UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES UNION - KILUSANG MAYO UNO (UFE-

DFA-KMU) v. NESTL PHILIPPINES INCORPORATED

FACTS:
As the CBA between Nestl and UFE-DFA-KMU, the Presidents of the Alabang & Cabuyao Divisions of the union, through
a Letter of Intent, informed Nestl of their intent to open Collective Bargaining Negotiation for 2001-2004. Nestl
acknowledged receipt and informed the union that it was preparing its own counter-proposal and proposed ground rules to
govern the conduct of CB Negotiations. It later underscored the position that "unilateral grants, one-time company grants,
company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight
Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall
be excluded therefrom." The Cabuyao Division later became the sole bargaining unit involved in negotiations with the
closure of the Alabang Plant.

Nestl, claiming to have reached impasse in dialogue, requested NCMB to conduct preventive mediation proceedings;
despite 15 meetings, however, the parties failed to reach any agreement on the proposed CBA. Conciliation proceedings
proved ineffective. UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice of Strike complaining of bargaining deadlock (on economic issues). It
later filed another Notice of Strike predicated on Nestl's alleged ULP (bargaining in bad faith --> setting pre-conditions
in the ground rules by refusing to include issue of Retirement Plan in the CBA negotiations) A strike vote conducted was
met with overwhelming approval.

Nestl filed with DOLE a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction, pursuant to LC 263 (g), effectively enjoying any
impending strike.

SOLE Sto. Tomas ordered any strike or lockout to be enjoined and the parties to cease and desist from committing any
act that might lead to the further deterioration of the current labor relations situation. The parties were further directed to
meet and convene for the discussion of the union proposals and company counter-proposals before the NCMB. MR filed
by UFE denied.

Despite SOLE Order, the union went on strike. SOLE issued an order directing (1) the members of UFE-DFA-KMU to
return-to-work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of such Order; (2) Nestl to accept back all returning workers
under the same terms and conditions existing preceding to the strike; (3) both parties to cease and desist from committing
acts inimical to the on-going conciliation proceedings leading to the further deterioration of the situation; and (4) the
submission of their respective position papers within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. But notwithstanding the Return-to-
Work Order, UFE continued with their strike, prompting SoLE to seek the assistance of the PNP for the enforcement of
said order.

Members still continued with their strike and refused to go back to work as instructed --> SOLE sought assistance of PNP
for enforcement of the order

CA: ordered the retirement plan was a unilateral grant and not a mandatory subject for bargaining and affirmed the
dismissal of ULP charges against Nestl.

ISSUES + RULING:
1) W/N the Retirement Plan was a proper subject to be included in CBA negotiations
YES. SC upheld UFE's contention, saying that there is nothing in either of the documents that prove that it agreed to treat
the Retirement Plan as a unilateral grant of the company which is outside the scope of the CBA. In a similar case
involving the same parties, the Court had occasion to rule that a retirement plan is consensual in nature. "The fact that the
retirement plan is non-contributory does not make it a non-issue in the CBA negotiations. Since the retirement plan has
been an integral part of the CBA since 1972, the Union's demand to increase the benefits due the EEs under said plan is
a valid CBA issue."

Here, as this benefit was already subject of the existing CBA, the members of UFE were only exercising their prerogrative
to bargain or renegotiate for the improvement of the terms of the Retirement Plan just like they would for all the other
economic & non-economic benefits previously enjoyed by them. Precisely, the purpose of collective bargaining is the
acquisition or attainment of the best possible covenants or terms relating to economic & non-economic benefits granted
by ERs due to EEs. LC has imposed a mutual obligation on both parties to bragain collectively (LC 252 & 253)

2) W/N assumption of powers of SOLE should have been limited merely to grounds alleged in the Second Notice
of Strike
NO. SOLE's assumption of jurisdiction power necessarily includes matters incidental to the labor dispute, that is, issues
that are necessarily involved in the dispute itself, not just to those ascribed in the Notice of Strike, or otherwise submitted
to him for resolution. Accordingly, even if not exactly on the ground upon which the Notice of Strike is based, the fact that
the issue is incidental to the resolution of the subject labor dispute or that a specific issue had been submitted to SOLE for
her resolution, validly empowers the latter to take cognizance of and resolve the same. In any event, the query as to W/N
the Retirement Plan is to be included in the CBA Negotiations between the parties ineluctably dictates upon SOLE to go
into the substantive matter of CBA negotiations.

3) W/N Nestl is guilty of ULP (setting a pre-condition to bargaining)

UFE-DFA-KMU: Refusal to bargain on a very important CBA economic provision constitutes unfair labor practice.
Respondent Nestl Phils., Inc. insisted that the Union should first agree that the retirement plan is not a bargaining issue
before respondent Nestl would agree to discuss other issues in the CBA.

SC: NO ULP.

The purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract binding on the parties; but the
failure to reach an agreement after negotiations have continued for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of good
faith. The statutes invite and contemplate a collective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to
bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.

The crucial question, therefore, of whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns
on the facts of the individual case. As we have said, there is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or
bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. To some degree, the question of good faith may be a question of
credibility. The effect of an employers or a unions individual actions is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the
impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole, and the inferences fairly drawn therefrom collectively may
offer a basis for the finding of the NLRC.

For a charge of ULP to prosper, it must be shown that Nestl was motivated by ill will, bad faith, or fraud, or was
oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social
humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted x x x in disclaiming unilateral grants as proper subjects in their
collective bargaining negotiations. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the employees to
bargain collectively with each other, such compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or
agree to the proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties should approach the negotiation with an
open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement.

In the case at bar, Nestle never refused to bargain collectively with UFE-DFA-KMU. The corporation simply wanted to
exclude the Retirement Plan from the issues to be taken up during CBA negotiations, on the postulation that such was in
the nature of a unilaterally granted benefit. An employers steadfast insistence to exclude a particular substantive
provision is no different from a bargaining representatives perseverance to include one that they deem of absolute
necessity. Indeed, an adamant insistence on a bargaining position to the point where the negotiations reach an impasse
does not establish bad faith.

By imputing bad faith unto the actuations of Nestl, it was UFE, therefore, who had the burden of proof to present
substantial evidence to support the allegation of ULP. The allegations & arguments raised readily show that they failed to
discharge this onus probandi as there is still a need for presentation of evidence other than its bare contention of ULP. It is
not enough that the union believed that ER committed acts of ULP when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima
facie showing to warrant such a belief.

Though Nestl underscored its position that "unilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies and
programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay
Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom,"
such attitude is not tantamount to refusal to bargain viewed in light of the fact that 8 out 9 BUs have allegedly agreed to
treat the Retirement Plan as a unilateral grant. Nestl, therefore, cannot be faulted for considering the same benefit as
unilaterally granted.

Construing arguendo that the content of the aforequoted letter of 29 May 2001 laid down a precondition to its agreement
to bargain with UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestls inclusion in its Position Paper of its proposals affecting other matters covered by
the CBA contradicts the claim of refusal to bargain or bargaining in bad faith. Accordingly, since UFE-DFA-KMU failed to
proffer substantial evidence that would overcome the legal presumption of good faith on the part of Nestl, the award of
moral and exemplary damages is unavailing.