The I nterplay bet w een

C ompetition L aw and I ntellectual

P roperty R ights in the
I ndian H ealthcare S ector
Murali Neelakantan*

There has been very little research published on the effect of

brands, design, and trade dress on extension of patent monopolies.
This paper explores how brand names, design, and trade dress
have the effect of creating barriers to competition in the Indian
healthcare market. Another consequence of the combination of
brands and patents is the compliance risk for doctors to whom
these drugs are being marketed. The paper concludes with some
recommendations to address these issues and a call for deeper
research into the Indian healthcare market, primarily from a
competition law standpoint.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Classification of Products . . . . . . . . . . 41

Historical Tension between IPR and Competition Law Remedies for Abuse
Competition Law Continues. . . . . . . . . . 32 of Patent Monopoly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Indian Competition Act and its Effect of Trademarks on Market
Uncertain Interplay with IPR. . . . . . . . . 33 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Are IPR Statutes Self-Contained Codes Why Dont We Name Drugs Like
and Immune from Competition Law?. . . 35 Other Products? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Market is the Starting Point for a Brand Names for Drugs Cause
Competition Law Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . 37 Confusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Physical Characteristics or End-use Trade Dress is the Next Barrier to
of the Goods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Price of Goods or Services. . . . . . . . . . 38 Trade Mark extends Patent Monopoly . . . 52
Consumer Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Conclusion and Recommendations. . . . . . 53
Existence of Specialized Producers . . . 41

*
Founder, amicus (formerly Global General Counsel, Cipla Ltd.); B.A., LL.B. (Hons.),
National Law School of India University (1996). This paper would not have been pos-
sible without research assistance from Suvajit Chakraborty and Anupama Konteti, for-
mer colleagues at Cipla Limited, and Dr. Swaraj Barooah of SpicyIP who helped with
valuable feedback on an early draft of this paper.
32 NLS BUSINESS LAW REVIEW VOL. 1

I ntroduction
Competition law advocates the necessity for free markets, detests monop-
olies, and aspires to create a perfectly competitive playground that benefits
consumer choice. It aims to create an ecosystem oriented towards consumer
rights, free trade, and efficient resource allocation. Intellectual property
legislation, in essence, creates monopolies. There is therefore a dichotomy
between Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and competition policy. The
former endangers competition and the latter engenders competition.1 This
paper is focused on certain activities of players in the Indian healthcare sec-
tor which highlight the conflict between IPR and competition law. While
there is a good basis for looking to the rest of the world to understand cer-
tain fundamental aspects of IPR and competition law, the Indian healthcare
sector operates in a completely different manner from that in the US and
Europe, and we should therefore be sceptical of applying the jurisprudence
from those jurisdictions to identify and address Indias problems.

I. H istorical Tension between IPR and

Competition L aw Continues
The discussion on the interplay between patents and competition law is not
recent.

The granting [of] patents inflames cupidity, excites fraud, stimulates

men to run after schemes that may enable them to levy a tax on the
public, begets disputes and quarrels betwixt inventors, provokes end-
less lawsuits...The principle of the law from which such consequences
flow cannot be just. The Economist may have put it rather strongly in
1851, but its disapproval of patents represented conventional wisdom
at the time. A century earlier, Adam Smith had described them as
necessary evils, to be handed out sparingly, and many other econo-
mists have since echoed his reservations. Patents amount to temporary
monopolies on useful new inventions.2

More recently, after the Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 1996,3 a

Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy
1
Report of High Level Committee on Competition Policy & Law Raghavan Committee
(Government of India, 2000), available at https://theindiancompetitionlaw.files.wordpress.
com/2013/02/report_of_high_level_committee_on_competition_policy_law_svs_ragha-
van_committee.pdf [hereinafter Raghavan Committee].
2
Patent Sense, The Economist, (October 20, 2005), available at http://www.economist.
com/node/5015083.
3
World Trade Organisation, Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996, WT/
MIN(96)/16 (Dec. 13, 1996) available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
2015 COMPETITION LAW & IPR IN THE INDIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR 33

was created in 1997. This working group discussed competition-related pro-

visions of all existing World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements. On
the subject of the relation between IPR and competition policy, the view was
expressed that the system of protecting technology through IPR could stim-
ulate research and development (R&D). However, members were directed
to consider the introduction of rules that could control anti-competitive
practices related to the use of IPR.4 The Parliamentary Standing Committee
stated that all forms of IPR have the potential to raise competition policy
issues.

Intellectual Property provides exclusive rights to the holders to per-

form a productive or commercial activity, but this does not include the
right to exert restrictive or monopoly power in a market or society.
Undoubtedly, it is desirable that in the interest of human creativity,
which needs to be encouraged and rewarded, intellectual property
rights need to be provided. This right enables the holder (creator) to
prevent others from using his/her inventions, designs or other cre-
ations. But at the same time, there is a need to curb and prevent
anti-competition behaviour that may surface in the exercise of the
intellectual property rights.5

During the exercise of a right, if any anti-competitive trade practice or

conduct is visible to the detriment of consumer interest or public interest, it
ought to be assailed under the competition policy/law.6 Despite this, when
the Competition Act was drafted, this conflict between IPR and competition
law was, arguably, not addressed in a comprehensive manner. On the other
hand, it may be contended that the omission of exclusions for IPR was delib-
erate and the only intended protection was clearly set out in Section 3 of the
Competition Act, 2002.

II. I ndian Competition Act and its

Uncertain I nterplay with IPR

As one pharma industry expert lamented, owing to the blanket exemption

under Section 3(5), the square peg of any anti-competitive practise tethered

min96_e/min96_e.htm.
4
World Trade Organisation, Report of the Working Group on the Interaction between
Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council (WT/WGTCP/4, Nov. 30, 2000).
5
Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, Ninety-
Third Report on the Competition Bill, 2001 available at http://www.prsindia.org/
uploads/media/1167471748/bill73_2007050873_ Standing_Committee_Report_on_
Competition_Bill__2001.pdf (Last visited on Jun. 25, 2015).
6
Raghavan Committee, supra note 1.
34 NLS BUSINESS LAW REVIEW VOL. 1

to the use of IPRs must now be brought through the round hole of abuse
of dominant position under Section 4.7 While one can sympathise with
the emotion, this is perhaps a very narrow and cynical view since the exemp-
tion for IPR from the application of Section 3 applies only to agreements.
It is a common misconception that IPR has a blanket exemption from all
the provisions of the Competition Act. Thus, if there is an instance of an
abuse of dominant position enjoyed by an IPR holder, the Competition
Commission of India (CCI) would have jurisdiction to inquire into such
abuse.8 Exclusions from the applicability of Section 3 have been provided to
persons seeking to protect their intellectual property rights as well as agree-
ments for the export of goods. However, the CCI would still be empowered
to look into the reasonableness of the restraint while exercising intellectual
property rights.9

The relationship between IPR and competition policy has been com-
plex and widely debated, and various models exist in different countries to
address potential conflicts.10 The complexity of IPR has deepened since the
adoption of legislative reforms in many developing countries as a part of
their commitment under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1995. While the importance of IPR in stim-
ulating inventions is widely advocated, by providing legal monopoly it also
raises competition concerns, and in certain areas like food and healthcare, it
is widely believed that diffusion of intellectual property should have prece-
dence over an incentive to invent.11 It is noticeable that the discussion about
IPR and competition law has remained focussed on patents12 with very little
thought about how other IPR like copyright, trademarks and design can
give rise to competition law issues. This paper is an attempt to look at how

7
Debolina Partap, Intellectual Competition, 5(9) Legal Era (November 2014).
8
Vinod Dall, Injunctions Sought By SEP Holders Abuse of Dominance or Protection of
IPRs?, 5(9) Legal Era (Nov. 2014).
9
Government of India Report on Competition Policy (Planning Commission, 2007), avail-
able at http://planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/wrkgrp11/wg11_cpolicy.pdf
[hereinafter Planning Commission].
10
Remedies for abuse of IPR could exist in IPR legislation and/or in competition law. In the
United Kingdom, competition law issues are addressed by the Office of Fair Trading but
also by specific industry regulators like Ofcom for the telecoms and broadcasting sector,
Ofwat for the water industry and Ofgem for the electricity sector. In the United States, it
is the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission and even the State Attorney
General.
11
This is evidenced in the Doha Declaration which seeks to explain and elaborate on the nexus
between IPR and national interest. See World Trade Organisation, Ministerial Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/
DEC/W/2), available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en/.
12
Raghavan Committee, supra note 1; Planning Commission, supra note 9.
2015 COMPETITION LAW & IPR IN THE INDIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR 35

the Indian healthcare industry uses IPR, and to identify the competition law
issues that arise from it.

III. A re IPR Statutes Self-Contained Codes

and I mmune from C ompetition L aw?

We have recently noticed a move by IPR owners to resist the application of

Indian competition law to IPR13 on the ground that each IPR statute is a
self-contained code and competition law may not be the appropriate rem-
edy for a right created by each of them.14 The Supreme Court of India has
discussed the term self-contained code in several judgments and held that
the following conditions need to be established for a self-contained code:
1. It is a complete legislation for the purpose for which it was enacted;15
2. It provides for all possible situations that may arise in relation to that
purpose;16
3. It contains an adjudicatory machinery;17
4. It provides for an appeal;18

13
Micromax Informatics Ltd., In re, [2013] CCI 77; the suit was filed in relation to refusal
by Ericsson to license standard essential patents for GSM technology to Micromax. The
CCI rejected this contention and directed the Director General to commence investigation.
Ericsson appealed this CCI order and the Delhi High Court granted an interim injunction
against the investigation.
14
See infra note 58 for examples. The United States uses antitrust legislation as the basis for
measures like compulsory licenses to address patent abuse. See, for example, Federal Trade
Commission order in Intel Corporation, FTC Docket no. 9288, Final Agency Decision
(Mar. 24, 1999), and notification by the Department of Justice in the case of United States
v. A.K. Steel Corpn., E.D. Mich. 15-cv-11804. For more examples, see, James Love &
Michael Palmedo, Examples of Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property in the
United States, CPTech Background paper 1 (Sep. 2001), available at http://www.
cptech.org/ip/health/cl/us-cl.html. It may well be argued that compulsory licenses and
other remedies for abuse of a patent are contained in the Patent Act thereby excluding
other legislation from providing measures to counter abuse of IPR. See supra note14.
15
Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2011) 4 Bom CR 212;
Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2010) 7 SCC 129.
16
Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2011) 4 Bom CR 212;
Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2010) 7 SCC 129.
17
The Patent Office can revoke a patent under a post-grant opposition. Similarly the High
Court and the IPAB have specific powers of revocation. See Girnar Traders v. State of
Maharashtra, (2004) 8 SCC 505.
18
See for example, S. 115 of the Patents Act, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India) [herein-
after Patents Act 1970]; S. 91 of the Trade Marks Act, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 1999
(India) [hereinafter Trade Marks Act 1999]; and S. 36 of the Designs Act 2000, No.
16, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India) [hereinafter Designs Act 2000]. See also Girnar
Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 8 SCC 505.
36 NLS BUSINESS LAW REVIEW VOL. 1

5. It contains provisions for offences;19

6. It contains comprehensive provisions pertaining to investigation, 20
inquiry, and trial for offences;21 and
7. It gives power to duly authorized officers to search, recover and
arrest, and record statements of witnesses. 22

The literal meaning of a self-contained code is a law that is complete and

exhaustive. While some of the criteria set out by the Supreme Court of India
are met by various provisions of Indias IPR laws, it is clear that the Patents
Act, 1970, the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Designs Act, 2000 have not
fulfilled all the conditions set out above. Such legislation, though dealing
with the creation and maintenance of IP rights, fails to tackle the existence
of such rights in the market, where they must co-exist with other rights and
the economics of supply and demand. 23

There is no common theme that runs through all IPR legislation and
despite being conceptualised, practiced, and taught as one subject, they have
fundamental differences in the jurisprudential and economic basis for their
existence and how they are meant to work. For example, if a patent is not
worked, the Government can force the patent holder to license it. 24 While a
similar provision exists in the Copyright Act, 25 no corresponding provisions
exist in the Designs Act. Similarly, if a trademark is not used, its registration
lapses26 but that does not prevent its continued use.

If the IPR laws do not exclude the application of competition law, does the
Competition Act, as some apprehend, 27 provide immunity to IPR from com-

19
CBI v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 9 SCC 735.
20
See for example, S. 13, Patents Act, 1970.
21
CBI v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 9 SCC 735. See for example, Ss. 123, 124, Patents Act,
1970; Chapter XII, Trade Marks Act, 1999.
22
CBI v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 9 SCC 735; Moti Lal v. CBI, (2002) 4 SCC 713 : (2002)
2 ACR 1192 (SC). See for example, S. 115(4), Trade Marks Act, 1999.
23
One could argue that S. 84 of the Patents Act, 1970 providing a simplified procedure for
issuing a compulsory license if the patentee indulges in anti-competitive practices specif-
ically allowing a competition law test refutes this. This is also supported by S. 62 of the
Competition Act, No. 12, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India) [hereinafter Competition Act
2002] which specifically states that the remedies provided in the Competition Act are
in addition to other laws and remedies. On the other hand, those who advocate the self
contained code theory could argue that by making specific reference to competition law
in just one provision, the Patents Act, by deliberate omission, excludes the application of
competition law except in S. 84.
24
S. 85, Patents Act, 1970.
25
S. 31, Copyright Act, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 1957 (India) [hereinafter Copyright
Act, 1957].
26
S. 47, Trade Marks Act, 1999.
27
See Debolina Partap, supra note 7.
2015 COMPETITION LAW & IPR IN THE INDIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR 37

petition law? The working group28 discussed examples of anti-competitive

behavior indicating to us that it was contemplated that IPR does have an
inherent quality of adversely affecting a competitive market or distorting
competition in a market.

A patent cross-licensing agreement that included mutual restrictions on

the pricing and output of the patented product, and substantially lessened
competition in the market for this product, would constitute an unreason-
able restraint of trade (as any other agreement fixing prices and limiting
output) and would therefore be illegal under competition law. Similarly,
bundling, predatory pricing, and other similar unfair trade practices should
be investigated where there is a dominance caused by a patent or other IPR.
There are other examples in real life29 that remind us that this possibility is
real and not just the imagination of the working group and academics.

IV. M arket is the Starting Point for

a C ompetition L aw A nalysis

The Competition Act requires that the relevant market be identified in terms
of (a) relevant geographical market;30 and (b) relevant product market.31 A
relevant product market is assessed on the basis of the following factors:
(a) Physical characteristics or end-use of goods;
(b) Price of goods or services;
(c) Consumer preferences;
(d) Exclusion of in-house production;
(e) Existence of specialised producers; and
(f) Classification of industrial products.32

A. Physical Characteristics or End-use of the Goods

Aerospatiale, a French company active in the aerospace sector had a prod-
uct range that included civil and military aircraft and helicopters, missiles,
satellites, space systems and avionics. Alenia was an Italian company also
predominantly active in the aerospace sector. Its product range included

28
World Trade Organisation, Report of the Working Group on the Interaction between
Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council (WT/WGTCP/4, Nov. 30, 2000).
29
See AZ, infra note 54 and Actavis, infra note 58.
30
S. 2(s), Competition Act, 2002.
31
S. 2(t), Competition Act, 2002.
32
S. 19(7), Competition Act, 2002.
38 NLS BUSINESS LAW REVIEW VOL. 1

civil and military aircraft, satellites, space systems, avionics, and air and
maritime traffic control systems. A concentrative joint venture within the
meaning of Article 3 of the European Commissions Merger Regulation was
notified. In determining the relevant market, the EC decided that aircrafts
which have less than 20 seats, 20 - 39 seats, 40 - 59 seats and 60 or more
seats are subject to different type certification standards. The certification
security requirements such as crash-worthiness, systems reliability, fatigue
resistance, damage tolerance and heat release of cabin materials in case of
fire differ greatly. It was held that a 60-seat commuter is not interchangeable
or substitutable with a 30-seat commuter. Both are used on routes with a
significantly different density and their prices vary significantly. The seg-
mentation was made on the basis of physical characteristics, nature and end
use of the products.33

In Cellophane34 case, the decisions of the Delaware District Court in

1953 and the U.S. Supreme Court in 1956 seemed to attract much comment.
The case was about whether Du Pont exercised market power over cello-
phane. The courts found that cellophane was in a market with other flexible
wrapping materials. More specifically the Supreme Court found that there
existed a substantial cross-elasticity between cellophane and other flexible
wrappings, and that cellophane and these other wrappings had reasonable
interchangeability. This seemed to suggest that if two products are not inter-
changeable or substitutable because of their physical characteristics, they do
not compete in the same relevant market.

B. Price of Goods or Services

The Indian automobile industry has major vehicle segments according to
the brand and the market positioning of vehicles in different regions. The
premium segment (representing highest prices and margins) comprises 10%
of the market. The value segment is the mid-price range; this comprises the
vast majority of vehicles sold in all markets (70%). The entry segment refers
to the least expensive vehicles in the different vehicle classes, making up the
other 20%.35 Creating such differentiation is vital to maintaining a premium
perception. Inside the car, premium Original Equipment Manufacturers

33
Case No. IV/M053 Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, Council Regulation (EEC) No.
4064/89.
34
United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 118 F Supp 41-233; United States v. E.I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 100 L Ed 1264 : 351 US 377 (1956).
35
Mohr, D., N. Mller, and A. Krieg, The road to 2020 and beyond: Whats driving the
global automotive industry? (McKinsey & Company, 2013), available at http://www.mck-
insey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/client_service/Automotive%20and%20Assembly/
PDFs/McK_The_road_to_2020_and_beyond.ashx.
2015 COMPETITION LAW & IPR IN THE INDIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR 39

could differentiate themselves with the help of design elements, new features
in infotainment, and innovations directed at safety and comfort.36 Even a
specific segment in the automobile sector is clearly bifurcated. The electric
vehicles category, for example, can be further divided in four types: bat-
tery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, range extenders and fuel cell vehicles.
On the other hand, non-rechargeable Full Hybrid Electric Vehicles tend to
belong to the segment of vehicles with internal combustion engines where
they play a role in improvement of fuel economy.37

Therefore, if a customer wishes to purchase a car, he would normally be

interested in one of the distinct segments. For a customer interested in pur-
chasing a Maruti 800, a Maruti Alto or a Tata Nano would be a likely option.
It is unlikely that a Bentley would be a viable alternative. Interchangeability
of products is therefore primarily based on the price, which may be a proxy
for the various features of the product segment and consequently, the mar-
ket. As a result, products that have a vast price difference do not usually
comprise the same relevant market as they are not viable substitutes.

In Belaire 38, the Commission stated that there is a distinction between

high-end and economy or low-end residential units. High end is
a complex mix of factors such as size, reputation of the location, character-
istics of neighbours, quality of construction inter alia. Residential accom-
modation for Lower Income Group, Middle Income Group and Higher
Income Group are standard descriptions adopted by several public sector
builders such as Delhi Development Authority and Ghaziabad Development
Authority.

Apart from the physical attributes, these categorizations also take

into account the income or expenditure levels of the customer base.
Together, these factors create a distinctly identifiable residential unit
that is not substitutable in an economic sense. In other words, a small
but significant non-transitional increase in price of a unit in one cat-
egory [termed SSNIP test often applied in abuse of dominance cases]
would not make the customer shift to another category. A 5% increase
in the price of a villa would not make the intending customer choose
a multi-storey apartment. The purchase may be deferred briefly or the
choice may shift to a slightly less comfortable villa but a person who

36
Ibid.
37
See Heike Proff and Dominik Kilian, Competitiveness of the EU Automotive
Industry in Electric Vehicles: Final Report (University of Duisburg-Essen, Dec. 19,
2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/automotive/files/projects/
report-duisburg-essen-electric-vehicles_en.pdf.
38
Belaire Owners Assn. v. DLF Ltd., (2011) 104 CLA 398 (CCI).
40 NLS BUSINESS LAW REVIEW VOL. 1

has made a final consumer choice of preferring a villa for the reasons
of family size, need for privacy, demonstration effect etc. would not
switch to an apartment for a small increase in price.39

In this case, prices create a clearly segmented market. Hence, the

Commission was able to identify Belair Housing as high-end housing. For
the consumer of such a market, a marginal change in price will not affect
his shift to a different category of housing. Hence, due to its inherent quality
of not being substitutable with a different category of housing, high end
housing forms its own relevant market. A similar, neatly segmented market
is the mobile phone market where price is a distinguishing factor. For an
iPhone user, the only likely substitutes would be a high end Android phone.
An iPhone user is very unlikely to consider a phone which sells at an 80%
discount.

It is sometimes argued that two products cannot be reasonably sub-

stitutable if they have substantially different prices. Price differences
have therefore been used to distinguish between products which may
be functionally substitutable, but are not substitutable from a com-
petition assessment perspective. Therefore, defining relevant market
solely on the basis of differences in price will be flawed if price dif-
ferences reflect quality differences (actual or perceived). When such
quality differences appear, defining relevant market merely on the
basis of absolute price levels, will ignore the possibility of consumers
making a trade-off between price and quality. (sic)40

It now seems that price is not the definitive criterion for establishing a
relevant market. There are also non-price factors that are considered when
a customer buys products. This is particularly significant when we discuss
pharmaceutical products and healthcare services where customer choice is
very limited because the decision making process for these is complex, with
the doctor, pharmacist, and often the hospital,41 exerting significant influ-
ence and excluding competing drugs that are qualitative substitutes. It may

39
Geeta Gouri, Making Markets Work Effectively in India, Experience of the Competition
Commission, (Competition Commission of India), available at http://www.cci.gov.in/
images/media/speeches/DrGG.pdf.
40
Ramakant Kini v. L.H. Hiranandani Hospital, 2014 Comp LR 263 (CCI).
41
Hospital chains often have pharmacies on their premises and patients are forced to buy
drugs and other medical supplies from these in house pharmacies. Patients are not
allowed to buy in drugs or other supplies from external sources. See Snehlata Shrivastav,
Hospitals Force Patients to Buy From In-House Pharmacies, Times of India (Apr.
24, 2015), available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/Hospitals-force-
patients-to-buy-from-in-house-pharmacies/articleshow/47032880.cms.
2015 COMPETITION LAW & IPR IN THE INDIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR 41

well be time for the application of the rationale in Hiranandani 42 to sales of

drugs and other consumables in hospitals to conclude that each hospital and
its in-house pharmacy is effectively a monopolistic market for patients
who have no choice of products.

C. Consumer Preferences
In Belaire, the Commission cited the example of a consumer who intends to
purchase a villa. For such a consumer, the independence, space and privacy
are factors in purchasing a place of residence. While consumer preferences,
social tastes, and behavioural trends of individuals could govern the demand
elasticity of a product, they are relevant only where there is a legitimate
choice to make. As seen in Chemistree, Actavis, AZ and Hiranandani, IPR
in the healthcare sector by its very nature may well be monopolistic and may
not, give the consumer a choice within that relevant market.

D. Existence of Specialized Producers

Where the producer is required to have highly sophisticated machinery to
manufacture the product, or manufacturing techniques are protected as IPR,
or that sector has high sunk costs, barriers to entry and competition are high
and viable substitutes may well be extremely limited. This is a feature of the
pharmaceutical sector where multinational pharmaceutical companies have
focussed on certain therapies, creating an oligopoly of sorts.43

E. Classification of Products
In the pharmaceutical sector, an important distinction must be drawn
between a molecule comprising its own market, and an entire therapy area.
In the case of Kaletra, the manner of identifying the relevant market deter-
mined that AbbVie did not hold a dominant position and there were several
competing products in the same market as Kaletra. A simple example could
be of acetylsalicylic acid, more commonly known as Aspirin, an analgesic.

42
Supra note 40. Surprisingly, the Competition Commission of India had previously held in
Consumers Guidance Society v. Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages (P) Ltd., [2011] CCI 25
that a multiplex chain that served only one brand of beverages was not a relevant market
even though customers could neither bring their own beverages nor leave during a show
to buy beverages from outside. No mention is made of this case in the CCIs order in
Ramakant Kini v. L.H. Hiranandani Hospital, 2014 Comp LR 263 (CCI).
43
See Evaluate Pharma World Preview 2014 Outlook to 2020, Evaluate Group (Jun. 1
2014), available at info.evaluategroup.com/rs/evaluatepharmaltd/images/EP240614.pdf,
on the projected market share of pharmaceutical companies in the global oncology market,
the fastest growing of all therapies. Roche had a market share in 2013 of 34.3%, followed
by Novartis with 10.8% and the top 10 companies had a market share of almost 78%.
42 NLS BUSINESS LAW REVIEW VOL. 1

If these are the only facts, then Aspirin has several well-known substitutes
such as paracetamol and ibuprofen. However, if Aspirin is prescribed to help
prevent unwanted blood clots from forming within the body, then its substi-
tute may be clopidropel.44

The Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classification System with

Defined Daily Doses (ATC/DDD) is used for the classification of active
ingredients of drugs according to the organ or system on which they act,
and their therapeutic, pharmacological and chemical properties. It is con-
trolled by the World Health Organisation Collaborating Centre for Drug
Statistics Methodology (WHOCC), and was first published in 1976.45
The Competition Commission of India was of the view that in gener-
ics markets, competition primarily takes place between different brands
based on the same molecule. Accordingly, it is appropriate to define the
relevant product market at the molecule level, i.e., medicines/formulations
based on the same API may be considered to constitute a separate relevant
product market.46 The CCI relied on sales data provided by the All India
Association of Chemists and Druggists, a national body representing most
of the retail chemists, and ignored the sales to millions of patients who are
treated by hospital chains who procure directly from manufacturers, public
sector undertakings, railways and defense services, all of whom provide free
healthcare but procure drugs either directly from manufacturers or their
selling agents. The CCI also ignored substitutes for a drug which may com-
prise other molecules which may be effective in the treatment of the same
disease or indication for example, paracetamol and ibuprofen for Aspirin.
In the case of Actavis, the decision to grant an injunction was based on the
monopoly of a single patented molecule dominating a market.47

In the United Kingdom, the approach of the Office of Fair Trading to

market definition is provided in the competition law guideline market defini-
tion which follows a similar approach to that of the European Commission
(EC). In order to establish which products or geographic areas are included

44
See infra note 74.
45
History, WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology (Nov. 19, 2011),
available at http://www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_methodology/history/.
46
CCI Order in the matter of the combination of Sun and Ranbaxy, Combination
Registration No. C-2014/05/170, 14 (Dec. 05, 2014), available at http://www.cci.gov.in/
May2011/OrderOfCommission/CombinationOrders/C-2014-05-170.pdf. For an example
of an ATC-3 therapeutic classification like antiepileptics, see Case No COMP/M.4402-
UCB/Schwarz Pharma, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/deci-
sions/m4402_20061121_20310_en.pdf. See also Case No. COMP/M.7275- Novartis/
GlaxoSmithKline Oncology Business, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/merg-
ers/cases/decisions/m7275_20150128_20212_4158734_EN.pdf. Here, treatment of ovar-
ian cancer was held to be a relevant market.
47
See infra note 59.
2015 COMPETITION LAW & IPR IN THE INDIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR 43

in the relevant market, a conceptual framework known as the hypothetical

monopolist test is usually employed.48 Products are differentiated into dif-
ferent markets primarily on the basis of the relevant product market and the
relevant geographical market.

In the United States, market definition focuses on demand-side substituta-

bility, and supply-side substitutability is considered later when the regulator
examines existing and potential participants in the market and barriers to
entry. Demand-side substitutability focuses on customers willingness and
ability to substitute other products for the products in question. Supply-side
substitutability focuses on other firms willingness and abilities to defeat
an attempted price increase by shifting production from one product to the
product in question. In contrast to the United States, the EC considers both
demand-side and supply-side substitutability when defining the relevant
product and geographic markets. It is unclear if the two approaches lead to
different results.49

V. Competition L aw R emedies for

A buse of Patent Monopoly
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) upheld the judgment
of the General Court, which found that AstraZeneca (AZ) had abused
its dominant position by misleading patent offices and misusing the patent
system in order to prevent generic competition against its anti-ulcer med-
icine, Losec.50 The EC had established that AZ had provided misleading
information to several national patent offices51 in the EU, resulting in AZ
gaining extended patent protection for Losec, and that it had selectively
deregistered market authorisations52 for Losec capsules in certain member

48
The Office of Fair Trading Competition Law Guideline on the Definition of Market, S.I.
2004 (OFT403), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/284423/oft403.pdf.
49
Mark Jamison, Defining Relevant Markets in Evolving Industries (University of Florida,
Department of Economics, Public Utility Research Center, Working Paper, 2014), available
athttp://warrington.ufl.edu/centers/purc/purcdocs/papers/1317_ Jamison_Defining%20
Relevant%20Markets%20in%20Evolving%20Industries%20Final.pdf.
50
Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v. Commission, 2010 ECR II-2805: MEMO/10/294. This
action in competition law perhaps provided a more effective remedy than revoking the
patent under the Patent Act which may well have been at the end of its term.
51
The Patent Act would have, at best, allowed revocation of the patent, which may not be an
effective sanction if the patent term had expired.
52
The drug regulatory system in India works differently from that of the EU and it may well
be argued that it may not have been possible for AZ to do what it did here. However, in
Roche v. Mylan & Biocon (Delhi High Court, 2014), it was argued that the clinical trial
data submitted by Roche should not be shared with Roches competitors even though this
is the only way that generics can show equivalence with the innovator product to comply
44 NLS BUSINESS LAW REVIEW VOL. 1

states, in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union. In doing so, AZ raised barriers of entry for generic players,
as they could no longer rely on AZs clinical trial data on the original capsule
version.53 The EC imposed a fine of 60 million on AZ for abusing its dom-
inant position. The CJEU held that as under Article 102, an undertaking
that holds a dominant position has a special responsibility and cannot use
regulatory procedures to prevent entry of competitors in the market. The
General Court upheld the ECs decision but reduced the fine to 52.5 mil-
lion.54 The CJEU dismissed AZs appeal.55 The EC in the EU and the Federal
Trade Commission in the US are currently challenging settlement agree-
ments involving pay-for-delay, and reverse payment arrangements whereby
patent holders pay generic companies to delay or impede the market entry of
competing products.56

Switching patients from a successful branded product to its next-genera-

tion, patent-protected offspring before the onslaught of generics is a crucial
tactic in what is often referred to as managing the lifecycle of a drug. The
most common choices for oral solid dosage forms i.e., pills, are modified-re-
lease systems (delayed, pulsatile, and extended), fast-dissolving tablets, and
bioavailability enhancement technology to improve the onset of action, min-
imise a fed/fasted effect, or increase overall drug absorption. Two examples
of successful dose frequency changes include Mercks Fosamax and Lillys
Prozac which went from daily therapies to weekly medicines for certain
well-managed patients. In the extended-release area, GlaxoSmithKlines
antidepressant Wellbutrin SR, Pfizers Procardia XL, Abbotts antibiotic
Biaxin XL Filmtab, Biovails Cardizem LA, and Sanofi-AventisAmbien CR
are a few of many such formulation changes designed to sidestep generics

with drug regulation. It may be argued that Roche seeking an injunction is itself anti-com-
petitive, based on AstraZeneca and the decision of the EU in Apple v. Motorola Mobility
(European Commission Press Release regarding decision on anti-competitive use of stand-
ard essential patents by seeking and enforcing injunctions Docket No.IP/14/489 (Apr. 29,
2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-489_en.htm).
53
European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission finds that Motorola Mobility
infringed competition rules by misusing standard essential patents (Apr. 29 2014), availa-
ble at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-489_en.htm.
54
See AstraZeneca, supra note 51.
55
Case C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v. European Commission (Dec. 6,
2012).
56
The lack of a formal patent linkage in India makes it unlikely that this situation should
arise. However, a new drug (whether or not patented) introduced in India has a three-year
head start since a generic will not be able to introduce a competitive drug during that time.
Together with courts being liberal in granting interim injunctions to patent holders, it
could be argued that there is de facto patent linkage in India.
2015 COMPETITION LAW & IPR IN THE INDIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR 45

competition by offering the promise of improved patient compliance and

convenience.57

However, in an ongoing US case, 58 Actavis was directed to halt plans to

pull Namenda, its Alzheimers drug off the market. Alzheimers disease is
currently treated by five drugs; all the drugs except Namenda are acetylcho-
linesterase inhibitors (CI) and work in the same basic manner. Namenda
is the brand name for memantine, an N-Methyl D-Aspartate (NMDA)
receptor antagonist and works differently from CIs.59 The CEO of Actavis
made a public statement to analysts that the core of the brand strategy
with the new extended release (XR) version was to convert the existing
business to Namenda XR as fast as possible to protect Namenda revenue
from generic penetration in 2015 when patent exclusivity expires. If we
do the hard switch and we convert the patients and caregivers to once-a-
day therapy versus twice a day, its very difficult for the generics then to
reverse-commute back.60 The judge relied on this statement to establish
intent and stated that while the mere possession of monopoly power is not
unlawful, monopolists cannot run their businesses in an anti-competitive
manner. The purpose of the hard switch was anticompetitive: to put barriers
and obstacles in the path of producers of generic memantine and thereby
protect Namendas revenues from a precipitous decline following generic
entry.

Although Section 3(5) of the Competition Act provides protection from

competition law for enforcement of IPR, it should not be construed to mean
that all actions permitted by IPR laws are immune to scrutiny under the
Competition Act. In Chemistree Homecare Ltd. (Chemistree) v. AbbVie
Ltd. (AbbVie),61 AbbVie supplied its HIV therapy drug Kaletra directly
to hospitals, without the use of wholesalers. In addition, AbbVie also sup-
plied the medicine to Chemistree to enable Chemistree to provide home-
care services to patients treated in the clinics covered by the London HIV
consortium. On Chemistrees orders increasing three-fold, AbbVie asked

57
See Dealing with the Generic Threat, Pharmafile (Sep. 15, 2005), available athttp://
www.pharmafile.com/news/dealing-generic-threat.
58
The People of the State of New York v. Actavis PLC and Forest Laboratories LLC,
S.D.N.Y.14-cv-4624 (2nd Cir, 2015).
59
There seems to be a clear acknowledgement of the monopoly of Namenda. See Stuart
Silverman, Second Circuit Affirms Preliminary Injunction in Antitrust Suit Against Drug
Companies for Product Hopping, American University WCL, National Law Review (May.
22, 2015) available athttp://news.monster.com/a/business/second-circuit-affirms-prelimi-
nary-injunction-in-antitrust-suit-against-drug-companies-for-pr-ff8e0f.
60
The People of the State of New York v. Actavis PLC and Forest Laboratories LLC,
SDNY14-cv-4624 (2nd Cir, 2015).
61
Case No: A3/2013/0559 Chemistree HomeCare Ltd. v. AbbVie Ltd., 2013 EWHC Civ
1338.
46 NLS BUSINESS LAW REVIEW VOL. 1

for an account of Kaletra. On receipt of the account, it was realised that

15% of the sales were home care, 40% of the sales were wholesale and 45%
were prescriptions in the European Economic Area. AbbVie stopped supply
for everything other than home care, stating that Chemistrees behaviour
was disingenuous. The Court of Appeal concluded that if a patient was pre-
scribed Kaletra then the patient required Kaletra alone, and that single drug
could be its own relevant market. It was the prescribing doctor, either alone
or in consultation with the patient, that made the decision as to whether or
not Kaletra should be used and it was that part of the buying chain which
was sensitive to increases in price. The Court stated that Chemistree was
not the relevant customer. The pharmacist merely acted as a middleman
and its role in the economic chain was irrelevant to the determination of
the relevant product market. In addition to demonstrating how commercial
arrangements can be anti-competitive, this case also highlights the impor-
tance of determining the relevant market in terms of product and the test of
substitutability for the correct customer.

Testing activities that are permitted by IPR legislation on the touchstone

of competition law will be the accomplishment of a milestone for the Indian
legal system. Therefore, the decision in Ericsson v. Micromax will be sig-
nificant since Standard-Essential Patents are, undoubtedly, monopolies.
While the rest of the civilized world has accepted FRAND as the acceptable
response to control the monopoly of SEPs, our courts are yet to find a theo-
retical basis for it in our law. Perhaps, we can then move on to establishing
the basis for identifying the relevant market in a more scientific manner than
we have done in Coca Cola, Hiranandani, Honda Siel, or Sun-Ranbaxy.
Once we have been able to establish a good basis for the determination of
the relevant market, we will be in a position to evaluate the effect of patents
and of the activities of patent holders. Perhaps then, we will be able to look
beyond the blinkers of traditional IPR remedies of revocation and compul-
sory licensing that have been employed to address the abuse of a patent
monopoly.

VI. Effect of Trademarks on M arket Definition

Trademarks affect both the demand side and the supply side substitutability
of products in the Indian healthcare sector. A patent is a legalized monopoly
for a specified period of time in relation to a product, whereas a trademark
allows a product to be identified with one producer forever. The response to
this allegation of an infinite monopoly by trademark owners is that there is
no restriction on how many trademarks can exist in a market and it is free
for anyone to enter the market with a trademark and compete fairly with
2015 COMPETITION LAW & IPR IN THE INDIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR 47

the existing products. There are several instances of brand leaders being
displaced by late entrants to demonstrate this. While this is a very persuasive
argument in itself, the infinite life of a trademark combined with a monopoly
for a patented product in the Indian healthcare sector creates several chal-
lenges for competition law. That anyone can compete using their own trade
mark assumes that it is possible to compete which is not possible when
there is a monopoly due to a patent, especially in the pharmaceutical sector.

We have always had trademarks for drugs and they have arguably made
them more accessible, since the name Aspirin is easier to remember than
acetylsalicylic acid. Why has this suddenly become an issue? Trademark law
has come a long way and it is perhaps important for us to retrace its history
to understand how far we have come from its roots and ask ourselves if we
really want to be where we are.

While we are all taught that the origin of trademarks was for goods to be
easily identifiable with their makers originally the artisan guilds in medi-
eval England this quickly morphed into a right for the maker rather than
a protection for the consumer. There is some evidence of Harappan marks
embossed on goods traded with foreign countries such as Mesopotamia and
Babylonia. The legal recognition of the trademark as a species of incorporeal
property was first accorded by the Court of Chancery in the first half of the
19th Century. In Millington v. Fox62 , it was decided that it was not neces-
sary to establish any intention to deceive on the part of an infringer against
whom an injunction to restrain his use of another trademark is sought.

The concept of distinguishing goods or services of the proprietor

from those of others was to be found in the requirements for a mark
to be registrable. Essentially, whatever the wording used, a trademark
or a service mark was an indication which enabled the goods or ser-
vices from a particular source to be identified and thus distinguished
from goods or services from other sources. In adopting a definition of
trademark which simply describes the function in terms of capability
of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those
of other undertakings the new law is really saying precisely the same
thing. (sic)63

Thus, the most critical object of a trademark is to clearly identify the

origin of the good.64 The function of a trademark is to give an indication to

62
Millington v. Fox, (1838) 3 My & Cr 338.
63
Ramdev Food Products (P). Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel, (2006) 8 SCC 726 : (2006)
33 PTC 281, 299.
64
S. 2(1)(zb), Trade Marks Act, 1999.
48 NLS BUSINESS LAW REVIEW VOL. 1

the purchaser, or a possible purchaser, as to the manufacture or the quality

of the goods,65 to give an indication to his eye of the trade source or trade
hands through which they pass on their way to the market. Thus, it is to be
distinguished from a property mark which denotes that a movable property
belongs to a particular person.66 While registration confers a permanent and
exclusive right in respect of a registered mark, it does not create a monopoly
in the mark in the true sense of the word monopoly. Trademarks give rise
to exclusive rights as indications of the source and quality of goods; it is
only when related to goods that they have life or value. A trademark is not
a type of copyright.67 It cannot exist in vacuum and should not therefore
be considered property.68 It can only exist in connection with the goods in
relation to which it is used or intended to be used.69 The proprietary rights
in the trademark/service mark are not acquired merely on account of reg-
istration in India but on account of priority in adoption, use, and even on
account of trans-border reputation spilling over to India.70 For a drug, this
means that it is possible, given the barriers to substitution in India by either
the pharmacist or the patient, that a brand could well be treated as Kaletra
was in Chemistree.

VII. Why Dont We Name Drugs

Like O ther P roducts?
All cars have light bulbs and no automobile company has its own special
name for a light bulb in a car that it makes, but there does not seem to be a
simple name for every drug or class of drugs.71 As drugs come out of patent

65
Quality is not relevant for pharmaceutical brands since all drugs having the same chemical
composition are approved before being allowed to be sold and it is a requirement of the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act that a generic is the chemical and bio-equivalent of the innovator
(patented) drug.
66
Sumat Prasad Jain v. Sheojanam Prasad, (1973) 1 SCC 56 : AIR 1972 SC 2488, 2490.
67
Glaxo Group v. Dowelhurst Ltd., 2000 FSR 529, 539.
68
But see the recent reports of Phillip Morris claiming expropriation of property in respect of
tobacco plain packaging laws of some countries, which highlights this issue once again. See
M.C. Porterfield & C.R. Byrnes, Philip Morris v. Uruguay: Will Investor-State Arbitration
Send Restrictions on Tobacco Marketing up in Smoke, Investment Treaty News (Jul.
12, 2011), available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-v-uruguay-will-
investor-state-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in-smoke/; Aylin A.
Sahin, Philip Morris v. Uruguay: Intellectual Property Debate in International Investment
Arbitration, Berkeley Tech. L.J. (Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://btlj.org/2014/11/phil-
ip-morris-vs-uruguay-intellectual-property-debate-in-international-investment-arbitra-
tion/.
69
American Home Products Corpn. v. Mac Laboratories (P) Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 465 : AIR
1986 SC 137, 154.
70
McAtee v. Chem Shengula, (2007) 34 PTC 298.
71
One may argue that there are families of drugs and they together with the International
Non Proprietary Names are well known amongst the cognoscenti. For example, statins
2015 COMPETITION LAW & IPR IN THE INDIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR 49

protection and become open to competition, the use of a trade name for that
drug is so prevalent that no one remembers the generic chemical name72 for
instance, acetylsalicylic acid has always been overshadowed by the brand
name Aspirin. This phenomenon of not having common names for products
does not seem to prevail in any other industry. When brand names became
common nouns like in the case of Yo-Yo (a childrens toy), cellophane73 (the
plastic wrapping material), photocopying (Xerox74) or instant photography
(Polaroid), there developed a theoretical basis for these trademarks to be
genericised. But pharmaceuticals seem to have managed to sidestep this
issue. In fact, the generics established their own pharmaceutical brands,
rather than challenge the basis for innovators to name a product and then
appropriate it to own the brand. The justification was patient safety it is
easier to prescribe and consume drugs which have simple, memorable names
than having to remember the generic chemical name.

VIII. Brand Names for Drugs Cause Confusion

Consider the common substitutes for Aspirin75 as an analgesic Disprin,
Crocin and Metacin. Disprin was initially a brand name for a generic ver-
sion of Aspirin but the chemical composition of the drug sold as Disprin
was later changed to paracetamol in India alone, leading to potentially fatal
mistakes in prescriptions.76 Similarly, Crocin and Metacin sound so very
much like Aspirin, but are, in fact, similar to Calpol.77 The use of Crocin and

as a family of drugs which help control cholesterol.

72
I have chosen to use the term generic chemical name rather than International Non-
Proprietary Name (INN), the term of art used by the healthcare industry. International
Non-Proprietary Names (INN) facilitate the identification of pharmaceutical substances
or active pharmaceutical ingredients. Each INN is a unique name that is globally recog-
nised and is public property. See Essential Medicines & Health Products: International
Nonproprietary Names, World Health Organisation, available at http://www.who.int/
medicines/services/inn/en/ (Last visited on Jul. 3, 2015).
73
See What you dont know about trademarks, World Intellectual Property Organisation
(Nov. 2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2009/06/article_0010.
html.
74
But see the decision of the IPAB rejecting the genericisation of Xerox and its criticism by
Prashant Reddy, Xerox is not Generic Yet?!, SpicyIP L. Blog (Oct. 16, 2012), available
at http://spicyip.com/2012/10/guest-post-xerox-is-not-genericyet.html.
75
Aspirin is also used to treat coronary thrombosis for which clopidogrel is a possible sub-
stitute. See Increasing the Knowledge & Understanding of Aspirin, Aspirin Foundation,
available at http://www.aspirin-foundation.com.
76
See Priya Yadav, Disprin is no Longer Disprin, Times of India (Sep. 12, 2001), avail-
able at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/Disprin-is-no-longer-disprin/article-
show/1020224953.cms. There are more than 630 brands of paracetamol (with significant
price difference) made by over 300 pharmaceutical companies in India. For a listing, see
www.drugsupdate.com.
77
This continues to occur despite the clear direction from the Supreme Court in Cadila
Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73 : AIR 2001 SC 1952,
50 NLS BUSINESS LAW REVIEW VOL. 1

Calpol, different trade names and marks for the same drug, paracetamol,
by one company, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in this case, creates significant
confusion for doctors, patients, and chemists.78 From a competition law per-
spective, it allows pharmaceutical companies to create a segmentation of the
market for analgesics, rather than just paracetamol a smaller market than
analgesics79 and justify the claim that they each have no significant market
power in the analgesics market.80 It is significant that paracetamol is covered
by the Drug Price Control Order81 and as a result, it is easily argued that by
this measure, the government has ensured that no paracetamol manufac-
turer has significant market power, thereby negating the effect of brands
causing any disruption to the working of market forces.82 This does not
however explain why patented drugs, which are very likely to have a monop-
oly, are not covered by price control in India, when a vibrant competitive
market with over 300 producers, like generic paracetamol, is. Evidently, the
economic basis for this policy of the Indian government is extremely difficult
to understand.

establishing the standard for approval of drugs and their trade names pursuant to S. 17-B
of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940: Exacting judicial scrutiny is required if there is
a possibility of confusion over marks on medicinal products because the potential harm
may be far more dire than that in confusion over ordinary consumer products.
78
There is also a brand called Krocetamol, presumably a take on both Crocin and paraceta-
mol and several variations on the Calpol brand Calpol Plus which has paracetamol and
ibuprofen, and Calpol T which has paracetamol with tramadol. These combinations are
one of the reasons cited by Indian doctors to prescribe brands rather than generic chemical
names. See K.K. Aggarwal, infra note 95.
79
While it may seem like the relevant market is either analgesics or paracetamol in India,
there are other aspects like price and substitutability that affect the definition of market.
80
It is arguable based on the views of doctors, pharmacists, and patients, on substitutability,
that combinations containing paracetamol, ibuprofen, and diclofenac for example, may be
treated as being part of the analgesics market. However, this conclusion is not supported
by the order of the Competition Commission of India in the matter of the Sun Ranbaxy
merger, supra note 46, where for example, atorvastatin and rosuvastatin were each con-
sidered as separate markets, although the family of statins all treat the same condition and
act in a similar manner and are similarly priced by Sun. Interestingly, the Competition
Commission considered spare parts for each car brand as a relevant market Shamesher
Kataria v. Honda Seil, [2014] CCI 26 , available at http://www.cci.gov.in/May2011/
OrderOfCommission/27/032011.pdf.
81
Issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. It has been and continues to be the
subject matter of challenge before the Delhi and Bombay High Courts and the Supreme
Court of India.
82
See paragraph 23 of the order of the Competition Commission of India in the matter of the
Sun-Ranbaxy merger, supra note 46 for an example of this concept being accepted, with
little explanation, by the Competition Commission of India.
2015 COMPETITION LAW & IPR IN THE INDIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR 51

IX. Trade Dress is the Next Barrier to Competition

Another aspect of trademark law is trade dress. In a country like India,
colour plays a significant role in patient retention and customer loyalty. For
example, the use of a purple-coloured inhaler83 is a sure way of keeping an
asthmatic patient handcuffed to a brand for life if the colour of the inhaler
is protected as a trade mark,84 even after the patent on the drug expires
and other cheaper and perhaps even more effective alternatives are availa-
ble, albeit in different coloured inhalers.85 The importance of colour-coded
asthma treatment in patient education is well accepted. Traditionally,
reliever medication inhalers are blue in colour and preventer inhalers
brown. This custom is not always followed and the inconsistencies in the
colour of inhalers create a lot of confusion.86 It is unlikely that when an
asthma attack comes on, a patient will read the label of the different inhalers
in a medicine cabinet or bag. By force of habit, a patient will not risk chang-
ing the brand since a colour is strongly associated with relief from a feeling
of certain death by suffocation. When a colour and/or a shape is associated
with a drug or a device, the patent monopoly naturally gets extended for the
life of the trademark and design. This principle also extends to the colour
and shape of pills that need to be taken routinely or when several pills need
to be taken by a patient. It is now widely acknowledged by empirical studies
that changing the colour of pills has an extremely adverse effect on patient
compliance making it difficult for competing products, usually significantly
cheaper generics to enter the market.87 As a consequence, the combination

83
The definition of trade mark was amended in 1993 to include shape of goods, their pack-
aging and combination of colours to follow global norms on trademarks. See S. 2(1)(m)
and S. 2(1)(xb), Trade Marks Act, 1999.
84
See the decision of the Court of Appeal in Nestle v. Cadbury, 2013 EWCA 1174 where
Cadbury was refused registration of its distinctive purple colour which it has used for over
a century.
85
The battle between GSK and Sandoz on the inhaler from Sandoz that competes with purple
coloured inhaler sold as Advair (the multi-billion dollar blockbuster from GSK) is being
keenly watched. GSK was granted CTM registration for the purple colour combination on
the inhaler. While a Danish court refused GSK an interim injunction, a court in Cologne
granted an interim injunction but the case was eventually settled.
86
Dr. B. Jayakrishnan, Asthma Inhalers And Colour Coding: Universal Dots, 60(578) Br J.
Gen Pract 690691 (Sep. 1, 2010), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC2930224/.
87
See Aaron S. Kesselheim, et al, Variations in Pill Appearance of Antiepileptic Drugs and
the Risk of Nonadherence, 173(3) Jama Internal Medicine 202 (Feb. 11, 2013); Brady
Dennis, If Color or Shape of Generic Pills Changes, Patients May Stop Taking Them, The
Washington Post (Jul. 14, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/if-color-or-shape-changes-patients-more-likely-to-stop-taking-much-need-
ed-drugs/2014/07/14/60e687f4-0b8c-11e4-8341-b8072b1e7348_story.html. See also U.S.
Federal Drug Administration, Guidance for Industry Size, Shape, and Other Physical
Attributes of Generic Tablets and Capsules (Dec. 2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm377938.pdf.
52 NLS BUSINESS LAW REVIEW VOL. 1

of a patented drug with a trade name, unique shape and colour is a potent
combination of IPR to keep competition out forever.

The use of a colour, shape, or trademark extends a patent monopoly for

every patient who either has really no choice once the doctor prescribes a
drug or device,88 or suffers from such a medical condition that a change
would be extremely disruptive of his treatment regimen, causing him to
reject the choice of cheaper alternatives.89 However, a Danish Court in GSK
v. Sandoz (2014) attached importance to the fact that GSK had not proved
to a sufficient degree that the purple colour served as a distinctive sign for
its inhaler or could in any other way influence consumers purchasing deci-
sions. It concluded that the inhaler was a prescription medicine, and it could
be assumed that the doctors who prescribed it would emphasise the special
functionality of the product for the patient and his or her needs, while the
patient would mainly consider the price. Since this was a decision on an
interim injunction in a healthcare market which has rules on generic substi-
tutability, it may well not apply in the Indian market.90

X. Trade M ark extends Patent Monopoly

It is perhaps time to question whether trademark law contemplated the

extension of patent monopoly. The judgment in Philips v. Remington 91
establishes that trademark law cannot be used to protect from competition
a shape marketed by one undertaking if the essential characteristics of that
shape perform a technical function. Such shapes are excluded from registra-
tion and there are no ways to circumvent this prohibition. Does it not follow
that this limitation ought to be applicable to drug and device colours as well,
where there is a compelling patient interest to have uniformity to reduce
confusion and mistakes?92

Despite there being a well-established understanding of the essential ele-

ments of a trademark and its role in a market economy, it was interesting
that the CJEU sought to clarify the basis for a trade mark:

to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product to

the consumer or end-user by enabling him, without any possibility

88
See Chemistree, supra note 61.
89
See supra note 86.
90
A similar reasoning is offered by Indian doctors to prescribe brands rather than generic
chemical names of drugs. See K.K. Aggarwal, infra note 94.
91
Case C-299/99 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington Consumer Products
Ltd., 2003 RPC 2.
92
See supra note 85.
2015 COMPETITION LAW & IPR IN THE INDIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR 53

of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from others which

have another origin, and for the trademark to be able to fulfill its
essential role in the system of undistorted competition which the
Treaty seeks to establish, it must offer a guarantee that all the goods
or services bearing it have originated under the control of a single
undertaking which is responsible for their quality (sic)93

This reaffirms the legal basis for a trademark to be the clear identification
of the source of the goods, and no more. It also reminds us of the potential
risk of trademarks distorting competition. In the Indian healthcare context,
each brand seems to be a market in itself since doctors prescribe brands, not
drugs by their generic chemical name,94 and patients dont consider them
substitutable because they would not be able to make the decision based on
information available to them from pharmacists who are incentivized to sell
more expensive drugs.95 This is not much of an issue in the United Kingdom
or most of Europe where healthcare is virtually free at the point of use and
patients pay very little for drugs or devices, all of which are primarily funded
by a national health service. In the United States, the oligopoly of insurers
negotiates the price of drugs with pharmaceutical companies and it may well
be argued that there is a fair balance of power. Brands therefore have little
effect of distorting competition where the buyer, the national health service,
or an oligopoly of insurers, with sufficient information and choice is able to
evaluate (both on a cost-benefit basis as well as medical need) before listing
the drugs that a doctor can prescribe. There is virtually a monopoly buyer
negotiating with a potential monopolist patent holder, and the patient is
rarely given a choice of the brand of the drug. In most of Europe, the patient
is often only aware of the generic chemical name on the label of the con-
tainer printed by the pharmacist.

Conclusion and R ecommendations

While the Indian healthcare market is rapidly developing, there is a need to
study it in much greater detail as a market than has been done until now.96

93
Case C-299/99 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v. Remington Consumer Products
Ltd., 2003 RPC 2, 30.
94
See Dr. Ganapati Mudur, Doctors in India Defy Guidelines on Generic Drugs, BMJ 347
(2013) available at , http://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f4244#.
95
For a summary of the viewpoints of the various players in the Indian healthcare sector
on competition between brands, see Dr. K.K. Aggarwal, The Generic Drug Controversy,
23(9) Indian Journal of Clinical Practice 485 (Feb. 9, 2013).
96
As a part of the Drug Price Control Order, the Indian government is now requiring all
manufacturers to register all products with details of price and sales. The Competition
Commission of India relied on sales data from the All India Association of Chemists and
Druggists who do not list all sales for all drugs. Information on direct sales to hospital
54 NLS BUSINESS LAW REVIEW VOL. 1

This will help us understand the impact of various regulations on the market
and the operation of market forces. There is clear evidence of the disrup-
tion of the market by brands, especially with several combinations97 which
are used as reasons for doctors to prescribe them in clear violation of their
ethical and legal obligations.98 The natural consequence of the existence
of brand names is their promotion by the brand owners. Since the doctor,
being the decision maker, is the real customer, pharmaceutical companies
are incentivized99 to use corrupt practices to influence them to prescribe
brands, rather than the generic chemical names of drugs.100 As a result, the
elimination of protection of brand names for drugs addresses several market
distorting issues.101 Corruption creates barriers to competition for those who
are unwilling to participate in corrupt practices, and increases the cost of
doing business which, in turn, is borne by patients. The belief that regula-
tion of drug prices is an easy fix to overcome potential dominance of brands
is a misconception that is disrupting the market by creating other barriers to
competition and incentivizing brands to game the system.

It is possible to prevent the distortion of the healthcare market by brand

names without any legislative measures. Section 13 of the Trade Marks
Act clearly prohibits the use of the international non-proprietary name or
any name deceptively similar to it from being registered as a trademark. If
any attempt is made to use a mark without registration to overcome this

chains, government, public sector undertakings, railways and defence and paramilitary
services and the like, for example, where millions of patients are treated every year are
routinely missed.
97
See supra note 78.
98
Indian Medical Council (Profession Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002,
Gazette of India, 1.5 (Apr. 6, 2002).
99
Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002,
6 prohibits doctors from accepting gifts. Often, to overcome this stipulation, free sam-
ples or special schemes are provided to doctors by pharmaceutical companies. An
example of a special scheme would be giving a doctor five free units for every one unit
of a drug purchased. The doctor would therefore be able to sell six units at the retail price
and make an astonishing profit without the patient ever knowing this.
100
A common definition of corruption is the abuse of public or private office for personal
gain. See Asian Development Bank, Anti-Corruption: Policies and Strategies, Description
and Answers to Frequently Asked Questions 1 (Manila, 2000).
101
See Corruption Explained, International Chamber of Commerce, available at http://www.
iccwbo.org/advocacy-codes-and-rules/areas-of-work/corporate-responsibility-and-an-
ti-corruption/corruption-explained/ (Last visited Jul. 3, 2015), for the position of the
International Chamber of Commerce; Guidance Note of the International Monetary Fund,
Role of the IMF in Governance Issues. See The IMF and Good Governance, International
Monetary Fund, (Apr. 9, 2015), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gov.
htm (Last visited Jul 3, 2015); Business and Governments Against Corruption: Factsheet,
United Nations Office Against Drugs and Crime, available at http://www.unodc.org/
documents/congress//background-information/Corruption/4._Factsheet_-_An_Anti-
Corruption_Ethics_and_Compliance_Programme.pdf.
2015 COMPETITION LAW & IPR IN THE INDIAN HEALTHCARE SECTOR 55

prohibition, Section 17-B of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 can be
used to disapprove the sale or marketing of a drug or product. Since limita-
tions can be placed on the use of a mark,102 the trademark registry can very
easily restrict the use of the name for the period of the patent,103 with the
express condition that the name be then made available thereafter to every
competitor to use, so long as the source is clearly identified on the product
or packaging. Therefore, if Aspirin is a trade name for acetyl salicylic acid
during the term of the patent, the name Aspirin and the generic chemi-
cal name should be used by every manufacturer or seller (after the patent
on Aspirin expires) together with the name or mark of the manufacturer
clearly stated, in order to distinguish products of different manufacturers
of Aspirin. Similarly, the colour of pills, devices, and packaging should be
uniformly used and industry standards established so that there is consist-
ency and confusion is avoided,thereby ensuring patient compliance. With
the elimination of competing brand names, it will be easier for ethical phar-
maceutical companies to compete, and for doctors to comply with their legal
and ethical professional obligations.104

Each drug name could automatically be listed under Section 23(1) of the
Trade Marks Act105 upon patent expiry so that they become generic, instead
of being registered. The colour of the drug or device, the text on the packag-
ing, and the design elements, all of which have a functional element, should
not be allowed to be owned separately from the product. This prevents the
composition of the drug from being changed while selling it under a well-
known brand name,106 and further ensures that patient interest is not com-
promised and patients have real choice of products in a market that allows
competition to thrive.

While we can look to the West for ideas on how to regulate our markets,
we need to be very vigilant about how different India is and why we need
to be wary of blindly implementing western models of market regulation.
Instead, we should focus on leapfrogging them to avoid the regulatory chal-
lenges that they have created in the process of their learning and growth.

102
S. 18, Trade Marks Act, 1999.
103
S. 2(1)(l), Trade Marks Act, 1999 defines limitations to mean any limitation of the exclu-
sive right to the use of a trade mark given by the registration of a person as proprietor
thereof, including limitations of that right as to mode or area of use within India or outside
India.
104
See supra notes 98, 99.
105
So far, the Central Government has listed names and pictures of gods and goddesses.
106
See for example, supra note 76.