The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a defining event of its time.

The revolution itself

has widely been described as an ‘Islamic Revolution’, and when considering the
outcome of this popular uprising it is an obvious conclusion to draw. A republic was
established under the control of the hierocracy and the nation actively portrays itself
as an Islamic nation. But it is necessary to distinguish outcomes from causes when
assessing any revolution, as there is a tendency to read history backwards by
analysing the causes in terms of the outcomes. There is a fairly wide consensus on the
reasons for the Iranian revolution. Most significant would be the drive toward
modernisation, begun by Reza Shah and continued by his son, Mohammad, and its
effects on Iranian society, including the growth of a significant middle class and the
failure to effectively manage subsequent economic growth. The regime suffered from
a lack of legitimacy due to its repressive nature and alliance with foreign powers,
particularly the United States, and was further weakened by corruption and hypocrisy.
Finally the role religion and a reassertion of cultural identity are also important. I
would argue that the potential for radicalisation in Shiia Islam was present, and was a
factor in the mobilisation of the population, but the emphasis placed on the role of
Islam in creating the revolution tends to be overemphasised. Rather, the hierocracy,
held a number of advantages over the secular opposition that allowed them to exert
their control over the revolution at its crucial juncture.

Reform and modernisation had a significant effect on Iranian society. It impacted all
social groups, from the traditional upper class, the emerging middle class, and the
rural villagers. The roots of modernisation can be traced back to Reza Shah,
beginning in the 1920s and continuing under Mohammed Reza Shah. Significant
secular reforms were instituted in the 1930s aimed at creating a centralised
bureaucratic state, also state run education and health care was initiated. The ‘White
Revolution’ was instituted in 1963.1 It included significant land reforms and a literacy
program. These and other reforms led to the creation of a significant middle class in
Iranian society. In the 1940s this group was numbered at most, 200,000, by the mid
1970s this figure had reached 2,000,000.2 These people were finding employment not
only in the private sectors but also in the government. The bureaucracy expanded

1
Arjomand S.A., The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran, NY, 1988, p72
2
Salehi M.M., Insurgency through Culture and Religion: The Islamic Revolution of Iran, NY, 1988,
p107.
between 1963-1967 from 150,000 to 304,000 people,3 and the percentage of middle
class, white-collar professions rose from 16.5% in 1966 to 33% overall.4 These
figures demonstrate the rapid expansion of the middle class, who had benefited from
state run education. This continued to expand under the second Shah from 23,000
students enrolled in tertiary institutions in the early 1960s to 80,000 a decade later, in
addition to at least a further 20,000 students studying abroad.5 McDaniel argues that
the new middles class’s “demand for political participation and law emerged from the
contradiction between their high level professional attainments and their social and
political emasculation.”6 Prior to the revolution, the bar was virtually the only
professional association in Iran. Reform and modernisation saw the emergence of a
significant middle class who was particularly vulnerable to government control due to
their urban location and social visibility.7 The reforms also had profound effects on
the other facets of Iranian society.

Land reform, as mentioned earlier was perhaps the most important aspect of the
‘White Revolution’. It was designed to break up the power of the feudal landlords,
and prevented them from having an interest in more than one village. This effectively
liquidated them as a class and broke up the power of the ‘thousand families’. 8 While
alienating this class, it could have been expected that the Shah would gain significant
support from the peasantry, who received their own plots of land. But the reforms
failed to provide them with enough land to be viable. Simultaneously, mechanisation
was being instituted in agriculture, making peasant labourers redundant. This had the
result of a huge rural to urban migration. Peasants flooded into the cities where
attractive wages were being paid in the heavily subsidised manufacturing and
construction industries and skilled or semi-skilled workers were receiving wages at
least equal to their highly educated counterparts in the middle class.9 Between 1956
and 1976 the urban component of the total population increased from 31% to 47%10

3
McDaniel T., Autocracy, Modernisation and Revolution in Russia and Iran, NJ, 1991, p68
4
Bayat A., Revolution without movement, movement without revolution: comparing Islamic activism
in Iran and Egypt in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Jan 1998 v40 n1 p149
5
Salehi M.M., Insurgency through Culture and Religion: The Islamic Revolution of Iran, NY, 1988,
p107
6
McDaniel T., Autocracy, Modernisation and Revolution in Russia and Iran, NJ, 1991, p139
7
Ibid
8
Arjomand S.A., The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran, NY, 1988, p73
9
Salehi M.M., Insurgency through Culture and Religion: The Islamic Revolution of Iran, NY, 1988,
p108
10
Arjomand S.A., The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran, NY, 1988, p74.
and Tehran almost doubled its share of the population from 7.9% to 13.3%.11 It is
argued that the cities continued to dominate Iran but lost their coherence and a former
mingling of classes was replaced with a new pattern of social segregation. 12 The
increase in the urban population led to an increase of 100% per year in the price of
land,13 coupled with the distorted path of economic development due to an influx of
petrodollars, inflation and corruption increased the gap between the haves and the
have nots. Failure by the regime to integrate the influx of migrants into the emerging
society was a crucial failing of the regime.

The regime of the Shah suffered from a lack of legitimacy that made its position at the
very least, precarious. Mohammad Reza Shah gained power in 1953 on the back of a
military coup. This had followed a long period of upheaval following the invasion of
Iran by Britain and Russia in 1941. It was widely known that the CIA were heavily
involved it orchestrating the coup. It is asserted that the Shah “never recovered from
the political sin of the coup. Foreign involvement with the coup and the general belief
that Westerners were behind the police state distorted the public image of the Shah.” 14
Following the coup the government’s first action was to ban all political activities and
arrest all insurgents. Salehi argues that the main intentions underpinning his reform
and modernisation strategy “were to consolidate his position and legitimise his rule.” 15
Whereas opposition groups remained sceptical of any action undertaken by the
autocratic regime. While it has been argued that there was a cultural tradition of
autocratic rule in Iran going back over 2500 years, “it is still the case that rightful
kings could no violate tradition. There was no warrant for the kind of rupture with the
past envisioned and promoted by the two Pahlavi Shahs.”16 The Shah made no
significant connection with his people. This is emphasised by his ludicrous attempt to
link his regime to the pre-Islamic Persian empire of 2500 years ago, the anniversary
of which was celebrated with a party in 1971 costing more than $100,000,000 where
alcohol and western delicacies were served.17 This party angered the people not only
because of its excess but also because of its disregard for Islamic heritage.
11
McDaniel T., Autocracy, Modernisation and Revolution in Russia and Iran, NJ, 1991, p130.
12
Salehi M.M., Insurgency through Culture and Religion: The Islamic Revolution of Iran, NY, 1988,
p110
13
Ibid
14
Ibid, p99
15
Ibid, p102
16
McDaniel T., Autocracy, Modernisation and Revolution in Russia and Iran, NJ, 1991, p60.
17
Lesch D.W., 1979: The Year That Shaped the Modern Middle East, Colorado, 2001, p30.
Compounding this, the Islamic calendar was replaced with an ancient Persian
calendar, but the Shah continued to claim, “there exists today, indissoluble spiritual
ties and emotional ties between my people and me the equivalent of which perhaps
exists nowhere else.”18 Not only was the Shah cut off from the people due to his
education in Switzerland, but also by his disregard for Islamic tradition.

The coercive arm of the state was significantly strengthened under Mohammad. The
centrepiece was the hated secret police, SAVAK whose atrocities of murder and
torture were well known among the population at large. McDaniel observes that, “No
doubt this flowering of the coercive apparatus intimidated many of the dictator’s
potential opponents and destroyed a significant part of the opposition, but it did so at
enormous cost to the Shah’s domestic and international reputation.”19 SAVAK was
bolstered by one of the world’s strongest militaries, which like the state itself was
constructed around the Shah’s own person. It was deliberately organised without clear
lines of communication or authority, and generals, antagonistic toward each other
were placed in opposing positions. All this was done in order to prevent a coup, but at
the time of the revolution it prevented the armed forces from acting independently and
saving the Shah’s regime. The bureaucracy was similarly restrained and loyalty was
not fostered among its members. “Fear rather than rationality, fear rather than
common sense, fear rather than patriotism, seems the governing force in the life of an
Iranian public servant.”20 The Shah, a known conspiracy theorist, constructed the state
in such a fashion that it was no surprise that in late 1978, the only group still on his
side was the military, which despite the above received huge amounts of funding. “In
curbing all independent group formation, and in following the principle of divide and
rule within Iranian society the Shah failed to build a constituency capable of
concerted action on his behalf among any major social group.”21 His disregard for
Iranian culture and alienation of the traditional classes, especially the clergy would
play a role in his downfall.

18
McDaniel T., Autocracy, Modernisation and Revolution in Russia and Iran, NJ, 1991, p60.
19
Ibid, p66
20
Ibid, p68
21
Salehi M.M., Insurgency through Culture and Religion: The Islamic Revolution of Iran, NY, 1988,,
p106
There is a strong argument that the nature of the Shiia branch of Islam contributed to
the revolutionary reaction of the people toward the Shah. Salehi observes that the “the
Shiiaite branch of Islam began because of a controversy over who ought to succeed
prophet Mohammed in leading Moslems and in ruling the Islamic state. The
discussion of the legitimacy of the government was therefore built in Shiiaite political
thinking.”22 All that was required was to create an analogy between the cotemporary
political situation and that in which the third Imam Hussein was slain. The Shah
becomes the hated Yazid whose rule had no legitimacy according to Shiia believers.
This is demonstrated by the chant adopted by many protesters during the revolution,
“Every place is Karballa! Every day is Ashura”23, a reference to the time and place of
the execution of Imam Hussein. As a result of the rapid reform in Iranian society and
the perceived Western influence being imposed from above by the Shah, there was
what has been termed a cultural, or Islamic revitalisation. This emerged on the back of
writers such as Dr. Ali Shariati who advocated a return to Islam as a way of life, and
provided a scientific reasoning in his arguments on religion, which appealed to the
educated middle class. Again, Salehi observes that, “The newcomers of 1960s and
1970s were entering the ranking of middle class at a time when these jobs no longer
carried such distinct identity. They were merely jobs like any other jobs.”24 As well as
increased receptiveness in the middle class, the new migrant population in the cities
brought with them a strong sense of traditionalism and religious ties. Mentioned
previously was the fact that the state failed to effectively integrate this group, making
them particularly receptive to the propaganda of the clergy. A young squatter
remarked that, “Nothings brings us together more than the love for Imam Hussein.” 25
While the ideological impetus for change may have begun in the middle class, it was
the ability of the clergy to massively mobilise this section of society against the
regime that eventually overthrew the Shah.

The clergy had a number of advantages over the middle class intelligentsia that
allowed them to take the reigns of the revolution and lead it to its conclusion. Salehi
brings to light an interesting quote attributed to Ardashir, the King of Kings in the 6 th

22
Salehi M.M., Insurgency through Culture and Religion: The Islamic Revolution of Iran, NY, 1988,
p49
23
Ibid, p50.
24
Ibid, p109
25
Arjomand S.A., The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran, NY, 1988, p92
century. It says, “Religion is the foundation and kingship the pillar, and the lord of the
foundation has prior potency over the entire edifice as against the lord of the pillar.” 26
The Pahlavi regime had increasingly eroded the position of the clergy since the time
of Reza Shah, beginning with judicial and educational reforms modelled on the
secular experience in Turkey. Mohammad, with his disregard for Iran’s Islamic
heritage, also antagonised the hierocracy. But, “no matter how hostile the regime may
have been to the Ulama, it could hardly use repression on a wide scale against the
representatives of a religion that it claimed to embrace.”27 While there was a strong
traditionalist movement, it is argued that the secular elements of the opposition
controlled events up until the spring of 1978. This is not to say that these elements of
the opposition disregarded Islam, as previously noted, there was a strong intellectual
movement advocating a return to Islam, but they had a more secularist conception of
the role Islam would play in politics. Henry Precht, a state department desk officer at
the Iranian embassy recalled that the “religious aspect wasn't the main focus in the
spring of 1978; it was a popular uprising. It wasn't even viewed as being a long-term
thing. After all, the Shah had a pretty tough secret police apparatus and an army
deemed to be loyal.”28 Bayat notes that the “the clergy had the comparative advantage
of possessing invaluable institutional capacity, including its own hierarchical order,
over 10,000 mosques, Hussieniehs, Huwsehs, and associations which acted as vital
means of communication among the revolutionary contenders.”29 Thus, the clergy
were able to mobilise huge amounts of people, especially from the urban poor in
whom they had a ready audience, and take control of the revolution. Once the Shah
had been toppled, Khomeini made early compromises in installing a secular Prime
Minister, but as Bani-Sadr, former Iranian president noted, “For Khomeini,
discrediting the intellectuals was no problem since most of them had ties to the United
States.”30

Thus an Islamic Republic was established in Iran. Despite having one of the world’s
most powerful militaries the Shah was removed from power, by a largely non-violent
26
Arjomand S.A., The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran, NY, 1988, p76
27
McDaniel T., Autocracy, Modernisation and Revolution in Russia and Iran, NJ, 1991, 146.
28
Precht H., The Iranian Revolution: an oral history in The Middle East Journal, Winter 2004 v58 i1
p9.
29
Bayat A., Revolution without movement, movement without revolution: comparing Islamic activism
in Iran and Egypt in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Jan 1998 v40 n1 p136
30
Bani-Sadr A., My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution & Secret Deals with the U.S., Virginia, 1991,
p3
popular uprising. As well as the fact that a program of reform had been taking place
for the better part of half a century, that despite its failings, had achieved incredible
gains in the areas of health and education and had raised the living standards of many
Iranians. But, a new middle class was created who were excluded from the political
process and any avenue of dissent. The regime through its repression and corruption
suffered a loss of any legitimacy that it might have retained, and the bumbling and
indecisiveness of the Shah, during 1978/1979 certainly contributed to his downfall.
As well as this a large section of the population, particularly the clergy, were alienated
by a perceived process of Westernisation, enforced from above, prompting a cultural
revitalisation that eventually united all sections of Iranian society in overthrowing the
Shah. But while all sections of Iranian society were arguably united in what they did
not want (autocratic rule by the Shah), they were certainly not united by what they
wanted to achieve. It is often said of revolutions that many who participated, had they
known the outcome, would not have been involved and this is certainly the case in
Iran. The institutional power of the Shiia clergy allowed them to control the
revolution and establish a state controlled by the hierocracy, that is today one of the
most repressive in the world.