Tayag vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

G.R. No. L-23145, Nov. 29, 1968

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Situs of Shares of Stock: domicile of the corporation

SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a
country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for
his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.

SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the
stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

FACTS:
Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates issued by
Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins’ estate in the
Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the
domiciliary administrator, refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced to issue an
order declaring the stock certificates as lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificates
representing Perkins’ shares. Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as
they are in existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD:
The appeal lacks merit.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the
jurisdiction of the Philippines

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier case, set forth by Justice
Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate
owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries.
That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does
not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator
appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a
person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of
the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs."

Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when
the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock
certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...."
be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the
unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from
lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds application. "In the instant case, the
actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above
undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it
were so minded.
 Vda. De Perez vs. Tolete G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994
FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents of New
York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known
which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a
fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.
Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not
an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should
govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to
notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New
York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an
order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed
HELD: Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon
compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by
the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with
those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as
follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the
foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the
foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran
Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54
Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is
impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered
herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she
only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal
party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will
probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time.
Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving
the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and
place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within
which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers
and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
 Re Estate of Suntay 95 PHIL 500

Doctrine:
There are matters to be established in order to prove a will proved outside the Philippines, among these are: (a) that the
foreign court was, under the laws of said foreign country, a probate court with jurisdiction over the proceedings; (b)
the law of the foreign country on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills; (c) the legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in such foreign country. Note: In the absence of proof of the foreign law, it
is presumed that it is the same as that in the Philippines.

Facts:
- Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino resident citizen, died in city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China. He entered into a
contract of marriage twice in his lifetime.- He had children, including the administrator-appellee Federico, with the late
Manuela T. Cruz. He also had a son herein petitioner-appellant Silvino with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived
him.
- Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (special proceedings No. 4892). After the
death of Apolonio Suntay, Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate.
- On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a
last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines in November 1929 by the late José B.
Suntay. But it was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof
and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. Appeal was taken and
SCremanded the case to CFI Bulacan upon the finding that the evidence is sufficient to prove the loss of the will.-
Nonetheless, the probate court denied motion for continuance of the hearing by the surviving widow and dismissed the
petition. In the meantime Pacific War supervened.
- After liberation, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate
of the will executed in the Philippines in November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed
in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4January 1931 (Exhibit N). He claimed that he had found among the files, records and
documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January
1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China.
- The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an attesting witness, Anastacio Teodoro and
Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was an attesting witness to the lost will, was dead at the time of the hearing of this
alternative petition.- CFI disallowed the alleged last will and testament executed in November 1929 and the
alleged last will and testament executed in Amoy, China.

Issue (TOPICAL): WON the last will and testament executed in Amoy, China should be allowed and recorded by
theCFI? [NO, because certain facts as to the due execution of the China will were not established.]

Ratio:
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the point in Rule78. Section
1 of the rule provides: Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be
allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines. Section 2 provides: When a copy of
such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by
the executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the
hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance. Section 3
provides: If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a
certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts, to which shall be
attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally
proved and allowed in such court.

1. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on
procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the
execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these
points.
2. The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul
General of the Republic of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the
appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make
the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be
admitted, the adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are
appointed to attend to trade matters.

3. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking
the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not
purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the
Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or
allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is proceedings in
rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be
made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that
no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the.

4. The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a deposition
or to perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure or come up to the standard of such
proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at
the back of such interested parties. Decision: The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport
to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate
thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles
followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in
the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings
leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed
and recorded by a competent court of this country.
 Maria Cristina Bellis vs Edward Bellis
20 SCRA 358 – Civil Law – Application of Laws – Nationality Principle
Succession – Nationality of the Decedent – Legitimes

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five
legitimate children (Edward Bellis et al), by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children. He,
however, also had three illegitimate children in the Philippines (Maria Cristina Bellis et al). Before he died, he made two
wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his
illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have
been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate
children.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the said children, maria Kristina et al, are not entitled to their legitimes under
the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.
 TITLE: Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo
CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867

FACTS:
Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish
citizen.

ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.

HELD:
Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with
the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the
testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.

The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre
Brimo, as one of the legatees.
 TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-
appellee, vs. MARCELLE D. VDA.DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ,
legatees, oppositors-appellants.

FACTS:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir.
His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa
Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be
divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow “en plenodominio” in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or
“free portion” shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez “en nudapropriedad.” Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free
portion is charged with the widow‟s usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in Spain on December
11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:

Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez

-widow
-French who lives in Paris
-received ½ (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion

Roberto and Jorge Ramirez

-two grandnephews
-lives in Malate
-received the ½ (free portion)

Wanda de Wrobleski
-companion
-Austrian who lives in Spain
-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion
-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez
-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix

-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because

a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widow’s usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio
Ramirez, wrt to Wanda’s usufruct is INVALID because first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator
b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the
first degree as provided in Art 863 CC
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5
d. proposed partition of the testator’’s interest in the Santa Cruz Building between widow and appellants violates testators
express will to give this property to them
-LC: approved partition

ISSUE
WON the partition is valid insofar as
a. widow’s legitime
b. substitutions
c. usufruct of Wanda

HELD
a. YES, appellants do not question ½ because Marcelle is the widow[1]and over which he could impose no burden,
encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever[2]
-the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testator’s widow of a usufruct over 1/3 of the free portion of
the testator’s estate cannot be made where it will run counter to the testator’s express will. The Court erred for Marcelle
who is entitled to ½ of the estate “enpleno dominio” as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the
will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to
the testator’s intention for as stated above his disposition even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.

b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only case where a vulgar substitution can be
made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is VALID.
BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez are not related to
Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a fideicommissary substitution provided that such substitution does not
go beyond one degreefrom the heir originally instituted. Another is that there is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to
transmit the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts the establishment of
the fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement
ofthe usufructuaries and naked owners.

c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID

-Art XIII[3]Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except toindividuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold land of the public domain in the
Philippines.[4]

The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also
testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this provision does not apply to testamentary succession for
otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would circumvent the prohibition by paying
money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land BUT an alienmay be bestowed
USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines. Therefore, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although
a real right, is upheld because it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to
land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

Decision:½ Marcelle (as legitime), ½ Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in naked ownership and the usufruct to
Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez
 EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. DE BARSOBIA and PACITA W. VALLAR vs VICTORIANO T. CUENCO,
G.R. No. L-33048. April 16, 1982

FACTS:
The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern side) of two adjoining parcels of coconut land located at
Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental (now Camiguin province).

The entire land was owned previously by a certain Leocadia Balisado, who had sold it to the spouses Patricio Barsobia
(now deceased) and Epifania Sarsosa, who were Filipino citizens.

Epifania who was then a widow, sold the land in controversy to a Chinese, Ong King Po who later took actual possession
and enjoyed the fruits of the property.

Ong King Po later litigated the property to Victoriano Cuenco, a naturalized Filipino who immediately took possession of
the property.

Epifania later usurped the controverted property who later sold one-half of the property to Pacita Vallar.
Epifania claimed that it was not her intention to sell the property as it was only to evidence her indebtedness to Ong King
Po.

Cuenco then filed a case for Forcible Entry against Epifania before the MTC which was later dismissed since the question
of possession could not be properly determined without first settling the issue on ownership.

Cuenco later filed a case in the CFI for recovery of possession and ownership of the said land. The CFI rendered a
decision in favor of Epifania and Vallar.

The CA later reversed the Decision decreeing instead that Cuenco was the owner of the litigated property.

ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the property? CUENCO.

HELD:
No private lands shall be transferred or conveyed to aliens.
There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and
void from the beginning, because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution,
which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos.

Had this been a suit between Epifania and Ong King Po, she could have been declared entitled to the litigated land.

But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer
owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject
property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is
already in the hands of a qualified person.

While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had no rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise
inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or
inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated property.

Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.

 G.R. No. L-3676 January 31, 1955
SOCORRO VASQUEZ, plaintiff-appellant,vs. LI SENG GIAPand LI SENG GIAP & SONS, defendants-appellees.

FACTS:
That on January 22, 1940, plaintiff sold and transferred to defendant Li Seng Giap, then Chinese citizen, for the sum of
P14,500, a parcel of land together with a house of strong materials existing thereon. On August 21, 1940, defendant Li
Seng Giap sold and transferred unto defendant Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., whose shareholdings then were owned by
Chinese citizens, for the same sum of P14,500, the above-mentioned parcel of land, together with the improvements
thereon, and duly registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 59684 of the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
city of Manila on August 23, 1940. Defendant Li Seng Giap was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on May 10, 1941,
under Certificate of Naturalization No. 515, the records of which were duly reconstituted under an order of this Honorable
Court in Case No. R-603 dated May 24, 1946. Also defendant Li Seng Giap & Sons,Inc., is now a Filipino corporation,
96.67 percent of its stock being owned by Filipinos, and duly authorized by its articles of incorporation to own, acquire or
dispose of real properties.

Issue: Whether or not naturalized Filipino citizens have a right to acquire and own land in the Philippines.

Held:Yes. The ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the
Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but achieved by making lawful theacquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization.

The title to the parcel of land of the vendee, a naturalized Filipino citizen, being valid that of the domestic corporation to
which the parcel of land has been transferred, must also be valid, 96.67 per cent of its capital stock being owned by
Filipinos.
 THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC. G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in
the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality
of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of
the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later,
Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties
has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale
by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of
the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal
Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on
sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by
private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off
[its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us.
In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official
representative, the Papal Nuncio.

ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its
Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p.
87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said
transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent
disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio.
The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22).
This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental
character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters
living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters
have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by
private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International
Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government
to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy
See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of
course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the
Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected
Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides
to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is
DISMISSED.
 Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.

Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of
the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the
war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the
commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the property is located in
Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies.

Issues and Held:

1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the
property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi
lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law
situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to
take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law
should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the
Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State.
And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs
does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced.
The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what
body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that
it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on
acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.
 THERKELSEN v. REPUBLIC (1964)
J. Reyes
FACTS:
In this adoption proceeding, the petitioners are husband and wife who were married on June 2, 1962, or barely ayear ago.
The minor sought to be adopted, born on February 16, 1960, is the natural child of petitioner wife. Hisfather was Charles
Joseph Week, who abandoned mother and child after the latter's birth. He is said to have goneback to the United States.

Petitioner husband is a Danish subject, who has been granted permanent residence in the Philippines, aformer employee
of Scandinavian Airlines System, he is now Manager of M. Y. Travel InternationalHongkong Ltd., with a monthly salary
of P1,200.00 plus allowances. It does not appear that either petitionerhas been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.

The minor sought to be adopted has been living with them ever since the marriage of petitioners. Petitionerhusband has
treated the minor as his son, and the latter calls him "Daddy." Although the possibility existsthat petitioners may yet have
their own children, the adoption at this time, before any such children arebegotten, may strengthen, rather than disrupt,
future domestic relations.
CFI
denied the adoption

The adoption was denied solely because the same would not result in the loss of the minor's Filipinocitizenship and the
acquisition by him of the citizenship of his adopter.
ISSUE/HELD: WON petitioner is qualified to adopt -
The present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either(a) non-
residents or (b) who are residents but the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations withtheir
government. Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting aperson
under our law. Petitioners admittedly do not fall in either class.The criterion adopted by the Court
a quo
would demand as a condition for the approval of the adoption that theprocess should result in the acquisition, by the
person adopted, of the alien citizenship of the adopting parent.This finds no support in the law, for, as observed by this
Court in
Ching Leng vs. Galang
, the citizenship of theadopter is a matter political, and not civil, in nature, and the ways in which it should be conferred
lay outside theambit of the Civil Code. It is not within the province of our civil law to determine how or when citizenship
in a foreignstate is to be acquired. The disapproval of the adoption of an alien child in order to forestall circumvention of
ourexclusion laws does not warrant, denial of the adoption of a Filipino minor by qualified alien adopting parents, since
itis not shown that our public policy would be thereby subverted.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed
from is reversed, and the court
a quo
is directed to allow theadoption sought. Without costs.