EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.]

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R.

OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA ,
petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO
ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
respondents.

Azcuna, Yorac, Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua and Rene A.V. Saguisag for petitioners.

Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for De Venecia.

SYNOPSIS

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of Republic
Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code by imposing so-called sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes. Petitioners brought this suit against herein respondents claiming that the
latter violated Rule VIII, Section 35, Rule XVII, Section 103, Rule XIX, Section 112,
Rule XVI, Section 97, Rule XX Section 121-122, Rule XXI Section 123 and Rule
XVIII Section 109 of the House Rules. For this matter, petitioners assert that
violation of the House Rules is a violation of the Constitution thereof.AEDISC

In its decision, the Supreme Court nds no ground for holding that congress
committed grave abuse of discretion in enacting Republic Act 8240. It is clear from
the facts of the case that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of
R.A. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than the
constitutional requirement for the enactment of a law, that is, Article VI, Section 26-
27 of the 1987 Constitution, pertaining to the existence of the quorum. The
established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on
account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself. Verily, it
follows that the case at hand does not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has gone beyond the constitutional limit of its jurisdiction so as to call
for the exercise of Article VIII, Section I.

Moreover, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of House No. 7198 by speaker
of the House and President of the Senate and certication by secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its
due enactment. In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
dismissed.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARLIAMENTARY RULES
ARE MERELY PROCEDURAL AND COURTS HAVE NO CONCERN WITH THEIR
OBSERVANCE; FAILURE TO CONFORM THEREWITH WILL NOT INVALIDATE ACTION
WHEN THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF MEMBERS HAVE AGREED THERETO. Cases,
both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed
to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of
a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v.
Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modication or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure
to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.'"

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES MUST NOT IGNORE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS
OR VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co ., the
rule was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules
of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to
the validity of a rule that a dierent one has been prescribed and in force for a
length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House,
and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal."CIHAED

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In this case no rights of private
individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress
in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to
look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to
look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has
its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate
balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our
system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to
enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must
accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; CANNOT DECLARE AN ACT OF LEGISLATURE VOID

FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE. If, then, the
established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on
account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows
that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government
has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the
exercise of our Art. VIII, 1 power.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES; THERE IS NO RULE REQUIRING THAT THE CHAIR MUST
RESTATE THE MOTION AND CONDUCT A VIVA VOCE OR NOMINAL VOTING. No
rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specically requires that
in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair
must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other
hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It
has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on
the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference
committee report on the bills amending the Tari and Customs Code were
approved. Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate and even more just. The advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for
judicial consideration. In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court
cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the
deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors,
our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional
command that the institution be allowed to manage its own aairs precludes us
from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem."

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION REQUIRING THAT THE YEAS

A N D NAYS OF THE MEMBERS BE TAKEN EVERYTIME A HOUSE HAS TO VOTE;
EXCEPTIONS. Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the
Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following
instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fth of the
Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. Indeed,
considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members
by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to
repeat the process.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARLIAMENTARY RULES; QUESTION REGARDING MOTION TO

APPROVE AND RATIFY CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, NOT A QUESTION OF
PRIVILEGE ENTITLED TO PRECEDENCE. Petitioners claim that they were
prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate
suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. It would appear, however,
that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because
when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything
anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4
p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if
there was anything he wanted to say. It is thus apparent that petitioners'
predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper
motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep.
Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's
question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege
entitled to precedence. And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's
motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any
further consideration of the question.

8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI ; GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION, DEFINED. The phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice
Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts
by Art. VIII, 1 extends to cases where "a branch of the government or any of its
ocials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction."

9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES; CONTINUED INTERPELLATION OF SPONSOR, AN
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRESENCE OF QUORUM. Here, the matter complained of
concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should
not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only
that Rep. Arroyo was eectively prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already
been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question
of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously
present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. Rep. Arroyo waived
his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in
effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.

10. ID.; ID.; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE; SIGNING OF HOUSE BILL BY THE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AND PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND CERTIFICATION BY
THE SECRETARIES OF BOTH HOUSES, CONCLUSIVE OF ITS DUE ENACTMENT.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate and the certication by the secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of
its due enactment. The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well
established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. The enrolled
bill rule rests on the following considerations: . . . As the President has no authority
to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the ocial attestations of the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to
coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon
that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in
the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. To
overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching
of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.

11. ID.; ID.; JOURNAL; CONCLUSIVE WITH RESPECT TO MATTERS THAT ARE
REQUIRED BY THE CONSTITUTION TO BE RECORDED THEREIN. The Journal is
regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution
to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive eect. Thus, in United
States v. Pons , this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the
Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should
be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent,
that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall
not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only
in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No.
8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

12. ID.; SUPREME COURT; WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO SET ASIDE LEGISLATIVE

ACTION AS VOID BECAUSE THE COURT THINKS THE HOUSE DISREGARDED ITS
OWN RULES. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the
Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can nd their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case
may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a
new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything
to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference
rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE;

APPLICATION MUST BE LIMITED TO MINOR MATTERS RELATING TO FORM AND
FACTUAL ISSUES WHICH DO NOT MATERIALLY ALTER THE ESSENCE AND
SUBSTANCE OF THE LAW. Reliance on the enrolled bill theory is not to be
discontinued but its application must be limited to minor matters relating more to
form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of
the law itself.

2. ID.; ID.; BILL; INTRODUCTION OF SEVERAL PROVISIONS IN THE BICAMERAL

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROSCRIPTION AGAINST ANY AMENDMENT UPON THE LAST READING. The
introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report
did not only violate the pertinent House and Senate Rules dening the limited
power of the conference committee but that the Constitutional proscription against
any amendment upon the last reading of a bill was likewise breached. Hence, in
view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would have been proper in order
to uphold the Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded invoking the
same principle which should have justied the Court in questioning the actuations
of the legislative branch.

PUNO; J.; concurring and dissenting opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF

CONGRESSIONAL RULES; BOUNDARIES. In the 1891 case of US. v. Ballin, (144
US 1 [1891]) the US Supreme Court rst dened the boundaries of the power of the
judiciary to review congressional rules. Ballin clearly conrmed the jurisdiction of
courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether they are
constitutional. Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith (286 US 6
[1932]). The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction over
the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction although "the question
primarily at issue relates to the construction of the applicable rules, not to their
constitutionality." Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling
falls within the test spelled out in Ballin. Smith was followed by the 1948 case of
Christoel v. United States (338 US 89 [1948]). A majority of the Court, with Mr.
Justice Murphy, as ponente, dened the issue as "what rules the House had
established and whether they have been followed." The US Supreme Court pursued
the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of Yellin v. United States (374 US 109
[1963]). In the benchmark case of Baker v. Carr , (369 US 186 [1962]), the US
Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-appointment of the
Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine, a tool for
maintenance of government order, will not be so applied as to promote only
disorder" and that "the courts cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona de controversy
as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority."
THEDCA

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling reason
for courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition
will cover up abuse of power. For Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was
intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and
was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also
xeroxed from the US Constitutional or any foreign state constitution. In Tolentino, I
endorsed the view of former, Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching
the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be
depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the
case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; LAW-MAKING POWER;

ENROLLED BILL, DEFINED. An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced,
nally enacted by both Houses, signed by the proper ocers of each House and
approved by the President. It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their
presiding ocers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the
sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him
in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress
shall be presented to him.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE; RULES. The enrolled bill originated
in England where there is no written Constitution controlling the legislative branch
of the government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as
judicial as emanating from the highest tribunal in the land are placed on the
same footing and regarded with the same veneration as the judgment of the courts
which cannot be collaterally attacked. In England, the conclusiveness of the bill was
premised on the rationale that "an act of parliament thus made is the exercise of
the highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be
altered, amended, dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms
and by the same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it requires
the same strength to dissolve as to create an obligation. Over the years, the
enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some jurisdictions have
adopted the modied entry or armative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the
presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity
to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the journals of the
legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one or more of the
constitutional requirements. Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence
Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has been
regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional requirements in
enacting a law have been violated. For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic
evidence are allowed to be received. Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to
issues of fraud or mistakes.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERN RATIONALE. The modern rationale for the
enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, viz.: . . . "The signing by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in
open session, of an enrolled bill, is an ocial attestation by the two houses of such
bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two Houses, through
their presiding ocers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in
due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which
pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President
has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the ocial attestations of the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President
of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to
coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon
the assurance, to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID; CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION RULE SHOULD BE ABANDONED.

The enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable respectability in
United States. Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's, ". . . the tendency
seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the
adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity which
may be attacked by any authoritative source of information." It is high time we re-
examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito , (78 Phil. 1 [1947]) that this Court, with three (3) Justices
dissenting, rst embraced the rule that a duly authenticated bill or resolution
imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In the 1969 case of Morales v.
Subido, (27 SCRA 131, 134-135) we reiterated our delity to the enrolled bill
doctrine. Signicantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the
enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia stressed: "All we hold is that with respect to
matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill
prevails in the event of any discrepancy." In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, (56
SCRA 714) we further diluted the enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to apply it
after the Senate President declared his signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled: As
far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certication
made by the presiding ocers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The law-
making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the
certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present
upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the
signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Finally in 1994 came the case of
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance , et al., and its companion cases. These cases show
that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in
Tolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here
made that the enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is now time for
the Court to make a denitive pronouncement that we no longer give our
unqualied support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are compelling reasons for
this suggested change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in
England where it originated because in England there is no written Constitution and
the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in the United States
have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of
contemporary developments in lawmaking. And more important, our uncritical
adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules.
I n Mabanag, we relied on Section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as
amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This
section, however has long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our
Rules will show that its section on conclusive presumption does not carry the
conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is not all. The
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of
t r u t h cannot be justied under the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our
Constitution demands that we live not only under a rule of law but also under a
regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national policy requiring full public
disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will
defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these
policies, this Court was given the power to pry open and to strike down any act of
any branch or instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled
bill for its ction of conclusiveness shuts o truth in many litigations. We cannot
dispense justice based on ction for the search for justice is the search for truth. I
submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of correctness
will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth.

7. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI ; GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION; NEGATED IN CASE AT BAR. I do not nd any grave abuse of
discretion committed by the public respondents to justify granting petition. As the
ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the complaint that petitioner was
prevented from raising the question of quorum. The petition does not concern
violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of a
non-member of the House which requires constitutional protection. The rules on
how to question the existence of a quorum are procedural in character. They are
malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact laws. As well
stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their observance or non-
observance is a matter of judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not
the business of the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

VITUG, J., concurring opinion:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; WITH POWER TO DETERMINE

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON ANY BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CONSTRUED. When the 1987
Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1,
Article VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there is grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government, the
Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed, could not have
been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility
of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has long
been understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical
or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion,
like the patent disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the
judgment of Congress under whose province the specic responsibility falls and the
authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into
the internal aairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of
government. At no time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers
of the fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure, from
the time-honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced, powers of the
three branches of government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old
rule and the new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial power." Now,
the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial
inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions provided, however,
that grave abuse of discretion the sole test of justiciability on purely political
issues is shown to have attended the contested act. DEICTS

DECISION

MENDOZA, J : p

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic
Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specic taxes) on the manufacture
and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
"constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of
the Constitution. cdphil

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was
approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September
16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third
reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.

The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of
the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech,
after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was rst to interpellate.
He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep.
Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call,
the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. 1 Rep.
Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a
vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.

Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order,
following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In
the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on
November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in
the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the
conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.

(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to
know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority
Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.

MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.

(It was 3:01 p.m.)

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday,
next week.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four
o'clock, Wednesday, next week.

(It was 3:40 p.m.)

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certied by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Petitioners claim that there are actually four dierent versions of the transcript of
this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound
recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session
adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C.
Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certied by the
Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep.
Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of
November 21, 1996 as certied by the Chief of the Transcription Division on
November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version
abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions dier on three points, to
wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13
in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certied on
November 21, 1996 the word "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other
versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not contain
the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of
the quorum," which appears in the other versions.

Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no

need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite
the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the
transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of
this proceeding the word "approved" appears in the transcripts.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee

report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A.
No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House; that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that
"each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently,
violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend
that the certication of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is
false and spurious.

More specically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule
XVII, 103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference
committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked
for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the
presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112, 3 the Chair deliberately
ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat
Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97, 4 the
Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep.
Albano's motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of
Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109, 5 the Chair suspended
the session without rst ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a
point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should
have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996,
because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon
the resumption of the session.

Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996 and the bill certied by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent
petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and
asking for a reconsideration.

Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certication of the Speaker of
the House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Court's power
under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other
departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v .
Secretary of Finance, 6 which armed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view
of the changed membership of the Court.

The Solicitor General led a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition,

respondent De Venecia led a supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is
anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine.
They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules
of the House and that there is no justication for reconsidering the enrolled bill
doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by
each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in
the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as
that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all
events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240,
the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of
conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.

In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certication of

H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the
judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the
House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996,
shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved
the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was
approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding
that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This
case is therefore dismissed.

First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated
in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the
House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art.
VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by
some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. cdrep

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with,
this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, 10 the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support
claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from
interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of
invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there
was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In
Osmea v. Pendatun , 11 it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the
rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modication or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts
have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'
Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate
the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.'"

I n United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co. , 12 the rule was stated thus: "The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not
by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House,
and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a
dierent one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to
make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted . It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House , and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

I n Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere
formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary
legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when
exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a
determination of the propriety and eect of any action as it is taken by the body as
it proceeds in the exercise of any power , in the transaction of any business, or in the
performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution."

I n State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio
stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is
therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having made the
rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of
judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and
also by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared
invalid for noncompliance with rules."

I n State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared

itself as follows: "The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the
rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the
Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of
the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the
House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted
invasion of the independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside
such action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or
departed from its own rules of procedure."

I n McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that
an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two
houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure
upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and nal passage. The presumption is
conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the
legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or
the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will.
If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them."

Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes
of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be
passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an
emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of
the rule. Plainti was convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing
gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly
passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had
not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the
State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:

We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read

a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it
sees t, either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or
without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a
statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon
proposed measures. It receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and
it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly
weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty
manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature
thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule
which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no
reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed
by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the
governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on
account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern
its deliberations . McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan,
80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway
Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief
Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to
determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are
 subject to revocation, modication or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not
have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject,
however, to this qualication. Where the construction to be given to a rule
aects persons other than members of the legislative body the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved. 18

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this
Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House
than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation
of constitutional provisions is shown.

Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has
its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate
balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our
system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to
enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must
accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship

in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, "nothing
involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this
statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the
jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art.
VIII, 5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts
can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the eld of
foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating
to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political questions such
as those which arise in the eld of foreign relations. As we have already held, under
Art. VIII, 1, this Court's function is merely [to] check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a dierent view. In the absence of a showing . . .
[of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion
for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what
it thinks is apparent error. 21

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it
follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to
call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, 1 power.
prcd
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded."
They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter
declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and
ratication of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections
to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being none, approved." At the same
time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . .
Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.

Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's
motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have been
stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have been
taken. They say that the method used in this case is a legislator's nightmare
because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators
opposed the report.

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specically requires
that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the
Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the
other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a
unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference
committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991
and the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tari and Customs
Code were approved.

In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House.
The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer
became the ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of
the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a
precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the
procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and
after the debate, then the voting comes in.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I
wonder what his attitude is now on his point of order. I should just like to
state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules.
The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional
requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sucient. When
 the Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and
nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is approved on second
reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would
have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that the
House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance
here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it,
and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are
against. 22

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate and even more just. 23 The advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. 24
In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a
second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and
esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference
and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that
the institution be allowed to manage its own aairs precludes us from even
attempting a diagnosis of the problem." 25

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be
taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon
the last and third readings of a bill, 26 at the request of one-fth of the Members
present, 27 and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. 28 Indeed,
considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members
by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to
repeat the process.

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly
as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session.
29 It would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to
settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo
did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for
adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at
least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is
that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows:

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the
session adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday,
November 27, 1996.

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (Emphasis added)

This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its
approval except Rep. Lagman.

It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own

making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon,
petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to
 the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance,
a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence. 30 And even if
Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have
precedence and would have put an end to any further consideration of the
question. 31

Given this fact, it is dicult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing
the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House acted with
grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the
jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to
lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision,
the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, 1 extends to cases where "a branch of
the government or any of its ocials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction." 32

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the

House with which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not
that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was eectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for
lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence
of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially
when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of
the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the
sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to
be present on November 21, 1996, only the ve, i.e. petitioners in this case, are
questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198
was approved on that day. No one except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to
the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did not
participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and
Rep. Zamora objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was approved; while
it is said that, if voting had been conducted, Rep. Taada would have voted in favor
of the conference committee report. 37

Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker
of the House and the President of the Senate and the certication by the secretaries
of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive
of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion
of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there
is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we
"went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether
certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate. Cdpr
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the
certication of the presiding ocers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths
vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been
obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity
and is binding on the courts." 39 This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the
following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory:

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to
check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store
by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second
and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of
trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inecient Legislature, they should
turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and
mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with
competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reect credit upon the name of popular
government. 40

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the
President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the
conference committee:

[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of

bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation
that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill
which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases
would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government. 41

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42

In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise
than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with
approval by text writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on the
following considerations:

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by

Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and
having the ocial attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
 executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. 45

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive
teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the

rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three
new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the
enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ
.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their
places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima,
Panganiban, and Torres, J J .) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in
the membership of the Court.

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is conrmed
by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on
that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution. Art. VI, 16(4)
provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, aect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by
the Constitution to be recorded therein. 46 With respect to other matters, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded
conclusive eect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court spoke of the
imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the
most permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are required
to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the
faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at
some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As
already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence
its due enactment has been duly proven.

xxx xxx xxx

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for

this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks
the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in
the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can nd
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a
roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of
grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case 48 may
instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new
law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather
than disrespect is due the judgment of that body. 49 cdtech

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Regalado, J ., concurs in the result.

Bellosillo, J ., took no part due to relationship to parties.

Panganiban, J ., took no part; former counsel of a party.

Torres, Jr., J ., took no part; on leave during deliberations.

Separate Opinions
ROMERO, J ., concurring:

In ling this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not
backtracking from the dissent which I expressed in Tolentino v . Secretary of
Finance. 1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vote which I cast
today might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent
with, my firm stance in Tolentino.

The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a
similar challenge to the constitutionality of a signicant tax measure namely,
Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT)
Law. There, a number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were posed by
petitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At any
rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely disagree with each and every
argument of the opinion, most especially those touching upon substantive issues.
My main objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I
perceived was a substantial breach and disregard by the Legislature of vital
constitutional requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in the passage
of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly put to rest by
hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that the Court is
not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly
violated. 3 To me, the position then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence
to otherwise sound principles of law which did not, however, t the facts as
presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these
principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they were applied, or misapplied,
to a case which I believe did not call for their application. cdtai

When I diered from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I
was very careful to emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but
that its application must be limited to minor matters relating more to form and
factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law
itself. Thus:

"As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the
procedural irregularities that attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197
and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and printing requirements
which were exempted by the Presidential certication, may no longer be
impugned, having been 'saved' by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled
bill. I see no cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the
enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to the procedure
followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent
engrossment, printing errors , omission of words and phrases and similar
relatively minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do
not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself .

Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy,

since constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily mastered.
Procedural disputes are over facts whether or not the bill had enough
votes, or three readings, or whatever not over the meaning of the
constitution. Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a
court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that legislatures would
be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.

Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes

in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress ,
catching both legislators and the public unawares and altering the same
beyond recognition even by its sponsors .

This issue I wish to address forthwith." 4

As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement
of internal legislative rules, both the majority and I were actually of one mind such
that I was quick to qualify the extent of the Court's review power in respect of
internal procedures in this wise:

"I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution
which provides that '(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.' We are also guided by the principle that
 a court may interfere with the internal procedures of its coordinate branch
only to uphold the Constitution." 5

I diered, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this
respect, I showed that the introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report did not only violate the pertinent House and Senate
Rules dening the limited power of the conference committee but that the
Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill
was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review
would have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This the majority,
however, disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justied the
Court in questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.

At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid

reasons I cited in the Tolentino dissent. At the same time, I realize that the
arguments I raised in my dissent would not hold true in the instant petition.

For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of Representatives
allegedly violated by respondents in the instant petition are purely internal rules
designed for the orderly conduct of the House's business. They have no direct or
reasonable nexus to the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the
passage of a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention. Likewise,
the petitioners are not in any way complaining that substantial alterations have
been introduced in Republic Act No. 8240. The thrust of petitioners' arguments in
attacking the validity of the law is merely with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker
Arroyo was eectively prevented from invoking the question of quorum and not
that the substance thereof oends constitutional standards. This being the case, I do
not now feel called upon to invoke my previous argument that the enrolled bill
theory should not be conclusive as regards "substantive changes in a bill introduced
towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress," when it is palpably
unwarranted under the circumstances of instant petition.

PUNO, J ., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result. I do appreciate the ne legal disquisition of Mr. Justice

Mendoza to justify the dismissal of the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express
my views on the alleged non-justiciability of the issue posed by the petitioner as
well as the applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of what I perceive
as new wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987 Constitution and the winds
of changing time.

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power
if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against
the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a window to view the
issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court rst dened the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. 2 It held:

"xxx xxx xxx

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this
authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker,

the names of members sucient to make a quorum in the hall of the House
who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and
reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be
counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890) cdll

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the
Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a
quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition
place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration.
With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings . It may not by
its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights , and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that
some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a dierent one has been prescribed
and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which
once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly conrmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined
by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method has a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the
mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. 3 I n Smith, the meaning of
sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue, viz.:

"xxx xxx xxx

"3. When a nomination is conrmed or rejected, any Senator voting in

the majority may move for a reconsideration on the same day on which the
vote was taken, or on either of the next two days of actual executive
session of the Senate; but if a notication of the conrmation or rejection of
a nomination shall have been sent to the President before the expiration of
the time within which a motion to reconsider may be made, the motion to
reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to request the President to
return such notication to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on
a nomination may be laid on the table without prejudice to the nomination,
and shall be a final disposition of such motion.

4. Nominations conrmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be

returned by the Secretary to the President until the expiration of the time
limited for making a motion to reconsider the same, or while a motion to
reconsider is pending, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate."

It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal Power
Commission has been conrmed by the US Senate. The resolution of conrmation
was sent to the US President who then signed the appointment of Mr. Smith. The
Senate, however, reconsidered the conrmation of Mr. Smith and requested the
President to return its resolution of conrmation. The President refused. A petition
for quo warranto was led against Mr. Smith. The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised
jurisdiction although "the question primarily at issue relates to the construction of
the applicable rules, not to their constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected
the Senate interpretation of its own rules even while it held that it must be
accorded the most sympathetic consideration.
"xxx xxx xxx

"Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction

dierent from that adopted by the Senate itself when the present case was
under debate is a serious and delicate exercise of judicial power. The
Constitution commits to the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it
is not the function of the Court to say that another rule would be better. A
rule designed to ensure due deliberation in the performance of the vital
function of advising and consenting to nominations for public oce,
moreover, should receive from the Court the most sympathetic
consideration. But the reasons, above stated, against the Senate's
construction seem to us compelling. We are conrmed in the view we have
taken by the fact, since the attempted reconsideration of Smith's
conrmation, the Senate itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering
of immediate notication to the President as tantamount to authorizing him
to proceed to perfect the appointment.
 Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within the
test spelled out in Ballin.

Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoel v. United States. 4 Christoffel
testied before the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of
Representatives. He denied he was a communist and was charged with perjury in
the regular court. He adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had no
quorum when the perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was convicted
in view of the judge's charge to the members of the jury that to nd Christoel
guilty, they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

"xxx xxx xxx

". . . the defendant Christoel appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen

members of the said Committee, and that at least that number must have
been actually and physically present . . . If such a Committee so met, that is,
if thirteen members did meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of
March 1, 1947, and thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of
them left temporarily or otherwise and no question was raised as to the lack
of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not remain there would not
aect, for the purposes of this case, the existence of that Committee as a
competent tribunal provided that before the oath was administered and
before the testimony of the defendant was given there were present as
many as 13 members of that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon
session . . ."

Christoel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the jury to assume
there was a continuous quorum simply because it was present at the start of the
meeting of the Committee. Under the House rules, a quorum once established is
presumed to continue until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed
jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice Murphy, as
ponente, dened the issue as "what rules the House had established and whether
they have been followed." It held:
"xxx xxx xxx

"Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business is

of course none of our concern, and by the same token the considerations
which may lead Congress as a matter of legislative practice to treat as valid
the conduct of its committees do not control the issue before us. The
question is neither what rules Congress may establish for its own
governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity may protect the
validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather what rules the House
has established and whether they have been followed. It of course has the
power to dene what tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the
conditions that establish its competency to do so. The heart of this case is
that by the charge that was given it the jury was allowed to assume that the
conditions of competency were satised even though the basis in fact was
 not established and in face of a possible nding that the facts contradicted
the assumption. llcd

We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which dened it. As a

consequence of this conviction, petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment
for a term of from two to six years. An essential part of a procedure which
can be said fairly to inict such a punishment is that all the elements of the
crime charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of
the crime charged in the instant indictment is the presence of a competent
tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed the jury. The House insists
that to be such a tribunal a committee must consist of a quorum, and we
agree with the trial court's charge that to convict, the jury had to be satised
beyond a reasonable doubt that there were 'actually and physically present'
a majority of the committee.

Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satised by a nding that

there was a majority present two or three hours before the defendant
oered his testimony, in the face of evidence indicating the contrary, is to
rule as a matter of law that a quorum need not be present when the oense
is committed. This not only seems to us contrary to the rules and practice of
the Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is that he
be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of the crime charged
against him. A tribunal that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is
unthinkable that such a body can be the instrument of criminal conviction."

The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and practice that a
quorum once established is presumed to continue unless and until a point of no
quorum is raised. By this decision, the Court, in eect, invalidates that rule . . ." The
minority view commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.

The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of
Yellin v. United States. 5 Yellin was indicted on ve counts of willfully refusing to
answer questions put to him by a sub-committee of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities. He was convicted by the District Court of contempt of
Congress on four counts. The conviction was armed by the Court of Appeals for
the 7th Circuit. On certiorari, he assailed his conviction on the ground that the
Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in executive session . He
alleged there was a violation of Committee Rule IV which provides that "if a
majority of the Committee or sub-committee, duly appointed as provided by the
rules of the House of Representatives, believes that the interrogation of a
witness in a public hearing might endanger national security or unjustly injure
his reputation, or the reputation of other individuals, the Committee shall
interrogate such witness in an executive session for the purpose of determining
the necessity or admissibility of conducting such interrogation thereafter in a
public hearing." In a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, held:

"xxx xxx xxx

"Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial review when he
 discovers at trial that his rights have been violated. This is especially so when
the Committee's practice leads witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its
rules . When reading a copy of the Committee's rules, which must be
distributed to every witness under Rule XVII, the witness' reasonable
expectation is that the Committee actually does what it purports to do,
adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a defense based upon those rules,
simply because the witness was deceived by the Committee's appearance of
regularity, is not fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for
prosecution in Yellin's case meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that
the Committee be equally meticulous in obeying its own rules ."

It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary has pruned
the "political thicket." In the benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme
Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-apportionment of the
Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine, a tool for
maintenance of government order, will not be so applied as to promote only
disorder" and that "the courts cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona de
controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds
constitutional authority."

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to

categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up
abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally
cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not
granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed
from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted
this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law
where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the
misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of
the judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government.
In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke
the political question defense. Section 18 of Article VII completely eliminated this
defense when it provided:

"xxx xxx xxx

"The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding led by any

citizen, the suciency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and
must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend
 the privilege of the writ."

The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question defense in
national security cases. To a great degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect
other abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with the new
power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government ". . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction." In Tolentino v . Secretary of Finance , 7 I posited the
following postulates:

"xxx xxx xxx

"Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."

Former Chief Justice Roberto R . Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision in

the Constitutional Commission explained the sense and the reach of judicial
power as follows :

'xxx xxx xxx

'. . . In other words, the judiciary is the nal arbiter on the question of
whether or not a branch of government or any of its ocials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that

the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute political question.'

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a
mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
ocials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking
powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite
their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being
elected by the people.

It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg to disagree
for the view misses the signicant changes made in our constitutional
canvass to cure the legal deciencies we discovered during martial law. One
of the areas radically changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the
imbalance of power between and among the three great branches of our
government the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. To upgrade
the powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commission strengthened
some more the independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the
security of tenure of the members of the Judiciary by providing 'No law shall
be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of
tenure of its Members.' It also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.

More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the Judicial

and Bar Council which was tasked with screening the list of prospective
appointees to the judiciary. The power of conrming appointments to the
judiciary was also taken away from Congress. The President was likewise
given a specic time to ll up vacancies in the judiciary ninety (90) days
from the occurrence of the vacancy in case of the Supreme Court and
ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of recommendees by the
Judicial and Bar Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further
insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme
Court was given the power to 'appoint all ocials and employees of the
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.' And to make the
separation of the judiciary from the other branches of government more
watertight, it prohibited members of the judiciary to be '. . . designated to
any agency performing quasi judicial or administrative functions.' While the
Constitution strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the
powers of the two other branches of government, especially the Executive.
Notable of the powers of the President clipped by the Constitution is his
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law.
The exercise of this power is now subject to revocation by Congress.
Likewise, the suciency of the factual basis for the exercise of said power
may be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding led by any
citizen.
cdt

The provision dening judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of
justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of
the eorts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this
court vis-a-vis the other branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation,
dictated by our distinct experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary
but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions , this Court
 approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot
do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by nding out what it
should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn
duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to dene the
parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not
be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to
exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this
exceeding timidity to unsheath the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened
other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In
Tolentino, 8 I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation
should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence.
In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the
light and not the experience of foreigners.

II

Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied on the
enrolled bill doctrine to justify the dismissal of the petition at bar.

An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, nally enacted by both
Houses, signed by the proper ocers of each House and approved by the President. 9
It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding ocers, to the
President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due form the sanction of the
legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to
the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented
to him.

The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written Constitution

controlling the legislative branch of the government, and the acts of Parliament,
being regarded in their nature as judicial as emanating from the highest tribunal
in the land are placed on the same footing and regarded with the same
veneration as the judgment of the courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. 10
In England, the conclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale that "an act
of parliament thus made is the exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom
acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with,
suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the same authority of
parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it requires the same strength to dissolve as
to create an obligation. 11

Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some
jurisdictions have adopted the modied entry or armative contradiction rule.
Under this rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The
rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the
journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one
or more of the constitutional requirements. 12 Other jurisdictions have adopted the
Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence
that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however, can be
destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional
requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this purpose, journals and
other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received. 13 Some limit the use of
extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes. 14

These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the enrolled bill.
The modern rationale for the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, 15
viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

"The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the

President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an ocial
attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress.
It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding ocers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction
of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass
Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives
his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the ocial attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
judicial department to act upon the assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress , all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill
doctrine. The doctrine is also justied as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids
dicult questions of evidence. 16 It is also believed that it will prevent the ling of
too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the
legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the validity of every act published
as law is to be tested by examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two
houses of the legislature, there will be an amount of litigation, diculty, and painful
uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the
alleged uncertainty of the law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also
justied on the ground that journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to
mistake, if not fraud.

These justications for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in various
jurisdictions in the United States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance , and its companion cases, 18 Mr. Justice Regalado cited some of the
leading American cases which discussed the reasons for the withering, if not demise
of the enrolled bill theory, viz.:

"xxx xxx xxx

"Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of

validity originally attributed to that doctrine has long been revisited and
qualified, if not altogether rejected. On the competency of judicial inquiry, it
has been held that "(u)nder the 'enrolled bill rule'by which an enrolled bill is
sole expository of its contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and
valid enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to inquire as to
what prerequisites are xed by the Constitution of which journals of
respective houses of Legislature are required to furnish the evidence.

In fact, in Gwynn vs . Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of Florida

declared:

(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the
legislative oces and led with the secretary of state, is the bill as it passed,
yet this presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown from the
legislative journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed by
the legislative ocers , contains provisions that have not passed both
houses , such provisions will be held spurious and not a part of the law. As
was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber Co.,
51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:

'This Court is rmly committed to the holding that when the journals
speak they control, and against such proof the enrolled bill is not
conclusive.'

More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision

promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W
Auto Supply, et al. vs . Department of Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts
wherefrom are extensively reproduced hereunder.

. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a

long line of decisions of this court which created and nurtured the so-called
'enrolled bill' doctrine.

xxx xxx xxx

[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures

that the legislature must follow before a bill can be considered for nal
passage. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a court may
not look behind such a bill, enrolled and certied by the appropriate ocers,
to determine if there are any defects. cdta

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In Laerty, passage of the law in question violated this provision, yet the
bill was properly enrolled and approved by the governor. In declining to look
behind the law to determine the propriety of its enactment, the court
enunciated three reasons for adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court
was reluctant to scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal branch
of government. Second, reasons of convenience prevailed, which
discouraged requiring the legislature to preserve its records and anticipated
considerable complex litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court
acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of the General Assembly and
expressed a preference for accepting the nal bill as enrolled, rather than
opening up the records of the legislature. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of judicial
whim. There are four historical bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill
was a 'record' and, as such, was not subject to attack at common law. (2)
Since the legislature is one of the three branches of government, the courts,
being coequal, must indulge in every presumption that legislative acts are
valid. (3) When the rule was originally formulated, record-keeping of the
legislatures was so inadequate that a balancing of equities required that the
nal act, the enrolled bill, be given ecacy. (4) There were theories of
convenience as expressed by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.

The rule is not unanimous in the several states , however and it has not been
without its critics . From an examination of cases and treaties , we can
summarize the criticism as follows : (1) Articial presumptions , especially
conclusive ones , are not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the
present case) produces results which do not accord with facts or
constitutional provisions . (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery,
corruption and other wrongdoings . (4) Modern automatic and electronic
record-keeping devices now used by legislatures remove one of the original
reasons for the rule. (5) The rule disregards the primary obligation of the
courts to seek the truth and to provide a remedy for a wrong committed by
any branch of government. In light of these considerations , we are
convinced that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled bill doctrine.

[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare
decisis . The maxim is "Stare decisis et non quieta movere," which simply
suggests that we stand by precedents and to disturb settled points of law.
Yet, this rule is not inexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require
perpetuation of error or logic. As we stated in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287
Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941)."

The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be
decided and the extent of the disturbance of rights and practices
 which a change in the interpretation of the law or the course of judicial
opinions may create. Cogent considerations are whether there is clear
error and urgent reasons 'for neither justice nor wisdom requires a
court to go from one doubtful rule to another,' and whether or not the
evils of the principle that has been followed will be more injurious than
can possibly result from a change.'

Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on

facts , or upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has been discredited by
actual experience, it should be discarded, and with it the rule it
supports .

[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Laerty decision, the
poor record-keeping of the legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment
and technology are the rule in record-keeping by our General Assembly.
Tape recorders, electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording
equipment, printing presses, computers, electronic voting machines, and
the like remove all doubts and fears as to the ability of the General Assembly
to keep accurate and readily accessible records.

It is also apparent that the 'convenience' rule is not appropriate in today's

modern and developing judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and
complexity of lawsuits may increase is not persuasive if one is mindful that
the overriding purpose of our judicial system is to discover the truth and see
that justice is done. The existence of diculties and complexities should not
deter this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or presumption that so
provides .

Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches of
government requires that we shut our eyes to constitutional failing and
other errors of our copartners in government. We simply do not agree.
Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that any law contrary to
the constitution is 'void.' The proper exercise of judicial authority requires us
to recognize any law which is unconstitutional and to declare it void. Without
elaborating the point, we believe that under section 228 of the Kentucky
Constitution it is our obligation to 'support . . . the Constitution of the
commonwealth.' We are sworn to see that violations of the constitution
by any person, corporation, state agency or branch or government are
brought to light and corrected. To countenance an articial rule of law that
silences our voices when confronted with violations of our constitution is not
acceptable to this court.

We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor

Sutherland describes as the 'extrinsic evidence.' . . . Under this approach
there is a prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such
presumption may be overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence establishing that constitutional requirements have not been met.

We therefore overrule Laerty v . Human and all other cases following the
so-called enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that there is no longer a
conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill is valid. . . ."
Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable
respectability in United States. Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's, ". . .
the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption
rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of
validity which may be attacked by any authoritative source of information." 19

It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was
in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 20 that this Court, with three (3)
justices dissenting, rst embraced the rule that a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963, we
firmed up this ruling in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:

"xxx xxx xxx

"Hence, 'urea formaldehyde' is clearly a nished product which is patently

distinct and dierent from 'urea' and 'formaldehyde,' as separate articles
used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as 'urea
formaldehyde.' Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction 'and' between the term 'urea'
and 'formaldehyde,' and that the members of Congress intended to exempt
'urea' and 'formaldehyde' separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called 'urea formaldehyde,' not the
latter as a nished product, citing in support of this view the statements
made on the oor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before
said House, by members thereof. But said individual statements do not
necessarily reect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the
intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs.
Central Bank, 54 O Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs.
Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960]). Furthermore,
it is well settled that enrolled bill which uses the term 'urea formaldehyde'
instead of 'urea and formaldehyde' conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there
has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certied by the
ocers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot
speculate without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree." cdti

In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, 22 we reiterated our delity to the enrolled
bill doctrine, viz.:

". . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened .
The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we
act upon the faith and credit of what the ocers of the said branches attest
to as the ocial acts of their respective departments . Otherwise we would
be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine
 what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-making, with consequent
impairment of the integrity of the legislative process . The investigation which
the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress .
After all, House cleaning the immediate and imperative need for which
seems to be suggested by the petitioner can best be eected by the
occupants thereof . Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the
attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes."

Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill
doctrine. The ponencia stressed:
"By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as
holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure
there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be
entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be aected by a failure to have such matters entered on
the journal, is a question which we do not now decide. All we hold is that with
respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy."

In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the enrolled bill
doctrine when we refused to apply it after the Senate President declared his
signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled:

"xxx xxx xxx

"Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding oces of

Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by
the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized
in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on
the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarication that the invalidation
for his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved
by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater
respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the

certication made by the presiding ocers . It is merely a mode of
authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses , and the certication does not add to the validity
of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other
words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
ocers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill
passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the
President." In Brown vs . Morris , supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri,
interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same
"makes it clear that the indispensable step is the nal passage and it follows
that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding
officer, the proof that it has 'passed both houses' will satisfy the
constitutional requirement."
 Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues
that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been
validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would
not aect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act
No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It
would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation
and to the eect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry,
however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer,
and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is
there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a
case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary

record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risk of misprinting and other errors, the
point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether
the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same
text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specic facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate
journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the oor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed
by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking , but to declare that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do , as
indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when
they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error
committed and subsequently rectied by the President of the Senate and by
the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding
such rectication and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would
be to sacrice truth to ction and bring about mischievous consequences
not intended by the law-making body."

I n 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary rationale in the
case of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado. 24 In this case, the judges claimed that
the pertinent part of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing the franking privilege of
the judiciary appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In rejecting this
contention, this Court ruled:

"While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for

compromising dierences between the Senate and the House, it is not
limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described
thus:

'A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or
it may be limited to resolving the precise dierences between the two
houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in
its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with
which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results,
 results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the
rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction.
This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference
committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986
Ed., p. 81).'prcd

It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in

question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certication by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both
Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire
beyond the certication of the approval of a bill from the presiding ocers
of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule
that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that
have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the nal reading
of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court,
as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we
explained the reason thus:

'To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature
when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.'

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners'

charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its nal form
were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled
bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e.,
in accordance with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are
bound by such ocial assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy."

Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v . Secretary of Finance , et al and its
companion cases. 25 Involved in the case was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax Law. The majority 26 partly
relied on the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7716. It held:

"xxx xxx xxx

"Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic

Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest rm
adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of
its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a
 proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes
for its approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a statute
had been 'smuggled' in the printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us
to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government.
There is no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the 'enrolled bill' rule is absolute. In fact in one
case we 'went behind' an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine
whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in
view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the
enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in eect
there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of
bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation
that the Conference Committee 'surreptitiously' inserted provisions into a bill
which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the 'enrolled bill' rule in such cases
would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government."

These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold
that "no claim is here made that the enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit
that it is now time for the Court to make a denitive pronouncement that we no
longer give our unqualied support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are
compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is
appropriate only in England where it originated because in England there is no
written Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the
courts in the United States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the
enrolled bill in light of contemporary developments in lawmaking. 27 And more
important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our
Constitution, laws and rules. In Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old
Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in
embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has long been repealed by our
Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules will show that its section on conclusive
presumption does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled bill.
But this is not all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results in
the suppression of truth cannot be justied under the 1987 Constitution. The
Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live not only under a rule of law but
also under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national policy 29
requiring full public disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any
rule which will defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored. And to
implement these policies, this Court was given the power to pry open and to strike
down any act of any branch or instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the
enrolled bill for its ction of conclusiveness shuts o truth in many litigations. We
cannot dispense justice based on ction for the search for justice is the search for
truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of
correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth.

III

In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar
and that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not nd any
grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondents to justify granting
said petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the complaint
that petitioner was prevented from raising the question of quorum. The petition
does not concern violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it
involve the right of a non-member of the House which requires constitutional
protection. The rules on how to question the existence of a quorum are procedural
in character. They are malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House
enact laws. As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their
observance or non-observance is a matter of judgment call on the part of our
legislators and it is not the business of the Court to reverse this judgment when
untainted by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Davide, Jr., J ., concurs.

VITUG, J ., concurring:

When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power
under Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or
not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government, the Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed,
could not have been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome
responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of
discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence as, and conned to, a
capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of
discretion, like the patent disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect
the judgment of Congress under whose province the specic responsibility falls and
the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion
into the internal aairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of
government. At no time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers
of the fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure, from
the time-honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced, powers of the
three branches of government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old
rule and the new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial power." Now,
the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial
inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions provided, however,
that grave abuse of discretion the sole test of justiciability on purely political
issues is shown to have attended the contested act.
All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance and companion cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to
deny the instant petition. cdtai

Footnotes

1. JOURNAL No. 39, pp. 66, 68; Rollo, pp. 210, 212; Transcript of November 21,
1996 session, pp. 39-52; Rollo, pp. 368-381; Petition, p. 6. par. 10; Rollo, p. 8.

2. Rule VIII. 35. Voting. Every member present in the session shall vote on
every question put unless he inhibits himself on account of personal pecuniary
interest therein.

Rule XVII. 103. Manner of Voting . The Speaker shall rise to put a
question saying "As many as are in favor of (as the question may be), say Aye"
and, after the armative vote is counted, "As many as are opposed, say Nay . .
."

3. Rule XIX. 112. Reading and Withdrawal of Motions . The Speaker shall state
the motion or, if in writing, shall cause it to be read by the Secretary General
before being debated. A motion may be withdrawn any time before its approval.

4. Rule XVI. 97. Recognition of Member . When two or more members rise at
the same time, the Speaker shall recognize the Member who is to speak first.

5. Rule XX. 121. Definition. Questions of privilege are those aecting the
duties, conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation of the House or
of its members, collectively or individually.

122. Precedence. Subject to the ten-minute rule, questions of

privilege shall have precedence over all other questions, except a motion to
adjourn and a point of order.

Rule XXI. 123. Denition and Precedence. A privileged motion

pertains to a subject matter which, under the rules, takes precedence over
others.

The order of precedence of privileged motions is determined in each case

by the rules.

Rule XVIII. 109. Who May Vote; Procedure; Exceptions . When a bill,
report or motion is adopted or lost, a member who voted with the majority may
move for its reconsideration on the same or succeeding session day. The motion
shall take precedence over all other questions, except a motion to adjourn, a
question of privilege, and a point of order.

6. 235 SCRA 630 (1994).

7. Rollo, p. 228.

8. Id., p. 229.
9. Art. VI, 16(3).

10. E. g. , United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co ., 144 U.S. 1, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1862);
Exxon Corp. v. FTC , 589 F.2d 582 (1978); Murray v. Buchanan , 674 F.2d 14
(1982); Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n., 675 F.2d 1282 (1982).
See also Osmea v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).

11. 109 Phil. at 870-71. See also EVAT cases [ Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance ], 235
SCRA 630.

12. 144 U.S. at 5.36 L.Ed. at 324-25 (emphasis added).

13. 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) (emphasis added).

14. 124 Ohio St. 256, 177 N.E. 910, 911 (1931) (emphasis added).

15. 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 (1906) (emphasis added).

16. 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185, 186 (1891) (emphasis added).

17. 5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897) (emphasis added).

18. ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED 188-

189 (1977); Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58
(1971).

19. Petition, p. 25, quoting the sponsorship speech of former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, chairman of the Committee on Judiciary of the Constitutional
Commission, in 1 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session
of July 10, 1986).

20. Gonzales v. Macaraig , 191 SCRA 452 (1990); See Marcos v. Manglapus , 177
SCRA 668, 695 (1989); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).

21. Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives , 199 SCRA 692, 701
(1991); Llamas v. Orbos , 202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA
at 480-481 (emphasis added).

22. 4 CONG. REC. 413-414 (Feb. 15, 1957).

23. United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co ., 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25; State v.
Lewis , 186 S.E. 625, 630 (1936).

24. United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 76 L.Ed. 954 (1931).

25. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 549 (1985).

26. Art. VI, 26(2).

27. Id., 16(4).

28. Id., 27(1).

29. Id., p. 17; id., p. 19.

30. INOCENCIO PAREJA, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMENTED

AND ANNOTATED 331 (1963); REYNALDO FAJARDO, PRINCIPLES OF
PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE 157-158, 172-173 (1963).

31. Rule XIX, 13.

32. 1 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session of July 10,

1986).

33. ALICE STURGIS, STANDARD CODE OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE, 17 (1950).

34. PAUL MASON, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 335 (1953).

35. Conference Committee Report, Rollo, p. 36; Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.

36. Ibid.

37. Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.

38. Astorga v. Villegas , 56 SCRA 714 (1974).

39. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 12 (1947).

40. Id. at 17, quoting 4 JOHN WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE LAW ON EVIDENCE
1350 at 702 (1940). This excerpt is preserved in the Chadbourne edition of this
locus classicus . See 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 1350 at 834 (James H.
Chadbourne, ed. 1972).

41. EVAT cases [ Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance ], 235 SCRA at 672. Cf . Morales v.
Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969).

42. Philippine Judges Ass'n v. Prado , 227 SCRA 703, 710 (1993); Morales v. Subido ,
27 SCRA 131.

43. Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez , 7 SCRA 347 (1963); Resins, Inc.
v. Auditor General, 25 SCRA 754 (1968).

44. 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 1350 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972); 6 MANUEL

V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 115 (1980); 7 VICENTE J.
FRANCISCO, THE REVISED RULES OF COURT (Pt. II) 454 (1973).

45. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L.Ed. 294, 303 (1891).

46. The following are required to be entered on the Journal: (1) The yeas and nays on
the third and nal reading of a bill (Art. VI, 26(2)); (2) the yeas and nays on any
question, at the request of one-fth of the members present (Id., 16(4)); (3) the
yeas and nays upon repassing a bill over the President's veto (Id., 27(1); and (4)
the President's objection to a bill which he has vetoed. (Id.)
47. 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v. Smith , 44 Ohio 348
(1886).

48. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 529.

49. Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n., 675 F.2d 1282.

ROMERO, J ., concurring:

1. 235 SCRA 630.

2. Id., at p. 672: "Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of
Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest rm
adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its
provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed
constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval
had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a state had been 'smuggled' in
the printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings
of a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now to depart from
this rule.

No claim is here made that the 'enrolled bill' rule is absolute. In fact in one
case we 'went behind' an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine
whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view
of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled
bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in eect there was no
longer an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of
bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee 'surreptitiously' inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the
bill. To disregard the 'enrolled bill' rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government."

3. Id., at p. 675: "Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement
of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, 'parliamentary
rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern.' Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for
the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are
satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these cases."

4. Id., pp. 778-779; emphasis supplied.

5. Id., p. 780; emphasis supplied; compare to note 3, supra.

PUNO, J ., concurring and dissenting:

1. 144 US 1 (1891).

2. The case involved the validity of a law which allegedly was passed in violation of
House Rule XV which provided that members present in the chamber but not
 voting would be "counted and announced in determining the presence of a
quorum to do business."

3. 286 US 6 (1932).

4. 338 US 89 (1948).

5. 374 US 109 (1963).

6. 369 US 186 (1962); see also Bond vs. Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966).

7. 235 SCRA 630.

8. Supra.

9. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Rev. ed., p. 624.

10. Price v. Moundsville, 64 Am. St. Rep. 878, 879; 43 W. Virginia 523 [1897].

11. Carr v. Coke , 47 Am. St. Rep. 801, 803 [1895]; see also Note on ex rel. Reed v.
Jones , 23 L.R.A. 211 [1893]. The rule of conclusiveness is similar to the common
law rule of the inviolability of the Sheri's return. The Sheri is considered as an
ocer of the King just as a parliamentary act is deemed as a regal act and no
ocial can dispute the King's word. Dallas, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory
Construction, Vol. 1, 4th ed., pp. 408-418 (1972).

12. Sutherland, op cit., p. 410.

13. Sutherland, Vol. I, Section 1405 (3rd ed., 1943).

14. See e.g., Mogilner v. Metropolitan Plan Communication, 236 Ind. 298, 140 N.E. 2d
220 [1957].

15. Op. cit, footnote No. 2.

16. 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, S. 150 (1938) 4 J. Wigmore Evidence, S. 1350 (3rd ed.
1940)

17. 63 Miss 512 (1886).

18. Op cit, pp. 729-732 (1994).

19. Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 224-225.

20. 78 Phil. 1 (1947).

21. 7 SCRA 374.

22. 27 SCRA 131, 134-135.

23. 56 SCRA 714.

24. 227 SCRA 703.

25. Supra.

26. Justices Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno dissented.

27. See writer's dissenting opinion in Tolentino, supra, p. 818.

28. Op cit.

29. Section 28 of Article II of the Constitution.