1 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. NO. 191567, March 20, 2013

MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN and TEODORA ALYN
ESTEBAN, Respondents.
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.

Facts:
On 18 December 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner, the
mother of Cheasare Armani "Chase" Callo Claridad, whose
lifeless but bloodied body was discovered in the evening of
27 February 2007, against Philip. It observed that: (1) there
was lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial evidence
sufficient to charge Philip with homicide, much less murder;
(2) the circumstantial evidence could not link Philip to the
crime; (3) Philip was not shown to have any motive to kill
Chase; (4) no sufficient evidence existed to charge Teodora
with the crime, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory. Petitioner moved to reconsider but was dismissed
on 15 December 2008.

On petition for review, the Secretary of Justice affirmed the

dismissal of the complaint on 16 April 2009. It stated that
the confluence of lack of an eyewitness, lack of motive,
insufficient circumstantial evidence, and the doubt as to the
proper identification of Philip by the witnesses resulted in
the lack of probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with
the crime alleged. Petitioner moved to reconsider, but was
denied on 21 May 2009. Petitioner went to CA via petition
for review under Rule 43. However on 20 November 2009,
the CA dismissed the petition for review. Petitioner moved to
reconsider, but was denied. Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the filing of the petition for review under
Rule 43 before the CA in order to assail the resolution of
Secretary of Justice is no proper. [YES]
2. Whether or not there was no probable cause to charge
Philip and Teodora with murder for the killing of Chase.
[YES]

Ruling:

Petition is Denied. CA Decision Affirmed.

I.
We note, to start with, that the petitioner assailed the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice by filing in the CA a
petition for review under Rule 43, Rules of Court. That was a
grave mistake that immediately called for the outright
dismissal of the petition. The filing of a petition for review
under Rule 43 to review the Secretary of Justice's resolution
on the determination of probable cause was an improper
remedy.11 Indeed, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction vis--
vis the Secretary of Justice.

A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be

taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards by
the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly
those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43.12 In the matter
before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an
officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the
findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of probable
cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially
executive function to determine whether the crime alleged
against the respondents was committed, and whether there
was probable cause to believe that the respondents were
guilty thereof.13
On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the
Secretary of Justice's determination of probable cause only
through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens
when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a
quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising
powers akin to those of a court of law.14 But the requirement
for such intervention was still for the petitioner to
demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the
intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the Court has postulated in
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III: 15

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to

directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute
their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in
this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the
courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable
cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility. x x x

Secondly, even an examination of the CA's decision indicates

that the CA correctly concluded that the Secretary of Justice
did not abuse his discretion in passing upon and affirming
the finding of probable cause by the OCP.

A preliminary investigation, according to Section 1, Rule 112

of the Rules of Court, is "an inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial." The investigation is advisedly called preliminary,
because it is yet to be followed by the trial proper in a court
of law. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display
of the parties' evidence but for the presentation only of such
evidence as may engender a well-founded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty of the offense.16 The role and object of
preliminary investigation were "to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and
to protect him from open and public accusation of crime,
from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and
also to protect the State from useless and expensive
prosecutions."17

In Arula vs. Espino,18 the Court rendered the three purposes

of a preliminary investigation, to wit: (1) to inquire
concerning the commission of a crime and the connection of
the accused with it, in order that he may be informed of the
nature and character of the crime charged against him, and,
if there is probable cause for believing him guilty, that the
State may take the necessary steps to bring him to trial; (2)
to preserve the evidence and keep the witnesses within the
control of the State; and (3) to determine the amount of bail,
if the offense is bailable. The officer conducting the
examination investigates or inquires into facts concerning
the commission of a crime with the end in view of
determining whether an information may be prepared
against the accused.

The determination of the existence of probable cause lies

within the discretion of the public prosecutor after
conducting a preliminary investigation upon the complaint of
an offended party.19Probable cause for purposes of filing a
criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed, and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause, although it requires less than evidence
justifying a conviction, demands more than bare suspicion.20

A public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of

evidence that establishes the probable cause justifying the
filing of a criminal information against the respondent
because the determination of existence of a probable cause
is the function of the public prosecutor.21 Generally, the
public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in
the conduct of a preliminary investigation. Consequently, it
is a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, and to just leave to
the Department of Justice the ample latitude of discretion in
the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed
offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse
the Secretary of Justice's findings and conclusions on the
matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave
abuse of discretion.22 By way of exception, however, judicial
review is permitted where the respondent in the preliminary
investigation clearly establishes that the public prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when the
public prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.23Moreover, the trial court
may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of
probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary
investigation when necessary for the orderly administration
of justice.24 Although policy considerations call for the widest
latitude of deference to the public prosecutor's findings, the
courts should never shirk from exercising their power, when
the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the public
prosecutor's findings are supported by the facts, and by the
law.25
Under the circumstances presented, we conclude to be
correct the CA's determination that no prima facie evidence
existed that sufficiently indicated the respondents'
involvement in the commission of the crime. It is clear that
there was no eyewitness of the actual killing of Chase; or
that there was no evidence showing how Chase had been
killed, how many persons had killed him, and who had been
the perpetrator or perpetrators of his killing. There was also
nothing that directly incriminated the respondents in the
commission of either homicide or murder.

Admittedly, the petitioner relies solely on circumstantial

evidence, which she insists to be enough to warrant the
indictment of respondents for murder.

We disagree.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a

conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with
one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading
to one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been
committed and that the respondents are probably guilty
thereof. The pieces of evidence must be consistent with the
hypothesis that the respondents were probably guilty of the
crime and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that they were innocent, and with every rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.26 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient,
therefore, if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.27

The records show that the circumstantial evidence linking

Philip to the killing of Chase derived from the bare
recollections of Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray and
Corpus (respectively, the househelp and nanny in the
household of a resident of the subdivision) about seeing
Chase board the white Honda Civic at around 7:00 p.m. of
February 27, 2007, and about Philip being the driver of the
Honda Civic. But there was nothing else after that, because
the circumstances revealed by the other witnesses could not
even be regarded as circumstantial evidence against Philip.
To be sure, some of the affidavits were unsworn.28 The
statements subscribed and sworn to before the officers of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) having the authority to
administer oaths upon matters connected with the
performance of their official duties undeniably lacked the
requisite certifications to the effect that such administering
officers had personally examined the affiants, and that such
administering officers were satisfied that the affiants had
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.29

The lack of the requisite certifications from the affidavits of

most of the other witnesses was in violation of Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides
thusly:

Section 3. Procedure. The preliminary investigation shall be conducted

in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall
be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses,
as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause.
They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus
two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed
and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized
to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a
notary public, each of who must certify that he personally examined
the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.
xxx

The CA explained that the requirement for the certifications

under the aforecited rule was designed to avoid self-serving
and unreliable evidence from being considered for purposes
of the preliminary investigation, the present rules for which
do not require a confrontation between the parties and their
witnesses; hence, the certifications were mandatory, to wit:

In Oporto, Jr. vs. Monserate, it was held that the requirement set forth
under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
is mandatory. This is so because the rules on preliminary investigation
does not require a confrontation between the parties. Preliminary
investigation is ordinarily conducted through submission of affidavits
and supporting documents, through submission of affidavits and
supporting documents, through the exchange of pleadings. Thus, it
can be inferred that the rationale for requiring the affidavits of
witnesses to be sworn to before a competent officer so as to ensure
that the affidavits supporting the factual allegations in the Complaint
have been sworn before a competent officer and that the affiant has
signed the same in the former's presence declaring on oath the truth
of the statement made considering that this becomes part of the bases
in finding probable guilt against the respondent. Well-settled is the
rule that persons, such as an employee, whose unsworn declarations
in behalf of a party, or the employee's employer in this case, are not
admissible in favor of the latter. Further, it has been held that unsworn
statements or declarations are self-serving and self-serving
declarations are not admissible in evidence as proof of the facts
asserted, whether they arose by implication from acts and conduct or
were made orally or reduced in writing. The vital objection to the
admission to this kind of evidence is its hearsay character.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the statements/affidavits

accompanying the complaint shows that out of the total of
16 statements/affidavits corresponding to the respective
witnesses, only nine (9) thereof were sworn to before a
competent officer. These were the affidavits of the following:
(1) SG Sarmiento; (2) SG Solis; (3) SG Fabe; (4) SG Marivic
Rodriguez; (5) Jennylyn Buri; (6) Richard Joshua Sulit; (7)
Marites Navarro; (8) Pamela-Ann Que; and (9) Edbert Ylo,
which were sworn to or subscribed before a competent
officer.

Thus, it is imperative that the circumstantial evidence that

the victim was last seen in the company of respondent Philip
must be established by competent evidence required by the
rules in preliminary investigation. Here, it was allegedly
Chase's sister, Ariane, and their two household helpers,
Marivic Guray and Michelle Corpus, who saw respondent
Philip pick up Chase at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of
February 27, 2007. Yet, such fact from which the inference
is derived was not duly proven. The statements of Marivic
and Michelle both executed on February 28, 2007 were not
sworn to before the proper officer. Neither was the affidavit
dated July 3, 2009 of Ariane Claridad duly notarized nor is
there any explanation why the same was belatedly executed.

It cannot thus be used to prove the circumstance that it was

respondent Philip who drove the white car parked in front of
their house at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of
February 27, 2007 and that the factual allegation that the
car used bore the Plate no. CRD-999. Further, since their
affidavits were not in the nature of a public document, it is
incumbent upon the complainant to prove its due execution
and authenticity before the same is admitted in evidence. It
is a well-settled rule that private documents must be proved
as to their due execution and authenticity before they may
be received in evidence.

Likewise, the circumstance that the victim sent a text

message to his girlfriend Monet that he was on his way to
get the tires at around 7:09 o'clock in the evening of
February 27, 2007 is likewise inadmissible in evidence
because Monet's affidavit was not sworn to before a
competent officer. There was also no evidence of the alleged
text message pursuant to the law on admissibility of
electronic evidence. Besides, it cannot be inferred therefrom
who the victim was with at that time and where he was
going to get the tires.

Neither can the handwritten unsworn statement dated

February 28, 2007 of SG Rodolph delos Reyes and
handwritten sworn statement dated March 8, 2008 of SG
Henry Solis be of any help in claiming that the victim was in
the company of respondent Philip when the latter entered
the village at around 7:26 o'clock in the evening of February
27, 2007. Suffice it to state that their statements only
identified respondent Philip driving the white Honda Civic
bearing Plate No. CRD-999. However, both were unsure if
they saw respondent Philip with a passenger because it was
already dark and the car was tinted.30

Also, the CA cited in its decision the further consequences of

not complying with the aforequoted rule, to wit:

It also follows that the succeeding pieces of circumstantial

evidence relied upon by complainant are not admissible for
either being incompetent or hearsay evidence, to wit:

(a) that at around 7:45 p.m., respondent Teodora Alyn Esteban, on

board a vehicle bearing plate no. XPN-733 entered Ferndale Homes is
inadmissible because it is not supported by any sworn affidavit of a
witness
(b) that at around the same time, two unidentified persons, a male
and female were heard talking inside Honda Civic bearing plate no.
JTG-333 allegedly belonging to respondent Philip, which was one of the
vehicles parked at the carport of #10 Cedar Place, inside Ferndale
Homes is inadmissible because it is not supported by any sworn
affidavit of a witness;
(c) that the Esteban family was temporarily using the carport of #10
Cedar Place as a carpark for their vehicles at that time is inadmissible
because it is not supported by any sworn affidavit of a witness;
(d) that when the guards went to the house of the Esteban family, the
same was unusually dark and dim is inadmissible because it is not
supported by any sworn affidavit of a witness;
(e) that while the crime scene was being processed, Mr. Esteban
sought assistance from the police and requested that they escort his
son, respondent Philip Esteban, to St. Luke's Medical Center, as the
latter also allegedly suffered injuries is inadmissible because it is not
supported by any sworn affidavit of a witness;
(f) that during the investigation, Philip, Mrs. Teodora Alyn Esteban and
their family refused to talk and cooperate with the authorities and that
they neither disclosed the extent of Philip's alleged injuries nor
disclosed as to how or why he sustained them is inadmissible because
it is not supported by any sworn affidavit of a witness; and
(g) Mrs. Edith Flores, speaking for respondents' family, reportedly
communicated with the family of the deceased on numerous occasions
and offered to pay for the funeral expenses is inadmissible because it
is not supported by any sworn affidavit of a witness.

This now leaves this Court with the remaining pieces of

circumstantial evidence supported by the sworn statement
dated March 6, 2007 of Marivic Rodriguez, handwritten
sworn statement dated March 8, 2007 of SG Abelardo
Sarmiento, Jr. and handwritten sworn statement dated
March 8, 2007 of SG Rene Fabe as follows:

(a) at around 7:30 p.m., Marivic Guray and Jennylyn Buri heard a
commotion (loud cries saying "Help! Help!) at No. 10, Cedar Place
inside Ferndale Homes;
(b) at around 7:50 p.m., the body of the deceased was discovered
lying in a pool of blood in the carport of #10 Cedar Place;
(c) there was blood inside and outside the white Honda Civic bearing
plate no. CRD-999;
(d) that at around 7:55 p.m., respondent Philip Esteban's father, Lauro
Esteban, who was then outside the village, called the security guard at
the entrance gate of the village to report the incident through his
mobile phone;
(e) that at around 9:09 p.m., Mr. Esteban entered the village and
admitted that he was the one who called for assistance regarding an
incident that transpired at Cedar Place; and
(f) as per Autopsy Report, the cause of Chase's death was a stab
wound in the chest and that the said wound was 9 centimeters deep,
or around 3.6 inches and cut the descending aorta of his heart.

The above pieces of circumstantial evidence, though duly

supported by sworn statements of witnesses, when taken as
a whole, do not, however, lead to a finding of probable
cause that respondents committed the crime charged.

The factual allegations of the complaint merely show that at

around 7:30 o'clock in the evening of February 27, 2007,
Marivic Rodriguez heard a male voice, coming from the front
of their employer's house, shouting "Help! Help!"; that at
around 7:50 p.m., the body of the deceased was discovered
lying in a pool of blood in the carport of #10 Cedar Place;
that there was blood inside and outside the white Honda
Civic bearing plate no. CRD-999; and, that as per Autopsy
Report, the cause of Chase's death was a stab wound in the
chest and that the said wound was 9 centimeters deep, or
around 3.6 inches and cut the descending aorta of his heart.
However, all of these do not prove the presence of
respondents at the scene of the crime nor their participation
therein.

We likewise agree with the DOJ Secretary that there was no

motive on the part of the respondents to kill the victim. This
was supported by the sworn statement dated March 1, 2007
of Richard Joshua Ulit; the sworn statement dated March 10,
2007 of Pamela-Ann Que; and, the sworn statement dated
March 10, 2007 of Egbert Ylo, who all knew the victim and
respondent Philip and claimed that the two were good
friends and that they were not aware of any
misunderstanding that occurred between the concerned
parties. Jurisprudence is replete that motive becomes of
vital importance when there is doubt as to the identity of the
perpetrator.

In Preferred Home Specialties, Inc., et al. vs. Court of

Appeals, et al., the Supreme Court held that while probable
cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is
a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent
material damage to a potential accused's constitutional right
to liberty, the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to
protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses
in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising
from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.31

It is clear from the foregoing disquisitions of the CA that the

Secretary of Justice reasonably reached the conclusion that
the dismissal by the OCP of Quezon City of the complaint for
murder had been based on the lack of competent evidence
to support a finding of probable cause against the
respondents. Accordingly, such finding of probable cause by
the Executive Department, through the Secretary of Justice,
could not be undone by the CA, in the absence of a clear
showing that the Secretary of Justice had gravely abused his
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means that the abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law,
such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.32That
showing was not made herein.