G.R. No.

L-29132 May 29, 1970

THE SPOUSES, JOSE YAP JOAQUIN and LAM SOK KAM, petitioners-appellants, vs.
HON. EMILIO L. GALANG, THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
Appeal to the Court of Appeals but certified to the Supreme Court as a case involving questions purely of law. This
appeal was interposed against a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 39025, denying
a petition for prohibition against the herein respondent-appellee, Commissioner of Immigration, for ordering the
deportation of herein petitioner-appellant Lam Sok Kam.

The case was submitted for decision before the trial court upon a stipulation of facts. In resume, these facts are as follows:

On 21 January 1958, petitioner-appellant Lam Sok Kam, a Portuguese woman, filed with the Philippine consulate
general in Hongkong a non-immigrant application for passport visa for the Philippines, "for the purpose of visiting a
friend" and "to remain in the Philippines for a period of 30 days," according to her application. She also therein stated
that she was married to one Tan Pio, a resident of Macau.

She arrived in the Philippines on 19 April 1958 and was admitted as a temporary visitor for a limited stay up to 18 May
1958. On 7 May 1958, she petitioned for, and was granted, an extension of her temporary stay up to 17 November
1958. On 17 October 1958, however, she married one Jose Yap Joaquin, a Filipino citizen, in a wedding solemnized by
the Justice of the Peace of Siniloan, Laguna. Four (4) days after the marriage, she applied for the cancellation of her
alien registry on the ground of having acquired Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to Joaquin. Her
application was granted in an order, dated 21 October 1958, by Associate Commissioner of Immigration Francisco de
la Rosa, and she was issued an identification certificate recognizing her as a citizen of the Philippines.

Upon further investigation, however, Immigration Commissioner Emilio L. Galang discovered that Lam Sok Kam was
not a divorcee, as she had stated in her marriage contract with Joaquin, because the document of divorce by mutual
consent that she had presented was defective and irregular on its face and, therefore, she had no right to contract
another marriage. The Commissioner sought the opinion of the consul of Portugal on the force and validity of a
"Divorcio Por Muto Consentimento" and its effect upon the marriage of Lam Sok Kam to Tan Pio, and the consul
replied that he considered the document not valid for the lack of the signature of Lam Sok Kam; the document was
supposedly executed in Macau on 19 July 1958, when Lam Sok Kam was already in the Philippines. Neither had the
consul issued to petitioner any certificate of legal capacity to marry, required by Article 66 of the Civil Code.
Thereupon, respondent-appellee Commissioner revoked, on 15 January 1959, the previous order of 21 October 1958 of
Associate Commissioner de la Rosa, and ordered her to leave the country within five (5) days. The Commissioner
further denied her request for stay of execution of the order, pending action by the President of the Philippines on her
request for additional extension of her stay. The Commissioner, likewise, forfeited her bond for having changed her
residence without giving notice and obtaining a previous written consent of the Bureau of Immigration.

On 21 January 1959, petitioners-appellants filed a petition for prohibition against the Commissioner of Immigration to
prohibit him from enforcing his deportation order.

In the meanwhile, two (2) daughters, Lita and Cita, had been born, on 20 January 1960 and 26 March 1961,
respectively, to the petitioners-appellants.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered its decision, subject of the present appeal, denying the
petition for prohibition.

The power of the Commissioner of Immigration to determine the validity of a marriage for the purpose of deporting
aliens was upheld in Brito, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 106 Phil. 417, in the following language:

The pivotal issue is whether or not the respondent Commissioner of Immigration has the power to determine the
validity of the marriage contracted by the petitioners for the purpose of arresting and deporting Tan Soo alias So
Wa. There is no question that the power to deport is limited to aliens, that the citizenship of the respondent in
deportation proceedings is determinative of the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Immigration, and that the power to
deport carries that of determining the respondent's nationality. But if the question of nationality is dependent upon the
validity of the respondent's marriage, may the Commissioner of Immigration pass judgment thereon?

The lower court rules against appellant Commissioner of Immigration. The latter, however, drew a distinction
between a voidable marriage and one which is void ab initio. He argues that in the first case the court may be
correct, but in the second, where the marriage is void ab initio, the Commissioner of Immigration may pass upon
the validity of said marriage ... no judicial decree being necessary to establish its nullity.

It is true that in relation to the marriage of petitioners no assumption can arise or should be made from the mere
discovery of a marriage contract between Olegario Brito and Narcisa Maya executed in 1943, without proof that
the first wife was still alive or that said first marriage was otherwise subsisting in 1954. As a matter of fact, it is to
be supposed that the marriage between the herein petitioners in 1954 is valid altho this is only a prima
facie presumption which may be overcome by evidence that it was contracted during the lifetime of Narcisa Maya
and before the first marriage of Olegario Brito was annulled or dissolved. In any event, these considerations going
into the validity of the marriage of petitioners are not an obstacle to the preliminary proceedings to be conducted
in this particular case by the appellant Commissioner of Immigration pursuant to Section 37(a) of the Philippine
 Immigration Act, as amended, to determine whether or not a prima facie case exists against appellee Tan Soo alias
So Wa to warrant her deportation.

Though the decision in the aforecited case was subsequently set aside, the ground therefor was on new relevant
evidence (See Brito, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-16829, 30 June 1965, 14 SCRA 539) which did not
reject or alter the ruling or opinion aforequoted upholding the power of the Commissioner to determine the validity of a
marriage, in the exercise of his jurisdiction to deport aliens, where such marriage is claimed as a ground for non-
alienage or citizenship.

But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the divorce from her first husband and her second marriage were
both valid, petitioner Lam Sok Kam is plainly deportable because her marriage to Joaquin did not excuse her from her
failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of the extended period of her temporary stay, which was on 17
November 1958, because her marriage did not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen (Ly Giok Ha, et al. vs. Galang, L-
10760, 17 May 1957, 101 Phil. 459; Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, 30 June 1967, 20 SCRA 568; Commissioner of
Immigration vs. Go Tieng, et al., L-22581, 21 May 1969, 28 SCRA 237).

Petitioners oppose consideration of the foregoing issue on the ground of its being raised for the first time on appeal.
The opposition is unacceptable; petitioners themselves raised the issue in their fourth assignment of error (Brief, 32) by
citing Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law, providing that:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Besides, the circumstances shown by the record before us are convincing that the marriage was not entered into in good
faith but only for the purpose of evading Lam Sok Kam's promise to leave the country upon expiration of her
temporary stay. Her case is identical to that dealt with in De Austria vs. Conchu, L-20716, 22 June 1965, 14 SCRA 336,
wherein this Court held the temporary visitor to be deportable, notwithstanding her marriage to a natural-born Filipino
citizen some forty days before expiration of her permit to remain in the Islands. Such devious maneuvers to circumvent
our immigration laws and confront the authorities with a "fait accompli" must be firmly discouraged if the country is
not to be flooded by illegal entrants, abetted by unthinking citizens devoid of regard for the country's higher interest.

That Lam Sok Kam now has children by her second husband, and that her deportation would tear her apart from them, is not
a ground that would bar exclusion. In Vivo vs. Cloribel, L-25411, 26 October 1968, 25 SCRA 616, this Court held:

It is contended that two-year old respondent Uy Tian Siong cannot, under Article 363 of the Civil Code, be
separated from his mother _ _ _ _ _ _; and that to make said wife depart from the Philippines is destructive of
family solidarity (Articles 218-221). These arguments are beside the point. Said laws govern the relations _ _ _ _ _
between private persons, not the relations between visiting aliens and the sovereign host-country _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners-appellants.
 DJUMANTAN vs. HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON.
REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
AND DEPORTATION

Facts
Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker. He then embraced and was
converted to Islam.

He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to the Philippines. Petitioner and her
two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the guests of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend
of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.
Banez executed an Affidavit of Guaranty and Support, for his guests. As guests, petitioner and her two children
lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina
Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for concubinage,
however, subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary
visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration. Banez eldest son,
Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino
citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines. They revoked the visa previously granted to her.

Issue
Whether or not the Djumantans admission and change of immigration status from temporary to permanent resident legal.

Ruling
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioners entry into the country and the change of her
immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained
through misinterpretation. Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her
applications for temporary visitors visa and for permanent residency.

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest
is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country. This right is based on the
fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and
simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay.

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given
permanent residency, in the Philippines.The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the
operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a
Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from
the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien
who applies for a visitors visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. an alien
allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and may be admitted as a permanent resident. Among
those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen. The entry of
aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to
Filipino citizens.
 MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
G.R. No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292

FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the
interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated
that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to
visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a
period of one month.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that
said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of
stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25
January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her
arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At
the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write
and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino
name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of
First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes
ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship
of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings,
Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who
dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.
As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for
naturalization proceeding to enable the alienwife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship
settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or
enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the
citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for
the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material
or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by
virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
 G.R. No. L-9430 June 29, 1957
EMILIO SUNTAY Y AGUINALDO, petitioner, vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE NICASIO YATCO, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, and THE HONORABLE CARLOS P. GARCIA, as Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, respondents.
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul an order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City directing

. . . the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs for them to take proper steps in
order that the accused, Emilio Suntay y Aguinaldo, who is alleged to be in the United States, may be brought
back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law, (Exhibit D)

and of prohibition to enjoin the Secretary for Foreign Affairs from cancelling the petitioner's passport without previous
hearing.

On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against
Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, as follows:

On or about June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges in Quezon City with lewd
design and took her to somewhere near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to have
carnal knowledge of her. Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years.

On 15 December 1954, after an investigation, an Assistant City Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon
City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a
letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City
Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against the herein petitioner.

On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs (No.
5981 [A39184]). On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he
is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the
petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation
had been conducted (crim. case No. Q-1596, Exhibit B). On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion
praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National
Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to
the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." (Exhibit C.) On 10 February 1955 the Court
granted the motion (Exhibit D). On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States
instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to
compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. "The Embassy was likewise
directed to make representation with the State Department that Emilio Suntay's presence outside the Philippines is
considered detrimental to the best interest of this Government, that his passport has been withdrawn, and that he is not
considered under the protection of the Philippines while abroad." (Exhibit E.) However, this order was not
implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be
judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955 counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the
action taken by him be reconsidered (Exhibit F), and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent
Court reconsider its order of 10 February 1955 (Exhibit G). On 7 July 1955 the respondent Secretary denied counsel's
request (Exhibit H) and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration (Exhibit I). Hence this
petition.

The petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take
proper steps in order that the" petitioner "may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be brought back to the
Philippines, so that he may default with in accordance with law," may be carried out only "through the cancellation of
his passport," the said order is illegal because "while a Court may review the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
in cancelling a passport and grant relief when the Secretary's discretion is abused, the court cannot, in the first instance,
take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a passport to be cancelled."

The petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court directing the department of Foreign Affairs "to take
proper steps in order that the" petitioner "may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law," may be carried out only "through the cancellation of his passport," the said order is illegal
because 'while a Court may review the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in cancelling a passport and grant
relief when the Secretary's discretion is abused, the court cannot, in the first instance, take the discretionary power
away from the Secretary and itself order a passport to be cancelled." The petitioner further contends that while the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised until
after hearing," because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the
Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law.

The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order of the
respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the accused . . . may be
brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," is not beyond or in excess of its
jurisdiction.
 When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by these rules, any suitable process
or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules. (Section 6,
Rule 124.)

Moreover, the respondent Court did not specify what step the respondent Secretary must take to compel the petitioner
to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charge preferred against him.

Section 25, Executive Order No. 1, series of 1946, 42 Off. Gaz, 1400, prescribing rules and regulations for the grant
and issuance of passports, provides that

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs as well as ally diplomatic or consular officer duly authorized by him, is
authorized, in his discretion, to refuse to issue a passport for use only in certain countries, to withdraw or
cancel a passport already issued, and to withdraw a passport for the purpose its validity or use in certain
countries. (Emphasis supplied.)

True, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued may
not be exercised at whim. But here the petitioner was hailed to Court to answer a criminal charge for seduction and
although at first all Assistant City Attorney recommended the dismissal of the complaint previously subscribed and
sworn to by the father of the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that no final action had been taken by the City
Attorney of Quezon City as the case was still under study. And as the Solicitor General puts it, "His suddenly leaving
the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate attemption his part to flee
from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to
bring him back to justice." In issuing the order in question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage
of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined
from carrying it out.

Counsel for the petitioner insists that his client should have been granted a "quasi-judicial hearing" by the respondent
Secretary before withdrawing or cancelling the passport issued to him. Hearing would have been proper and necessary
if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a
passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted
whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing
of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite
to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the
Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of
the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of clause of the
Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.

In the cases of Bauer vs. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445; Nathan, vs. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 951; and Schachtman vs.
Dulles No. 12406, 23 June 1955, all decided by the States Court of Appeals for the district of Columbia, cited by the
petitioner, the revocation of a passport already issued or refusal to issue a passport applied for, was on the vague reason
that the continued possession or the issuance thereof would be contrary to the best interest of the United States.

The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.

In Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) ... written by Justice Miller ... we addressed the issue of a defendant brought
before the court by way of a forcible abduction. Frederick Ker had been tried and convicted in an Illinois court for
larceny; his presence before the court was procured by means of forcible abduction from Peru. A messenger was sent to
Lima with the proper warrant to demand Ker by virtue of the extradition treaty between Peru and the United States.
The messenger, however, disdained reliance on the treaty processes, and instead forcibly kidnapped Ker and brought
him to the United States. We ... rejected Kers due process argument more broadly, holding in line with the highest
authorities, that such forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within
the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an offence, and presents no valid objection to his
trial in such court. Ker, supra, at 444.

In Frisbie v. Collins, 342 US. 519, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952), we applied the rule in Ker to a case in which
the defendant had been kidnaped in Chicago by Michigan officers and brought to trial in Michigan. We upheld the
conviction over objec- tions based on the Due Process Clause and the Federal Kidnapping Act, and stated:

This Court has never departed from the rule announced in [Ker] that the power of a court to try a person for crime is
not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the courts jurisdiction by reason of a forcible abduction. No
persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They [504 U.S. 655,662] rest on the sound
basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly
apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There
is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice
because he was brought to trial against his will. Frisbie, supra, at 522 (citation and footnote omitted).
 Sec. Of Justice V. Hon. Lantion (2000)
GR No. 139465 Jan. 18 2000

FACTS:
In accordance to "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America" (RP-US Extradition Treaty), the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs
U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States attached with the Grand
Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
documents on June 18, 1999. Mr. Jimenez was charged with the following:
i. 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; 2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
ii. 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;4 counts; Maximum Penalty:5 years/count)
iii. 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; 2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
iv. 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; 6 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
v. 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts; Maximum Penalty: less than 1 year)

The Department of Justice denied Mr. Jimenez request for extradition documents based
on the following:
i. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary
requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as
evidence. Evidentiary requirements are under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069. Evaluation by the Department of the documents
is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. Thus, the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are not available. It merely determines the compliance of the
Requesting Government with the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty. After the filing of the
petition for extradition, the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition.
ii. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition
requests. Furthermore, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides that the Philippine Government must
represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. Thus, it must comply
with the request of the United States Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information.
iii. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "Every treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to
be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
Mr. Jimenez filed with filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition presided
over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation:
i. mandamus to compel the Department to furnish the extradition documents
ii. certiorari to set aside Departments letter dated July 13, 1999 denying his request
iii. prohibition to restrain the Department from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court
iv. enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition
v. application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
Honorable Ralph C. Lantion ordered the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to maintain the status quo by refraining from
committing the acts complained of, from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United
States Government, from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court and from performing any act
directed to the extradition for a period of 20 days from service of the order.
Hon. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines ordered Hon. Lantion to cease and
desist from enforcing the order. Due to transcendental importance, the Court brushed aside peripheral procedural
matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684 and the TRO and proceded on the issues.

ISSUE:
i. Whether or NOT the evaluation procedure is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation
of criminal cases
ii. Whether or NOT the twin basic due process rights granted by Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court on the right to
be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents and the right to submit counter-
affidavits and other supporting documents within 10 days from receipt is dispensable
iii. Whether or NOT the right of the people to information on matters of public concern granted under Sec. 7 of Art.
III of the 1987 Constitution is violated

HELD: DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.
i. NO.
Extradition Request
The Extradition Request (Sec. 4. PD 1069) is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs has the executive
authority to conduct the evaluation process which, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by
itself or is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of
ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power:
 1) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers in form and substance
2) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are
not extraditable
3) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one
which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation.
The process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process (NOT an exercise of an administrative body's
quasi-judicial power) (Sec. 5. PD 1069 and Pars. 2 and 3, Art. 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) that is indispensable to
prosecution. The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or
tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.
In Ruperto v. Torres, the Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial
functions or merely investigatory functions applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents.
If the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances
presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an
absence of judicial discretion and judgment. Thus, the role of the administrative body is limited to an initial finding of
whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court. The court has the power to determine whether or not the
extradition should be effected. The evaluation procedure (in contrast to ordinary investigations) may result in the deprivation
of liberty of the prospective extraditee or accused (Sec. 2[c] of PD 1069) at 2 stages:
1) provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request
This is because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the
person sought pending presentation of the request (Par. 1, Art. 9 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) to prevent flight but
he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days (Par. 4 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) or 20 days (Sec. 20[d] PD
1069) if no request is submitted. Otherwise, he can be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Par. 5,
Art 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty)
2) temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Sec. 6, PD 1069).
The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure is that:
1) there is yet no extradite; BUT
2) it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration
The evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Similar to the evaluation stage of
extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the
respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. The characterization of a treaty
in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do
with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
In this case, the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999 (the
following day the Department of Justice received the request). Thus, the Department of Foreign Affairs failed to
discharge its duty of evaluating the same and its accompanying documents.
Extradition Petition
After delivery of the Extradition Request by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Justice, the latter shall
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Par. 1, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The attorney shall file a
written Extradition Petition with the proper regional trial court, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under
consideration (Par. 2, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The presiding judge shall issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to
appear and to answer the petition. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice or to prevent flight (Par. 1, Sec. 6, PD 1069).
Extradition Hearing
The provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings,
shall apply during the Extradition Hearing (Par. 1, Sec. 9, PD 1069) The attorney may represent the Requesting state. (Sec. 8, PD
1069). The Courts decision on whether the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other
conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty or whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested
is a political one (Par. 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) shall be final and immediately executory (Sec. 12, PD 1069)
and appealable with the Court of Appeals where the provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the
Court of Appeals shall apply except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Sec. 13, PD 1069).
ii. YES.
Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the twin rights of notice and hearing from a prospective extradite. In the
absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. Petitioner contends that United States requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Such argument, however has been
overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. If
the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. The
constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights,
although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.
However in this case, with the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period
of time due to its intricacies and certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the
official English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated) it cannot to be said to be urgent. Therefore, notice
and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
iii. NO.
During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence
the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall
under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have already made an official decision to grant
the extradition request.
 Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan
GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002

Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due Process and Fundamental Fairness in Extradition
Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty

FACTS: Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr.
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within
which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed
its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest
pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr.
Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking
an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The
court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he
had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for
the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems
best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing
an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i. YES.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected
merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as
regards the arrest and detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition
and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents.
Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused
his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans
to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to
persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date
would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution
itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice In Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as
soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the
petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is
determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same
time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be
given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.

ii. Yes.
The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation
of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence
is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion
or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to
grant him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for
which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts
of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those
cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already
of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should
have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his
election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.

Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to
giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the
extradition proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid
the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.

That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within
reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.

iii. NO.
Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to
due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition
court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full
chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking
it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:
Five Postulates of Extradition
1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime
In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states
in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the
willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:
a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights. It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for
conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case
 d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to
extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or
convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. The ultimate purpose of
extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the
Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes
he is charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially Executive

Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct
foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its
duty and power of implementation.
 Wright v. CA
Gr. No. 113213 Aug. 15, 1994

FACTS: To suppress crimes, Australia and the Government of the Philippines entered into a Treaty of Extradition
on the 7th of March 1988. It was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both
States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been
complied with. The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader coverage of
extraditable offenses between the 2 countries and embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least 1 year. It
also allows extradition for crimes committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were in
the statute books of the requesting State at the time of their commission.
Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite persons wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a
sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable offense." A request for extradition requires, if the person is accused of an
offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person, or,
where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought to be extradited.
The Treaty defined extraditable offenses to include all offenses "punishable under the Laws of both Contracting States
by imprisonment for a period of at least 1 year, or by a more severe penalty." For the purpose of the definition, the
Treaty states that:
(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the Contracting States place the offense
within the same category or denominate the offense by the same terminology;
(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is requested shall be taken into
account in determining the constituent elements of the offense.
On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department
of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of
Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy seeking to indict Paul Joseph Wright, an Australian Citizen for:
a. 1 count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958
because he and Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonestly obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and Round
Solicitors, secured by a mortgage on the property in Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven Nominees Pty.
Ltd., a company controlled by a Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all the relevant legal
documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell
b. 13 counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of
1958 because he and Mr. John Carson Craker's received approximately 11.2 in commission (including
$367,044 in bonus commission) via Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd., by submitting 215 false life insurance
proposals, and paying premiums thereon o the Australian Mutual Provident Society through the Office of
Melbourne Mutual Insurance, where he is an insurance agent
c. 1 count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian Crimes
Act of 1958 because he and Mr. Craker's attempted to cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank
account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting 1 false proposal for Life Insurance to the AMP
Society based on an inexistent policy-holder
d. 1 count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr. Craker's
signed and swore before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession
Practice Act (1958), a Statutory Declaration attesting to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance
proposals of AMP Society and containing 3 false statements

In accordance to Section 5 of PD No. 1069 (September 10, 1990), an extradition proceedings was initiated
on April 6, 1993 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Regional Trial Court on June 14, 1993
granted the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australian concluding that the
extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense was committed. The extradition proceeding
resulted in an order of his deportation. The decision was sustained and Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the Court of Appeals. Wright filed a review on certiorari to set aside the order of deportation
contending that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex
post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he argues that the trial
court's decision ordering his extradition is based on evidence that failed to show that he is wanted for
prosecution in his country.

ISSUES:
a. Whether or NOT the Regional Trial Court committed an order in granting the extradition proceeding.
b. Whether or NOT enforcement of Article 18 of the Treaty states a prohibition for the retroactive application of
offenses committed prior to the date of its effectivity
c. whether or not such retroactive application is in violation of the Constitution for being an ex post facto law

HELD: AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit

i. NO.
Complying with Article 2, Section 2 of the Treaty, the crimes for which the Mr. Wright was charged and for which
warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to
have been committed. The trial court correctly determined the offenses under our penal laws are Articles 315(2) and
183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false testimony/perjury, respectively.
The provisions of the Treaty was properly complied with. The signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of
Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the Acts and Omissions,
including the statement itself. The last requirement was accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine
Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.

The relevant provisions merely requires "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the
person sought to be extradited. It does not limited the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to a person charged with an
information or a criminal complaint as it will render the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the
purpose of evading arrest and prosecution. Moreover, the Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets shows that he is not
only wanted for prosecution but has absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or information
under the Treaty is required only when appropriate such as in cases where an individual charged before a competent
court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not required if
the offender has already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed.

ii. YES.
Article 18 states: ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION
This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the Contracting States have notified each other
in writing that their respective requirements for the entry into force of this Treaty have been complied with.
Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any time and it shall cease to be in force on
the one hundred and eightieth day after the day on which notice is given.
The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's date of effectivity and the second paragraph pertains to its
termination. There is no prohibition for its retroactive effect.
Furthermore, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that: 4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to
provisions of this Treaty irrespective of when the offense in relation to which extradition is requested was committed,
provided that:
(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions constituting the offense; and
(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of the Requested State at the time of the
making of the request for extradition, have constituted an offense against the laws in force in that state.

iii. NO.
Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept of ex post facto laws in our Constitution was limited only to penal and
criminal statutes which affects the substantial rights of the accused. As concluded by the Court of Appeals, the Treaty
is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of
persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or
consummated at the time the treaty was ratified."
 Cuevas VS Munoz
GR No. 140520 December 18, 2000

Facts:
Cuevas, as Sec. of DOJ filed the instant petition.

Munoz filed for release contending that since he has been detained beyond 20 days, the maximum for the provisional
arrest, without a request for extradition being received by the DOJ, he should be released. Cuevas, on the other hand,
avers that:
i) The Philippine DOJ had already received a formal request for extradition.
ii) There was urgency for the provisional arrest
iii) The municipal law does not subordinate an international agreement
iv) The supporting documents for the request need not be authenticated
v) There was factual and legal bases in determining probable cause
vi) The offense of accepting an advantage as an agent is punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue
Whether the provisional warrant of arrest issued by the RTC was void

Ruling
Sec. 20 of PD 1069 provides that the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant treaty or convention and while the
same remains in force, request for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition.

In urgent cases, the person sought may, in accordance with the law of the requested Party, be provisionally arrested on
the application of the requesting Party.

There was urgency in the present case as there was a concern of Munoz being a flight risk if he will be informed of the
pending request for extradition especially given the fact that if he will be found guilty of the charges against him, the
penalties are of such gravity as to increase the probability of Munoz absconding if allowed provisional liberty.

Sec. 20 (d) of PD 1069 provides that if within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs has not received the request for extradition, the accused shall be released from custody. While the RP-HK
Extradition Agreement provides for 45 days. Cuevas argument that the latter agreement amended PD 1069 has been
rendered moot and academic by the fact that the Phil. DOJ had already received a request for extradition as early as 12
days after his provisional arrest. Contrary to Munozs contention, the request for extradition need not be filed in court,
rather only need be received by the requested state. The request, as well as the accompanying documents, are valid
despite lack of authentication. The pertinent extradition law does not provide for a requirement of
authentication for the provisional arrest. Moreover, the authenticated copies of the decision or sentence imposed
upon Munoz by HK and the warrant of arrest has already been received by the Phil. Furthermore, the extradition
agreement only requires authentication for the request of extradition and not for the provisional arrest.

Provisional arrest is a solution to the impending risk of flight as the process of preparing a formal request for
extradition and its accompanying documents is time-consuming and leakage-prone. Thus, it is an accepted practice for
the requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable or facsimile.

The temporary hold on private respondents privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process
which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to HK.
There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

As to Munoz contention that it should be the Foreign Diplomat who should send the request for provisional arrest, as
required by PD 1069, the invoked provision only provides for the request for extradition and not the provisional arrest.
There is sufficient compliance with the law if the request for provisional arrest is made by an official who is authorized
by the government of the requesting state to make such a request and the authorization is communicated to the
requested state.

There was sufficient factual and legal basis for the determination of probable cause as a requisite for the issuance of the
Order of Arrest. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. The judge
sufficiently complied with the requirement of personal determination if he reviews the information and the documents
attached thereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of the crime with which he
is being charged. He need not examine personally the complainant and the witnesses.
 Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 (2007)

Facts
Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a
final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition
for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and
that the respondent was a high flight risk. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by
the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the
issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will
further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order
before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest
office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the
assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from
his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted
therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No.
153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being
available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law
on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the
sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to
post bail.