EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of
all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching ,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said ordinances
and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law,
their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did not
suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any
of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily
not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations
marine wealth. The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph
of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal
waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to
effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise
of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

GENUINE NECESSITY/JUDICIAL REVIEW

Municipality of Meycauayan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GR L-72126, 29 January 1988]
Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur

Facts: In 1975, the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation (PPMC) filed with the Office of the Municipal
Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a width of 26.8 meters and
a length of 184.37 meters covered by TCTs 215165 and 37879. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable
the storage of PMC's heavy equipment and various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon
pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete
pipes, and parts for low cost housing. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then
Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the
respondent's parcel of land covered by TCT 37879. An opposition to the resolution was filed by the PPMC with the
Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a special committee of four members to investigate the
matter. On 10 March 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or
annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to
expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road. On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of
Bulacan passed Resolution 238, Series of 1976, disapproving and annulling Resolution 258, Series of 1975, of the
Municipal Council of Meycauayan. The PPMC, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval
of the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. On 21 October 1983, however, the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution 21, Series of 1983, for the purpose of
expropriating anew PPMC's land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on 25 January
1984. Thereafter, the Municipality of Meycauayan, on 14 February 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil action for expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00,
which is the market value of the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court on 1 March 1984 issued a
writ of possession in favor of the municipality. On 27 August 1984, the trial court issued an order declaring the
taking of the property as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court commissioner who shall
hold the hearing to ascertain the just compensation for the property. PPMC went to the Intermediate Appellate Court

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on petition for review. On 10 January 1985, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. However, upon
motion for reconsideration by PPMC, the decision was re-examined and reversed. The appellate court held that
there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several other roads for
the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road. The court, taking into
consideration the location and size of the land, also opined that the land is more ideal for use as storage area for
respondent's heavy equipment and finished products. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the
municipality went to the Supreme Court on petition for review on certiorari on 25 October 1985.

Issue: Whether there is genuine necessity to expropriate PPMCs property for the purpose of a connecting road, in
light of other appropriate lots for the purpose.

Held: There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private property for public use upon payment of
just compensation. What is questioned is the existence of a genuine necessity therefor. The foundation of the right
to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character.
Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a
public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to require into the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor. The government may not
capriciously choose what private property should be taken. With due recognition then of the power of Congress to
designate the particular property to be taken and how much Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 22 ) thereof may be
condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such
competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause
will not allow. The Special Committee's Report, dated 10 March 1976, stated that "there is no genuine necessity for
the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandizing
Corporation for use as a public road. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available road and vacant lot
offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question and lying idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriated which
was found by the Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy equipment after it is fenced
together with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does not appear to be very imperative
and necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan
to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully and better attained by acquiring the other
available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate
business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered
for sale for a wider public road to attain decongestion of traffic because as observed by the Committee, the lot of
the Corporation sought to be taken will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore, will not suffice to
improve and decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area." There is absolutely no showing in
the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not been the subject
of the municipalities's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another connecting road.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660

FACTS:

The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is
alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province.
Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,
and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run
away from the reservation.

The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up
their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by
the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and
was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

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SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the prior approval of
the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to
take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial
board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:

Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head, therefore making it unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the
provincial governor and the provincial board.

In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department
or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it
has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to
give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.

In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial
governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the
execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge when such as course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people
who have the misfortune of being in a backward state. Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department
head.