire to be more like us, say the educated. You may

have what we have had. You may hope to be as
educated as the best of us. So resist us. Become us.
Education is not perverted, it is perversion. Education

sets down the intellectual and affective foundations for
another century of rampant growth, exploitation, pollution
and barbarity. The educator helps model the
directionless, frantic subjectivity we too must acquire.
Education sets us up so that we are already defeated by
it. Education prepares our defeat by constructing
frameworks of disappointment. It develops terminal
subjectivities so we are forever dependent on its life-
support, so we may live as if part deceased. Here, Cynic
and Cynical educator serve to cultivate our misgivings,
dredging impressions from unimpressionable minds. No
proofs are offered. We are not convinced through
painstaking argument or reasoned debate that our
educational ideals are unjustified, and perhaps
unjustifiable. They discredit themselves. Our beliefs are
abandoned as we struggle to take them in earnest. The
Cynic seeks not assent but your complicity.
There is a difference between the Cynics point of view

and everyday cynicism, though the Cynic may still appeal
to the latter. Everyday cynicism prepares you well, the
Cynic may say, but requires adjustment. Confined to a
lowercase c, this cynicism exists in a weakened state,
reactive and conditional.
2
Dead Materials
To be a better cynic you are directed to the Cynics of

4
yore. A barbed invitation, for borrowings are fraught with
difficulty. After two millennia straightforward emulations
are out of the question. You would not bring forth a
returned Diogenes. He would not squat before you and
deliver a lesson in Cynic contempt. Some tried but shat
for cinematic effect, exchanging one aperture for
5
another.
A Cynicism of our own might still be attempted. A militant

philosophy promoting change through personal
discomfort. With it we give way to our suspicions. We
confront educational subjectivities as systems of bad
faith. We encounter educational frameworks that bind us
still, though they are frayed and torn between themselves.
A Cynicism of our own pays close attention to cynical
attitudes otherwise lost in the day-to-day of work and
living. It roots them out, transforms them and performs
them to greater effect. It draws attention to the presence
of everyday cynicism, nowhere more entrenched, and at
times nowhere more disavowed, than in education. This
cynicism becomes manifest in our grumblings, but cloaks
itself too. Our cynicisms are tied just as much to moments
of romance and hope, where nothing is more assured and
fondly believed than the promise education makes over
and never delivers. To be cynical today is to live with
paradox, half-formed and fretful.
The educated are cynics in a more personal sense. This

cynicism becomes manifest in the standing of educated
people, in the straight-backed conceit of the educated
person. Even more as they stride out. Their gait may be
distinct, but is assumed and maintained by little more than
3
habit. Educated people are doomed in modernity to a

6
spinning of culture from their entrails. Finally driven to cry
7
out: I am culture, I am! Peevish and uptight, educated
people feel this to be so, but refuse to admit theirs is a
performance like any other. Our modern cynicism is found
everywhere then, including where we least expect. It
drains where it might invigorate.
This book takes aim at you and me, at our cynical

attachments to education and the educated person. It
unearths the teacher within us. It confronts us with our
disavowed cynicisms only to affirm them. It traces the
origins of everyday cynicism by locating the rise of
cynicism in the fall of Western education. The romantic
educator that last bastion of the Western educational
experience is now falling from grace, though with a
death rattle that may last decades still. Education is under
attack more than ever for failing to deliver on its promises,
but rarely doubted itself. Few see how its failures are
systematically produced, and necessary.
The death of education? Announced last century more

8
than once, proclaimed without conviction and forgotten.
Insist on the question mark because education remains.
We may suffer its last agonies, our vision clouded by its
pain. But we continue as educators and educated people.
A little flushed. Rather listless. Possessive. Prancing back
and forth upon a grave we refuse to acknowledge. Last
rites have no function. Only a Dionysian wake will disturb
our slumber as we imbibe our sorrow and encounter what
9
we already inter. Struggling to remember, we ache with a
loss of which we can hardly speak.
4
Dead Materials
On Pedantry
With every extinguished life histories are lost, completing
that lifelong attrition of memories which fade and alter.
We refuse to admit the world is draining itself of places,
events and memories, most of which are never heard nor
10
described. Our histories are made of fragments.
Transformed in their descent, augmented with chunks of
our present. It is laughable but symptomatic we insist on
finding order and support in our past. Our pedantry
prevents us from standing back only to discover we are
already fallen.
Amid educated people, academics are specialist

pretenders. If this were a more standard text, it would
disguise itself as commentary; as a history chastened to
its timeframe; a philosophy limited to its field. This text
would announce itself as an elucidation of Nietzsche, or
Foucault, or some other late modern canon. It would
expend itself recounting positions one might take with
regard to their work. It would make substantive claims
that others may then contest. It would locate itself within a
proliferating field of study beneath which both are
submerged, and would do so by default and without a
second thought. For that is how academics operate,
paying due regard to their kin. When I appeal to the work
of another, I do so without the roll of a drum. This
convention insisting you reference a good slice of your
contemporaries exercises more scholarly restraint than
it offers assistance. It functions as a condition of entry.
Academics reference one another because they defy
anything remotely original to announce itself as such.
Material of this kind takes too long to digest. Nobody has
time or energy for that, not even your traditional academic
whose peristaltic motions could win records for lethargy.
But original work remains the obsession. The ancient
5
code whereby originality is a defect, innovation is

suspect, and fidelity to tradition, a duty is long
11
dismissed. Our academic code insists we parade back
and forth under a banner. It declares our commitment to
fresh ideas, new insights and innovations. In practice this
pledge inverts. It manifests as an obsession with all that
remains unoriginal in each text. Academia is as
preoccupied with its fetish for originality as it is suspicious
of its appearance. Academics need to be assimilated. So
this pursuit of originality by which each writer attempts a
position against the heavy bibliography he or she must
employ leads to a profound and tightly felt academic
bondage. Which gives another slant on the joke: I've seen
the best research ideas of my generation destroyed by a
12
brief literature search.
*
13
We might relate to texts differently. Each book, each
treatise considered an accumulation of dead materials.
Each had its motion, logic of advance and now lifeless
inertia. We grasp hold, tear along for a while, and grasp
another. Grabbing texts when writing ones own acquires
its own momentum; live for an instant, dead the next.
Least pleasurable mode of transport: the philosophical
disquisition. Riding to no effect, one falls asleep.
The Cynics dead materials were organised as sayings

(chreiai) and provocations to awaken the living. But they
were open to adjustment too. Concerted attempts were
made to idealize Cynicism, as Roman Stoic philosophers
traced a line of descent from Socrates, through Cynicism,
to themselves. The educated wit also claimed the tradition
14
as his own, transforming it into a literary genre. The
force of Cynicism, a lived philosophy that debunks
6
Dead Materials
convention, insults decorum, mocks philosophy and

undermines pretension, was thereby reduced. This
philosophy of deviant life, as scornful as it was devoted to
humanity, is all but lost to history. Scholars may well
remind us that Cynicism once took a more bawdy form.
We may learn how the first Cynics bore witness to their
philosophy by obscene gestures and scatological acts.
But we can hardly fathom why. We cannot understand
ancient Cynicism without cheapening it or turning it into
respectable philosophy.
On Writing
The academic who goes cap in hand to the publishing
house, begging to be considered profitable, needs
approval like a rat needs petting. Better to bite the hand
that pats. It scarcely even feeds. These folk are so well
fed already.
This book raises more problems than it answers a

common refrain amongst authors. It defers to the reader
in hope of better reception. Fortunately such deferrals,
deceptions and seductions can be dispensed with here.
The problems of this book are raised as one does the
devil.
This book provides no systematic answers; it makes no

claim to be definitive the scholars excuse for inaction.
*
15
Everything is dangerous nothing can be trusted. The
mantra of radical scholars trained to suspect power and
7
intrigue everywhere. At most, those insisting power

always eludes analysis, that definitive critique is a
hopeless dream, offer the following: Recommending little,
prescribing naught, they oppose nothing definitively,
merely outlining a horizon and a background upon which
16
we may move with care. But their modesty is deceptive.
It generates a dogmatism of the impasse much harder
17
to root out than dogmatic conviction. Expressed as a
kind of vigilance, as a determined effort to be prudent in
ones statements, avoiding any which appears overly
certain of itself, this high intellectualism has flattened out
contemporary thought under its scrupulous yet heavy
18
tread. These radicals of the impasse celebrate the
virtues of intellectual caution and scholarly calculation that
have, we cannot help but notice, the convenient effect of
justifying their continued employment. There is always
another problem to describe and paper to write. Our
challenge is more demanding than a call to perpetual
vigilance. It is to live at times without caution, even
without calculation.
This book seeks out its populace with polemic intent. It

was not written for applause. Some academics would be
received in this fashion, reaching out with a generosity of
spirit born of conceit. The civilizing mission of the
profession enchants those who fervently believe in
accessibility before all else. Those seeking to excite their
public will also dupe it into believing that the university,
and this academic in particular, is indispensible. Those
wishing to inspire their public conjure a populace that
eagerly awaits each offering. This simplistically
deferential, peaceable citizenry is the kind of illusion upon
which academic public engagement depends. But the
university most often greets its public like a damp squib,
losing sparkle amid widespread indifference. The
8
Dead Materials
university machine (which must secure the reputation of

the institution before all else) grasps on to small pockets
of enthusiasm it misreads and misrepresents as an
affirmation of its kindly mission. All window-dressing and
good feeling is tied up, in other words, with a form of
institutional inertia, where large corporations adapt to
changing circumstance by managing their image rather
than questioning their content.
Academic writing will not become open to others so long

as it perpetuates the tedious rituals of the craft. Once
described as the most eccentric latecomer of all
19
philosophical forms, the peer-reviewed paper has
academia in its grip. That academic thought has confined
itself to single slabs of writing where all that can be
expressed is that which can be enclosed within a
prescribed word limit with all the structural, stylistic,
topical and hence intellectual constraints this involves is
one of the most remarkable and noteworthy of the
uncontested assumptions that make up academic
discourse. Academics are not unaware of other styles of
writing, and feel the constraints of their discipline rather
acutely when work is rejected for publication. But
conformity is at a high premium. Work must be adapted
and resubmitted if the academic is to remain research
active. Indeed our very conception of research has been
reduced to that which is funded, published, and ranked.
All else is defined by what it lacks. It is unpublished
research. Unranked, unfunded, perhaps even unfundable.
Against the stifling conformity of a profession in which

transgressors have their journals too inflicting just
another code upon those who must publish or otherwise
9
perish, establishing yet another cartel where people of

similar taste gather together for protection the
unhoused mind does not seek recognition and applause,
20
and hence admission as a condition of existence. Like
Diogenes the Cynic, whose existence on the social and
institutional periphery bore witness to its perverse
construction, those labouring at this periphery are
prepared to be consistently misread, just as todays
homeless are misunderstood by social workers whose
conception of a positive outcome is the product of a
21
housed state of mind. Attempts to work against the
boundaries of academic life are similarly misunderstood
and misapprehended, or apprehended and despised.
They are tolerated only as caricatures of deviance, as
part of a wider liberal fetish which finds solace in its
benevolent gestures. How open we are, these liberals
declare, since we tolerate your existence.
A reading of the playwright Bertolt Brecht would have

academics better alienate their audience. In so doing,
they would also alienate themselves, from their work. For
Brecht, enchanted publics make passive audiences,
disappearing and reappearing within the spectacle,
identifying with its narrative. Against this tendency, Brecht
would remind his audience and have his actors remind
themselves of its material presence, of the distance
between audience and play, actor and lines. By
extension, when the university reaches out it would
instruct the public on how it ordinarily excludes them, and
remind the academic of the oddities and exclusions of
academic life. Rather than invite the public to engage with
the university and be at one with it in spirit, the addressed
public would be encouraged to distance itself from the
university it confronts. Academic writing, so influenced,
would not condescend to its readers by inviting its
10
Dead Materials
audience with gentle encouragement into the deep

knowledge of the text. Rather, academic writing would
encourage a degree of ironic detachment and suspicion,
even estrangement from itself.
Friedrich Nietzsche will at times repel even his most avid

supporters. His intent, so he tells us, was not to
intoxicate his audience and force it to the height of a
moment of strong and elevated feeling. Such audiences
have already been whipped too much into aping the
high tide of the soul! What now? Nietzsche asks:
One gives the mole wings and proud conceits before it
is time to go to sleep, before he crawls back into his hole?
One sends him to the theatre and places large glasses
before his blind and tired eyes? That is decent, you say;
that is entertaining; that is culture But our mole has
been distracted, quite deliberately. And besides, whoever
finds enough tragedy and comedy in himself, probably
does best when he stays away from the theatre. Or if he
makes an exception, the whole process, including the
theatre, the audience, and the poet, will strike him as the
really tragic or comic spectacle, while the play that is
performed will mean very little to him by comparison. We
might turn then, with Nietzsche, away from the narcotica
of so-called higher culture, and confront the tragi-comic
22
nature of our daily existence. By making mischief with
23
the habits of our senses, by working with form as well
as content, Nietzsche confronts his reader with
meditations as untimely as they are upsetting of
conventional mores. Nietzsches writings do not
accommodate themselves to the reader. The reader is
forced to confront the space between maxims that insist,
at each break, not to become comfortable with the tone,
conventions and style of the text. The reader should
become, and remain distressed.
11
Educators may become distressed, and feel the torment

of their profession, but are rarely shaken from it.
Educators are instead stirred into action, as if they could
save education from itself. But education itself goes
unquestioned. Indeed a radical questioning of education
is ruled out by the common insistence it be saved before
all else. So when you hear echoes of their refrain, Save
us! Save education! Arise! Hear too the Cynic reply:
Arise what?
This book takes aim at the conceit of educated people, in

particular those educated educators in the business of
educating others. They believe an educational good to
exist and defend it against attack. The good of the
educational good is assumed everywhere and without
question. Precisely here their conceit resides a conceit
which is yours and mine. On all fours, this book sets off. It
confronts the educated with their downgoing.
A new breed of Cynic trots forth: The challenge it

declares, is to be both philosopher and fool, moralist and
24
rogue as we engage in the patient, urgent labour
conjured for us, and demanded of us by none other than
our educated nihilism.
12
II
PROMISED GOODS
Glorify What Exists

Despite all corruptions the inherent goodness of
education is believed incorruptible. This conviction will not
be abandoned however much education is debased,
reduced to the status of commodity, or instrument for
getting ahead. Despite everything that degrades
education, supplying endless source material for its
critics, the romance of an educational good lives on. Even
those claiming to have seen it all, those who have
become cynically detached and will no longer be
disappointed, fall under its spell. Through tears of pain or
with eyes dried blank, educators remain enamoured.
1
They glorify what exists for fear of its dissolution.
13
In todays educational circles, those holding to the

remnants of twentieth century progressivism believe the
worst kind of educator asserts himself as a purveyor of
expertise. To privilege ones expertise, with the
implication that the educators primary mission is to
transmit this knowledge to the student who must listen
attentively, is viewed as if it were a perfect demagoguery
to be driven out of the classroom by all means. Our last
surviving progressives rail against such expressed
authority as symptomatic of a lack of openness to the
knowledge of others. Such educators are at their purest
when beginning each lesson with the utterance: I am
here to facilitate your learning, I will learn from you as you
learn. The alternative and opposite introduction: Here is
what you must know, is only expressed under duress
when teaching to the test. Meanwhile educators and
commentators of a reactionary persuasion rage against
this progressive orthodoxy that somehow, they claim,
remains alive and well despite the devastatingly effective
work of their predecessors to bring it to its knees.
Denouncing that spectre, they assert the virtue of the
teachers classroom sovereignty and the value of a lesson
that begins: Now I will tell you what is worth knowing. As
familiar as it is tiresome, this endless dispute over
whether or not the teacher is a tyrant to exercise authority
in the classroom, endless debate considering the
justifiable limits and scope of teacherly influence,
operates as if a non-tyrannical teacher could, with
compassion, strip education of its barbarities. Here
manifests a conceit common to all parties, a shared belief
that education could be rescued from the effects of
power, either by removing or by justifying the presence of
the overbearing teacher; as if this would allow the
essential goodness of the teacher-educator to be
realised at last before us. This shared conceit took
modern form as it became attached to the idea that any
single individual, suitably trained, might achieve the kind
14
Promised Goods
of reasonable and dependable neutrality expected of

todays educator. Few today could still defend this
position in good faith. We late moderns are most of us far
too cynical for that. Yet we remain attached to its echo,
out of weakness and for want of alternative.
Our Nihilism
Western educators cry out, suffering the effects of their
2
European nihilism. There is something consumptive, in
the tubercular sense, about todays educator. Riven by a
disease which becomes manifest in the wasting away of
high ideals, the educator hides blood-filled sputum in a
rag. Once waved aloft, now filled with detritus. In it we find
denial, the pursuit of distraction, and over-attachment to
defeated ideals. Three lines of catarrh. These remnants
constitute education today.
Embrace your nihilism with tears and laughter for the

biggest laughs are based on the biggest
3
disappointments. The hardest laugh and also the most
4
difficult, is for those still insisting on their optimism. As
the destiny of two millennia of Western history nihilism is
5
our unavoidable affliction. Those educators claiming to
exist beyond its reach merely deny its presence. Those
hoping to alter its destiny make only noise. There is no
quick and easy escape. We are trapped in the digestive
tract of Western history. Our challenge, perhaps our only
6
option, is to contrive an accomplished nihilism. Here is
no wish to supersede modernity, or supersede education.
Accomplished nihilism admits its predecessors as its facts
of existence. It decides to interrogate rather than ignore
its past, realising it remains haunted. The nihilist can only
hope to dissolve modernity [and dissolve education]
through a radicalization of its own constitutive
15
7
tendencies. Hence Zarathustras commandment: What
8
falleth, that shall one also push! The accomplished
nihilist desires only to force one out.
We follow education downwards giving its worst aspects

their due. And once we have stared into the educational
abyss, having chased education to the bottom of its
despair. After our Cynicism has taken us into the
darkness that education prepared. As we face the stench
of its defeated ideals and aborted lives, we must attempt,
indeed learn to breathe in its ruins. Written for
consumptives, for those already fallen ill, this book would
9
have educated folk better cough, expectorate and spit.
Spit furthest at the promise of hope at the assurance we

might with assistance overcome our nihilism. From habit
we would have ourselves sustained by a hope which
cannot be refuted by any actuality which is not done
10
away with by any fulfilment: a hope in the Beyond. But
nihilism is not refuted by appeal. When nihilism is
denounced, its consequences are mistaken for the thing
itself. We do not perceive nihilism as a cultural
bequeathment whose essential ground lies in
11
metaphysics. Nihilism was established as a framework
of appeal: as the world was given meaning and denied
sense by reverence to something beyond sensory
perception. As each transcendental order and system of
appeal was contested, refined, augmented, corrupted,
debased and replaced, frantic attempts were made to
restore meaning to the universe. Becoming most
apparent during times of upheaval, nihilism is denounced
as if it were a temporary condition.
16
Promised Goods
Declarations against nihilism, claims it can be overcome,

generally remain captive to a logic of development that is
built into European thought. Overcoming is inscribed in a
tradition of thought for which the new is identified with
value through the mediation of the recovery and
12
appropriation of the foundation-origin. The claim that we
might overcome our nihilism falls prey to a similar drive,
one that attempts to establish a new basis of legitimacy
by staging a recovery, rebirth, or return to, foundational
systems of value. In the Nietzschean tradition, these
foundational hopes are radically interrogated, with origins
unveiled as moments that only receive homage from afar,
for the closer you come to an origin, the more it flattens
out into a sequence of events: The more insight we
possess into an origin the less significant does the origin
13
appear. If we retain our commitment to origins, this
commitment remains unsatisfied, because origins always
14
retreat into the background of the already begun. We
are faced with strange continuities and repeated
eruptions. Doubting origins, we develop a suspicion of the
new as a continuation of the old where the new
generally acquires the old as a confused inheritance. This
is the history of nihilism, a history of new values becoming
old, and old values becoming new.
Our self-told destiny murmurs on as we open out the

triptych of Western history. For Christianity history
appears as the history of salvation, only to become the
search for a worldly condition of perfection, before
15
turning, little by little, into the history of progress. This
latter formation is uniquely diminished, finding its ultimate
purpose to be in creating conditions in which further
progress is possible. Our nihilism is expressive of this
17
triptych; it represents our disappointment with the third

panel and its superficial illustrations, in contrast to the
glory of those to which they are hinged.
For some the advent of Western nihilism is not to be

regretted. As we suffer its catastrophic effects, we gain
access to the process of becoming of the false
constructs of metaphysics, morality, religion and art
and education. This catastrophe brings into view the
entire tissue of erring that alone constitutes the wealth or,
16
more simply put, the essence of reality. Those turning
away in search of security, grasping for fundamentals, do
not merely deny themselves this perception, they set out
in search of new masters.
The accomplished nihilist resists the pathos of

authenticity or in Nietzschean termsresistance to the
17
accomplishment of nihilism which surrounds us today.
From this point of view, other cultures, subcultures, and
oppressed groups are not by their former or continued
exclusion more authentic. Nor are marginalised research
methodologies, modes of representation, or neglected
forms of participation more legitimate than the traditional
approaches they hope to replace. Such attempts to find
value, authenticity and direction in anything suppressed
are symptomatic of a weakened nihilism, retreating from
the abyss of its making. Active nihilism does not ground
its hope in the subaltern but confronts itself with the
effects of mainstream culture in decline.
18
Promised Goods
But we have been schooled too well and too long to

unlearn our lessons without struggle. By habit we insist
there be hope, that nihilism will not run its course. We will
find value and meaning somewhere before all is said and
done. Divined in ancient Greece; we have been educated
to follow in step. The first philosophical schools taught
their members to ration existence to a higher ideal, to an
ideal beyond achievement and beyond question. We
remain haunted by this schematic. Distinctly
unphilosophical as they have become, our schools are
still harried by the educational figure of Socrates. His was
an educational scheme where a quest to give meaning to
ones existence was yoked to an experience of doubt, and
a promise too, that education would be its overcoming. It
was necessary to learn first of all to be guided by this
promise. Belief in the promise of education was a
prerequisite for ones subordination to it. Henceforth, the
educated were those ready to proceed before the fact.
They were the credulous.
Socrates goaded others, but claimed to be himself driven

by an inner daemon or divine voice that issued signs as
18
warnings. Perhaps here can be found an early version
19
of your moral conscience. First installed by Socratic
inquisition; developed through educational activities
designed to raise doubt in the individual about his or her
worth and understanding. These techniques would teach
us to relate differently (and with suspicion) to the self.
They would install our conscience by a procedure, the
malice of which was concealed by its benign educational
intent. The good news is we can blame our education.
Indeed what is education for but to furnish us with our
excuses? The bad news is the excuses keep coming.
19
Make no mistake, our conscience may be ancient in

pedigree, perhaps even a little decrepit, but remains
dangerously effective with a grasp tightened by centuries.
By it we acquired a soul, as the body develops rigor
mortis a temporary stiffening, which departs as
decomposition begins. The more educated we became
the more it calcified, inflicting its regimen upon us. With it
we are encumbered by a whole load of weighty, solemn
materials passed down from history. In part a pre-modern
device, the product of an era many today would locate far
behind (and below) that ideal to which they still aspire: a
modern, enlightened sensibility.
Half Dead Already

Education is best attacked as it is venerated, by tracing it
to some cradle of Western civilization. In Platos
dialogues we find education modelled as a relationship
demanding trust and deferred gratification. We discover
that Socrates (our first and best model teacher) does not
educate directly but relentlessly interrogates, basing his
replies on those things each pupil admits that he himself
knows. These things become those articles of faith each
20
pupil must be induced to doubt. Socrates develops an
educational art, in other words, one that operates by
21
seduction. The pupil is enticed to willingly engage,
discourse openly, and remain available to adjustment.
The educational challenge is to turn away from sensory
distraction. The best pupil in such a scheme is he who is
most easily seduced by education, he who already
believes in the educational good promised by the
educational encounter.
20
Promised Goods
The Socratic teacher builds so much on so little, relying

on foundations of professed ignorance, guided by the
unfolding structure of his interrogations. The tremendous
leap of faith implied here is striking. Surely to teach
through ignorance and dialogue alone would be too much
for us now; it would be a weight our conscience could not
bear. What if on occasion Socrates did more damage
than good, unsettling his pupils assuredly, yet generating
little of value in return? But these are matters of concern
for todays educator. The Socratic conscience was less
stirred; it was daemonic and occasional. Socrates was
free of that constant, nagging presence, our modern voice
of guilt, which echoes the pained worldview of its
Christian forbears. Unlike its distant Socratic ancestor,
this conscience requires something rather more concrete
than a leap of faith to justify its interventions and
submissions. Our contemporary educational conscience
no longer abides mere dialogue and suggestion. It
requires an institutional framework for reassurance; it
insists on its own confinement. Today we demand some
kind of norm, some sort of procedure, some conception of
outcomes, some shared sense of technique, to be settled.
And even then we remain disturbed.
Centuries after Plato yet to our eyes still ancient, Plotinus

offers some measure of reassurance to the baffled
educator. He adapts Platonism by outlining a path of sorts
to guide those seeking wisdom. The spiritual progress of
his imagined philosopher-pupil was divided into a number
of stages, beginning with exercises to detach the soul
from the impulses of the body, and ending with full though
transient union with a supreme, undivided transcendental
entity known as the One. But this educational sequence,
affording a structure of sorts and a vague outline of
progression, would not instruct the pupil directly. The
21
educational path could not be rationalised. And its object

remained ineffable. Such an education relied upon
indirect instruction through a sequence of analogies and
22
negations, still requiring in other words a leap of faith.
More clearly sequenced perhaps, yet still too vague for us
now. There is no reassurance here for a modern
educational conscience that requires far more than
analogies and negations. Demanding the support of
definite procedures and finding such guidance readily
available, this conscience is attached to more proximal
objectives. These objectives have been reduced in turn
so as to ignore, forget, and yet repeat unwittingly in a
frenzied but shadowy form the ancient philosophical quest
for wisdom. In our more utilitarian age, educational
objectives have been collected together like so many nuts
23
and bolts.
To encounter education in its pre-modern contexts,

abandon those sensibilities which govern not only how
education is practiced but also how education is felt.
Relinquish your subjective attachments and become cold
to the educational endeavour. More distorting than any
other is that warmth of feeling we associate with the
educational conscience which insists upon the goodness
of education before all else. To paraphrase Nietzsche,
this is how the educational beast in us wants to be lied
24
to. It would have us believe that education can be
genuine and morally pure, that it can exist as a moment of
simple generosity where good intentions become
synonymous with good deeds. Without this belief the
everyday violence of education would be too great to
bear. We would find ourselves unable to endure its
presence, despite its distribution (and concealment
thereby) across artifices weighing so evenly we become
convinced of their necessity. Without that conscience,
22
Promised Goods
with it finally relinquished, no artifice will suffice to conceal

the violence, even the benign violence, of the educational
endeavour. So become cold, educate and be educated
without clothing yourself against the chill.
From cadaver to cosmic vacuum, Western education

draws us down by degrees. We are rendered numb,
duped into experiencing extreme cold as if it were heat,
as if we could be warmed by that cosy, promising,
promised space of an educational good. We will not see
how coldly education inherits its point of view, denigrating
our orb in favour of another, putting down this life for the
promise of one higher (or better). With unflagging
commitment, debased educational realities are contrasted
to ineffable educational goods. And by unwitting
obedience to its precepts, we are as disturbed
scandalised by educational failure, as we are
perpetually committed to the idea that failure must occur.
Platonic idealism may be attacked, but is only half our

inheritance. There is another argument for education. It
claims Aristotelian roots but is similarly judgemental. The
inherent goodness of education is not made impossible
by its failure to match up against pre-given forms that
would be our Platonic inheritance. Rather, the inherent
failure of education to objectify its goodness is a product
of its pursuit: the Aristotelian argument.
Some would have us return to Aristotles notion of praxis,

though it is feared we have all but lost the capacity for it.
As a form of practical reasoning, praxis is acquired (and
23
manifested) on the job. Praxis cannot be pre-defined,

decided externally, or set down in writing, since it defines
itself via a process of reflection that reflexively changes
25
the knowledge-base which informs it. The ends or
aims of praxis are inseparable from, and intrinsic to,
26
praxis and can only exist in praxis itself. Though the
ends, means and indeed norms of praxis are locally
defined, praxis remains high-minded enough in its
commitments, seeking to realise that great philosophical
simper known as the good life. That life does not exist as
something which can be theoretically specified in
advance, nor can it be objectively realised. The nature of
the good life only becomes known through praxis. Outside
its realm of action one cannot judge whether or not it has
been reached because the good life is only ever
manifested in action. It consists in how we respond to
particular situations and scenarios in all their temporal
uniqueness. Certain activities allow us to realise the good
inherent to human existence, others do not highly
technical activities would be in the latter category.
Education is or at least ought to be in the former, insofar
as its practitioners constantly negotiate its conditions of
existence. Educators orient themselves by on-going
negotiation to the good that is inherent in their work.
Indeed that good, the good of education, becomes
something that one has to do because it can only be
27
realised in action. For the good of education to warrant
pursuit, it must be assumed that educational practice can
realise, in and of itself, a morally worthwhile form of
human life. Building on this assumption educators must
know their primary objective is to accomplish the
educational potential, the inherent goodness, of each
educational moment through praxis. Under these
conditions and none other, educators will set about
practicing or hoping to practice the good life that
education promises. Driven by a desire for what is
worthwhile, where that which is worthwhile can only be
24
Promised Goods
judged in action, the educator is guided by a moral

disposition to act truly and justly, a quality the Greeks
28
called phronesis. Phronesis functions as a guiding
virtue, and like everything else must be acquired through
practice. Educational practice is concerned, then, not only
with realising the inherent goodness of education, but with
cultivating the virtue, or disposition to do good, of the
educational practitioner. But as a practical endeavour,
which constantly adjusts as conditions change, the quest
for a good life (a life that is objectively or independently
unassailable) must be constantly undertaken... These
ideas have some resonance, even now. It becomes
apparent that education is not only beholden to a Platonic
promise which haunts it still and returns in ever more
perverse forms. Education is subject to an Aristotelian
29
equivalent with a similar afterlife. The Aristotelian
position claims that education is promissory in and of
itself. Educational practice is a pursuit based on a
promise made by educators when educating. Never to be
objectified, it is the hope of each passing moment.
Education is given the idea that man always encounters

the good in the form of the particular. It is for the person
acting to know and decide, and he cannot let anything
30
take this responsibility from him. The Aristotelian
argument for education places responsibility here, with
the educator, and with the student too. Indeed, the
person listening to Aristotles lecture should not expect to
receive what the philosopher cannot provide. The student
must be mature enough not to ask that his instruction
31
provide anything other than it can and may give. It is a
sign of the recipients maturity to understand that the
philosopher cannot teach us how to educate or how to be
educated as if it were a skill, nor can he objectify the
inherent good of education. That good is realised in the
25
moment, it lives and dies by the moment. The basis of

moral knowledge, he discovers, is a situated thing,
32
revealed only to those who seek it out in praxis. The
educators moral bearing is his unique achievement, a
product of each passing moment. As such nobody can
assay it, or take it from him. His commitment to the
educational good is his pursuit of an ideal located in
practice. If you want to objectify that ideal and locate the
educational good, you must take it from his cold dead
hand. Or so this educator might say, in a moment of
heightened feeling. Become inactive, you will find it turned
to dust.
For Plato we are already so much dust, being too earthly

to begin with. So the lesson is different: The best
philosopher is a dead philosopher; the best educator is a
dead educator. These are not expressions of contempt.
In the perverse view of Platonic philosophy they venerate
philosopher and educator alike. This tradition treats the
33
world of the living as if it were a phenomenal shell. We
are trapped, it declares, prevented from accessing a kind
of philosophical truth that exists beyond sense perception.
Considered thus, death does not upset philosophy. Death
is the affliction of bodies alone. Bodies are those sad
temporary prisons to which we are confined. Our intellects
are better homed elsewhere, in the eternal realm of
34
thought. The ancient philosopher of this cast of mind
welcomes death as liberation, for life only makes
philosophy difficult. The philosopher may enjoy this life in
a manner of his own, but what the philosopher cannot
stand is the unphilosophical life. A life of that kind is
manifestly not worth living; a prejudice the educated
inherit. A life without education is a life without worth.
26
Promised Goods
On the eve of execution our first and best model educator

affirmed his condition, as one disciple laughingly put, it of
35
being half dead already. Defining death quite simply as
36
the release of the soul from the body, and philosophy
as the rejection of bodily distractions such as food, drink
and sex, as a turning away from the body and towards the
soul in pursuit of wisdom; Socrates claimed that the true
philosopher already frees himself from association with
the body (so far as is possible) and so has little to fear
37
from death. Since true philosophers make dying their
38
profession, anyone distressed at the prospect of dying
39
is no lover of wisdom, and no philosopher. He is trapped
by the love of his body. The body is his diversion. It
prevents the soul from achieving that clarity of
perspective from which it reasons best. Human affairs in
general more often affairs of the body and its passions
than affairs of the mind begin to appear awfully puny
40
from the perspective of the death-bound philosopher.
Death becomes a welcome opportunity. Those awaiting
death must occupy their time in anticipation. They require
41
an education in mortification.
*
42
At most philosophy would offer a foretaste of wisdom.
Despite variation between schools and philosophies
(Epicurean, Stoic, Sceptic, Platonist, Aristotelian), each
recommended its own system of life-denial. Each had its
own regimen attached to a decidedly untouchable notion
of the philosophical, and hence educational good it
offered. Each insisted on a kind of deference to the love
(philos) of wisdom (sophia), whereby a philosopher only
ever tends towards wisdom it can only be
approximated, never achieved. Unlike the sage whose
divine insights are inspired rather than reasoned, the
27
43
philosopher is reasoned but rarely inspired. The
educational message is clear: You will orient yourself
towards wisdom but forever remain in its shadow.
Philosophy, and hence education, are defined by what
44
they lack that is, by a norm which escapes them. The
Socratic teacher, whose superiority is guaranteed by the
admission he is wise because he knows he is not,
occupies an ambiguous position here, being neither quite
of this world, nor quite outside it. This teacher points the
way towards wisdom without having to objectively achieve
or embody it. This teacher is nothing more, and nothing
less than a revered intermediary. On offer is a mere
promise of tranquillity and happiness. And at this point the
philosophical schools agreed, believing that human
beings are plunged in misery, anguish, and evil because
.
they exist in ignorance. Each school gave its pupils the
following promise, that through its precepts they would be
delivered from evil by learning to relate to the world
differently. Hence the philosophers advice: Evil is to be
found not within things, but in the value judgements which
45
people bring to bear upon things. The good offered by
education could not be grasped in advance. The ignorant
must assent to it before it arrives.
Before Socrates, educational subjectivities were simply

defined. The itinerant Sophists, perhaps the first to
distinguish themselves as educators, are credited with
formalising education, transforming it from an activity
involving non-specialized contact with the adult world to
an endeavour involving teachers working in an artificial
environment. But the Sophists were attacked as mere
salesmen of knowledge investing little in the
46
subjectivities of those they educated. From Socrates
onwards they were considered philosophically and
morally inadequate. This established a judgemental
28
Promised Goods
hierarchy that survives to our present, where the most

basic and disreputable mode of teaching approaches
education as a mere process of putting in or filling up.
Against this, Greek philosophy transformed education into
a process of leading out the educator would now adopt
the role of guide and exemplar, drawing out what is
already there. Purveyors of knowledge were replaced, or
at least accompanied, by masters of the soul.
Philosopher educators were intimate on their own terms.

With Socrates we observe how a philosopher-teacher
might be bound to his pupils, often boys, through a
loving connection between master and disciple. This was
billed as the first stage in the ascent of the masters soul.
Through discipline and better control of the passions, the
philosopher would begin to perceive in carnal love the
poor reflection of its transcendent counterpart. This
educational relationship established a model that more
recent educational thinkers have sought to revive, much
47
sanitised of course. Their hope is to return depth and
meaning to educational relationships that have become
shallow and cynical. In their hands, intimacy stays with us
as the saving grace of the educational good.
In an educational context intimacy ought not excite the

body. Intimacy of an educational kind elevates the spirit.
This is Platos legacy, or the legacy of his kind of thinking.
As Adriana Cavarero frames the problem, in her
influential feminist critique: Platos conception of
philosophy may be intimate, but is hostile to life to the
point of immaculate conception. Plato inaugurates in and
of his philosophy the birth-giving male. He conceives for
48
ever more this educator of higher things. Philosophy
29
henceforth denigrates the physical procreation of birth-

giving women. The mother who gives birth to life is
superseded in thought by the philosopher who gives birth
to ideas. According to this conceit, this fruit of masculine
conception, there could be no higher calling than
philosophy, of giving birth to ideas by ones own sex.
Unlike women who produce in body nothing that endures
beyond death, the philosopher (and misogynist) gives
birth as he conceives: namely, in spirit.
Only well into modernity does the birth-giving teacher

develop feminine attributes, and this is associated with,
but not reducible to, increased numbers of women
49
employed as school teachers. This transition occurs as
boundaries between wage-labour and home life take
form, as capital invests the latter, exploiting and
conducting the unpaid labour of its female occupants.
50
Education follows into the home, and into the kitchen.
But in schools and universities there is a parallel shift, as
the caring teacher acquires gendered characteristics, and
51
classed ones too. She may be a mother, and as such,
as teacher and mother, her emotional labour can be
assumed, taken for granted and taken from her. The
emotional labour of the educator becomes the irrefutable
but unrewardable mainspring of education.
As women teachers exchanged the basic teaching of the

household or dame school for that of the more
respectable teacher, we educators and educated people
inherit with her the perspective of philosophy. The woman
teacher acquires male characteristics, in the sense that
she is expected to take forward an educational tradition
that was profoundly masculine in conception, a tradition
30
Promised Goods
contrasting the pursuit of eternals to the distractions of

having a body. Educators hereby remained wedded to
intellectual creations designed to transcend or better
manage the frailties of human existence. Aligned to that
intellectual pretence, educators and educated people
hoped to place themselves beyond scorn, the scorn of an
educated class. With female attributes, they bore the
52
burden of birth-giving men.
31
32
III
BENEVOLENT EDUCATORS
The Great Educational Swindle

On earth philosophy is remarkably accommodating,
despite claims to be at one remove from worldly things.
With the Greek philosophical schools in decline, practices
were adapted to new contexts. Admittedly, in late
antiquity the odd philosopher still gathered an audience,
as willing spectators were educated in a revived
1
Platonism, for instance. Philosopher educators still
existed in that sense, holding their own against the
2
barbarian theosophy of the early Christians. But the
Athenian schools had largely dissipated, their legacies co-
opted to the educational demands of an aristocratic
Roman elite. A smattering of Greek philosophy was now
expected of those who considered themselves cultured.
Conceptions of the educational good taken from classical
antiquity, originally crafted for only a few disciples, were
33
passed to new contexts. They were passed on to a far

more dispersed and diverse group of jobbing aristocrats
more concerned with maintaining a cultivated air, than
subordinating themselves to a specific philosophical
order. In this context the Roman educator begins to
operate rather differently. Attempts are still made to bind
educator and pupil in a relationship where the educational
good promised by the former is to be believed by the
latter. Yet the educator more commonly took the position
of private tutor or counsellor employed by a social
3
superior, than revered head of a philosophical school.
This deepened the plight of an educational good to be
followed but forever deferred.
The notion of philosopher as necessary eccentric

(Socrates) or institutional head (a Plato, Epicurus, or
Zeno) gradually gave way. Those providing spiritual
direction no longer spoke from the security of a revered
position or philosophical school. Educators increasingly
offered counsel from positions directly subservient to
power, being dependent upon their patrons for support. At
its extreme, the educator combined his moral and spiritual
superiority his justification for employment with servile
gestures and near obsequious tact. Such hirelings were
clearly not latter-day Sophists, winning customers by
promising much and delivering little. At least they did not
present themselves so. They continued to work within the
tradition of ancient Greek philosophy that had long set
itself against cheap imitators. Wisdom, for these Roman
tutors represented more than a technique or body of
knowledge that could be bought as and when convenient.
It demanded lifelong commitment. But there was a shift
nonetheless in the history of educational subjectivity. We
have the makings of a social role in which the educator
experiences great responsibility the care of the soul no
34
Benevolent Educators
less combined with a nagging sense of insecurity. The

educator suffers the perpetual fear that ones masters will
decide ones mastery is no longer required.
There is, in the Roman period, extensive discussion about

the relationship between parrhesia, or speaking freely,
4
and its antithesis which is flattery. The problem is this:
How to prevent the educator and social inferior from only
telling his patron what he wishes to hear? How to build a
relationship in which frank speech necessary for
reorienting the employers soul can be safely delivered?
It would seem that the educator can only respond to this
impossible situation by developing and strengthening the
relationship which binds pupil to teacher. The teacher
cannot rely upon reputation or respect alone, nor can the
educator expect to hold the pupils attention by force. It is
necessary, in other words, to establish an educational
tradition driven to convince its patrons of the benevolence
if not dire necessity of their education before all else.
These fragments may sound distant, for we inhabit their

echo. The great educational swindle of late antiquity
reaches us, distorted. The educational good we inherit
was first promoted from a position of weakness: the
educators weakness in the case of the hired teacher. It
was the product of a servile relationship between
educator and patron; an expression not merely of the
need to convince, but a need to please. The Roman
educator would justify himself to his employer, and say:
Though the educational remedy on offer is worthwhile, it
must bring discomfort. True to the tradition of Greek
philosophy, education will cause pain when it instructs
those lacking in virtue, when it harries them to reorient
35
their being. The educator must convince his patron that

despite all the discomfort involved, education is worth the
investment.
Hired teachers handled their employers with care,

avoiding overly severe reprimands or regimes of
instruction. In the education of his passions, an employer
is advised to exercise only a gentle violence on the
5
body. It was futile, these tutors counselled with
undeniable cunning, to overrule the body in such a
complete and tyrannical manner that it be injured by
excessive denial and self-discipline. But a good measure
of self-control was still advised. Patrons were told, and
6
subsequently told one another, that they would not
govern others well if they could not first govern
themselves. Rather conveniently, influential patrons were
invited to apply the same principle of measure to the
government of those beneath them, as they would to
themselves. With care, education negotiates its field of
violence.
As philosophy lost its old securities that is, once pupils

ceased flocking to the philosopher educator, once the
philosopher educator increasingly becomes an educator
philosopher, and finally, simply an educator new means
are found by which the educator binds himself to his
7
pupils. Writing in the second century, acting as personal
8
physician to several Roman emperors, Galen prepares a
text that is educational in a dual sense. It both defines the
role of educator and educates the tastes of those seeking
to employ such an individual. In this book, On the
Passions and Errors of the Soul, Galen explains how the
powerful and rich are in need of honest educators, since
36
most remain silent out of fear, or engage in flattery. As a

consequence, those wishing to be educated well, must
first make themselves weak:
If, therefore, anyone who is either powerful or also rich
wishes to become good and noble, he will first have to put
aside his power and riches, especially in these times
when he will not find a Diogenes who will tell the truth
9
even to a rich man or a monarch.
Galen gives his noble reader the following counsel: If,

after several days, your guide has not reproached you for
your passions, which must assuredly be clouding your
reason, assume he has been negligent, that he is
unwilling to help, or that he remains silent because he is
afraid to reproach you. It is for this last reason you must
look upon him as your deliverer and tell him so, making
him promise from the outset to reveal your passions as if
10
he were saving you from an illness of the body. There
will be no recriminations, you must assure him. But if your
guide still fails to reproach, employ another. To receive
honest guidance become known as someone who
endures, if not welcomes, unwelcome advice. You will be
rewarded by the attentions of those who at last feel free to
give true correction. Insolence is another matter. In this
case be steadfast, replying not with passion, but with the
11
better argument. But Galen repeats over and again his
argument for the importance of the educator or guide to
be held in esteem, indeed valued most, when his advice
and guidance is displeasing. Even insolent educators are
to be tolerated with restraint. Those wishing to be
educated must realise, Galen claims, that their greatest
foe is self-love which deludes them into believing there is
nothing wrong with their soul: Only the wise man is free
from fault, and such men hardly exist, which is why you
hear the philosophers of old saying that to be wise is to
12
become like God it is an impossibility. Hence most
people who aspire to an educated soul one that
overcomes diseases of the soul including lust for power,
37
love of glory and greed, becoming temperate and

13
tranquil urgently require the assistance of a guide and
educator of the type Galen has in mind. This educator will
be a kind of doctor, for these roles are not clearly
distinguished. Care of soul and care of body intermingle,
leading to intrusions that are both moral and medical. And
so, in the medical and philosophical advice of Galen, and
also Plutarch, even ones deportment during sex is to be
14
carefully prescribed. Clearly, this kind of educator must
feel free to identify faults of the most intimate kind, where
the pupil (his employer, even his emperor) believes none
to exist.
The educator makes himself weak whilst insisting on the

value of his presence. Despite his long training,
exemplary self-discipline, temperance and tranquillity, his
poise and achievements, the educator remains humble.
Humility is one of his distinctions. He will look with scorn
on glory, Galen explains, holding only the truth in
esteem. He will remain alert to those passions that might
still claim him. He will not demand all acknowledge his
excellence, though it has taken him a lifetime to cultivate.
For the desire to have all men praise me is like the desire
15
to possess all things, it is symptomatic of greed. This
educator will be content to remain unpopular at times, and
even be a little resented. He will be generous and
proceed as if all members of the aristocracy, however
16
ravaged by diseases of the soul, can be redeemed. It is
in the educators self-interest, after all, to forever work in
the hope that all can be saved, that all the men with
whom we spend our time will come to share our own
sensibilities, that with patience they will become like us.
He nevertheless accepts his work will be limited by the
self-love of those he teaches, and by variations in their
nature, believing that: If their nature will accept the
38
advantage of our care, they could become good men. If

they should fail to accept this attention, the blame would
17
not be ours. The educator will commit himself to
unstinting effort, combining the poise of an educated man,
the airs of a cultivated soul, and the humility of a noble
servant who seduces his master with generosity of spirit.
*
18
With Seneca and Marcus Aurelius we find the same
recurring problem: how to justify the role of the educator,
how to convince those in power of the necessity of the
educators intrusive advice. This educator self-
consciously exhibits the best intentions. He exudes
sincerity and devotion. By speaking freely at moments
that are carefully chosen, the educator seeks to establish
a bond with his pupil, declaring in effect: Look, I risk
telling you the truth, so I must be on your side.
The survival of an educational scheme involving delicately

negotiated relations of power, where wealthy patrons are
taught to welcome unwelcome advice, to lay themselves
open to the scrutiny of those they employ, appears odd
against the backdrop of an empire that was becoming
frankly authoritarian. These educational relations seem
rather quaint, if not completely out of touch with the
19
politics of a vast, despotic empire. In such a context
there would, one presumes, be little patience for the
cultured refinements of educated persons still cleaving to
the role of disinterested advisor, to the figure of the
philosopher-tutor. There would, one assumes, be little
indulgence of the educated supplicant, who attempts to
sway the will of the powerful through intrusive practices
that recommend discomfort and self-abasement. It seems
odd at first sight that paideia (as this system of education
39
and refinement is called), was still championed, bringing

with it the expectation of a benevolent, because
cultivated, exercise of authority, where all members of
the upper class are said to benefit from common codes of
20
courtesy and self-control. Yet despotism over vast
territories requires extended networks of support in order
to function. Within these frameworks paideia thrived,
greasing the wheels of imperial machinery by negotiating
21
its violence. More than this, paideia expressed the
morality of an increasingly weakened aristocracy, living in
a world characterized by a chilling absence of legal
restraints on violence in the exercise of power. A lurking
fear of arbitrary violence, caused elites fearful of
maintaining their position to fall back on the advantages
22
of their educated refinement. Educators could, then,
appeal to a common fear of that tide of horror which
23
lapped close to the feet of all educated persons who
were only exempt from corporal punishment because of
their noble status. Educators could appeal to patrons who
recognised the advantages of a culture of refinement in
which anger is seen as a failure in decorum, and
clemency is viewed as a manifestation of the dignity and
24
poise of the powerful. It was sufficiently obvious that
ceremony and decorum did not simply exalt the powerful;
it controlled them, by ritualizing their responses and
25
bridling their raw nature through measured gestures.
The noble ideal of character formation was then, a moral
formation born of weakness, the weakness of a class of
notables seeking to maintain its position. It assured that
within the imperial system, cultured individuals or
educated people were still treated as such. On occasion,
favoured members of their class would even be permitted
to speak back to the powerful, themselves now adopting
the role of educated supplicants. This was the context
within which the seductions of the educator-employee
gained purchase. As Christianity subsequently took hold
across the empire, these practices were not extinguished.
40
The philosopher educator was replaced by the Christian

bishop, in the sense that the latter occupied the
educational role established by the former, transforming
this role, adapting its intrusions and seductions to new
ends and contexts. This holy man would also at times
offer unwelcome advice to his emperor, but with divine
backing and the implied threat of Gods wrath if left
unheeded. Such bishops still practiced paideia then,
though there had been an important shift: Paideia was no
longer treated as the all-embracing and supreme ideal of
a gentlemans life, rather it was viewed as the necessary
first stage in the life cycle of the Christian public man. It
had been reduced in status, becoming mere preparatory
schooling to a wider project of Christian character
26
formation.
A Christian Soul
For a time, Christianity existed as just another cult gaining
27
influence as the Roman Empire degenerated. The
Roman elite, wanting philosophy for themselves,
regarded with disgust that other great philosophical
inheritance found across sects sweeping through Empire,
with all their vagabonds, preachers, moralists, cults and
communities. They turned up their noses at Christians
28
as they did at the tattered, shameless Cynics.
Christianity would, of course, eventually triumph over its
detractors. Not only did it assimilate itself to the ideology
of the ruling order, it redefined and took over what it
meant to be both cultured and educated. The other sects,
including the Cynics, would only survive to the extent they
were incorporated.
The Western soul became the property of Christian

theology, the educated soul being itself Christianised.
41
This Christian appropriation took its time. A first century

follower such as Paul the Apostle had little interest in the
soul as distinct from the body, speaking in the latter case
only of the flesh. The flesh stood here for the general
condition of humankind soon to be judged at the Second
Coming of Christ. It was the plight of human beings
29
caught in a hurried instant. But as Christ failed to
materialise, first century Christians were forced to realise
their collective sojourn on earth would be somewhat
extended. It was now worth asking, as the ancients once
had, how on earth the soul might protect itself from the
impulses of the body. Here Christianity borrowed from its
philosophical predecessors. And so, we encounter in
Christian hands the following recognisably Stoic advice:
Live as if you were going to die every day, devoting
attention to yourselves and remembering my
30
exhortations. Or the Platonic line: Approach your life as
a training for death and a flight from the body since the
soul must be separated from the body if it is to know
31
God. Wisdom is reconceived as knowledge of God. It
remains an otherworldly thing, approached only through
death.
Where pagan philosophers educated their desires,

Christians went much further: our ideal is not to
32
experience desire at all, one said. In principle, the
egoistic self could be so undermined it would cease to
desire completely, allowing the ascetic to arrive at a point
where he has no will of his own. This person would not
want things to be as he wishes since he wishes them to
33
be as they are.
42
The body remained a training ground for the soul,

furnishing it with all manner of edifying distractions.
Ascetic practices such as fasting were hence designed to
reconstitute the self so that body and soul would no
34
longer be enslaved to the appetites. Even illness was
considered profitable by these Christian opportunists:
You must consider your illness a pedagogue, one said,
which leads you to what is profitable to you that is,
teaches you to despise the body and corporeal things and
all that flows away, is the source of worries, and is
perishable, so that you may belong completely to the part
which is above, making this life down below as Plato
says a training for death If you philosophize in this
way, you will teach many people to philosophize in their
35
suffering. The body may be loathsome, but was the
36
best educational tool one had.
Though Christian practices were geared to the formation

of a spiritual elite, Christianity operated as a popular
philosophy too. A Platonism for the masses, as Nietzsche
37
put it. Christianity cemented that educational
commitment which holds all souls recoverable in principle.
Until final judgement none are beyond redemption. And
so, with Christianity, that flight from the body inaugurated
by Hellenistic philosophy persists and spreads. Strategies
are developed and extended that control the appetites,
38
restrain the passions, and thereby educate the soul.
Christianity continues to pursue objectives remaining
beyond reach by definition. Down below in this life that
persists despite everything it is taught to abhor about
itself, the message is clear: You can aspire to a virtuous
life despite all your bodily distractions, despite your
debased existence. In pursuing virtue you will begin to
approach knowledge of God. So go forth, be virtuous, but
remember the path is difficult. In contemporary terms the
43
formula is adjusted: Seek tranquillity in your classroom,

cry out for a state of calm, cultivate a moment of
interrupted calamity, make that your primary objective and
sustain yourself by it. What else is there to hope for on
earth?
Baptism offers an early example of Christian education. It

involved a death of sorts, imitating the death and
39
resurrection of Christ. Baptismal preparation was an
enterprise in mortification by which those hoping to be
baptised demonstrated the extent they were willing to die
voluntarily, ending their earlier, sinful life through a final
40
act of devotion. These baptismal rituals demanded
rigorous preparation and commitment, obeying the
41
precept: no baptism without prior teaching. To be
purified the soul would have to be first educated, or
formed. Exercises such as fasting and sexual abstinence
ensued. These obeyed a demonology whereby spirits
unable to enjoy bodily pleasures directly, are forced to
enjoy them vicariously through their human host. These
spirits are most active when the body is moved by those
42
pleasures they seek to share. Hence, the quest for
Christian spiritual purity is associated with a fight to limit
pleasurable activities. The early Christian begins to
observe life-denial as an ongoing problem. Such denials
precede but reach beyond baptism, giving us the roots of
a practice that would extend to occupy the entire life a
life of denials of the practicing Christian.
There was some disagreement concerning when, at

which point exactly, baptismal purification occurred. Was
it during immersion, or was purification a prerequisite for
baptism? In the former case, baptism in water was
44
analogous to baptism in blood, namely, martyrdom.

Unlike martyrdom, water baptism was complicated by the
ongoing life of the baptised. The baptised soul would
remain attached to the body after the event. In this case,
rather a lot perhaps too much was expected of the
ritual. Hence a whole machinery of self-purification prior
to baptism was developed. The baptised would not only
believe in the moment of baptism through an act of faith.
They would commit to the educational process that
preceded it. Hence the canonical statement: We are not
bathed in the baptismal water in order to be purified, but
we are bathed in the baptismal water because we are
43
purified. For this education to be a success, it was
necessary to convince the soon-to-be baptised it was
worthy of commitment. And so in a different context,
serving a different purpose, a familiar problem recurs:
how to convince the educatee of the educational good. In
the second and third centuries the Christian solution
differs from its pagan cousins. It gives care of soul over to
the pupil. The pupil rather than the tutor now operates as
guarantor to the educational good. The educator remains,
yet becomes more of an educational conduit than a self-
possessed guide. When things go awry, the educator can
claim: You have nobody to blame but yourself. The
obsequious plea of the Roman tutor is replaced by the
knowing look of the baptismal teacher.
Catechumens candidates for baptism were presented

to the teachers by their sponsors. During this initial
examination the candidates intentions and prior life were
44
put to the test. A number of professions were prohibited,
including brothel keepers, prostitutes, unfaithful
concubines, men who kept concubines, pagan teachers,
magicians, astrologers, pagan priests, gladiators, soldiers
45
and charioteers. If admitted, catechumens embarked on
45
a training period of some months or years, concluding

with another examination testing how piously they lived
since joining. Those considered ready underwent more
intense preparation, involving ascetic practices (such as
prayer, fasting, kneeling) that were, through their rigor,
46
intended to test the authenticity of the faith. Two days
before baptism, the catechumen underwent exorcism
carried out by the bishop. As the bishop uttered
imprecations to drive out Satan, the catechumen was
expected to listen without moving or fidgeting thereby
47
proving the spirit of evil is no longer master of his soul.
Those who became agitated, perhaps foaming at the
mouth, gnashing their teeth, or becoming excessively
uplifted, would be placed to one side for further
48
cleansing. Exorcism was not simply about purging the
soul in final preparation for baptism; it was a procedure by
which those to be purified were expected to manifest the
49
truth they were ready for baptism. Clearly there was a
voluntary dimension to baptismal initiation, where it was
believed lack of success in expelling the alien spirits was
due to the candidates failure to receive his instructions in
50
good faith. Uncleanness at this late juncture was
considered the catechumens fault, since the devil could
51
not have survived this far without assistance. In
Augustines words:
We heap upon you the curses that his wickedness
deserves; but you on your side declare a most glorious
war against him by your aversion and your pious
52
renunciation This is now your task, this is your labour.
During baptism a last test was applied. At this point, so it

was hoped, the Holy Spirit would descend into the soul of
the baptised. Three questions were asked: Do you
believe in the Father? Do you believe in the Son? Do you
believe in the Holy Spirit? The baptised would reply to
53
each, and be submerged three times. Yet the
ceremonies continue: And when he has done exorcising,
let him [the bishop] breathe in their face. And when he
46
has sealed their foreheads and their ears and their noses,
let him raise them up. And let them spend all the night in
54
vigil, and let them be read to and instructed. The devil,
one presumes, was still present, fighting for control of his
victims who, once cleansed, had to be safeguarded
55
against re-entry. The candidate for baptism had been
tested repeatedly and with increased severity, right until
the moment of purification. Educationally, everything that
could be done had been done to assure success.
Procedures had been instituted, attention had been
lavished. At each stage a concerned gaze was fixed on
the soul of the candidate, raising the stakes of failure,
further intensifying pressure on the baptised to
demonstrate success.
The levels of purification achieved through baptism were

always limited. Christianity insisted all members of its
congregation would remain a little impure, at least in this
56
life. Hence, the work of redemption was never-ending.
Tranquillity would be desired, and fervently pursued, but
never entirely achieved. Here the Christian soul differs
57
from Greek antiquity by the addition of original sin. A
specifically Christian conception of human frailty and its
overcoming takes form, where nobody, however pure,
has the necessary strength to step outside convention
and remain faithful to God. All must submit to the
protection of the Church. Unlike the Platonic soul which
loses its knowledge of higher things, or the soul of the
58
neo-Platonists which falls into matter becoming
59
harmed and diminished by association the Christian
soul is gradually understood according to the fall of Adam.
This soul is still troubled by the body, and the hope
remains it will be liberated when the latter passes on. But
the Christian soul is not so much educated through a
(Platonic) process of ascent and rediscovery by which it
47
aspires to wisdom (and death). Rather, it is formed

through a constant battle with the evil it contains. The risk,
clearly enough, is that its demons will follow to the
afterlife, which means that the educational drama of
redemption is no longer one of progressive illumination,
60
but one of struggle and perpetual suspicion.
Reconceived as knowledge of God, wisdom is similarly
transformed, becoming ever more desired, yet ever more
remote and unachievable. Nobody is rescued by force of
will alone from a fallen condition, since every act of will is
infected by the very condition from which it needs to be
rescued. Success is reliant upon Gods grace, committing
each Christian subject to an educational project that
61
remains, by definition, incomplete in this present life.
The Christian cultivates spiritual success as an
obsessional objective, in a context where only failure
manifests.
A transformed, evil Satan lies behind the coming

educational drama of early Christianity. In the Testaments
Satan was not yet evil personified. He was custodian on
earth, a mere functionary of divine government charged
62
with testing and disciplining Mankind. Satan first takes
form as examiner, testing the faith of Gods people. The
fall of Satan only occurred as Christianity evolved in late
antiquity, with Satan becoming Gods adversary instead,
the personification of radical evil. In educational terms,
the greatest external examiner ever imagined was hurled
from his office. Since their examiner on earth had
departed, Christians were forced to examine themselves,
fearing that if they failed to do so adequately Satan would
return and take up residence within. For fear of Satan, the
educational mission of Christianity became inescapable,
since the more Christian one is, the more one is at
riskthe more the devil rages against his expulsion from
48
63
the soul. The more Christian one became, the more one
needed education.
Baptised Christians could still fall from grace. Centuries

before the sale of indulgences became commonplace,
fallen Christians would find salvation, if at all, only through
a second penance, begging for admission once more to
an educational order that makes shame and supplication
a lifelong experience. Commitment to the educational
good was again a condition of entry, this time to the order
64
of penitents. Clearly the Christian was never safe and
65
must never relax: the danger of sin never subsides.
This introduced a new kind of fear, a sense of fear about
oneself, of what one is. This fear was more radical in its
reach and constantly present than a fear of destiny or of
66
Gods wrath. It was the fear we might fail at any moment
in our attempts to become free of Satans grip. Thus
motivated one toils ceaselessly until the moment of final
deliverance It would appear that a whole subjectivity,
and a whole educational tradition, was built upon this fear
of self. Education dealt again in conceptions of weakness,
in this case, the inevitable weakness of the sinner who
fears for his soul. Education recommended itself as the
unflagging response, the first and last hope, against evil.
Sin Multiplied
Education swallows everything and anything, given the
chance. Having become lost in its digestive tract,
educational practitioners experience their confinement as
if it were a stable condition, not realising they have been
taken in and will eventually pass out. Its historians are
similarly afflicted, most settled when locating their object
within more immediate institutional confines. From this
position, early Christian baptismal practices are not
49
particularly educational, or hardly appear central to a

history of education: If we must draw from our early
Christian precursors, why not base our understanding in
Christian monasticism, or the first Christian schools? Or
so resounds that tendency, which would have us confine
education to its most obvious ancestral manifestations,
strengthening an educated conceit that finds security in
solidity. The Cynic replies with aperient measures, but
cannot resist doubling back and probing its strongholds.
The first monks were uncultured, lowly and contemptible.

Uneducated, they lacked paideia. The grubby ascetic was
67
only later transformed, eventually becoming the
disciplined vanguard of a new elite, specialising in
spiritual warfare. Here the occasional violence of fourth
century monastic vigilantes, ransacking towns for idols,
tearing down synagogues and pagan shrines, coalescing
68
as lynch mobs, only reflected those more sustained, far
more constantly exerted inner aggressions by which
monks disciplined themselves in acts of pious devotion.
69
These monks were warriors of the spirit, and described
70
themselves in such militant terms. But it was not all
violence, or at least, some violence was benign in
appearance. These monastic orders not only preyed
through acts of terror, but installed themselves as
71
distributors of welfare to those they persecuted. In a
similar way, the violence of monastic self-discipline was
matched by its claim to be the most benignant of
exertions ever made upon the human soul. To erase the
presence of sin and save the soul, monasticism
recommended itself.
50
Within the walls of the monastic institution, another

interiority was constructed. Those seeking redemption
were no longer asked simply to exhibit themselves as
fallen beings. There was an expectation to divide and
inspect ones being, multiplying its potential for sin. This
newfound depth was cosmic, rather than personal, since
the details of a monks inner life were expressive of
exterior forces. Hence sexual renunciation was not a
matter of treating ones individual desires, proclivities and
so on, as if they were lodged in the isolated body.
Rather, the task facing the monk and early Christian drew
its seriousness from the cosmic scale of the battle, where
those energies pulsing through the body were the same
72
energies that kept the stars alive. Individual privacy had
little meaning in this context. Sex was just another bodily
distraction overshadowed by the most obscene disruption
of all in the texture of the universe the parting of the
body and soul at death. Sexual renunciation or at least
discipline was only valuable in giving a manageable face
to the diffuse horror of mortality. It provided an outlet
where early Christians could gain some measure of
control. By denying those forces that were expressive of
life, of its drive for continuity through reproduction, early
Christians believed themselves able to install a place in
the human heart where the footsteps of death might be
73
muffled. The point was to pre-empt death by practicing
mortifications of ones own. This made sense because life
itself had little intrinsic value. Earthly existence was
considered the product of an over-riding demonic
74
tyranny whose end Christ inaugurated. It was the duty
of each Christian to hasten the collapse of that tyranny by
75
refusing to satisfy sexual desires. Other justifications
soon followed. For Origen (pious to the point of self-
castration) earthly pleasures were considered mere
slurred echoes of those heavenly delights reserved for
76
the pious. In the monastery, practices designed to
attack these existential slurs became highly developed.
51
Whilst baptism, and then penance, sought to rescue the

soul from its fallen state, monasticism refined the soul it
rescued. It turned attention to those recesses where sin
might hide. Monasticism still implied a life of penance, yet
penance was now tied to the production of sin. The monk
would cultivate his soul through a mortification of the flesh
far more diligent and persevering.
Traceable to the third century if not earlier, Christian

monasticism was a way of life for the social outcast. Early
monks lived alone or in groups, either in the desert or on
the fringe of society. The subsequent history of
monasticism is the history of their institutionalisation, of
the social outcast who becomes socially useful. Aspiring
monks no longer walked into the desert. They stood at the
monastery gate. According to Cassian, they waited for
days as monks within heaped abuse on those seeking
admission. Only having endured such humiliations would
they be admitted, exchanging their clothes for the habit of
the order, renouncing all prior wealth, becoming entirely
dependent. The second admission might take a year,
during which the candidate was permitted to live on the
outskirts of the monastery performing menial tasks.
Following tests of patience, obedience, submission and
humility, the candidate might finally be allowed to join the
77
order. An indefinite period followed during which the
novice would be taught to further renounce his will. Any
wishes or inclinations that contradicted his orders, even if
they were never realised, were to be confessed to an
elder. Each monk was expected to obey in everything
and to hide nothing, to obey exhaustively and
78
exhaustively tell what one is.
52
Monastic institutions were not reliant on the greatness of

their teachers or spiritual leaders. They would not transfer
wisdom downwards. The monastic life was still a
philosophical life in the ancient sense, reorienting the soul
whilst deferring wisdom. And yet, monasteries no longer
required the guidance of a great philosopher in order to
79
function. This was a sensible precaution given their
susceptibility to temptation and sin. Even great monks
and spiritual leaders could fall from grace. And so, in the
monastic orders envisaged by Cassian, and later by
80
Benedict, the corporate body of the monastery rather
than the piety of any single leader, bridles the dangerous
assertion of the individual will and its accompanying
81
cravings. Obedience remained absolutely necessary to
monastic life, yet students were not obedient because of
the greatness of the teacher who knew better; rather, they
were obedient for the sake of obedience, remaining
obedient even when the teacher was no longer worthy of
it. Elders and teachers were not given licence to fail their
students; they too would be subject to the strictures of
monastic life. Yet, the monastic institution did not depend
upon their excellence for its survival. Such teachers did
not yet carry the success of education, and the
educational encounter, on their conscience.
Monastic obedience was not demanded to render

education more efficient. An efficient transfer of
knowledge, or wisdom, from master to student was not its
object. Monastic obedience did not derive its authority
from the quality of the order nor was it reliant on the
82
quality of the person giving the order. The fact the
student obeyed, whatever the order, was more important.
Cassian reports a whole number of absurd orders and
requests to make this point, that obedience is the basic
83
condition of monastic life. The monk obeys in order to
53
84
be obedient ideally reaching a state of obedience so
absolute he is ready to obey even before he receives the
order. When orders are wanting, the monk must see to it
that events take on the form and value of an order. The
monk fills his world with orders, experiencing everything
as an order, so there is no act in the monks life that is
not a response to an order or, at the least, a reaction to
85
permission given. In part the monk experiences
everything as an order because he is expected to place
himself as low as possible in relation to everyone else.
Believing himself to be a sinner, he must consider himself
more humble than any of his companions accepting their
86
wishes as if they were commands. His extreme humility,
giving himself over to the will of others, prepares the
monk to cease willing entirely. The aim of obedience, thus
understood, is the eventual mortification of ones will; it is
87
to act so that ones will, as ones own will, is dead. And
so, whilst monasteries might be celebrated in the popular
imagination for their great endurance, surviving the
upheavals of history so they could preserve and pass on
culture to future generations; their early philosophical
outlook and educational ethos was one of extreme
submission and deathly inertia.
Self-discipline should remain measured and sedate. Any

self-denying ordinance pushed to excess risks becoming
self-destructive. The monk risks succumbing to hubris.
Cassian recalls monks casting themselves down wells,
fasting excessively, or crossing deserts without food to
demonstrate just how catastrophically they had purged
88
themselves of natural inclinations and desires. Despite
appearances, these were not acts of extreme piety. They
were symptomatic of a desire for glory, or so runs this line
of critique. The monasteries of the fourth century were
perhaps themselves established in response to the
54
untrammelled intensification of such practices. Some

ascetic practitioners were becoming dangerously
indifferent to pain and discomfort, removing themselves
89
beyond the grasp of power. In its advanced form
asceticism posed a challenge to Christianity, delivering its
practitioners beyond the influence of its institutions and
teachings. The most potent ascetics effectively reversed
the self-denials of monastic obedience, transforming
these denials into a form of egoistic self-mastery that
90
denied access to external power.
To secure their foothold monastic and ecclesiastical

institutions had to bring self-mastery back within their
control. They would purge themselves of all vagrant, self-
sufficient, ascetic heresies, and bring all miracles,
marvels, punishments and self-flagellations back into the
orbit of their influence. This was achieved in part by the
idea that the devil present within us cannot be cast out
alone. He may lie concealed behind those acts we
consider most holy. Excessive fasting, for example, could
be the devils work, as he weakens those abstaining from
food so they cannot resist other temptations. Hence the
monk learns to exercise discrimination, moderating his
devotional activities where necessary, inspecting every
inclination and thought. Such processes of inspection
(seeking to cast out the devils trickery, including illusions
of piety implanted by the devil) were to be carried out
under the auspices of an institutional framework, where
one monk relies upon the ear of another. This ear must
not become too friendly, however. In some early
monasteries young monks were expected to maintain a
91
distance of one cubit between each others bodies. The
monk to whom one confesses does not have to be an
intimate, nor does this monk require greater powers of
discrimination. As Foucault suggests in his critique of
55
confessional practices; the monk to whom one confesses

is merely an instrument in the moral architecture of the
monastery, where the purpose of confession is not so
much to appeal to anothers better judgement. The form
of confession is more important than the wisdom of the
person to whom one speaks; the quality of the person to
whom one speaks, the advice he might be able to give,
and his experience is less important than the simple fact
of speaking. The main feature of confession is not the
authority of the master, but the fact one confesses to
92
someone who is basically an x. Confession expresses
and brings to the surface thoughts and feelings, however
fleeting, that each monk may have otherwise ignored or
been able to forget. Their objective content, whether they
are true or false, is less important than what they reveal
93
about the preoccupations of the thinker. These thoughts
are to be sifted through. They are symptomatic of the soul
that is given form and made available to inspection
through confession. The expectation is that confession
becomes perpetual and continuous, allowing the flow of
thoughts that ceaselessly agitate the monks soul to be
94
put under constant supervision. This obligation to
confess ties the monk to his community, forcing him to
establish a connection where submission is accompanied
by a great deal of disclosure. The monk not only gives up
his freedom and renounces his will, he commits to making
himself known, permanently and in almost every detail, so
that he can be acted upon. This is designed to turn the
monks inner world inside out leaving nothing remaining
95
that could not be placed before others. There would be
nothing left that could be privately willed. At its best and
most effective, evil forces are no longer feared because
they are concealed, they are not found lurking behind a
faade of faithful devotion. Rather, the monastery
produces its evil tidings, it multiplies sin through relentless
confessional practices, as compulsive as they are
conditional.
56
In monastic communities it was considered a privilege to

visit good Christian violence upon oneself mortifying the
flesh, engaging in self-denial, submitting to endless
inspection for only those willing to prostate themselves
before the gates of the community were admitted and
trained to do so. This began that process by which
members renounced their will, so as to approach an
educational good that would never be realised, regardless
of the devotions of an entire community working its
regimen. It would never be manifested, either in pious
individuals or pious acts, for these individuals and their
actions would always be suspected for their vainglory.
Whenever the educational good becomes manifest, it is to
be doubted as the devils work. The educational good
functions as its own aperient.
In a pre-modern context, the educational good is

postponed yet affirmed. It seduces but never delivers. It is
as fervently believed as it is cloaked, operating a system
that ties its pursuers to an educational path along which
hope is forced but never realised. It ensnares the
educated and those about to be educated. It attaches its
victims to an educational promise that remains forever
empty. It conjures the educated soul and bases its conceit
in processes of self-doubt and suspicion. It is born of
weakness, reinforcing the weakness of those who
educate and weakening those educated by them. It
inaugurates a line of descent where nothing suffices but
everything must be done. We must always fall short and
remain within its shadow.
57
58
IV
OUR EDUCATIONAL CONSCIENCE
The Healthy Educator

The philosopher educator becomes educator philosopher.
And then, finally, educator without philosophy. This is the
history of Western education.
Seneca anticipated the second coming of educator

philosopher in the first century, offering the following
counsel:
Avoid shabby attire, long hair, an unkempt beardand all
other misguided means to self-advertisement. The very
name of philosophy, however modest the manner in
which it is pursued, is unpopular enough as it is: imagine
what the reaction would be if we started dissociating
ourselves from the conventions of society. Inwardly
everything should be different but our outward face should
conform to the crowd Let our aim be a way of life not
59
diametrically opposed to, but better than that of the mob.

Otherwise we shall repel and alienate the very people
1
whose reform we desire.
The philosophers life must be a compromise between

the ideal and the popular morality. People should admire
our way of life but they should at the same time find it
2
understandable. The philosopher must not appear too
otherworldly. A Stoic may wish to live in conformity with
nature, but should not torture his body, make a point of
being dirty or adopt a diet that is not just plain but
hideous and revolting Philosophy calls for simple living,
3
not for doing penance. The art of seduction depends
upon a respectable appearance. The educator
philosopher accommodates himself to his
contemporaries.
Whilst the Stoic philosopher prepares himself each day to

endure any possible misfortune, he should not seek it out.
He will enjoy whatever he is able to accumulate. Only
fools and those of unstable mind find wealth to be an
4
intolerable burden. The secret, Seneca decides, is to
avoid becoming overly attached to material things;
prepared to give them up if forced. Even friendships are
5
to be enjoyed without becoming dependent upon them.
Here the relationship between tutor and patron may be
modelled on friendship, but the tutor must not invest
himself in the success of his pupil. In his musings On the
Shortness of Life, Seneca laments, most squander their
lives servicing the needs of others, paying too little
attention to their own: Think how much of your time was
taken from you by a creditor, how much by a mistress,
6
how much by a patron, how much by a client. Attending
to others may bring benefits, even fame and glory, but
these attendant folk will have hardly lived, busying
themselves as they scurry to and fro, spreading
60
Our Educational Conscience
7
themselves too thin. Under these conditions no one is
8
his own person having wasted energies on others.
When they eventually come to face death, these
wretches are already destroyed. For they busied
9
themselves too long in doing nothing. Unlike the
philosopher they discover too late that a life spread thin is
a life wasted. They beg for just a little more time of their
own before they depart. By contrast the philosopher
stares death in the face knowing his life was well spent.
The dying philosopher consoles himself that he lived in
contemplation of higher things. His life was a cultivation of
self. The philosopher of this more ancient tradition has not
squandered his life. He was not distracted by useless
diversions, having realised long ago that before all else
he must attend to his own being, using all the time he is
given to master his existence and make of it something
worthwhile. For the Stoic, self-mastery is also a form of
self-sufficiency, where Seneca has in mind a rather heroic
yet leisured figure. His soul being raised so high, his self-
mastery being so well practised, this figure carries his
10
valuables intact through cities burnt to ashes. As an
educator, and as a philosopher, the Stoic hopes to
become impregnable. He remains true to himself, true to
his philosophy, a generous benefactor to humankind.
The educated conceit of the Stoic philosopher was

somewhat muddied under Christian influence. Christianity
intensified that process of introspection by which the
philosopher endlessly toils towards a form of self-
perfection never to be realised, only approximated. The
educator must now carry intact not only his valuables, but
the valuables of those he teaches through cities burnt to
ashes. The plight of the educators soul becomes fettered
to the plight of those to be educated. Eventually such
teachers would carry the success of education, and the
educational encounter, on their conscience.
61
Seneca gave intimate advice but lacked an educational

conscience. His advice was that of the doctor who attends
to your health yet remains distant. Since his good-health
remains unaffected by your ill-health, the educators
health is secure regardless of whether or not you ignore
his advice, or fail to take his prescriptions. Your fate is not
tied to his own.
Without wisdom, Seneca writes to his pupil, the mind is

sick, and the body itself, however physically powerful, can
only have the kind of strength that is found in persons of
11
demented or delirious state. It is silly and no way for
an educated man to behave, to spend ones time
exercising the biceps, broadening the neck and shoulders
and developing the lungs. Even when extra feeding has
produced gratifying results and youve put on a lot of
muscle, youll never match the strength or the weight of a
prize ox. The educated man, must make room for the
12
spirit, keeping the body within more reasonable bounds.
Recalling that convention by which letters are begun, I

trust this finds you as it leaves me, in good health,
Seneca prefers the following salutation: I trust this finds
13
you in pursuit of wisdom. Crucially, the recipient is to be
assured his tutor and advisor is already well on the way.
The Roman tutor is employed because of his independent
refinements. He sets himself against all false educators
14
who teach how to argue instead of how to live. The
liberal arts in general come under attack by Seneca,
15
insofar as they lead in that direction. We must reject
62
those who offer lessons that have little bearing on the way
they live. People prone to every fault they denounce, are
walking advertisements to the uselessness of their
16
training. The educator philosopher teaches by example,
though he does so without alienating the very people
whose reform he desires. Exemplary though he may be,
the educator remains cautious and alert. He bears the
employer in mind.
I, Seneca, am worthy of employment precisely because I

bear out my lessons in my actions. It is the philosophers
self-mastery that qualifies him for favourable employment,
and not his favourable employment that guarantees his
self-worth. But under the yoke of medieval Christianity, a
reversal occurs. The work of the educator, the educators
achievements rather than the educators independent
refinements, increasingly provide succour in a context of
rising insecurity. Indeed the self-worth of the educator is
rendered precarious by a growing attachment, Seneca
might say over-attachment, to the plight of those to be
educated. The conceit of the educator is no longer
guaranteed independently of education. It must be
secured through education. The educator can no longer
rely upon his status as philosopher. His conceit now
depends on his status as educator. The self-reinforcing
esteem of the philosopher who lives the exemplary life,
who represents the epitome of philosophical excellence,
is replaced, whereupon the esteem of the educator, if not
the educators soul, is dependent on the educators good
work.
Principles of Pastoral Care

We owe much to the Christian pastorate. Its logic of
power comes to define the subjectivity of the Western
63
educator. It binds the educator to his pupils by committing

the educator to a project of mutual redemption. Of pre-
Christian and Hebraic conception, it continues even now
to provide the core moral technology of the school. For
its principles of care were not reducible to theological
propositions. They would eventually slip their doctrinal
17
moorings and quietly migrate to a secular context.
In its early forms pastoral power held within view not a

territory, but a flock. Its deity the Hebrew God moves from
place to place. His presence, as Foucault argues, is
never more intense and visible than when his people are
on the move for in their wanderings they require
18
direction. Pastoral power offers guidance through
uncertain terrain. Fundamentally a beneficent power, the
shepherd-God operates a regime of power that exists in
explicit contrast to those characterised by wealth,
splendour and above all by their ability to triumph over
enemies, defeat them, and reduce them to slavery. The
pastoral ruler, like the pastoral teacher, stands in contrast
to regimes of force that may at times be beneficent too,
but are not primarily so. Pastoral power is entirely defined
19
by its beneficence; its only raison d'tre is doing good.
The shepherd desires the salvation of his flock. He guides
it to good pasture; he cares for his flock as a whole and
individually, retrieving strays.
Pastoral power is not allergic to displays of strength and

superiority. But these are its occasional forms. The
shepherd exerts a form of power less spectacular as it is
more committed. The shepherds power is notable for its
20
zeal, devotion and endless application. To be a
shepherd is not an honour, it is a burden. The shepherd
64
directs all care and attention to others and rarely to

himself. The good shepherd is selfless, serving as
intermediary between the flock and pasture, food, and
21
salvation. But the shepherd is also torn. He directs the
flock as a whole, whilst ensuring no individual escapes his
22
attention. He keeps an eye on all and on each.
The shepherd deals with impossible scenarios. Will he

neglect the whole of the flock in order to save a single
23
sheep? Or will he neglect a single sheep to save the
flock? This theme is endlessly repeated from Genesis up
24
to the rabbinical commentaries and becomes, in turn,
the problem of the Church. Will it abandon, exclude or
chase away the sheep that is a cause of scandal, or
whose corruption is in danger of corrupting the whole
flock? Because here is the paradox of pastoral care: The
flocks salvation depends upon the supervision of each
sheep. The basic problem the Church faces again and
again is to ask itself: What is to be done about those who
stray, those who renounce the Church? A serious matter,
for at the end of the day, at the end of life in the world
the Christian shepherd and pastor will have to account
25
for every sheep. Any missing sheep, or sheep led
astray, could be counted against him. The shepherd is
forever answerable.
The pastor identifies with his congregation. He feels their

pain and suffering as if it were his own. He carries every
act of those in his care, every merit and fault. When good
deeds are done, the pastor shares in them as if they were
his own. Where evil surfaces, the pastor cannot help
wondering if it were somehow his doing, from inattention
at least, if not from false teaching.
65
The shepherd is prepared to die to save his sheep. He

risks his soul for the souls of others. He becomes their
confidant as he tells his flock to unburden their minds of
every sin and indiscretion. Through confession he
absolves those in his care, hearing their darkest thoughts,
risking his own. Together they develop a conscience. By
encountering such beautiful sinners, hearing their
temptations to evil, he risks temptation himself. The
26
pastor gambles so much but remains hopeful. He
believes himself saved by his commitment to die on their
behalf. In this sacrifice lies his salvation his last hope.
But the hope which motivates his actions is of a kind
never to be realised on earth. The pastors salvation is in
Gods hands. He must remain uncertain of his success
amid so much failure. His salvation, and theirs, is not
guaranteed. It is never assured.
The pastor must recognise his imperfections and reveal a

select few to his congregation. He must repent openly
and show humility before his faults in a self-abasement
27
that will edify the faithful. The conceit of the pastor by
which he justifies his elevated position as director of souls
is a product of his self-abasement. The pastor is not
simply elevated. He is elevated by virtue of the fact that
he, more than any other, recognises his fallen state, his
incompleteness. The most conceited educator, by
extension, is that educator who openly declares his
incompleteness before his congregated pupils. Our most
conceited educator of this tradition makes this
proclamation, this declaration of his indefinite limitations
the basis of his practice. He claims that only in this
classroom, in communion with these pupils does he
66
become what he must be. Only here, in this moment does

he become an educator.
As an educational problem, the paradoxical equivalence

of all sheep generates a dilemma that remains with us to
this day. The care of all and each, the holding to account
of educator to his actions as viewed through the lens of
his pupils, the assumption that he will if necessary be
their sacrificial victim, haunts education still. For the
shepherd and educator whose raison d'tre is to guide
and protect, whose salvation depends on the success of
his good work, this paradox becomes a source of
considerable unsettlement.
Against those who mount the pulpit and those who

congregate below. Against those who operate outside the
Christian church adopting its techniques as their own, the
following is due: Each gathering flock be warned. Each
educational congregation take heed. Christianity
coagulated all these themes of pastoral power into
precise mechanisms and definite institutions. It
implanted its apparatuses within the Roman Empire and
organised at its heart a type of power perhaps unknown
to any other civilization Of all civilizations, Foucault
continues, the Christian West has undoubtedly been at
the same time, the most creative, the most conquering,
the most arrogant, and doubtless the most bloody. Yet
over millennia Western man has learned to see himself
as a sheep in a flock, something that assuredly no Greek
would have been prepared to accept. Over millennia he
has learned to ask for his salvation from a shepherd. This
strangest form of power one that is most typical of the
West, and that will also have the greatest and most
67
durable fortunewas born, or at least took its model from

the fold, from politics seen as a matter of the sheep-
28
fold.
The sceptic may agree; it is conceivable that a caring

educator of conventional moral bearing might today still
institute some principles of pastoral care. But surely most
educators escape this scheme? They moralise, if at all,
within a more permissive, liberal framework of influence.
Radical educators in particular, who seek out power and
intrigue everywhere, would surely be allergic to such
morally managed relationships? Not necessarily. Though
conventional moralities may have been replaced, pastoral
care remains, indeed proliferates in those secular
contexts where it is at the same time disavowed.
Traditional flaws, those foibles we inherit from the pulpit,
have been sociologically deepened. As such they still
require careful, supervised extraction. Radical educators
actually multiply our potential to err. They achieve this
effect with an oppositional reading of the current stage of
world history and a reading of our unwitting participation
in those systems that reproduce power and co-opt us as
its agents. Exercises in pastoral care that involve self-
examination and sustained introspection, are transformed
to meet a new set of demands. The radical educator finds
in each student not merely signs of conscience but also
symptoms of the relative ravages of patriarchy and
29
capitalism or whatever else fits the bill. The radical
educator negotiates such symptoms with care, cultivating
an environment in which they may be expressed, owned
and willingly worked upon. The educator remains in place
as our necessary though self-effacing guide. By thanks to
this foremost virtuoso of conscience, we, along with
30
education are to be redeemed.
68
Educational Ill-Health
The shepherd-flock metaphor of care should not be
misunderstood as if it were a commitment to health. A
priestly class and its descendant educators have common
interest in making those in their care ill. In Nietzschean
terms: The Christian and, by extension, educational
31
pastorate has a life-interest in making mankind sick
where making sick is the true hidden objective of the
32
Churchs whole system of salvation procedures.
Making sick should not be understood in the form of an

attack or infection. The pastorate does not inflict sickness
upon its congregation, at least not at first. It begins by
appealing to a sickness already present. Hence the
Nietzschean line: No one is free to become a Christian or
not to do so; one is not converted to Christianity one
must be sufficiently sick for it. That is, one must be
33
predisposed to the sickness it cultivates.
Continuities abound. The priests interest is coterminous

with the professional interest of the Roman educator, who
must first convince his patron of the sickness of his soul.
What changes nonetheless is the treatment. There is a
shift in the realm of spiritual direction: Sickness once
taught self-mastery, recommending submission to a
philosophical regimen. With Christianity it breeds
submission to a pastoral regime. In Antiquity spiritual
direction was somewhat voluntary, where the person who
wishes to be directed finds someone whom he asks to
direct him. Spiritual direction was also often paid for, as a
consultation. This consultation was circumstantial; ones
34
spiritual director would not take care of ones entire life.
Indeed, the educational objective was that the pupil would
69
35
take control and become master of himself. By
contrast, Christian spiritual direction is not oriented as
with the ancients to self-mastery. Or at least, Christian
self-mastery is now encouraged only to the extent it
36
becomes an instrument of subordination. One does not
consent to spiritual direction as one consents to palmistry.
Submission was not voluntary in this sense, nor was it
circumstantial. It relied upon a form of renunciation that
was intended to become absolutely permanent. The
purpose of spiritual direction was to develop a form of
introspection that would fix more firmly the relationship of
subordination. It would attach its recipients to a regime of
power that would take care of their entire life, in all its
37
detail, and for the rest of its duration.
Sickness becomes permanent; an irreparable disease; a

perpetual disorder. Any hope of rescue demands
obedience to a higher ordinance of salvation. From now
on if mastery has any meaning, it means our
enslavement. Though Christian self-denial was
continuous with the ancient pursuit of mastery, it would
push that ancient pursuit even further towards its self-
denying conclusion. Christian denial is premised, as
Nietzsche put it, on the idea that the perfect soul could
38
be carried about in a cadaver of the body. To make
himself perfect man was advised to draw his senses back
into himself in the manner of the tortoise, to cease to have
any traffic with the earthly, to lay aside his mortal frame.
Following which, so it was promised, the chief part of him
39
would remain behind as pure spirit. But pure spirit
becomes pure stupidity once we deduct its nervous
40
system, its senses, its appetites. Pure stupidity is the
sickness Western education would have us suffer. Few
attain it. My own stupidity is only the larger half of a
smaller whole.
70
Christianity hardly forms a unified subject matter. Its

descent is quite obviously riven with rifts and diverging
traditions. A pastoral motif can be traced nonetheless.
Each incarnation of the Christian church shepherds its
congregation, regulating the conduct of individual
members on the grounds of their salvation. The pastorate
has been a site of struggle admittedly, yet battles were
fought over its direction and form rather than its existence
41
as such. There have been anti-feudal revolutions, so
the argument goes, but there has never been an anti-
pastoral revolution. The pastorate has not yet
experienced an insurrection so profound, or a revolution
so far reaching that could have definitively expelled it
42
from history. The soul it cultivated, the promise of
salvation it enshrined, the impossible pursuit of perfection
it demanded; these instruments of torture remain with us
43
still. That entire regime of power, one might say, is
44
something from which we have still not freed ourselves.
We do not question if education should adopt this
framework at all. Rather, we ask, what kind of salvation
should education offer? We attack education not for its
continued adoption of an ethos of care, based on a
promise of salvation. Rather, we attack education, if at all,
for being the wrong kind of church, for failing to become
the church it had the potential to be. In the eyes of its
severest critics our school system adopts the form of a
humble church built out of stones intended for a great
cathedral. It is mocked by the scale of its unrealised
potential, by the grandeur of the edifice that it might have
been, if only its builders had not lost faith and gone into
moral and political bankruptcy. These critics beggar the
school by projecting its structure as the flawed realisation
45
of an ideal form. But the ideal form remains, and serves
as a distraction from the real success story here. As we
71
forever attack schools for failing to come up with the

goods, for failing to deliver the salvation they promise, we
refuse to see how the school has been more
catastrophically successful than any cathedral; not in
offering us salvation, but in making us forever beholden to
that offer.
As a religious body the pastorate was rarely if ever in

absolute control. Religious communities existed that
countered the conduct of the pastorate with religious
46
conduct of their own. But this counter-conduct (to
47
borrow a term ) would refuse the priesthood without
rejecting its form. Here the Protestant Reformation made
resistance to the existing pastorate the principle of its
replacement. Martin Luther attacked the established
Church and its pastoral regime only to replace it with his
own. As Nietzsche famously observed, Luther restored
48
the church by attacking it. Adopting the language of its
adversaries, Luther declaimed against that pure
invention of the established Church the spiritual divide
it imposed between priesthood and laity. We are all
consecrated priests through baptism, Luther
49
pronounced. A ridiculous suggestion for many, but
Luther was content to be court jester. As he wrote, it was
a question of who will put the bells on whom that is,
50
who is the biggest fool. Here Luthers Cynicism
51
appears. He was willing to adopt the guise of fool where
necessary, for as it is said in the bible, and Luther quotes:
52
He who wishes to be wise must become a fool. So let
us sing along with Luther the fools song as he put it, and
53
see what it means for the educator. For Luther was
looking far beyond his contemporary university where
loose living is practiced, where little is taught of the
Christian faith, and where only the blind, heathen teacher
54
Aristotle rules. Luther gave definition to an educational
72
subjectivity that would transcend such temporal

confinements.
Principles of Educational Sickness

Everyone is an educator, in theory, in the pastoral sense.
Anyone can adopt a flock or individual, and make its care
the basis of his own salvation. This is Luthers first
educational principle.
Anyone can become an educator for in cases of

55
necessity anyone can baptize and give absolution but
not everyone remains an educator. Luthers second
principle.
Whilst there is no higher consecration, no better calling,

than that of educator who has Holy Scripture as his
object: not all persons will hold this office. It should be
considered an office, Luther tells us rather than a
secure identity guaranteed once and for all since a
priest in Christendom is nothing else but an officeholder.
He should be deposed, becoming a peasant or
townsman like anybody else, if he is found wanting; for
the devils work is everywhere, all are susceptible to
temptation. Cast aside here, along with the wayward
priest, is the illusion that a priest can never be anything
other than a priest, or ever become a layman. All this is
56
just contrived talk, and human regulation. By analogy,
the status of educator like that of priest should remain
uncertain, it being contingent on the educators good
work. No teacher, and no priest is beyond dismissal.
Remember, it is said: False teachers will rise up among
you who will deceive you, and with their false and fanciful
73
57
talk, will take advantage of you. This, highest office,
must be under the constant gaze of its congregation.
Against the Catholic position which would exempt the
clergy from the jurisdiction of civil courts spiritual
authority, Luther declares, is never beyond the temporal
authority of its laity. None should be permitted to rise so
far that they are beyond reach: Whoever is guilty, let him
58
suffer.
Each teacher will have his congregation, but a following is

forever contingent on the officeholders faithful devotions.
Luthers third principle.
I am faithful, the educator replies with rising intonation.

My heart is with you: I adopt your best interests as my
own.
The equivalence of all sheep and the paradox it brings is

exaggerated by Luther and his kin, allowing the pastor not
a moments peace. In principle he could be replaced at
any moment, and should fear as much. The pastor is a
sheep like any other; his authority is only temporary. His
burden, how he bears it, is his claim to excellence. It is his
only claim, and a weak one at that, for the pastors
excellence is rather diminished by the diabolic realisation
that in this world it is impossible to overcome sin. We are
beyond indulgence and inescapably damned. Hence we
should not become overly impressed by our own good
59
works. And we must not, in a grander sense, become
overly taken by this world either, for it is the Devils
dominion. We should not desire this world, and become
74
influenced by our desire to live in it. Rather we should

entertain with serious devotion a wish to die, for God
60
makes alive by slaying. That is to say, we should
pursue death, and death-in-life, in the hope of a more
61
joyful resurrection. Our flesh belongs to the Devil, our
spirit to Christ. In this latter doctrine we come to see the
tremendous extension of the Devils empire. With Luther
62
we realise how far God has retired into invisibility
leaving his elect more uncertain than ever as to the
goodness of their efforts.
No teacher is good enough no teacher can be good in

the purest sense because education is a worldly thing
but all must hope to become good. Luthers fourth
principle.
Luther accuses Rome of being so far gone, that if the

pope were so scandalously bad as to lead crowds of
63
souls to the devil, still he would not be deposed. This
unquestioning guarantee of papal authority, this play of
force, is denounced as a game of the Antichrist or at any
64
rate its forerunner. The pope keeps a brothel above all
imaginable brothels in its extent and reach, Luther
continues, for even the right to practice knavery must first
65
be bought. Anything that is forbidden can be permitted
for a fee. Indulgences are for sale. The only absolute
prohibition is to question papal authority itself. Papal
authority operates as a regime of self-preservation. It will
do the Devils work if necessary to stay in power and
shore up its riches. In that respect it is cynical to the
extreme. As an educational force, the pastorate must
define itself against such machinations. This much we
may gather from Luthers polemic. The pastorate must
75
defend itself by laying itself open. There is no earthly

realm beyond reproach, no office beyond critique, it
chants. If God spoke through an ass against a prophet,
why should he not be able even now to speak through a
66
righteous man against the pope? And in turn, why
should he not at times speak through a pupil against his
master?
We arrive at the following conclusion: I, Luther, am worthy

of employment as your educator so long as I keep up my
good work. For there is no authority in the church except
67
to promote good. But my good work will never be good
enough, for such is the human condition. So judge for
yourselves, judge me by my faithful devotions, because I
am your guide and as your guide I must be judged.
Though remember, even as you find reason to depose
me in this temporal realm, God remains my adjudicator. I
have chosen to educate you, quite simply, because I keep
the faith. That is all.
That is all? Was Luthers doctrine not hatched on the

privy in the tower a position from which all
accompanying sewage had egress down the monastery
68
walls? The anality of this vision, as Luther bestowed it
from a great and precarious height, has not gone
69
unnoticed. Recurring here is a basic correlation between
faith and vulnerability, where Luther becomes most
ecstatic, proclaiming his principle of faith, precisely when
crouched, when weakened by the matter at hand. We
encounter faith as an expression of weakness. The force
by which the educator pours out his devotions to
70
education, is an expression of the frailty of both.
76
The insidious logic of Luthers educator enables that

figure to be elevated above us because he is precarious,
because he has no other justification for his existence as
your educator, than the argument that he is doing his best
to be a good Christian (that he is busy with the matter at
hand). As such, he comes from nowhere, assumes his
office, and presumes a following. Because he has no
independent claim to excellence beyond his faith,
because he has, quite simply, and by virtue of his faith
chosen to become an educator with all the precarity that
position entails; he is to be considered excellent. That the
educator is earnest and faithful in his devotions is his
single most important qualification. The passionate
educator is born here, in this moment.
Luthers philosophy may sound quaint to the modern ear.

We know that in a century or so God would begin to
perish. But the death of God famously announced by
Nietzsche still devastates us, even now. His absence is
no more strongly felt than in the pious devotions of our
contemporary secular humanist, or atheist, who considers
himself to be above all that. Our difficulty, is that despite
all contenders, no candidate appears able to replace God
71
as shared source of meaning and value. In the old
language, we are left as before, with the entire devilry of
the world, but without the possibility of escape or
redemption. Caught short by a divine absence for which
we are insufficiently prepared, we are forced to rely upon
72
our habits, those habits of our senses now
disconnected from their originating contexts. Thus struck,
educators have only reproduced and extended the work
of a medieval pastorate, adopting habits now divorced of
sense. In modernity, education promises salvation,
77
demands obedience, and requires as a condition of its

functioning that each individual becomes known to its
officeholders, where the care of all is considered
dependent on the care of each. Nevertheless, the
destination served by this regime has become uncertain.
It has been obscured by the habitual belief in the
existence of an educational good. By desperate habit we
keep the faith.
Beware the promise of salvation in education. It

perpetuates an entire economy of salvation which
plagues the secular realm as it does the religious,
deriving from the medieval a belief that man was not
made to live in this world but was placed within it only so
73
that he might pass into another. He earns his salvation,
deferring the realisation of his efforts to another realm.
But that realm no longer exists before us as a definite
promise. We defer as before, but do so without fixed
horizons.
The end served by education is obscured by the habitual

pursuit of a destination we presume worthy of our efforts.
In the absence of a new rationale, one that would replace
God and overcome this state of dependency that
Christendom bequeaths us, old metaphysical doctrines,
old destinations beyond physics (meta ta physika) are
recycled as sufficient reason but without sufficient heart.
74
The artificial respiration of old metaphysical doctrines
forces a situation in which these doctrines are animated
to serve the needs of a social reality in which they have
no basis. Sensing this detachment, those who depend
upon these doctrines develop a fanatical attachment to
75
them. They consent to a kind of mass hypnosis that
78
finds security in high principles, which constitute, so they

believe, their last protection against nihilism. To live a
principled existence, this is our last hope. To come across
as principled is more important than the principles
themselves, which can remain ill-defined. Education is
one such principled fanaticism. With each fresh doubt,
with each debasement of education, each demonstration
that education is flawed, something independent is
presumed more fervently to exist; some pure
unadulterated core. This core attachment is all the more
fervently protected as it is brought into question. Our
attachment to education receives its strength from our
fear of its debasement, its lack of value. Our fanatical
attachment to this thing, education, is the product of our
pessimistic gloom it is the effect of our weariness,
76
fatalism and disappointment.
Luthers fifth principle is lost on us: It represents the

culmination of a philosophy we have yet to realise. We
have no stomach for his more basic claim: I am the ripe
shard and the world is the gaping anus. Our vision of the
world may be dark at times, but it is not as black as
Luthers, for whom our only escape is through the
digestive system of a world so corrupt that it is a rain of
filth upon us. We live in the Devils worm-bag, Luther
claims, and can only free ourselves by chasing it to the
77
very bottom. The imagery may be grotesque, but the
point is acute. If we are to educate and retain, perhaps
even foster, a belief in salvation through education, we
must with determination and without recoil, hold in view
the worm-bag that constitutes education as our long
confinement.
79
80
V
MASS CYNICISM
Emptied Out and Set to Work

Our romantic educators may be impassioned, but
passionate attachment is about all they have left. If
Rousseau or Erasmus were resurrected, these fathers of
contemporary education, they would be rejected as
impossible idealists. Even a famous pragmatist such as
Dewey would be sniffed at for having his head in the
clouds. Educational romanticism is an institutional affect.
If someone wants to seem to be something, stubbornly

and for a long time, he eventually finds it hard to be
1
anything else. So argues Nietzsche. A doctor, for
example, must seem the part in her patients eyes, though
she knows her professional expertise is made as much by
rituals and habitual procedures, familiar scenarios and
81
repeated phrases as by evidence-based practice. The

educator faces a similar scenario. She must exude moral
character and kindly intent, her techniques legitimated by
reference to the notion that they will neither do harm to
2
individuals or cause them frustration. To do away with
the physical and subjective violence that education
sometimes betrays, attempts are made to overlay this
violence with the sweet smile of forced harmony, in the
protected island of an institution called school. In this
institution, it is fancied, problem-free relations with
children are possible if only one applies the right
3
principles. The romantic educator believes in education,
in the student, in the school. This educator remains
hopeful and kindly, having our best interests at heart.
Naturally in the staffroom and in private, educators may
be biting and severe. Which reproduces that dissonance
between the kindly appearance of education and its
everyday disillusionment. At times such dissonance is
keenly felt. Educational encounters are messy, testing,
full of their own complex systems of injustice, and one
suspects, rather damaging too. As an institution education
suffers its glut of shifting imperatives. Educators face a
task that appears all the more impossible for the hopes
that are invested in it. But the educator must appear
optimistic, stubbornly and with great resolve she acts the
part, aligning herself to the idea education is synonymous
with betterment. In this way the educator, who is aware of
the hypocrisy of the caring professional, eventually out of
desperation or exhaustion, sheds that hypocrisy, adopting
the act that is performed. At least, this is what happens to
the best of us. There is a jaded remainder in the
teaching profession. Their mass cynicism is not without its
problems, but remains closest amongst contemporary
cynicisms to actioning itself. For them I write, staking the
terrain of a temptation that might still claim them, a
temptation to believe in education once more. This
temptation leads to a more duplicitous, less obvious
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Mass Cynicism
cynicism, one that prevents discontent from engaging

productively which is to say actively with its
predicament. And so, when I write, I have those many
teachers in mind who with jaw-clenched disgust, despise
everything that education represents today. Those who
would, given the chance, trample underfoot each new
government initiative. Those who look with barely
disguised contempt, if not open hostility, at managers,
educational consultants, school advisors, improvement
officers, and presiding academics. These agents and
agencies are rightly despised for their constant meddling.
The teaching profession is ground down, without space to
breathe. But there is a more dangerous effect, more
dangerous than compression, more disturbing than
outside pressures such as audit, managerial imposition,
or consumer dissatisfaction. This danger takes hold as
teachers and lecturers are encouraged to come up for air,
to have faith once more. This invitation to hope promotes
a weakened, weakening cynicism. It exploits and puts to
work the last remaining educational commitments of an
otherwise broken workforce. This far more duplicitous
cynicism, leads to final exhaustion and drains that
workforce of its last remaining pleasure: Revolt.
In modern secular institutions faith is instrumentalised and

our cynicism is set to work. Following Peter Sloterdijk, we
might take Dostoyevskys Grand Inquisitor as its
4
prototype. As Sloterdijk explains, this Inquisitor may
appear as a figure of the Christian Middle Ages, but
functions as a retrospective projection. He represents a
more recent, secular cynicism. Dostoyevsky describes the
return of Christ, arriving in Seville where the Spanish
Inquisition is busying itself with heretics. Christ performs a
number of miracles, ending by the Cathedral as an open
childs coffin is borne with weeping into the place of
83
worship. Christ speaks and the seven-year-old girl sits

upright, holding the bouquet she was to be buried with.
There is a bit of a to-do, and then the Cardinal Grand
Inquisitor himself appears, with his withered face and
5
sunken eyes. He raises an index finger and orders the
arrest. The Cardinal recognises his captive as Christ, and
commits him to be burned at the stake. As Sloterdijk
interprets: What Jesus had assumed about his crucifiers
as grounds for forgiveness for they know not what they
do can in no way be applied to the churchman. He
knows what he is doing and he knows it with downright
6
shocking clarity. The Cardinal accuses Jesus of
disrupting the work of the Catholic Church, which is, he
explains, stamping out the last sparks of Christian
freedom. The Church is making amends for a cruel
mistake: Christ encouraged his followers to seek freedom,
and thereby set them up to fail. It was a callous move,
causing so much pain and suffering. The Cardinal
explains how the Church was forced to respond. It
satisfied the needs of the majority who require security,
habit, certainty and tradition before all else by siding
with and sacrificing itself to the Devil. Out of compassion
the Church inflicted order, power and law upon those
without the strength to be free, whilst convincing them of
their liberty, hammering a rhetoric of freedom into their
heads. This sacrifice, this pact with the Devil, is what
gives the Cardinal his unhappy consciousness. But all
was done in the knowledge millions of people will enjoy
their existence as a result of the security spiritual
7
dominion assures. The Cardinals faith was emptied out,
rationalised and put to work.
The bold and barefaced cynicism of the Grand Inquisitor

is too heroic for us to quite believe. His strain of
unchristian Christianity has gone too far even for modern
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Mass Cynicism
cynics to stomach. To build benevolent rule upon an evil

lie is too much. At best and this is Sloterdijks point we
cynics have only one foot in the area beyond good and
evil, feeling around with the other for a reassuring
foothold in morality. Our modern cynical consciousness
seeks to combine a rigorous cynicism of means with an
equally rigid moralism of ends. As far as ends are
concerned, scarcely anyone risks imagining a real region
beyond good and evil for that would be nihilism.
Consequent attempts to resist the accomplishment of
nihilism have, for Sloterdijk, constituted the real
8
ideological war of modernity. It is precisely here that the
bloodless romanticism of contemporary education takes
hold, with its vague moralism of ends. The educational
ideal this romanticism serves becomes an ever-retreating
formation, an empty signifier, and a distant prospect.
However brutal educational institutions might become as
means to an end, education itself the ultimate end
remains untarnished. Peter Sloterdijk recommends the
following: An equally deep-set Cynicism of ends must
accompany the cynicism of means that characterizes our
present. This Cynicism of ends would reveal the
9
fundamental excess and absurdity of goals ever
retreating before us. This condition of perpetual deferral,
where we have always just one more matter to attend to,
one more wish to satisfy, one more account to settle, is
what keeps the system of excessive production going.
We are haunted by ends that delude us with their distant
light, for whenever we approach it recedes once more
10
into the distance. Mass cynicism is overcome only by its
intensification, by dialogue with the nihilism it is
symptomatic of.
Our Detached Negativity

Our cynicism becomes manifest in the workplace refrain,
Im just playing the game, where most would admit they
85
play to a tune not always their own. A decidedly weak

cynicism of means, this cynicism of ours is far more
diffuse than we realise, occurring where we least expect.
We find it too in that rigid moralism of ends which afflicts
education. This moralism would immobilise us completely.
It would be our educational rigor mortis, if our bodies were
not already broken into so many pieces.
Refusing to take itself or anything else in earnest,

contemporary cynicism cannot be attacked by
conventional means. Diffuse and insubstantial, it runs
circles around sincere discussion. As Sloterdijk observes,
paid up philosophers long struggled to comprehend the
ideological template of such unserious, shallow systems
11
preferring more serious opponents. Academic research
is similarly wrong-footed. If cynicism can be attacked at
all, a different style of delivery is required.
Cynics were once eccentrics, ridiculing social convention,

attacking the high-minded values and commitments of
civilized life, emulating their most notorious representative
Diogenes. Cynicism made its way into the Roman Empire
as a popular philosophy, a scurrilous way of life for the
12
disenfranchised and discontented. But Cynicism held
its attractions for the educated too. Well-to-do Romans
would co-opt Cynicism as a respectable philosophy, and
turn it into a literary genre. Many centuries later Cynicism
underwent a kind of revival. Marshalled to the project of
Enlightenment, a literary, respectable Cynicism was put to
use by those attempting (in the spirit of Diogenes) to
13
deface select political norms and traditions. Returned in
sanitised form, its most scurrilous and scatological
elements carefully excised, Cynicism was so flattened by
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Mass Cynicism
co-option to the spirit of Enlightenment that it was

14
diminished to insignificance. A neutered philosophical
tradition could now be rejected on terms other than its
own. It was condemned theoretically unfit a
nonsensical rationale from the Cynic perspective and
marginalised by the standards of newly professionalised
15
philosophy. A militant Cynicism all but disappeared,
leaving behind a few surface features, mere imprints
incorporated within our modern cynic attitude. This jaded
attitude so extended the critique of tradition inaugurated
by Enlightenment thinkers, that even their legacies are
now cynically attacked. Modern cynicism can be
described as the final resting place of an exhausted
16
critical consciousness that has finally consumed itself.
On occasion this modern attitude is expressed with force,
as a kind of morally disillusioned, politically disaffected
17
contempt for the ideals and promises of modernity.
Generally though, cynicism appears in disguise, as a
harried attachment to those same ideals. These ideals
remain with us as surface commitments, commitments for
the sake of commitment, enacted to be believed.
The split between ancient Cynicism and its cynical heirs

has only compounded and rendered more exacting any
attempt at revival. Who could recall Cynicism from its
slumber? Its descendant namesake has such widespread
influence it is hard to shake off. This mass cynicism has
given up the quirks and outrages of its ancestral tradition.
Banal yet oddly formidable, it sidesteps all attackers, not
by insult or gall, but through insipid wet contempt. It will
not be called short for perpetuating errors, because it no
longer pays reverence to the truth. Having given up on
reason, modern cynics kneel no more before its promise,
claiming that reason has been overtaken by the power of
18
things. The attitude of contemporary cynicism is near
87
insensible to attack, responding to any serious combatant

with an air of ironic detachment.
The cynic is able to survive, indeed thrive despite

persistent doubt, a nagging realisation the activities we
engage in must fail to live up to their expectations. For
want of alternatives, the cynic learns to accommodate
himself to, if not implicate himself in the very system he
19
has damned. The cynic often remains in work, working
the system. Modern cynics know what they are doing but
do it anyway, if they didnt someone else would.
Contemporary cynics claim to have discarded all illusions.

They have seen the world without its ideological gloss: it
is all really about money/power/sex, they declare. But this
realism without illusions is the very form of their
blindness. They will not see how their cynicism is itself an
operation of power; it functions to maintain the system
they deride. That, precisely, is the naivety of their cynical
20
wisdom, its blindness to itself. As heirs of Enlightenment
they finally decide; we are enlightened, we are
apathetic. In such contexts no one talks anymore of a
21
love of wisdom, we are only left with its motions.
Because everything has become problematic, everything

22
is also somehow a matter of indifference. Having been
schooled in reality, contemporary cynics have grown up
23
to embrace it. The ideological commitments of
modernity are half-believed or dismissed in displays of
light-hearted disdain. Either way these hopes are no
longer taken in earnest. Modern cynics are not fatally
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Mass Cynicism
disillusioned, and refuse to be dragged down by a reality

laid bare. At worst they are a little listless, having been
rescued from depression by a detached negativity, which
scarcely allows itself any hope, at most a little irony and
24
pity. From this perspective everything is hopeless, yet
the cynic refuses to become genuinely depressed.
25
Present-day cynics are only borderline melancholics.
Despite everything they have seen and done, they remain
more or less able to work. Desperate for work,
determined to survive, propelled by an instinct for self-
preservation, the cynic puts up with dubious situations,
and finally carries out their business.
Melancholia afflicts those who know not what they have

26
lost. Melancholic cynics feel a sense of loss, and feel
entitled to indulge themselves in that sensation, without
having a clear picture of what life was like before the loss
occurred. A phantom of the past, or of the present that
might have been, takes hold. A world better ordered by
reason, or by a more genuine commitment to justice, or
by a more coherent community, or by a better sense of
collective purpose, is bemoaned. In educational settings
these ideological losses are matched if not exceeded by
the personal losses of those who joined the profession
with more immediate but equally hazy desires, such as
the hope for job satisfaction, the anticipation of
meaningful work, and the wish to make a difference.
Lacking clear conception of these lost ideals, educators
will not come to terms with their departure. Here they are
prone to a deeper and more enduring melancholy. Not
only do they fail to confront their loss, they risk
27
internalising the lost object to prevent its departure.
Melancholic educators of this sort are subjectively
wedded to educational ideals that are for all intents and
purposes lost causes. These lost causes are retained
89
half-alive but in a putrescent state, existing as vague

subjective attachments. Educators are prevented thereby
from coming to terms with a loss that is everywhere
apparent but rarely confronted. They remain attached to
28
ideals that are everywhere inoperable. With these lost
ideals internalised and thereby retained, educators
inherit all the ambivalence once built into educational
goods that were promised but forever deferred.
Abandoned by educational contexts that have fallen
under the yoke of instrumentalism, melancholic educators
are rendered susceptible to the belief they are the last
true educators standing. This becomes their romanticism.
They defend individuated educational goods as if they
were their last representatives. Educators hereby
internalise all the pain of a good that is promised but
never appears. Our best educators see themselves as the
last defenders of a good they cannot finally manifest, or
excrete, a good whose content they cannot adequately
describe. A little overstuffed with commitments but
otherwise reflexively buffered, these educators remain at
work, a bit dejected and troubled but not fundamentally
disturbed. It would seem their coming to terms requires
far more than an acknowledgement of their educated
nihilism. It necessitates a careful, meticulous and
sustained effort to disentangle subjective attachments
that bind us to education still. We put ourselves, with
education, on the block.
The Educators Smile

As an institution, education is widely attacked for its
cynicisms, plagued by activities that are openly
performative and often rather faddish. Of little value in
themselves some claim, their meaning derives from the
bureaucratic or governmental ethos to which they are
subservient. This wider ethos serves equally specious
masters such as the imagined needs of an economy in
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Mass Cynicism
perpetual flux. Confused about how one best feeds the

temperamental impulses of global capital, education
retreats to a focus on skills malleable by definition, and
adaptable thereby to uncertain contexts.
Educators are as cynical as the best of us, sometimes

openly so. The hollow-eyed teacher, ground down and
grim faced, under pressure and failing, is familiar on
screen and in daily life. This teacher has become distant
from the profession and the things it has her do. Ironically
detached, avoiding the pain otherwise produced by more
heartfelt commitments, such a teacher has long given up
on the job, yet does it anyway.
It is hard to exaggerate the plight of educators, operating

in a realm whose airs once tasted sweet. Education has
been ploughed over, upturned by widely recognised
forces variously denounced as the reductive powers of
commodification, audit, managerialism, performativity and
that abstract beast, neoliberalism. Educational
researchers have bemoaned such attackers for decades,
yet few admit in their wake the situation has become, as it
strikes me, decidedly post-apocalyptic. This refusal to
admit the full consequences of educational destruction is
extraordinary, since it is clear enough that for some
conditions have become intolerable. Educators are
quitting the profession in droves, sometimes rather
publicly, writing embittered, valedictory articles and
29
emails, even suicide notes. Whilst those remaining in
the profession are themselves often also despondent,
they may resist giving up hope entirely. Their optimism
may be at times forced, but is a force to be reckoned with.
A romantic urge lives on in the profession, and tempts
91
even those most dejected. It is manifested in the

commitments of those educators who will not give up on
the idea theirs is a noble cause. For todays cynic is often
a romantic too, though of a peculiar kind: When
educational ideals are resurrected, they appear in a
cluster, hiding behind one another for mutual support.
When mentioned they are accompanied by the sound of
swallowing, betraying lack of conviction.
Let us consider the value of our highest educational

values. I suspect education as an emancipatory
endeavour, would strike many as a little over the top
these days. We in the liberal West believe ourselves
largely emancipated already. Education in pursuit of
social justice receives far more attention, but is divorced
from the dream that social roles could be allocated on
merit and wealth could be fundamentally redistributed.
The realisation of that old dream became harder and
harder to imagine as sociologists explained with evermore
sophistication how inequalities are subtly reproduced. The
aspiration to achieve social justice effectively killed itself
30
as a result of its own truthfulness. Finally in an age of
impact and knowledge exchange, education for its own
sake is only guiltily admitted as an ideal, for it bears the
whiff of its aristocratic origins. It is tainted by association
with wealth and leisure, falling under the shadow of its
very own ivory tower.
Todays educator adopts a fixed but miserable grin, at

once despairing yet hopeful. I feel the misery of this
educator most acutely at university meetings, where
depressed resignation to institutional and political
imperatives holds sway. Here comes yet another drive to
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Mass Cynicism
secure the financial future of our employer, and by clear

implication ours too, through higher student recruitment,
better reputation, more research funding, and so on. At
times we discuss little else, falling prematurely between
the wheels of that juggernaut, which seems to be
squeezing any space left for thought, and thoughtful
teaching, from our working lives. This despair is most
acutely expressed as a kind of desperation, where
colleagues grasp anything at hand that may give them
purpose. For this reason, vapid institutional drivers
towards a more inspirational student experience (for the
sake of fees), or more world class research (for the sake
of funding), are rarely greeted with the open contempt
they deserve. Some academics find themselves rather
drawn to these imperatives, perhaps despite their better
judgement, hoping against hope to find something in them
worth rescuing. Faced with a landscape of defeated
ideals, the educator who does not quit the profession
retreats into her educational present. Abandoned by
educational ideals, devoid of values to which they can
appeal yet believing themselves undervalued, romantic
educators shroud themselves in the beneficent aura they
take such pains to cultivate. They devote themselves to
the job and allow themselves to imagine their efforts are
not in vain.
The Educators Last Hope

An old educational ethos stretches to modernity but
extends only weakly to our present: The more arduous
the duty one assumes, the more it educates and uplifts
31
the soul, it repeats. For contemporary tastes this
declaration is a little too lofty in tone if not a trifle
contrived. Today it is sufficient to call an arduous task
educational and be done. In that way the labour of
educating and being educated is exalted by simple
decree. This completes the short circuit that connects the
93
assumed educational good with its often compromised

reality. It is educational, we say in all simplicity. Indeed
some educators will put up with almost any debasement
however technocratic and instrumental so long as it can
be rendered formative, and hence educational. To which
the Cynic reply: Formative of what?
Today hopeful educators scarcely allow themselves to

believe education will change the world. They hold fast to
Bernsteins edict: education cannot compensate for
32
society. Yet refusing to abandon the profession and
their professional identity as a progressive force, they
remain resolutely positive. They focus on the plight of the
moment, on the plight of those before them. For the hope
of the educator cannot be sustained in abstraction. The
idea hers is a benevolent profession, that it is essentially
good, requires propping up. Abandoned by educational
ideals, the benevolent educator needs something
concrete on which to cling. For this reason, initiatives
launched by government and sponsored by business
promising to deliver us to an educational good, hold a
certain attraction. These initiatives trade on over-inflated
and often politicised and commercialised promises of
hope, happiness, individual wellbeing, economic
prosperity and collective security. They are not uniformly
adopted, nor are they implemented without adjustment.
When they are not met with open hostility, or enacted with
begrudging compliance, or adopted in an effort to survive
the system; when they generate some interest and some
measure of support, their success where it occurs is not
the simple product of pragmatic calculation or managerial
imposition. The hold of techniques promising to deliver
value to the educational project draws strength from the
felt need they satisfy. Their promise is to redeem
education through its adoption of fresh innovations.
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Mass Cynicism
Clearly this redemptive promise is unevenly felt, being

more alluring to those in managerial or advisory positions.
But where these innovations succeed most they feed an
educational desire that is committed to a project of
educational redemption whilst being profoundly
pessimistic about the possibility of its realisation. In this
desperate search for hope and meaning we encounter
once more the effects of our longer battle with nihilism.
According to the logic of that battle, once God the former
giver of value departs, principles of universal happiness,
reason, justice and humanity are slipped in. This sleight of
hand takes place without bringing into question the entire
evaluative framework it perpetuates. Values are still
placed above and beyond us, against which we remain all
too human. Given this cycle of disappointment is so old,
and given its workings have long been revealed, since
Nietzsche that is, it is tempting to suggest an escape. We
might abandon this metaphysic altogether and build
values from the bottom up. But metaphysical attachments
haunt us still; they are not done away with by decree. And
besides, this solution is already anticipated by
government. Whilst transcendent educational values have
become increasingly anaemic in their effects, they have
not been replaced by other grand principles that would
prevent us from experiencing the agony and
bewilderment which descends as old values begin to
decay. This sense of loss is prevented rather differently
now through the educational narcotic of constant activity.
We take some small measure of delight in bustling
about, though our delight expresses the restless energy
33
of a haunted mind. This sense of loss, experienced
when transcendent values become doubtful, we abate
through the ceaseless adoption of work, work initiatives
and accompanying techniques. We hate these initiatives,
but we love them too. For the loss of value that afflicts
education is papered over by such movement. Values are
today constructed in situ through the everyday reality of
95
educational work. Which is not to say that educators are

increasingly duped by the system, that they are distracted
by the day-to-day and thereby diverted from the pursuit of
something more meaningful, more educational even.
Given form in motion, in the daily commitments of a
workforce on the brink of exhaustion, the educational
good has never been more literal.
The erosion of faith in higher educational values is not

experienced as acutely as it might be, since educational
values are already brought down to earth. Values are
embodied in the various activities and techniques
available to education, techniques that instrumentalise
our hopes, fears, vulnerabilities and emotions. Educators
have come to embody the value these tools create
through use. In this way, instead of working towards the
fulfilment of transcendent ideals, educators give value to
their work, through work. Even grumbling about work
becomes an activity of self-affirmation; it implies work is
worth grumbling about. When transcendent ideals are
lost, educators become more committed to the job, not
34
less.
The educational critic might pay heed: When attacking

that constant barrage of fresh imperatives, new
techniques and essential procedures, that perpetual
35
drive for improvement which defines our educational
landscape, dominating todays classroom, school and
university with its whirlwind of initiatives, do not ask: How
do they warp the educational endeavour, distort it, distract
it, and so on. Rather, investigate how they promise to give
education meaning, value and substance through their
adoption and use; ask what desires they satisfy, what
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Mass Cynicism
temptations they permit. For the great curiosity of

contemporary education is that hope and belief limp on.
*
36
The pursuit of hope in education takes different forms.
Where pupils are encouraged to reach for their dreams,
they are expected to hope resolutely. Impossible hopes
are sometimes indulged, but must be managed through
their subdivision into achievable steps. Here a mode of
hoping is adopted that is carefully goal-directed and
guided by more realistic objectives. Pupils are
encouraged to live by their predicted grades, and aspire
to hopes that have been judged statistically sound. Sound
hopes such as these are then to be combined with far
less well-defined, less goal-directed, more patiently
hopeful dispositions. These reflect the attitude of the
profession, which is beholden to a patient optimism. It
makes a virtue of this distinctly quiet, self-contained form
of hoping. Archetypal traits associated with the good
student such as modesty, humility, perseverance,
restraint and self-discipline are recycled and invested
with new meaning. They are attached to pedagogies that
seek to educate pupils in modes of hoping that will better
accommodate them to the possibilities and opportunities
afforded by the existing social order. With the activity of
hoping chastened in this way, pupils learn to live in hope,
and educators learn to place their hope in those they
educate.
From the resolutely positive stance of the motivational

educator, that saviour of the educational present, open
cynicism is likened to a plague that kills dreams.
Strategies are recommended to help teachers stop
cynical feelings, including the adoption of a hopeless
97
student, because it is hard to be cynical when someone

depends upon you, especially a child. As if everyday
educational cynicism could be defeated by a love of the
student that would transcend into a desire to secure hope
37
for all. But the motivational educator is a false radical,
and a concealed cynic. For there is nothing inherently
radical, or even progressive, about the pursuit of hope.
Capitalism depends upon it. Advanced liberal societies
operate by stimulating rather than simply directing or
repressing the desires of their populations. Under these
conditions, obedient subjects are those who do not give
up hope.
Like hope, fear has its uses. Our fears are redefined as
vulnerabilities, and in that form they are adopted. It is
striking how a discourse of vulnerability tempts the
pastoral teacher into compliance, where policies and
professional activities bring to visibility an ever-expanding
range of mundane incidents and feelings that indicate our
susceptibility to harm. The various symptoms of
vulnerability, and the various techniques, possibilities and
38
sites for intervention it proposes, have multiplied. In
Britain, the poor, the infirm, the disabled and the exploited
have all been reconceptualised as vulnerable subjects.
They are viewed in terms of the risks they face, and the
risks they pose to society. Young people, who may be all
of the above but also have the disadvantage of their
youth, are said to occupy a particularly precarious
39
position. Various agencies committed to social welfare,
or social order, engage our vulnerabilities at this level,
responding to those factors that are felt to make lives
precarious. But the perspectives they adopt, however well
meaning in appearance, are decidedly pessimistic. The
possibility of a more secure, less risky future is all they
can imagine. The risks posed by social and institutional
98
Mass Cynicism
life are viewed as perpetual threats we must learn to

negotiate. Education must teach us to better cope with
the inevitable disappointments of life, developing our
ability to adapt and mould ourselves to changing contexts.
Whilst institutions promising to develop such skills may
appear positive, they are nonetheless despairing. They
preach an ethic of survival in an unpredictable and
dangerous world.
The melancholic underpinnings of contemporary

education are hidden in part by attempts to appear
positive. With determination we might sound out this
teacherly attitude. Following Nietzsche, educators might
again philosophise with a hammer blow, listening to the
40
sounds that return. But that would miss the point and
misdiagnose the problem. When our idols are no longer
becoming hollow but are produced through frenetic
activity, we do not tap at them, deftly and with
determination so as to hear and make heard their empty
reverberations. Our idols may be insubstantial, but they
are not hollow in any straightforward sense. Akin to egg
timers that are turned and turned again it matters not
which way the sand falls, so long as it flows. A tapping at,
or even a destruction of such idols would be futile. They
are mass-produced. With their coming obsolescence
built-in, these idols loose value as soon as they arrive.
The effects of accumulated wealth have been something

of a disappointment. We in the West guiltily admit more
wealth does not always entail more happiness. Deemed
41
to be facing a crisis in happiness, psychologists and
psychologically minded individuals multiply in such a
42
climate. They tap into and support a proliferation of
99
magazines, self-help manuals, life coaches, professional

interests, educational techniques, whole-school policies
and political reforms. Proponents of a happy life
generously adopt the role of educators, educating us to
help ourselves to a life of greater contentment. In this
context, certain mythological constructs, such as the
43 44
happy marriage, the happy family, the happy
45
childhood, or the happy consumer, are recycled and
imposed as aspirational objects. Happiness becomes
contingent, a promise attached to objects of desire. And
guilt is produced in those inevitable moments when
happiness does not arrive as promised. We become
isolated at moments such as these, wondering why we
feel empty, asking what prevented the promise from
finding its fulfilment. We feel inadequate, questioning not
46
the promise but our ability to enjoy. Some react with
47
determined cheerfulness. Not in itself a problem,
necessarily. But a cheerful attitude risks becoming a
moral duty, where those who abstain are not simply pitied
for their lack of good cheer, they are resented for letting
the rest of us down. Good cheer becomes the individuals
48
contribution to collective wellbeing. The cynicism of
happiness, then, is that it is either rendered remote and
unrealisable, or immediate and insistent. In the first case,
the pursuit of happiness isolates individuals, suggesting
they are unable to live up to a collective ideal of what it
means to be happy. In the second case, where individuals
are brought together in good cheer, the emotional
condition that unites them becomes an imperative for
others. It is tempting, as one faces up to a climate of
forced cheer and happiness, to respond by adopting their
opposites. Those seeking to resist on these terms would
of course be promptly dismissed simply because of their
gloom. For there is today a kind of mortgage on thinking
that proceeds in a negative direction. So we put it off,
suffering a self-imposed obligation to arrive at a cheerful
49
conclusion. It is considered enough of an accusation to
100
Mass Cynicism
declare that someone lacks hope, that they have nothing

to promise, nothing positive to contribute, to dismiss them
from the scene of debate. But this dismissal is
symptomatic of an embedded cynicism. Against it, instead
of patching the cracks in the edifice of our civilization, we
might emancipate ourselves from our fear of despair,
from the fear of being called nihilistic, and be prepared to
50
face up to the darkness of our times.
Gloomy educators have their merits, better placed to

resist the use of positive emotion as a governing
technique. Yet there are dangers inherent in a leaden
response. It risks perpetuating a common mistake, where
we take the pursuit of happiness at its own word. Hence
those reacting with a determined effort to become
relentlessly severe, even manifestly gloomy, might do so
only after recognising the deep pessimism and disavowed
cynicism of those promoting emotional positivity. Those
attempting a gloomy rebellion would point rather
insistently to the pessimism of educators still cleaving to
the remote hope of educational redemption. The unique
claim of revolting individuals such as these would be that
they, unlike others, have come to terms with their
melancholia.
As an educational objective the pursuit of happiness, or

wellbeing, achieves its appeal against the common-sense
view that educational institutions have become anything
but happy, that they are dominated by the miserable
pursuit of results. Hence the allure of an industry which
divides happiness into teachable techniques that presume
to make the pursuit of it more realistic. We must identify
such activities without equivocation as survival
101
techniques, designed to accommodate us to our late

modern predicament. In no particular order: we wonder
how we might survive capitalism, overwork and
underemployment; global warming, environmental
degradation and depleted resources; the other, one
another and ourselves. In this context, happiness does
not fulfil the role of a transcendental ideal. When it
appears as such, this is part of its technique. Reduced to
the status of a survival objective, happiness is rendered
subservient to a biopolitical ethos that pursues health
against ill health, rather than right against wrong. The
pursuit of happiness becomes an issue of success or
failure, evading all questions concerning the legitimacy or
51
illegitimacy, and hence value of the quest itself. In its
operationalized form, taken as a set of handy, learnable
techniques, this educational activity is, again, intrinsically
pessimistic and inherently cynical. It separates happiness
as an affective state from a more critical and serious
engagement with the problem of happiness. For some,
the most obvious alternative would be a revived
Aristotelian approach that redefines happiness by
associating it with the ability to live a good and flourishing
life. The advantage of this definition is that it ties the
question of happiness to a consideration of the context in
which it is to be realised. We should, however, avoid any
nostalgia for classical versions of the good life that were
themselves connected to systems of coercion, also
excluding by default the vast majority of the population as
incapable of its realisation. Still, we can observe a
contrast here with modern happiness, which is to be
treated on its own without bringing into question the
perfectibility of the way of life to which it is connected. As
we late moderns are so fond of admitting, our way of life
is beyond fundamental adjustment. This life may be
imperfect but we are nevertheless stuck with it. Trapped
as we are in the present, we must simply do our best to
enjoy what we have accumulated.
102
Mass Cynicism
The Educators Last Breath

Contemporary cynicism is widespread but hard to detect.
Increasingly lived as a private disposition, todays cynics
do not generally announce themselves, having little
energy or appetite for direct confrontation. They are too
well integrated into the society they scorn, existing as a
diffuse but hardly rebellious presence. Contemporary
cynics have no wish to appear eccentric. It is quite difficult
indeed to bring this diffuse, murky cynicism to
expression. It has withdrawn into a mournful detachment
and no longer sees any reason to expose itself
52
aggressively. In its educational contexts cynicism is
particularly shy. It lies hidden within the educators good
intentions. Facing such widespread disavowal, the
standard response of the educational critic is to subject
educators to some form of ideology critique. This would
systematically diagnose their disorder and explain how
education today, in practice, betrays its ideals, and
unwittingly promotes ends most educators would not
openly support. The educational enterprise would be
attacked as somehow degenerate, as if a true education
could then emerge. But if the cynicism of education is as
widespread as I suggest, this kind of ideology critique will
have no great effect. Otherwise put, our problem is not
that we are fools in need of enlightenment. Rather, our
53
problem is that we lack the power not to be fooled. It is
comparatively easy to be critical of society and claim that
we are not taken in by it. The problem we face is located
at a different level. To borrow once more a phrase from
Nietzsche, our difficulty as critics is that we live in a
society that no longer has the strength to excrete those
54
commitments and values it finds dubious. In such a
climate, the cynical educator must be invited to embrace
and force out a widespread cynicism that is everywhere in
practice, but rarely admitted.
103
The cynical educator is challenged to admit the crisis of

55
value from which we suffer, without perishing and
without ceasing to educate. The task is to embrace a
crisis of value that is everywhere apparent but rarely
acknowledged and even less often accepted. It is to reject
the commitment to work, to perpetual industry. It is to
attack an educational injunction that would have us give
education value through our exhaustion as a labour force.
104
VI
INSULTS AND OBSCENITIES
Scandalous Teachings
Contemporary cynicism lacks conviction, accommodating
itself to the status quo it rejects. This attitude has but a
sinuous link to its ancient Greek ancestor, which refused
point blank to accommodate itself to anything or anyone.
Educators are not always teachers, and teachers do not

have to believe in education. The ancient Cynics were a
case in point, pushing any definition of education to its
limits by turning it into an insult. Diogenes of Sinope
actively ridiculed those who would have him be their
teacher. According to one account: When someone
expressed a wish to study philosophy with him, Diogenes
gave him a fish to carry and told him to follow in his
footsteps; the man threw it away out of shame. When
105
Diogenes came across him some time later, Diogenes

burst out laughing and said, Our friendship was brought
1
to an end by a fish! What the man failed to understand
is that to practice Cynicism one undergoes repeated
humiliation, where to carry the fish (or cheese in a
different version of the story), would be to act as if one
were Diogenes slave. The Cynic has a taste for
humiliation, understanding that shame is the most
intimate social fetter, which binds us, before all concrete
2
rules of conscience, to universal standards of behaviour.
Even from a distance of more than two millennia, it is hard

to take Cynicism entirely seriously; the Cynic responds to
seriousness with malicious laughter. Cynic humour is
designed to outrage its victims, since outrage expresses
3
the very conventions the Cynic seeks to upset.
The Cynic scoffs at the very notion of an educated soul;

your educated soul. The Cynic sneers at the entire history
of Western education. For it bears the imprint of
transcendental Platonism which put this phantom into
circulation. Under this philosophical tread, education
became synonymous with activities seeking to control
ones appetites in the name of a higher calling. Since
these appetites were taken to be a private, if not shameful
weakness of the untrained soul, education was developed
as a specialist pursuit requiring intimacy, seclusion and
trust. Again, the Cynic snorts with contempt. For the
Cynic there is no retreat to a secluded spot, or inner
citadel. Cynics seek exposure, living on the street,
begging and then berating any would-be benefactors. The
shamelessly licentious, happily impoverished, barely
dressed Cynic finds all higher things to be worthless and
106
Insults and Obscenities
says so, pushing courage and boldness to the point that

4
it becomes intolerable insolence. The Cynic breaks with
the world of convention and forces it to react.
Foucault devoted his last lectures to ancient Cynicism.

Here he elaborated on the term parrhesia, meaning to
speak freely, now using it to define the Cynic philosopher.
The term applies to others too, such as Socrates who
conducted free speech as dialogue. But unlike Socrates,
a Cynic such as Diogenes of Sinope (known for
5
masturbating in public amongst other things ) would not
be so courteous. His speech would pour forth heedless of
whether or not one consented to its onslaught, requiring
courage of a different sort. Whilst Socrates risked the
irritation if not anger of his companions by persuading
them through dialogue, trickery and irony of their
ignorance, of not knowing what they claimed to know, the
Cynic risks the vengeance of his auditors berating them to
reject and despise everything they accept to be true and
proper. Dialogue is replaced by diatribe and insult, or it is
suspended altogether, whereupon one exhibits oneself
shamelessly before a public, causing deliberate offence.
Where Socratic irony sought to create a sense of
existential doubt amongst friends and acquaintances, the
Cynic brought forth a public scandal.
It is claimed that after one particularly well-received public

oration, at which many stood about and listened to his
words with great pleasure, Diogenes ceased speaking,
and squatting on the ground, performed an indecent
6
act. This caused great insult. Diogenes not only
excreted, he did so precisely when his audience was
most enraptured.
107
Wisdom is associated with a metaphor of elevation. The

wise rise above the workaday diversions of the rest and
refine themselves. Entire cultures view themselves in this
way, each becoming taken by its own sophistication. So
when the Cynic shits openly he insults an audience in
denial, for it shits too. The consequence of denial for
those dissociating themselves from what is low and
embarrassing, is that they eventually end up suffocating
7
in their own shit, as Sloterdijk phrased it. They are
overcome by nausea as they encounter the base matter
their highest achievements are built of. The Cynic, by
contrast, is not overcome by paralysis, having become
familiar with his raw materials.
Cynics left the labour of writing up their exploits and

sayings to others. They handed down no set texts and
8
established no firm doctrines. Theirs was an attitude and
a way of being, rather than a philosophy in the
conventional sense. Indeed the Cynic had contempt for
the formal lectures and exalted language of established
philosophy. The Cynic who simply regards such dialogue
9
as hot air passes wind by way of a critique.
Bawdy Educators
When approaching the Cynics we are forced to rely upon
a range of sketches and sayings of doubtful authenticity.
These were passed down by commentators wedded to
other modes of address, who were not always
10
sympathetic to a Cynic way of life. Early commentators
found themselves face to face with a philosophy that
addressed a wider, and hence in their eyes, not very
108
cultured public, drawing its recruits from outside the

11
educated elites that usually practiced philosophy. Some
claimed Cynics were mere opportunists. These rude
upstarts were crude imitators, pretending to cultivate a
philosophy, but succeeding only in the cultivation of their
12
ignorance. Others accused Cynics of a kind of barbarity,
hell bent on destroying all beauty, honesty and goodness,
trampling justice and honour under foot, devoid of respect
for the rights of others, operating without reverence for
the Gods, and perhaps worst of all, turning philosophy
13
into a laughing stock. Those adopting a Cynic way of life
surely deserved stoning, if not the barathrum. They
should be thrown into this Athenian pit just like any other
criminal so it could swallow up and devour their
14
profanity. Such violent loathing and devout retching over
the shameless existence of lowbrow Cynicism,
nevertheless served a recuperative function for the
scandalised. It allowed Roman commentators to distance
themselves from the noisy and coarse realities of a Cynic
life, so they might reclaim another measured, thoughtful,
15
well-bred, discreet, honest and really austere Cynicism.
This high-class Cynicism was a respectable philosophy
one might practice at home. Bold but honourable, here
was a Cynicism one could base in reading and careful
reflection. This was a Cynicism good enough for the
educated. A Cynic of this variety would still speak the
truth, fearlessly at times, but without the insults and
aggressions of the Cynic diatribe. Such insights would be
carefully delivered and could expect to be well received.
Indeed the Cynic in question would finally gain the
respect of his fellow citizens. Most of all, he would be
admired for his consistency, for how closely his words
matched his deeds, where his philosophy was
demonstrated through his actions first and foremost. This
honourable Cynic was incapable of hypocrisy. He would
always be true to his word.
109
The street Cynic was a familiar sight under Roman rule.

Cynicism of this type had to be categorically rejected if
anything was to be rescued for respectable philosophy.
Hence Epictetus quip, that street Cynics mimicked their
16
masters in nothing other than cutting farts. Such bawdy
imitators were to be ignored: In the fourth century,
Emperor Julian devoted some time to the study of
Cynicism. He was prompted by the influence street
Cynics were having on his soldiers and lower levels of
17
citizenry. Deeply irritated by their activities, Julian
explores how a true Cynicism might operate.
Accordingly, the body is looked down upon as that jailer
18
of the soul to be escaped through rigorous training. It
becomes something the Roman Cynic learns to utterly
despise and regard as more deserving to be thrown out
19
than dung. The Cynic learns to control his passions,
and ensure he will never again be ruled by his nether
regions. He also learns to disregard public opinion, since
the man who has attained to a life of reason no longer
needs to submit to the guidance of conventional mores.
20
He has transcended them. No longer distracted by the
body or by the mob, the Cynic is free to focus on divine
21
thoughts, which are stainless and pure. True followers
of Diogenes will affirm with Plato the superiority of soul
22
over body. Whereupon the Roman Cynic steps outside
23
himself being assured the soul within him is divine. His
soul is educated, in contrast to those who, by their
ignorance, remain tied to the body and popular opinion,
against those who are by consequence subject to false
24
opinion rather than truth. They are to be pitied, if not
despised. In recuperating Cynicism then, Emperor Julian
affords a complete reversal of the Cynic attitude.
110
Cynicism, of the sham sort, was reproached for having

no fixed dogmata. Surely a philosophy without central
doctrine or code of belief is not a philosophy at all? In its
more basic, un-recuperated and shambolic form,
Cynicism remained unaccountable. Rather confusingly,
Cynic philosophy operated without an end or
philosophical goal otherwise known as its telos. This
continues to baffle those who will not comprehend how
one functions philosophically speaking in the absence
of some goal or other. Consequently, even todays
philosopher may insist that Cynicism was basically all
about the pursuit of happiness, or virtue, or nature, or
25
whatever.
Educated Bodies
Cynics were not hostile to the notion one might wish to
understand the world in which one lives. They were
merely suspicious of the common prejudice that the world
is best understood by adopting the conventions of
rationality endorsed by a particular philosophical school.
By rejecting intellectual culture, actively seeking
destitution and hardship, the Cynic discovered the world
through a series of practical confrontations with it.
The Cynics were great improvisers. What became their

most famous tenets grew out of a continual process of ad
hoc improvisation. Against Platos conception of the
philosopher as a spectator of time and eternity,
Diogenes was the philosopher of contingency, of life in
26
the barrel. Diogenes did not seek out his barrel with the
self-absorbed pathos of a martyr. According to one
version of the story, upon arrival in Athens, Diogenes set
up home in a storage jar simply because the little house
27
he had hoped for could not be arranged in time.
111
The philosopher of contingency lives without certainties

and does not mourn their absence. The Cynics life
becomes an experiment. His philosophy constitutes a
dialogue with the contingencies that shape the material
28
conditions of existence. It takes the form of a rhetorical
engagement, in the sense that the philosopher sends out
provocations, examines the retorts provoked by them,
and comes to understand the limits these retorts reflect.
The challenge is to improvise a way of life that can
sustain itself alongside and outside these limits.
Despite appearances, Cynics had nothing against the

pursuit of virtue. Their contempt was merely heaped on
the idea that virtue is best cultivated in a rarefied
29
atmosphere.
One portrait depicts the Cynic as a scout, sent in

advance of humanity, to determine what may be
favourable or hostile to man in the things of this world.
The Cynic learns to live without shelter, a home, or even
a country as he roams, running ahead of humanity,
returning only to recount with fearless speech what he
30
has discovered. To speak fearlessly one becomes free
of attachments, of duties that function as constraints.
The pursuit of a life without attachments had paradoxical

effects. The Cynic began by stripping down existence,
getting rid of anything that might be considered
112
superfluous: Diogenes observes a boy drinking from his

hollowed hand, then casts aside his wooden cup deciding
31
it to be yet another unnecessary possession. The Cynic
of this more radical tradition was always looking for
possible further destitution. His was a dissatisfied
poverty which strives to get back to the ground of the
absolutely indispensable. An indefinite poverty endlessly
32
at work on itself. This deliberate impoverishment,
committing the Cynic to a life of dirt and dishevelment,
gave an independence of sorts, offering a kind of
liberation from the trappings of wealth and civilized
society. But it imposed a dependence of its own, since the
Cynic became reliant on the alms of others. In the Greek
and Roman context, with personal honour holding such
high premium, this kind of dependence was almost
unbearable. To court dishonour would be a radical test of
ones resolve to live a different life. It would ensure the
Cynic pursuit of poverty was more than a romantic
affectation. The true Cynic actively seeks the shame of
penury and hopes to survive it. For those who overcome
the worst kinds of humiliation will have been purged of all
false codes of conduct and notions of decency. The route
to independence, rather oddly then, is through ones
insufferable dependence on the charity of others. The
Cynic must learn to be resolutely ungrateful when given
alms, and be indifferent to those who cast judgement:
One portrait depicts Demetrius, a first century Cynic from
Corinth, refusing money from the Roman Emperor. If he
wanted to tempt me, he should have offered me the
33
whole Empire. This would be a real test of his mettle, of
his determination to remain uncorrupted by power and
wealth. The strength of his Cynicism, its indifference to
things valued by his contemporaries, could only benefit
from such refusal.
113
As an educational activity Cynicism is distinctly life

affirming, in contrast to the stiff austerity of Platonism. For
Plato, the body is an unfortunate appendage, filling us
with loves and desires and fears and all sorts of fancies
and a great deal of nonsense, with the result that we
literally never get an opportunity to think at all about
anything. So long as we remain affected by it, there is no
chance of our ever attaining satisfactorily to our object,
34
which we assert to be Truth. For the Cynic, the body
operates very differently. It becomes a site for the
manifestation of truth. The body bears witness to reality,
bringing us to question the existence of higher things. And
so, whilst Plato sought to define the souls being in its
radical separation from the life of the body, the Cynic
operated in the opposite direction, seeking to reduce life
to itself, to what it is in truth. This basic truth was
revealed through the very act of living as a Cynic, where
all pointless conventions and all superfluous opinions
were cast aside, in a general stripping of existence to its
35
bare essentials In each case the true life takes a
different meaning. For Plato it is associated with the life
that is simple, that does not conceal its intentions, the life
that is straight and undeviating. It is completely at odds
with the life of he who is prey to the multiplicity of his
36
desires, appetites, and impulses of his soul. The true
life is defined by its adherence to rules of good conduct
(that Plato outlines), but more than this, by its overall
unity. It is the life that remains unchanged in the face of
adversity. It is lived by those few who maintain a secure
and stable identity among corruption and upheaval.
Ultimately, Plato assures us, the only souls passing
judgement upon death will be the souls of those that have
37
remained true in life For the Cynic, the true life
operates rather differently. It is the dogs life. Diogenes
was known as the dog and responded in kind: At a
dinner some people were tossing bones to him as though
he were a dog. So Diogenes rid himself of them by
114
38
pissing on them. Diogenes remained true to his
philosophy, doing in public what others would conceal,
acting without modesty or shame. He extended, if not
radicalised, Platos injunction to be unflagging in ones
commitment to truth and remain unchanged in the face of
adversity. By acting the part of the dog Diogenes inverted
the humiliation. He embraced his caricature, injuring the
39
dignity of those pissed on.
For the Greek philosopher, the true life is a sovereign life

in which the philosopher achieves, or at least works
towards, self-mastery. This life deserves the epithet
sovereign since it describes a state of absolute self-
control. No part of the philosophers self thus imagined
escapes the discipline and composure of a well-governed
mind. This kind of self-possession is not only the high
ideal to which Platos philosopher king aspires. It is also
the Roman Stoic dream of a figure such as Seneca.
Crucially, it is believed that the sovereign life will be
beneficial to others. Indeed the generosity of the
sovereign life is constructed as if that were an obligatory
component. The philosopher will provide students and
friends alike with assistance and direction, extending the
same care of self (a form of diligent self-denial) that
resulted in the philosophers self-mastery, to the care of
the student or friend. There will be wider benefits too,
since the philosophers life offers a lesson that is of
greater, if not universal significance. The splendour and
brilliance of the sovereign life, the life of complete self-
40
mastery, adorns humankind and educates it too,
having an influence so profoundly far reaching it
continues long after the philosophers exemplary life has
ended The Cynic also claims to be living a sovereign
existence, to be a king amongst men, except this
philosopher has achieved self-composure rather
115
differently, and with regard to external temptations and

humiliations. The Cynic chooses to pursue destitution,
41
pushing back the limits of what he can bear, in order to
develop a completely different way of relating to the
world. This sovereign life still has a duty to others, a duty
of care. Yet the Cynics generosity takes the form of a
personal sacrifice and a public scandal designed to
confront those it upsets with their afflictions. The Cynic life
involves a dedication to others that operates without
gratitude or recognition. The Cynic does not offer a
beautiful example for others to emulate. The Cynic life
does not adorn humankind, it besmirches it. The Cynic
still adopts the role of public benefactor, but Cynic
generosity is self-consciously and deliberately harsh. As
Diogenes used to say: Other dogs bite their enemies, but
42
I my friends, so as to save them.
One might describe the Cynic as an aggressive

43
benefactor. Yet this would downplay the benign
violence of other breeds of benefaction. It would imply
theirs is a generosity without aggression. The philosopher
who gives kindly advice, who perhaps adorns humankind
with the beautiful example of his presence, is also
aggressive in promoting his version of the good. The
Cynic is only unique for openly declaring his aggressive
intent. As an educational project, Cynicism embraces
44
quite explicitly the form of a battle. For Platonists and
Stoics, the battle is covered over with refinement, taking
form as a philosophers fight against his passions, desires
and false appetites, as he hopes to ensure the victory of
45
reason over his own appetites or his soul over his body.
Some version of the philosophers fight, along with its
recommended destination, is then prescribed for others.
The Cynics also battled with passions and appetites, yet
this battle was extended to customs, conventions,
116
institutions, laws, and a whole condition of humanity that

46
our passions and appetites are symptomatic of. Hence
the Cynic battle is an explicit, intentional, and constant
47
aggression directed at humanity in general. The Cynic
sought to release humanity from its current attachments
so that it might work towards another life, and another
world. In this context, the truths offered by the Cynic grow
in strength and quality to the extent they scandalise,
bringing unthinking commitments to the surface,
rendering them visible and hence open to adjustment. By
contrast, the true life of the conventional philosopher,
which carries to perfection the virtues and qualities that
are only said to be weakly expressed in ordinary lives,
comes across as distinctly conservative, if not
reactionary. By rejecting accepted values in an attempt to
transform them, the Cynics was a thankless task. The
more thankless the better.
Diogenes could have left Athens and lived as a hermit of

sorts. If his was a simple regression to the animalistic, it
might have been pursued anywhere. But Diogenes
remained in Athens participating in a cultural
transformation the destination of which remained
uncertain. Diogenes did not teach: Be like an animal.
Rather, he taught; Bear witness to the animal and the
possibility that anything which exceeds this animal form
may be superfluous, and is certainly contingent.
Whilst Socrates famously received word from the Delphic

oracle, Diogenes had his own encounter. Or at least,
Diogenes forges one with a counterfeit oracle of his own.
His encounter was a rascals take on the dignity of
48
oracles, a parody of Socrates own. Diogenes, so the
117
story goes, was instructed to change the value of the

currency in the phrase: parakharattein to nomisma. The
word nomisma has multiple significations, referring to
49
legal tender, but also norms, customs, and laws. Inciting
subversive if not criminal activity, became a defining idea
in the life of the Cynic. It was taken to refer to the position
a Cynic must take with relation to any social convention in
circulation. The command to change the value of the
currency is nevertheless ambiguous: A currency can
simply be devalued, by defacing a coin, so it no longer
can be used in exchange for goods. Or, one might start
with a coin that carries a certain effigy (such as the
reigning monarch), erase that effigy and replace it with a
different one (depicting accumulated wealth and
exploitation). This would enable the coin to circulate with
its true value since it is now stamped with another,
50
better, and more adequate effigy. Here the Cynic
endeavours to show that the lives of others are no more
51
than counterfeit. By changing the value of the currency,
coins that once had value become worthless, and things
once considered worthless, gain value. The life of the
Cynic embodies this switch by putting its conception of
52
the true currency with its true value into circulation.
This life breaks with existing systems of value. By making
a spectacle of itself, it demonstrates another life is
possible (another currency could be minted). The true
life becomes that life which is radically opposed to its
surroundings. It exposes those surroundings in all their
constraint, whilst speaking of the possible existence of
another radically different conception of the truth. Unlike
the Platonic conception of another transcendent world
(the world of the Forms) which is used to denigrate this
world and tie it to a death-bound education of the soul;
the Cynic conception of another life is used to denigrate
this life in a way that invigorates it and causes it to
explode its confines.
118
If the soul is to be educated, it must be convinced that

somewhere, somehow its activities and inclinations are
visible. For a Stoic philosopher such as Epictetus it was
sufficient to argue God dwells within us. Hence all impure
thoughts and dirty actions sully him as much as they do
53
us. Consequently one lives in private as if nothing
remains concealed, developing inhibitions and restraints.
But the Cynic decides to radicalise the idea that nothing is
concealed, by acting it out. The Cynic responds to the
injunction, the true life is the life that has nothing to hide,
by hiding nothing. The Cynic does everything in the open,
having no home or private place to retreat to. This
removes the constraining influence of a conscience that is
designed precisely for those private spaces which must
be convinced of their culpability. Since these private
spaces have become the residence of the conscience,
this staging of life in its material and everyday reality
under the real gaze of others, of everyone else, or at any
54
rate of the greatest possible number of others, renders
the moral order imposed by the conscience ineffective.
Cynic teaching, when not directly exemplified through the

life of a Cynic philosopher, was conveyed through brief
anecdotes, recollected gestures and retorts, ironic
encounters and witty remarks. These were designed to be
55
as portable and memorable as jokes. Hence they were
passed on by means sharply contrasted to those of more
traditional philosophical doctrines. In Foucaults words,
once more; traditional philosophy consists in
reactualizing a forgotten and misunderstood core of
thought in order to make it the point of departure and
56
source of authority of a more recent tradition. It was a
matter of defining oneself in relation to what Aristotle or
119
57
Plato had originally said, for instance. By contrast,
Cynics had a very different relationship to their
predecessors. Episodes from the lives of past Cynics
were recalled not because these episodes and their
doctrinal content had been forgotten (indeed it mattered
little if the episodes recounted were actual occurrences or
mythical constructs). Rather, they were recalled because
todays philosopher might no longer be equal to these
examples due to some sort of decline, enfeeblement or
58
decadence that has bled our capacity for Cynicism. Past
Cynics were remembered to provoke present actors to
reconsider their conduct, and perhaps enable the
strength of conduct exemplified in the actions of past
59
Cynics to be restored to those lacking courage.
The educational legacy of Cynicism remains obscure. It is

less directly accessible as a history than the educational
legacies of the more formally endowed philosophical
schools. These latter histories can be traced through
institutional chronicles and the descent of canonical texts.
They were teaching institutions in the traditional sense,
with the potential to multiply their activities with
missionary zeal. But the Cynic accumulated disciples if at
all only by accident. This was the education of a life of
provocations, always foreclosed by death. The
educational descent of Cynicism is episodic and erratic.
The history of Cynicism is complicated too by its gradual
transformation from a term referring to an ascetic way of
life, to a term (with a small c) used to describe a more
generalised sense of disenchantment. The Cynics
criticised the culture in which they found themselves
contrasting it to nature as expressed by the animality of
each Cynic. By asserting oneself as an animal and
reducing life to its bare essentials, the Cynic implicitly
questioned the intrinsic worth of refined customs and
120
cultured attitudes that surround civilized beings. The

Cynic way of life was designed to scandalise
contemporaries, draw out their prejudices and bear
witness to the possibility of a completely different attitude
60
to existence. More recent cynicism still casts a
suspicious gaze on cultured refinements and rarefied
customs, yet its scandalising impulse operates without
direction. It operates without the Cynics pursuit of
animality. No longer convinced of the point of bodily
engagement, no longer offering an alternative way of life
grounded in an encounter with nature, or in an encounter
with what culture rejects, this cynicism is overcome by
apathy.
Cynicism has other descendants. The wandering

61
Christian monk was also a martyr of the truth, bearing
witness to this truth by way of contrast between the freely
chosen destitution of the ascetic life, and the life of those
still enjoying a materially well off but spiritually hollow
existence. Here Foucault offers a tentative foray into the
62
long history of Christian Cynicism, suggesting it
preserved and passed on many of the themes, attitudes,
and forms of behaviour observable in the Cynics to the
63
spiritual movements of medieval Europe. It was, he
suggests, a particularly lively, intense, and strong
practice in all the efforts at reform which were opposed to
the Church, its institutions, its increasing wealth, and its
64
moral laxity. This Christian Cynicism was designed to
force ecclesiastical institutions in all their splendour and
corruption to face some basic Christian truths, expressed
in the wretched bodily piety of the medieval ascetic. Yet
this was a very different kind of ascetic practice. Whereas
the Cynic acted on this life to bring it to the point where it
passes over into another form of worldly existence,
Christian asceticism incorporated Platonic elements,
121
invoking a contrast between this worldly life and the true

65
life of the Christian hereafter. Its ultimate objectives
were externally ordained and pre-defined. Similarly
constrained, the Christian martyr also adapted Cynic
technique, inviting the wrath of a social order that was
scandalized by the martyrs determined obedience to
another, higher authority. Martyrdom became the ultimate
embodiment of ones commitment to a truth
fundamentally at odds with ones surroundings. The
daring insolence of the martyr nevertheless expressed a
diluted version of Cynic courage. The martyr desired not
simply to inspire others, but to exhibit him or herself
before a watchful God, hoping such displays of trust
would bring salvation. The Cynic, by contrast, had no
such contract or guarantee. One could argue, as does
Foucault, that revolutionary movements later inherited
some of the attitudes and forms of behaviour variously
passed on by Christian martyrs and ascetics. In a similar
way they would incorporate a higher authority, or telos
into their practice, which becomes their driving rationale.
They would also remain marginal to those great
organisational efforts that sought to define and impose a
revolutionary discipline and a temporary set of values on
their combatants and members. These marginal attitudes
would be expressed through the figure of the militant
with little time for party discipline. The militant would have
the boldness to embody a form of existence that already
broke with the social, political and economic conventions
that were to be overthrown. This life would not restrain its
impulses for the purposes of future victory. The
uncompromising militant would shamelessly scandalise
sympathetic reformists and unsympathetic reactionaries
with equal zeal and pleasure.
A Returned Diogenes
Cynicism drops to cynicism with a lower case c, once
122
taken up by that modern figure, the rebel without a cause.

With no truth to bear witness too, and faced with a
66
question: How to live if nothing is true?
Committed nihilists are rare. Against affirmation, mass

cynicism makes for a distinctly non-committal nihilism, a
decidedly weak nihilistic impulse. Todays nihilist tends to
be sickly, removed and bad tempered.
The committed nihilist does not think in order to revolt, but

revolts in an attempt to think. In an educational context,
the committed nihilist follows through with the suspicion
modern education lacks value, seriously broaching a
predicament where the values promoted by modern
education have become institutional affects. Drawing from
a long tradition of Cynic engagement, this figure acts out
his or her educational reservations. The most expensively
educated nihilists in particular (those occupying lucrative
university positions) focus resolutely on that Nietzschean
adage: Success has always been the biggest liar as if it
67
were their closest mantra. Our most educated nihilists
would not simply feel embarrassed by their education and
by the conceit of their educated class (for those merely
embarrassed can still enjoy the pleasures of false
modesty). They act upon their conviction that education
lacks value by seeking to unsettle and render precarious
the high status and privilege still conferred upon them by
their educational attainments. And yet, the Cynical
educator, that practitioner of educated nihilism, remains
within the confines of education as Diogenes remained in
Athens. This educator will not depart easily or willingly.
123
The educated nihilist offends us. By definition, this

creature only rejects education after enjoying its benefits.
An odious situation, though claims were never made here
for its moral decency. The educated nihilist is indecent by
profession.
Shitting in public no longer vitiates society. Other famous

acts of Cynic shamelessness would be similarly
ineffective. All such perversions have since been
subsumed by psychologies that presume to treat them.
They have been adopted by disciplines that take these
perversions for their bread and butter. There is even a
Diogenes syndrome for homeless people exhibiting
68
signs of extreme self-neglect. In our late modern
context, acts of bodily shamelessness designed to call
into question the very values that animate the
scandalised, only fuel the system. Shameless acts
reinforce those very disciplines that seek to normalise
behaviour by constructing abnormalities as sufficient
reason for remedial action. Undeniably this is a relief (in a
different sense) for todays educated Cynic, who must
look elsewhere for inspiration. But the relief is short-lived.
The Cynics task has become far more punishing.
We can imagine along with Sloterdijk a returned

Diogenes climbing out of his Athenian tub, into recent
69
history. He gets caught up in two world wars and
numerous other conflagrations, genocides and
massacres. He strolls through the principal sites of
capitalism and communism watching the former expand
through a series of aggressive cycles and the latter
undergo the most brutal implosions. He eventually
124
stumbles forth into the political apathy of our present that

no longer dreams of changing its conditions of existence.
He witnesses how our most progressive contemporaries
confront their own century of ecological and social
catastrophe by purchasing ethical beans and aspiring to
pious reservations of carbon neutrality as they, and we,
befoul the rest of the planet. And in the midst of this
cynical disorder Diogenes finally encounters education,
and is surprised to hear a repeated promise, that through
education all can achieve success. Whilst Diogenes had
taught: Be ready for anything, what he now sees goes
70
beyond comprehension. Though Diogenes had a pretty
low opinion of his fellow Athenians, what he finds in our
present (a present in many respects already thoroughly
perverted) seems to have descended so far into absurdity
that it is beneath subversion. Diogenes is rightly fearful of
our psychiatric institutions and so comes across a little
muted. Yet his silence is more enduring. A productive
response to our present impasse, a real game changer as
they say, seems at first beyond him.
The modus operandi of the Cynic living differently

must face its inevitable adoption by capital. Here May
1968 serves as a galling reminder of how attempts to
reinvent daily life can be outmanoeuvred. They were cut
short by a revolution in the workplace, so the argument
goes, one that increasingly valued autonomy, inspiration
and the odd wacky idea, rather than conformity and
71
protocol. Everyday existence is now relentlessly
exploited to breathe life back into the dead hand of
72
capital. Workers and educational subjects are expected
to take upon themselves a stylization of life that will
render them permanently adaptable to the whims of the
marketplace. Hence those who approach Nietzsche with
fresh ears today, hearing how he flirted with the idea of an
125
bermensch the heroic few who, having achieved

authentic existence through self-assertion, free
themselves from Christian morality will fear not the
seeds of some Nazi ideology. They come to see a version
of this quest is all too common now. Feverishly promoted
by capital: To Be Yourself, to the exclusion of all others,
authentic to the point of nothing, to the point of
destruction in the face of such impossible responsibilities,
73
is the modern ultimatum. Individual lives are framed
increasingly in this way; folded back on themselves, as
lives of self-stylization vis--vis the cultivation of
[potentially counter-]cultural taste, body image and so
74
forth. Our bodies, our tastes and inclinations, have
become objects of training, therapy, adornment and free
expression. These bodies exist as cultural and counter-
cultural projects, requiring continual inspection,
adjustment and readjustment. Our lives have been
invested with a quest for enrichment, alteration, for new
experiences, new trends. And so, should todays Cynic
manage to avoid pathologization or arrest for indecency,
the embodied practices this Cynic displays would be
perceived as just another lifestyle choice albeit with
exhibitionist tendencies operating within the boundaries
of liberal acceptability.
Refusing those selves, confronting these self-governing

agents of power, inevitably calls for a more radical act. It
leads those resisting to new forms of self-repudiation. In
the Cynic tradition at its most extreme, this entails a form
of bodily and subjective rejection akin to suicide. For such
a refusal of self would, by definition, go against our very
nature as it has been constituted by power. We are
agents of power, we do its bidding, we produce its effects,
we adapt it to circumstance. By living we fulfil its urges. In
this context, self-repudiation would be an act of refusal, of
126
revolt, of a kind Diogenes attempted. This old dog, so the

75
story goes, finally expired by holding his breath. The
point of interest is the impossibility of the act. Who
commits suicide by holding their breath? Nobody. The
very notion is absurd. But with a returned Cynic, suicide
rises up the philosophical agenda. It could even become
the only truly philosophical problem, as Camus once put
76
it. The Cynic approaches suicide without appeal to
external forces, without relying on chemistry, or gravity, or
whatever. The Cynic refuses all assistance that might
entail capitulation to power, a giving up in the face of
insuperable odds, a laying down before that which cannot
be defeated. The Cynic repudiates the authentic self of
self-government, refusing that mythical but affective self
in an act of defiance that produces the Cynic. Cynic
refusal does not entail a practice of the self that folds
back on itself, giving another spin on the injunction to be
yourself. Rather Cynic refusal folds outwards.
For the educated nihilist, career suicide might be

reconceptualised as a form of impossible suicide, akin to
holding ones breath. It would be a project where one
affirms the inevitable end of ones career, committing to
the practice of career suicide all ones working life. This
would go against the very nature of the educator as he or
she has been constructed. It would dig away at her core
attachment to education without which, she believes, she
could not operate. Crucially, the pursuit of career suicide
would match in its pitch the progress of ones career,
where it is all the more intensely pursued as ones
position in the organisation becomes more secure.
According to this hierarchy of transgressions, the
university vice chancellor would be the biggest
educational heretic in town.
127
Do not misunderstand the invitation. The outer limits of

acceptable conduct are sufficiently clear. But how is the
educator otherwise constrained excepting obvious
taboos? That such and such would be tantamount to
career suicide is a common enough refrain in work
settings. Less exaggerated expressions of the same
sentiment would be, that such and such risks too much;
that it is not worth it; that there will be comeback; that one
would be endangering ones position, and so on. In the
university this fear is sometimes nurtured by a threat in
the small print: a contract may not be issued, or if issued
may not be renewed, or if permanent the employee may
be fired for bringing the corporation into disrepute. Or
less obviously, positions are slowly made untenable, with
reprisals obscuring themselves through a time delay.
Fortunately for academics (and unfortunately for the
pursuit of truth), they have become increasingly adept at
the necessary self-chastisements and pre-emptive self-
discipline that will keep them far from trouble. Most
successful careerists curtail their infractions so diligently
that each breach of convention manages to fall short of
that lower, hazy border which defines the onset of risky
behaviour. Most often, indeed, we barely notice when our
colleagues rebel, even though they themselves may be
experiencing all the stress and excitement of a
transgressive act. But in noting such timorous traits I do
not ridicule todays educator. I merely recognise that for
this figure, bravery is manifested in the pettiest misdeeds.
To encourage these timid souls (of which I am one) to
approach the boundaries of their educated existence, is
not to suggest they work towards a militant individualism.
To push ones cynicism to its capitalisation is not to cut
oneself off from others in solitary protest. Rather, the
plight of the educated Cynic is similar to that of the
beggar Cynic. The irony of the latter is that in pursuing
128
independence, in cutting oneself off from all luxuries and

commitments yet remaining in Athens, the beggar Cynic
becomes only more dependent. In seeking independence
from all cultural mores, the beggar Cynic comes to rely
upon the charity of the system he subverts. But the Cynic
overcomes this double bind, refusing to display any
gratitude when alms are given. Even better, the Cynic
insults those who give alms. The indifference of the
beggar Cynic is designed to undermine this relationship of
charity, where those who give alms would normally use
their connection with the beggar to affirm themselves as
benefactors. In a similar way the educated Cynic refuses
all compassion or well-intended advice. This calms the
situation, mollifies the Cynic, but most importantly, it
allows ones compatriots to return to work. Against this,
the purpose of Cynicism in the workplace is to make the
discomfort involved a shared and productive experience,
as we attempt to overcome or at least bring into question
77
this thing we call education.
Paulo Freire once called upon critical pedagogues to

78
commit class suicide. His counsel was this: In order to
side with the exploited and dispossessed, the critical
pedagogue must finally, and conclusively, close the door
on his or her bourgeois existence. In his Letters to
Guinea-Bissau (extending an argument made by guerrilla
79
leader Amilcar Cabral ), Freire recognises that such a
death will not be easily accepted even by those verbally
80
committed to a revolutionary stance. Though
intellectuals may agree in principle that the new society
81
might require a different conception of education they
will not be able imagine a conception of education so
different that it has no place for them and their kind in it.
In a similar way, the educated nihilist also struggles to
imagine a conception of education so different that his or
129
her educated credentials become questionable

appendages. And yet, whilst most educated critics of the
Freirean tradition would understand the logic of this
invitation to commit class suicide but would
82
characteristically fail to take it up, the educated nihilist
also finds the invitation to be incoherent. After all, class
suicide is recommended so as to foster a more authentic
educational encounter, precisely the thing the educated
nihilist has given up on. Militant action for the latter
represents something very different, that is, an attempt to
live without education, or at least entertain in its presence
the most radical form of doubt.
For the educated nihilist, career suicide is approached as

a limit-experience. It is pursued as an ongoing series of
encounters with the limits imposed by ones place of
work. Discomfort is necessary. Since these limits are
already absorbed within the subject who seeks to confront
them, because they are deeply formative of the
professional self, each confrontation is experienced as
pain. But the educated Cynic pursues each limit-
experience that wrenches the subject from itself with
abject determination. The Cynic sees to it that the subject
of education the educator within each educated person
is no longer itself, or that it is brought to its annihilation
83
or its dissolution.
A direct, unmediated encounter with failure, would finish

the educator off. A conception of mastery still haunts the
profession, and sustains it. Admittedly the pursuit of
mastery has been reduced of late, from the aspiration to a
high and distant ideal, to a more straightforward
estimation of ones ability to meet desired outputs.
130
Academics in particular are governed like this; they

govern one another and themselves like that. As a peer
network they collude in judging one anothers outputs,
servicing the machine that turns intellectual work into
measurable commodities. For academics, then, the
opening gambit in their revolt could simply be an
interruption of efforts to satisfy other academics, in
particular the peer reviewer, that benchmark of quality
and conformity. The revolting academic might cease
production altogether, failing to churn out the required
bids and papers, or, better still, would write in a style that
lacks due seriousness. A remarkably difficult effect to
sustain:
PLAYBOY: In some of your books especially The Sirens
of Titan and Slaughterhouse-Five theres a serious
notion that all moments in time exist simultaneously
VONNEGUT: You understand, of course, that everything I
say is horseshit. PLAYBOY: Of course. VONNEGUT:
Well, we do live our lives simultaneously. Thats a fact
PLAYBOY: It still seems paradoxical. VONNEGUT: That
84
is because what I just said to you is horseshit.
Lacking seriousness, the revolting academic ensures

work cannot be traded for points, since in academic terms
such outputs are unacceptable currency. In response to
the well-known refrain, publish or perish, this academic
would rather perish outright, or at least publish perished
works works considered too far gone by ones peers.
From this position, each time the academic is drawn back
to institutional productivity, each time a paper is
submitted, and then accepted, there will be a little pang, a
sensation of failure.
But Cynicism still seems beyond our grasp. The pursuit of

success and mastery is so endemic to education that
even failure is recast as its opposite. When educators
131
leave their profession, they risk affirming education in a

parting shot. Each departure testifies to the individual who
was too authentic, too true to education to tolerate what it
has become. Even those claiming to leave education
cannot show it contempt.
132
VII
SPIRIT OF HEAVINESS
Held in denial
Forever held in denial, mastery of an aborted, duplicitous
kind catches and keeps us mid-gasp. With a promise of
mastery, education claimed to elevate, even make the
philosopher immune to the world below and its
persecutions. Yet mastery was yoked to its opposite: the
enslavement of philosopher to philosophical doctrine, for
mastery also required discipline and self-control. It
attached the self to an ordinance that promised
sovereignty but demanded obedience. With Christianity,
self-mastery became an instrument of subordination of
more complete effect, as spiritual training occupied the
1
entire life of the Christian subject. It committed its
practitioners to a regime of power that would take care of
their entire life in all its detail and for the rest of its
2
duration. At the same time, the promise of
transcendence became ever more spectral, dependent on
133
Gods will. The strength of will exhibited by the self-

denying Christian was of secondary importance, for at the
gates of heaven, God decides. On earth, the Christian
monk is warned against pursuing any self-denying
ordinance to excess. And so we find Cassian denouncing
those who would cast themselves down wells, fast
excessively, or cross deserts without food in an effort to
demonstrate just how catastrophically they had achieved
self-mastery, purging themselves of natural inclinations
3
and desires. These were not acts of extreme piety. They
were symptomatic of pride. And pride is of the devil.
Mastery holds within itself the danger of its fulfilment, a

danger that theological orders and educational regimes
are concerned to mitigate. In the first centuries after
Christ, with extreme asceticism on the rise, the old but
sinuous link connecting the promise of mastery to the
necessity of enslavement calcified, and then broke. In
perfecting their self-denials, early Christian ascetics
(those Cassian warned against) became increasingly
indifferent to pain and discomfort, and thereby removed
themselves beyond the grasp of power. Ascetics denied
themselves so completely that little remained for power to
gain purchase on. This posed a challenge to organised
Christianity, since its most potent ascetics had effectively
reversed the self-denials of monastic obedience,
transforming these denials into a form of egoistic self-
4
mastery. Monastic and ecclesiastical institutions were
faced with the task of bringing self-mastery back within
their control. They would purge themselves of all vagrant,
self-sufficient, ascetic heresies, reclaiming all marvels and
self-flagellations as their own. Eventually self-mastery of
this more duplicitous kind would, like pastoral care, slip its
5
doctrinal moorings and migrate to a secular context.
Education remains in awe of mastery but preaches denial.
134
Spirit of Heaviness
Education yokes its members to the pursuit of mastery

but will not allow that mastery to become realised as
such. Mastery haunts education as its most enduring,
unrealisable promise.
What education promises mastery of changes: From

ancient self in pursuit of wisdom, to medieval body
desiring knowledge of God, to modern subject of
autonomous reason, until finally, we arrive at the promise
we might master our own performativities. By definition
mastery is to remain spectral. Our nihilism is the product
of this framework, this belief that education requires
higher objectives, a belief so entrenched that as each
objective comes under attack another is substituted, or
when substitutes are left wanting, we are launched into
overproduction. For we scarcely know how to operate let
alone educate without the promise of mastery. Nihilism is
an unavoidable affliction. It has us in its grasp. Those
claiming to exist beyond its reach are in denial. There is
no quick and easy escape. We are trapped in the
digestive tract of Western history. Attached to a promise
never delivered, we are produced as disappointments.
Masters of everything and nothing.
Sade as Educator
Education is opposed to nihilism, as hope is opposed to
despair. One is the assumed antidote for the other. Yet
those hoping to escape nihilism through education rather
than in spite of it will find themselves poisoned by false
remedies. Nihilism is not escaped by perpetuating what
produced it. Education cannot solve nihilism, it only
colludes with it. Of course, as educators and educated
people we remain unmoved by such claims. We are
forever attached to our poisons: Surely the fight against
135
nihilism is best fought as a fight for education, as a battle

for the realisation of an educational project finally made
good, a form of education that gives up this ancient game
of deferral, deceit and perpetual disappointment, and in
full sincerity finally delivers what it promises? Since we
remain unmoved, let us take our poison instead, and
judge its effects. To those educators who remain wedded,
despite everything, to the idea of education, itself
dominated by the idea of mastery and this represents
most of us it is worth experiencing how an exit might
look, one that gives mastery a chance to express itself
without doubling back and denying its realisation. This
would be an exercise in Sades Reason, as Maurice
Blanchot described it. For there is no better example of
mastery run amok than is found in the writing of that
eighteenth century libertine, the Marquis de Sade. We
find here an attempt to practice mastery without duplicity,
without the accompanying call to self-denial. We
encounter education as mastery, as its fulfilment.
Justine; Juliette; Philosophy of the Boudoir; The 120 Days

of Sodom: scandalous books that scandalise us still. And
yet, whilst there is no better symbol of scandal than the
Marquis de Sade, the scandalous audacity of his thought
6
has remained long unknown. This was Blanchots
analysis. Sades books were excessive in every sense,
that much we perceive. What we fail to see is how, in their
excess, they exaggerate our own basic attachments. We
find ourselves confronted with works of horrific,
unsurpassable monstrosity, though rationalist in
7
construction and pedagogic in genre. Sades offence, in
short, was to follow through. It was to express the idea of
mastery inherent in reason, and the idea of education
inherent in mastery. It was to bring education, mastery
and reason to their conclusion.
136
Spirit of Heaviness
*
8
Sades texts are instructional, educational. They are
relentlessly, tediously educational, perhaps unrivalled in
their singular commitment to instruction. Juliette, their
most accomplished student, must surpass, then abandon,
perhaps even sacrifice each teacher she encounters in
9
her pursuit of mastery. Initially Juliette misunderstands,
hoping that her teacher will be her protector in crime and
debauchery. But as Noirceuil explains, one must learn to
manage by oneself, to rely upon ones own solitary
10
resources. Juliette must learn to practice mastery
alone, eventually becoming master of herself. Her
education demands absolute commitment to vice. Failure
is inexcusable. Even the slightest indication of failure will
invoke severe reprisal, if not an attempt on her life from
11
those who were formerly her teachers. Only later does
she realize that, by extension, her whole ambition shall
12
be someday to surpass my teacher One might
expect that in attempting to surpass her teachers in
mastery Juliette would aspire to become the most
exemplary teacher herself. Indeed, this is what Juliette
first assumes:
I keenly sense my need of instruction, I no less keenly
desire to educate someone: I must have a teacher, yes,
13
and I must have a pupil too.
Yet by the time Juliette finally acquires her pupil, she is on

the road to becoming such an accomplished libertine, so
apathetic to the plight of others that she loses all interest
14
in teaching those far beneath her. Juliette so bores of
her assigned pupil Alexandrine that she dispatches of her,
and her biography, in a mere paragraph so as to avoid
15
ever having to mention her again. Rather significantly,
Alexandrines swift demise is attributed to the very poor
16
instruction she received from her tutor, Juliette. Hence,
137
in Sade we discover how the desire to outdo ones

teachers in mastery could be fatal to teaching, and so to
education. The desire to achieve full blown mastery
certainly does not breed a desire to surpass ones
teachers in teaching, to become a better teacher.
If Juliettes teachers are ever annihilated, this occurs only

if they are found wanting from the perspective of her own
developing supremacy. She respects her teachers as
long as their libertine mastery is assured. They are
heeded for as long as they can teach, and teach by
example. Otherwise Juliette would have bled them
17
white, as she puts it, at the first opportunity. Overcome
here, then, are centuries of Christian toleration, where
mastery is to be diligently pursued but never presumed to
become fully manifest, even in the most holy, for that
would lead to a dangerous asceticism. Overcoming all
tolerations, the libertine student no longer suffers the
teacher who does not bear out, in all completeness, his
philosophical teachings in his actions. Through education,
the libertine adopts that ancient logic of mastery found
inherent in education, unshackles it, and drives the
pursuit of mastery to its hilt.
Libertine mastery has its subtleties. In the context of

Sades writing we might associate it with and perhaps
reduce it to a form of phallic supremacy. Or we might find
ourselves reminded of Greek pederasty in its aboriginal
relationship to philosophy (so many of Sades victims are
children), where, in one reading, we observe how over
and again a greater man penetrates a lesser man with
his knowledge. This, after all, is a classic paradigm in
18
Western pedagogy. Such conclusions are too easy,
138
Spirit of Heaviness
however. Though Sades texts are all about penetration,

the penetrating agent is not singular in its form, nor is it
always modeled on the phallus. The libertine often
socratizes (as he calls it) by other means, and does so
not merely for pleasure, or to dominate, but for purposes
of examination in both a medical and educational sense.
The libertine will enter the body by any means, cutting
into it if necessary. In so doing, the better libertine, like
the better educator, does not simply put in; he also
19
leads out from what is found there. His mastery
depends upon a prior investigation into the internal
consistency of Man, of what makes him tick, of how his
juices flow, of how he errs. He renders Man entirely
material. He destroys the conceit of Man by making Man
the object of type of study, a vivisection, which leads to
the most intimate and base observations. His
investigation is at once an enquiry into what we are in
20
body and of what must be overcome. Hence mastery of
this kind is less assured, and more intricated in the
problems of an irrational bodily materiality than we might
21
otherwise assume. With Sade, mastery eventually
confronts the impossibility of its realization. It destroys
itself in the attempt.
The libertines self-mastery reaches towards complete

egoism, complete in the sense that the libertine remains
unaffected by his crimes. Self-possessed, deracinated,
his ego can indulge itself without consideration. His
crimes obey no external logic or internal demand; they
are an expression of the libertines own prolific creativity.
Becoming inaccessible to others, the libertine asserts his
or her will without appeal (the most enjoyable crimes are
the motiveless ones. The victim must be perfectly
innocent: if we have sustained some harm from him it
22
legitimates the harm we do him ). In this sense his
139
mastery is complete; the libertine wilfully destroys others,

even destroys himself for no other reason. But this
exalted state is only achieved at great expense, by
defeating Man, God, and even Nature (though not
23
necessarily in that order ). The libertine must overcome
each framework of appeal through force of will alone,
exaggerating each metaphysical attachment to the point
of its own annulment. Through the pursuit of mastery,
even mastery itself must eventually expire.
In Blanchots view, Sade remains a prodigious enigma

so long as we fail to interrogate the logic exemplified in
24
his work. Perhaps last of all will we permit a
confrontation between Sade and education, for Sade
threatens education as he threatens reason, not by
stepping outside its boundaries, but by exaggerating its
own inherently debauched tendencies to dramatic
25
effect.
With Sade we find depicted sovereign man, inaccessible

because nothing can hurt him. He dominates others and
tortures them with such delight in order to experience just
how dispassionate he has become. What is murder to
him? Nothing but a little organized matter disorganized; a
few compositional changes, the combination of some
molecules disturbed and brokentossed back into the
26
crucible of nature. As Juliettes first teacher explains,
he will execute every atrocity, great and small, with a
27
constant and inviolable serenity. He knows how to turn
all distaste into tastes, all repugnance into attractions. He
sets about accomplishing the enormous task of
completely enumerating every anomaly, every distraction,
every human possibility. He must experience everything
140
Spirit of Heaviness
28
in order to be at the mercy of nothing. The libertine
29
even welcomes the gallows with pleasure. Against such
a Power, what can the law do? It intends to punish such a
man, but it rewards him, and it thrills him by demeaning
30
him. He is sovereign for that reason. But he is
sovereign too in the more complete sense that each time
he sacrifices a victim, he decides to sacrifice a thousand
more. He is not tied to his victim in a relation of
dependence. He does not derive meaning from the
individual he annihilates; his victim barely exists as a
distinct sentient being. Each victim is but a simple
component, indefinitely exchangeable, within an
31
enormous erotic equation.
Mastery of such monstrous proportions is not achieved

without considerable effort. The libertine becomes
sovereign only after passing through all prior stages of
debauchery. In the less practised libertine we discover
someone who derives pleasure from aggravating the
32
plight of others. His is a pleasure of comparison
where the suffering of others only brings out, by way of
contrast, his own happiness. His mastery is dependent on
the subjugation of others, a relationship that brings into
question his own strength. For by comparing his situation
with that of the wretched, the fortunate man ineluctably
identifies himself with the wretched one. At this
intermediate stage, the mind of the libertine remains
riveted on the reality of the other, which it seeks to deny
The debauchee remains attached to the victim of his
lusts. He is obsessed with his victims suffering, and this
is his weakness. This debauchee has not yet achieved
sovereignty. His pride and his sense of self-worth is
dependent on the defeat of others. But the sovereign man
does not attach himself to any object; caught up in the
perpetual motion of nature, he obeys his impulses and
33
looks upon natures creatures as no more than its foam.
141
Sovereign man may have succeeded in detaching himself

from the pleasure of comparison, yet the pursuit of
mastery has him enslaved to a destructive, ultimately self-
destructive path of voluptuous annihilation. Like the
extreme ascetic so feared by Cassian, the soul that
wishes to become free must first deny all pleasure,
removing every last temptation. Unlike the ascetic, the
libertine does so by pursuing all temptation, destroying all
pleasures, and in so doing destroys everything else
besides. Hence Sades writings are littered with the
corpses of libertines, struck down at the height of their
34
glory. Sovereign man may achieve mastery, but he
does so by annihilating all things, including himself. By
reducing all he touches to nothing, the most practised
libertine only makes this nothingness manifest. The
world in which he lives is a desert; the beings he
encounters there are less than things, less than shadows.
While studying them, tormenting them and destroying
them, he does not seize upon their life, but verifies their
nothingness. He becomes master of their nonexistence,
35
and he draws great pleasure from this. Quite literally
the libertine realises his nihilism. He follows through with
that tradition in Western metaphysics which associates
being with a higher realm. He gives expression to a
tradition which denigrates this world below by associating
it with a process of transient becoming. This world is
nothing by comparison to the world above, a prejudice
Sade takes great pleasure in exploiting. Sade pursues
that disavowal of reality upon which the language of the
36
West was built, by treating its members as they
conceptualise themselves, by approaching them as if they
were already dead, as if they were already worth
37
nothing.
142
Spirit of Heaviness
In Sades world those seeking mastery achieve it through

an enormous, monstrous negation. Blanchot again: This
negation, which is carried out on a massive scale, which
no individual instance is enough to satisfy, is essentially
38
destined to surpass the plane of human existence. It
requires a kind of boldness no philosopher has managed
hitherto. Sadean man frees himself in relation to his victim
because he wishes to exist independently. He wishes to
become the perfect philosopher by virtue of his separation
from worldly things. Admittedly, he does so by engaging
in bodily acts, but he is never consumed by the act. For
all his commitment to bodily perversion he remains a
philosopher. As Simone de Beauvoir once put it,
sovereign man never loses himself in his animal nature.
His exploits are so premeditated and cerebral that
philosophic discourse, far from dampening his ardor, acts
39
as an aphrodisiac. He is no Cynic, then. With Sade we
find the wildest hope of philosophy realised; a lucid mind
40
inhabits a body which is being degraded into matter.
But Sadean man does not stop there. He reduces God to
nothing also, and thereby reveals not only the monstrous
negation upon which Western philosophy is built. He
41
reveals what Nietzsche describes as the empty fiction
that justified such negation. For the world was denied in
the name of otherworldly beings and ideas, in the name of
spectres that finally coalesced, with Christianity, in the
figure of God. With Christianity, knowledge of God and
access to heaven became dependent on practices of
Christian self-denial. And yet, as Sade portrays it, this
monstrous order of discourse will itself eventually
crumble, for nihilism entails the death of God too, in a
42
final painful, drawn-out negation. Again in Sades hands
this death is too much even for todays atheist to
stomach. Sovereign man hopes to first negate but
eventually become indifferent to God. He no longer
143
derives strength, as many atheisms do, from a rejection of

God.
Sade completes the project of Western metaphysics by

founding mans sovereignty on the transcending power of
negation, a power that depends in no way upon the
objects that it destroys, which in order to destroy them,
does not even suppose their existence beforehand. But
then, as Blanchot argues, he goes one further. Sade
rejects the idea of God as the inexpiable fault of man, his
43
original sin, the proof of his emptiness. Sade again:
The very conceiving of this so infinitely disgusting
phantom is, I confess it, the one wrong I am unable to
forgive man. I excuse him all his whims, his ironies, and
his eccentricities, I sympathize with all his frailties, but I
cannot smile tolerantly upon the lunacy that could erect
this monster, I do not pardon man for having himself
wrought those religious chains which have so dreadfully
hobbled him and for having crept despicably forward,
eyes downcast and neck stretched forth, to receive the
shameful collar manufactured only by his own stupidity.
There would be no end to it, Juliette, were I to give vent to
all the horror waked in me by the execrable doctrine
based upon a Gods existence; mere mention of him
rouses my ire, when I hear his name pronounced I seem
to see all around me the palpitating shades of all those
woebegone creatures this abominable opinion has
slaughtered on the face of the earth. Those ghosts cry out
beseechingly to me, they supplicate me to make use of all
I have been endowed with of force and ingenuity to erase
from the souls of my brethren the idea of the revolting
44
chimera which has brought such rue into the world.
The chimera that Sade rejects is what justifies and

authorizes those crimes he imagines, for we cannot be
too forceful in our efforts to annihilate a being who is
45
willing to bow down and prostrate himself before God.
144
Spirit of Heaviness
The idea of God reduces man to nothingness, Sade

perceives, since man conceives of himself as owing
everything to that idea however vaguely it may be
expressed. Indeed, the idea of God derives its strength
from the fact that God must remain unknown, from the
fact that his ineffable ways surpass understanding, that
he waxes wroth as soon as anyone has the temerity to
46
pry into his secrets. Those seeking mastery have, then,
no option but to make God manifest, to give definite form
to mans conception of divine sovereignty and reign over
men like Gods. To remove the last vestiges of religious
faith, Sadean man momentarily becomes God, so that,
when in his presence, other men become inconsequential
and then realize exactly to what extent a being before
God is sheer nothingness. Being God can only mean
47
one thing: crushing men, annihilating creation. Thus
Sadean man finally destroys any last vestige of God by
assuming His image. At the same time he destroys men
by acting out the consequences of their image of
themselves as reflected in their conception of God. He
shows how in creating God they inaugurated their own
destruction.
In mans conception of God Sade hates the nothingness

of man who created such a master for himself. Though
Sades characters would temporarily work with God to
sanction this nothingness to express the destructive
logic in the idea of God and bring it to its conclusion
they will not become Godlike for more time than is
48
necessary. Sade eventually gives up even hating God,
so Blanchots argues, for in hating God Sade affirms God
by negation. His hatred of God must finally mature until it
49
liberates hate from God. Sades hate becomes too
great to be contained by just one object. He identifies
instead with that spirit of destruction he associates with
145
50
Nature. Yet Nature too becomes unbearable. By
aligning himself with Nature, Sade finds himself
constantly confronted with its insurmountable and
51
sovereign presence. Nature as conceived by Man,
dooms us to a pursuit we can never fulfil. We are formed,
Sade tells us, so that we would wish to outrage her, but
as Nature herself is the spirit of destruction, there is no
outrage, no act of destruction, that can escape her
embrace. As the libertine Pope explains, addressing
Nature:
Thou, unreasoning and reasonless force of which I find
myself the involuntary result, Thou who hurled me into
this world with the desire that I offend Thee, and who hast
however denied me the means to do so, inspire in my
blazing soul those crimes which would serve Thee better
than these poor melancholy things Thou hast put inside
my reach... When I have exterminated all the creatures
that cover the earth, still shall I be far from my mark, since
I shall have merely served Thee, O unkind Mother, for it is
to vengeance I aspire, vengeance for what, whether
through stupidity or malice, Thou doest to men in never
furnishing them the means to translate fairly into deeds
52
the appalling desires Thou dost ever rouse in them.
53
Sadean man gradually becomes aggravated by Nature.
His sovereignty will bear no comparison to its supremacy.
Nature too must studied, and subjected to libertine
probing. The study of Nature helps destroy our last
presumptions concerning Man, God, Justice and so on; it
is part of the process of their negation. The libertine must
engage in incessant, unwearying study of her; only by
probing into her furthermost recesses may one finally
54
destroy the last of ones misconceptions. But the study
of Nature also allows for the possibility of her own
negation, or so the most accomplished libertine comes to
believe. And so we find imagined a great cataclysm that
would destroy the very laws of Nature. Sade imagines an
engineer of such accomplishment that he creates a
146
Spirit of Heaviness
55
machine to pulverize the universe. Though even this,
for Sade, would not suffice.
By his imagined defeat of Nature, Sades mastery once

again becomes dependent upon, and presumes the
existence of, that which it destroys. What he pursued by
56
pushing the spirit of negation to its limit is sovereignty.
He sought after a sovereign mastery which creates and
destroys without appeal. Through the pursuit of mastery
and after so much destruction, Sade eventually sacrifices
mastery, travelling beyond good and evil, and beyond
value itself. He realises it will not suffice to ensure the
other is reduced to nothing through its destruction. For, as
Klossowski argued in Sade My Neighbour, if the other is
nothing for me... I am not only nothing for him but also
nothing before my own consciousness and in fact that
57
consciousness is no longer still mine. Here we are left
with the last effects of Sades Reason. At its extreme
realisation, mastery (and hence education) destroys itself;
it reduces sovereign man to nothing since if he is
something he must exist in dependent relation to
something else. We arrive at the negation of destruction
58
itself.
The wilful destruction of objects belies the dependence of

the destroyer on those things he annihilates. What better
way to remove that dependence, Sade decides, than to
depreciate it by becoming apathetic to destruction itself.
Now the simple quantity of the objects sacrificed,
becomes the object of these acts. Deriving little from their
destruction, these acts being too numerous to count or
even notice, the reality of the other and of the self are
59
dissolved. As Horkheimer and Adorno put it: little but a
147
tense, purposive bustle prevails in which no moment is

unused, no body orifice neglected, no function left
60
inactive. The libertine disappears in an endless
61
reiteration of acts. He romps without purpose,
remaining active for no other reason. Like todays
educator, yet shorn of all romantic illusion, sovereign man
in his last iteration operates devoid of any substantial
62
goals, everything he touches is apprehended in terms
63
of manipulation and administration. As Sades Chief of
Police declares:
It does indeed seem that the lamp of reason does not
begin to enlighten us until such time as we are no longer
able to profit from its rays, and not before stupidity has
been added to stupidity that we arrive at the discovery of
the source of all that ignorance has caused us to
64
commit.
Let us treat this remark with the seriousness it deserves.

Once Sades reason has run its full course and mastery
has emptied itself of all content, there is nothing left to
say. After so many lessons we find ourselves stripped
bare, piling stupidity upon stupidity. At its limit, this is what
education for mastery becomes.
Mastery or Failure
Sades direction of travel is also our own, insofar as we
65
too suffer the effects of European nihilism. But our
collective travel is less deliberate: we kill Man, God and
Nature without always fully intending to. This killing of
each is built into the pursuit of mastery that we (unlike
Sade) disavow. Sade only brings to the surface that
brutalism inherent in Western education, which negates
and negates monstrously in order to affirm. If this
tendency were fully acknowledged, if the grotesque
nature of our dream, our pursuit of mastery were fully
manifested, we might develop the strength to reject it as
our educational objective. And not by returning to that
148
Spirit of Heaviness
dirty compromise of mastery through enslavement, which

kills, though it does so quietly. Rather we might pursue its
opposite, which is failure, a failure to master others and
ourselves.
Mastery or failure, these are the options given us by

education. Mastery is promised through a sleight of hand
that prevents its delivery (we become enslaved to the
pursuit of something that is rarely, if ever, realised), whilst
failure is guaranteed. Educational failure is far more
common and systematically produced than we would like
to admit. In short, if one did not fail, another would not
succeed. Outside Sades grasp, educational mastery is
only ever relative, never absolute, though it still brings
destruction in its wake. Educational mastery appears in a
reduced form, where the mastery of those who succeed is
dependent on the existence of those multitudes that fail.
We are in a position similar to that of the debauched
libertine still reliant on the pleasure of comparison.
Educational success remains dependent on educational
failure, on negation. We are not simply waiting for the
right pedagogy to be applied successfully so that failure
66
can be removed. Once described as the traumatic real
of contemporary education, failure belies the barbarism of
educational mastery and the fantasy of an educational
67
good. In a perverse cycle of self-affirmation, education
is offered as the solution to the problem, that of systemic
failure, which education creates. Failure is the necessary
consequence of that nihilism which attaches us to
promises that are never delivered, which makes us its
inevitable disappointments. The educated nihilist would
not retreat from failure, then. This figure would not seek to
heal education of that affliction, since failure constitutes
education. Even for the educated nihilist this is difficult to
admit. It really is traumatic for those wedded by
constitution to an ideology of educational success.
149
Our options are limited by our histories. And they appear

radically opposed. We affirm mastery or we pursue its
opposite. Rejecting mastery, we could embrace failure
instead, learning to fail better. We could seek to fail
without appeal, failing on our own terms. But can we fail
without appeal? It seems unlikely. For our failures to be
affirmed in their own right, they would need to fall outside
the shadow of a promised mastery. As we plummet
downwards, we would confront that devil, the Spirit of
68
Heaviness through which all things fall. We would
laugh heartily at that metaphysical ghost, which nihilism
produces and has us suffer. We would confront that spirit
and understand how it was first and forever since
conjured by man. Confronted by things that will no longer
be suspended aloft. These things fall, we fall with them.
This fallout we perceive as the necessary outcome of that
unnecessary belief in spectral things, ideas, Gods.
Our affirmation of failure would be deliberate, giving

expression to our nihilism, revealing its downward
tendencies. We would no longer kill Man, God and
Nature, or this outcome would at least become less
inevitable, since mastery, and education too, would no
longer be revered.
150
VIII
A MODERN FETISH
Incessant Motion
With modern science the dead acquired degrees of
vitality. The boundary between life and death became
uncertain as vital signs were observed in the deceased.
Better still, they were put to use, as body parts were
consumed by the living. Seventeenth century doctors
noted a range of unusual phenomena: The corpse
retained a remnant of life, where some claimed the dead
body of a victim bleeds profusely when placed in the
1
presence of the murderer. Continued movement was
recorded along with perspiration and the growth of hair,
nails and teeth. Erections were reported on hanged men
and dead soldiers. Cadavers emitted sounds like the
squealing of pigs from the depths of their graves. When
the graves were opened it was reported that the dead had
devoured their shrouds or their clothing. Was this an
omen of plague? Were these noisy and hungry corpses
151
natural or diabolical phenomena? Either way, a

transformation had occurred. The corpse was given its
2
own sensibility.
Vestiges of life could be harvested for the living. A

cadavers sweat was considered a good remedy for
haemorrhoids and tumours. The still-warm hand of a
corpse might cure diseased areas. Dead body parts could
be used to heal living ones, like for like. The soil of
graves, especially of hanged men, was rich in therapeutic
properties. The most fertile soil contained bones. The
ashes of happily married couples and lovers could be
3
taken as an aphrodisiac. Effectively, the dead body was
becoming productive, both as source of knowledge and
source of material. From here it was a short step to
treating the living body as one treats the dead, from
dreams of animating the dead (a modern Prometheus), to
institutes for animating the living through artificial
technique. A disciplinary regime was in the making. It
produced not simply the mechanical movements but also
4
the life-force of the living. This regime developed its
own romance, as death acquired its own beauty. Schools
were filled with pained desire, as martyred saints adorned
5
churches with macabre eroticism. Complete with aching
romance, both productive and lost: this is our new order.
Education has long been obsessed with death, operating

variously as a self-denying bodily ordinance, of marginal,
perhaps supine, supplicatory eroticism. Yet today the
scheme is adjusted. The bodily denials of the death-
bound educator those denials we inherit from ancient
Greece have been augmented. We encounter bodies
amassed and in motion. Education confronts us with
152
A Modern Fetish
ceaseless activity as it shuffles forth without direction or

strength, our only consolation being the sensation it gives
6
of incessant friction. Yet despite our weakened condition,
the romantic educator can still demand the odd,
temporary interruption, and mount the occasional revolt.
We still have the affective resources to appreciate the
perversity of our shifting about. But we are carried away
nonetheless, yielding to sensations of movement.
The problem for todays Cynic, for a returned Diogenes, is

not that life has been denied in any straightforward sense,
or emptied of meaning. Rather, meaning is now
dependent on the body. The Cynic confronts bodies in
ceaseless motion, each bearing witness to its own
7
existence.
In its latest manifestation, education allows weak cynicism

to fester and multiply. We must insist if nothing else on
the uselessness of this breed of cynicism. It risks nothing
but remains open to seduction. It appears to reject
everything but remains susceptible to the allure of
redemption. Todays cynic may be withdrawn and
dejected but is prone to a superficial romance, to a
frottage with educational ideals that gives temporary
relief. Education becomes a fetish.
Education is that kind of fetish which functions best when

left unquestioned. The fervour with which we pursue
education is proportionate to our ignorance of its nature.
Those who ask the simple question What is education?
so flaunt common protocol they are met with
153
embarrassment: Do they really mean to admit, quite so

openly and to those of us who know, that they have no
idea? Silence ensues. Following which the security of an
assumed answer is shored up by the collective inertia of
those refusing to ask the question.
As Universal Good
Education has become victim of its universality. Before
education became an inalienable right, that thing
everyone must have, it had some definite content, specific
to the context in which it was expressed. For the Roman
elite, education represented a form of training for those
hoping to operate within the higher machinery of Empire.
For the early Christian, education represented a form of
spiritual training for those hoping to ward off the devil.
Education effectively changed definition across contexts,
being free of the expectation that, as universal right, it
must transcend them all and be applicable to each.
Once universalised, education stood for all activities that

could be gathered under its umbrella. It even applied to
anyone left outside where all activities could be
measured according to their educational value. Under
these conditions, education would no longer have any
kind of definite content. Here it approximates the
commodity fetish described by Marx, itself an effect of
generalisation. The commodity fetish appears following
transition from pre-capitalist societies where there was
no need for labour and its products to assume a fantastic
form since they existed in localised relations of
dependence to capitalist societies where labour and its
8
products became necessary abstractions. By analogy,
education only became a fantastical ideal, and hence a
fetish, once it was necessary to abstract education across
154
A Modern Fetish
diverse contexts, establishing a principle of equivalence

(everything is educational) across unequal contexts
(education is doing very different things, to different
people). The universality of education could only take
hold on the condition its variety was provisionally ignored,
on the premise that all variations are placed behind a
principle of equivalence. Only then could the idea of
education as a universal right make sense. Crucially,
there is no commitment here to making education the
same for all. Its universality is only expressed as an
abstraction. This gives birth to the fatuous idea that
education can be measured across contexts, that you can
have an objectively good or bad school, teacher,
university or curriculum.
Education has long been oriented to a transcendent

educational good. For centuries, there was an awkward
relation between educational practices and their ultimate
objective, an educational good forever to be deferred. But
in each case the deferral was given appropriate content
and a clear enough rationale. For the Roman tutor, the
promise of an educational good was attached to the
common practice of paideia, without which the aristocrat
could not function. For the Christian bishop, the promise
of an educational good was attached to the labour of
securing the souls place in heaven. In modernity,
however, once education is universalised, the educational
good it promises must be relevant to all contexts. We are
left with the following predicament: If we seek to uncover
what education really is, perhaps in an attempt to better
defend it from attack, we must either radically limit our
scope in order assert that it is something particular, or we
must return to pre-modern definitions of education that
were limited by the specific contexts which gave birth to
them. Each attempt to find and defend contemporary
155
education fails to understand that its lack of content is

precisely what defines it.
Todays educators are expected to be the bearers of a

thing that only makes sense so long as it remains in
motion. By analogy, the commodity Marx describes in
Capital has little intrinsic worth beyond its immediate use-
value. It achieves universal value only as a set of
relations, established by those who act before thinking, by
those who assume value exists and base their actions
9
upon the common assumption of its objectivity. In a
similar way, modern education is given its content though
the ceaseless activity of educators who begin only with
the deed, assuming that education has independent worth
10
beyond the immediate instances of its use. This is
difficult to recognise since, as Marx put it, the movement
through which this process has been mediated vanishes
11
in its own result, leaving no trace behind. We are left,
quite simply, with the conviction that education as a
universal concept, already exists before us. We refuse to
see the alternative, which is to say that the value of
education is produced because it is pursued. This is a
riddle. It still has us in its grasp.
The commodification of education is much bemoaned.

Under the name of that abstract foe neoliberalism, a
market logic invests our educational institutions.
Accordingly todays student is lamented for treating her
education as a commodity. She is deplored for treating
her educators as its vendors. She expects, so they say, to
get a return on her investment. In response educational
institutions adopt the language of the marketplace. They
are sold and sell themselves as commodities, dressing
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A Modern Fetish
their windows, maintaining the brand. They insist that

their workforce understands itself, and its relations, as
already branded goods. This situation is much scoffed at
by those of greater refinement and with longer memories,
who consider themselves and their wares to be above
and beyond commodification. These noble souls insist
they are no mere shopkeepers of knowledge. They will
not have their efforts reduced, as if they were so many
pieces of merchandise with a given price. But the
commodification of education is much older than these
educated critics suspect. Moreover, it has long operated
in reverse, issuing from the romantic attachments of those
educators who place education upon a pedestal, and
generalise, universalise its worth. Since education
became a universal signifier, and so had no specific
purchase on a particular educational reality, all moments
could in principle be packaged, and considered in terms
of their educational value. Education, as an abstract
signifier, became the universal money form that could be
used as a principle of exchange converting anything into
an educational commodity. Education became the
universal, empty signifier through which the value of all
formative moments could be expressed. Everything was
now in principle educational, where educational moments
only varied in terms of their relative value, some having
more than others. The recent and more obvious
commodification of our educational institutions, our
schools and universities, is only a belated and inverted
realisation of that logic. And this situation is to their
benefit, since todays institutions would stretch any
narrow definition of education to breaking point. A broad if
not empty signifier allows institutional life to become
decidedly cynical and yet still be called educational.
These institutions are happily promiscuous in that
respect. Nothing can take away their educational
credentials however grubby their operations.
157
The Educated Critic

Educated critics have no idea how impotent they become,
destroying connections with practice as they retreat into
abstraction. They find security in their expertise, in their
idealism, in their capacity for intellectualised contempt, in
educated diversions as frightfully nebulous as they are
reassuringly dense. But our critics are rejected
themselves with equal if not greater force by the
instrumental rationality within which they operate. They
are largely ignored by an educational system that is
cynically performed to monstrous effect. The story of
modernity is their story, that of the disembodiment of
knowledge, of its divorce from the knower, from the
moral commitments of those able to draw from a shared
12
morality. Our critics have little to contribute, having no
shared system of value, and no agreed educational
project to which they may appeal. They are without the
means to interrupt those morbid proceedings from which
they devoutly recoil. All we have is a critics recital of
woeful notes, a mere tuning up of instruments that convey
little but toneless devotion. They expel air, hot air: that is
all.
A new breed of moralist would bring the intensity of a

moral performance to the flagging project of the
13
educational critic. This moralist would assert the
impossibility of our existing moral order, and our
impossible existence within it. In Cynic terms, the
challenge to live like a dog, that is to say, in rupture with
14
society. One does not observe remotely from above or
below, but seeks exposure, adopting a perilous stance,
open to biting and being bitten. Intellectual problems are
indulged accordingly, only if they are felt.
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A Modern Fetish
To make a life the test of its critique is to risk that life.

Ancient Cynics have been widely misunderstood in this
respect, so odd do they appear by contrast to the
reserved, enlightened critic. Cynic aggression has been
interpreted as if it were a species of simple insolence, or
at best a form of existential self-assertion in the face of
15
annihilating power. The Cynic does nothing but gives
vent to his libidinous energies, so it goes. The Cynic
protest is just a barbaric cry, a futile plea for freedom.
There is nothing worth repeating here... That is the
diagnosis of prissy folk. They cannot see the patient
16
labour that lies behind each act of Cynic subversion.
There is no discipline more exacting than that of the
Cynic, whose rebellions are not at random. They are
situated with care, designed to confront those principles
17
to which society pays lip service. They lay bare such
principles, twist and contort them. Each Cynic revolt
attempts to refashion how we are fashioned as self-
asserting subjects wedded despite ourselves to systems
that define our being. Or to switch terminology, one might
frame this as a question of desubjectification. It is a
matter of confronting the educational subject, or making
that subject confront itself, as we labour to experience
something leading to its actual destruction, its
decomposition, its explosion and perhaps conversion
18
into something else. A Cynic strategy in part, here too is
the gist of Foucaults critical ethos. In response to the
complaint his work had a paralyzing effect on its readers,
Foucault remarked, this very reaction proves that the
19
work was successful. Following an honest reading of
Discipline and Punish a correctional officer or social
worker should expect to be at a loss, no longer able to
rely so easily upon those assumptions that make up his or
her professional self. An educator might experience
similar paralysis.
159
It is assumed that all great thinkers deserve

commentary. For how could academics not generate
commentaries, critiques and compendia of their illustrious
predecessors? And yet, when approaching a thinker such
as Foucault we might wonder if he needs such
accompaniment. Admittedly his work benefits from a
certain amount of guided digestion and elaboration. But
here it is hardly left wanting. Foucault-related scholarship
abounds. We should pay attention to the tone of this
scholarship, often at odds with the deliberate production
20
of estrangement to which Foucault aspired. Most of it is
already too familiar. Too predictably Foucauldian. By
contrast Foucault offered a detailed but disruptive reading
of texts, destabilizing those aspects of the present most
readily taken as its givens. This was intended to open the
present to the possibility of its transformation. In pursuing
his objective Foucault would necessarily appear odd, if
not untimely, perhaps unreasonable. Hence those who
read Foucault best are not simply informed by his work,
they are unsettled by it. But the typical scholar is
characteristically and temperamentally opposed to the
untimely meditations, the inopportune and vigorous
contemplations of a thinker who, at his best, overturned
21
those frameworks we most take for granted. This was
an uneasy and restless activity, as Foucaults
interminable self-adjustments and restatements of
22
purpose bear witness. The danger with conventional
scholarship, with the whole industry now surrounding
Foucaults work, is that it buries this restless ethic under
the weight of its commentaries. Nietzsche bemoaned that
scholarly habit, which serves to destroy the extraordinary
impulse echoed in the work of the philosopher under
study. Through excessively scrupulous enquiries the
scholar unwittingly helps to break or even better! to
loosen every tensed bow, with deference, with a gentle
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A Modern Fetish
23
hand, to be sure in friendly sympathy loosen it. For
Nietzsche the choice was obvious. To the extent
academic philosophy is overrun by a scholarly impulse,
the true philosopher must today live unphilosophically
and unwisely and above all imprudentlycontinually
24
risking himself. The problem with so much work taking
inspiration from Foucault, and Nietzsche for that matter, is
that it entails little risk, causes little disruption, and invites
little action.
An Odd Beast Indeed

For the Cynic parrhesiast, scholarship is an alien activity.
25
The parrhesiast obeys a very different regime of truth.
As Foucault argues, for this mode of verediction or truth-
26
telling to occur, the subject who speaks the truth must
be taking some kind of riska risk which concerns his
relationship with the person to whom he is speaking. With
courage the parrhesiast will take the risk of offending the
other person, of irritating him, of making him angry and
provoking him to conduct which may even be extremely
27
violent. For the scholar this announces the opposite. It
signifies the departure of truth before a reign of force.
Not all parrhesiasts are outsiders. For some frank speech

involved a pact with the powerful, where the parrhesiast
becomes a necessary figure in the Kings Counsel. Here
the parrhesiast still demonstrates courage by telling the
truth, but he does so expectantly. To participate, the
person to whom this parrhesia is addressed will have to
demonstrate his greatness of soul by accepting being told
28
the truth. Such truth is uttered in earnest, and in this
respect is entirely opposed to the art of rhetoric. In
antiquity, rhetoric enabled the person speaking to say
something which may not be what he thinks at all, but
161
whose effect will be to produce convictions or instil

certain beliefs in the person to whom he speaks. Rhetoric
established a constraining bond between what is said
29
and the person or persons to whom it is said. Here it is
the exact opposite of parrhesia, which risks the bond
between parrhesiast and audience. The parrhesiast may
provoke anger, turn friend into enemy, arouse the
hostility of the city, or, if he is speaking the truth to a bad
and tyrannical sovereign, he may provoke vengeance and
punishment. He may even pay with his life for the truth
30
he has told. Hence the Roman tutor, in part parrhesiast
but also philosopher, also learnt to seduce. Through
seduction, through a common belief in education, he
would re-establish the very bond his advice put in peril.
The parrhesiast must contend with other rival truth-tellers,

such as the prophet who transmits the wisdom of others,
or the sage who transmits his own. The prophets posture
is one of mediation, often transmitting the word of God
and always addressing his audience with a truth that
31
comes from elsewhere. The prophet is intermediary in
another sense too, serving as a point of connection
between the present and its prophetic future. The
parrhesiast, by contrast, makes no attempt to help people
somehow step beyond some threshold in the ontological
structure of the human being and of time, which
separates them from their future. At most, the parrhesiast
helps them in their blindness seeking to unveil reality in
all its coarseness, so that it may be better acted upon.
This truth-teller avoids the characteristic obscurity of
prophetic speech, with its divine riddles, seeking to say
things as clearly and directly as possible, without any
disguise or rhetorical embellishment. The objective is to
speak in such a way that ones words strike home with
32
maximum force... The posture of the sage with regard to
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A Modern Fetish
truth-telling is very different. Characteristically the sage

considers the very nature of things in grand abstraction.
Comfortable in his obscurity, the sage feels no
compulsion to speak and give others the benefit of his
wisdom. By contrast, the parrhesiast must always speak,
favouring only knowledge that is directly and urgently
33
applicable to ones life. The parrhesiast has no time for
grandiose ideas that lesser mortals might be invited to
contemplate. Rather the parrhesiast seeks to
demonstrate, and encourages his audience to discover,
what they are Modern teaching occupies a far more
restricted regime of truth. As a profession, teachers and
academics tend to evaluate things very differently,
seeking to transmit approved truths (known as curricula),
or at least gain approval by consent for any scrap of new
knowledge they manage to produce. The teacher
establishes, or at any rate hopes to establish a bond of
shared knowledge, of heritage, of tradition, and possibly
also of personal recognition with the student body.
Teaching becomes a matter of passing things on without
taking too much risk in truth-telling. A teacher of this kind
is linked to a whole weight of tradition that bears down
34
upon the profession and lends it its seriousness. In
direct contrast to the parrhesiast, for whom the most
pertinent truths are the most dangerous, the teacher and
academic takes the highest truths to be those associated
with the greatest safety. They are least contestable and
hence most worthy of inclusion in the curriculum. In effect,
the more secure, the more true. To suggest with Cynic
malice that teachers or academics might better pursue
untimely ideas, measuring their value by the jeopardy
they entail, is to invite these same educators to drop
entirely out of one regime and land in another. On the
whole they would fail if indeed they could be convinced
to make the attempt in the first place. But educators are
not bound inexorably to their favoured mode of truth-
telling. It would be a mistake to claim that for all teachers
163
and academics truth-telling is always associated with

security and consensus. The modes of verediction
Foucault outlines intermingle, and so the teachers mode
of truth-telling might find itself combined at times with
other modes. In the traditional university, for example, the
teachers duty to transmit heritage, pass down learning
and ways of thinking, is found in combination with a sage-
like figure. That is, it is embodied in the old-school
academic who speaks of grand generalities. Unlike the
teacher, this academic feels under no compulsion to
share this wisdom, or at least will only divulge his or her
knowledge when it suits (or under duress, when forced to
35
teach the undergraduates). Equally, teachers now
abound who consider it their calling to teach their
students to think independently, become autonomous
and so on. Yet these teachers and their academic
supporters characteristically give little attention to the role
of teacher as exemplar in this respect. It remains the case
that the pedagogues approach to truth is rarely if ever
combined with that of the parrhesiast, where all that is
shared between these positions is the duty to speak. We
should not underestimate the extent to which educators
are wedded to a mode of truth-telling that remains
bounded, that does not risk the subjectivity of the
educator. If realised, the Cynical educator and parrhesiast
would be an odd beast indeed, but a beast of this world
nonetheless.
As a fetish education persists. Not simply does it

habituate the educator to a mode of truth telling that
entails little personal risk, and hence encourages a point
of view that will not risk taking up a position of truth
against education. More obliquely, education will not be
given up because there is little to abandon. To give up on
education is not to risk destroying an edifice, it is to
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A Modern Fetish
discover no edifice exists. More modestly, it is to

recognise that, as its mission, telos or guiding ideal, this
edifice is made of fine-grained but dead materials, falling
back as soon as shored up. How could you take a
position against that?
Educators may shy away from risking their profession. It

may be their habit to proceed apace with mouths agape,
eyes fixed shut and limbs in motion; feeding the former
with materials grasped by the latter, only making for a
greater hunger. Educators are bound to a situation
whereby the educational telos of modernity is not so
much hollow, as given substance and value through the
exhaustion of its labour force. In Marxs terms,
educational labour is a commodity whose use-value
possesses the peculiar property of being a source of
value, whose consumption is therefore itself an
36
objectification. That is to say, the value of educational
work is only realised through its consumption, where
educators themselves are always the first consumer.
Educators are bound to defend precisely that which
drains them of vitality. But they are not, for all that,
suffering for want of an alternative. Educators of the
cynical kind may be right in refusing as futile any attempt
to reverse or radically overhaul a system whose inertia is
centuries old. But Cynical educators may nonetheless
become active in an attempt to hasten its downgoing. It is
worth noting here that the idea of impossible suicide is in
one respect continuous with the history of education. This
form of educational militancy is as moribund as its
comparatively mundane educational cousins. Here we
have another form of educated denial, though admittedly
more radically nihilistic than its cousins, those existing
(and already death-bound) traditions of Western
education. And so again, I am not suggesting a radical
165
departure from education as if one could escape its

confines by decree. Rather, I invite here a radicalisation
of its existing tendencies. This is not prompted by some
vitalism, where against this educational foe we glorify life,
fight for life and so on. This is not a matter of life versus
education.
Consumptive Educators
Education is sick this declaration of ill-health is
commonplace today. But I have a second declaration in
mind. Rather more deviously, it suggests those declaring
ill-health, and those agreeing, are equally sick. In
response, educators and educated people alike will likely
deny they are similarly far-gone. Or, more to the point,
they will acknowledge the sickness of education in a way
that affirms the educated self. For are not those who spot
the sickness, those who are most refined?
Your sickness can be your crowning the death-bound

hope of the educated person. To the Romantic poet,
consumption (in the tubercular sense) was for a time the
37
most alluring of all diseases. In the early nineteenth
century it was, as Alexandre Dumas put it a little wryly,
the fashion to suffer from the lungs; everybody was a
consumptive, poets especially; it was good form to spit
blood after each emotion that was at all sensational, and
38
to die before reaching the age of thirty. In the poetic
imagination at least, tubercular consumption held the
promise of a beautiful death; it was portrayed as the
39
glamorous disease of the genius. Medical and literary
opinion seemed to agree: the consumptive poet was
afflicted by enhanced sensibility to the point of excessive
suffering when in contact with the rough, insensible
40
world. Over-stimulated, the consumptive burned too
166
A Modern Fetish
brightly, exhausting vital energies at an unsustainable

rate. Fatal genius was the outcome of an over-exerted
mind. The consumptive poet wasted away: emaciated
and with deathly pallor, reaching towards genius, bright
one moment, dead the next. Two centuries on, the
suffering of the romantic educator bears comparison, as
this educator strains towards an educational good that is
otherwise denied by a harsh, insensible reality. The
romantic educator is in some weakened sense, a martyr
to the sickness of education. Seduced by the romance of
consumption, romantic educators seem to realise despite
themselves that the very disease that drains them of
vitality, this wasting disease that exhausts them as a
labour force, is the source of all value in education. It is as
if their wilful exhaustion were expressive of all that
remains good about education. In their hyperactivity
resides their love, for they only allowed themselves to put
up with so much overwork, so many hours, so much
stress for so long, out of love for what they do. Exhaustion
through education is the inevitable outcome today of a
love of education. The educator is truest to education
when most done in.
The virtues of a consumptive death were so exalted it

became decorative and lyrical, almost metaphysical.
Being a disease of the lungs, those loftier parts of the
human being, this ailment had its own nobility, rendering it
distinct from afflictions of the lower regions. Those other
ailments were mere diseases of the body, whereas
41
consumption was expressive of the soul. It demanded
the use of privileges only available to the wealthy and
refined. It required rest, retreat and travel. Symptomatic of
excessive passion, of an over-refined sensibility,
consumption was treated by therapies that would allow
such ardour to be expressed in a more controlled and
167
gentle environment. Two centuries on, the educator is

prone to a similar romance. Those most committed to
educational redemption are drawn, sometimes despite
themselves, to want to inherit such indulgences. After all,
the survival of education is at stake. Afflicted by their
zealous attachment to education, by a desire for the
realisation of an as yet unrealised educational good, by a
passion for education that can, we are led to believe, only
just be contained; they would have themselves housed
liberally in a privileged and protected environment, so
they might safely luminesce without burning up. Brimming
with enthusiasm, exuberant, almost tearful, this educator
begs our indulgence, pleading for an educational
environment that is safe and comfortable, one that
guarantees the survival of the educator, and the survival
of an educational art that is always vulnerable and needs
protection. The alternative for a consumptive and
passionate educator such as this is relapse, decay,
ultimately death, where the life at stake is not simply that
of the educator but that of refined sensibility itself. But
these are mere diversions. Despite all entreaties, all
appeals for therapy and respite, the consumptive
educator remains bound to a consumptive death. Do not
be distracted by the exuberance of our most romantic
educators, or by the educators claim to health and
productivity. Death beckons.
The consumptive educator almost desires to waste away.

This wasting disease has come to represent the
apotheosis of ones career. It is expressive of ones
commitment to education, poetry, culture and refinement.
And for all that, it is profoundly nihilistic (in the weak
sense) drawing meaning and purpose from its own
enfeebled destruction. When the value of education is
expressed only through the determined exhaustion of its
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A Modern Fetish
labour force, it becomes a matter of strenuous self-

expression, little more. The persistence of educated
conceit in a landscape so broken may well disturb us, but
it should not lead to any kind of persecution. Persecution
gives its object the appearance of honourableness it
42
bestows on it the fascination of martyrdom. Besides, is
the martyrdom of the educator even an argument? Is the
educators sacrifice-by-exhaustion an argument for
education? Must we refute it as if it were?
The educated Cynic admits that our claim to educated

refinement has no independent standing. It stands by
comparison only. Education depends on those debased
educational realities that educated people bemoan. Our
refinement and our conceit relies on this contrast. Against
it they gain relief. Educated people maintain that
distinction.
We are ill with education, there is no denying it. Our

educated conceit is our illness. Our task, perhaps the task
defining our present, is to focus with courage on that
morbid truth. It is to experience, for so long as we can
bear, this sickness stripped of its consumptive romance.
169
170
IX
THE ABSURD
Artificial Brutalities
Diogenes was asked how he would like to be buried. On
my face he replied, since after a little time down will be
1
converted into up. Even Diogenes is too optimistic for us
now.
The educated nihilist is schooled to the point of revolt,

and reads Nietzsche for signs of conduct. For all her wilful
distortions Nietzsches sister could at least see the logic
in that: Dear, dear Clara tell no one Fritz has become
2
different, he is just like his books.
Nietzsches first book, The Birth of Tragedy tears away at
171
the brutal idealism of Greek philosophy and all that comes

after. However, questionable, however impossible his
book appeared in retrospect, in its grip was a problem
3
with horns. That is, the legacy of Greek metaphysics,
4
and what Nietzsche called Socratism. This originated
the belief that despite our ignorance everything is
5
knowable, and hence teachable. From Socrates
onwards, so it goes, nothing satisfies the appetite of
education. Insatiable, greedy for knowledge, knowing no
bounds, education has fitted a gastric band. An equally
Socratic tendency to constrain the appetites pacifies
those hungering for education. It draws boundaries
between and within them, inside which they are to
6
achieve self-knowledge and moderation. For Nietzsche:
All of our educational methods take their bearings from
7
this ideal. Hence The Birth of Tragedy indicts Western
education to its core.
Greek tragedy is not to be confused with that other tragic

experience more familiar to us now. At its most decadent,
misfortunes are greedily embraced as opportunities to
display refined, compassionate sensibilities. Typically
bourgeois, as Camus observed, these moderns need
tragedy in a different way its their little transcendence,
their apritif used to bestir themselves and their finer
8
emotions. Nietzsche preferred the pre-Socratic Greeks.
Less self-indulgent, their experience of tragedy was of a
different order. It issued from a horrific realisation that the
world not only lacks meaning but is profoundly indifferent
to human suffering. The pre-Socratic Greeks had seen
into the abyss and perceived well enough that beneath it
all, stripped of mythologies and consolations, existence is
horrifically banal, formless. Nietzsche indicts everything
since Socrates for papering over that profound
indifference. For denying the existential horror it
172
The Absurd
produces. Education, philosophy, culture, religion these

are all too many distractions. Whilst Greek tragedy
9
afforded a metaphysical consolation of sorts, allowing
its pre-Socratic auditors to approach reality through its
representation in art, and survive the encounter, its
influence would not last. Tragic theatre was destroyed
and replaced by the cheerful optimism of a Socratic
quest. Following Nietzsche, Socratism is a distraction we
can no longer afford. This cultural bequeathment of the
metaphysical Greeks operates as a blight upon us, the
extent of which is only just becoming apparent.
The blight that lies dormant in the womb of theoretical

culture is gradually beginning to frighten modern man,
Nietzsche writes. Man casts uneasily around in the stores
of experience for remedies to ward off the danger without
10
quite believing in their efficacy. In Nietzsches first book
we find already portrayed the restless subjectivity of the
modern cynic. We encounter theoretical man who trots
out remedies as todays educator trots out techniques,
cheerfully forlorn, weakly pessimistic, but committed
nonetheless.
The Tragedy of Education

Despite the aporia and inherent difficulties of The Birth of
Tragedy, that impossible book whose non-sequiturs later
scholars would almost, but never quite, bet their life on
we begin to imagine its consequences for education. A
distraction from the brutality of existence, education
introduces brutalities of its own. The indifference of the
world is replaced by the moral imperium of education, far
from indifferent when it comes to human lives. Despite its
consolations, despite pasting meaning and order into
existence, education attaches to that existence its
173
impossible excess: the unearthly goal of wisdom. In its

modern form this pursuit is reduced to the equally
specious though decidedly less noble quest for
educational success. Other close associates include
innovation, creativity and the cultivation of an aspiring,
entrepreneurial spirit. To a degree the effect is similar.
These distinctly late modern goals continue to
domesticate us with the sense, when measured against
them, there is something lacking we must work to fulfil.
But to add insult to injury, our educational objectives are
no longer seriously attached to a project seeking after
their realisation, promising our fulfilment. Without the
accompaniment of a progressive metanarrative they exist
marooned in the present. For Nietzsche, the existence of
this educational dream world, and all those before it, is
understandable, indeed necessary. Our weakness is that
we allow it to consume us. In The Birth of Tragedy the
pre-Socratic Greeks are presented as far less credulous.
They do not escape entirely into equivalent distractions,
but just enough to endure existence. The educator who
takes inspiration from The Birth of Tragedy is always on
the cusp of giving up on education entirely. As a friend of
mine once said: I have always held on to the idea that it
might all be for nothing, that education is just an exercise
of power. What intrigued me, was that he long drew
strength from the very idea.
The pre-Socratic Greeks are credited with great

sensitivity, for feeling and confronting the futility of their
existence. According to Greek mythology, when the
daemon Silenus was asked: What is the best and most
desirable thing of all for mankind? he answered; The
best of all things is something entirely outside your grasp:
not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second-
11
best thing for you is to die soon. The early Greeks
174
The Absurd
12
managed to overcome this demonic insight, Nietzsche
claims, without forgetting the deep pessimism it
conveyed. They knew and felt the fears and horrors of
existence: in order to be able to live at all they had to
interpose the radiant dream-birth of the Olympians [and
later, Greek tragedy] between themselves and those
13
horrors. To live, the Greeks constructed a dreamworld,
14
reflecting themselves in a higher sphere to cope with
15
the primal suffering below. Unlike theoretical man
which for Nietzsche stands for everything since Socrates
the pre-Socratic Greeks did not so easily mistake their
reassuring fantasies for reality. Through tragedy they
recognised the illusions they consoled themselves with
were the products of eternal, primal suffering, the sole
16
foundation of the world. Primal suffering is not
considered evil. It is found at the origin of all human
culture which seeks to redeem existence by giving it
meaning: primal suffering is the wellspring of all beautiful
distractions. A distinction that is crucial, having
implications for all would-be educators and their
educational consolations: it keeps all that is good in
culture and education in a state of suspense. It allows us
to suspend judgement in a way that prevents us from fully
believing education and culture might extinguish all that is
bad, because bad or evil things are acknowledged as
the motor behind attempts to redeem existence in the first
place. We have here, in other words, the makings of an
eternally vigilant educational mindset which constantly
interrogates the moral purpose of education. The history
of education is darkened as its wellsprings are plumbed to
their depths. The highest educational ideals are carefully
and without demur located in the lowest, grubby moments
of human intrigue. This genealogy of educational ideals
digs away without indulging itself in the simple horror of
its findings. The challenge is to occupy such a mindset,
entertain such radical doubt and yet continue to educate.
175
Those taking lessons from The Birth of Tragedy must

suffer its most fiendish insight. Nietzsches cruellest
moment, so it has been argued, was to recognise, and
give voice to our absurd predicament. We realise with
Nietzsche that we are intoxicated by our metaphysical
consolations, yet find ourselves able at the same time to
17
recognise their bankruptcy. We develop the horrible
presentiment that metaphysical ways out might be void of
meaning and that existence without a metaphysical
18
overlay would be insufferable. Though we may think we
turn unbearable conditions into bearable ones, we come
to realise that we have not made unbearable
circumstances bearable or even less bearable but only
19
still more unbearable as fabrications and lies. The effect
is deeply nauseating.
We have the following conundrum: Those perceiving how

20
the horror and absurdity of existence is papered over
by a world of illusion, those understanding these chaotic
underpinnings, will consider it ludicrous or shameful that
they should be expected to restore order to the chaotic
21
world. Once they see through to the absurdity of life,
and the absurdity of attempts to redeem it, they reach a
kind of understanding that kills action. Since action
depends on a veil of illusion which gives meaning to an
22
indifferent universe. Hence, the educator taking lessons
from The Birth of Tragedy must just about maintain a
belief in the civilizing illusion of education, if he or she is
to continue to operate as an educator. This educator will
23
realise nonetheless that the special stimulants of
education, culture and civilization can become addictive,
24
helping to paper over the repellence of the absurd.
Searching for an alternative, Nietzsche put his faith in art
176
The Absurd
(rather naively he later decided), yet also mentioned

25
another release, comedy. Perhaps then, todays
educator should first admit the absurdity of the whole
endeavour, and learn to laugh whilst laden. The
educators laugh would bring relief whilst expressing pain.
Here we encounter the comic as a discharge of the
26
nausea of absurdity. The Cynical educator learns the
art of laughing as a letting of blood.
To those who find little worth in pessimism, especially

educational pessimism, this is no laughing matter. For
what is education without hope? Surely we must cure
ourselves of all pessimism if we are to continue to
educate? But what if Nietzsche was right to suggest, as
he once did, that all pessimism (the inveterate evil of old
27
idealists) is thoroughly cured by falling ill? What if our
pessimism is best approached by affirming it? By
constitution educators are allergic to such suggestions. It
makes no sense to wonder as Nietzsche once did if there
28
could be a pessimism of strength? But we must insist
on this question for that very reason and continue: Must
pessimism always be associated with weakness and
denial? Is pessimism in education necessarily deceitful,
hiding from view educational values that could otherwise
redeem it and us? Or is educational optimism the
greatest deceit? Certainly, pessimism is uncomfortable,
excruciating at times as purgatives are. But it liberates us,
if only in passing, from burdens of hope.
With Blistered Fingers

There is a suspicion I believe educators feel, if only
fleetingly, that the educational endeavour which occupies
and exhausts them could itself be rather absurd. The
sensation subsides into an accusation that in his moment,
177
or this instance, absurdity resides. Diminished

accusations such as these reduce our discomfort. When
encountered directly, the absurd is distinctly unsettling
all the better to confine it to this or that case of
professional frustration. Hence for our most dogged and
perceptive educational critics, a new benchmarking test,
system of performance related pay, or fresh strategy for
raising standards is considered absurd, rather than the
educational zeitgeist it may be symptomatic of.
Those seeking an encounter with the absurd may turn

from Nietzsche to his absurd successor, Camus. Written
29
with blistered and stiffened fingers, Camus wartime
book The Myth of Sisyphus was an attempt to write
without the aid of eternal values which, temporarily
30
perhaps were absent or distorted. Facing European
disaster, this book was an invitation to embrace the
absurd, to live and to create, in the very midst of the
31
desert.
In our century the landscape remains obscene. Advanced

nihilism and its pessimistic outlook afflict us too. Only, the
affliction is differently felt. The old twentieth century fear
of military annihilation and complete repression to the
point of extinction, has been replaced by a more abstract,
yet deeply persistent fear of impending civil and
ecological collapse, a prospect rehearsed repeatedly in
film. Our response is as abstract and edgeless as its foe
is conceived. We late modern descendants of liberalism
are distinguished by our reflexive impotence. We combine
the weak cynicism of those who have seen it all, with the
performative optimism and good cheer of those who can
no longer be disappointed. Nowhere is this more evident
178
The Absurd
than in education. It introduces us to the world and its

realities, not so that we might better reject it, but as
preparation to endure. We aspire to making things a little
better about the edges.
Though Cynic perversion is almost beyond revival being

too readily recuperated by capital, diminished and
pathologised the mode of interruption offered by
Cynicism is urgently missed today. It would attempt the
absurd. Following Camus, the absurd offers potential for a
more self-conscious mode of interruption that resists
recuperation. It is represented by that scandalous figure,
the absurd hero, who takes form in the closing pages of
32
Camus wartime novel, The Outsider. Having spent the
first half of the novel in a stupor, experiencing the world
as a sequence of sensations, the absurd hero comes into
being during the second half when forced to reflect on his
33
existence. Compelled by imprisonment and trial, this
character begins to feel the burden of history and of the
society in which he finds himself. Eventually he is
sentenced to death. The decisive moment in condemning
the absurd man, in deciding his crime is pre-meditated
and fully conscious, is that moment where the prosecutor
34
claims that here, before the jury, is an educated man.
In this context education is no excuse. It is sufficient
ground for conviction... The absurd educator faces the
prospect of similar disapproval. This educator is
castigated for being both absurd and educated where
the latter mark of distinction is used to condemn the
former attitude. To be educated and absurd is
inexcusable, or so it goes. But as the absurd educator is
condemned, she nevertheless escapes the stupor of
educational busy-work. Facing the judgement of her
peers she is forced to reflect, and finds herself similarly
burdened by history, and by the society in which she
179
lives. She is tempted to abandon her absurd position,

being susceptible to the old metaphysical promise. Yet
along with the absurd hero who refuses to find solace in
35
hope, or in his newfound facility for reflection, who
eventually lays his heart open to what he perceives to be
36
the benign indifference of the universe the absurd
educator does not find solace in the hope of redemption,
or the securities of critique. She endures the heavy
realisation that education could be nothing but a futile
distraction, which promises and defers, and defers and
promises.
Despite its allure for the educated nihilist, as concept and

37
experience, the absurd has lost traction. Camus made
reference to the absurd in a way we no longer can. In The
Myth of Sisyphus he took the absurd as his starting point,
invoking an absurd sensitivity, which, he claimed, was
38
commonly felt at the time. The absurd feeling Camus
found so abundant was the product of a collision between
39
passionate belief and sore disappointment. It was no
accident that the absurd became the talk of the sixties,
only to become a dulled and increasingly rare sensitivity
in our more cynical present.
The world is not absurd in itself. Rather, the absurd is

made present to us, through us. It is produced by how we
position ourselves in relation to the universe. The absurd
is a disease of the intellect bred to revere higher things,
an intellect that expects the universe to mirror its ideas of
justice and reason.
180
The Absurd
Absurd Lessons
If man realized that the universe like him can love and
40
suffer, he would be reconciled. If thought discovered its
principles perfectly mirrored in phenomena, it would give
birth on behalf of its originating thinker to an intellectual
joy of which the myth of the blessed would be but a
41
ridiculous imitation. Those who insist that life be
meaningful would finally, and conclusively, find
themselves vindicated. Alas, their story (a story which is
yours and mine) is one of continual disappointment. We
continue to live by ideals that, were they put to the test,
would upset everything we believe. Those of us
professing a secular outlook know the universe is
indifferent to human suffering, and yet continue to act as if
we were the exception. That all human toil and torment
could be without reason and ultimately in vain is
personally inconceivable; or to adopt different idiom, the
very idea is so inhumanly grotesque it is beyond belief.
And so, a hiatus is maintained between the
acknowledged indifference of the universe, and the belief
that humans are meaningful animals in control of their
destiny, existing outside or against a reality in which
entropy reigns supreme. This is how we position
ourselves. This act of positioning defines us as absurd
beings.
This world in itself is not reasonable, that is all that can

42
be said. It only becomes absurd through human
contact. The absurd is generated where the need for
understanding encounters the unreasonable silence of
43
the world, between the mind that desires and the world
that disappoints, between our nostalgia for unity and
44
this fragmented universe. It appears precisely in this
divorce, where irrational reality meets the wild longing for
45
clarity whose call has echoed in the human heart since
181
Socrates, as Nietzsche would have it. Absurdity binds this

desire to its impossible context as only hatred can weld
46
two creatures together. It is a hostile, painful encounter,
which education attempts to cover up with hopeful
assurances.
Those seeking a direct encounter with the absurd

47
consider hope to be a fatal evasion on par with suicide.
48
For hope, like suicide, is symptomatic of those who
cannot endure an absurd existence. Undoubtedly, even
just a little hope affords a consolation that few, if any, are
able to resist. A declared passion for life is similarly
evasive. It represents a retreat from the metaphysics of
hope, a determined but reactive effort to find solace in
what is. A passion for education, also reactive, occurs
where the value of education wears thin. A passion for
education is indiscriminate in its attachments and not a
little desperate. It is the response of those facing the loss
of an object to which they have been long attached.
Properly felt, the absurd is not an abstract concept. It is

something we attempt to live with in close proximity. In
education the absurd is particularly hard to confront,
despite longstanding disparity between our highest
educational ideals and the unremittingly grubby nature of
educational realities that remain subservient to relations
of power, class and capital. This disparity perfectly
exemplifies what Camus might describe as the presence
49
of the absurd in education. By profession, educators are
protected from such encounters, somehow believing that
despite it all, education can escape its grasp.
182
The Absurd
Assuming the absurd can still be experienced in an age of

mass cynicism, it is hard to imagine how any educator
who approaches the absurd could return to her
profession. This educated nihilist would be left unable to
operate, or could only continue on the condition the
performative optimism of the profession were all the more
doggedly embraced. This educated nihilist would return to
work more devotional in her commitments than ever,
clinging more tightly to a narrative of educational
redemption, grasping with bloodless hands at old and
tired assurances that education must, somehow,
somewhere, have a core worth rescuing. Or she would
quit.
The absurd brings painful ambivalence to those who can

endure it. There is no either or. In this respect it affords a
distinct opportunity for the educated nihilist, one that is
difficult to grasp, admittedly. Nihilism must not entail, as
its detractors would have it, that one gives up on
everything with absolute severity. Another, less hopeful,
more absurd education is imaginable, one in which
absurdly-honest educators openly demonstrate how they
are only pretending to knowledge with its attendant
prestige, and absurdly-perceptive students do everything
50
necessary to see through the pretence. This breaks with
mass cynicism. Pain is acknowledged. Melancholia
subsides. Action ensues.
To an absurd mind reason is useless and there is nothing

51
beyond reason. Each rationality has its order and field
of influence within which it is efficacious. That much can
be admitted. But rationality on its own has no existence or
183
global purchase. Like those who put their faith in reason,

those who would scorn reason and admit the irrational,
clearly have little stamina for the absurd. When it comes
to reason they refuse ambivalence, insisting it be nothing
or all.
The absurd has meaning only in so far as it is not agreed

52
to. As we approach it we are repelled. In it we find
manifested this desire for unity, this longing to solve, this
need for clarity and cohesion combined with the clear
impossibility of reducing this world to a rational and
reasonable principle. Calling back to us from its dizzying
53
crest the absurd man shouts above the clamour of our
hopes and makes an absurd promise: It is indeed
54
possible to live without appeal. To which we reply: Is it
also possible to educate without appeal? But the absurd
man will prove nothing through reason. All notions of
proof are given wide birth with one exception: Through
action alone he gives proof of his only truth which is
55
defiance.
*
56
The absurd does not liberate; it binds. Its first and most
perfect casualty found himself condemned to roll a huge
bolder uphill, only to see his burden roll back to its starting
point. Upon which the task of pushing upwards resumed.
Chained to perpetual toil without consolation or hope,
engaged in labour that had no ultimate value or meaning,
possessed of its own closed and relentless logic, King
Sisyphus, craftiest of men, became superior to his absurd
task by embracing it.
184
The Absurd
57
There is no fate that cannot be surmounted by scorn.
From the mythical figure of Sisyphus to the everyday
worker, Camus locates the absurd in that moment of
absurd recognition. With rasping breath and a pained
expression, the absurd man sees his plight for what it is.
Following recognition, the challenge for Camus, and for
us, is to engage in persistent rebellion, in a kind of revolt
that has no definite future or resolution. Our revolt unfolds
without giving in to hope or despair, without seeking
consolation in higher things or declaring that everything is
meaningless. But we are also told that the absurd man
may look and act like any other. With Camus we discover
that the absurd civil servant would look like the common
civil servant; the absurd commuter like the common
commuter. As such, each rebellion risks becoming little
but a supercilious gaze, an expression of scorn, or a
hidden contempt. The absurd gaze risks becoming
defined by its reactive and weak hostility if not by its
58
outright ressentiment. At this point the Cynical educator
draws away in disgust. Here absurd educator and absurd
man part company. After all, educators have long carried
the burden of that ancient commitment; to teach by
example. The absurd educator who for good or ill
embodies her lesson will look very different, and will
appear in explicit contrast to the rest of her profession.
Hers is not a supercilious gaze. The absurd educator
conveys her experience of the absurd to others. Hers is
an education without hope, but in rebellion.
The absurd is largely absent from view and recalled with

difficulty. As more ambitious commitments to progressive
educational ideals gave way to a vaguely felt romantic
impulse, as mass cynicism extended its grip, the
necessary conditions for absurd perception fell away.
Attempting to raise the tone of once noble sounds,
185
contemporary educators claim over and again, absently

but insistently: education is good and worthwhile. This
jaded insistence has become a measure of their cynicism.
Uttered in despair, this conviction will not confront the
cause of its gloom, the fact education is failing, by design.
Without this conflict, the absurd retreats from view.
A man who has become conscious of the absurd is for

59
ever bound to it here Camus is a trifle optimistic. But
for the Cynic this remains true. Painful ambiguities are all
we have left, the Cynic decides. An urban stray yet
capable of faithful devotion, even discipline; a rogue with
a beastly tongue but a heterodox moralist too. Who better
to pursue, express and endure the absurdity of civilized
living? Our Cynic survives ambiguity not in spite of it, but
in pursuit of it. Forget scatological acts; the affirmation of
ambiguity, its dogged embrace, is sufficient now for
embarrassment.
Despite the mass cynicism of their occupants, educational

institutions are full of bombast. Our universities are
forever now saving the world with rhetoric. On occasion
the Cynic might take such rhetoric at face value and
pursue it in earnest. In a context where everyone knows
but nobody admits they have been abandoned, or at least
been leached of content, this Cynic would not act out
ideals to reassert them. The absurd educator does not
follow to the letter the rhetoric of her institution in an effort
to shame that institution into alignment with its flatulent
claims. When absurd educator and Cynic decide to
embody educational rhetoric in all its impossible excess,
they make painfully apparent forgotten conflicts between
186
The Absurd
educational dreams and their inevitable disappointments.

Flavour returns, we taste the absurd.
The Cynical educator seeks out painful experiences

because they are repellent. It is better to live with the
absurd and teach absurdly this educator decides, than
live with and perpetuate consolations of hope and
education, promises of reason and order. It is better to
embrace the ambiguity of absurd existence and be torn
by ambiguity, than reconcile oneself to it. Educational
promises are avoided: they lead to fixed rebellion a
revolt constrained by its hopes or they lead to immobility
and despair. The absurd is uniquely valuable, if not
essential to the Cynical educator. It prompts to perpetual
revolution.
187
188
Detail from a Dead Fly - Front
189
NOTES
1
This book was written with the aid of a fellowship from the
Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain. I am grateful to
my editor, Christopher Land at Mayfly Books for supporting the
project as well as my anonymous reviewers. The book is
indebted to numerous conversations with colleagues and
friends, including Emile Bojesen, Darren Webb, Kathryn
Ecclestone, Wilfred Carr, Nick Peim, Tony Williams and
Maurizio Toscano, as well as the close friendship and
intellectual collaboration of Roy Goddard. I am particularly
thankful to Sarah Spencer for her love, companionship, close
reading and insight. This book is dedicated to our daughter,
Sasha.
2
Almost a century old, this refrain echoes in the ear of the
educator (Wells, H. G. The Outline of History: Being a Plain
History of Life and Mankind. London: Cassell, 1951 [1920]. p.
1192.). It recurs, for example, in Stoner a book recently become
popular whose author an English professor described it
upon retirement in 1985 as a book about teaching, about the
sense of identity education gives the teacher, a book about
teaching as a thing driven by love, by a commitment to keep the
tradition going, because the tradition is civilisation (Williams,
John. Stoner. London: Vintage, 2012 [1965]. p. xi.): Here a love
of teaching and literature is the love and salvation of civilisation.
3
Some would have education reconceived, as study, for
example, and thereby seem to escape a predicament where
more education is the only remedy to educational problems.
This is what Stefano Harney and Fred Moten argue in The
Undercommons (Harney, Stefano and Moten, Fred. The
Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study. Wivenhoe:
Minor Compositions, 2013). Study is here conceptualised in
opposition to institutionalised education. Study occurs inside
and beyond its institutional sites, and is based on a questioning
191
of what mainstream education offers: what we want to do is to

organize ourselves around the principle that we dont want
everything they have. Not only is a lot of the shit that they have
bad, but so too is their very mode of having (ibid. p. 121). This
invocation of study appears to think beyond education, and
oppose itself to educational ways of having that are currently
being farmed out to others (ibid. p. 122). But this argument only
works in a world where education does not already pervade
society. Otherwise, an argument for study is an argument for
more education. For study to release itself from education, it
would need to confront that rather troubled individual, the
educator within.
4
Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2001 [1987].
5
See: Osborne, Peter. Disguised as a dog. Radical Philosophy
2012; 174 (July/August). During the 1960s, and following their
most violently indecent performances, Viennese Actionists such
as Gnter Brus were either incarcerated or fled the country.
Unlike Diogenes, they did not remain in Athens so to speak.
Note too that between camera and audience the former takes
precedence, where the latter is used to stage the former,
performing a vital role in the composition of the photograph. For
the Cynic, by contrast, the immediate audience takes
precedence. See: Widrich, Mechtild. The Informative Public of
Performance: A Study of Viennese Actionism, 1965-1970. The
Drama Review 2013; 57(1).
6
Recall Swifts parable of the spider and the bee in The Battle
of the Books: Swift, Jonathan. A Tale of a Tub and Other
Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1704 [2008]. p. 113.
7
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Anti-Education: On the Future of Our
Educational Institutions. New York: New York Review Books,
2016 [1872]. p. 81.
8
See, for example: Postman, Neil. The End of Education:
Redefining the Value of School. New York: Vintage, 1996.
9
A Dionysian wake would not announce a simple escape from
all that is measured and restraining. As readers of The Birth of
Tragedy may recall, Dionysian excess only appears by contrast
192
Notes
to Apolline restraint: the fact that he appears with this precision

and clarity is the effect of Apollo (Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth
of Tragedy. London: Penguin, 2003 [1872]. 10).
10
Sebald, W. G. Austerlitz. London: Penguin, 2002. p. 31.
11
Hadot, Pierre. Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1998 [1989]. p. 17.
12
Shit Academics Say, Twitter post, 26 October 2015,
https://twitter.com/AcademicsSay.
13
Another note, I know: Once endnotes reach a certain
frequency they make themselves increasingly redundant.
14
Shea, Louisa. The Cync Enlightenment: Diogenes in the
Salon. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. pp. 4-
7.
15
Foucault, Michel. On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of
Work in Progress. In: Rabinow, editor. Essential Works of
Foucault 1954-1984. Volume 1. London: Penguin, 2000 [1983].
p. 256.
16
Vattimo, Gianni. The End of Modernity: Nihilism and
Hermeneutics in Post-modern Culture. Cambridge: Polity, 2002
[1988]. p. 13.
17
Doeuff, Michle Le. Hipparchia's Choice. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2007 [1989]. p. 18.
18
Doeuff. Hipparchia's Choice. p. 24.
19
MacIntyre, Alasdair. The relationship of philosophy to its past.
In: Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner, editors. Philosophy in
History: Essays in the historiography of philosophy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984. p. 32.
20
Adlam, John. Going spiral? Phenomena of 'half-knowledge' in
the experimental large group as temporary learning community.
Pedagogy, Culture & Society 2014; 22(1). p. 158.
21
Scanlon, Christopher. 'Defacing the Currency?': A Group-
Analytic Appreciation of Homelessness, Dangerousness,
Disorder and Other Inarticulate Speech of the Heart. Group
Analysis 2011; 44(2). Adlam, John and Scanlon, Christopher.
Personality Disorder and Homelessness: Membership and
193
'Unhoused Minds' in Forensic Settings. Group Analysis 2005;

38(3).
22
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in
Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs. New York: Vintage, 1974
[1882]. 86.
23
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Daybreak: Thoughts on the prejudices of
morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 [1881].
117.
24
Shea. The Cynic Enlightenment. p. 200.
II. Promised Goods
1
Marx, Karl. Capital: Volume I. London: Penguin, 1990 [1867].
p. 103.
2
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power. New York: Vintage,
1968.
3
Vonnegut, Kurt. Playboy Interview. Wampeters, Foma &
Granfalloons. London: Granada, 1982 [1973]. p. 230.
4
By way of an aside, one might argue it is here that Nietzsche
comes closest to the Cynic position he appears to admire,
where seriocomic laughter makes its mischief by revealing the
comedy of our existence. See: Bracht Branham, R. Nietzsche's
Cynicism: Uppercase or lowercase? In: Bishop, editor.
Nietzsche and Antiquity. New York: Camden House, 2004.
5
Heidegger, Martin. Nietzsche's Word: 'God Is Dead'. In: Young
and Haynes, editors. Off the Beaten Track. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002 [1943]. p. 160.
6
Vattimo. The End of Modernity. p. 19.
7
8
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All
and None. Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1909 [1883]. p. 255.
9
Here I have in mind the Renaissance and later Romantic
consumptive (more later) where consumption was, for a time,
the desirable, and then fashionable disease of a social elite,
before, long before it became associated with poverty and
194
Notes
degeneration. See: Arnold, Marc. Disease, Class and Social

Change: Tuberculosis in Folkestone and Sandgate, 1880-1930.
Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012.
10
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Anti-Christ. Twilight of the Idols and
The Anti-Christ. London: Penguin, 2003 [1895]. 23.
11
Heidegger. Nietzsche's Word: 'God Is Dead'. p. 166.
12
13
Nietzsche. Daybreak. 44.
14
Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things: An archaeology of the
human sciences. London: Tavistock, 1966 [1985]. p. 330.
15
Vattimo. The End of Modernity. pp. 7-8.
16
17
18
Plato. The Apology. The Last Days of Socrates. London:
Penguin, 1993. 31d.
19
Hadot, Pierre. What is Ancient Philosophy? Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard, 2004 [1995]. p. 34.
20
Plato cited in Hadot, Pierre. Philosophy as a Way of Life.
Oxford: Blackwell, 1987 [1995]. p. 95. This is Hadots translation
from Platos Meno, 75c-d.
21
Practiced here is the Socratic art of seducing soulstowards
conversion (Hadot. Philosophy as a Way of Life. p. 92-3).
22
Hadot. Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision.
23
Hadot makes a distinction in this regard between teaching
concerned with technical matters versus teaching concerned
with existential questions: Building on this division, we might say
that education today is predominantly concerned with
everything that is technical. It is concerned with things which
can be dealt with more or less directly, having long given up on
everything that touches the domain of the existential, on
everything which remains ineffable and can only be alluded to
indirectly. To qualify as educational concerns, these existential
matters (how we respond to the inevitability of death, for
example) must be translated into technical terms, which can be
195
dealt with and taught in a more straightforward manner (Hadot.

Philosophy as a Way of Life. p. 285).
24
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Human, All Too Human. London:
Penguin, 2004 [1878]. 40.
25
Carr, Wilfred and Kemmis, Stephen. Becoming Critical:
Education, Knowledge and Action Research: Deakin University
Press, 1986. p. 33.
26
Carr, Wilfred. Educational Research as a practical science.
International Journal of Research & Method in Education 2007;
30(3). p. 276.
27
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. London:
Continuum, 2004 [1975]. p. 312.
28
Carr and Kemmis. Becoming Critical. p. 33.
29
Education has become the passionate attachment of the
romantic educator, the heartfelt commitment of the modern
educator who labours in and against a technocratic regime.
Modern educational practice may remain haunted by praxis, but
can ignore its basic principles, including many of those cited
above. It forgets, too, the Aristotelian argument that a person
who is overwhelmed by his passions suddenly no longer sees
what is right to do in a given situation. He loses mastery of
himself and lets his passions decide what is right (Gadamer.
Truth and Method. p. 319). Praxis remains, for Aristotle, a
resolutely calculative activity, though its algorithms are of the
moment.
30
Gadamer. Truth and Method. p. 311.
31
32
33
Cavarero, Adriana. In Spite of Plato: A Feminist Rewriting of
Ancient Philosophy. Cambridge: Polity, 1995. p. 35.
34
Cavarero. In Spite of Plato. p. 49.
35
Plato. Phaedo. 64a-b.
36
Plato. Phaedo. 64c.
37
Plato. Phaedo. 65a.
38
Plato. Phaedo. 67e.
196
Notes
39
Plato. Phaedo. 68b.
40
Hadot. Philosophy as a Way of Life. p. 96.
41
To clarify, Platonic philosophers did not directly court death
but learned to live in this world as if already dead. This notion
preoccupied them for centuries, and so we have a philosopher
such as Plotinus toiling away under its influence more than six
hundred years later. For Plotinus, supreme transcendence was
a spiritual state that the most practiced philosopher would only
experience a handful of times. And so, each fleeting moment of
ascent whereby the soul is lifted into the highest realms, would
be accompanied by an inevitable descent. The problem the
philosopher faced was that of reconciling these transitory and
divine experiences with his more common, corporeal existence
from which he now felt alienated. The philosopher had to learn
to live, after contemplation, putting up with day-to-day life,
making do with the quotidian (Hadot. Plotinus or The Simplicity
of Vision. p. 65). For Plotinus, there was nothing wrong with
material things, and the body itself was not inherently bad. The
issue with the body, rather, was its excessive vitality which
served as a distraction (ibid. p. 81). The challenge was to
overcome all such diversions and orient oneself towards that
which is immaterial. The philosopher was not so much rejecting
material reality here, as becoming preoccupied with a non-
material transcendent state of existence. This was a question of
preparing the soul for its next ascent, for which we must detach
ourselves from life down here, becoming entirely passive in our
contemplations, so that we are ready to receive the divine
presence, when it manifests again (ibid. p. 65). The soul must
purify itself, removing all that is superfluous to this objective.
Terrestrial things simply become irrelevant, and are to be
disregarded so that the soul is ready to rise up and experience
the ecstasy of transcendence. This realm lies far beyond the
boundaries of individual personhood, and so with Plotinus we
arrive at the only desire which defines him: no longer to be
Plotinus (ibid. p. 22). Believing our existence on earth to be only
a shadow and a poor imitation of the world above, the
philosopher attempts to live increasingly in that other world at
197
the expense of this one, which becomes as hollow and devoid of

passion as his engagement with it.
Platonism was not the only school to extend its influence into
late antiquity, nor was its influence unadulterated. This was a
period in which philosophers and philosophical agendas were
often alloyed to one another. The educational, philosophical
legacies were mixed as were their originating traditions:
The dogmas of these other Athenian schools varied
considerably. On one point however, there was broad
agreement. Following Socrates, it was axiomatic that ignorance
must be challenged. Hence, all that was done in the name of
education could now be justified by this commitment to fight
ignorance, since ignorance was associated with all that is
wretched in human existence. Each school in classical antiquity
had its own solution to the problem of ignorance, and this
proffered solution became its definition of generosity. Each
defined an educational path that would lead its beneficiaries to
see the world differently. This would entail a radical adjustment
to ones entire way of thinking and being, which not only
changed how one viewed and evaluated the world, but how one
lived in it too (Hadot. What is Ancient Philosophy? p. 102). The
educational fight against ignorance varied according to how its
chief evils were defined. The Epicureans sought to educate
desire, claiming that we suffer so much because we are ignorant
of the conditions required for genuine pleasure. We are haunted
by insatiable desires and hopes that corrupt our ability to enjoy.
Genuine pleasure is a simple thing, which can arrive once the
body is freed of hunger, thirst and cold on the one hand, and
unnecessary desire on the other. The Epicurean recites:
Thanks be to blessed Nature, who has made necessary things
easy to obtain, and who has made things difficult to obtain
unnecessary. This meditative philosophy consists in limiting
ones appetites suppressing those desires which are neither
natural nor necessary, and limiting as much as possible those
which are natural but not necessary where the latter are
dangerous, since they may result in violent and excessive
passions (ibid. p. 117). The Epicurean tradition reserves the
right, of course, to define which desires are allowed, and which
198
Notes
are to be avoided. The Epicureans desires were to be

developed and denied in seclusion, with masters and disciples
working together to cure their souls. Epicurus himself assumed
first in person, and later through writing, the role of a director of
conscience (ibid. p. 123). Members of his school were
encouraged to act as though Epicurus were watching you
(Seneca cited in ibid. p. 124). Epicureans would also watch
over one other, training their inclinations through exercises in
the examination of ones conscience, confession, and fraternal
correction (ibid. p. 124), wherein masters would hand out
reproaches, and disciples would volunteer their faults. In short,
the serenity, if not repose, to which each member aspired was
underwritten by a shared discipline of restraint and denial. [By
way of an aside, we might note how the Epicurean school
developed confessional practices that were almost proto-
Christian in their attempts to educate the conscience. At this
point however, it is worth turning to Foucault who was careful to
distinguish Christian confessional practices from their Greek and
Roman precursors. Foucault argues that Epicurean practices
were designed to reorient the subjects being, without taking the
soul or the self as the real object of knowledge (Foucault,
Michel. The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the
Collge de France 1981-1982. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005 [1982]. p. 243). The subject was not expected
to tell the truth about himself and hence reveal the workings of
his soul as in later Christian practices; rather, subjects were
encouraged to relate to themselves and the world differently, or
so the argument goes, without the imperative to divulge a true
self (Foucault, Michel. On the Government of the Living:
Lectures at the Collge de France 1979-1980. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014 [1980]. p. 321).
The Stoics followed a very different path believing that
happiness consists not in a redefinition of pleasure, but in ones
alignment to the good. Unlike the Platonic tradition, for which
the good is a worthy target but is ultimately unrealisable in this
life (with all its bodily distractions), Stoicism claimed the good to
be attainable through a careful cultivation of the self. It was
resolutely materialist in this respect, seeking not to deny the
body in favour of a transcendental realm, but to reconcile the
199
body to its material existence. This attention to its material

existence was still a denial of the body, however. Rejecting
Platos conception of the Forms, Seneca, for example,
nevertheless viewed the body from above, as nothing more or
less than a fetter on my freedom. Harassed by the bodys
overwhelming weight, the soul is in captivity unless philosophy
comes to its rescue, bidding it breathe more freely in the
contemplation of things far above (Seneca. Letters from a Stoic.
London: Penguin, 2004. p. 122). Equally, Seneca denies the
body in his meditation upon death, where he recommends that
we make death actual in life by living each day as if it were our
last (Foucault. The Hermeneutics of the Subject. p. 504). Every
day should be regulated as if it were the one that brings up the
rear, the one that rounds out and completes our lives (Seneca.
Letters from a Stoic. p. 58). Those who practise this meditation
should eventually be able to go to sleep and contemplate death
with contentment, declaring: I have lived (ibid. p. 59). Living
each day as if it were ones last does not imply for the Stoic that
one lives that day to the full. Rather, thinking from the
perspective of ones imminent death is designed to immobilize
the present, forcing one to take an instantaneous view of it from
above (Foucault. The Hermeneutics of the Subject. p. 479).
Believing each current moment to potentially represent what one
was doing when one died, causes one to reflect upon its value
with greater attention. Hence the Stoic asks: What would I like to
be doing the moment I die? What would it say about my life? If I
can think of something better or more worthwhile, perhaps I
should be doing that instead, if this moment is to be my last?
Consequently, the Stoic is encouraged to inspect each moment
for its moral value. By focusing so intently on what one can
influence, the Stoic was expected to face everything beyond our
control with self-composure, responding to all misfortunes,
including ones inevitable death with a resigned yet cheerful
shrug. Human existence will always be, in part, a tragic affair
buffeted by causes beyond our control. Hence, the Stoic
practiced a form of determined acquiescence to the accidents
and setbacks that life throws up, to be combined with a
deliberate focus on the only thing remaining that is within our
control, this being our personal commitment to what is good.
200
Notes
Hence the Stoic must both confront ones fate and even ones
death with radical indifference, whilst pursuing that which one
considers morally right. Stoicism offers a way of coping with
existence by dulling its adverse effects. Unlike the Epicureans
who sought to detach thought from all things painful and focus
instead on attainable pleasures, the Stoics focused resolutely on
all possible misfortunes, seeking to picture every conceivable
disaster in advance so that they would be fully prepared to bear
adversity when it arrived. Where the Epicureans sought to relax
the soul, the Stoics taught it to stretch itself tight (Hadot.
Philosophy as a Way of Life. p. 88). Buttressed in this way, it
would become impregnable. The point was to build and then
occupy an inner citadel from which one views the world from
above and with a uniformly benign gaze (see: Hadot, Pierre.
The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001).
Stoicism insists on noticing the puniness of human beings, lost
in the cosmos. We are to become reconciled to our puniness,
the Stoic decides, though in a way that allows the Stoic to
pursue undistracted the transcendence of [his own] moral
conscience (ibid. p. 311). This transcendent view takes years to
cultivate, as the Stoic learns to become indifferent to all things
produced by external causes. Unaffected by external forces,
through a discipline of assent (ibid. p. 101) that refuses to pass
judgement on material matters which are neither good nor bad
in themselves, the Stoic is free to cultivate himself. This is the
philosophy of the emperor, or statesman, who decides that he
has no time or patience to constantly second-guess the
meaning of worldly things, deciding instead to deal with matters
according to the facts of their appearance. The world is brutal,
he decides, but we should not regret that fact, and decide that it
is a bad state of affairs to be constantly deplored. Free of such
false judgements things simply are as they are, they are not
good or bad in themselves the Stoic is at liberty to lavish
attention on the only project worth pursuing, his own singular
goodness. It would be a lifelong pursuit.
The Sceptics sought peace of mind by more radical means.
Believing all human judgements to be in error, and hence the
source of all human misery, the Sceptics sought to suspend
201
judgement entirely. They could not cope with the existence of

such widespread ignorance, and so attempted to step over it,
and hence over all human understanding, as one steps over
something dirty in the street. The Sceptic would live like
everyone else, existing from day to day, conforming to custom,
obeying social convention, satisfying natural desires. This would
be a return to simplicity. Philosophy would be employed as a
purgative, used to evacuate all higher notions and forms
including philosophy itself. With ones judgement suspended, no
single event in ones life could be considered better than any
other, and so the Sceptic would face life, and everything it
throws up with equanimity.
Despite obvious variations between each philosophical
school, they shared a common educational point of view. Each
school recommended its own system of life-denial, connecting
its regimen to a decidedly abstract notion of the philosophical,
and hence educational good that would be served through ones
obedience to its precepts. Each philosophy insisted on a kind of
deferral, which can be explained across schools by reference to
the idea of wisdom or sophia, that was at their root. Conceptions
of wisdom varied widely of course, as did recommendations for
how one might best work towards it.
42
Hadot. What is Ancient Philosophy? p. 4.
43
This argument concerning wisdom is not without controversy.
It draws from the work of Pierre Hadot, in which it is claimed that
ancient philosophy is best understood as a series of spiritual
exercises. Philosophy, here defined as the love of and search
for wisdom, entailed for each philosophical school a certain way
of life for which wisdom was a guiding ideal (Hadot. What is
Ancient Philosophy? p. 102). In Hadots interpretation of the
Symposium, for example, it is argued that philosophy is not
wisdom, but a way of life and discourse determined by the idea
of wisdom (ibid. p. 46). This, for Hadot, is part of the grandeur
and the paradox of ancient philosophy in that it is at one and
the same time, conscious of the fact that wisdom is
inaccessible, and convinced of the necessity of pursuing
spiritual progress (Hadot. Philosophy as a Way of Life. p. 265).
It is notable that Foucault drew attention to a similar point of
202
Notes
distinction, claiming that the ancient and contrasting figure of the

sage achieves wisdom through inspiration rather than reason,
though nothing obliges him to share his wisdom, to teach it, or
demonstrate it (Foucault, Michel. The Courage of Truth:
Lectures at the Collge de France 1983-1984. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 [1984]. p. 17). By contrast, the
philosopher-teacher is always on the path approaching wisdom,
and unlike the sage, experiences the obligation to teach, an
office filled most famously by Socrates. Against the sage whose
wisdom is distant and reserved, the philosopher-teachers
wisdom is applied, directed to individuals and situations in an
attempt, however faltering, to assist the philosophers
interlocutors to live a better life (ibid.).
44
See: Hadot. What is Ancient Philosophy? p. 47.
45
46
47
See, for example: Quinn, Josephine Crawley and Brooke,
Christopher. 'Affection in Education': Edward Carpenter, John
Addington Symonds and the politics of Greek love. Oxford
Review of Education 2011; 37(5).
48
Cavarero cited in: Clack, Beverley. Sex and Death: A
Reappraisal of Human Mortality. Cambridge: Polity, 2002. p. 15.
49
Clifford, Geraldine J. Those Good Gertrudes: A Social History
of Women Teachers in America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2014.
50
Walkerdine, Valerie and Lucey, Helen. Democracy in the
Kitchen: Regulating Mothers and Socialising Daughters.
London: Virago, 1989.
51
Skeggs, Beverly. Formations of Class & Gender: Becoming
Respectable. London: Sage, 1997.
52
Against this noble lineage of educated men there is a
perspective that does not view death as if it were an argument
against life. Death must not be treated as a sign of the futility of
life. Equally, death must not signify the ultimate boundary
separating this dirty, perishable world from an eternal realm of
philosophical thought. There is a conception of death that does
203
not support metaphysics. There is a conception that recognises

death as birth, death as productive of other transient things. This
would be a death to be affirmed. As Cavarero argues, this would
be a conception of a kind of death that is not yet placed in
isolation at the centre, as though dismally supporting the
obsession with metaphysics, but is linked to birth as to a living
context of its own occurring. This would be a Dionysian
conception of death, where birth and death are but rhythm and
cadence (Cavarero. In Spite of Plato. p. 113.).
III. Benevolent Educators
1
In the third century Plotinus was still able to man his
classroom, perhaps separated by a curtain from the street,
where pupils gathered to hear him and his disciples discoursing
(see: Hadot. Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision. p. 82.)
2
Brown, Peter. The World of Late Antiquity. London: Thames &
Hudson, 1971. p. 72.
3
Foucault. The Hermeneutics of the Subject. pp. 136-44.
4
A point made in: Foucault. The Courage of Truth. Foucault.
The Hermeneutics of the Subject. pp. 372-80.
5
Brown, Peter. The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual
Renunciation in Early Christianity. Twentieth-Anniversary
Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. p. 27.
6
See: Brown. The Body and Society. p. 22.
7
An early version of this technique can perhaps be observed in
Philodemus who studied at the Epicurean school in Athens
before moving to Rome and occupying the position of private
counsellor. He describes a way of binding educator to pupil, a
technique involving a kind of parrhesia a mode of truth telling
involving, amongst other things, frank speech. In one recovered
fragment, Philodemus explains that by speaking freely, the
educator will intensify and enliven the students benevolence. At
first sight a rather peculiar suggestion, it makes greater sense
when placed within the more general Epicurean emphasis on
the importance of reciprocal friendship, where, leading by
204
Notes
example, the educator encourages students to speak freely, and

thereby bind themselves to one another through their mutual
confidences (see: Foucault. The Hermeneutics of the Subject. p.
389.). Outside the securities of that philosophical school, in a
context where educational relationships could no longer appeal
to the authority of masters of tradition passing down the wisdom
of Epicurus, such reciprocal relationships would gain greater
significance, basing themselves more explicitly within the
promise of mutual salvation (see: ibid. pp. 390-1. See also:
Foucault, Michel. The Care of the Self. London: Penguin, 1990
[1984]. p. 52.).
8
See: Foucault. The Hermeneutics of the Subject. pp. 396-9.
9
Galen. On the passions and errors of the soul: Ohio State
University Press., 1963. p. 36.
10
Galen. On the passions and errors of the soul. p. 33.
11
12
13
14
See: Brown. The Body and Society. p. 18.
15
16
17
18
In the first century, Emperor Neros advisor, Seneca, devises
a similar argument in favour of the educators frank speech:
again we find how the educator should be valued for saying
things that at times one would not wish to hear, discoursing
against anger, for example, or in favour of clemency. For the
powerful, Seneca decides, mercy without pity is strength; anger
without exception is weakness (Seneca. Dialogues and Essays.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.). In an imperial system
where force is routine, violence is systematic, slavery
naturalised, and power guaranteed, the restraint of the
aristocratic class becomes the apparent measure of its
greatness. Unlike Galen, who believed that the position of the
educator who teaches his patron to restrain his passions is best
occupied by a stranger, Seneca suggests that the educator
205
must also be a friend (see: Foucault. The Hermeneutics of the

Subject. pp. 400-7. And: Seneca. Letters from a Stoic. ). In the
second century, to take another example, Emperor Marcus
Aurelius was taught by a sequence of social inferiors, each
considered a mere epigone in his chosen tradition of Stoic
philosophy. Not all teachers of Marcus Aurelius were personal
tutors however. Apollonius of Chalcedon and Sextus of
Chaeronea were professors in charge of a school, to whom
Marcus was forced to travel in order to hear their lectures
(Hadot. The Inner Citadel. p. 15). Indeed, it is said that
Apollonius refused to come to the palace to give lessons to his
royal student, declaring that: The disciple must come to the
master, and not the master to the disciple (cited in ibid.).
Evidently the ancient tradition of philosopher-sage, and the
more recent tradition of philosopher-tutor, were concurrent at
this point. Relations with his favourite teacher, a personal tutor
called Junius Rusticus, were at times a little stormy, yet Marcus
credits his teacher with not only reforming his character, but also
for teaching him the virtue of indulgence, a virtue which Rusticus
embodied each time Marcus became irascible. Marcus thereby
testifies to the importance of a relationship of tolerance between
a student and his tutor, though now the argument is made from
the perspective of the student (see: ibid. pp. 9-10.).
19
Brown, Peter. Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992. p. 7.
20
Brown. Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity. p. 4.
21
Brown. Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity. pp. 30-1.
22
23
24
25
26
27
The Roman empire, so it goes, had become a colossal
bureaucratic apparatus whose workings most individuals could
not fathom or influence. As its power to rouse feelings of
citizenship and commitment to the state dissipated, Roman
206
Notes
subjects sought meaning elsewhere. (Sloterdijk. Critique of

Cynical Reason. pp. 170-1).
28
Sloterdijk. Critique of Cynical Reason. p. 171.
29
Brown. The Body and Society. p. 49.
30
This was Anthony the Great. Dorotheus of Gaza said
something similar: Let us pay attention to ourselves, my
brothers, and let us be vigilant, while we still have time Since
the beginning of our conversation two or three hours have
elapsed, and we have come closer to death; yet we see without
fear that we are wasting our time (both cited in Hadot. What is
Ancient Philosophy? pp. 242-3.)
31
Evagrius of Pontus cited in: Hadot. What is Ancient
Philosophy? p. 246.
32
Clement of Alexandria cited in: Brown. The Body and Society.
p. 31.
33
Dorotheus of Gaza cited in: Hadot. What is Ancient
Philosophy? p. 245. Here, Hadot observes, was perhaps an
echo of the Epicurean injunction: Do not seek to have that
which happens happen as you wish. Wish that what happens
may happen as it happens, and you will be happy (ibid.).
34
35
Clement of Alexandria cited in: Hadot. What is Ancient
Philosophy? p. 246.
36
This point is made by Brown (Brown. The Body and Society.
p. 235.), who argues; whilst Christian ascetics may have given
the body an almost oppressive prominence as if motivated by
hatred of the body, if we retrospectively focus only on such
bodily denials we risk missing its most novel and its most
poignant aspect, which was that the defiled body was also seen
(as stated above) as the privileged training ground of the soul.
37
Christianity is Platonism for the common people.
(Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a
Philosophy of the Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998
[1886]. p. 4.)
38
207
39
According to one interpretation, the baptismal water was the
water of death, the bath into which one was put, was Christs
tomb (Foucault. On the Government of the Living. p. 156).
40
Foucault. On the Government of the Living. p. 156.
41
42
Kelly, Henry Ansgar. The Devil at Baptism: Ritual, Theology,
and Drama. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2004
[1985]. pp. 126-7.
43
Tertullian cited in: Foucault. On the Government of the Living.
p. 117.
44
See: Johnson, Maxwell E. The Rites of Christian Initiation:
Revised and Expanded Edition. Collegeville, Minnesota:
Liturgical Press, 2007. p. 97. At the end of the second century,
practices of catechesis were becoming institutionalised. This
can be seen in The Apostolic Tradition, an early third century
text attributed to Hippolytus and considered to be one of the first
clear accounts of early Christian baptismal ritual in the West
(see: Kelly. The Devil at Baptism.). Its contents are nevertheless
disputed, since the original text does not survive, leading
scholars to question whether some of the practices described
might date from the fourth century or later (see: Johnson. The
Rites of Christian Initiation. pp. 101-10).
45
Johnson. The Rites of Christian Initiation. p. 97. The exclusion
of pagan teachers suggests a clear boundary at this point
between secular teachers and Christian educators, presumably
because the former taught the pagan arts (see: Cramer, Peter.
Baptism and Change in the Early Middle Ages, c. 200 - c. 1150.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. p. 16).
46
47
48
This is from a fifth century text: If while the bishop
pronounces this exorcism, anyone should become agitated and
suddenly rise up and break into tears or shout, or foam at the
mouth or gnash his teeth, or shamelessly stare about, or
become excessively uplifted, or be seized by a sudden impulse
and rush away the candidate is put to one side, so that he can
208
Notes
be exorcized by the priests until he is cleansed, and then

baptized (cited in Kelly. The Devil at Baptism. p. 141.).
49
50
Kelly. The Devil at Baptism. p. 273.
51
Cramer. Baptism and Change in the Early Middle Ages. p. 11.
52
Augustine cited in: Kelly. The Devil at Baptism. p. 115.
53
Foucault. On the Government of the Living. p. 153. Johnson.
The Rites of Christian Initiation. p. 99.
54
Hippolytus cited in Kelly. The Devil at Baptism. p. 84.
55
Kelly. The Devil at Baptism. p. 88.
56
57
Original sin was not original to Christianity; theologians
developed conceptions of it during late antiquity.
58
59
MacIntyre, Alasdair. God, Philosophy, Universities. A
Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition.
Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009. p. 22.
60
61
MacIntyre. God, Philosophy, Universities. p. 25.
62
Kelly, Henry Ansgar. Satan: A Biography. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006. p. 7.
63
64
Following baptism, the chief problem a Christian faced was
that of falling back into sin and foregoing the promise of
salvation. Life after baptism became a matter of avoiding
relapse, or if it occurred; of redeeming the soul a second time. A
second penance was devised for such cases, allowing those
who had offended God to atone for their sins within a regimen
that would also strengthen their ability to resist the devil. As an
institutional procedure it rose to prominence during the
persecutions of the third century, where baptised Christians
were routinely forced to renounce their faith in an attempt to
eradicate Christianity from the Roman Empire (Foucault. On the
Government of the Living. p. 199). Like baptism, second
209
penance was a unique event, only becoming repeatable from

the sixth and seventh centuries, whereupon it was divided into a
whole sequence of individual penitential acts that could be
observed in succession after each isolated sin (ibid. pp. 194-5).
During second penance the sinner would join the order of
penitents, remain within it for several years, and be remembered
for the rest of his or her life as having been a penitent. Individual
penitents were not expected to do this or that or to renounce
this or that in isolation every aspect of their existence was at
stake (ibid. p. 197). Again, as with baptism, the penitent was
expected to manifest the truth of his or her soul, which was a
first step towards taking responsibility for that soul, and its
education. This manifestation did not at this point in the second
and third century, involve a detailed confession of every sin
committed. Rather, each penitent manifested the truth of the
soul in more general terms, through collective prayer during
which each penitent acknowledges before God and,
consequently, before the others that he has sinned and is a
sinner (ibid. p. 203), or through ritual where the penitent would
undergo a public act of supplication, pleading for entry at the
door of the church, begging to be readmitted (see: ibid. pp. 205-
8). This latter spectacle was, arguably, only the most
exaggerated manifestation of a more permanent drama of
repentance, during which the penitent would fast and otherwise
seek out discomfort to manifest externally the conversion he or
she was expected to be engaged with more or less constantly
within (ibid. p. 210). The penitent was expected to relinquish his
or her attachments to the world, overcome its distractions and
temptations, once again hoping to guarantee rebirth and a future
life by renouncing this life, seeking death and mortification for a
life that was already fallen. The supplication of the penitent was,
as Foucault put it, a matter of manifesting what one is and, at
the same time, erasing what one is (ibid. p. 214). Admission to
the order of penitents with its lifelong commitment to shame
and supplication was not guaranteed. Indeed, a whole
procedure was devised to decide which of the fallen would be
admitted. Accordingly, Foucault claims that this examination of
the would-be penitent, was not, as in later monastic practice, an
examination of conscience designed to scrutinize the recesses
210
Notes
of the heart in order to divine if the candidate was sincere in his

or her repentance. That remained a matter for God to decide
(ibid. p. 200). Those judging admission could only guess at the
commitment of the would-be penitent, though the framework of
an incepting examination that served itself, but only to a limited
extent, as a test of commitment. Crucially, however, penitents
were not coopted by force, but were to consider their inclusion in
the order as if it were a privilege bestowed upon them. Hence
penitence was not inflicted upon unwilling subjects. Aspiring
penitents were expected to desire wholeheartedly those
practices of personal discomfort and public shame that
penitence involved. Their commitment to the educational good
promised by penitence, was a condition of entry.
65
66
67
According to Brown, a whole succession of highly educated
Christians (master practitioners in Greek and Latin style)
backed into the limelight that they had brought to bear on the
illiterate monks, apostles, and martyrs (Brown. Power and
Persuasion in Late Antiquity. p. 74). Rather paradoxically,
Christianity was able to mobilise the high culture of a Roman
elite in terms comfortable to them, whilst asserting a religion
which claimed at first to speak to the lowest members of society
in their language.
68
Brown. The World of Late Antiquity. p. 104.
69
Smith, Katherine Allen. War and the making of Medieval
Monastic Culture. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2011. p. 38.
70
Smith. War and the making of Medieval Monastic Culture. pp.
89-96.
71
Brown. The World of Late Antiquity. p. 110.
72
Brown. The Body and Society. pp. xlv-xlvi.
73
Brown. The Body and Society. p. xlvi.
74
75
Brown (The Body and Society. p. 257.) argues that by the fifth
century this radical stance had softened. The continence of
monks was now seen as a mark of distinction, allowing them to
211
stand before the throne of God as the representatives of

common humanity.
76
77
Foucault. On the Government of the Living. pp. 264-5.
78
79
80
The influential Rule of Saint Benedict, a book of precepts
concerning monastic life, is attributed to Benedict of Nursia in
the sixth century, who was heavily influenced by Cassian. It
describes a monastic order run under the auspices of an abbot,
a figure who is more a disciplinarian overlord than he is a
spiritual guide. The abbot makes sure that the Rule is followed,
that discipline is maintained. He is not a great philosopher or
theologian who embodies the poise and virtue to which all
aspire (see: Coon, Lynda L. Dark Age Bodies: Gender and
Monastic Practice in the Early Medieval West. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.).
81
Coon. Dark Age Bodies. p. 76.
82
83
Ibid. pp. 269-70.
84
Foucault, Michel. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at
the Collge de France 1977-1978. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004 [1978]. p. 177.
85
86
87
Foucault. Security, Territory, Population. p. 178.
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
212
Notes
95
IV. Our Educational Conscience
1
Seneca. Letters from a Stoic. p. 37.
2
Seneca. Letters from a Stoic. pp. 37-8.
3
4
5
6
Seneca. On the Shortness of Life. Dialogues and Essays.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. p. 142.
7
Seneca. On the Shortness of Life. p. 155.
8
9
10
11
12
Seneca. Letters from a Stoic. p.60.
13
14
15
16
17
Hunter, Ian. Rethinking the school: Subjectivity, bureaucracy,
criticism. New York: St Martin's Press, 1994. p. xxi.
18
19
20
21
22
23
Foucault. Security, Territory, Population. pp. 128-9.
24
25
213
26
27
28
29
Hunter. Rethinking the school. pp. 85-6.
30
Hunter. Rethinking the school.. p. 168.
31
Nietzsche. The Anti-Christ. 24.
32
33
34
Foucault. Security, Territory, Population. p 181.
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
The Wars of Religion, the Reformation, and the Counter-
Reformation can be viewed in this light, as battles over and
concerning the pastorate. Its membership, for example,
becomes a point of contention. Can parish priests be seen as
pastors? Yes, said Wycliffe, following which a whole series of
Protestant Churches will say yes, each in their way The
Catholic Church will obstinately reply: No, parish priests are not
pastors only bishops can hold this office (Foucault. Security,
Territory, Population. p. 153). But Christianity had already laid
claim over the government of men. The question became, which
version of Christianity must dominate the fold.
42
43
44
45
Hunter. Rethinking the school. p. 1.
46
Foucault. Security, Territory, Population. pp. 208-14.
47
48
214
Notes
49
Luther, Martin. To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation
concerning the Reform of the Christian Estate. In: Tappert,
editor. Selected Writings of Martin Luther 1517-1520.
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967 [1520]. p. 263.
50
Luther. To the Christian Nobility. p. 260.
51
Somewhat disavowed: Kinney, Daniel. Cynic Selfhood in
Medieval and Renaissance Culture. In: Bracht Branham and
Goulet-Gaz, editors. The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in
Antiquity and Its Legacy. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1996. p. 324.
52
I Corinthians 3:18 cited in: Luther. To the Christian Nobility. p.
260.
53
54
Luther. To the Christian Nobility. p. 336. Despite his wider
remit, Luther does give the reform of the universities (and
schools) some attention, fearing that without reform, without
committing themselves to the task of turning out men who are
experts in the Holy Scriptures, men who can become bishops
and priests, and stand in the front line against heretics, the devil,
and all the world, these unreformed universities will become
wide gates to hell (ibid. pp. 336-43.).
55
56
57
II Peter 2:1-3 cited in: Luther. To the Christian Nobility. p. 267.
p. 267.
58
Luther. To the Christian Nobility.
59
Brown, Norman O. Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical
Meaning of History (Second Edition). Middletown, Connecticut:
Wesleyan University Press, 1985. p. 214.
60
Luther cited in: Brown. Life Against Death. p. 215.
61
Brown. Life Against Death. p. 216.
62
63
64
215
65
66
67
68
69
70
Nietzsche. The Gay Science. 347.
71
Wrathall, Mark A. Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth,
Language and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011. p. 199.
72
Nietzsche. Daybreak. 117.
73
74
Horkheimer, Max. Reason Against Itself: Some Remarks on
Enlightenment. In: Schmidt, editor. What Is Enlightenment?
Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth Century Questions.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996 [1946]. p. 365.
75
Horkheimer. Reason Against Itself. p. 365.
76
77
V. Mass Cynicism
1
Nietzsche. Human, All Too Human. 51.
2
Depaepe, Marc and Smeyers, Paul. Educationalization as an
ongoing modernization process. Educational Theory 2008;
58(4). pp. 380-1.
3
Depaepe and Smeyers. Educationalization as an ongoing
modernization process. pp. 380-1.
4
We find the Inquisitor included in his cabinet of cynics. See:
Sloterdijk. Critique of Cynical Reason. pp. 182-95.
5
Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. The Brothers Karamazov. London:
Penguin, 2003 [1880]. p. 325.
6
7
216
Notes
8
9
10
11
12
13
Shea (The Cynic Enlightenment) explores various attempts to
revive Cynicism ranging from Diderot and DAlembert, to
Wieland, Rousseau and Sade.
14
15
Shea. The Cynic Enlightenment.. p. ix.
16
This is Stanleys gloss of Sloterdijks argument regarding
modern cynicism: Stanley, Sharon. Retreat from Politics: The
Cynic in Modern Times. Polity 2007; 39(3). p. 385.
17
Shea notes two early manifestations of this more strident
cynicism: Diderots depiction of Rameaus Nephew and various
depictions by Sade, in particular the character Dolmanc in
Philosophy of the Boudoir. Here connections with ancient
Cynicism are still apparent, though only through a modern
transvaluation of key Cynic values, which is at the same time a
destruction of key elements of the Cynic tradition (Shea. The
Cynic Enlightenment. p. 110). Hence Rameau makes mischief
by unmasking the pretenses and the corruption of the mid-
eighteenth-century Parisian literati but nevertheless accepts it
as a fait accompli and accommodates himself to [that] reality
as best he can (ibid. p. 59). Absent here is the Cynic drive to
overthrow the social order such hypocrisies reveal. Similarly, the
Cynics free and courageous speech becomes in Rameau mere
impudence, a form of entertainment. The Cynics appeal to a life
lived according to nature (designed to cast light on the
pretensions of civilized existence), is repeated in Rameau, but
nature is now redefined as a battle for survival, recommending
self-interested compliance with the corrupted norms of ones
social habitat. The Cynic mantra deface the currency is
interpreted not to subvert the norms governing ones existence,
but to attack the ideals foisted on ones existence by a small
group of philosophers. Again, justified here, is Rameaus
217
attachment to the status quo (see: ibid. pp. 59-61). Rameau is

not a cynic in the late modern sense, however. He, unlike his
late modern descendants, still has the energy and appetite for
combative, prolonged confrontations Sade, by contrast,
subverts Cynicism by transforming the frank Cynic into the
master of hypocrisy (Dolmanc helps Eugne to see through
the veneer of our moral codes whilst instructing her in deceit
and subterfuge so that she may keep her infidelities hidden
(ibid. p. 111). Extended to the public realm Sades cynicism
becomes a parody of its ancestor, where the Cynic injunction to
live in accordance with nature (designed in part to free the Cynic
from the moral force of shame and question what it means to be
human) becomes a social norm that makes free sex an
obligation, not an option (ibid. p. 126). Again, the cynicism of
Sades characters is more strident (to say the least) than that
with which we are accustomed. Though a taste for scandal
remains, our late modern cynic is more prone to be publicly
scandalized than privately scandalous, establishing a strange
link between perverse enjoyment and moral indignation.
18
19
Stanley. The Cynic in Modern Times. p. 391.
20
iek, Slavoj. Trouble in Paradise: From the End of History to
the End of Capitalism. London: Penguin, 2015. pp. 67-9.
21
Sloterdijk. Critique of Cynical Reason. p. xvi.
22
Sloterdijk. Critique of Cynical Reason. p. xxxii.
23
24
25
26
As Freud claimed, melancholia is difficult to overcome, as it is
impossible to fully reconcile oneself to a loss one can only
vaguely comprehend (see: Freud, Sigmund. Mourning and
Melancholia. In: Strachey, editor. Volume XIV. The Standard
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud.
London: Vintage, 2001 [1917] ).
27
Not only does he [the melancholic] not detach himself from
the object, but he internalizes it consequently preventing the
218
Notes
possibility to detach (Ferber, Ilit. Melancholy Philosophy: Freud

and Benjamin. E-rea 2006; 4(1)).
28
Strictly speaking these ideals were always inoperable
anyway. What has changed, to be more precise, is that the
promises that were attached to such ideals have become
inoperable.
29
For some exemplary media accounts by teachers leaving the
profession see: Sloggett, Chris. This is why I am among the
thousands leaving teaching this month: Excessive
accountability, an unhealthy level of suspicion and an obsession
with statistics has made this an impossible career path. The
Independent. Thursday 10 July 2014. Burton, Sam. A teacher
speaks out: 'I'm effectively being forced out of a career that I
wanted to love'. The Independent. Monday 15 September 2014.
Hawkins, Pauline. Why I'm Resigning After 11 Years as a
Teacher. Huffington Post. 16 April 2014. And for accounts by
academics leaving the profession see: Jarosinski, Eric.
#failedintellectual. The Chronicle of Higher Education. 30 June
2014. Warner, Marina. Diary. London Review of Books. 11
September 2014. Katsari, Constantina. Leaving academia: 'I can
offer more to the public outside the university system'. The
Guardian. Friday 22 November 2013. See also the tragic case
of Stefan Grimm: Parr, Chris. Imperial College professor Stefan
Grimm was given grant income target. Times Higher
Education. 3 December 2014 2014.
30
Allen, Ansgar. Benign Violence: Education in and beyond the
Age of Reason. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
31
Gide, Andr. Strait is the Gate. London: Penguin, 1979
[1909]. p. 63.
32
Bernstein, Basil. Education cannot compensate for society.
New Society 1970; 387.
33
A phrase I borrow from: Seneca. Letters from a Stoic. p. 36.
34
Exemplary of this condition is the following appeal, attached
to an email from the general secretary of the University College
Union seeking to rally support for a strike ballot: Dear
colleague. If you agree with Steve, time is running out. The
ballot closes next week and with a bank holiday coming up, you
219
really need to vote now. Please return your ballot. What I do as

a teacher, tutor, lecturer and researcher generates value and
will go on generating value. I am not only worth far more than I
am or have ever been paid, I am worth far more than I ever will
be paid. I have worked and studied hard over a long time to
become and stay good at a difficult job and I deserve to be
earning more, not less, as the years go by and as I keep
learning from my experience in the profession. The same is true
of the vast majority of people working in education as educators,
and yet the idea of reward is only respected for the so-called
leaders (colleagues with management responsibilities).
Enough! Time for the union to do what unions are needed for:
protect the pay and working conditions of its membership. Do
you agree? Vote TODAY. (Email to UCU membership dated 28
April 2016).
35
On improvement see: Flint, Kevin and Peim, Nick. Rethinking
the Education Improvement Agenda: A Critical Philosophical
Approach. London: Continuum, 2012.
36
Webb, Darren. Pedagogies of Hope. Studies in Philosophy
and Education 2013; 32.
37
Curwin, Richard. Cynicism is Contagious; So Is Hope.
www.edutopia.org April 17, 2013.
38
Ecclestone, Kathryn and Lewis, Lydia. Interventions for
resilience in educational settings: challenging policy discourses
of risk and vulnerability. Journal of Education Policy 2014; 29(2).
39
Brown, Kate. Re-moralising 'vulnerability'. People, Place &
Policy 2012; 6(1).
40
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols or How to
Philosophize with a Hammer. Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-
Christ. London: Penguin, 2003 [1889].
41
Ahmed, Sara. Multiculturalism and the Promise of Happiness.
New Formations 2007-2008; 63(Winter).
42
This new formation has been described by Sara Ahmed as
the happiness turn (Ahmed, Sara. Editorial. The Happiness
Turn. New Formations 2007-2008; 63(Winter)).
220
Notes
43
Love, Heather. Compulsory Happiness And Queer Existence.
New Formations 2007-2008; 63(Winter).
44
Ahmed, Sara. Affect Aliens: Happiness as a Cultural Politics.
In: Satterthwaite, Piper and Sikes, editors. Power in the
Academy. Stoke on Trent: Trentham Books, 2009.
45
Levering, Bas, Ramaekers, Stefan and Smeyers, Paul. The
Narrative of a Happy Childhood: on the presumption of parents'
power and the demand for integrity. Power and Education 2009;
1(1).
46
Ahmed. Happiness as a Cultural Politics.
47
Colebrook, Claire. Narrative Happiness and the Meaning of
Life. New Formations 2007-2008; 63(Winter).
48
Kotchemidova, Christina. From Good Cheer to "Drive-by
Smiling": A Social History of Cheerfulness. Journal of Social
History 2005; 39(1).
49
Horkheimer. Reason Against Itself. p. 366.
50
Horkheimer. Reason Against Itself. pp. 366-7.
51
Foucault, Michel. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the
Collge de France 1978-1979. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008 [1979].
52
53
Nietzsche. The Will to Power. p. 35.
54
55
VI. Insults and Obscenities
1
Diogenes. Diogenes the Cynic: Sayings and Anecdotes.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. p. 17.
2
Sloterdijk. Critique of Cynical Reason. p. 168 (original
emphasis).
3
Laughter is not the only available technique. Parody, for
example, was used by Diogenes to mock the authority of
reason. Accordingly, Diogenes used the conventional
221
philosophical form of a syllogism to justify theft. The butt of the

joke is its form, seeking to provide a jarring contrast between
the formal protocols of reason and the paradoxically Cynic
conclusion it leads to (see Bracht Branham, R. Defacing the
Currency: Diogenes' Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism. In:
Bracht Branham and Goulet-Gaz, editors. The Cynics: The
Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1996. p. 94.).
4
Foucault. The Courage of Truth. p. 165.
5
As Sloterdijk observes: Diogenes taught masturbation by
practical example, as cultural progress, mind you, not as
regression to the animalistic. (Sloterdijk. Critique of Cynical
Reason. p. 168.)
6
Dio Chrysostom, Oration 8.
7
8
Cynic attitudes were passed on chiefly through an oral
tradition. Some of the first Cynics do appear to have written, but
almost all of their works have been lost. These works were,
moreover, said to be rather unconventional, either parodying
conventional forms of writing (such as the philosophical
treatise), or subverting convention by adopting non-literary
forms such as the diatribe (see: Bracht Branham. Diogenes'
Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism.).
9
Cutler, Ian. Cynicism from Diogenes to Dilbert. Jefferson,
North Carolina: McFarland, 2005. p. 25.
10
Bracht Branham and Goulet-Gaz. The Cynics: Introduction.
11
12
Foucault. The Courage of Truth. pp. 196-7.
13
You have even managed to diminish the prestige of
philosophy in general (Julian. To the Cynic Heracleios (Oration
7). In: Dobbin, editor. The Cynic Philosophers from Diogenes to
Julian. London: Penguin, 2012 [362]. p. 225.).
14
Dobbin. The Cynic Philosophers. p. 210.
15
222
Notes
16
Krueger, Derek. The Bawdy and Society: The Shamelessness
of Diogenes in Roman Imperial Culture. In: Bracht Branham and
Goulet-Gaz, editors. The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in
Antiquity and Its Legacy. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1996. p. 226.
17
He had in mind those moving from city to city or camp to
camp and insulting the rich and prominent in all such places
while associating with societys dregs (Julian. To the Cynic
Heracleios. p. 223.).
18
Julian. Against the Ignorant Cynics. p. 198.
19
Cited in: Billerbeck, Margarethe. The Ideal Cynic from
Epictetus to Julian. In: Bracht Branham and Goulet-Gaz,
editors. The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its
Legacy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. p. 216.
For a slightly different translation see: Julian. To the Cynic
Heracleios. p. 226.
20
Julian. Against the Ignorant Cynics. p. 196.
21
Cited in: Billerbeck. The Ideal Cynic. p. 216.
22
Such is the Neoplatonic coloring of Julians speech
(Billerbeck. The Ideal Cynic. p. 216.).
23
Julian. To the Cynic Heracleios. p. 226.
24
Julian. To the Cynic Heracleios. p. 207.
25
Bracht Branham and Goulet-Gaz. The Cynics: Introduction.
pp. 21-3.
26
Branham. Diogenes Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism.
p. 87.
27
Laertius, Diogenes. Lives of Eminent Philosophers II (Loeb
Classical Library). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1931 [3rd century CE]. 6.22-3.
28
Bracht Branham. Diogenes' Rhetoric and the Invention of
Cynicism. p. 89.
29
The idea virtue can only be cultivated in a rarefied
atmosphere is so common to Western philosophy and its
educational legacies it is almost futile to dignify it with a single
footnote. Effectively, it is believed that virtue only comes to a
223
character which has been thoroughly schooled and trained and

brought to a pitch of perfection by unremitting practice (Seneca.
Letters from a Stoic. pp. 176-7.). It is the possession of wise
men. Indeed the exclusivity of virtue, achieved through wisdom,
is the best thing about her. There is about wisdom [and the
virtue it cultivates] a nobility and magnificence in the fact that
sheis not a blessing given to all and sundry (ibid. p. 162.).
30
31
Diogenes. Sayings and Anecdotes. pp. 10-11.
32
33
34
Plato. Phaedo. 66b-c.
35
36
37
38
Diogenes. Sayings and Anecdotes. p. 25.
39
As Foucault argues, we can see traces of this Cynic game of
humiliation in Christian humility: From Cynic humiliation to
Christian humility there is an entire history of the humble, of
disgrace, shame, and scandal through shame, which is very
important historically and, once again, quite foreign to the
standard morality of the Greeks and Romans. Foucault argues
nevertheless, that we should distinguish the future Christian
humility, which is a state, a mental attitude manifesting itself and
testing itself in the humiliations one suffers, from this Cynic
dishonor, which is a game with conventions of honor and
dishonor in which the Cynic, at the very point when he plays the
most disgraceful role, brings out his pride and supremacy. Cynic
pride relies on these tests. The Cynic asserts his sovereignty,
his mastery through these tests of humiliation, whereas
Christian humiliation, or rather, humility, is a renunciation of
oneself. (Foucault. The Courage of Truth. p. 262.)
40
41
42
Diogenes. Sayings and Anecdotes. p. 24.
224
Notes
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
Bracht Branham. Diogenes' Rhetoric and the Invention of
Cynicism. p. 86.
56
57
Foucault claims this attempt to reactualize the original core of
a philosophy was essential to Platonism and Aristotelianism,
and was also present in Stoicism and Epicureanism, though in
the latter attempts were also made to reactualize a form of
existence. With Cynicism, the importance of reactualizing a form
of existence almost completely replaces the drive to define
oneself in relation to the essential doctrinal core of the tradition
(see: Foucault. The Courage of Truth. p. 209.). Of course,
attempts to reactualize the original core of Cynicism were
indeed made, but these efforts were made by those seeking to
integrate aspects of Cynicism into other philosophical traditions.
Consequently, it was necessary to idealize Diogenes in
particular, and purge his portrait of any features that might
shock or keep off potential followers (see: Billerbeck. The Ideal
Cynic. p. 205.).
58
59
60
This pursuit of animality was a tactic used to disrupt cultural
conventions the status of which depended upon their elevation
225
above base inclinations. By resorting to animality, and giving it a

certain priority over more refined human traits, the Cynic was
not expressing a belief in nature. A normative conception of
nature did not provide a foundation for Cynic philosophy.
Interpretations vary, of course, but those suspicious of the
common view that nature was Cynicisms foundational belief,
claim that on a closer look at the anecdotes collected by
Diogenes Laertius that purport to quote Diogenes [of Sinope]
verbatim, nowhere does he show any interest in nature as a
philosophical concept (Bracht Branham. Diogenes' Rhetoric and
the Invention of Cynicism. p. 96.)
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil. 269 (my emphasis).
68
Adlam and Scanlon. Personality Disorder and Homelessness:
Membership and 'Unhoused Minds' in Forensic Settings. p. 453.
69
70
71
Boltanski, Luc and Chiapello, Eve. The New Spirit of
Capitalism. London: Verso, 2007 [1999]. Boltanski, Luc. The
Left after May 1968 and the longing for total revolution. Thesis
Eleven 2002; 69.
72
Cederstrm, Carl and Fleming, Peter. Dead Man Working.
Winchester: Zero Books, 2011.
73
This obsession with authenticity is reflected in the tendency
for contestants of the UK Big Brother television game show to
be the most authentic housemate. Contestants are perfectly
aware of this; they frequently discuss the idea of having a game
plan to win, suspecting each other for having one and hence for
being inauthentic. Of course, many declare that the ultimate
game plan is to just be yourself.
226
Notes
74
Gardiner, Michael E. The Grandchildren of Marx and Coca-
Cola: Lefebvre, Utopia and the 'Recuperation' of Everyday Life.
In: Hayden and El-Ojeili, editors. Globalization and Utopia:
Critical Essays. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. p. 228.
75
Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers II. 6.76-7.
76
The absurd (to which I return in Chapter IX) is given content
by Albert Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus, a book in which
Camus takes pains to explain that once the absurd becomes
apparent the only truly philosophical problem is whether or not
to commit suicide (Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus.
London: Penguin, 2000 [1942]. p. 5). In educational settings
however, the absurd remains largely hidden from view, or at
least, is only superficially felt despite longstanding disparity
between our highest educational ideals and the unremittingly
grubby nature of educational realities that remain subservient to
relations of power, class and capital. This disparity perfectly
exemplifies what Camus might describe as the presence of the
absurd in education (where the hopes themselves, or the
unremitting nature of reality are not absurd; the absurd is
generated in the impossible relationship established between
them; see ibid. p. 24). The presence of the absurd in education
is not generally recognised, since by profession, educators are
reflexively buffered from perceiving it, blinkered into believing
that despite it all education can be redeemed (The idea that
education can be redeemed persists against all the evidence.
This point is made by Nick Peim, who attacks the powerful
mythology of redemption which dominates educational thought
and practice See: Peim, Nick. The Big Other: An Offer You Can't
Refuse - or Accept, in Some Cases. Education as Onto-
Theological Principle (Empire): An Anti-Manifesto. Other
Education: The Journal of Educational Alternatives 2012; 1(1)).
Since the absurd is beyond the educators grasp, the challenge
becomes one of establishing a new, inverted relationship
between the absurd and suicide, approaching suicide in order to
discover the absurd. And having sought suicide so as to
experience the absurd, the real effort for those remaining in the
profession is to stay there within that experience, continuing to
work in an educational landscape that has come to appear
227
devastatingly odd, refusing the temptation to fall back on the old

reassurances that education must, somehow, somewhere, have
a core worth rescuing (Camus. The Myth of Sisyphus. p. 10).
The challenge begins as one encounters the absurd, since it is
so tempting to recoil, retreating from this disconcerting
encounter either into the consolations of hope and belief, or
through despair to that ultimate exit, which is suicide. Living with
the absurd requires that one endure and affirm an impossible
tension never to be resolved, between the mind that desires
and the world that disappoints, between our nostalgia for unity
and meaning, and this intransigent, fragmented universe (ibid.
p. 37). Hence Camus attacks suicide as an expression of
weakness. It represents an escape route for those who cannot
stand the absurd, those who will not be consoled and cannot
live without consolation. With this in mind, Camus portrays
suicide as a form of capitulation to more dominant forces.
Suicide constitutes for him a species of acceptance of those
very forces at its extreme (ibid. p. 41). Presumably this act of
final submission could be to forces ranging from the more
grandiose but immediately felt exertions of an indifferent
universe, to those more straightforward forces which make
suicide practically possible, such as the force of gravity or
chemical reaction. To return to our problem then. If Camus was
correct to characterise suicide in this way, it would appear that
to approach the absurd through suicide ignores his basic insight,
which insists that suicide is a form of surrender. For this tactic to
make sense whereby the absurd is approached by first risking
oneself we must seek out a form of exit which does not seek
escape from an absurd existence it can no longer bear. It would
desire instead to transform that existence, and render it more
palpably absurd, if only by the force of example. Here we must
hold in view a type of suicide of the kind Diogenes attempted; an
impossible suicide in other words, since it refused all assistance,
declining to give in to or take advantage of dominant forces,
affirming its decision without capitulation.
77
Cynicism has nevertheless been interpreted as an act of
individual self-assertion, and reduced thereby to a species of
individualism. However, as Shea observes (building on
Foucault), this fails to notice a basic connection between the
228
Notes
Cynic act and the truth it manifests, where Cynicism seeks to

redefine the relation between the self and truth and thereby
redefine the relationship between subject and power, by bearing
witness to other possible forms of embodied truth (Shea. The
Cynic Enlightenment. p. 176). In short, the Cynic is labouring to
disturb a broader framework. This mode of resistance becomes
only more significant in an age where, according to Foucault, we
are increasingly constituted as self-constituting agents of power.
In order to contest power it is necessary to contest how it is
manifested in those subjects of power who are now,
increasingly, its agents.
78
Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy in Process: The Letters to Guinea-
Bissau. London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative,
1978. pp. 103-4.
79
See: Cabral, Amilcar. The Weapon of Theory. Unity and
Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amilcar Cabral. New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1979 [1966]. p. 136. Crucially, Cabral
also insisted that re-Africanization would be necessary in the
death and rebirth of Guinea-Bissau intellectuals (see: Cabral,
Amilcar. National Liberation and Culture. Unity and Struggle:
Speeches and Writings of Amilcar Cabral. New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1979 [1070]. p. 145). The suggestion that the
revolutionary petty bourgeoisie must be capable of committing
suicide as a class (Cabral. The Weapon of Theory. p. 136), was
based on Cabrals observation that the petty bourgeois class
was in such a precarious position (in contemporary Cape Verde
and Guinea) that class suicide was a viable alternative to siding
with the Portuguese colonialists.
80
Freire. Pedagogy in Process. p. 103.
81
Freire. Pedagogy in Process. p. 104.
82
Freires invitation to commit class suicide (or as Jonathan
Kozol put it in his Forward to the book: that those who have
grown up, lived and studied, in a privileged situation, must die
as a class and be reborn in consciousness, Freire, Pedagogy
in Process. p. 3.) is rarely mentioned. For an exception see:
Mayo, Peter. Synthesizing Gramsci and Freire: possibility for a
229
theory of radical adult education. International Journal of

Lifelong Education 1994; 13(2).
83
Foucault, Michel. Interview with Michel Foucault. In: Faubion,
editor. Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Volume 3.
London: Penguin, 2002 [1978]. p. 241.
84
Vonnegut. Playboy Interview. p. 214.
VII. Spirit of Heaviness
1
2
3
See: Foucault. On the Government of the Living. p. 291.
4
5
Hunter. Rethinking the school. p. xxi.
6
Blanchot, Maurice. Lautramont and Sade. Stanford: Stanford
7
Lingis, Alphonso. Translator's Introduction. Sade My
Neighbour. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press,
1991. p. x.
8
The educational intent of Sades work is not only modeled
internally. Juliette, according to one footnote, is intended for lady
readers: Hot-blooded and lewdly disposed ladies, these are
words to the wise, hark attentively to them: they are addressed
not only to Juliette but to yourselves also; if your intelligence is
in any sense comparable to hers, youll not fail to extract great
benefit from them (Sade, Marquis de. Juliette. New York: Grove
Press, 1968 [1797]. p. 340).
9
Though it is a woman, Juliette, who is the libertine hero of the
book of the same name, and though the book is addressed to
lady readers, our hero rarely encounters her match in libertine
women, and finds she has much to teach most of the women
she meets. So, for example, to Princess Borghese she remarks:
Among libertine women I have never encountered your
superior But there arescores and scores of little habits, dirty
and furtive ones, loathsome and ugly ones, crapulous and brutal
ones, which, perhaps, my gentle dove, you are still to make
230
Notes
acquaintance of (Sade. Juliette. p. 709). For lessons in mastery,

with the exception perhaps of the sorceress Durand, Juliette
looks most often, and more beseechingly to men.
10
Sade. Juliette. p. 181.
11
The moment he detects her falter and recoil before his
imagined crimes Saint-Fond, Juliettes greatest sponsor,
abandons her and has her quit Paris (and later France) leaving
behind all she has acquired through his largesse and protection.
This is after so much success, after Juliette has given him so
much cause to admire her grotesque affinity for libertinage. But
for her moment of weakness, Juliette had otherwise reached
that exalted and most libertine state of numbed indifference. It
is at this point, once so much has been achieved in crime and
horror, Juliette recalls, that virtue makes a final effort inside
us this is the moment, beware of it, when long-forgotten
prejudices reappear (Sade. Juliette. pp. 548-9.). Eventually
Juliette rises to power once again, whilst Saint-Fond falls foul of
her accomplice, Noirceuil.
12
Sade. Juliette. p. 285. Juliette is frequently upbraided by her
teachers, but is on the lookout too for inconsistencies and
weaknesses in those who instruct her. She questions Saint-
Fonds mastery on more than one occasion; for allowing himself
to be in debt to others (ibid. p. 245), and for allowing himself to
believe in some form of afterlife (ibid. p. 370). Meanwhile, she
accuses Clairwil (who will eventually die by her hand) of a
weakened atheism (ibid. p. 451).
13
14
There is little patience for teaching those who do not swiftly
acquire libertine mastery. The libertine educator, like the
libertine Pope, is under an obligation to make fools of the
simple (Sade. Juliette. p. 757). Fellow libertines wanton enough
to deserve some respect, such as the Countess Donis (who,
Juliette narrates was already almost a match for me in
wickedness) do, however, still manage to incite Juliette to teach
(ibid. p. 634). This is because Juliette finds in those of similar
cast an opportunity for libertinage. In Donis she swiftly acquires
a wealthy accomplice. If she also teaches Donis for a short
231
interval, it is only so as to acquire a better partner in crime, and

perhaps hone her own philosophy too, as she holds forth before
a willing listener. But Donis is soon sacrificed, having betrayed
herself as still imperfectly libertine. Juliette has little patience for
teaching. As she explains to her student and unwitting victim,
any residual virtue fairly turns my stomach (ibid. p. 646).
Another student, Duchess Grillo, is tolerated for longer since
she is at first a great source of pleasure. But as soon as she
proves unresponsive to her teachings Juliette loses patience:
that was the moment I took the resolve to destroy her (ibid. p.
722). Princess Borghese is also finally despatched, after many
libertine adventures by Juliettes side. She is cast into a volcano
because, in the end, she lacked depth and rigor in her
principles; timorous, still in prejudices grip, apt at any moment
to give way before a reverse, and who, owing to nothing more
than this one weakness, was unsuitable company for a woman
as corrupt as Juliette (ibid. p. 1019).
15
This is unusual in the prolix context of Sades writing.
16
17
18
Gallop, Jane. The Immoral Teachers. Yale French Studies
1982; 63. p. 118.
19
Gallop. The Immoral Teachers. p. 126.
20
Kings are ridiculed accordingly: In our day there is nothing
more superfluous than a king. Having become weak, their
authority rests on nothing solider than opinion, which is fickle
and will most assuredly betray them. These kings, seated at one
remove and in luxury neglect, moreover, the first virtue
demanded of anyone who wishes to be a ruler of men which is
knowledge of them. Tucked away, perpetually stunned and
fuddled by their flatteries, monarchs are not able to sift nor
scan those they rule (Sade. Juliette. p. 568). To master men
one must live among them and examine them most intimately.
21
Gallop. The Immoral Teachers. p. 122.
22
Hence the most enjoyable crimes are the motiveless ones.
The victim must be perfectly innocent: if we have sustained
232
Notes
some harm from him it legitimates the harm we do him (Sade.

Juliette. p. 702).
23
It suits my exposition to treat Man, God, and finally Nature in
that sequence. But it must be remembered that Sade works
away at each problem (the problems posed by Man, God and
Nature) throughout his texts and in no particular order. This is,
as Jane Gallop argues, no simple dialectical arrangement (see:
Gallop, Jane. Intersections: A reading of Sade with Bataille,
Blanchot, and Klossowski. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1981). Sades attacks are too frenzied for that.
24
Blanchot. Lautramont and Sade. p. 7.
25
With regard to reason, Sade confronts the idea that a better
use of reason, and better knowledge of and more thoroughgoing
attempt to master our material existence will make possible a
better individual and social morality (Klossowski, Pierre. Sade
My Neighbour. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University
Press, 1991 [1967/1947]. p. 81). As Pierre Klossowski argued,
Sade foresees instead from reason not the arrival of a happier
era for humanity, but only the beginning of tragedy, which Sade
not only consciously and deliberately accepts, but also realises
in his writing, making use of reason to monstrous effect (ibid.).
26
27
28
29
As the libertine Princess Borghese declares: The stocks, the
pillory, the scaffold itself would for me be a privilege, the throne
of delight, upon it Id cry death defiance, and discharge in the
pleasure of perishing the victim of my crimes and over the idea
that in future my name would a byword for evil, at whose mere
mention generations of men would tremble I see the abyss
yawning at my feet, and jubilantly I hurl myself over the brink
(Sade. Juliette. pp. 663-4). Elsewhere Juliette says something
similar: There is nothing I fear less in the world than the
noose If ever a judge sends me to the scaffold, you will see
me go forward with light and impudent step (ibid. p. 1014).
30
233
31
32
See: Sade, Marquis de. The 120 Days of Sodom and other
writings. New York: Grove Press, 1966 [1785]. p. 362. And not
only comparison is suspect, pleasure itself is problematic. The
libertine should, in principle, be able perpetrate the worst crimes
with the coolest temperament, without being fired up and into
action by the atrocities occasioned: Crime is the torch that
should fire the passions. Whereas the opposite (passion firing
her to crime) is infinitely suspect. We are told that the
difference is enormous, where the latter signifies, for the
libertine concerned, that she is still plagued by a ruinous
sensibility (Sade. Juliette. p. 475).
33
Klossowski. Sade My Neighbour. p. 79.
34
Blanchot. Lautramont and Sade. pp. 18-9.
35
36
Cavarero. In Spite of Plato. p. 55.
37
38
39
Though Simone de Beauvoirs account is divergent in so
many other respects, here there is agreement (see: Beauvoir,
Simone de. Must We Burn Sade? In: Wainhouse and Seaver,
editors. The 120 Days of Sodom and other writings - Marquis de
Sade. New York: Grove Press, 1966 [1951]. p. 21).
40
Beauvoir. Must We Burn Sade? p. 29. This elision between
the philosopher and the libertine is not exaggerated. In Sades
writing accomplished philosophy and perfect libertinage are
virtually synonymous, where the most horrific crimes are only
achieved through the most perfect philosophy.
41
Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idols. p. 46.
42
43
44
45
46
234
Notes
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Horkheimer, Max and Adorno, Theodor. Dialectic of
Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments. Stanford: Stanford
61
62
Horkheimer and Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. p. 69.
63
Horkheimer and Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. p. 65.
64
65
Nietzsche. The Will to Power.
66
See: Straehler-Pohl, Hauke and Pais, Alexandre. Learning to
fail and learning from failure - ideology at work in a mathematics
classroom. Pedagogy, Culture & Society 2014; 22(1). One
educational response to failure is to argue that we should make
failure an option, making it permissible for those who do not fit
to opt out of the normative order of an educational system they
cannot bear. Such non-normative others would be encouraged
to follow other pathways to success (see: Steigler, Sam and
Sullivan, Rachael E. How to 'fail' in school without really trying:
queering pathways to success. Pedagogy, Culture & Society
2015; 23(1)). The problem with this kind of critique, I suspect, is
that it would seem to perpetuate a belief in educational mastery
by seeking to bleed out the effects of failure and diversify what it
235
means to succeed. This admittedly generous, and typically

progressive response to the presence of failure in education is
problematic, in that it defers the problem of failure, and hence,
despite itself, leaves education essentially intact.
67
Straehler-Pohl and Pais. Learning to fail and learning from
failure. p. 81.
68
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for
Everyone and Nobody. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005
[1883]. p. 36.
VIII. A Modern Fetish
1
Aris, Philippe. The Hour of Our Death. New York: Vintage,
2008 [1977]. p. 355.
2
Aris. The Hour of Our Death. p. 357.
3
Aris. The Hour of Our Death. pp. 357-8.
4
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The
Prison. London: Penguin, 1975 [1991].
5
We find women carved swooning in stone relief upon their
tombs. Upon these carvings death seemingly pierces like the
arrow of an angel, the little death of sexual pleasure
associated with the final death of the body (Aris. The Hour of
Our Death. p. 373).
6
It is tempting to invoke some kind of zombie metaphor here.
That metaphor has become strangely popular and informs the
following collection of essays: Whelan, Andrew, Walker, Ruth
and Moore, Christopher. Zombies in the Academy: Living Death
in Higher Education. Bristol: Intellect, 2013. It is striking that
even with this metaphor employed we are unlikely to fully
confront our condition. This can be felt as one observes a
zombie film. Do we not have a tendency still, to identify with the
survivors rather than the zombie horde?
7
This is reflected, Ben Jeffery argues, in the work of Michel
Houellebecq. See: Jeffery, Ben. Anti-Matter: Michel Houellebecq
and Depressive Realism. Winchester: Zero Books, 2011.
236
Notes
8
Marx. Capital I. p. 170.
9
10
Here Marx cites Goethe, claiming that our commodity owners
think like Faust: In the beginning was the deed (Marx. Capital
I. p. 180.).
11
12
Goddard, Roy and Payne, Mark. Criticality and the practice-
based MA. Journal of Education for Teaching 2013; 39(1). p.
133.
13
Goddard and Payne. Criticality and the practice-based MA. p.
133
14
15
16
17
18
Foucault. Interview with Michel Foucault. p. 247.
19
Foucault. Interview with Michel Foucault. p. 245.
20
Rabinow, Paul. Foucault's Untimely Struggle. In: Falzon,
O'Leary and Sawicki, editors. A Companion to Foucault.
Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. p. 192.
21
Rabinow. Foucault's Untimely Struggle. p. 191.
22
Rabinow. Foucault's Untimely Struggle. p. 192.
23
Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil. 206.
24
Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil. 205.
25
Foucault spends some time explaining what he means by the
phrase regime of truth in: Foucault. On the Government of the
Living. pp. 93-100. Foucault contests the idea that truths are
self-evident, and that once they are admitted, the obligation to
follow them is more or less automatic. Believing that this
obligation is always a historical-cultural artefact, Foucault
investigates how different regimes of truth have variously been
tied to systems of obligation. His objective is to investigate how
expressions of truth variously serve to constrain and bind all
those involved in a particular regime of truth.
237
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
Lawlor, Clark. Consumption and Literature: The Making of the
Romantic Disease. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. p.
10.
38
Dumas cited in: Lawlor. Consumption and Literature. p. 113.
39
Lawlor. Consumption and Literature. p. 112.
40
Lawlor. Consumption and Literature. p. 113.
41
Sontag, Susan. Illness as Metaphor. Illness as Metaphor and
AIDS and Its Metaphors. London: Penguin, 1978 [2002]. pp. 19-
20.
42
IX. The Absurd
1
Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers II. 6.31-2.
2
Excerpt from a letter written by Nietzsches sister to Clara
Gelzer in 1882. Cited in: Salom, Lou. Nietzsche. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2001 [1894]. p. li.
3
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Attempt at Self-Criticism. The Birth of
Tragedy. London: Penguin, 2003 [1886]. 1-2. The book is
impossible, James Porter argues, since Nietzsche demonstrates
in his writing the extreme, perhaps intractable difficulties faced
as we seek to escape our metaphysical inheritance (Porter,
238
Notes
James. The Invention of Dionysus: An Essay on The Birth of

Tragedy: Stanford University Press, 2000).
4
A note of caution: Nietzsche typically invokes historical
characters as vague cyphers, or code words, for broader
structures of feeling. Consequently, as Michael Tanner argues
in his Introduction to The Birth of Tragedy, the historical
accuracy of these figures in Nietzsches work may be at an
ultimate discount (Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy. p. xxi)
5
The influence of which, Nietzsche claims, spread across
posterity like a shadow lengthening in the evening sun
(Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy. 15).
6
Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy. 9. Here Nietzsche is
referring to Apolline qualities that exist in tension with the
Dionysian aspect of Greek tragedy. This latter Dionysian aspect
gives the lie to those boundaries established by Apolline art.
Later these bounded qualities are transformed to become what
Nietzsche refers to as the Socratic tendency, where self-
knowledge and contemplation are now promoted in earnest.
From this point on, so the argument goes, we become lost in an
illusory world of bounded, knowledge-seeking individuals. As
such, we are no longer disposed to confront the tragedy of
human existence.
7
Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy. 18.
8
Camus, Albert. The Fall. London: Penguin, 1980 [1956]. p. 27.
9
10
Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy. 18 (my emphasis).
11
12
Claiming that the worst thing of all for them would be to die
soon, the second worst to die at all (Nietzsche. The Birth of
Tragedy. 3).
13
14
15
16
17
Porter. The Invention of Dionysus. p. 86.
239
18
Porter. The Invention of Dionysus. p. 85.
19
Bernhard, Thomas. Walking. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. p. 7.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Porter. The Invention of Dionysus. p. 113. This being Porters
translation from: Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy. 7.
27
Nietzsche. Human, All Too Human. Preface 5.
28
Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy. Attempt at Self-Criticism 1.
29
Zaretsky, Robert. A Life Worth Living: Belknap Press, 2013. p.
32.
30
Camus. The Myth of Sisyphus. p. ix.
31
Here Camus held to the view that even within the limits of
nihilism it is possible to find the means to proceed beyond
nihilism (Camus. The Myth of Sisyphus. p. ix).
32
Camus, Albert. The Outsider. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972
[1942].
33
It is not in his prereflective indifference or honesty, but in
his reflections before death, that Meursault becomes a
semblance of the absurd hero (Solomon, Robert. Dark
Feelings, Grim Thoughts: Experience and Reflection in Camus
and Sartre. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 26).
34
Camus. The Outsider. p. 100.
35
As argued, Meursault perversely [and eventually] sees that,
on reflection, it can be seen that reflection is worthless
(Solomon. Dark Feelings, Grim Thoughts. p. 31). It is in the
impassioned hopelessness of reflection, just before his
execution, that Meursault faces the absurd as a final revelation
and lays his heart open to the benign indifference of the
universe (ibid. p. 32).
240
Notes
36
Camus. The Outsider. p. 120.
37
It is conceivable that the absurd lost traction in stages: As
Zaretsky observes, to the extent that post-war critics of The
Myth of Sisyphus also felt the absurdity Camus described, they
decided the best response was to adopt a position of ironic
detachment. This was now the response of those who similarly
felt the cosmic indifference to our situation. Yet by contrast to
the inescapable pain the presence of absurdity once entailed for
Camus, this more distant, ironic and philosophical response to
the presence of absurdity seems to have come more easily to
those who have lived mostly in the aftermath of World War II
[rather] than those who lived through it (Zaretsky. A Life Worth
Living. pp. 49-50). So we have a sequence, where the coupling
between absurdity and pain is replaced by a more detached
coupling between absurdity and irony. Sticking with the idea of a
staged departure, one might then suggest that today the
position has advanced one stage further. We late moderns have
been left only with the detached irony that the presence of the
absurd once inspired. The absurd itself rarely appears to us
now.
38
Camus. The Myth of Sisyphus. p. 3.
39
Zaretsky offers two contemporary examples: Firstly, the
disparity between Frances strength [in 1940] and the
suddenness of its collapse, and secondly, the disparity
experienced by those millions of refugees fleeing from Belgium
and northern France who, just days before they were pulled into
the vortex created by the capsizing of the French republic, still
believed stupidly in the permanence of their civil, legal, and
political institutions, as well as the durability of their everyday
lives (Zaretsky. A Life Worth Living. p. 29). These lives were
suddenly punctured in moments that could be as banal as an
overheard conversation or a glimpsed interaction, or as
extraordinary as a Stuka bearing down on you (ibid. p. 30). Try
though one might to return to normal, those who had
experienced such absurdity would always remain, as Camus put
it, at least just slightly out of tune (ibid.).
40
241
41
Camus. The Myth of Sisyphus. p. 15
42
43
44
45
46
Camus. The Myth of Sisyphus. pp. 17-8.
47
48
Not to be confused with impossible suicide. See VI note 76.
49
Where the hopes themselves, or the unremitting nature of
reality alone, are not absurd; the absurd is generated in the
impossible relationship that is established between them. See:
50
You describe [this world] to me and you teach me to classify
it. You enumerate its laws and in my thirst for knowledge I admit
that they are true. You take apart its mechanism and my hope
increases. At the final stage you teach me that this wondrous
and multi-coloured universe can be reduced to the atom and
that the atom itself can be reduced to the electron. All this is
good and I wait for you to continue. But you tell me of an
invisible planetary system in which electrons gravitate around a
nucleus. You explain this world to me with an image. I realize
then that you have been reduced to poetry: I shall never know.
Have I the time to become indignant? You have already
changed theories. So that science that was to teach me
everything ends up in a hypothesis, that lucidity founders in
metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved in a work of art (Camus.
The Myth of Sisyphus. pp. 16-7.).
51
52
53
Camus. The Myth of Sisyphus. pp. 38-9.
54
55
56
57
242
Notes
58
The charge made in: Solomon. Dark Feelings, Grim
Thoughts.
59
243

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Ground down, disenchanted, but

committed to education. Unable to quit,

CC: Ansgar Allen 2017

Images by Frances Allen, University of California,

Cover design by Zanna Allen

ISBN (Print) 978-1-906948-35-1

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons

Ansgar Allen is a Lecturer in Education at the University

III BENEVOLENT EDUCATORS 33

IV OUR EDUCATIONAL CONSCIENCE 59

VI INSULTS AND OBSCENITIES 105

VII SPIRIT OF HEAVINESS 133

VIII A MODERN FETISH 151

IX THE ABSURD 171

Dying all about us? It hardly lived. But education is vital,

Aspire to be more like us, say the educated. You may

Education is not perverted, it is perversion. Education

There is a difference between the Cynics point of view

To be a better cynic you are directed to the Cynics of

A Cynicism of our own might still be attempted. A militant

The educated are cynics in a more personal sense. This

habit. Educated people are doomed in modernity to a

This book takes aim at you and me, at our cynical

The death of education? Announced last century more

Amid educated people, academics are specialist

code whereby originality is a defect, innovation is

The Cynics dead materials were organised as sayings

convention, insults decorum, mocks philosophy and

This book raises more problems than it answers a

This book provides no systematic answers; it makes no

intrigue everywhere. At most, those insisting power

This book seeks out its populace with polemic intent. It

university machine (which must secure the reputation of

Academic writing will not become open to others so long

Against the stifling conformity of a profession in which

perish, establishing yet another cartel where people of

A reading of the playwright Bertolt Brecht would have

audience with gentle encouragement into the deep

Friedrich Nietzsche will at times repel even his most avid

Educators may become distressed, and feel the torment

This book takes aim at the conceit of educated people, in

A new breed of Cynic trots forth: The challenge it

Glorify What Exists

In todays educational circles, those holding to the

of reasonable and dependable neutrality expected of

Embrace your nihilism with tears and laughter for the

We follow education downwards giving its worst aspects

Spit furthest at the promise of hope at the assurance we

Declarations against nihilism, claims it can be overcome,

Our self-told destiny murmurs on as we open out the

triptych; it represents our disappointment with the third

For some the advent of Western nihilism is not to be

The accomplished nihilist resists the pathos of

But we have been schooled too well and too long to

Socrates goaded others, but claimed to be himself driven

Make no mistake, our conscience may be ancient in

Half Dead Already

The Socratic teacher builds so much on so little, relying

Centuries after Plato yet to our eyes still ancient, Plotinus

educational path could not be rationalised. And its object